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{{#Wiki_filter:HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 76. Given the following:  
{{#Wiki_filter:HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC Written Written Exam Exam Given the
-The plant is operating at 100% RTP. -All control systems are in their normal alignments, with the exception of PC-444J, PZR PRESSURE which is in MANUAL. -PC-444J is in MANUAL due to erratic control when in AUTO. -The output of PC-444J drifts down to 20-25%. AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE. Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on RCS pressure and the procedure used to mitigate the transient?
: 76. Given
A. RCS Pressure increases.
: 76.        the following:
Enter AOP-019. B. RCS Pressure increases.
following:
Enter AOP-025. C. RCS Pressure decreases.
        - The
Enter AOP-019. D. RCS Pressure decreases.
        -       plant isis operating The plant       operating at  at 100%     RTP.
Enter AOP-025. 76 000008 G2.4.11 OOllPZR VAPOR SPACE ACCI/l/l/4.0/4.2/SRO/HIGH/43.S/RNP AUDIT -2007/AOP-019-002 Given the following:  
100% RTP.
-The plant is operating at 100% RTP. -All control systems are in their normal alignments, with the exception of PC-444J, PZR PRESSURE which is in MANUAL. -PC-444J is in MANUAL due to erratic control when in AUTO. -The output of PC-444J drifts down to 20-25%. AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE. Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on RCS pressure and the procedure used to mitigate the transient?
All control
A'I RCS Pressure increases.
        - All
Enter AOP-019. B. RCS Pressure increases.
        -    control systems systems areare in    their normal in their normal alignments, alignments, with with the the exception exception of of PC-444J, PC-444J, PZR PZR PRESSURE which PRESSURE         which isis in  MANUAL.
Enter AOP-025. C. RCS Pressure decreases.
in MANUAL.
Enter AOP-019. D. RCS Pressure decreases.
PC-444J is
Enter AOP-025. The correct answer is A. A: Correct -As PC-444J output is reduced, it is calling for pressure to be raised. Pressure will rise as heaters turn ON and spray valves CLOSE. Malfunction is on the controller (NOT the instrument), AOP-019 should be used. B: Incorrect  
        - PC-444J
-Transient direction is correct, but mitigating procedure is incorrect. (AOP-025 is for instrument failures)
        -            is in in MANUAL MANUAL due    due to to erratic erratic control control when when in in AUTO.
C: Incorrect  
AUTO.
-Pressure transient direction is incorrect, procedure is correct. 0: Incorrect  
The output
-BOTH transient direction and procedure are incorrect.
        - The
Exam Question Number: 76  
        -      output of of PC-444J PC-444J driftsdrifts down down to to 20-25%.
20-25%.
MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL.
AOP-019, MALFUNCTION                                           CONTROL.
AOP-025, RTGB RTGB INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT FAILURE. FAILURE.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on RCS pressure and the procedure used to mitigate the transient?
A. RCS Pressure increases. Enter AOP-019.       AOP-01 9.
B. RCS Pressure increases. Enter AOP-025.
C. RCS Pressure decreases. Enter AOP-019.
D. RCS Pressure decreases. Enter AOP-025.
76 76
 
000008 G2.4.11 000008   G2.4. 11 OOllPZR 001/PZR VAPOR VAPOR SPACESPACE ACCI/l/l/4.0/4.2/SRO/HIGH/43.S/RNP ACCII1!l/4.0/4.2/SROIHIGHI43.5/RNP AUDIT AUDIT - 2007/AOP-019-002
                                                                                              - 20071A0P-019-002 Given the following:
Given The plant
    - The
    -        plant is is operating operating at at 100%
100% RTP.
RTP.
All control
    - All
    -                systems are control systems     are in in their their normal normal alignments, alignments, with with the the exception exception of of PC-444J, PC-444J, PZR PZR PRESSURE which is PRESSURE                  is in in MANUAL.
MANUAL.
PC-444J is
    - PC-444J
    -              is in in MANUAL MANUAL due    due to erratic erratic control control when in in AUTO.
    - The output of
    -                of PC-444J PC-444J drifts down down to 20-25%.
AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS                RCS PRESSURE CONTROL.
AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENTfNSTRUMENT FAILURE. FAILURE.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on RCS pressure and the procedure used to mitigate the transient?
A RCS Pressure increases. Enter AOP-019.
A'I                                              AOP-01 9.
B. RCS Pressure increases. Enter AOP-025.
C. RCS Pressure decreases. Enter AOP-019.       AOP-01 9.
D. RCSRC5 Pressure decreases. Enter AOP-025.
The correct answer is A.
A: Correct - -    As PC-444J output is reduced, it is calling for pressure to be raised. Pressure will rise as heaters turn ON and spray valves CLOSE. Malfunction is on the controller (NOT the instrument), AOP-01    AOP-019 9 should be used.
B: Incorrect - Transient direction is correct, but mitigating procedure is incorrect. (AOP-025 is for instrument failures)
C: Incorrect - Pressure transient direction is incorrect, procedure is correct.
D:
0: Incorrect Incorrect - BOTH
                -   BOTH transient direction and      and procedure areare incorrect.
incorrect.
Exam Question Number: 76


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
AOP-019, AOP-019, PagesPages 3-4;3-4; SD-059, SO-059, Page Page 17, 17, Figures Figures 66 and and 7, 7, AOP-025, AOP-025, Page Page 3.
3.
KA KA Statement:
Statement: Knowledge Knowledge of    of abnormal abnormal condition condition procedures.
procedures.
History:
History: Modified Modified from RNP RNP bank        changed stem bank - changed
                                            -            stem toto make make A A correct SRO SRO - Required
      - Required to  to assess assess conditions conditions and and select select appropriate appropriate procedure.
Qprocedure.
KA Name:
KAName:            PZR V PZR  VAPOR  SPACE ACCI AFOR SPACE  ACCI Tier/Group:
Tier/Group:        1/1 111 Importance Rating:
Importance Rating: 4.0/4.2 4.0/4.2                  RO/SRO Level:
RO/SRO  Level:    SRO SRO Cognitive Level:
Cognitive Level:  HIGH HIGH                    10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43  link:  43.5 43.5 Source:
Source:            RNP AUDIT RNP  AUDIT - 2007
                                - 2007      Learning Objective:
Learning Objective: AOP-019-002 AOP-019-002
Rev.
Rev. 13 13 AOP-019 AOP-019              MALFUNCTION MALFUNCTION OF OF RCS RCS PRESSURE PRESSURE CONTROL CONTROL Page Page 33 of of 17 17 Purpose Purpose and and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)
1.
: 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This This procedure provides instructions instructions in in the event event RCS RCS pressure isis higher ORQ. lower than required for for current current plant conditions.
conditions.
This procedure is applicable in Modes 1, 2, and 3.
: 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS This procedure may be entered when RCS      pressure deviates from the desired control band due to aa fault in    pressure control components. (AOP-025 covers Instrument    Failure)
                                        - END -
Ai      , i.*    s,, C    2 AlL /
                                                                                      ,/
1_i i/j zJ 7 9>        c)
                                /.__t  7                                ,
                                                  -;2 z,w,1
Rev.
Rev. 13 13 AOP-019                                            CONTROL MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL Page 44 of 17 17 STEP H          INSTRUCTIONS I          RESPONSE NOT RESPONSE  NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
NOTE Steps 1 and 22 are Immediate Action steps.
* 1.
* Determine If PZR PORVs Should Be Closed:
: a. Check PZR pressure - LESS
                                -              a. Verify OPEN at least one PZR THAN 2335 PSIG                        PORV and associated PORV BLOCK Valve:
* PCV-455C AND 2 RC-536 OR
* PCV-456 AND RC-535 WHEN RCS pressure is less than 2335 psig, THEN perform Step Lb.
l.b.
Go To Step 2.
: b. Verify Both PZR PORVs - CLOSED
                                  -          b. IF any PZR PORV can NOT  Qff be closed, THEN close its PORV BLOCK Valve.
: 2. Control The PZR SPRAY VALVES AND PZR Heaters To Restore RCS Pressure To The Desired Control Band
  ** 3. Check PZR Pressure - UNDER
                            -                IF PZR Pressure approaches a I
OPERATOR CONTROL                      Reactor Trip Setpoint, THEN trip the Reactor and Go To Path-1.
Path-l.
* Low PZR Pressure - 1844 psig
* High PZR Pressure - 2376 psig
                                              **  OT~T OTT    - Variable (TR-412)
                                                          -          (TR-4l2)
SD-059 SD-059                                                                          PRESSURIZER PRESSURIZER SYSTEM  SYSTEM 5.1.1 PZR 5.1.1  PZR Pressure Pressure Control    (PZR-Figure 66 && PZR-Figure Control (PZR-Figure                PZR-Figure 7) 7)
Pressure control Pressure    control is is accomplished accomplished via  via pressure pressure controller controller PC-444A PC-444A which which isis aa Proportional Proportional
      ++ Integral Integral controller; controller; the the Derivative Derivative section section has has been been defeated.
defeated. This This means means the the controller controller develops an develops    an output output signal    that is signal that  is determined determined by by how how far far pressure is is from from setpoint setpoint (Proportional) and (Proportional)    and how    long the pressure how long          pressure hashas been away away from from setpoint setpoint (Integral).
(Integral).
PT-444 PT  -444 sends a pressure signal to PC-444A which is compared to the pressure setpoint PC-444J which is controlled on the RTGB. PC-444J is a Hagan Manual-developed by PC:-444J Auto station with a 10  10 turn pot capable of developing a control setpoint over the entire pressure range of PT  PT-444.
                                -444. PTPT-444
                                            -444 ranges from 2500 to 1700  1700 psig therefore PC-444J is capable of 800 psi range of control. For Example if the operator desires the controller to maintain normal pressure of 2235 psig the pot setting would be determined as follows:
2235 - 1700 ** 10 == 6.69 on the 10 turn pot.
800 PC-4441 (setpoint signal) is sent to PC-444A to be compared to the actual The output of PC-444J pressure. PC-444A has a gain of 2 which effectively cuts in half the range of control of PZR pressure to 400 psi around the setpoint determined by PC-444J. The controller output is then directed to the proportional heaters, spray valves via controllers PC-444C and PC-              PC 444D, backup heaters, PZR PORV 456 and PI-458          P1-458 and is displayed on the meter on PC-4441 444J The components operated by PC-444A operate at a fixed deviation from setpoint or controller output as observed on the meter on PC-4441,  PC-444J, no matter what setpoint is dialed in on PC-444J. For example the backup heaters are set to turn on 25 psi below set pressure.
If set pressure is 2235 psig, their setpoint would be 2210 psig and the control output when they came on would be as follows:
2210-2035            =
                                                      =      .4375 or 43.75% demand 400 If the pot on PC-444J were then set at 6.25 this would give a set pressure of 2200 psig.
If When the output of PC-444A PC-444A was at 43.75% the backup heaters would come on, pressure would be 2175 psig; 25 psi below set pressure. The setpoints normally listed for heater, spray, and PCV-456 PCV-456 setpoints are based on a set pressure of 2235 psig where PC-4441          PC-444J is normally set.
As stated stated before, PC-444A PC-444A is  is a Proportional +  + Integral controller, therefore controller output may not correspond exactly to the pressure monitored  monitored by the operator.
operator. If  If pressure pressure is away from setpoint for an extended extended period of time the controller output may saturate  satunite while increasing increasing its output trying to return pressure to setpoint.
setpoint.
PZR PZR                                        Page Page 17 of 27 17 of 27                                            Revision 99 Revision INFORMAT INFORMATION                ION USE ONLY
PRES  SURE CONTROLLER PRESSURE      CONTROLLER PZR-FIGURE-6 PZR-FIGURE-6 PZR Press PZR    Press Lo Press La  Press (213)
(2/3)
        <  2000 psiu
        <2000      psiO PZR Press PZR  Press Channel 445 Channel  445 PZR Press Channel 444 Adjustable Press
                                                            }~.--  Re'erence Setpoint Satpoint
                                                , .....;.. .      Normal 2236 PZR Control HilLo Press Manual                            2310/2185 L-(!)                  'I 2336 PZR Press ControBer Controller PCV-455C        PCV-4S6                    Hi  Output BUH', on I-li Output PCV-453C        PCV-456 2310 2310        2210 Spray Spray Proportional Proportonat Valva  Valve Heaters Helter.
I pzrfoa pzrfO8 I INFORMATION INFORMATION USE            USE ONLY ONLY
PC-444A CONTROLLER PC-444A                      CONTROLLER PZR-FIGURE-7 PZR-FIGURE-7
-2500--
PC+44J P0444J smolm SETPOINT 243m.
)?j/~ \.                                                                        2235-170Q535 2235-1700      .. 535
  'i:l3fff ' ,,
535/800    ...669 535/B0Q.66Q W!.#4." "
203~            I                                                              .660 X
                                                                                .669 6.69 TO 6.119 X 10  TURN POT=
10 TURN    POT=
MAINTAIN 2235 TO MAINTAIN    2235 I
I
                        ,I
                          \
I
                              \
1700 1700--                        \
                                  \
                                    \
                                      \
                                        \          2035 - 2435 (pC444J@6.fi9) 1__ ( 400 POUND RANGE)                      :                  I I - - -_ _              L_----I-T---~
CONTROL Hill.
MODULATION ON 43.75%
ON-43.75%
  -                        ON -46.25% -  46.25%          OPEN - 66.75%
OPEN-Sl.75%          70%                  75%
OFF -4625%
OFF-46.25%                  OFF -53.75%
OFF-5l.75%                            - 66.25%
CLOSED - 56.25%
OETERMINAT1ON PETERMINATION OF EXPECTED COHTROti.R      CONTROlLER OUTPUT
: 1. Btu flU HEATERS --ON              ON  =2210                      3. PCV-4S5C PCV-455C OPENS",
OPENS = 2335 2210-2035 .. 175                                                  2335-2035 ..x 300 300 175/400 '" .4375 OR 43.75%                                        300/400 300/400 = ....75 75 OR 75%
Z. SPRAY VALVE OPENING
: 2.                                            2260 OpENING'" 2250 2260-2035 .. 225 2260-2035 5625 OR 225/400 -**.5625            OR S&15%56.2S%
pzrf09 INFORMAT INFORMATION                                  ION USE ONLY
Rev.
Rev. 10 10 AOP-025 AOP-025                        RTGB RTGB INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT FAILURE FAILURE Page 33 of Page    of 27 27 Purpose &
Purpose  & Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)
1.
: 1.      PURPOSE PURPOSE ThisThis procedure procedure provides provides instructions instructions for for failure failure of of process process variable transmitters variable      transmitters which which provide    input iEo RTGB provide input'to    RTGB controllers.
controllers.
IF
: j. an      applicable transmitter an applicable  transmitter fails fails while while the the controller controller is is operating operating in  in manual manual OR is is being being fed fed from from an an alternate alternate channel.
channel, THENTHEN entry entry to to this procedure is  is NOT required.
This procedure is applicable in Modes 1.        1, 2.
2, 3.
3, and 4.
: 2.            CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS Failure of any process variable transmitter which affects Failure automatic operation of RTGB controllers with the following exceptions:
exceptions:
        **    FT-6O5, RHR Flow FT-605.
      **    LT-1l5, LT-115. VCT Level
        **    LT-ll2, LT-112. VCT Level
        **  PR PR NIS (NI-4l.        43. && 44)
: 42. 43, (NI-41. 42,
                                            - END -


AOP-019, Pages 3-4; SO-059, Page 17, Figures 6 and 7, AOP-025, Page 3. KA Statement:
QUESTIONS REPORT for 2007 ROBINSON - REV FINAL
Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.
                    >'3034 034
History: Modified from RNP bank -changed stem to make A correct SRO -Required to assess conditions and select appropriate procedure.
              .i     ,,__ c'
KAName: PZR V AFOR SPACE ACCI Tier/Group:
        \.Allel'tthe following:                                                         q4
111 Importance Rating: 4.0/4.2 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH lOCFR55.43 link: 43.5 Source: RNP AUDIT -2007 Learning Objective:
AOP-019-002 Rev. 13 AOP-019 MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL Page 3 of Purpose and Entry Conditions (Page 1 of 1) 1. PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions in the event RCS pressure is higher OR lower than required for current plant conditions.
This procedure is applicable in Modes 1, 2, and 3. 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS This procedure may be entered when RCS pressure deviates from the desired control band due to a fault in pressure control components. (AOP-025 covers Instrument Failure) -END -17 Rev. 13 AOP-019 MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL Page 4 of 17 INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Steps 1 and 2 are Immediate Action steps.
* 1. Determine If PZR PORVs Should Be Closed: a. Check PZR pressure -LESS THAN 2335 PSIG b. Verify Both PZR PORVs -CLOSED 2. Control The PZR SPRAY VALVES AND PZR Heaters To Restore RCS Pressure To The Desired Control Band
* 3. Check PZR Pressure -UNDER OPERATOR CONTROL a. Verify OPEN at least one PZR PORV and associated PORV BLOCK Valve:
* PCV-455C AND RC-536
* PCV-456 AND RC-535 WHEN RCS pressure is less than 2335 psig, THEN perform Step Lb. Go To Step 2. b. IF any PZR PORV can NOT be closed, THEN close its PORV BLOCK Valve. IF PZR Pressure approaches a Reactor Trip Setpoint, THEN trip the Reactor and Go To Path-1.
* Low PZR Pressure -1844 psig
* High PZR Pressure -2376 psig *
-Variable (TR-412)
SD-059 PRESSURIZER SYSTEM 5.1.1 PZR Pressure Control (PZR-Figure 6 & PZR-Figure
: 7) PZR Pressure control is accomplished via pressure controller PC-444A which is a Proportional
+ Integral controller; the Derivative section has been defeated.
This means the controller develops an output signal that is determined by how far pressure is from setpoint (Proportional) and how long the pressure has been away from setpoint (Integral).
PT -444 sends a pressure signal to PC-444A which is compared to the pressure setpoint developed by PC:-444J which is controlled on the RTGB. PC-444J is a Hagan Auto station with a 10 turn pot capable of developing a control setpoint over the entire pressure range of PT -444. PT -444 ranges from 2500 to 1700 psig therefore PC-444J is capable of 800 psi range of control. For Example if the operator desires the controller to maintain normal pressure of 2235 psig the pot setting would be determined as follows: 2235 -1700
* 10 = 6.69 on the 10 turn pot. 800 The output of PC-444J (setpoint signal) is sent to PC-444A to be compared to the actual pressure.
PC-444A has a gain of 2 which effectively cuts in half the range of control of PZR pressure to 400 psi around the setpoint determined by PC-444J. The controller output is then directed to the proportional heaters, spray valves via controllers PC-444C and PC-444D, backup heaters, PZR PORV 456 and PI-458 and is displayed on the meter on PC-444J The components operated by PC-444A operate at a fixed deviation from setpoint or controller output as observed on the meter on PC-444J, no matter what setpoint is dialed in on PC-444J. For example the backup heaters are set to turn on 25 psi below set pressure.
If set pressure is 2235 psig, their setpoint would be 2210 psig and the control output when they came on would be as follows: 2210-2035 400 = .4375 or 43.75% demand If the pot on PC-444J were then set at 6.25 this would give a set pressure of 2200 psig. When the output of PC-444A was at 43.75% the backup heaters would come on, pressure would be 2175 psig; 25 psi below set pressure.
The setpoints normally listed for heater, spray, and PCV -456 setpoints are based on a set pressure of 2235 psig where PC-444J is normally set. As stated before, PC-444A is a Proportional
+ Integral controller, therefore controller output may not correspond exactly to the pressure monitored by the operator.
If pressure is away from setpoint for an extended period of time the controller output may satunite while increasing its output trying to return pressure to setpoint.
Page 17 of 27 Revision 9 INFORMATION USE ONLY Manual PZR Press Lo Press (2/3) < 2000 psiO PCV-455C PCV-4S6 PRESSURE CONTROLLER PZR -FIGURE-6 PZR Press Channel 445 PZR Control HilLo Press 2310/2185 PZR Press Channel 444 Adjustable Press Re'erence Satpoint , ..... ;.. . Normal 2236 L-(!) 'I 2336 PZR Press Controller Hi Output BUH', on 2310 2210 Spray Proportional Valva Helter. INFORMATION USE ONLY Spray Valve I pzrfoa I PC-444A CONTROLLER PZR-FIGURE-7 243m.
\. 'i:l3fff ' , W!.#4." "
I I I , I \ I \ 1700--\ \ \ \ PC+44J smolm 2235-1700
.. 535 535/800 ... 669 .669 X 10 TURN POT= 6.119 TO MAINTAIN 2235 \ 2035 -2435 (pC444J@6.fi9) 1 __ ( 400 POUND RANGE) : I ON-43.75%
OFF-46.25%
ON -46.25% OFF-5l.75%
I---__
OPEN-Sl.75%
70% 75% CLOSED -56.25% PETERMINATION OF EXPECTED CONTROlLER OUTPUT 1. Btu HEATERS -ON = 2210 3. PCV-4S5C OPENS", 2335 2210-2035
.. 175 2335-2035
.. 300 175/400 '" .4375 OR 43.75% 300/400 ... 75 OR 75% Z. SPRAY VALVE OpENING'" 2260 2260-2035
.. 225 225/400 ** 5625 OR 56.2S% INFORMATION USE ONLY pzrf09 Rev. AOP-025 RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE Page Purpose & Entry Conditions (Page 1 of 1) 1. PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions for failure of process variable transmitters which provide input'to RTGB controllers.
IF an applicable transmitter fails while the controller is operating in manual OR is being fed from an alternate channel. THEN entry to this procedure is NOT required.
This procedure is applicable in Modes 1. 2. 3. and 4. 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS Failure of any process variable transmitter which affects automatic operation of RTGB controllers with the following exceptions:
* FT-605. RHR Flow
* LT-115. VCT Level
* LT-112. VCT Level
* PR NIS (NI-41. 42. 43. & 44) -END -10 3 of 27 QUESTIONS REPORT for 2007 ROBINSON -REV FINAL >'3034 . . i ,, __ c' \.Allel'tthe following:
* The plant is at 100% power.
* The plant is at 100% power.
* All control systems are in their normal alignments, with the exception of the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller, which is in MANUAL.
* All control systems are in their normal alignments, with the exception of the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller, which is in MANUAL.
* The Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller output drifts L{J . Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on RCS pressure and the correct actions to mitigate the transient?
* The Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller output drifts to2C. t~~. Lf)
pressure increases.
L{J ~D
Enter AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control. closed PZR PORV PCV-455C and control heaters and spray manually.
      . Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on RCS pressure and the correct procedure actions to mitigate the transient?
pressure increases.
pressure increases. Enter AOP-01    9, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control.
Enter AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failures.
AOP-019, erify closed PZR PORV PCV-455C and control heaters and spray manually.
Verify closed PORV PCV-455C and control heaters and spray manually.
RCS pressure increases. Enter AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failures. Verify closed PZR PORV PCV-455C and control heaters and spray manually. Place bistables in trip within 6 hours.
Place bistables in within 6 hours. pressure decreases.
C. RCS pressure decreases. Enter AOP-01        AOP-019,9, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control.
Enter AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control. closed PZR PORV PCV-455C and control heaters and spray manually.
Verify            closed PZR PORV   PCV-455C and control heaters and spray manually.
pressure decreases.
D. RCS pressure decreases. Enter AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failures. Verify closed PZR PORV PCV-455C and control heaters and spray manually. Place bistables in trip within 6 hours.
Enter AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failures.
                                                                              ~7b Tuesday, May 27, 2008 2:58:50 PM                                                                        4
Verify PZR PORV PCV-455C and control heaters and spray manually.
 
Place in trip within 6 hours. 4 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 77. Given the following:  
HLC-08 NRC Written Exam
-The plant is operating at 100% RTP. -VCT makeup is in progress.  
: 77. Given the following:
-BOTH VCT level channels indicate 19 inches. -The following indications are noted: -BA Transfer Pump "A" is running. -PW Pump "A" is running. -FCV-113A, BA FLOW, OPEN. -FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, CLOSED. -FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE, OPEN. -FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, CLOSED. -45 seconds later: -APP-003-D5, BA FLOW DEV alarm has illuminated.  
        - The plant is operating at 100% RTP.
-APP-003-E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV alarm has illuminated.
        - VCT makeup is in progress.
Which ONE (1) of the following has caused the alarms and what actions, if any, are required to mitigate the event? A. The Charging Pump suction has swapped to the RWST. No actions required.
        - BOTH VCT level channels indicate 19 inches.
Ensure LCO 3.5.4, RWST OPERABILITY is met. B. FCV-113B has failed CLOSED. Implement AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL. C. The Charging Pump suction has swapped to the RWST. Implement AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL. D. FCV-113B has failed CLOSED. Implement AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR. 77 000022 A2.03 OOllLOSS OF RX COOL MAKE/1I1I3.1I3.6/SROIHIGHJ43.5INEW  
        - The following indications are noted:
-2008/AOP-003-002 Given the following:  
                - BA Transfer Pump "A"
-The plant is operating at 100% RTP. -VCT makeup is in progress.  
                -                      A is running.
-BOTH VCT level channels indicate 19 inches. -The following indications are noted: -BA Transfer Pump "A" is running. -PW Pump "A" is running. -FCV-113A, BA FLOW, OPEN. -FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, CLOSED. -FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE, OPEN. -FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, CLOSED. -4S seconds later: -APP-003-DS, BA FLOW DEV alarm has illuminated.  
                - PW Pump "A"
-APP-003-ES, MAKEUP WATER DEV alarm has illuminated.
                -            A is running.
Which ONE (1) of the following has caused the alarms and what actions, if any, are required to mitigate the event? A. The Charging Pump suction has swapped to the RWST. No actions required.
                - FCV-113A, BA FLOW, OPEN.
Ensure LCO 3.S.4, RWST OPERABILITY is met. B!'" FCV-113B has failed CLOSED. Implement AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL. C. The Charging Pump suction has swapped to the RWST. Implement AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL. D. FCV-113B has failed CLOSED. Implement AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR.
FCV-1 1 3B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, CLOSED.
The correct answer is B. A: Incorrect  
                - FCV-113B,
-Swapover setpoint is 12.5 inches. NO swapover should have occurred.
                - FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE, OPEN.
Action is appropriate for swapover on VCT low level. B: Correct -FCV-113B is the ONLY valve listed that is out of position.
                - FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, CLOSED.
Since FCV-113B is NOT operating as expected, AOP-003 is the correct procedure to use. VCT is NOT at the swapover setpoint.
        - 45 seconds later:
C: Incorrect  
                - APP-003-D5, BA FLOW DEV alarm has illuminated.
-Swapover setpoint is 12.5 inches. NO swapover should have occurred.
                - APP-003-E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV alarm has illuminated.
Action is appropriate for swapover on VCT low level. D: Incorrect  
Which ONE (1) of the following has caused the alarms and what actions, if any, are required to mitigate the event?
-FCV-113B is the ONLY valve listed that is out of position.
A. The Charging Pump suction has swapped to the RWST. No actions required. Ensure LCO 3.5.4, RWST OPERABILITY is met.
Since FCV-113B is NOT operating as expected, AOP-003 is the correct procedure to use. AOP-017 is the appropriate procedure if air header pressure was low, but FCV-114A fails CLOSED on a loss of instrument air. Exam Question Number: 77  
B. FCV-113B FCV-1 13B has failed CLOSED. Implement AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL.
C. The Charging Pump suction has swapped to the RWST. Implement AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL.
FCV-1 13B has failed CLOSED. Implement AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR.
D. FCV-113B 77
 
000022 A2.03 000022          001/LOSS OF A2.03 OOllLOSS     OFRX            MAKE/1/1/3.1/3.6/SRO/HIGHI43.5JNEW - 2008/AOP-003-002 COOL MAKE/1I1I3.1I3.6/SROIHIGHJ43.5INEW RX COOL                                        - 2008/AOP-003-002 Given the Given        following:
the following:
The plant
    - The
    -      plant isis operating operating at at 100%
100% RTP.RTP.
VCT makeup
    - VCT
    -        makeup isis in in progress.
progress.
BOTH VCT
    - BOTH
    -                  level channels VCT level                 indicate 19 channels indicate     19 inches.
inches.
The following
    - The
    -      following indications indications areare noted:
noted:
              - BA
              -      Transfer Pump BA Transfer     Pump "A"     is running.
A is  running.
PW Pump
              - PW
              -        Pump "A"A is  running.
is running.
FCV-113A, BA FLOW,
              - FCV-113A,
              -                      FLOW, OPEN.
              - FCV-113B,
              -                BLENDED MU FCV-1 1 3B, BLENDED           MU TO CHGCHG SUCT, SUCT, CLOSED.
CLOSED.
FCV-114A, PRIMARY
              - FCV-114A,
              -                PRIMARY WTR FLOW     FLOW DILUTE DILUTE MODE, MODE, OPEN.
FCV-1 14B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, CLOSED.
              - FCV-114B, 45 seconds later:
    - 4S APP-003-D5, BA FLOW DEV alarm has illuminated.
              - APP-003-DS, APP-003-E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV alarm has illuminated.
              - APP-003-ES, Which ONE (1) of the following has caused the alarms and what actions, if any, are required to mitigate the event?
A. The Charging Pump suction has swapped to the RWST. No actions required. Ensure LCO 3.5.4, RWST OPERABILITY is met.
3.S.4, FCV-1 1 3B has failed CLOSED. Implement AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR B FCV-113B B!'"
MAKEUP CONTROL.
C. The Charging Pump suction has swapped to the RWST. Implement AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL.
D. FCV-113B FCV-1 13B has failed CLOSED. Implement AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR.
 
The correct The   correct answer answer isis B.B.
A: Incorrect A:  Incorrect - Swapover
              -   Swapover setpoint setpoint isis 12.5 12.5 inches.
inches. NO NO swapover swapover should should have have occurred.
occurred. Action Action isis appropriate    for swapover appropriate for swapover on     on VCT VCT low low level.
level.
B: Correct B: Correct --      FCV-1 1 3B is FCV-113B     is the the ONLY ONLY valve valve listed listed that that isis out out of position. Since of position. Since FCV-113B FCV-1 1 3B isis NOT operating NOT   operating as as expected, expected, AOP-003 is      is the the correct correct procedure procedure toto use.
use. VCT is is NOT at the swapover setpoint.
NOT                        setpoint.
C: Incorrect C: Incorrect - Swapover
              -   Swapover setpoint setpoint isis 12.5  inches. NO 12.5 inches. NO swapover swapover should should have have occurred.
occurred. Action Action isis appropriate for swapover appropriate        swapover on  on VCT low     level.
low level.
              -    FCV-1 1 3B is D: Incorrect - FCV-113B         is the ONLY valve listed that is out of position. Since FCV-113B FCV-1 1 3B isis NOT operating as expected, AOP-003 is            is the correct procedure procedure to use.
use. AOP-017 is the appropriate procedure if air header pressure  pressure was low, low, but FCV-114A FCV-1 1 4A fails CLOSED on a loss of instrument air.
Exam Question Number: 77


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
APP-003-D5 and E5; AOP-003, Pages 3 and 10, AOP-017, Page 3, ITS 3.5.4.
KA Statement: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Failures of flow control valve or controller.
History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam.
SRO - Requires analysis of plant conditions and selection of mitigating procedure.
KA Name:              LOSS OF RX COOL MAKE                Tier/Group:            III 1/1 Importance Rating:    3.1/3.6 3.113.6                              RO/SRO Level:          SRO Cognitive Level:      HIGH                                  IOCFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43            43.5 Source:                NEW - 2008
                              -                            Learning Objective: AOP-003-002


APP-003-D5 and E5; AOP-003, Pages 3 and 10, AOP-017, Page 3, ITS 3.5.4. KA Statement:
APP-003-D5 APP-003-D5 ALARM ALARM BABAFLOW FLOWDEV DEV      ***
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Failures of flow control valve or controller.
WILLREFLASH
History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam. SRO -Requires analysis of plant conditions and selection of mitigating procedure.
                      *** WILL     REFLASH***
KA Name: LOSS OF RX COOL MAKE Tier/Group:
AUTOMATICACTIONS AUTOMATIC       ACTIONS 1.1.      FCV-1 1 3B, BLENDED FCV-113B,       BLENDEDMU    MUTOTOCHGCHG SUCT, SUCT, CLOSES CLOSES CAUSE CAUSE 1.1.      Improper blended Improper    blended makeup makeup concentration concentration 2.2.     Improper Boric Improper    Boric Acid Acid Pump Pump operation operation 3.3. Improper control Improper    control of of FCV-113A FCV-1 1 3A or   positioner failure or positioner  failure (BA (B.A. flow) flow) 4.
III Importance Rating: 3.113.6 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH lOCFR55.43 link: 43.5 Source: NEW -2008 Learning Objective:
: 4.      Excessive LIP Excessive    AP across across Boric Boric Acid Acid Filter Filter OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS 1.
AOP-003-002 ALARM BA FLOW DEV *** WILL REFLASH *** AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1. FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, CLOSES CAUSE 1. Improper blended makeup concentration
: 1.       Boric Acid Boric  Acid Flow Flow (FR-113)
: 2. Improper Boric Acid Pump operation
(FR-i 13) 2.
: 3. Improper control of FCV-113A or positioner failure (BA flow) 4. Excessive LIP across Boric Acid Filter OBSERVATIONS
: 2.       Position of Position   of FCV-113A FCV-1 1 3A 3.
: 1. Boric Acid Flow (FR-113) 2. Position of FCV-113A 3. RCS Temperature (Tavg) 4. Reactor Power ACTIONS APP-003-D5
: 3.      RCS Temperature RCS    Temperature (Tavg)
(Tavg) 4.
: 4.      Reactor Power Reactor    Power ACTIONS ACTIONS 1.
: 1.          alarm is due to intentional operator action, THEN no other actions are necessary.
IF alarm IF 2.
: 2.          required, THEN verify Boric Acid makeup stopped.
IF required, IF 3.
: 3.      IF the IF  the alarm alarm isis due due to a Malfunction of Makeup Control, THEN Refer to AOP-003.
4.
: 4.      IF the IF      alarm is the alarm  is due to low boron concentration, concentration, THEN take manual control of RCS makeup,  makeup, as as required.
required.
DEVICE/S    ETPOINTS DEVICE/SETPOINTS 1.
: 1.      FC-1 FC-113 13 /+/-0.2 1+/-0.2 gpm (Alarm will activate 45 seconds after Boric    Boric Acid flow deviation of of 0.2 0.2 gpm gpm from from the the controller controller setpoint.)
setpoint.)
POSSIBLE POSSIBLE PLANT PLANT EFFECTS EFFECTS 1.
: 1.      Inadvertent Inadvertent RCSRCS dilution dilution 2.
: 2.      Tavg-Tref Tavg-Tref Deviation Deviation alarm alarm REFERENC REFERENCES    ES 1.1. AOP-003, AOP-003, Malfunction Malfunction of of Reactor Reactor Makeup Makeup Control Control 2.2. CWD CWD B-i    90628, Sheet B-190628,    Sheet 481, 481, Cable Cable XX IAPP-0  03 APP-003                                                Rev.
Rev. 37 37 I                  Page35 Page    35 of of53 I
531
 
APP-003-E5 APP-003-E5 ALARM ALARM MAKEUP WATER MAKEUP  WATER DEV DEV AUTOMATIC ACTIONS AUTOMATIC      ACTIONS 1.1. DILUTE MODE:
DILUTE    MODE: FCV-114B, FCV-114B, BLENDED BLENDED MU  MU TOTO VCT, VCT, closes closes 2.
: 2. ALT DILUTE ALT  DILUTE MODE:
MODE: FCV-113B, FCV-113B, BLENDED BLENDED MU  MUTOTO CHGCHG SUCT,      AND FCV-114B, SUCT, AND  FCV-114B, BLENDED BLENDED MUMU TO VCT, TO  VCT, close close 3.
: 3. AUTO MODE:
AUTO    MODE: FCV-113B, FCV-113B, BLENDED BLENDED MU    MU TOTO CHG CHG SUCT, SUCT, closes closes CAUSE CAUSE 1.
: 1. Improper control Improper  control ofof FCV-114A FCV-1 14A or or positioner positioner failure failure (P.W.
(P.W. flow) flow) 2.
: 2. Inadequate flow Inadequate    flow from from Primary Primary Water Water Makeup Makeup Pumps Pumps 3.
: 3. Measured PW Measured    PW flow flow isis not not within within 55 gpm gpm ofof set set PW PW flow flow (45 (45 sec.
sec. TD).
TD).
OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS 1.
: 1. Primary Water FlowFlow (FR-114)
(FR-i 14)
: 2. Position of FCV-114A Position    FCV-i 1 4A for Primary Primary Water FlowFlow
: 3. Primary Water Makeup Pumps operating ACTIONS
: 1. IF alarm is due to intentional operator action, THEN no other actions are necessary.
: 1. IF alarm is due to intentional operator action, THEN no other actions are necessary.
: 2. IF required, THEN verify Boric Acid makeup stopped. 3. IF the alarm is due to a Malfunction of Makeup Control, THEN Refer to AOP-003. 4. IF the alarm is due to low boron concentration, THEN take manual control of RCS makeup, as required.
: 2. IF the alarm is due to a Malfunction of Makeup Control, THEN Refer to AOP-003.
DEVICE/SETPOINTS
IF DEVICE/S ETPOI NTS DEVICE/SETPOINTS 1..
: 1. FC-113 1+/-0.2 gpm (Alarm will activate 45 seconds after Boric Acid flow deviation of 0.2 gpm from the controller setpoint.)
1     FC-114/+/-5gp FC-114   1+/-5 gpm m POSSIBLE PLANT EFFECTS 1.
POSSIBLE PLANT EFFECTS 1. Inadvertent RCS dilution 2. Tavg-Tref Deviation alarm REFERENCES
: 1. Overboration of RCS during  during blended makeup REFERENC REFERENCES ES 1.
: 1. AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control 2. CWD B-190628, Sheet 481, Cable X I APP-003 Rev. 37 Page 35 of 531 ALARM MAKEUP WATER DEV AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1. DILUTE MODE: FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, closes APP-003-E5
: 1. AOP-003, Malfunction Malfunction of  of Reactor Reactor Makeup Makeup Control Control 2.
: 2. ALT DILUTE MODE: FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, AND FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, close 3. AUTO MODE: FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes CAUSE 1. Improper control of FCV-114A or positioner failure (P.W. flow) 2. Inadequate flow from Primary Water Makeup Pumps 3. Measured PW flow is not within 5 gpm of set PW flow (45 sec. TD). OBSERVATIONS
: 2. CWD CWD B-i    90628, Sheet B-190628,   Sheet 481, 481 , Cable Cable ZZ 1 APP-003 APP-003                                              Rev.
: 1. Primary Water Flow (FR-114) 2. Position of FCV-114A for Primary Water Flow 3. Primary Water Makeup Pumps operating ACTIONS 1. IF alarm is due to intentional operator action, THEN no other actions are necessary.
Rev. 37 37                                      43 of Page 43 Page        531 of 53
: 2. IF the alarm is due to a Malfunction of Makeup Control, THEN Refer to AOP-003. DEVICE/SETPOINTS 1 . FC-114 1+/-5 gpm POSSIBLE PLANT EFFECTS 1. Overboration of RCS during blended makeup REFERENCES
 
: 1. AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control 2. CWD B-190628, Sheet 481 , Cable Z 1 APP-003 Rev. 37 Page 43 of 531 Rev. AOP-003 MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL Page Purpose and Entry Conditions (Page 1 of 1) 1. PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to provide instructions in the event of a malfunction of the Reactor Makeup Control System. 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS This procedure is entered upon VCT level OR makeup anomalies.  
Rev.
-END -12 3 of 43 Rev. 12 AOP-003 MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL INSTRUCTIONS
Rev. 12 12 AOP-003 AOP-003               MALFUNCTION OF MALFUNCTION   OF REACTOR REACTOR MAKEUP MAKEUP CONTROL CONTROL Page     of 43 Page 33 of  43 Puroose and Purpose   and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)
: 19. (CONTINUED) e. At the RTGB, Verify FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT -OPEN f. Verify LCV-IISA, VCT/HLDP TK DIV Valve -CLOSED (Positioned To The VCT) g. Go To Step 21 Page 10 of 43 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED II FCV-113B has failed, THEN perform the following:
1.
: 1) Place FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, Control Switch to OPEN 2) Restart Automatic Makeup As Follows: a) Momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch to STOP b) Momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch to START c) Verify Automatic Makeup is initiated d) Return to procedure and step in effect Rev. AOP-017 LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR Purpose and Entry Conditions (Page 1 of 1) 1. PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions in the event a loss of Instrument Air occurs. 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS a. Instrument Air Header pressure less than 85 psig. b. Instrument Air System pipe break. -END -Page 35 3 of 61 
: 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE The purpose The purpose of  this procedure of this procedure is is to to provide provide instructions instructions inin the the event of event  of aa malfunction malfunction of of the the Reactor Reactor Makeup Makeup Control Control System.
---3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) LCO 3.5.4 The RWST shall be OPERABLE.
System.
2.
: 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY  CONDITIONS This procedure This  procedure is   entered upon is entered  upon VCT VCT level level OR makeup makeup anomalies.
anomalies.
                                        - END
                                        - END --
 
Rev.
Rev. 12 12 AOP-003 AOP-003                 MALFUNCTION OF MALFUNCTION  OF REACTOR REACTOR MAKEUP MAKEUP CONTROL CONTROL Page Page 10 10 of of 4343
 
STEP H              INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I      RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
19.
: 19.   (CONTINUED)
(CONTINUED)
    .~  e.
: e. At  the RTGB, At the   RTGB, Verify Verify FCV-113B, FCV-113B,    ~e.
: e. II IF FCV-113B FCV-113B has has failed, failed, THEN THEN BLENDED BLENDED MU MU TO TO CHG CHG SUCT SUCT - OPEN
                                          - OPEN        perform perform the the following:
following:
1)
: 1) Place Place FCV-114B, FCV-ll4B. BLENDED BLENDED MUMU TO TO VCT, VCT, Control Control Switch Switch toto OPEN OPEN 2)
: 2) Restart Restart Automatic Automatic Makeup Makeup As Follows:
As Follows:
a) a) Momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM SYSTEM Switch to STOP b) Momentarily place the b)
RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch to START c) Verify Automatic Makeup is initiated d) Return to procedure and step in effect
: f. Verify LCV-115A, LCV-IISA, VCT/HLDP TK DIV Valve - CLOSED (Positioned To The VCT)
: g. Go To Step 21
 
Rev.
Rev. 35 35 AOP-017 AOP-017                      LOSS LOSS OF OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR Page Page 33 of of 61 61 Purpose and Purpose   and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)
1.
: 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This  procedure provides provides instructions instructions in  in the the event event aa loss loss of of Instrument Air Instrument  Air occurs.
occurs.
~
-*2.
: 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY  CONDITIONS
    ~  a. Instrument
: a. Instrument Air Air Header Header pressure pressure less less than than 85 85 psig.
psig.
    ~                      System pipe break.
: b. Instrument Air System
                                          - END -
 
RWST RWST 3.5.4 3.5.4 3.5 EMERGENCY 3.5       EMERGENCY CORE CORE COOLING COOLING SYSTEMS SYSTEMS (ECCS)
(ECCS) 3.5.4 Refueling 3.5.4      Refueling Water Water Storage Storage Tank Tank (RWST)
(RWST)
LCO 3.5.4 LCO    3.5.4          The The RWST RWST shall shall bebe OPERABLE.
OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A. RWST boron A.1 Restore RWST to concentration not OPERABLE status. within limits. OR RWST borated water temperature not within 1 imits. B. RWST inoperable for B.1 Restore RWST to reasons other than OPERABLE status. Condition A. C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 5. HBRSEP Unit No. 2 3.5-10 RWST 3.5.4 COMPLETION TIME 8 hours 1 hour 6 hours 36 hours Amendment No. 176 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 78. During Mid-Loop operations, the following indications and conditions are noted: -RHR Pump "A" is operating, FCV-605, RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS is in AUTO. -FI-605 indicates 3600 GPM and is oscillating  
APPLICABILITY:          MODES MODES 1.
+/- 100 GPM. -RHR Pump discharge pressure is oscillating  
1, 2. 3. and 2, 3. and 4.
+/- 30 PSIG. -RCS standpipes indicate -73 inches (RTGB) and -74 inches (LOCAL). What conditions are causing the oscillations and the actions necessary to stabilize the RHR system parameters?
4.
The RHR Pump ... A. is in runout due to excessive flow. Reduce flow lAW GP-OOS, DRAINING THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM. B. is cavitating due to limited suction and vortexing.
ACTIONS ACTIONS CONDITION CONDITION                         REQUIRED ACTION ACTION      COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME TIME A. RWST boron A.                                  A.1       Restore RWST to   88 hours concentration not                       OPERABLE status.
Stop RHR Pump "A" lAW AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
* within limits.
C. is in runout due to excessive flow. Stop RHR Pump "A" lAW GP-OOS. D. is cavitating due to limited suction and vortexing.
OR OR RWST borated water RWST temperature not within 1limits.
Reduce flow lAW AOP-020. 78 000025 A2.07 OOllLOSS OF RHR/l/l/3.4J3.7/SROIHIGHl43.5INEW  
imits.
-200S/AOP-020-002 During Mid-Loop operations, the following indications and conditions are noted: -RHR Pump "A" is operating, FCV-605, RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS is in AUTO. -FI-605 indicates 3600 GPM and is oscillating  
B.
+/- 100 GPM. -RHR Pump discharge pressure is oscillating  
B. RWST RWST inoperable for           B.1 8.1      Restore RWST to   11 hour hour reasons reasons other than                     OPERABLE status.
+/- 30 PSIG. -RCS standpipes indicate -73 inches (RTGB) and -74 inches (LOCAL). What conditions are causing the oscillations and the actions necessary to stabilize the RHR system parameters?
Condition Condition A.
The RHR Pump ... A. is in runout due to excessive flow. Reduce flow lAW GP-008, DRAINING THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM. Bt is cavitating due to limited suction and vortexing.
C.
Stop RHR Pump "A" lAW AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
C. Required Required Action Action and and      C.1 C.1      Be in Be in MODE MODE 3.
C. is in runout due to excessive flow. Stop RHR Pump "A" lAW GP-008. D. is cavitating due to limited suction and vortexing.
: 3. 66 hours hours associated associated Completion Completion Time Time not not met.
Reduce flow lAW AOP-020. The correct answer is B. A: Incorrect  
met.               AND AND C.2 C.2       Be in Be in MODE MODE 5.
-Flow is NOT excessive, pump runout does NOT occur until greater than the design flowrate of 3750 GPM, therefore reducing flow is NOT necessary.
: 5.   .3636 hours hours HBRSEP HBRSEP UnitUnit No.
B: Correct -Standpipe levels indicate -73 inches, which is below the point where pump cavitation is likely and is an entry condition for AOP-020. The first two steps of AOP-020 direct stopping the RHR pumps if below -72 inches, with flow instability or pump cavitation.
No. 22                      3.5-10 3.5-10                Amendment No.
C: Incorrect  
Amendment   No. 176 176
-Flow is at the upper range, but NOT excessive or at runout conditions.
 
D: Incorrect  
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08      NRC Written Written Exam Exam
-Standpipe levels indicate -73, which is below the point where pump cavitation is likely and is an entry condition for AOP-020. The first two steps of AOP-020 direct stopping the RHR pumps if below -72 inches, with flow instability or pump cavitation, not reducing flow. AOP-020 does NOT direct a reduction of flow. Exam Question Number: 78  
: 78. During Mid-Loop
: 78. During  Mid-Loop operations, operations, the the following following indications indications andand conditions conditions are are noted:
noted:
RHR Pump
      - RHR
      -      Pump "A"A is is operating, operating, FCV-605, FCV-605, RHR        HEAT EXCHANGER RHR HEAT       EXCHANGER BYPASSBYPASS is  is in in AUTO.
AUTO.
FI-605 indicates
      - FI-605
      -        indicates 3600    GPM and 3600 GPM             oscillating +/-
and isis oscillating     100 GPM.
                                                                +/- 100   GPM.
RHR Pump
      - RHR
      -      Pump discharge       pressure is discharge pressure          oscillating +/-
is oscillating  +/- 30   PSIG.
30 PSIG.
RCS standpipes
      - RCS
      -      standpipes indicate indicate -73 inches inches (RTGB)
(RTGB) and and -74 inches   (LOCAL).
inches (LOCAL).
What conditions areare causing causing the oscillations oscillations and and the the actions actions necessary necessary to to stabilize stabilize the the RHR RHR system parameters?
RHR Pump The RHR   Pump...
A. is in runout due to excessive flow. Reduce Reduce flow lAW GP-OOS,         DRAINING THE REACTOR GP-008, DRAINING              REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.
B. is cavitating due to limited suction and vortexing. Stop RHR Pump "A"           A lAW AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
C. is in runout due to excessive flow. Stop RHR Pump "A"           A lAW GP-OOS.
GP-008.
D. is cavitating due to limited suction and vortexing. Reduce flow lAW AOP-020.
78 78
 
000025 A2.07 OOllLOSS 001/LOSS OF OF RHR/l/l/3.4J3.7/SROIHIGHl43.5INEW RHRI1/l/3.4/3.7/SRO/HIGHI43.5/NEW - 200S/AOP-020-002
                                                                  - 2008/AOP-020-002 During Mid-Loop operations, the following indications and conditions are noted:
RHR Pump
    - RHR
    -      Pump "A" A is operating, FCV-605,  RHR HEAT FCV-605, RHR   HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS  BYPASS is in in AUTO.
FI-605 indicates 3600 GPM and is oscillating +/-
    - FI-605
    -                                                      100 GPM.
                                                          +/- 100
    - RHR Pump discharge pressure is oscillating +/-
                                                        +/- 30 PSIG.
    - RCS standpipes indicate -73 inches (RTGB) and -74 inches (LOCAL).
What conditions are causing the oscillations and the actions necessary to stabilize the RHR system parameters?
The RHR PumpPump...  ...
A. is in runout due to excessive flow. Reduce flow lAW GP-008, DRAINING THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.
Bt B is cavitating due to limited suction and vortexing. Stop RHR Pump "A"       A lAW AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
C. is in runout due to excessive flow. Stop RHR Pump "A"       A lAW GP-008.
D. is cavitating due to limited suction and vortexing. Reduce flow lAW AOP-020.
The correct answer is B.
A: Incorrect - Flow is NOT excessive, pump runout does NOT occur until greater than the design flowrate of 3750 GPM, therefore reducing flow is NOT necessary.
B: Correct - -    Standpipe levels indicate -73 inches, which is below the point where pump cavitation is likely and is an entry condition for AOP-020. The first two steps of AOP-020 direct stopping the RHR pumps if below -72 inches, with flow instability or pump cavitation.
C: Incorrect - Flow is at the upper range, but NOT excessive or at runout conditions.
D: Incorrect - Standpipe levels indicate -73, which is below the point where pump cavitation is likely and is an entry condition for AOP-020. The first two steps of AOP-020 direct stopping the RHR pumps if below -72 inches, with flow instability or pump cavitation, not reducing flow. AOP-020 does NOT direct a reduction of flow.
Exam Question Number: 78


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
SD-003, RHR, Pages 22 and 23, Figure 1;          1; AOP-020, Pages 3-4.
KA Statement: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Pump Cavitation.
History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC exam.
SRO - Requires analysis of plant conditions and selection of mitigating procedure.


SD-003, RHR, Pages 22 and 23, Figure 1; AOP-020, Pages 3-4. KA Statement:
KA Name:
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Pump Cavitation.
KAName:            LOSS OFRHR LOSS    OF RHR Tier/Group:
History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC exam. SRO -Requires analysis of plant conditions and selection of mitigating procedure.
Tier/Group:         III 1/1 Importance Rating:
KAName: LOSS OFRHR Tier/Group:
Importance Rating: 3.4/3.7 3.4/3.7        RO/SRO Level:
III Importance Rating: 3.4/3.7 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH lOCFR55.43 link: 43.5 Source: NEW -2008 Learning Objective:
RO/SRO   Level:    SRO SRO Cognitive Level:
AOP-020-002 SD-003 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM limits. The RHR System can be used to fast fill the Refueling Canal. For fast fill of the refueling cavity, the RHR System is lined up for the RHR Pumps to take suction from the RWST through Valves SI-862A and B. The reactor vessel head is removed and used for shielding.
Cognitive Level:   HIGH HIGH          10CFR55.43 link:
The Refueling Canal is filled by pumping water from the RWST into the system. The slow fill method uses the SI pumps through the RCS hot leg. In order to drain the Refueling Canal, the system will be lined up to take water from the RCS hot leg through Valves RHR-750 and RHR-751 and pump it back to the RWST through Valves SI-863A and B. When the level in the Refueling Canal is equal to a prescribed value, the remainder of the water in the Refueling Canal will be removed by draining to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank and/or containment sump. 6.5 Reactor Coolant System/RHR Level Monitoring During outage conditions when the RCS/RHR level is required to be maintained below the vessel flange, the level is monitored by RCS Loop 2 & 3 standpipes in the containment and LT-403 and LT-404, which indicate level on the RTGB. This monitored level range is from the vessel flange down to the upper core plate (-125"). The level at the center line of the RCS piping is -82 inches of water. If the level is lowered below -72 inches, cavitation of the RHR Pumps is likely to occur. RHR pump discharge pressure is monitored on the RTGB oy PI-602A and PI-602B. Recent Westinghouse studies have shown that vortexing could occur above -72 inches. 6.6 Initiation of an S Signal when aligned to the Injection Phase In the event of a SI signal, the RHR pumps A and B will start and RHR-744 A and B will open. The system will take suction from the RWST and circulate borated RWST water through the recirc. lines until RCS pressure decreases to a point where RHR pump shutoff head can force open the check valves to the RCS cold legs (-130 psig), or until the operator secures the RHR system. 6.7 Precautions and Operational Limitations on RHR RHR
10CFR55.43   link: 43.5 43.5 Source:
* RCS temperature and pressure shall be less than 350&deg;F and 375 psig before the RHR System is put in service, and the RHR system will be removed from service before RCS pressure and temperature are raised above these values.
Source:           NEW    - 2008 NEW - 2008     Learning Objective:
* To prevent boiling the CCW liquid contained in an RHR HX, CCW flow should not be isolated to an RHR HX when the temperature of the RHR System is greater than 200&deg;F. (CR 95-00565)
Learning Objective: AOP-020-002 AOP-020-002
Page 22 of 45 Revision 14 INFORMATION USE ONLY SD-003 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM
 
* Neither RHR-750 nor RHR-751 will open unless the following conditions are satisfied:  
SD-003 SD-003                                                                 RESIDUAL HEAT RESIDUAL            HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL SYSTEM  SYSTEM limits. The limits.      The RHRRHR System System can can be  used to be used       fast fill to fast   fill the the Refueling Refueling Canal.
-The breakers for SI-862A & Band SI-863 A & B are closed. -The control power switches for SI-862A & Band SI-863 A & B are in NORMAL. -Valves SI-862A and B are closed. -Valves SI-863A and B are closed. -RCS pressure is less than 445 psig.
Canal.
* SI-862A & B, and SI-863A & B are interlocked so they cannot be opened unless the RHR loop pressure is less than 210 psig.
For fast For    fast fill fill of of the the refueling refueling cavity, cavity, the the RHR RHR System System isis lined lined upup for for the the RHR RHR PumpsPumps to to take  suction take suction from from thethe RWST RWST through through Valves Valves SI-862A SI-862A and   and B. B. The The reactor reactor vessel vessel head head isis removed and removed       and used used for for shielding.
* When the Residual Heat Removal System is providing Core Cooling AND seal injection flow is desired to maintain a positive L'lP across the Thermal Barrier of the Reactor Coolant Pumps, letdown flow through HCV-142 and PCV-145 should be maintained to provide makeup to the VCT.
shielding. TheThe Refueling Refueling Canal Canal isis filled filled by by pumping pumping water water from from the RWST the RWST into theinto  the system.
* When RHR-757C or RHR-757D is closed, 3,350 gpm flow, indicated on FI-605, with one RHR pump running or 6,700 gpm flow with two RHR pumps running shall not be exceeded, except as allowedlrequired by approved test procedures for which flowrates on FI-605 may be as high as 3800 gpm for one pump or 7600 gpm for two pumps. . When both RHR-757C and RHR-757D are open, 3750 gpm total per running pump as read from FI-605, FI-608A and FI-608B, shall not be exceeded, except as allowedlrequired by approved test procedures for which total flowrates may be as high as 4200 gpm for one pump or 8400 gpm for two pumps.
system. TheThe slow    fill method slow fill   method uses uses thethe SISI pumps pumps through through thethe RCS RCS hot leg.
* When running RHR Pumps with SI-863A and/or SI-863B open, RHR-744A and RHR-744B should be closed to prevent excessive RHR pump runout.
hot  leg.
* If CCW is not available to the RHR pump seal coolers, the RHR pumps shall not be operated with pump discharge temperature greater than 135 OF. With CCW available to the RHR pump seal coolers there is no time limit for running a single pump with flow only through the heatup recirculation line. It will be necessary to rotate the RHR pumps to avoid exceeding the 50&deg;F L'lT limit between RHR loops as stated in GP-007. RHR pump flowrates of less than 2,800 gpm have been shown to increase pressure and flow fluctuations and should be avoided when plant conditions permit. This does not apply during recirculation operation. (ACR 91-078) RHR Page 23 of 45 Revision 14 INFORMATION USE ONLY c&#xa5;es r .;......:..--'-,,-"-FA RHR SYSTEM-CORE COOLING LINEUP RHR-FIGURE-l I *.. . 1/1-1 SI-887 RHR*754B . MINIFLO'NRECIRC FROM CONTAINMENT SUMP RHR. HEAT.UP LINE INFORMATION USE ONLY TO SIANO CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP SUCTIONS t.o l ,.. -.'4! I
In order In order to to drain drain thethe Refueling Refueling Canal, Canal, the the system system will will bebe lined lined up up to to take take water water from from thethe RCS    hot  leg  through    Valves RCS hot leg through Valves RHR-750     RHR-750 and  and RHR-751 RHR-751 and    and pump pump itit back back toto the the RWST RWST through Valves through      Valves SI-863A SI-863A andand B.
* FROM RWST ?" "" :t ?" Ul o FR.OM Re LOOP 2 HOT lEG rhrf01 Rev. 29 AOP-020 LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING) Page 3 of INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1. PURPOSE This procedure provides the instructions necessary to mitigate the loss of RHR in all conditions for which RHR can be aligned to provide shutdown cooling. This includes loss of RHR cooling for reasons such as RCS leakage, loss of power, loss of Service Water or Component Cooling Water, RHR pump cavitation, and inadequate RHR flow or abnormal reductions in RHR cooling. This procedure is applicable in Modes 4, 5, and 6 when fuel is in the vessel. 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS Direct entry from any condition resulting in a loss of RHR pump(s), pump cavitation, abnormal RHR flow or temperature control, or excessive loss of RCS inventory while RHR is aligned for shutdown cooling. As directed by the following other procedures:
B. When When the  the level level in in the the Refueling Refueling Canal Canal isis equal equal toto aa prescribed     value,   the remainder prescribed value, the remainder of          of the the water water in in the the Refueling Refueling CanalCanal will will be be removed removed by by draining to draining     to the the Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant Drain Drain Tank Tank and/or and/or containment containment sump. sump.
* AOP-005, Radiation Monitoring System, when a low level in the SFP exists due to an RCS leak with the SFP GATE VALVE open.
6.5 6.5    Reactor Coolant Reactor     Coolant System/RHR System/RHR Level Level Monitoring Monitoring During outage conditions when the RCS/RHR level is                        is required to be maintained below the vessel flange, the level is monitored by RCS Loop 2 &                        & 3 standpipes in the containment and LT-403 and LT-404, which indicate level on the RTGB. This monitored level range is from the vessel flange down to the upper core plate (-125").                       (-125).
The level at the center line of the RCS piping is -82 inches of water. If the level is
~
lowered below -72 inches, cavitation cavitation_of of the RHR Pumps is likely to occur. RHR pump tIiEtirge      pressur          iomtored.
discharge pressure is monitored on the           IeTby RTGB oy P1-602A PI-602A and PI-602B. Recent Westinghouse studies have shown that vortexing could occur above -72 inches.
Westinghouse 6.6   Initiation of an S      S Signal when aligned to the Injection Phase In the event of a SI signal, the RHR pumps A and B                    B will start and RHR-744 A and B              B will open. The system will take suction from the RWST and circulate borated RWST water through the recirc. lines until RCS pressure decreases to a point where RHR pump shutoff head can force open the check valves to the RCS cold legs (                            (-130     psig),
130 psig),
or  until or until   the   operator   secures the RHR system.
6.7 6.7    Precautions Precautions and   and Operational Operational Limitations Limitations on   on RHR
      **  RCS RCS temperature temperature and  and pressure pressure shall shall bebe less less than than 350&deg;F 350&deg;F and and 375 375 psig psig before before thethe R}{R RHR System System isis putput in in service,  and the service, and     the RHR RHR system system will will be be removed removed from from service service before before RCS RCS pressure pressure and and temperature temperature are  are raised raised above above these these values.
values.
      ** ToTo prevent prevent boiling boiling the the CCW CCW liquid liquid contained contained in  in an an RHR RHR HX, HX, CCW CCW flowflow should should notnot be isolated be   isolated to     an RHR to an  RHR HX  HX when when thethe temperature temperature of     of the the RHR RHR System System isis greater greater than than 200&deg;F.
200&deg;F. (CR  (CR 95-00565) 95-00565)
RHR RHR                                                      Page 22 Page 22 of of45 45                                   Revision 14 Revision  14 INFORMAT INFORMATION             ION USE     USE ONLY    ONLY
 
SD-003 SD-003                                                            RESIDUAL HEAT RESIDUAL       HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL SYSTEM    SYSTEM
      **   Neither RHR-750 Neither   RHR-750 nor  nor RHR-751 RHR-75 1 will     open unless will open    unless the   following conditions the following    conditions areare satisfied:
satisfied:
The breakers
          - The
          -      breakers forfor SI-862A SI-862A && Band B and SI-863 SI-863 A A && BB are are closed.
closed.
The control
          - The
          -      control power power switches switches for     SI-862A && Band for SI-862A        B and SI-863 SI-863 A A && B B are are in in NORMAL.
NORMAL.
Valves SI-862A
          - Valves   SI-862A and and B    are closed.
B are   closed.
Valves SI-863A
          - Valves
          -          SI-863A and and B  B are are closed.
closed.
RCS pressure
          - RCS
          -        pressure isis less less than than 445  psig.
445 psig.
      ** SI-862A &
SI-862A    & B,   and SI-863A B, and    SI-863A && B      are interlocked B are  interlocked so   they cannot so they    cannot bebe opened opened unless unless the the RHR loop RHR            pressure is loop pressure         less than is less   than 210 210 psig.
psig.
      ** When the the Residual Heat Removal System      System is providing Core Core Cooling Cooling ANDANTI seal seal injection injection    flow is desired desired    to maintain   a positive  AP across a positive L'lP across the Thermal Thermal Barrier of the Reactor Coolant Pumps, letdown flow through HCV-142 and PCV-145 should be maintained to provide makeup to the VCT.
* When RHR-757C or RHR-757D is closed, 3,350 gpm flow, indicated on FI-605, with one RHR pump running or 6,700 gpm flow with two RHR pumps running allowed/required by approved test procedures for shall not be exceeded, except as allowedlrequired which flowrates on FI-605 may be as high as 3800 gpm for one pump or 7600 gpm for two pumps.
~      .* When both RHR-757C and RHR-757D are open, 7Qgptotal as read from FI-605, FI-608A and FI-608B, 3750 gpm total per running pump FI-608B shall not be exceeded, except as allowed/required by approved test procedures for which total flowrates may be as allowedlrequired high as 4200 gpm for one pump or 8400 gpm for two pumps.
* When running R}{R  RHR Pumps with SI-863A and/or SI-863B open, RHR-744A and RHR-744B should be closed to prevent excessive RHR pump runout.
* If CCW is not available to the RHR pump seal coolers, the RHR pumps                  pumps shall not be operated with pump discharge temperature greater than 135                     OF. With CCW 135 &deg;F.
available to the RHR pump seal coolers there is no time limit for running aa single pump pump with flow only  only through the heatup recirculation line. It        It will will be necessary necessary to rotate the the RHR pumps to avoid exceeding the 50&deg;F           50&deg;F ATL'lT limit limit between between RHR loops as stated stated inin GP-007.
GP-007.
~.
* R}IR RHR pumppump flowrates of    of less less than than 2,800 2,800 gpm    have been gpm have   been shown shown toto increase increase pressure pressure and and flow fluctuations fluctuations and and should should bebe avoided avoided when when plant plant conditions conditions permit.
permit. This This does  not  apply does not apply during during recirculation recirculation operation.
operation. (ACR (ACR 91-078) 91-078)
RHR RHR                                                  Page Page 23 23 of of 45 45                               Revision 14 Revision 14 INFORMAT INFORMATION                 ION USE ONLY         ONLY
 
RHR RHRSYSTE  M-CORE COOL SYSTEM-CORE             ING LINEU COOLING         LINEUPP RHR-FIGUR  E- 1 RHR-FIGURE-l I *.. .                                               1/1-1-~--,
SI-887 TOTOSI AND SIANO CONTAINM    ENT RHR*754B                                                     CONTAINMENT SPRAY SPRAYPUMP PUMP SUCTIONS SUCTIONS t.o l,..   -.'4!       I FROM  RWST
* FROM RWST c&#xa5;es          r
.;......:..--'-,,-"-FA
                                                                        . ~~
MINIFLO'NRECIRC      FROM CONTAINMENT SUMP RHR. HEAT.UP LINE
                                                                                                          ~
                                                                                                          ?"
                                                                                                        ~
                                                                                                        ""?"
:t Ul o
FR.OMRCReLOOP FROM            LOOP RHR-7448      51.8768  SI875B                                                                      2 2HOTHOTLEG lEG rhrfol rhrf01 INFOR MATION USE INFORMATION          USE ONLY  ONLY
 
Rev.
Rev. 2929 AOP-020 AOP-020          LOSS OF LOSS      RESIDUAL HEAT OF RESIDUAL  HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
COOLING)
Page Page 33 ofof 107 107
__STEP  H              INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I        RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
1.
: 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This  procedure provides provides the the instructions instructions necessary necessary toto mitigate mitigate the the loss of loss   of RHR RHR in in all all conditions conditions for for which which RHR RHR can can be be aligned aligned to to provide shutdown provide    shutdown cooling.
cooling. This This includes includes loss loss of of RHR RHR cooling cooling for for reasons  such  as  RCS reasons such as RCS leakage, leakage, loss loss of of power, power. loss loss of of Service Service Water Water or  Component Cooling or Component  Cooling Water, Water, RHR RHR pump pump cavitation, cavitation, and and inadequate inadequate flow or RHR flow        abnormal reductions or abnormal    reductions in in RHR RHR cooling.
cooling.
This procedure This  procedure is is applicable applicable inin Modes Modes 4,4, 5,
: 5. and and 66 when when fuel fuel is is in in vessel.
the vessel.
the 2.
: 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY    CONDITIONS Direct entry from any condition resulting in a loss of RHR
      ~ pump(s), ~HR  HR pump cavitation, abnormal RHR flow or temperature eF3sive loss control, or excessive      If  of RCS inventory while RHR is aligned for shutdown cooling.
As directed by the following other procedures:
          **    AOP-O05, Radiation Monitoring System, when a low level in the AOP-005, SEP exists due to an RCS leak with the SFP SFP                                           SEP GATE VALVE open.
* AOP-014, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, resulting in stopping of the RHR Pumps while in CSD.
* AOP-014, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, resulting in stopping of the RHR Pumps while in CSD.
* AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, if less than 200&deg;F and leakage exceeds Charging Capacity.
* AOP-016, AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, if less than 200&deg;F and leakage exceeds Charging Capacity.
* AOP-017, Loss Of Instrument Air, if the loss of Instrument Air has affected core cooling while on RHR. -END -107 Rev. 29 AOP-020 LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING) INSTRUCTIONS
            **   AOP-017, AOP-017, Loss Of Instrument Air, if the loss of Instrument Air has affected core cooling while on RHR.
* 1. Check RCS Level -LESS THAN -72 INCHES (69% FULL RANGE RVLIS) 2. Verify BOTH RHR Pumps -STOPPED 3. Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry Page 4 of RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IF RCS Level becomes less than -72 inches (69% FULL RANGE RVLIS). THEN verify BOTH RHR Pumps stopped. Go To Step 3. FRP-S.1 is NOT applicable for this event unless directed by the CSFSTs. 4. From The RTGB. Verify Reactor Tripped As Follows:
                                                - END
* REACTOR TRIP MAIN AND BYP -OPEN
                                                - END --
* Rod Position indication  
 
-ZERO
Rev.
* Rod Bottom lights -ILLUMINATED
Rev. 2929 AOP-020 AOP-020              LOSS OF LOSS    OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
: 5. Check RCS Level -DECREASING:
COOLING)
* Pressurizer level
Page Page 44 ofof 107 107
* RCS loop standpipe level
 
* RVLIS
STEP H                INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I            RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
* Refueling Cavity Watch report IF the reactor does NOT trip. THEN dispatch an Operator to the Rod Drive MG Set Room to Open REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS A AND B. IF either PZR PORV is failed open due to loss of input from PT-500 OR PT-501. THEN place the associated LTOPP Arming Switch to the NORMAL position.
1.
IF the event does NOT involve a loss of Inventory.
: 1.      Check RCS Check     RCS Level Level - LESS LESS THAN THAN           IF IF RCS RCS Level Level becomes becomes less less than than
THEN Go To Section E. Loss Of RHR Flow Or Temperature Control. IF RHR Pumps have been stopped due to loss of Inventory.
              -72 INCHES
THEN Go To Step 6. 107 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 79. Given the following:  
            -72   INCHES (69%    FULL RANGE (69% FULL   RANGE RVLIS)
-The plant is in MODE 3. -The plant experiences a loss of 480V Bus E-1 and EDG "A" does NOT start. -CCW Pump "C" breaker has tripped on overload.  
RVLIS)    -72
-CCW Pump "A" is running. Which ONE (1) of the following describes the required actions? A. Enter LCO 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM; Place the plant in MODE 5 within 72 hours. B. Enter LCO 3.0.3; Place the plant in MODE 4 within 37 hours. C. Enter LCO 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM; Restore 1 CCW Train to operable status within 72 hours. D. Enter LCO 3.0.3; Place the plant in MODE 5 within 37 hours. 79 000026 G2.2.38 001ILOSS OF CCW/1/1/3.6/4.5/SROIHIGH/43.1INEW  
                                                              -72 inches inches (69%    FULL  RANGE (69% FULL RANGE RVLIS).
-2008/CCW-012 Given the following:  
RVLIS), THENTHEN verify verify BOTH BOTH RHRRHR Pumps Pumps stopped.
-The plant is in MODE 3. -The plant experiences a loss of 480V Bus E-1 and EDG "A" does NOT start. -CCW Pump "c" breaker has tripped on overload.  
stopped.
-CCW Pump "A" is running. Which ONE (1) of the following describes the required actions? A. Enter LCO 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM; Place the plant in MODE 5 within 72 hours. B. Enter LCO 3.0.3; Place the plant in MODE 4 within 37 hours. C. Enter LCO 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM; Restore 1 CCW Train to operable status within 72 hours. Dy Enter LCO 3.0.3; Place the plant in MODE 5 within 37 hours. The correct answer is D. A: Incorrect  
Go Go ToTo Step Step 3.
-LCO 3.7.6 is correct entry for a single train of CCW INOPERABLE.
3.
LCO 3.7.6 Condition A is actually to restore an OPERABLE train of CCW within 72 hours. B: Incorrect  
  ~
-BOTH trains INOPERABLE therefore LCO 3.0.3 must be entered, but time to get to MODE 4 is actually 13 hours, 37 hours is correct time to get to MODE 5. C: Incorrect  
  -  2.
-LCO 3.7.6 is correct entry and action for a single train of CCW INOPERABLE.
: 2. Verify BOTH Verify    BOTH RHR RHR Pumps Pumps - STOPPED
D: Correct -CCW Pump "A" is powered from the DS Bus, which is NOT a credited Safeguards power source. Both "B" and "C" Pumps are INOPERABLE and LCO 3.7.6 does NOT contain a condition for BOTH trains INOPERABLE, therefore LCO 3.0.3 must be entered and the plant must be in MODE 5 in 37 hours. Exam Question Number: 79  
                                          -  STOPPED 3.
: 3. Make PA Make        Announcement For PA Announcement    For Procedure Entry Procedure      Entry NOTE FRP-S.1 is FRP-S.1     is NOT NQI applicable applicable forfor this event unless unless directed by the   the CSFSTs.
CSFSTs.
4.
: 4. From The RTGB.
From        RTGB, Verify Reactor               IF the reactor does iQ
                                                            .LE                        NOT trip.
trip, Tripped As Follows:
Tripped                                        THEN dispatch an Operator to        to the the Rod Drive MG Set Room to      to Open Open
          **    REACTOR TRIP MAIN AND BYP -
REACTOR                            -
REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS A        A AND AND B.B.
OPEN OPEN
            **   Rod Position Rod  Position indication -      -
ZERO ZERO
            **    Rod Rod Bottom Bottom lights -   -
ILLUMINAT ILLUMINATED ED 5.
: 5. Check Check RCS RCS Level Level - DECREASIN DECREASING: G:          IF either IF   either PZR PZR PORV PORV isis failed failed open due open    due to to loss loss of of input input from from
          **    Pressurizer Pressurizer level level                      PT-500 OR PT-500      OR PT-5O1, PT-501. THEN THEN place place the the associated LTOPP associated      LTOPP Arming Arming Switch Switch to the to    the NORMAL NORMAL position.
position.
          **    RCS RCS loop loop standpipe standpipe level level          IF the the event event does does NOT involve involve aa loss of loss     of Inventory, Inventory. THEN THEN GoGo To To OR                              Section E, Section      E. Loss Loss OfOf RHR RHR Flow Flow OrOr Temperature Control.
Temperature       Control.
          **    RVLIS RVLIS
                                                            ,IF RHR RHR Pumps Pumps have have been been stopped stopped due to due   to loss loss of of Inventory, Inventory. THENTHEN Go To Go   To Step Step 6.
6.
          **    Refueling Refueling Cavity Cavity Watch Watch report report
 
HLC-08 NRC Written Exam
: 79. Given the following:
in MODE 3.
      - The plant is in
      - The plant experiences a loss of 480V Bus E-1 and EDG "A"
        -                                                        A does NOT start.
COW Pump "C"
      - CCW
        -              C breaker has tripped on overload.
      - CCW Pump "A"
      -                A is running.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the required actions?
A. Enter LCO 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM; Place the plant in MODE 5 within 72 hours.
B. Enter LCO 3.0.3; Place the plant in MODE 4 within 37 hours.
C. Enter LCO 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM; Restore 11 CCW Train to operable status within 72 hours.
D. Enter LCO 3.0.3; Place the plant in MODE 5 within 37 hours.
79
 
000026 G2.2.38 000026   G2.2.38 001ILOSS 001/LOSS OF  OF CCW/1/1/3.6/4.5/SROIHIGH/43.1INEW CCW/1/1/3.6/4.5/SRO/HIGHJ43. 1/NEW - 2008/CCW-012
                                                                                    - 2008/CCW-012 Given the Given    the following:
following:
The plant
    - The
      -      plant isis inin MODE MODE 3. 3.
The plant
    - The
      -      plant experiences experiences aa loss  loss of of 480V 480V Bus Bus E-1 E-1 and and EDG EDG "A" A does does NOT NOT start.
start.
COW Pump
    - CCW
      -          Pump "c"         breaker has C breaker       has tripped tripped on  overload.
on overload.
CCW Pump
    - CCW
      -          Pump "A"   A isis running.
running.
Which ONE Which    ONE (1)  (1) of of the the following following describes describes the the required required actions?
actions?
A. Enter LCO A. Enter     LCO 3.7.6,3.7.6, COMPONENT COMPONENT COOLING      COOLING WATER WATER SYSTEM; SYSTEM; Place  Place the the plant plant in in MODE MODE 55 within 72 within   72 hours.
hours.
B. Enter LCO 3.0.3; Place B. Enter                      Place the plant in MODE  MODE 4 within 37 hours.
Enter LCO C. Enter     LCO 3.7.6, COMPONENT COMPONENT COOLING      COOLING WATER SYSTEM; Restore         Restore 11 CCW CCW Train to operable status within 72 hours.
D Enter LCO 3.0.3; Place the plant in MODE 5 within 37 hours.
Dy The correct answer is D.
A: Incorrect - LCO 3.7.6 is correct entry for a single train of CCW INOPERABLE.             INOPERABLE. LCO 3.7.6 Condition A is actually to restore an OPERABLE train of CCW within 72 hours.
B: Incorrect - BOTH trains INOPERABLE
                  -                        INOPERABLE therefore LCO 3.0.3 must be entered, but time to get to MODE 4 is actually 13 hours, 37 hours is correct time to get to MODE 5.
C: Incorrect - LCO 3.7.6 is correct entry and action for a single train of CCW INOPERABLE.
INOPERABLE.
D: Correct -   -      CCW Pump A      "A" is powered from the DS Bus, which is NOT a credited Safeguards power source. Both B          "B" and C "C" Pumps are INOPERABINOPERABLE  LE and LCO 3.7.6 does NOT  NOT contain a condition for BOTH trains INOPERAB    INOPERABLE,  LE, therefore LCO 3.0.3 must be entered and the plant must be in MODE 55 in 37 hours.
Exam Exam Question Question Number: 79
 
==Reference:==


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
ITS        3.7.6; ITS ITS 3.7.6;              3.0.3, ITS ITS 3.0.3,          3.7.6 BD.
ITS 3.7.6  BD.
KA KA Statement:
Statement: Knowledge Knowledge of      of conditions  and limitations conditions and  limitations inin the the facility license.
license.
History:
History: New New - Written Written for for HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC exam.
exam.
SRO SRO - Analysis Analysis of  of current current plantplant conditions  and application conditions and    application ofof generic generic LCOLCO requirements requirements..
KA KA Name:
Name:                  LOSS LOSS OF    OF CCW CCW                      Tier/Group:
Tier/Group:            1/1 1/1 Importance Rating:
Importance  Rating:      3.6/4.5 3.6/4.5                                RO/SRO RO/SRO Level:
Level:        SRO SRO Cognitive Cognitive Level:
Level:        HIGH HIGH                                    10CFR55.43    link:
10CFR55.43link:        43.1 43.1 Source:
Source:                    NEW NEW - 2008 2008                        Learning Learning Objective:
Objective:    CCW-012 CCW-012


ITS 3.7.6; ITS 3.0.3, ITS 3.7.6 BD. KA Statement:
CCW CCW System System 3.7.6 3.7.6 3.7 PLANT 3.7   PLANT SYSTEMS SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Component 3.7.6  Component Cooling Cooling Water Water (CCW)
Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license. History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC exam. SRO -Analysis of current plant conditions and application of generic LCO requirements.
(CCW) System System LCO 3.7.6 LCO   3.7.6       Two Two CCW CCW trains trains powered powered from from emergency emergency power  power supplies supplies shall shall be be OPERABLE.
KA Name: LOSS OF CCW Tier/Group:
OPERABLE.
1/1 Importance Rating: 3.6/4.5 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH lOCFR55.43link:
43.1 Source: NEW -2008 Learning Objective:
CCW-012 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System CCW System 3.7.6 LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains powered from emergency power supplies shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required CCW train A.1 ........ NOTE* ........ inoperable.
APPLICABILITY:      MODES MODES 1.
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops -MODE 4." for residual heat removal loops made inoperable . -by CCW . ---_ ....... _._-_ .. --........ -Restore required CCW 72 hours train to OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours HBRSEP Unit No. 2 3.7*16 Amendment No. 176 LCO Applicability 3.0 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.1 LCO 3.0.2 LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.4 HBRSEP Unit No. 2 LCOs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the App 1 i cabi 1 i ty, except as provi ded in LCO 3.0.2 and 3.0.7. Upon di scovery of a fai 1 ure to meet an LCO, the Requi red Acti ons of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.0.5 and LCO 3.0.6. If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Time(s), completion of the Required Action(s) is not required unless otherwise stated. When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable.
1, 2.
Action sha 11 be i ni ti ated wi thi n 1 hour to place the unit, as app 1 i cab 1 e, in: a. MODE 3 within 7 nours; b. MODE 4 within 13 hours; and c. MODE 5 within 37 hours. Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.
2, 3.
Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance wi th the LCO or ACTIONS, comp 1 et i on of the act ions required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required.
3, and and 4.
LCO 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made: (continued) 3.0-1 Amendment No. 203 CCW System 8 3.7.6 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 8 3.7.6 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System BASES BACKGROUND HBRSEP Unit No. 2 The CCW System provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient.
4.
During normal operation.
ACTIONS ACTIONS CONDITION                       REQUIRED ACTION                       COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME TIME A. One required CCW train         A.1       ........ NOTE*
the CCW System also provides this function for various nonessential components.
NOTE ........
as well as the spent fuel storage pool. The CCW System serves as a barrier to the release of radioactive byproducts between potentially radioactive systems and the Service Water System. and thus to the environment.
inoperable.                           Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS RCS Loops LoopsMO- MODE   4, for DE 4."
The CCW System consists of three pumps. two heat exchangers.
residual heat removal loops made inoperable
a supply and return header. a surge tank. and associated piping. valves. and instrumentation.
                                . -         by CCW CCW..
The "B" and "c" CCVI pumps are each powered by a separate safety related blJs The "A" CCW Dump is powered by the nonsafety related aedlcafed shutdown lfie surge tank accommodates changes in water volume in the system and ensures that sufficient net positive suction head is available for the CCW pumps. All CCW pumps automatically start on low pump discharge header pressure.
Restore required CCW                    hours 72 hours train to OPERABLE status.
All CCW pumps in operation upon initiation of a Safety Injection (SI) signal will continue to operate as long as normal power is available.
B.
Upon loss of normal power. the "8" and "c" CCW pumps are automatically loaded onto the emergency diesel generator (EDG) buses as long as an SI signal is not present. If a Containment Spray signal occurs after the EDG loading sequence has been completed.
B. Required Action Action and        B.1 B.1      Be in Be  in MODE 3. 3.                   66 hours hours associated associated Completion Time Time of of Condition Condition AA        AND AND not met.
the CCW pumps are stripped from the buses. The "B" and "C" CCW pumps are not loaded onto the EDG buses as part of the 51 loading sequence.
not met.
however. they are capable of manual start when EDG loads allow. Additional information on the design and operation of the system. along with a list of the components served. is presented in the UFSAR. Section 9.2.2 (Ref. 1). The principal safety re'lated function of the CCW System is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. This may be during a normal or post accident cooldown and shutdown. (continued)
8.2 B.2      Be in Be  in MODE MODE 5.5.                   36 hours 36  hours HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.
B 3.7*36 Revision No. 0 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 80. Given the following:  
No. 22                      3.7*16 3.7-16                                  Amendment No.
-The plant is in MODE 5 with RHR Pump "A" in service. -A loss of the Startup Transformer has occurred.  
Amendment    No. 176 176
-ALL equipment functioned as designed.  
 
-NO local actions have been performed.  
LCO LCO Applicability Applicability 3.0 3.0 3.0 LIMITING 3.0  LIMITING CONDITION CONDITION FORFOR OPERATION OPERATION (LCO)  (LCO) APPLICABILITY APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.1 LCO  3.0.1         LCOs LCOs shall shall bebe met met during during thethe MODES MODES oror other other specified specified conditions conditions in in the the App 1i cabi 1i ty,, except Applicability          except as as provi ded in provided    in LCO   3.0.2 and LCO 3.0.2    and 3.0.7.
-The Instrument Air Header is depressurized.  
3.0.7.
-The crew has implemented AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR. AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING) What is the plant response and what actions are required to restore core cooling? FCV-605, RHR BYPASS FLOW and HCV-758, RHR DISCH FLOW fail ... A. OPEN; AOP-017 performs ALL required actions. B. OPEN; Perform AOP-020 and AOP-017 concurrently.
LCO 3.0.2 LCO  3.0.2        Upon Upon di  scovery of discovery      of aa fai 1ure to failure    to meet meet anan LCO, LCO, the the Requi   red Acti Required          ons Actions of of the the associated associated Conditions Conditions shall        be  met,  except  as shall be met, except as provided provided in LCO in        3.0.5 and LCO 3.0.5    and LCOLCO 3.0.6.
C. CLOSED; AOP-017 performs ALL required actions. D. CLOSED; Perform AOP-020 and AOP-017 concurrently.
3.0.6.
80 000055 EA2.01 BLACKOUT/l/l/3.4/3.7/SROIHIGHl43.5INEW  
If the If  the LCO LCO is is met met oror isis no no longer longer applicable applicable priorprior to to expiration expiration of of the the specified specified Completion Completion Time(s),
-2008/AOP-024-007 Given the following:
Time(s), completion completion of  of the Required the  Required Action(s) is not required  required unless otherwise otherwise stated.
-The plant is in MODE 5 with RHR Pump "A" in service. -A loss of the Startup Transformer has occurred.  
stated.
-ALL equipment functioned as designed.  
LCO 3.0.3 LCO  3.0.3        When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are                   are not not met, met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by                            the by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE                 MODE oror other other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action                  Action sha shall11 be i ni ti ated wi thin beinitiatedwi        thi n 1ihourtoplacet hour to place the       unit, as app heunit,            1i cab1e, applicable, in:
-NO local actions have been performed.  
: a.     MODE 3 3 within 7    7 nours; hours;
-The Instrument Air Header is depressurized.  
: b.     MODE 44 within 13 hours; and
-The crew has implemented AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR. AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING) What is the plant response and what actions are required to restore core cooling? FCV-605, RHR BYPASS FLOW and HCV-758, RHR DISCH FLOW fail ... A. OPEN; AOP-017 performs ALL required actions. B. OPEN; Perform AOP-020 and AOP-017 concurrently.
: c.     MODE 55 within 37    37 hours.
C. CLOSED; AOP-017 performs ALL required actions. CLOSED; Perform AOP-020 and AOP-017 concurrently.
Specification are stated Exceptions to this Specification                       stated in in the the individual individual Specification Specifications. s.
The correct answer is D. A: Incorrect  
Where corrective Where    corrective measures measures are are completed completed thatthat permit permit operation operation accordance with in accordance in                  wi th the the LCO LCO or or ACTIONS, ACTIONS, completion comp1et i on of of the the actions act ions required by required      by LCO LCO 3.0.3 3.0.3 is  is not not required.
-FCV-605 and HCV-758 both fail CLOSED on a loss of instrument air. AOP-017 will restore Instrument Air, but does NOT restart the non-running RHR pump. B: Incorrect  
required.
-FCV-605 and HCV-758 both fail CLOSED on a loss of instrument air. AOP-020 and AOP-017 must be used concurrently to restore core cooling. Correct procedure, but incorrect failure of RHR valves. C: Incorrect  
LCO 3.0.3 LCO    3.0.3 isis only only applicable applicable in   in MODES MODES 1, 1, 2, 2, 3,   and 4.
-FCV-605 and HCV-758 both fail CLOSED on a loss of instrument air, but AOP-017 will NOT restart the non-running RHR pump. D: Correct -FCV-605 and HCV-758 both fail CLOSED on a loss of instrument air, AOP-017 and AOP-020 must be used concurrently to restore IA and restart the RHR pump because the SI sequencer is defeated when in MODE 5.
3, and  4.
Exam Question Number: 80  
LCO LCO 3.0.4 3.0.4        When an When    an LCO LCO isis notnot met, met, entry entry intointo aa MODE MODE oror other other specified specified condition in condition      in the the Applicability Applicability shall  shall only only bebe made:
made:
(continued)
(continued)
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.
No. 22                            3.0-1 3.0-1                                Amendment No.
Amendment    No. 203 203
 
CCW CCW System System 8B 3.7.6 3.7.6 BB 3.7 3.7 PLANT PLANT SYSTEMS SYSTEMS 8B 3.7.6 3.7.6 Component Component Cooling Cooling Water Water (CCW)
(CCW) System System BASES BASES BACKGROUND BACKGROUND          The The CCW CCW System System provides provides aa heatheat sink sink for for the the removal removal of of process process and and operating operating heatheat from from safety safety related related components components during during aa Design Design Basis Basis Accident Accident (DBA)
(DBA) or or transient.
transient. DuringDuring normal normal operation.
operation. the the CCW CCW System System also also provides provides this this function function for for various   nonessential components.
various nonessential      components, as as well well as as the the spent spent fuel fuel storage storage pool.
pool. TheThe CCW CCW System System serves serves asas aa barrier barrier to  to the the release release of of radioactive byproducts byproducts between between potentially potentially radioactive systems radioactive   systems and and the the Service Service Water Water System.
System, and and thus thus to the environment.
environment.
The CCW System consists of three pumps. pumps, two heat exchangers.
exchangers.
supply and return header.
a supply                  header, a surge tank.
tank, and associated associated piping. valves, and instrumentation.
piping, valves.            instrumentation. The   TjjB    and "c" "B" and     C CCVI CCW pumps are each powered by a separate             safety separate..safe    y  related relatRcl  blJs Liits..
_>    The "A" A CCW Dump u      is powered owered by the nonsafety nons          related e ica e shutdown b~s.
aedlcafed               b s. lfiee surge tank accommodates accommodates changes changes in water wa er volume vo ume in the system and ensures that sufficient  sufficient net positive suction head is available for the          the CCW CCW pumps.
pumps.
All CCW pumps automatically start on low pump discharge      discharge header pressure. All CCW pumps in operation upon           upon initiati initiation on of aa Safety Injection (SI) signal will continue to            to operate operate as long as normal power is available. Upon loss           loss ofof normal normal power. the B power,      "8" and C "c" CCW pumps are automatically loaded    loaded onto the emergency diesel generator (EDG)     (EDG) buses buses asas long long as as present. If aa Containment Spray an SI signal is not present.                                 Spray signal signal occurs after the EDG loading sequence sequence has beenbeen completed, completed.
the CCW the  CCW pumps pumps are are stripped stripped from the buses. The     The B "B" and and C "C" CCW pumps CCW  pumps are not loaded onto  onto the EDG buses as   as part part ofof the the 51 loading SI  loading sequence, sequence. however, however. they they are capable capable of of manual manual start when start   when EDG EDG loads loads allow.
allow.
Additional information Additional   information on   on the the design design and and operation operation of  of the the system. along system,  along with with aa list list of of the the components components served, served. is is presented in presented   in the the UFSAR, UFSAR. Section Section 9.2.2 9.2.2 (Ref.
(Ref. 1).
1). TheThe principal safety principal   safety related re'lated function function of of the the CCW CCW System System is is the the removal of removal  of decay decay heatheat from from the the reactor reactor via via the the Residual Residual Heat  Heat Removal (RHR)
Removal  (RHR) System.
System. This This may may bebe during during aa normal normal or or post post cooldown and accident cooldown accident                and shutdown.
shutdown.
(continued)
(conti  nued)
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.
No. 22                      BB3.7-36 3.7*36                             Revision No.
Revision      No. 00
 
HLC-08 NRC Written Exam
: 80. Given the following:
      - The plant is in MODE 5 with RHR Pump "A"
      -                                          A in service.
      - A loss of the Startup Transformer has occurred.
      - ALL equipment functioned as designed.
      - NO local actions have been performed.
      - The Instrument Air Header is depressurized.
      - The crew has implemented AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR.
AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
What is the plant response and what actions are required to restore core cooling?
FCV-605, RHR BYPASS FLOW and HCV-758, RHR DISCH FLOW fail...       fail ...
A. OPEN; AOP-017 performs ALL required actions.
B. OPEN; Perform AOP-020 and AOP-017 concurrently.
C. CLOSED; AOP-01 AOP-017 7 performs ALL required actions.
D. CLOSED; Perform AOP-020 and AOP-017 concurrently.
80
 
000055 EA2.01 000055  EA2.0 1 ~Ol/STATION 001/STATION BLACKOUT/l/l/3.4/3.7/SROIHIGHl43.5INEW BLACKOUT/l/ 1/3.4/3 .7/SROIHIGH]43 .5/NEW - 2008/AOP-024-007
                                                                            - 20081A0P-024-007 Given the Given  the following:
following:
The plant
    - The
    -        plant isis in in MODE MODE 55 with with RHR RHR Pump Pump "A"   in service.
A in  service.
A loss
    - A
    -    loss of of the the Startup Startup Transformer Transformer has has occurred.
occurred.
ALL equipment
    - ALL
    -        equipment functioned functioned as as designed.
designed.
NO local
    - NO
    -      local actions actions have have been   performed.
been performed.
The Instrument
    - The
    -        Instrument Air Air Header  is depressurized.
Header is depressurized.
The crew has implemented AOP-017, LOSS
    - The
    -                                              LOSS OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR.
AOP-020, LOSS LOSS OF  OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEATHEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
COOLING)
What is the plant response and what actions are required to restore core cooling?
FCV-605, RHR BYPASS FLOW and HCV-758, RHR DISCH FLOW fail                         ...
fail...
A. OPEN; AOP-017 performs ALL required actions.
B. OPEN; Perform AOP-020 and AOP-017 concurrently.
C. CLOSED; AOP-017 performs ALL required actions.
D CLOSED; Perform AOP-020 and AOP-017 concurrently.
D~
The correct answer is D.
A: Incorrect - FCV-605 and HCV-758 both fail CLOSED on a loss of instrument air. AOP-017 will restore Instrument Air, but does NOT restart the non-running RHR pump.
B: Incorrect - FCV-605 and HCV-758 both fail CLOSED on a loss of instrument air. AOP-020 and AOP-017 must be used concurrently to restore core cooling. Correct procedure, but incorrect failure of RHR valves.
C: Incorrect - FCV-605 and HCV-758 both fail CLOSED on a loss of instrument air, but AOP-017 will NOT restart the non-running RHR pump.
D: Correct - -    FCV-605 and HCV-758 both fail CLOSED on a loss of instrument air, AOP-017 and AOP-020 must be used concurrently to restore IA and restart the RHR pump because the SI sequencer is defeated when in MODE 5.
 
Exam Question Exam     Question Number:
Number: 80   80
 
==Reference:==
AOP-017,


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
AOP-017, Pages  Pages 33 and and 36;    AOP-020, Pages 36; AOP-020,      Pages 3,  3, 4,60-62 4, 60-62.. ..
KA  Statement: Ability KA Statement:      Ability to to determine determine or or interpret interpret the the following following as      they apply as they    apply to to aa Station Station Blackout:
Blackout:
Existing valve positioning Existing          positioning onon aa loss loss of of instrument instrument air air system.
system.
History: New History:        - Wriffen for New - Written      for HLC-08 HLC-08 NRCNRC Exam.
Exam.
SRO    - Requires analysis SRO - Requires      analysis of of plant  conditions, prediction plant conditions,    prediction of of subsequent subsequent failures failures during during abnormal abnormal and emergency plant plant conditions, conditions, selection selection of mitigating mitigating procedures.
procedures.
KA Name:
KAName:                STATION BLACKOUT STATION                                Tier/Group:
Tier/Group:              111 ill Importance Rating:    3.4/3.7                                          Level:
RO/SRO Level:            SRO SRO Cognitive Level:
Cognitive Level:      HIGH HIGH                                    10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43    link:    43.5 43.5 Source:
Source:              NEW - 2008 Learning  Objective:
Learning Objective:      AOP-024-007 AOP-024-007
Rev.
Rev. 35 35 AOP-017 AOP  017                        LOSS OF LOSS    OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR Page Page 33 of of 61 61 Purpose and Purpose    and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)
1.1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This  procedure provides provides instructions instructions in  in the the event event aa loss loss of of Instrument Air Instrument  Air occurs.
occurs.
2.
: 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY  CONDITIONS
: a. Instrument
: a. Instrument Air Air Header Header pressure pressure less less than than 85 85 psig.
psig.
: b. Instrument
: b. Instrument Air Air System System pipe pipe break.
break.
                                            - END
                                            - END - -


AOP-017, Pages 3 and 36; AOP-020, Pages 3, 4,60-62 .. KA Statement:
Rev.
Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Station Blackout:
Rev. 35 35 AOP-017 AOP-017                          LOSS LOSS OF OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR    AIR Page  36 of Page 36  of 61 61 ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 11 MAJOR COMPONENTS MAJOR  COMPONENTS AFFECTED AFFECTED BY    BY LOSS LOSS OF OF IA IA (Page (Page 33 of  of 5) 5)
Existing valve positioning on a loss of instrument air system. History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam. SRO -Requires analysis of plant conditions, prediction of subsequent failures during abnormal and emergency plant conditions, selection of mitigating procedures.
6.
KAName: STATION BLACKOUT Tier/Group:
: 6. Isolation Valve Isolation  Valve Seal Seal Water Water System System Components Components FAILFAIL POSITION POSITION
111 Importance Rating: 3.4/3.7 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH lOCFR55.43 link: 43.5 Source: NEW -2008 Learning Objective:
: a. PCV-1922 A
AOP-024-007 AOP 017 LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR Purpose and Entry Conditions (Page 1 of 1) 1. PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions in the event a loss of Instrument Air occurs. 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS
: a. PCV-1922  A &
: a. Instrument Air Header pressure less than 85 psig. b. Instrument Air System pipe break. -END -Rev. 35 Page 3 of 61 AOP-017 LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR ATTACHMENT 1 MAJOR COMPONENTS AFFECTED BY LOSS OF IA (Page 3 of 5) 6. Isolation Valve Seal Water System Components FAIL POSITION a. PCV-1922 A & B, IVSW AUTO HEADER ISOLs -OPEN 7. Main Steam System Components FAIL POSITION a. MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES -CLOSED b. STEAM LINE PORVs -CLOSED 8. Primary Sample System Components FAIL POSITION a. PS-956 A through H, PRIMARY SAMPLE ISOLATIONS
                      & B, B, IVSW IVSW AUTO AUTO HEADER HEADER ISOLs ISOLs - OPEN
-CLOSED 9. Radiation Monitoring System Components FAIL POSITION a. RMS-1,2,3
                                                                  - OPEN 7.
& 4, R-11/R-12 ISOL VALVES -CLOSED 10. Reactor Coolant System Components FAIL POSITION a. PCV-455 A & B, PZR SPRAYS -CLOSED b. RC-516 & 553, PRT TO GAS ANALYZER -CLOSED c. RC-519 A & B, PW TO CV ISOs -CLOSED d. RC-544, RV FLANGE LEAKOFF -OPEN e. RC-550, PRT NITROGEN SUPPLY -CLOSED II. Residual Heat Removal System Components FAIL POSITION a. HCV-142, PURIFICATION FLOW -CLOSED b. HCV-758, RHR HX DISCH FLOW -CLOSED c. FCV-605, RHR HX BYPASS FLOW -CLOSED Rev. 35 Page 36 of 61 Rev, 29 AOP-020 LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING) Page 3 of INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1. PURPOSE This procedure provides the instructions necessary to mitigate the loss of RHR in all conditions for which RHR can be aligned to provide shutdown cooling. This includes loss of RHR cooling for reasons such as RCS leakage, loss of power, loss of Service Water or Component Cooling Water, RHR pump cavitation, and inadequate RHR flow or abnormal reductions in RHR cooling. This procedure is applicable in Modes 4, 5, and 6 when fuel is in the vessel. 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS Direct entry from any condition resulting in a loss of RHR pump(s), RHR pump cavitation, abnormal RHR flow or temperature control, or excessive loss of RCS inventory while RHR is aligned for shutdown cooling. As directed by the following other procedures:
: 7. Main Steam Main  Steam System System Components Components FAIL  FAIL POSITION POSITION
* AOP-005, Radiation Monitoring System, when a low level in the SFP exists due to an RCS leak with the SFP GATE VALVE open.
: a. MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES - CLOSED    -
* AOP-014, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, resulting in stopping of the RHR Pumps while in CSD.
LINE PORVs
* AOP-016. Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. if less than 200&deg;F and leakage exceeds Charging Capacity.
: b. STEAM LINE    PORVs - CLOSED
* AOP-017. Loss Of Instrument Air. if the loss of Instrument Air has affected core cooling while on RHR. -END -107 Rev. 29 AOP-020 LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING) INSTRUCTIONS
: 8. Primary Sample System Components FAIL POSITION Primary PS-956 A
* 1. Check RCS Level -LESS THAN 72 INCHES (69% FULL RANGE RVLIS) 2. Verify BOTH RHR Pumps -STOPPED 3. Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry Page 4 of RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED II RCS Level becomes less than -72 inches (69% FULL RANGE RVLIS). THEN verify BOTH RHR Pumps stopped. Go To Step 3. FRP-S.1 is NOT applicable for this event unless directed by the CSFSTs. 4. From The RTGB. Verify Reactor Tripped As Follows:
: a. PS-956  A through H, PRIMARY SAMPLE ISOLATIONS    ISOLATIONS - CLOSED 9.
* REACTOR TRIP MAIN AND BYP -OPEN
: 9. Radiation Monitoring System Components FAIL POSITION
* Rod Position indication  
: a. RMS-1,2,3 &  & 4, R-11/R-12 ISOL VALVES - CLOSED     -
-ZERO
10.
* Rod Bottom lights -ILLUMINATED
: 10. Reactor Coolant System Components FAIL POSITION a.
: 5. Check RCS Level -DECREASING:
: a. PCV-455 AA && B.
* Pressurizer level
B, PZR SPRAYS - CLOSED
* RCS loop standpipe level
: b. RC-516 && 553, 553, PRT TO GAS ANALYZER ANALYZER - CLOSED
* RVLIS
: c. RC-519
* Refueling Cavity Watch report IF the reactor does NOT trip. THEN dispatch an Operator to the Rod Drive MG Set Room to Open REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS A AND B. IF either PZR PORV is failed open due to loss of input from PT-SOO OR PT-S01. THEN place the associated LTOPP Arming Switch to the NORMAL position.
: c.              B, PW TO CV ISOs - CLOSED RC-519 AA && B,                       -
IF the event does NOT involve a loss of Inventory.
d.
THEN Go To Loss Of RHR Flow Or Temperature Control. IF RHR Pumps have been stopped due to loss of Inventory.
: d. RC-544, RV FLANGE FLANGE LEAKOFF - OPEN -
THEN Go To Step 6. 107 Rev. 29 AOP-020 LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING) Page 60 of 107 INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Section E Loss Of RHR Flow Or Temperature Control (Page 1 of 20) 1. Implement the EALs 2. Check CV Closure Status -PENETRATIONS OPEN 3. Check Refueling Cavity Level -29 INCHES OR GREATER BELOW THE OPERATING DECK 4. Initiate CV Closure Using OMM-033, CV Closure 5. Check SI Pumps -ONE SI PUMP AVAILABLE TO START FROM RTGB
e.
* 6. Check Core Exit TiCs -LESS THAN 200 0 F
: e. RC-550, PRT NITROGEN RC-550, PRT  NITROGEN SUPPLY SUPPLY - CLOSED
* 7. Check Core Exit TiCs -LESS THAN 175 0 F 8. Check Reason For Entry:
                                                -  CLOSED 11.
* LOW FLOW RHR PUMP TRIP Go To Step 8. Go To Step 8. Dispatch an operator to the E-1/E-2 Room to prepare to verify the breaker Racked In AND Fuses Installed for ONE SI Pump when notified by the Control Room. Verify ONE SI Pump breaker is Racked In AND Fuses Installed.
II. Residual Residual Heat Heat Removal Removal System System Components Components FAIL  FAIL POSITION POSITION
Go To Step 44. Verify ONE SI Pump breaker is Racked In AND Fuses Installed while continuing with step in effect. Go To Step 19.
: a. HCV-142,
Rev. 29 AOP-020 LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING) Page 61 of 107 INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Section E Loss Of RHR Flow Or Temperature Control (Page 2 of 20) **************************************************************************
: a. HCV-142, PURIFICAT PURIFICATION     FLOW - CLOSED ION FLOW      -    CLOSED
CAUTION Changes in RCS ptessure may result in inaccuracies in RCS Loop Standpipe indications.  
: b. HCV-758,
**************************************************************************
: b. HCV-758, RHR RHR HX HX DISCH DISCH FLOWFLOW - CLOSED
: 9. Check RHR Pumps -ALL STOPPED Observe the NOTE prior to Step 12 and Go To Step 12. The intent of this procedure is to maintain the CV Purge in service if the Equipment Hatch is not installed.
                                              -   CLOSED c.
: 10. Check power supply to at least one RHR Pump -AVAILABLE:
: c. FCV-605, FCV-605, RHR RHR HX HX BYPASS BYPASS FLOW FLOW - CLOSED
* RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP A -E-l (CMPT-22A)
                                                -  CLOSED
* RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP B -E-2 (CMPT-26B)
 
Initiate CV Closure Using OMM-033. CV Closure. Go To Step 32 Rev. AOP-020 LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING) Page INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Section E Loss Of RHR Flow Or Temperature Control (Page 3 of 20) 11. Determine RHR Status As Follows: a. Check CCW -AVAILABLE
Rev, Rev. 2929 AOP-020 AOP-020             LOSS OF LOSS  OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
: b. Adjust FC-60S, RHR HX BYPASS FLOW Controller 0% (Closed) c. Adjust HIC-7S8, RHR HX DISCH FLOW, 0% (Closed) '--:::> d. Attempt to start the standby RHR pump a. Go To Step 23. 29 62 e. Check RHR Pumps -ONE RUNNING e. Observe the NOTE prior to Step 10 and Go To Step 10. f. Adjust FC-60S, RHR HX BYPASS FLOW Controller.
COOLING)
To Restore Flow Between 3000 gpm And 37S0 gpm g. Adjust HIC-7S8. RHR HX DISCH FLOW. To Obtain Desired Cooling of 107 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 81. EPP-26, LOSS OF DC BUS "A" contains this CAUTION prior to Step 1: CAUTION "Restoration of DC Control Power to a de-energized AC Bus before Steps 16 through 23 have been completed may result in uncontrolled equipment starts." (Steps 16-23 strips all load breakers on 4160V Busses 1 and 2, 480V Busses 1 and 2A). Which ONE (1) of the following describes the basis for this CAUTION? A. DC start contactors on some AC equipment may have latched to the START condition, allowing restart on restoration of AC power. B. Breaker anti-pump features will NOT be available to protect the breakers and equipment upon restart. C. 4160V Busses 1 and 2 and the busses downstream are de-energized with load breakers still closed. On power restoration, auto transfer could occur before the load breakers trip on Undervoltage, allowing connected equipment to start. D. Breakers on equipment connected to busses downstream of 4160V Busses 1 and 2 automatically re-close on restoration of AC power if their Undervoltage relays have been re-energized.
Page Page 33 ofof 107 107
81 000058 G2.1.32 001ILOSS OF DC POWERllI1I3.8/4.0/SROILOW/43.5INEW  
[ STEP H                INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I H        RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 1.
-2008/EPP-26-003 EPP-26, LOSS OF DC BUS "A" contains this CAUTION prior to Step 1: CAUTION "Restoration of DC Control Power to a de-energized AC Bus before Steps 16 through 23 have been completed may result in uncontrolled equipment starts." (Steps 16-23 strips all load breakers on 4160V Busses 1 and 2, 480V Busses 1 and 2A). Which ONE (1) of the following describes the basis for this CAUTION? A. DC start contactors on some AC equipment may have latched to the START condition, allowing restart on restoration of AC power. B. Breaker anti-pump features will NOT be available to protect the breakers and equipment upon restart. C'r' 4160V Busses 1 and 2 and the busses downstream are de-energized with load breakers still closed. On power restoration, auto transfer could occur before the load breakers trip on Undervoltage, allowing connected equipment to start. D. Breakers on equipment connected to busses downstream of 4160V Busses 1 and 2 automatically re-close on restoration of AC power if their Undervoltage relays have been re-energized.
: 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This    procedure provides provides the the instructions instructions necessary necessary toto mitigate mitigate the the loss    of RHR loss of RHR in allin all conditions conditions for for which which RHR RHR can can be be aligned aligned to to provide shutdown provide      shutdown cooling.
The correct answer is C. A: Incorrect  
cooling. This This includes includes loss loss of of RHR RHR cooling cooling for for reasons such reasons     such as as RCS  leakage, loss RCS leakage,   loss of of power, power. loss loss of of Service Water Service  Water or Component or   Component Cooling Cooling Water, Water, RHR RHR pump pump cavitation, cavitation, and and inadequate inadequate RI-JR flow RHR   flow or   abnormal reductions or abnormal  reductions in in RHR RHR cooling.
-DC start contactors do NOT have latch conditions.
cooling.
B: Incorrect  
This procedure This     procedure isis applicable applicable in in Modes Modes 4,4. 5, 5, and and 66 when when fuel fuel is is in in the  vessel.
-Breaker anti-pump circuits are restored as soon as DC power is restored.
the vessel.
C: Correct -Potential for uncontrolled start of equipment upon power restoration.
2.
D: Incorrect
: 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY    CONDITIONS Direct entry from any condition resulting in a loss of RHR pump(s), RHR pump cavitation, abnormal RHR flow or temperature control, or excessive loss of RCS inventory while RHR is aligned for shutdown cooling.
-Upon power restoration, loads should strip, NOT re-energize if DC UV coils are energized.
As directed by the following other procedures:
Exam Question Number: 81
* AOPOO5, Radiation Monitoring System, when a low level in the AOP-005, 5FF exists due to an RCS leak with the SFP SFP                                            5FF GATE VALVE open.
* AOPO14, AOP-014, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, resulting in stopping of the RHR Pumps while in CSD.
          **     AOP-O16.
AOP-016. Excessive Primary Primary Plant Leakage, Leakage. if less than 200&deg;F 200&deg;F and leakage exceeds Charging Capacity.
          **     AOP-O17, AOP-017. Loss Of Instrument Air, Air. if the loss of Instrument Air has affected core cooling while on    on RHR.
                                                - END
                                                - END --
 
Rev.
Rev. 2929 AOP-020 AOP-020             LOSS LOSS OF OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
COOLING)
Page 44 of Page      of 107 107
 
STEP H                INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I          RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 1.
: 1. Check Check RCS RCS Level Level - LESS LESS THAN THAN           II IF RCS RCS Level Level becomes becomes less less than than 72 INCHES
              -72  INCHES (69%
(69% FULL FULL RANGE RANGE RVLIS)
RVLIS)    -72
                                                          -72 inches inches (69%
(69% FULL FULL RANGE RANGE RVLIS).
RVLIS), THEN THEN verify verify BOTH BOTH RHR RHR Pumps Pumps stopped.
stopped.
Go Go To To Step Step 3.
3.
: 2. Verify BOTH RHR Pumps - STOPPED
                                        - STOPPED
: 3. Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry NOTE FRP-S.1 is NOT  NQI applicable for this event unless directed by the CSFSTs.
: 4. From The RTGB.RTGB, Verify Reactor           IF the reactor does NOT trip.
IE                          trip, Tripped As Follows:                           THEN dispatch an Operator to the Rod Drive MG Set Room to Open
* REACTOR TRIP MAIN AND BYP -   -      REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS A  A AND B.
OPEN
* Rod Position indication -    -
ZERO
* Rod Bottom lights - -
ILLUMINATED
: 5. Check RCS Level - DECREASING:
IF either PZR PORV is failed open due to loss of input from
            **     Pressurizer level                     PT-SOO OR PT-5O1, PT-500      PT-S01. THEN place the the associated LTOPP Arming Switch OR                          to the NORMAL position.
          **      RCS loop standpipe level              IF the event does NOT involve aa j.
Inventory. THEN Go loss of Inventory,          Go To OR                         Secti~. Loss Of RHR Flow SectionE,                Flow Or Temperature Control.
Temperature
            **    RVLIS RVLIS IF RHR Pumps have been been stopped stopped OR                          due to loss loss of Inventory, Inventory. THEN THEN To Step Go To   Step 6.
6.
            **    Refueling Cavity Cavity Watch report
 
Rev.
Rev. 29 29 AOP-020 AOP-020            LOSS LOSS OFOF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
COOLING)
Page 60 Page 60 of of 107 107 j STEP 1[              INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS Section Section E E
 
===RESPONSE===
RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED Loss Of Loss      RHR Flow Of RHR  Flow Or Or Temperature Temperature Control Control (Page (Page 11 of of 20) 20) 1.
: 1. Implement the Implement          EALs the EALs 2.
: 2. Check CV Check        Closure Status CV Closure     Status --                Go Go To To Step Step 8.
8.
PENETRATIONS PENETRATIONS OPEN OPEN 3.
: 3. Check Refueling Check    Refueling Cavity Cavity Level Level - -         Go Go To To Step Step 8.
8.
29 INCHES OR GREATER BELOW THE OPERATING DECK 4.
: 4. Initiate CV Closure Initiate        Closure Using OMM-033, CV Closure
: 5. Check SI Pumps - ONE SI PUMP
                                -                          Dispatch an operator to the AVAILABLE TO START FROM RTGB                     E-l/E-2 Room to prepare to E-1/E-2 verify the breaker Racked In AND Fuses Installed for ONE SI Pump when notified by the Control Room.
* 6.
Check Core Exit TiCs  T/Cs - LESS THAN Verify ONE SI Pump breaker is 200 FF 200&deg;0 Racked In AND Fuses Installed.
Go To Step 44.
* 7. Check Core Exit T/Cs  TiCs  - LESS THAN
                                        -                   Verify ONE SI Pump breaker is 175&deg; 175 0 FF                                        Racked In AND Fuses Installed while continuing with step in effect.
8.
: 8. Check Reason For Check            For Entry:                            Step 19.
Go To Step   19.
            . LOW LOW FLOW FLOW OR
          ~.
          .      RHR RHR PUMP PUMP TRIP TRIP
 
Rev.
Rev. 2929 AOP-020 AOP-020            LOSS OF LOSS   OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
COOLING)
Page Page 6161 of of 107 107 H__STEP  H                INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS Section I I Section EE
 
===RESPONSE===
RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED Loss Of Loss    Of RHR RHR Flow Flow Or Or Temperature Temperature Control Control (Page (Page 22 of of 20) 20)
CAUTION CAUTION Changes in Changes    in RCS RCS ptessure pressure may may result result in  in inaccuracies inaccuracies in  in RCS RCS Loop Loop Standpipe Standpipe indications.
indications.
9.
: 9. Check RHR Pumps - ALL STOPPED Observe the NOTE prior to      to Step 1212 and Go To Step 12.
NOTE The intent of this procedure is to maintain the CV Purge in service if                        if Equipment Hatch is not installed.
the Equipment
: 10. Check power supply to at least                  Initiate CV Closure Using one RHR Pump - AVAILABL AVAILABLE:  E:                OMM-033. CV Closure.
OMM-O33,
            **   RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP A        A      Go To Step 32
                  - E-1 E-l (CMPT-22A (CMPT-22A))
OR
            **     RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL PUMP PUMP BB
                  - E-2 (CMPT-26B))
E-2 (CMPT-26B
 
Rev.
Rev. 29 2,9 AOP-020 AOP-020            LOSS OF LOSS  OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOwN COOLING)
COOLING)
Page  62 of Page 62  of 107 107 j__STEP_H                INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS Section Section EE I        RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
Loss Of Loss  Of RHR RHR Flow Flow Or Or Temperature Temperature Control Control (Page (Page 33 of of 20) 20) 11.
: 11. Determine RHR Determine  RHR Status Status As As Follows:
Follows:
: a. Check
: a. Check CCW CCW - AVAILABLE
                            - AVAILABLE                  a.
: a. GoGo To To Step Step 23.
23.
: b. Adjust
: b. Adjust FC-60S, FC-605, RHR RHR HX HX BYPASS BYPASS FLOW Controller FLOW  Controller 0% 0% (Closed)
(Closed)
: c. Adjust
: c. Adjust HIC-7S8, HIC-758, RHR RHR HX HX DISCH DISCH FLOW, 0% (Closed)
      >     d. Attempt to start the standby d.
RHR pump Check RHR Pumps - ONE RUNNING
: e. Check              -
: e. Observe the NOTE prior to  to Step 10 and Go To Step 10.
: f. Adjust
: f. Adjust FC-605, FC-60S, RHR HX BYPASS FLOW Controller. To Restore Flow Between 3000 gpm And 3750 gpm 37S0 gpm
: g. Adjust Adjust HIC-758, HIC-7S8. RHR HX DISCH FLOW, FLOW. To Obtain Desired Cooling Cooling
 
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08     NRC Written Exam Exam
: 81. EPP-26,
: 81. EPP-26, LOSSLOSS OF OF DC DC BUS BUS "A" A contains contains this CAUTION CAUTION prior prior to to Step Step 1:
1:
CAUTION CAUTION Restoration of "Restoration   of DC DC Control Control Power Power to to aa de-energized de-energized AC Bus Bus before before Steps Steps 16 16 through through 23 23 have have been completed may result in uncontrolled equipment starts."
starts.
41 60V Busses 11 and 2, 480V Busses 11 and 2A).
(Steps 16-23 strips all load breakers on 4160V Which ONE (1) of the following describes the basis for this CAUTION?
A. DC start contactors on some AC equipment may have latched to the START condition, allowing restart on restoration of AC power.
B. Breaker anti-pump features will NOT be available to protect the breakers and equipment upon restart.
41 60V Busses 11 and 2 and the busses downstream are de-energized with load breakers C. 4160V still closed. On power restoration, auto transfer could occur before the load breakers trip on Undervoltage, allowing connected equipment to start.
D. Breakers on equipment connected to busses downstream of 4160V     41 60V Busses 11 and 2 automatically re-close on restoration of AC power if their Undervoltage relays have been re-energized.
81 81
 
000058 G2.1.32 000058    G2.1.32 001ILOSS 001/LOSS OF  OF DCDC POWERllI1I3.8/4.0/SROILOW/43.5INEW POWERI1/1/3.8/4.0/SROILOW/43.5/NEW - 2008/EPP-26-003
                                                                                          - 2008IEPP-26-003 EPP-26, LOSS EPP-26,      LOSS OF  OF DCDC BUS  BUS "A" A contains contains this this CAUTION CAUTION prior prior to to Step Step 1: 1:
CAUTION CAUTION Restoration of "Restoration       of DC DC Control Control PowerPower toto aa de-energized de-energized AC AC BusBus before before Steps Steps 1616 through through 23 23 have have been    completed      may    result  in uncontrolled been completed may result in uncontrolled equipment starts." equipment  starts.
(Steps 16-23 (Steps    16-23 strips strips all    load breakers all load     breakers on on 4160V   Busses 11 and 41 60V Busses         and 2,2, 480V 480V Busses Busses 11 and and 2A).
2A).
Which ONE Which     ONE (1)(1) of of the   following describes the following      describes thethe basis basis for for this this CAUTION?
CAUTION?
A. DC A. DC start    contactors on start contactors         on some some AC AC equipment equipment maymay have have latched latched to to the the START START condition, condition, allowing restart allowing     restart on     restoration of on restoration      of AC power.
power.
B. Breaker anti-pump B. Breaker      anti-pump features features will NOTNOT be be available to to protect protect the breakers breakers and and equipment upon restart.
C'r' 41 60V Busses C 4160V       Busses 11 and 2 and      and the busses busses downstream are     are de-energized de-energized with load load breakers breakers still closed. On power restoration, auto transfer could occur before the load breakers trip on Undervoltage, allowing connected equipment to start.
Undervoltage, D. Breakers on equipment connected to busses downstream of 4160V Busses 11 and 2 automatically re-close on restoration of AC power if their Undervoltage relays have been re-energized.
The correct answer is C.
A: Incorrect - DC start contactors do NOT have latch conditions.
B: Incorrect - Breaker anti-pump circuits are restored as soon as DC power is restored.
C: Correct -   -      Potential for uncontrolled start of equipment upon power restoration.
D: Incorrect - Upon power restoration, loads should strip, NOT re-energize if DC UV coils are energized.
Exam Question Question Number: 81
 
==Reference:==


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
EPP-26, EPP-26, Page 4;        4; EPP-26-BD, Page 4.
KA Statement:
KA  Statement: AbilityAbility to    explain and to explain          apply system and apply    system limits    and precautions.
limits and History:
History: New New - Written Written for for HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC Exam.
Exam.
SRO - Knowledge SRO    -
Knowledge of    of cautions cautions and  and basis basis for for cautions cautions in in procedures procedures past past Immediate Immediate Action Action steps.
steps.
KA  Name:
KAName:                  LOSS LOSS OF    OF DC DC POWER POWER                Tier/Group:
Tier/Group:              III 1/1 Importance Rating:
Importance    Rating:    3.8/4.0 3.8/4.0                                RO/SRO RO/SRO Level:
Level:      SRO SRO Cognitive Cognitive Level:
Level:      LOW LOW                                    10CFR55.43 10CFR55.43link:
link:    43.5 43.5 Source:
Source:                  NEW - 2008 NEW      -
2008                        Learning Objective:
Learning  Objective:  EPP-26-003 EPP-26-003
Rev.
Rev. 77 EPP-26 EPP-26                                  LOSS OF LOSS      OF DC    BUS "A" DC BUS    A Page Page 44 ofof 47 47 STEP H              INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I          RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED CAUTION CAUTION Restoration of Restoration      of DC DC Control Control Power Power to to aa deenergized deenergized AC    AC Bus Bus before before Steps Steps 16 16 through 23 through      23 have have been been completed completed may may result result in in uncontrolled uncontrolled equipment equipment starts.
starts.
* 1.      Check The The Cause
* 1. Check        Cause Of  Of The The DCDC Bus Bus              WHEN WHEN the the cause cause is  is determined.
determined, Failure - KNOWN Failure      KNOWN                                    THEN THEN notify notify Maintenance Maintenance to    to correct correct the the problem.
problem.
NOTE AFW PUMP AFW    PUMP AA will will not not be available available due    due to to loss loss ofof control control power to    to the the breaker.
breaker.
2.
: 2. Maintain S/G Maintain    S/C Levels Between 8%
And 50%
And  50% Using Available AFW Pumps:
Pumps:
          **    AFW PUMP B AFW        B
          **    STEAM DRIVEN STEAM  DRIVEN AFW PUMP 3.
: 3. Check Check SISI Signal    - INITIATED                    Go To Step 5.
STEP SPECIFIC STEP    SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION AND            AND RNP RNP DIFFERENCES DIFFERENCES The following The  following pagespages willwill provide provide the  the RNPRNP step step number.
number. There There isis no  no ERG ERG for  for this this procedure.
procedure.
RNP RNP          BASIS BASIS STEP STEP PEC PEC        This procedure This      procedure will  will bebe entered entered from from EPP-4 EPP-4 or  or EPP-7 EPP-7 based based on on thethe initial initial conditions conditions at  at the the time time of  of the the loss loss of DC.of DC. IfIf thethe pant pant isis at  at power power (>  (> 100 100 MW)
MW) itit isis expected ex ected thatt the    the ent.!'L~ill entry will be      via EPP-7.
be via  EPP-7.
  ----~:-,                                                                                                                                          -'-'-----~
Cl C1          The Caution The        Caution isis provided provided to        warn the to warn            Operator of the Operator          the possibility of the    possibility of  of equipment equipment performing performing uncontrolled uncontrTh equipment starts.
equipment          starts. IfIf the the loss loss ofof DCDC BusBus AA occurred occurred from from an  an at at power power condition condition the  the busses busses fed  fed downstream of downstream              of 4160V 41 60V BussesBusses 11 and  and 22 are    deenergized with are deenergized            with load load breakers breakers still still closed.
closed. IfIf DC DC Control Control Power isis restored Power            restored to  to the the 4160V 41 60V busses busses and and anan automatic automatic transfer transfer occurs occurs before before the the load load breakers trip on undervoltageundervoltage all      all equipment equipment will  will start start simultaneously.
simultaneously. The    The stepstep below below the the Caution Caution will  wi,J initiate efforts to restore the faulted DC Bus.
1          This step This      step isis provided provided to initiate initiate efforts efforts to repair repair thethe faulted faulted DC  DC Bus.Bus. ItIt is is placed placed early early inin the the procedure procedure so    that efforts so that    efforts can  can bebe made made to contactcontact Maintenance Maintenance personnel.
personnel. The  The high high level level step    provides direction step provides        direction toto diagnose diagnose the    the cause cause and    and provides provides transitional transitional guidance.
guidance. There  There are  are three three possible possible failure failure mechanisms that are the most likely causes:
              **      FaultonABat Fault  on A Battery  tery
              **      Fault on A Battery Bus Fault
              **      Fault on MCC-5 Fault          MCC-5 The failure, or tripping, of the in-service Battery Charger, is not a likely cause of the loss of DC since warning would be provided via an annunciator with ample time for Operator action to transfer the chargers.
N2 N2      The note reminds the Operator that since DC BUS A has been lost, no control power is available for                                                          for AFW PUMP A. The subsequent step will control SIG                              S/G level.
22        S/G level is maintained in order to provide a heat sink. BB AFW pump and the SDAFW pump are specified specified because because A      A AFW AFW pump  pump is    is not not available available due due to  to the the loss loss of of DC.
DC.
33        Subsequent Subsequent steps      steps will reset an      an SI SI Signal. This diagnostic diagnostic step  step provides        Transitional direction provides Transitional            direction should should the the event event have have occurred occurred with  with the      Unit Auxiliaries the Unit    Auxiliaries being being powered powered from  from the the SUT.
SUT. In  In this this case case the the RNORNO bypasses bypasses the    the steps steps to to reset SI        and restore SI and    restore Instrument Instrument Air    Air to to the the CV.
CV.
44        ItIf an an SISI has has occurred occurred itit willwill be be necessary necessary to  to restore restore Instrument Instrument Air    Air to to the the CV CV in in order order toto perform perform subsequent subsequent steps    steps such such as  as placing placing Excess Excess Letdown Letdown in    in service.
service. TheThe step step provided provided resets resets SI SI and and Phase Phase AA then then restores restores IA  IA toto the the CV.CV. PCV-1716 PCV-1716 should should be  be available available during during aa lossloss ofof DCDC BusBus A A since since itsits solenoid solenoid isis powered powered from    from Auxiliary Auxiliary PanelPanel GC GC (DC (DC BusBus B). B). Resetting Resetting SI    SI isis possible possible since since Train Train AA has  has not initiated not      initiated and and Train Train BB has  has control control Power.
Power. IfIf resetting resetting the  the Isolation Isolation Signal Signal is  is unsuccessful unsuccessful in    in restoring restoring IAIA toto the the CV, CV, the  the valve valve is  is placed placed in  in the the Override Override position position whichwhich places places control control power power fromfrom AuxAux Panel Panel GCGC directly directly onon thethe solenoid solen'oid for  for opening opening the the valve.
valve. Instrument Instrument Air    Air pressure pressure isis verified        prior to verified prior    to attempting attempting toto place place airair inin the the CV CV in  in order order to  to assure assure airair pressure pressure isis higherhigher than than potential potential CV  CV pressure.
pressure. IfIf IA IA isis not not established established the      the steps steps for  for placing placing Excess Excess letdown letdown inin service service are are also also bypassed bypassed since  since this this also also requires requires air air inin the the CV.
CV.
55        This This stepstep provides provides the    the means means to    to control control PZR PZR level level during during thethe loss loss ofof DC.
DC. Excess Excess Letdown Letdown isis usedused because because power  power isis lostlost to to the the Normal Normal Letdown Letdown Valves.
Valves. Letdown Letdown isis necessary necessaryto      to control control PZRPZR level level since since Seal Seal Injection Injection must must be  be maintained.
maintained.
IEPP-26-BD EPP-26-BD                                                                  Rev.
Rev. 77                                                            Page 44 of Page        of 1111
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08      NRC Written Written Exam Exam
: 82. Given
: 82. Given the the following:
following:
      -A
      - A Reactor Reactor Trip Trip has has occurred occurred from    100% RTP.
from 100%    RTP.
The BA
      - The
      -          Transfer Pump BA Transfer      Pump aligned aligned toto BLEND BLEND hashas tripped.
tripped.
      - The crew
      -      crew isis implementing implementing EPP-4, EPP-4, REACTOR REACTOR TRIP TRIP RESPONSE.
RESPONSE.
      - At Step 13,
      -            13, "Check Check ALLALL rods rods fully inserted" inserted the following following is is noted:
noted:
Rod M-6
            - Rod
            -      M-6 isis at at 99 inches.
inches.
Rod H-4 is
            - Rod
            -            is at 14 14 inches.
inches.
F-i 2 is at 20 inches.
            - Rod F-12 Which ONE (1)  (1) of the following is the action required?
A. Begin Boration by OPENING LCV-115B,  LCV-i 15B, EMER MU TO CHG SUCT AND CLOSING LCV-1  1 LCV-115C, 5C,  VCT    OUTLET.
B. Begin Boration using Normal Boration path via FCV-113A,    FCV-1 13A, BA FLOW and FCV-113B, FCV-i 13B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT.
C. Borate using EMER BORATION, MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT.
D. Continue to Step 14 (No boration is required).
82 82
000024 A2.02 000024  A2.02 OOllEMERG 001/EMERG BORATION/1I2/3.9/4.4/SROIHIGHJ43.5INEW BORATION/1/2/3.9/4.4/SRO/HIGHJ43 .5/NEW - 200SIEPP-4-003
                                                                        - 2008!EPP-4-003 Given the following:
Given Reactor Trip
    - A Reactor
    -              Trip has has occurred occurred from from 100%
100% RTP.
RTP.
    - The BA
    -      BA Transfer Transfer Pump Pump aligned aligned to BLEND BLEND hashas tripped.
tripped.
    - The crew is implementing EPP-4, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE.
13, "Check
    - At Step 13,
    -              Check ALL rods fully inserted" inserted the following is noted:
        - Rod M-6 is at 9 inches.
        - Rod H-4 is at 14 14 inches.
        - Rod F-12 is at
        -              at2O 20 inches.
Which ONE (1) of the following is the action required?
A Begin Boration by OPENING LCV-115B, A'I                                    LCV-1 1 5B, EMER MU TO CHG SUCT AND CLOSING LCV-1 1 5C, VCT OUTLET.
LCV-115C, B. Begin Boration using Normal Boration path via FCV-113A, BA FLOW and FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT.
C. Borate using EMER BORATION, MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT.
D. Continue to Step 14 (No boration is required).
The correct answer is A.
A: Correct --    lAW EPP-4, boration must be initiated if 2 rods are NOT fully inserted. NOT fully inserted is any rod above 12.0 inches as defined in OMM-022. The ONLY correct flowpath available is the Emergency Makeup flowpath using LCV      -115B, LCV-1 1 5B, LCV-1 150 must be closed to cause water to enter Charging Pump suction, since LCV-115C there is NO BA transfer pump aligned to BLEND.
B: Incorrect - Flowpath is a viable flowpath as listed in EPP-4 if there is a BA transfer pump aligned to BLEND. The stem indicates there is NO pump available, therefore opening these valves would NOT initiate a boration.
C: Incorrect - Flowpath is a viable flowpath as listed in EPP-4 if there is a BA transfer pump aligned to BLEND. The stem indicates there is NO pump available, therefore opening this valve would NOT initiate a boration.
D: Incorrect - lAW EPP-4,
              -        EPP-4, boration must be initiated if 2 rods are NOT fully inserted. NOT fully inserted is any rod above 12.012.0 inches as defined in OMM-022. This action would be correct ifif ONLY 11 rod were NOT NOT fully inserted.
Exam Question Exam                Number: 82 Question Number:        82


EPP-26, Page 4; EPP-26-BD, Page 4. KA Statement:
==Reference:==
Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.
EPP-4,
History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam. SRO -Knowledge of cautions and basis for cautions in procedures past Immediate Action steps. KAName: Importance Rating: Cognitive Level: Source: LOSS OF DC POWER 3.8/4.0 LOW NEW -2008 Tier/Group:
RO/SRO Level: lOCFR55.43link:
III SRO 43.5 Learning Objective:
EPP-26-003 Rev. 7 EPP-26 LOSS OF DC BUS "A" Page 4 of 47 INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED **************************************************************************
CAUTION Restoration of DC Control Power to a deenergized AC Bus before Steps 16 through 23 have been completed may result in uncontrolled equipment starts. **************************************************************************
* 1. Check The Cause Of The DC Bus Failure -KNOWN WHEN the cause is determined.
THEN notify Maintenance to correct the problem. AFW PUMP A will not be available due to loss of control power to the breaker. 2. Maintain S/G Levels Between 8% And 50% Using Available AFW Pumps:
* AFW PUMP B
* STEAM DRIVEN AFW PUMP 3. Check SI Signal INITIATED Go To Step 5.
STEP SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION AND RNP DIFFERENCES The following pages will provide the RNP step number. There is no ERG for this procedure.
RNP BASIS STEP PEC This procedure will be entered from EPP-4 or EPP-7 based on the initial conditions at the time of the loss of DC. If the pant is at power (> 100 MW) it is expected that the be via EPP-7.
C1 The Caution is provided to warn the Operator of the possibility of equipment performing uncontrolled equipment starts. If the loss of DC Bus A occurred from an at power condition the busses fed downstream of 4160V Busses 1 and 2 are deenergized with load breakers still closed. If DC Control Power is restored to the 4160V busses and an automatic transfer occurs before the load breakers trip on undervoltage all equipment will start simultaneously.
The step below the Caution will initiate efforts to restore the faulted DC Bus. This step is provided to initiate efforts to repair the faulted DC Bus. It is placed early in the procedure so that efforts can be made to contact Maintenance personnel.
The high level step provides direction to diagnose the cause and provides transitional guidance.
There are three possible failure mechanisms that are the most likely causes:
* Fault on A Battery
* Fault on A Battery Bus
* Fault on MCC-5 The failure, or tripping, of the in-service Battery Charger, is not a likely cause of the loss of DC since warning would be provided via an annunciator with ample time for Operator action to transfer the chargers.
N2 The note reminds the Operator that since DC BUS A has been lost, no control power is available for AFW PUMP A. The subsequent step will control S/G level. 2 S/G level is maintained in order to provide a heat sink. B AFW pump and the SDAFW pump are specified because A AFW pump is not available due to the loss of DC. 3 Subsequent steps will reset an SI Signal. This diagnostic step provides Transitional direction should the event have occurred with the Unit Auxiliaries being powered from the SUT. In this case the RNO bypasses the steps to reset SI and restore Instrument Air to the CV. 4 If an SI has occurred it will be necessary to restore Instrument Air to the CV in order to perform subsequent steps such as placing Excess Letdown in service. The step provided resets SI and Phase A then restores IA to the CV. PCV-1716 should be available during a loss of DC Bus A since its solenoid is powered from Auxiliary Panel GC (DC Bus B). Resetting SI is possible since Train A has not initiated and Train B has control Power. If resetting the Isolation Signal is unsuccessful in restoring IA to the CV, the valve is placed in the Override position which places control power from Aux Panel GC directly on the solen'oid for opening the valve. Instrument Air pressure is verified prior to attempting to place air in the CV in order to assure air pressure is higher than potential CV pressure.
If IA is not established the steps for placing Excess letdown in service are also bypassed since this also requires air in the CV. 5 This step provides the means to control PZR level during the loss of DC. Excess Letdown is used because power is lost to the Normal Letdown Valves. Letdown is necessary to control PZR level since Seal Injection must be maintained.
I EPP-26-BD Rev. 7 Page 4 of 11 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 82. Given the following: -A Reactor Trip has occurred from 100% RTP. -The BA Transfer Pump aligned to BLEND has tripped. -The crew is implementing EPP-4, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE.
-At Step 13, "Check ALL rods fully inserted" the following is noted: -Rod M-6 is at 9 inches. -Rod H-4 is at 14 inches. -Rod F-12 is at 20 inches. Which ONE (1) of the following is the action required?
A. Begin Boration by OPENING LCV-115B, EMER MU TO CHG SUCT AND CLOSING LCV-115C, VCT OUTLET. B. Begin Boration using Normal Boration path via FCV-113A, BA FLOW and FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT. C. Borate using EMER BORATION, MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT. D. Continue to Step 14 (No boration is required).
82 000024 A2.02 OOllEMERG BORATION/1I2/3.9/4.4/SROIHIGHJ43.5INEW
-200SIEPP-4-003 Given the following: -A Reactor Trip has occurred from 100% RTP. -The BA Transfer Pump aligned to BLEND has tripped. -The crew is implementing EPP-4, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE.
-At Step 13, "Check ALL rods fully inserted" the following is noted: -Rod M-6 is at 9 inches. -Rod H-4 is at 14 inches. -Rod F-12 is at 20 inches. Which ONE (1) of the following is the action required?
A'I Begin Boration by OPENING LCV-115B, EMER MU TO CHG SUCT AND CLOSING LCV-115C, VCT OUTLET. B. Begin Boration using Normal Boration path via FCV-113A, BA FLOW and FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT. C. Borate using EMER BORATION, MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT. D. Continue to Step 14 (No boration is required).
The correct answer is A. A: Correct -lAW EPP-4, boration must be initiated if 2 rods are NOT fully inserted.
NOT fully inserted is any rod above 12.0 inches as defined in OMM-022. The ONLY correct flowpath available is the Emergency Makeup flowpath using LCV -115B, LCV-115C must be closed to cause water to enter Charging Pump suction, since there is NO BA transfer pump aligned to BLEND. B: Incorrect
-Flowpath is a viable flowpath as listed in EPP-4 if there is a BA transfer pump aligned to BLEND. The stem indicates there is NO pump available, therefore opening these valves would NOT initiate a boration.
C: Incorrect
-Flowpath is a viable flowpath as listed in EPP-4 if there is a BA transfer pump aligned to BLEND. The stem indicates there is NO pump available, therefore opening this valve would NOT initiate a boration.
D: Incorrect
-lAW EPP-4, boration must be initiated if 2 rods are NOT fully inserted.
NOT fully inserted is any rod above 12.0 inches as defined in OMM-022. This action would be correct if ONLY 1 rod were NOT fully inserted.
Exam Question Number: 82


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
EPP-4, Pages Pages 10-11; 1 0-1 1; SO-021, SD-021, CVCS, CVCS, Figure Figure 2; 2; OMM-022, OMM-022, Page Page 53.
53.
KA Statement:
KA  Statement: Ability to determine determine and and interpret interpret the the following as    they apply as they  apply to the Emergency Emergency Boration: When use of manual boration valve is needed.
History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC exam.
SRO - Requires analysis of plant conditions and selection of mitigating procedure.
KA Name:
KAName:              EMERG BORATION                    Tier/Group:          1/2 112 Importance Rating:    3.9/4.4                            ROISRO Level:
RO/SRO                SRO Cognitive Level:      HIGH                              10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43            43.5 Source:              NEW - 2008 Learning Objective:  EPP-4-003
rt,                c s
2 xoZcf        4ZoZ Rev.
Rev. 2222 EPP-4 EPP-4                          REACTOR REACTOR TRIP TRIP RESPONSE
===RESPONSE===
Page Page 1010 of of 28 28 STEP H            INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS                          RESPONSE NOT RESPONSE  NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED CAUTION CAUTION The boration The  boration  pathway pathway  through through FCV-114B FCV-114B does does NOT NQI have have heat heat trace.
trace. Use Use of of this  pathway this pathway    without without  flush water flush  water could could result result inin blockage blockage of of the the pathway.
pathway.
.~ 13.
: 13. Check All Check      Control Rods All Control    Rods - FULLY FULLY  ~    IF j only only one one Control Control Rod Rod is is stuck stuck INSERTED INSERTED                                  out, out, THEN Th Go Go To To Step Step 14.
14.
                                                  ~
                                                  -IFIF two two or or more more Control Control Rods Rods are are stuck stuck out, out, THEN ThEN perform perform the the following:
following:
: a. Verify at least one  one Charging Charging Pump is RUNNING.
RUIINING.
: b. Borate to cold shutdown shutdown boron boron concentration using using one one ofof the following:
* Blender to Charging      Pump Charging Pump suction:
: 1) Open FCV-ll3A,
: 1)        FCV-113A,  BA TO BA  TO BLENDER.
BLENDER.
2)" Openl13B,B enFCV        FCV-l13B, LENDBLENDED ED MU TO CHG CHG SUCT.
SUCT.
3)
: 3)  Start Boric Start  Boric Acid Acid Pump Pump aligned for aligned  for blend.
blend.
OR
* RWST to RWST  to Charging Charging Pump Pump suction:
suction:
: 1) Open
: 1)  Open LCV-ll5B, LCV-11SB, EMERG EMERG MU TO MU  TO CHG CHG SUCT, SUCT, OR OR locally open locally  open CVC-358, CVC-3S8, RWST TO RWST  TO CHARGING CHARGING PUMP PUMP SUCTION.
SUCTION.
: 2) Close
: 2)  Close LCV-llSC, LCV-11SC, VCT VCT OUTLET.
OUTLET.
OR (CONTINUED (CONTINUE    NEXT PAGE)
D NEXT  PAGE)
Rev.
Rev. 22 22 EPP-4 EPP-4                        REACTOR REACTOR TRIP TRIP RESPONSE


EPP-4, Pages 10-11; SO-021, CVCS, Figure 2; OMM-022, Page 53. KA Statement:
===RESPONSE===
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration:
Page  11 of Page 11  of 28 28
When use of manual boration valve is needed. History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC exam. SRO -Requires analysis of plant conditions and selection of mitigating procedure.
-j STEP H            INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I        RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 13.
KAName: EMERG BORATION Tier/Group:
: 13.     (CONTINUED)
112 Importance Rating: 3.9/4.4 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH lOCFR55.43 link: 43.5 Source: NEW -2008 Learning Objective:
(CONTINUED)
EPP-4-003 rt, Rev. 22 EPP-4 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Page 10 of 28 INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED **************************************************************************
                                                        **   Blender Blender toto VCT:
CAUTION The boration pathway through FCV-114B does NOT have heat trace. Use of this pathway without flush water could result in blockage of the pathway. ************************************************************************** 13. Check All Control Rods -FULLY INSERTED IF only one Control Rod is stuck out, THEN Go To Step 14. IF two or more Control Rods are stuck out, THEN perform the following:
VCT:
: a. Verify at least one Charging Pump is RUNNING. b. Borate to cold shutdown boron concentration using one of the following:
1)
Blender to Charging Pump suction: 1) Open FCV-113A, BA TO BLENDER. 2)" Open FCV-l13B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT. 3) Start Boric Acid Pump aligned for blend.
: 1) Open Open FCV-113A, FCV113A, BABA TO TO BLENDER.
* RWST to Charging Pump suction: 1) Open LCV-11SB, EMERG MU TO CHG SUCT, OR locally open CVC-3S8, RWST TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION. 2) Close LCV-11SC, VCT OUTLET. (CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)
BLENDER.
Rev. 22 EPP-4 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS
2)
: 13. (CONTINUED)
: 2) Open Open FCV-114B, FCV-114B, BLENDED BLENDED MU MU TO TO VCT.
: 14. Check PZR Level -LESS THAN 14% Page 11 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
VCT.
* Blender to VCT: 1) Open FCV-113A, BA TO BLENDER. of 28 2) Open FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT. 3) Start Boric Acid Pump aligned for blend.
: 3) Start
: 3) Start Boric Boric  Acid Acid Pump Pump aligned for     blend.
blend.
OR
* Emergency boration:
* Emergency boration:
: 1) Open MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT. 2) Start Boric Acid Pump aligned for blend. 3) Verify boric acid flow on FI-110. c. Open CVC-310B, LOOP 2 COLD LEG CHG. IF CVC-310B will NOT open, THEN open CVC-310A, LOOP 1 HOT LEG CHG. d. Verify charging flow on FI-122A. Go To Step 16.
: 1) Open MOV-350, MOV350, BABA TO TO CHARGING PMPPMP SUCT.
TO PRT ...... --,---, LOOP 1 LOOP 1 AUX SPRA,(4t...rf  
SUCT.
.'. I LOOP 2 COLD LEG EXCESS eves FLOW DIAGRAM, SIMPLIFIED CVCS-FIGURE-2 Analyzer From Loop 2 LTDN HX Cold Leg 137 To RCDT-. I ' From RCP Seals Pulse Dampener " To Rep Seals 1 INFORMATION USE ONLY FCV* 114A Deborating Demins Mixed Bed Demins. Cation Bed Demin. ./T iii _ From Primary Y Water Pumps From RWST :PI From BA Transfer Pumps ATTACHMENT 10.4 Page 2 of 3 GLOSSARY (Continued) 1.1.9 Recirculation Mode -When referenced for the current status of the RHR System, the system is aligned to take a suction on the CV Sump and discharge to the loops. 1.1.10 Redundant  
: 2) Start Boric Boric Acid  Pump Acid Pump aligned forfor blend.
-(In reference to an indication)
blend.
Having multiple indications of the same type for the same parameter.
3)
An example of redundant indication is verification of S/G level using all three narrow range level channels. 1.1 .11 Rod On Bottom -A Control Rod is defined as "on the bottom" when NARPI indication shows a position of less than or equal to 12". This originates from Westinghouse Documentation ESBU/wOG 96-0080, which defines rod bottom occurring at entry to the dash pot. Dash Pot entry occurs at 20 steps from the bottom which is equal to 12.5". The value is rounded down to the nearest legible increment on the NARPI. 1.1.12 S/G Status: 1. Ruptured S/G -Any generator with failed tubes resulting in a loss of the RCS pressure boundary greater than RCS makeup capability.
: 3)          boric acid Verify boric     acid flow flow FI-110.
: 2. Faulted S/G -A faulted S/G is any generator with a steam line or feedwater line break associated with it. 3. Leaking S/G -Any generator with failed tubes resulting in a loss of the RCS pressure boundary within RCS makeup capability.
on Fl-lb.
1.1.13 S/G Level -Unless otherwise stated, a step which refers to S/G level means narrow range S/G level. A step which requires the use of wide range S/G level will state specifically to use wide range S/G level. 1.1.14 Stable -(In reference to a parameter)
: c. Open
To be within the normal control band or controllable within some desired range. 1.1.15 Uncontrolled  
: c. Open CVC-310B, LOOP LOOP 22 COLD COLD LEG CHG.
-Refers to a condition that is not under the control of the operator and is incapable of being controlled by the operator using available equipment.
LEG  CHG.
IOMM-022 Rev. 29 Page 53 of 54\
IF CVC-3bOB iE  CVC-310B will will NQI NOT open, open, THEN open Tii    open CVC-310A, CVC-310A, LOOP LOOP 11 HOT LEG HOT   LEG CHG.
HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 83. Given the following:  
CHG.
-Plant startup is in progress lAW GP-005, POWER OPERATION.  
: d. Verify
-Reactor is at 8% RTP. -Reactor Engineering has notified the SSO that BOTH Intermediate Range High Flux Trip setpoints were determined to be set non-conservative.  
: d. Verify charging charging flow flow on on FI-122A.
-The SSO has declared BOTH IR Channels INOPERABLE.
FI-122A.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the action(s) that must be taken in order to comply with Technical Specification requirements?
14.
A. Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions AND reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours. B. Reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours OR increase thermal power to> P-10 within 2 hours. C. Place channels in TRIP within 6 hours or be in MODE 3 within 12 hours. D. Open the Reactor Trip Breakers immediately.
: 14. Check Check PZR PZR Level Level - LESS LESS THAN THAN 14%
83 000033 A2.10 OOIILOSS ON IR NI/1/2/3.1/3.8/SROILOW/43.5IFARLEY-20011NIS-01l Given the following:  
14%      Go To Go To Step Step 16.
-Plant startup is in progress lAW GP-005, POWER OPERATION.  
16.
-Reactor is at 8% RTP. -Reactor Engineering has notified the SSO that BOTH Intermediate Range High Flux Trip setpoints were determined to be set non-conservative.  
 
-The SSO has declared BOTH IR Channels INOPERABLE.
evesFLOW CVCS  FLOWDIAGRAM, DIAGRAM, SIMPLIFIED SIMPLIFIED CVCS-FIGURE-2 CVCS-FIGURE-2 TO PRT ......--,---,
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the action(s) that must be taken in order to comply with Technical Specification requirements?
Mixed LOOP 1                                                                                                         Bed COLDLEG~                                                                                                        Demins.
A'I Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions AND reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours. B. Reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours OR increase thermal power to> P-10 within 2 hours. C. Place channels in TRIP within 6 hours or be in MODE 3 within 12 hours. D. Open the Reactor Trip Breakers immediately.
Analyzer LOOP 1                                                                                   Deborating HOTLEG4t~                                                                                  Demins AUX SPRA,(4t...rf .'. I                                                                                           Cation LOOP 2                                                                                                           Bed COLD LEG                                                                                                         Demin.
The correct answer is A. A: Correct -LCO 3.3.1, Condition G actions required if TWO IR channels INOPERABLE with power> P-6, but < P-10. B: Incorrect  
EXCESS FCV*
-LCO 3.3.1, Condition F actions required if ONE IR channel INOPERABLE with power> P-6, but < P-10. C: Incorrect  
FromLoop From   Loop 2           LTDN HX
-Actions required for most INOPERABLE instrument channels to remove the channel from service, Nls would be BYPASSED instead of removed from service in this manner. D: Incorrect  
              ~~~
-LCO 3.3.1, Condition J action for TWO Source Range Channels INOPERABLE.
114A ColdLeg Cold   Leg                                                                           ./T iii              _ From Primary 137                                                             Y        Water Pumps To RCDT-     . I '
FromRCP From   RCPSeals Seals       I~
Pulse Dampener To Rep Seals 1~                                    From RWST
:PI FromBA From   BA Transfer TransferPumps Pumps INFORMA INFORMATION    HON USEUSE ONLY ONLY
 
ATTACHMENT 10.4 ATTACHMENT                 10.4 Page 22 of Page        of 33 GLOSSARY (Continued)
GLOSSARY             (Continued) 1.1.9 1.1.9    Recirculation Mode Recirculation         Mode - When
                                              -  When referenced referenced for   for thethe current current status status ofof the the RHR System, RHR    System, the  the system system isis aligned aligned to  to take take aa suction suction onon the the CVCV Sump Sump and discharge and   discharge to    to the the loops.
loops.
1.1.10 Redundant 1.1.10   Redundant - (In  -      reference to (In reference         to an an indication) indication) Having Having multiple multiple indications indications of the same     type   for of the same type for the same  the    same parameter.
parameter. An      An example example of  of redundant redundant indication isis verification indication         verification of   of S/G S/G level level using using all all three three narrow narrow range range level level channels.
channels.
~
--- 1.1.11 1.1     Rod On
          .11 Rod   On Bottom Bottom - AA Control
                                        -    Control Rod  Rod is is defined defined as    as "on on the the bottom" bottom when when NARPI    indication      shows NARPI indication shows aa position        position of of less less than than or or equal equal to to 12".
: 12. This This originates from originates     from Westinghouse Westinghouse Documentation Documentation ESBU/wOG   ESBU/WOG 96-0080, 96-0080, which defines which    defines rod rod bottom bottom occurring occurring at  at entry entry to to the the dash dash pot.
pot. Dash Dash PotPot entry occurs entry  occurs at  at 20 20 steps steps fromfrom thethe bottom bottom which which is    is equal equal to to 12.5".
12.5. The The value isis rounded rounded down  down to the nearest nearest legible legible increment increment on the NARPI.
1.1.12 S/G 1.1.12  S/GSta    tus:
Status:
: 1.       Ruptured S/G     SIG - Any generator with failed tubes resulting in aa loss of the RCS pressure boundary greater than RCS makeup capability.
: 2.       Faulted S/G   SIG - A faulted S/G is any generator with a steam line or
                                            -                                                                            or feedwater line break associated with it.
: 3.       Leaking SIG    S/G - Any generator with failed tubes resulting in a loss of the RCS pressure boundary within RCS makeup capability.
1.1.13 1.1.13 SIG S/G Level - Unless otherwise stated, a step which refers to S/G level means means narrow narrow range S/G     S/G level.
level. A step which requires the use            use of of wide range S/GS/G level level will state state specifically specifically to  to use use widewide range S/G  S/G level.
level.
1.1.14 1.1.14 Stable Stable - (In (In reference reference to     to aa parameter) parameter) To     To be be within within the the normal normal control control band band oror controllable controllable within within somesome desired desired range.
range.
1.1.15 1.1.15 Uncontrolled Uncontrolled - Refers
                                  -   Refers to   to aa condition condition that that isis not not under under the the control control of of the the operator operator andand isis incapable incapable of      of being being controlled controlled by    by the the operator operator using using available available equipment.
equipment.
OMM-022 IOMM-022                                             Rev.
Rev. 29 29 I                      Page 53 Page     53 of   54\
of 54 I
 
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Exam Exam
: 83. Given
: 83. Given the following:
Plant startup
        - Plant
        -      startup is is in in progress progress lAW lAW GP-005, GP-005, POWER POWER OPERATION.
OPERATION.
        - Reactor
        -          is at Reactor is at 8%
8% RTP.
RTP.
        - Reactor Engineering has notified the SSO that BOTH Intermediate Range High Flux Trip setpoints were determined to be set non-conservative.
SSQ has declared BOTH IR Channels INOPERABLE.
        - The SSO Which ONE (1) of the following describes the action(s) that must be taken in order to comply with Technical Specification requirements?
A. Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions AND reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours.
B. Reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours OR increase thermal power to> P-10 P-1O within 2 hours.
C. Place channels in TRIP within 6 hours or be in MODE 3 within 12 hours.
D. Open the Reactor Trip Breakers immediately.
83 83
 
000033 A2.10 000033 A2.10 OOIILOSS 001/LOSS ON  ON IR IR NI/1/2/3.1/3.8/SROILOW/43.5IFARLEY-N1111213.113.8ISRO/LOW/43.5/FARLEY- 20011NIS-01l 2001/NIS-Ol 1 Given the Given  the following:
following:
Plant startup
    - Plant
    -        startup isis in in progress progress lAWlAW GP-005,      POWER OPERATION.
GP-005, POWER       OPERATION.
Reactor isis at
    - Reactor
    -                at 8%   RTP.
8% RTP.
Reactor Engineering
    - Reactor
    -            Engineering has has notified notified the   SSO that the SSO  that BOTH BOTH Intermediate Intermediate Range Range HighHigh Flux Flux Trip Trip setpoints were setpoints     were determined determined to  to be be set  non-conservative.
set non-conservative.
The SSO
    - The
    -      SSO has  has declared declared BOTHBOTH IR  IR Channels Channels INOPERABLE.
INOPERABLE.
Which ONEONE (1)  (1) of of the following describes the action(s) that must   must bebe taken inin order to comply requirements?
with Technical Specification requirements?
A'I Immediately suspend A Immediately          suspend operations operations involving involving positive positive reactivity reactivity additions additions AND reduce reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours.
B. Reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours OR increase thermal power to> P-10                   P-i 0 within 2 hours.
C. Place channels in TRIP within 6 hours or be in MODE 3 within 12 hours.
D. Open the Reactor Trip Breakers immediately. immediately.
The correct answer is A.
A: Correct - -
LCO 3.3.1, Condition G actions required if TWO IR channels INOPERABLE      INOPERABLE with power> P-6, but < P-10. P-ic.
B: Incorrect - LCO 3.3.1, Condition F actions required if ONE IR channel INOPERABLE INOPERABLE with power> P-6, but < P-10. P-i 0.
C: Incorrect - Actions required for most INOPERABLE
                -                                    INOPERABLE instrument channels to remove the channel from service, NIs    Nls would be BYPASSED instead of removed from service in this manner.
D: Incorrect - LCO 3.3.1, Condition J action for TWO Source Range Channels INOPERABLE.
INOPERABLE.
This action is NOT applicable because both SR instruments are deenergized.
This action is NOT applicable because both SR instruments are deenergized.
Exam Question Number: 83  
 
Exam Question Exam                Number: 83 Question Number:       83
 
==Reference:==
ITS


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
ITS 3.3.1, 3.3.1, Page Page 3.3-1, 3.3-1, 3.3-3 3.3-3 KA Statement:
KA  Statement: Ability Ability to to determine determine and and interpret interpret the the following following as they apply as they  apply to to the the Loss Loss ofof Intermediate Range Intermediate            Nuclear Instrumentation:
Range Nuclear    Instrumentation: Tech-Spec Tech-Spec limits limits ifif both both intermediate range intermediate    range channels channels have have failed.
failed.
History: Modified History:  Modified by by changing changing distractors distractors Band B and 0,D, Removed Removed Subsequent Subsequent actions actions and and reference reference to procedures.
to procedures.
SRO - application of required actions AND application of ITS
      -                                                            ITS Conditions for Table 3.3.1-13.3.1-1 for Conditions in excess of  of LCO.
KA Name:
KAName:                      ON JR NI LOSS ONIRNI                      Tier/Group:          1/2 112 Importance Rating:    3.1/3.8 3.113.8                          RO/SRO Level:        SRO Cognitive Level:      LOW                                IOCFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43          43.5 Source:              FARLEY- 2001                      Learning Objective: NIS-011 NIS-Ol 1


ITS 3.3.1, Page 3.3-1, 3.3-3 KA Statement:
RPS Instru  menta Instrume      tion ntati on 3.3.1 3.3 INSTRU    MENTA INSTRUMEN      TIONN TATIO 3.3.1 Reactor Prote          ctionn System (RPS) Instru Protectio                      Instrum  menta  tionn entatio LCO 3.3.1              The RPS instru  menta instrum entatiotionn for each FunctFunctiion on in Table 3.3.1-shall be OPERA                                                    3.3.1-11 BLE..
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation:
OPERABLE APPLIC    ABILIT APPLICABIL      Y:
Tech-Spec limits if both intermediate range channels have failed. History: Modified by changing distractors Band 0, Removed Subsequent actions and reference to procedures.
ITY:      Accor Accord ding ing to Table 3.3.1-1.
SRO -application of required actions AND application of ITS Conditions for Table 3.3.1-1 for Conditions in excess of LCO. KAName: LOSS ONIRNI Tier/Group:
ACTION ACTIONSS
112 Importance Rating: 3.113.8 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: LOW lOCFR55.43 link: 43.5 Source: FARLEY-2001 Learning Objective:
        - -..... ... -... -.. -... --.. -... -..... .. NOTE*
NIS-011 
NOTE ...... ...... .... -. -..... ..... -... -..
* ----3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1 LCO 3.3.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
Separ Separa  ate te Condi Condittion ion entry is allowed for each Funct      Functiion.
APPLICABILITY:
on.
According to Table 3.3.1-1. ACTIONS --........ -... -.. -... --.. -... -....... NOTE* ................ -. -..........  
CONDI  TION CONDITION                            REQUIR REQUIRED  ED ACTION ACTION            COMPL ETIONN TIME COMPLETIO A. One or more Funct  Functiions ons    A.1        Enter the Condi Condittion ion      Imme Immed diately iately with one or more
-... -.. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
* ----        requir require inope edd chann inoperrable.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately with one or more referenced in required channels Table 3.3.1-1 for the inoperable.
channe able, els ls refere referen nced ced in Table 3.3.1-3.3.1-11 for the chann channeell (s).
channel (s). B. One Manual Reactor B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours Trip channel OPERABLE status. inoperable.
Cs).
OR B.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours AND B.2.2 Open reactor trip 55 hours breakers (RTBs). (continued)
B. One Manual Reactor                  B.1        Resto Restorree chann channeell to      48 hours Trip chann channeell                            OPERA BLE status.
HBRSEP Unit No. 2 3.3*1 Amendment No. 176 ACTIONS (continued)
OPERABLE inope  rable.
CONDITION E. One channel E.1 inoperable.
I nopera  bi e.
OR E.2 F. THERMAL POWER> P-6 F.l and < polO. one Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel OR inoperable.
OR B.2.1 8.2.1      Be in MODE 3.                 54 hours V
F.2 .. G. THERMAL POWER> P-6 G.l and < polO. two Intermediate Range 1I Neutron Flux channels Mill. G.2 HBRSEP Unit No. 2 REQUIRED ACTION Place channel in trip. Be in MODE 3. Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6. Increase THERMAL POWER to > polO. . -------NOTE -.. ------Limited boron concentration changes associated with ReS inventory control or limited plant temperature changes are allowed . .. __ ... _--_ ............  
AND B.2.2      Open reacto reactorr trip            55 hours break breake ers rs (RTBs).
---... _--Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.
(conti nued)
Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6. RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1 COMPLETION TIME 6 hours 12 hours 2 hours 2 hours Immediately 2 hours (continued) 3.3-3 Amendment No. tTfr.190 B -Correct, If one SR is lost all fuel movement must be suspended per TS 3.9.2. Must have two SR and one audible count rate operable.
(contin ued)
Source: Farley Exam Bank Question #052302M04007 Answer: C 53. 033EG2.1.121 A Unit 1 reactor startup is in progress.
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit No. 2    2                            3.3*1 3.3-1                          Amendment No. 176
One hour ago Intermediate Range, IR, channel N-36 was taken out of service due to a power supply problem. The decision was made to continue with the reactor startup, power is currently at 8%. It is estimated that N-36 will be returned to service in the next 2 hours. The technician working on the N-36 power supply performed an action that resulted in Intermediate Range, IR, N-35 failing low. Which ONE of the following describes the action(s) that must be taken in order to comply with Technical Specification requirements?
 
A. Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions AND reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours. B. Place IR N-36 channel level trip switch in the 'BYPASS' position within 6 hours and be in Mode 3, Hot Standby, within 12 hours. C. Do NOT change power level until at least one IR channel is restored to operable status. D. Place the IR N-35 channel level trip switch in the 'BYPASS' position and increase thermal power to> P-lO within TWO hours. A -Correct, Actions required by TS 3.3.l.G. with 2 IR channels lost. B -Incorrect, Action required if two SR channels were lost. C -Incorrect, Action if power level was below P-6. D -Incorrect, Action that was in progress with just the one IR channel was out of service, TS 3.3.1.F. 54. 033K3.01 1 Annunciator FR5, "SFP AREA RE25 A OR B HI RAD" is in alarm on Unit 1. It has been determined that Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust Flow Gas monitors R-25A and R-25B indicate high activity.
RPS Instrumentation I nstrunientati on 3.3.1 ACTIONS    (continued) fcont  niiHi CONDITION               REQUIRED ACTION                             COMPLETION TIME E. One channel              E.1     Place channel in                          66 hours inoperable.
Which ONE of the following describes the automatic action(s) that occur as a result of this alarm? A. The SFP supply and exhaust fans shift to the recirculation mode.
inoperable,                    trip.
HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 84. Given the following:  
OR E.2    Be in MODE 3.                               12 hours F, THERMAL POWER>
-The plant is operating at 100% RTP. -The Inside AO has reported a 100 GPM leak from the RWST. -The leak is into the storm drains and appears to be unisolable.
F.             POWER > P-6  F.l F.1    Reduce THERMAL POWER                      22 hours and << P-b, polO. one              to < P-6.
Which ONE (1) of the following actions is required for this event? A. Implement AOP-008, ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF LIQUID WASTE. Initiate LOCAL evacuation using EVACUATION ALARM and PA announcement.
Intermediate I ntermedi ate Range Neutron Flux channel     OR inoperable.
B. Implement AOP-008, ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF LIQUID WASTE. Send personnel to isolate the Settling Ponds and establish access control. C. Implement PLP-021, CHEMICAL STORAGE, INVENTORY, SPILL AND HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROGRAM, Initiate LOCAL evacuation using EVACUATION ALARM and PA announcement.
F.2     Increase THERMAL                           22 hours POWER to >     > polO.
D. Implement PLP-021, CHEMICAL STORAGE, INVENTORY, SPILL AND HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROGRAM, send personnel to isolate the Settling Ponds and establish access control. 84 000059 G2.4.4 OOl/ACC RADWASTE RELEASE/l/2/4.5/4.7/SROILOW/43.5/NEW  
P-1O.
-2008/AOP-008-004 Given the following:  
~ -~        ..
-The plant is operating at 100% RTP. -The Inside AO has reported a 100 GPM leak from the RWST. -The leak is into the storm drains and appears to be unisolable.
G. THERMAL POWER>
Which ONE (1) of the following actions is required for this event? A ':I Implement AOP-OOB, ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF LIQUID WASTE. Initiate LOCAL evacuation using EVACUATION ALARM and PA announcement.
POWER > P-6 G.l G.1    . -------NOTE NOTE -.. ------
B. Implement AOP-OOB, ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF LIQUID WASTE. Send personnel to isolate the Settling Ponds and establish access control. C. Implement PLP-021, CHEMICAL STORAGE, INVENTORY, SPILL AND HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROGRAM, Initiate LOCAL evacuation using EVACUATION ALARM and PA announcement.
and < P-1O, polO. two              Limited boron Intermediate Range              concentration changes Neutron Flux channels  1I        associated with ReS           RCS inoperable.~
D. Implement PLP-021, CHEMICAL STORAGE, INVENTORY, SPILL AND HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROGRAM, send personnel to isolate the Settling Ponds and establish access control. The correct answer is A. A: Correct -Leakage from RWST, Monitor Tanks or Waste Condensate Tanks requires entry into AOP-OOB. Steps 3,4,5 & 6 of AOP-OOB are paraphrased in "A". B: Incorrect  
inoperable.                      inventory control or limited plant temperature changes are allowed allowed..
-Leakage from RWST, Monitor Tanks or Waste Condensate Tanks requires entry into AOP-OOB. AOP-OOB does NOT isolate the Settling Ponds or establish access control. C: Incorrect  
Suspend operations                          Immediately Iniinedi atel y involving positive reactivity additions.
-PLP-021 is used for Chemical spills, but borated water is NOT considered a hazardous liquid. D: Incorrect  
Mill.
-PLP-021 is used for Chemical spills, but borated water is NOT considered a hazardous liquid. Exam Question Number: B4  
ANU G.2    Reduce THERMAL POWER                        22 hours to < P-6.
(continued)
HBRSEP Unit No. 22                  3.3-3                                  Amendment No. tTfr.190
                                                                                                  +/-7,19O
 
      - Correct, If BB - Correct,    If one one SRSR isis lost lost all all fuel fuel movement movement must must bebe suspended suspended per  per TS TS 3.9.2.
3.9.2. Must Must have    two  SR    and  one  audible have two SR and one audible count rate    count  rate operable.
operable.
Source: Farley Source:    Farley Exam Exam Bank Bank Question Question #052302M04007
                                                      #052302M04007 Answer: CC Answer:
,3EG2.1.12
: 53. 033EG2.1.1211 AA Unit      reactor startup Unit 11 reactor    startup isis in in progress.
progress. One One hour hour ago ago Intermediate Intermediate Range, Range, IR,IR, channel channel N-36 N-36 was was taken out taken        of service out of  service due due toto aa power power supply supply problem.
problem. The The decision decision waswas made made to  to continue continue with with the reactor the            startup, power reactor startup,    power is    currently at is currently   at 8%.
8%.
It is It     estimated that is estimated   that N-36 N-36 willwill be be returned returned to  service in to service   in the the next 22 hours.
hours. TheThe technician working working on the N-36 power supply on                        supply performed an     an action action that that resulted resulted in in Intermediate Range, Range, IR,IR, N-35 failing low.
failing  low.
Which ONE of the following describes      describes the action(s) that must be taken in        in order to comply with Technical Specification Specification requirements?
requirements?
A. Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions AND reduce thermal power to <  <P-6 P-6 within 2 hours.
B. Place IR JR N-36 channel level trip switch in the 'BYPASS'     T position within 6 hours and be in BYPASS Mode 3, Hot Standby, within 12 hours.
C. Do NOT change power level until at least one IR                   JR channel is restored to operable status. status D. Place the IR N-35 channel level trip switch in the 'BYPASS'           BYPASS position and increase thermal power to>
to > P-lO P-1O within TWO hours.
A - Correct, Actions required by TS 3.3.1.G.
3.3.l.G. with 2 JR  IR channels lost.
B - Incorrect, Action required if two SR channels were lost.
C - Incorrect, Action if power level was below P-6.
C  -
D - Incorrect, Action that was in progress with just the one JR IR channel was out of service, TS 3.3.1.F.
Source: New 54.
: 54. 033K3.O1 033K3.01 11 Annunciator Annunciator FH5,        "SFP AREA FR5, SFP       AREA RE25  RE25 A OR  OR B   HI RAD B HI  RAD" is     in alarm is in alarm onon Unit Unit 1.1.
It has It has been been determined determined that        Spent Fuel that Spent           Pool Exhaust Fuel Pool   Exhaust Flow Flow GasGas monitors R-25AR-25A and and R-25B R-25B indicate   high   activity.
indicate high activity.
Which ONE Which      ONE of  of the the following following describes describes thethe automatic automatic action(s) action(s) that that occur occur asas aa result result of of this this alarm?
alarm?
The SFP A. The A.          SFP supply      and exhaust supply and     exhaust fansfans shift  to the shift to the recirculation recirculation mode.
mode.
 
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08     NRC Written Written Exam Exam
: 84. Given
: 84. Given the the following:
following:
The plant
      - The
        -      plant isis operating operating atat 100%
100% RTP.
RTP.
The Inside
      - The
        -      Inside AO AO has    reported aa 100 has reported     100 GPM GPM leakleak from from the the RWST.
RWST.
The leak
      - The
        -      leak isis into into the the storm storm drains drains and and appears appears to to be be unisolable.
unisolable.
Which ONE Which  ONE (1)(1) of of the the following following actions actions isis required required for    this event?
for this event?
A. Implement AOP-008, A. Implement      AOP-008, ACCIDENTAL ACCIDENTAL RELEASE RELEASE OF     OF LIQUID    WASTE. Initiate LIQUID WASTE. Initiate LOCAL LOCAL evacuation    using    EVACUATI evacuation using EVACUATION         ON  ALARM     and and PA    announceme PA announcement. nt.
B. Implement AOP-008, B. Implement      AOP-008, ACCIDENTAL ACCIDENTAL RELEASE RELEASE OF    OF LIQUID LIQUID WASTE.
WASTE. Send Send personnel personnel to to isolate the Settling isolate        Settling Ponds Ponds and and establish access access control.
control.
C. Implement PLP-021, C. Implement       PLP-021, CHEMICAL CHEMICAL STORAGE, STORAGE, INVENTORY, INVENTORY, SPILL  SPILL AND HAZARD HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROGRAM, Initiate LOCAL evacuation using EVACUATION COMMUNICATION                                                                    EVACUATION ALARM announcement.
and PA announcement.
D. Implement PLP-021, CHEMICAL STORAGE, INVENTORY,          INVENTORY, SPILL AND HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROGRAM, send personnel to isolate the Settling Ponds and establish COMMUNICATION access control.
84 84
 
000059 G2.4.4 000059   G2.4.4 OOl/ACC 00 1/ACC RADWASTE RADWASTE RELEASE/l/2/4.5/4.7/SROILOW/43.5/NEW RELEASEI1/2/4.5/4.7/SRO/LOW/43 .5/NEW - 2008/AOP-008-004
                                                                                  - 2008/AOP-008-004 Given the following:
Given
      - The plant
      -      plant is is operating at at 100%
100% RTP.
RTP.
The Inside
      - The
      -      Inside AO AC has has reported reported a 100 100 GPM GPM leak leak from the RWST.
RWST.
      - The leak is into the storm drains and appears to be unisolable.
Which ONE (1) of the following actions is required for this event?
A A ':I Implement AOP-OOB, AOP-008, ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF LIQUID WASTE. Initiate LOCAL evacuation using EVACUATION ALARM and PA announcement.
B. Implement AOP-OOB,AOP-008, ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF LIQUID WASTE. Send personnel to isolate the Settling Ponds and establish access control.
C. Implement PLP-021, CHEMICAL STORAGE, INVENTORY, SPILL AND HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROGRAM, Initiate LOCAL evacuation using EVACUATION ALARM and PA announcement.
D. Implement PLP-021, CHEMICAL STORAGE, INVENTORY, SPILL AND HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROGRAM, send personnel to isolate the Settling Ponds and establish access control.
The correct answer is A.
A: Correct - -      Leakage from RWST, Monitor Tanks or Waste Condensate Tanks requires entry into AOP-008.
AOP-OOB. Steps 3,4,5 3, 4, 5 & 6 of AOP-008 AOP-OOB are paraphrased in "A".A.
B: Incorrect - Leakage from RWST, Monitor Tanks or Waste Condensate Tanks requires entry into AOP-008.
AOP-OOB. AOP-008 AOP-OOB does NOT isolate the Settling Ponds or establish access control.
C: Incorrect - PLP-021 is used for Chemical spills, but borated water is NOT considered a hazardous liquid.
D: Incorrect - PLP-021 is used for Chemical spills
                -                                      spills, but borated water is NOT considered a hazardous liquid.
Exam Question Number: 84        B4


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
AOP-008, AOP-OOB, Pages 3 and 4, PLP-021, Pages 4 and 38.        3B.
KA Statement:
Statement: Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters parameters that are entry-level conditions conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
History: New New - Written for HLC-08
                  -              HLC-OB NRC Exam.
SRO SRO - Requires
        - Requires analysis of  of plant conditions conditions and selection of mitigating mitigating procedure.
procedure.
KA Name:
KAName:                  RADWASTE ACC RADW      ASTE RELEASE Tier/Group:        1/2 112 Importance Rating: 4.5/4.7                    RO/SRO Level:      SRO Cognitive Level:  LOW                        10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43          43.5 Source:            NEW -2008
                          - 2008              Learning Objective: AOP-008-004
Rev.
Rev. 99 AOP-008 AOP-008                    ACCIDENTAL ACCIDENTAL RELEASE RELEASE OF OF LIQUID LIQUID WASTE WASTE Page Page 33 ofof 25 25 STEP H              INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS                          RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
1.
: 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE To To provide provide the instruction instruction necessary to  to respond respond to aa leak leak from from the the RWST, RWST, Monitor Monitor Tank Tank AA or or B, B, or or Waste Waste Condensate Condensate Tank Tank C, C, D, D, or or E.
E.
: 2.      ENTRY CONDITIONS Any Any unexplained indication indication ofof aa decrease decrease inin any any of of the following following tanks oror upon receiving aa report that leakage leakage has developed developed from from any any of of the following following tanks:
    ,..... .*  RWST
          **  Monitor Tank A or B
* Waste Condensate Tank C, D, or E
                                              - END -


AOP-OOB, Pages 3 and 4, PLP-021, Pages 4 and 3B. KA Statement:
Rev.
Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
Rev. 99 AOP-008 AOP-008                 ACCIDENTAL ACCIDENTAL RELEASE RELEASE OF OF LIQUID LIQUID WASTE WASTE Page 44 of Page     of 25 25 H STEP 1
History: New -Written for HLC-OB NRC Exam. SRO -Requires analysis of plant conditions and selection of mitigating procedure.
H            INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I      RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 1.
KAName: ACC RADW ASTE RELEASE Tier/Group:
: 1. Check Check Leak Leak Status Status -- CONFIRMED CONFIRMED BYBY    Perform Perform the the following:
112 Importance Rating: 4.5/4.7 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: LOW lOCFR55.43 link: 43.5 Source: NEW -2008 Learning Objective:
following:
AOP-008-004 Rev. 9 AOP-008 ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF LIQUID WASTE Page 3 INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1. PURPOSE To provide the instruction necessary to respond to a leak from the RWST, Monitor Tank A or B, or Waste Condensate Tank C, D, or E. 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS Any unexplained indication of a decrease in any of the following tanks or upon receiving a report that leakage has developed from any of the following tanks: ,..... . RWST
LOCAL LOCAL VISUAL VISUAL INSPECTION INSPECTION a.
* Monitor Tank A or B
: a. Perform Perform aa local local visual visual inspection inspection for for leakage leakage prior prior to continuing.
* Waste Condensate Tank C, D, or E -END -of 25 Rev. 9 AOP-008 ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF LIQUID WASTE INSTRUCTIONS
continuing.
: 1. Check Leak Status -CONFIRMED BY LOCAL VISUAL INSPECTION Locally Identify The Source Of Leakage To Determine If It Is Isolable Evacuate Unnecessary Personnel From The Affected Area As Follows: a. Place the VLC switch in EMERG b. Place and hold the EVACUATION ALARM switch in the LOCAL position for 15 seconds c. Make a PA System announcement for all unnecessary personnel to stand clear of the affected area due to a leak in progress d. Place and hold the EVACUATION ALARM switch in the LOCAL position for 15 seconds e. Repeat the announcement
: b. IF external leakage is found, THEN Go Go To To Step Step 2.
: f. Place the VLC switch in NORM Page 4 of 25 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Perform the following:
2.
: a. Perform a local visual inspection for leakage prior to continuing.
: c. IF leakage is NOT jjQ found, THEN perform the following:
: b. IF external leakage is found, THEN Go To Step 2. c. IF leakage is NOT found, THEN perform the following:
: 1) Contact I&C to determine the problem with level indication.
: 1) Contact I&C to determine the problem with level indication.
: 2) Return to procedure and step in effect.
: 2) Return to procedure and and step in effect.
1.0 PURPOSE{ TC "PURPOSE" \f C \1 "1" } 1.1 This procedure implements the Chemical Safety and Health Management Program, the U. S. Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200) as adopted by the South Carolina Department of Labor, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act and the Emergency Planning and Community Right To Know Act. The procedure also provides chemical storage, handling, hazard, and spill information.
  ~2.
1.2 This procedure provides guidance for: 1.2.1 Emergency plans for accidental chemical release. 1.2.2 Chemical spills at RNP and Robinson Unit I and Darlington County , Electric Plant. 1.2.3 The preparation of Tier II EPCRA reports and 90 day inventory change EPCRA reporting requirements.
r-2. Locally Identify The Source Of Leakage To Determine If It Is Isolable Is o labl e
1 .2.4 Employee Right to Know Requirements NOTE: The Robinson/Darlington Co. Fossil Plants SHOULD comply with applicable portions of this procedure.  
  ~3.
  ? 3. Evacuate Unnecessary Personnel From The Affected Area As Follows:
: a. Place the VLC switch in EMERG
: b. Place and hold the EVACUATION ALARM switch in the LOCAL position for 15 position        15 seconds
: c. Make a PA System
: c.              System announcement unnecessary personnel for all unnecessary    personnel stand clear of to stand        of the the area due affected area  due to to a leak leak in progress in progress
: d. Place and Place  and hold hold the EVACUATION switch in ALARM switch    in the the LOCAL position for 15 position        15 seconds seconds
: e. Repeat
: e. Repeat the the announcement announcement f.
: f. Place the Place  the VLC VLC switch switch in in NORM NORM
 
1.0 1.0   PURPOSE{
PURPOSE{       TC  PURPOSE \f TC "PURPOSE"       c \1
                                      \f C     1 }
                                            \1 "1"   }
1.1 1.1 This procedure implements the Chemical Safety and Health    Health Management Management Program, the U. U. S. Hazard Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200) 1910.1200) as adopted by the South Carolina Department of Labor, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act and the Emergency Planning and Community Right To Know Act. The procedure also provides chemical storage, handling, hazard, and spill information.
1.2 This procedure provides guidance for:
1.2.1     Emergency plans for accidental chemical     release.
chemical_releas 1.2.2     calpllsat Chemical spills at RNP and Robinson Unit II and Darlington County
                ,Electric Plant.
1.2.3     The preparation of Tier II EPCRA reports and 90 day inventory change EPCRA reporting requirements.
11.2.4
        .2.4     Employee Right to Know Requirements NOTE:     The Robinson/Darlington Co. Fossil Plants SHOULD comply with applicable portions of this procedure.
 
==2.0  REFERENCES==
{                REFERENCES TC "REFERENCES"    \f C \1 "1"  }
1 }
2.1  SAF-SUBS-0001 6, Hazard Communication SAF-SUBS-00016, 2.2  EVC-SUBS-00018, Oil Spill and Chemical Release Notification and EmergencxEmergency Res~n~
Response                                                                            .
2.3    U. S. Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200) 1910.1200) 2.4    Emergency Response Community Right to Know Act Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Title Ill III 2.5    Emergency Preparedness Procedures 2.6    PLP-022, Environmental Regulatory Compliance Responsibilities, Guidelines and Disposal of Hazardous Waste/Surplus Chemicals 2.7    MCP-NGGC-0402, Material Material Management Management (Storage, Issue, Issue, and Maintenance)
Maintenance) 2.8    MCP-NGGC-0401, Material Material Acquisition (Procurement, Receiving, and Shipping)
Shipping) 2.9  CHE-NGGC-0045, NGG Chemical Control Program Procedure 1PLP-021 PLP-021                                    Rev. 26                            Page Page 44 of of 38 381
                                                                                                \


==2.0 REFERENCES==
ATTACHMENT 10.9 ATTACHMENT         10.9 Page 11 of Page    of 11 CHEMICAL SPILL CHEMICAL   SPILL REPORTABLE REPORTABLE QUANTITY QUANTITY LlST{ LIST{  TC TC "CHEMICAL CHEMICAL SPILL SPILL REPORTABLE REPORTABLE QUANTITY LIST" QUANTITY  LIST  \f
{
                                              \f C C \l
TC "REFERENCES" \f C \1 "1" } 2.1 SAF-SUBS-00016, Hazard Communication 2.2 EVC-SUBS-00018, Oil Spill and Chemical Release Notification and Emergencx . 2.3 U. S. Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200) 2.4 Emergency Response Community Right to Know Act Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Title III 2.5 Emergency Preparedness Procedures 2.6 PLP-022, Environmental Regulatory Compliance Responsibilities, Guidelines and Disposal of Hazardous Waste/Surplus Chemicals 2.7 MCP-NGGC-0402, Material Management (Storage, Issue, and Maintenance) 2.8 MCP-NGGC-0401, Material Acquisition (Procurement, Receiving, and Shipping) 2.9 CHE-NGGC-0045, NGG Chemical Control Program Procedure 1 PLP-021 Rev. 26 Page 4 of 381 \
                                                      \1 "2" }
ATTACHMENT 10.9 Page 1 of 1 CHEMICAL SPILL REPORTABLE QUANTITY LlST{ TC "CHEMICAL SPILL REPORTABLE QUANTITY LIST" \f C \l "2" } APPROXIMATE REPORTABLE REPORTABLE QUANTITY QUANTITY CHEMICAL NAME POUNDS GALLONS AMMONIUM HYDROXIDE (28%) 1,000. 478 ETHYLENE GLYCOL (88-90%) 5000. 540 HYDRAZINE (35%) 1. 0.33 SODIUM HYDROXIDE (50%) 1,000. 157 SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE (12-15%) 100. 74 SULFURIC ACID (93%) 1,000. 70 POTASSIUM DI-CHROMATE
2 }
: 10.
APPROXIMATE REPORTABLE             REPORTABLE QUANTITY QUANTITY              QUANTITY QUANTITY CHEMICAL NAME                     POUNDS               GALLONS AMMONIUM HYDROXIDE (28%)                     1,000.
* POTASSIUM CHROMATE 10.
1,000.                478 ETHYLENE GLYCOL (88-90%)                     5000.                 540 HYDRAZINE (35%)                                 1.                 0.33 SODIUM HYDROXIDE (50%)                       1,000.                 157 (1 2-1 5%)
* SODIUM DI-CHROMATE
SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE (12-15%)                   100.                   74 SULFURIC ACID (93%)                           1,000.                 70 POTASSIUM DI-CHROMATE                           10.                   **
: 10.
POTASSIUM CHROMATE                             10.                     **
* SODIUM CHROMATE 10. *
SODIUM DI-CHROMATE                             10.                   **
SODIUM CHROMATE                                 10.                     **
* Dependent on concentration (PPM) in solution.
* Dependent on concentration (PPM) in solution.
1 PLP-021 Rev. 26 Page 38 of 381 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 85. Given the following:  
1PLP-021 PLP-021                                 Rev.
-The crew has entered FRP-C.1, RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING. -RCS temperature by CETC is 750 of. -Step 21 of the procedure directs the crew to depressurize all intact S/Gs to 140 PSIG. Which ONE (1) of the following conditions would be entered/violated while performing the procedure actions of Step 21? A. ITS 2.1.1, Reactor Core Safety Limits. (Combination of Thermal Power, RCS Cold Leg Temperature, and Pressurizer Pressure within limits of Figure 2.1.1.1).
Rev. 26 26                                Page Page 38 38 of of 38 381
B. ITS 3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits. (RCS pressure, Temperature, and Heatup and Cooldown rates within limits of Figures 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2).
 
C. TRM 3.3, Steam Generator Secondary Side PressurelTemperature (P/T) Limits. (Secondary side of S/Gs maintained within PIT limits of Figure 3.3.1). D. ITS 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits. 85 000074 G2.2.42 OOllINAD CORE COOLING/1I2/3.9/4.6/SRO/HIGH/43.2/43.3/NEW  
HLC-08 NRC Written Exam Given the following:
-2008IRCS-013 Given the following:  
: 85. Given 85.
-The crew has entered FRP-C.1, RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING. -RCS temperature by CETC is 750 of. -Step 21 of the procedure directs the crew to depressurize all intact S/Gs to 140 PSIG. Which ONE (1) of the following conditions would be entered/violated while performing the procedure actions of Step 21? A. ITS 2.1.1, Reactor Core Safety Limits. (Combination of Thermal Power, RCS Cold Leg Temperature, and Pressurizer Pressure within limits of Figure 2.1.1.1).
FRP-C.1, RESPONSE
B!'" ITS 3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits. (RCS pressure, Temperature, and Heatup and Cooldown rates within limits of Figures 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2).
      - The crew has entered FRP-C.1,
C. TRM 3.3, Steam Generator Secondary Side PressurelTemperature (P/T) Limits. (Secondary side of S/Gs maintained within PIT limits of Figure 3.3.1). D. ITS 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits. The correct answer is B. A: Incorrect  
        -                                RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE INADEQUATE CORE COOLING.
-LCO 2.1.1 is applicable in MODES 1 and 2, since the plant has been shutdown due to an accident and is in MODE 3, 4 or 5, this LCO does NOT apply. B: Correct -Cooldown limit for the RCS is 100 of/hr. Step 21 of FRP-C.1 will depressurize S/Gs and cooldown the RCS to 365 of. This action will exceed the cooldown limit of Figure 3.4.3-2. C: Incorrect  
      - RCS temperature by CETC is 750
-TRM 3.3 is applicable at ALL times, but < 1350 PSID will be established with depressurization of S/Gs to 140 PSIG. This ensures that the Steam Generator Vessel temperature remains in the acceptable region. D: Incorrect  
        -                              750 of.
-LCO 3.4.1 is applicable in MODE 1, since the plant has been shutdown due to an accident and is in MODE 3,4 or 5, this LCO does NOT apply. Exam Question Number: 85  
                                            &deg;F.
      - Step 21 of the procedure directs the crew to depressurize all intact S/Gs to 140 140 PSIG.
Which ONE (1) of the following conditions would be entered/violated while performing the procedure actions of Step 21?
2.1 .1, Reactor Core Safety Limits. (Combination of Thermal Power, RCS Cold Leg A. ITS 2.1.1, 2.1 .1 .1).
Temperature, and Pressurizer Pressure within limits of Figure 2.1.1.1).
B. ITS 3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT)(P/T) Limits. (RCS pressure, Temperature, and Heatup and Cooldown rates within limits of Figures 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2).
C. TRM 3.3, Steam Generator Secondary Side PressurelTemperature Pressure/Temperature (P/T)(PIT) Limits.
SIGs maintained within PIT limits of Figure 3.3.1).
(Secondary side of S/Gs D. ITS 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB)
Limits.
85
 
000074 G2.2.42 000074     G2.2.42 OOllINAD 001/INAD CORECORE COOLING/1I2/3.9/4.6/SRO/HIGH/43.2/43.3/NEW COOLING/1/2/3.9/4.6/SRO/HIGHJ43.2/43.3/NEW- 2008IRCS-013- 2008/RCS-013 Given the Given     the following:
following:
The crew
      - The
      -      crew has  has entered entered FRP-C.1, FRP-C.1, RESPONSE RESPONSE TO       TO INADEQUATE INADEQUATE CORE   CORE COOLING.
COOLING.
RCS temperature
      - RCS
      -        temperature by        CETC isis 750 by CETC               F.
0 750 of.
Step 21
      - Step
      -        21 of of the the procedure procedure directs     the crew directs the    crew toto depressurize depressurize allall intact intact S/Gs S/Gs to to 140 140 PSIG.
PSIG.
Which ONE Which      ONE (1) (1) ofof the the following following conditions conditions would would be be entered/violated entered/violated while while performing performing the the procedure actions procedure        actions of  of Step Step 21?
21?
A. ITS A. ITS 2.1.1, 2.1 .1, Reactor Reactor Core Safety Limits. Limits. (Combination (Combination of Thermal Power,   Power, RCSRCS Cold Cold Leg Leg Temperature, and Temperature,           and Pressurizer Pressurizer Pressure Pressure within within limits limits of of Figure Figure 2.1.1.1).
2.1.1.1).
B ITS 3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT)
B!'"                                                              (P/T) Limits. (RCS pressure, Temperature, and Heatup and Cooldown rates        rates within limits of Figures 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2).
C. TRM 3.3, Steam Generator Secondary Side PressurelTemperature     Pressure/Temperature (P/T)  (PIT) Limits.
(Secondary side of S/Gs maintained within PIT limits of Figure 3.3.1).
D. ITS 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB)
Limits.
The correct answer is B.
A: Incorrect - LCO 2.1.1 is applicable in MODES 11 and 2, since the plant has been shutdown due to an accident and is in MODE 3, 4 or 5, this LCO does NOT apply.
B: Correct -   -      Cooldown limit for the RCS is 100 &deg;F/hr. of/hr. Step 21 of FRP-C.1 will depressurize S/Gs and cooldown the RCS to 365 &deg;F.            of. This action will exceed the cooldown limit of Figure 3.4.3-2.
C: Incorrect Incorrect - TRM 3.3 is applicable at ALL times, but << 1350 1350 PSID will be established with depressurization depressurization of S/Gs to 140           PSIG. This ensures 140 PSIG.            ensures that the SteamSteam Generator Generator Vessel temperature remains in        in the acceptable region.
D:
D: Incorrect Incorrect - LCO 3.4.1 3.4.1 is applicable in is applicable    in MODE MODE 1,  1, since the plant plant has has been been shutdown shutdown due due to an an accident accident andand is is in in MODE MODE 3,  3,44 or  5, this or 5,   this LCO LCO does does NOTNOT apply.
apply.
Exam       Question Number:
Exam Question            Number: 85  85


==Reference:==
==Reference:==


FRP-C.1 , Page 10; ITS 3.4.1, 3.4.3, 2.1.1; TRM 3.3. KA Statement:
==Reference:==
Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications.
FRP-C.1, FRP-C.1 , Page Page 10;10; ITS ITS 3.4.1, 3.4.1, 3.4.3, 3.4.3, 2.1  .1; TRM 2.1.1;   TRM 3.3.
History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC exam. SRO -requires analysis of plant conditions and selection of applicable ITS condition.
3.3.
KAName: INAD CORE COOLING Tier/Group:
KA Statement:
112 Importance Rating: 3.9/4.6 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH lOCFR55.43 linle 43.2/43.3 Source: NEW -2008 Learning Objective:
KA    Statement: AbilityAbility to to recognize recognize system system parameters parameters that      are entry-level that are entry-level conditions conditions for for Technical Technical Specifications.
RCS-013 Rev. 17 FRP-C.1 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Page 10 of 28 INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
Specifications.
* Partial uncovery of SIG tubes is acceptable in the following steps due to steaming faster than feeding.
History:
History: New New - Written Written forfor HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC exam.
exam.
SRO SRO - requires requires analysis analysis ofof plant plant conditions conditions andand selection selection ofof applicable applicable ITSITS condition.
condition.
 
KA Name:
KAName:           INAD CORE COOLING Tier/Group:         1/2 112 Importance Rating: 3.9/4.6           RO/SRO Level:       SRO Cognitive Level:   HIGH             10CFR55.43 linle 10CFR55.43  link:  43.2/43.3 Source:           NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: RCS-013
 
Rev.
Rev. 17 17 FRP-C.l FRP-C.1                 RESPONSE RESPONSE TOTO INADEQUATE INADEQUATE CORE CORE COOLING COOLING Page Page 10 10 of of 2828 STEP H            INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I          RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
NOTE
* Partial uncovery of SIG S/G tubes is acceptable in the following steps due to steaming faster faster than feeding.
feeding.
* After the Low Steamline Pressure SI Signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam flow rate setpoint is exceeded.
* After the Low Steamline Pressure SI Signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam flow rate setpoint is exceeded.
Depressurize All Intact SIGs To 140 PSIG As Follows: a. Check Steam Dump to Condenser  
*~*21.
-AVAILABLE
-.*2l. Depressurize All Intact SIGs S/Gs To 140 PSIG As Follows:
: b. Dump steam to Condenser at maximum rate c. Check RCS Hot Leg Temperatures
: a. Check Steam Dump to Condenser           a. Dump steam at maximum rate
-LESS THAN 543&deg;F d. Defeat Low Tavg Safety Injection Signal as follows: 1) Momentarily place SAFETY INJECTION T-AVG Selector Switch to BLOCK position 2) Verify LO TEMP SAFETY INJECTION BLOCKED status light -ILLUMINATED
              - AVAILABLE
: e. Check SIG pressures
              -                                         using STEAM LINE PORVs.
-LESS THAN 140 PSIG a. Dump steam at maximum rate using STEAM LINE PORVs. Go To Step 21.c. c. WHEN RCS hot leg temperatures less than 543&deg;F, THEN perform Step 21. d. Go To Step 21.e. e. IF SIG pressure is decreasing, THEN observe NOTE prior to Step 19 and Go To Step 19. IF SIG pressure is increasing, THEN Go To Step 28. (CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)
PORV5.
RCS Pressure.
Go To Step 21.c.
Temperature.
2l.c.
and Flow DNB Limits 3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 RCS Pressure.
: b. Dump steam to Condenser at maximum rate
Temperature.
: c. Check RCS Hot Leg                      c. NWHEN RCS hot leg temperatures Temperatures - LESS THAN 543&deg;F less than 543&deg;F, THEN perform Step 21.d.
and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (ONB) Limits LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure.
: 21. d.
RCS average temperature.
Go To Step 21.e.
and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified below: a. Pressurizer pressure 2205 pSig; b. RCS average temperature s 579.4&deg;F; and c. RCS total flow rate 97.3 x 10 6 lbm/hr. APPLICABILITY:
: d. Defeat Low Tavg Safety Injection Signal as follows:
MODE 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1)
NOTE* ........................ ---Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during: a. THERMAL POWER ramp> 5% RTP per minute; or b. THERMAL POWER step> 10% RTP. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more RCS DNB A.1 Restore RCS DNB 2 hours parameters not within parameter(s) to limits. within limit. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. HBRSEP Unit No. 2 3.4-1 Amendment No. 176 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits RCS PIT Limits 3.4.3 LCO 3.4.3 RCS pressure.
: 1)               place SAFETY Momentarily place T-AVG Selector INJECTION TAVG position Switch to BLOCK position
RCS temperature.
: 2) Verify LO TEMP SAFETY INJECTION BLOCKED status light - ILLUMINATED light  - ILLUMINATED e.
and RCS heatup and cool down rates shall be maintained within the limits specified in Figures 3.4.3-1 and 3.4.3-2. APPLICABILITY:
: e.         SIG pressures - LESS Check S/G              -              e. IF S/G SIG pressure isis THAN 140 THAN  140 PSIG PSIG                            decreasing, THEN decreasing,  THEN observe observe NOTE NOTE prior to prior  to Step Step 19 19 and and Go Go To To Step 19.
At all times. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ---------NOTE ---------A.l Restore parameter(s) 30 minutes Required Action A.2 to within limits. shall be completed whenever this AND Condition is entered. --_ ...... -.... -....... __ ..... -.... A.2 Determine RCS is 72 hours acceptable for Requirements of LCO continued operation.
Step  19.
not met in MODE 1. 2. 3. or 4. B. Required Action and associated Completion B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours Time of Condition A AND not met. B.2 Be in MODE 5 with RCS 36 hours pressure < 400 psig. (continued)
IF S/G IE      pressure is SIG pressure  is increasing, THEN increasing,  THEN Go Go To To Step 28.
HBRSEP Unit No. 2 3.4-5 Amendment No. 176 MATERIALS PROPERTIES BASE Res PIT Limits 3.4.3 CONTROLLING MATERIAL:
Step  28.
Upper Shell Plate Limiting ART Values at 35 EFPY: 1/4T. 167&deg;F Curves applicable for heatup rates up to 60&deg;F/Hr for service period up to 35 EFPY Heatup Curves include +10&deg;F and -60 psig Allowance for Instrumentation error. 2750 2500 2250 200!} (J) 5 150!} VI VI (J) 5:. u 125!} (J) +> <0 U 'r-"E moo ....... 750 500 250 o HBRSEP Unit No. 2 50 3/4T. 14rF 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 Indicated Temperature (oF) Figure 3.4.3'1 Reactor Coolant System Heatup Limits Applicable Up to 35 EFPY 3.4*7 Amendment No. 202 Res PIT Limits 3.4.3 MATERIALS PROPERTIES BASE Controlling Material:
(CONTINUED NEXT (CONTINUED  NEXT PAGE)
Upper Shell Plate and Girth Held Limiting ART Values at 35 EFPY: Curves applicable for cool down rates up to 100 0 F/Hr for the service period up to 35 EFPY, 2750 2500 2250 2000 "......, (.!) 1750 I-i U) CL. '-' (l) s-'1500 ::s Vl Vl (l) s-CL. u '1250 (l) +> t'O U 'r-U 1000 s::: ..... 750 500 -250 o o 50 HBRSEP Unit No. 2 1/4T. 167&deg;F and 242&deg;F Curves include +10&deg;F and -60 PSIG Allowance for Instrurnentati on error_ 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 Indicated Temperature (oF) Figure 3.4.3-2 Reactor Coolant System Cooldown Limits Applicable Up to 35 EFPY 3.4-8 Amendment No. 202 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) 2.1 SLs 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs SLs 2.0 In MODES 1 and 2, the combination of THERMAL POWER, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) highest cold leg temperature, and pressurizer pressure shall not exceed the SLs specified in Figure 2.1.1-1. 2.1.2 RCS Pressure SL In MODES 1, 2, 3, 4. and 5. the RCS pressure shall be maintained 2735 psig. 2.2 SL Violations 2.2.1 If SL 2.1.1 is violated.
PAGE)
restore compliance and be in MODE 3 within 1 hour. 2.2.2 If SL 2.1.2 is violated:
 
2.2.2.1 In MODE 1 or 2. restore compliance and be in MODE 3 within 1 hour. 2.2.2.2 In MODE 3. 4. or 5. restore compliance within 5 minutes. HBRSEP Unit No. 2 2.0-1 Amendment No. 176 SG Secondary Side PIT Limits 3.3 3.3 STEAM GENERATOR (SG) SECONDARY SIDE PRESSUREITEMPERATURE (PIT) LIMITS TRMS 3.3 The secondary side of the SGs shall be maintained within the (CTS 3.1.2.2) PIT limits of Figure 3.3-1. APPLICABILITY:
RCS RCS Pressure.
At all times. COMPENSATORY MEASURES CONDITION REQUIRED COMPENSATORY ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TRMS not met. TEST REQUIREMENTS None. HBRSEP Unit No. 2 A.l AND A.2 TEST Initiate action to Immediately restore SG secondary side PIT to within 1 imits. Initiate a Condition Report in accordance with the Corrective Action Program. 3.3-1 Immediately FREQUENCY NA PLP-I00 Rev. 22 1500 1400 1300 ;:: 1200 r-;o 1000 .r-:;=; fl:. 900 c 800 ::: >, 700 .r-o 600 OJ c 5 8 500 400 OJ'-' fl:. 300 200 100 o 40 HBRSEP Unit No. 2 60 SG Secondary Side PIT Limits 3.3 Figure 3.3-1 (Page 1 of 1) Steam Generator PIT Limits 80 100 Region of Acceptable Operation 120 140 160 180 200 Steam Generator Vessel Temperature (OF) 3.3-2 PLP-100 Rev. 22 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 86. Given the following:  
Pressure, Temperature.
-The plant is in MODE 4 at 210 of and 350 PSIG. -RCS is solid. -RHR Pump "A" and RCP "C" are running. -While swapping Charging Pumps, the operator inadvertently starts the Standby Charging Pump with the speed controller set at maximum. Which ONE (1) of the following will occur to limit RCS pressure?
Temperature, and and Flow Flow DNB DNB Limits Limits 3.4.1 3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR 3.4    REACTOR COOLANT COOLANT SYSTEMSYSTEM (RCS)  (RCS) 3.4.1 RCS 3.4.1      RCS Pressure.
A. RHR-706, RHR SYSTEM RELIEF, will OPEN at 600 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT. Enter AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL. B. RHR-706, RHR SYSTEM RELIEF, will OPEN at 600 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT. Enter AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
Pressure. Temperature.
C. PCV-455C and PCV-456, PZR PORVs will OPEN at 400 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT. Enter AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
Temperature, and          and FlowFlow Departure Departure from  from Nucleate Nucleate Boiling Boiling (ONB)
D. PCV-455C and PCV-456, PZR PORVs will OPEN at 400 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT. Use APP-003-A2/A3, PCV-455C and PCV-456 LP PROT ACT/TROUB to direct operator actions. 86 007 A2.03 OOIIPRT/QUENCH TANKl2/1/3.6/3.9/SROIHIGH/43.5/NEW
(DNB) Limits Limits LCO 3.4.1 LCO    3.4.1        RCS RCS DNB DNB parameters parameters for        for pressurizer pressurizer pressure.
-2008IPZR-01O Given the following:
pressure, RCS RCS average average temperature.
-The plant is in MODE 4 at 210 of and 350 PSIG. -RCS is solid. -RHR Pump "A" and RCP "C" are running. -While swapping Charging Pumps, the operator inadvertently starts the Standby Charging Pump with the speed controller set at maximum. Which ONE (1) of the following will occur to limit RCS pressure?
temperature, and          and RCS RCS total total flow  flow rate rate shall shall be be within within the the limits limits specified specified below:    below:
A. RHR-706, RHR SYSTEM RELIEF, will OPEN at 600 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT. Enter AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL. B. RHR-706, RHR SYSTEM RELIEF, will OPEN at 600 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT. Enter AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
a.a.       Pressurizer Pressurizer pressure    pressure        ~>  2205 2205 pSig; psig; b.
C. PCV-455C and PCV-456, PZR PORVs will OPEN at 400 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT. Enter AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING). PCV-455C and PCV-456, PZR PORVs will OPEN at 400 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT. Use APP-003-A2/A3, PCV-455C and PCV-456 LP PROT ACTITROUB to direct operator actions. The correct answer is D. A: Incorrect
: b.       RCS RCS average average temperature temperature            s 579.4&deg;F; 579.4&deg;F; andand c.
-RHR-706 is set to OPEN at 600 PSIG. AOP-019 is applicable ONLY in MODES 1,2 and 3. B: Incorrect
: c.       RCS RCS total total flow  flow rate rate    ~ 97.3 97.3 xx 101066 lbm/hr.
-RHR-706 is set to OPEN at 600 PSIG, but entry conditions will NOT be met for AOP-020 unless RHR inventory loss occurs. AOP-033 will be used for shutdown LOCA with the RCS greater than 200 of. C: Incorrect  
lbm/hr.
-PZR PORVs are set at 400 PSIG during L TOP conditions.
APPLICABILITY:
AAOP-033 will be used for shutdown LOCA with the RCS greater than 200 of. D: Correct -LTOP will actuate the PZR PORVs at 400 PSIG. APP-003-A2/A3 is the correct procedure to use.
APPLICABILITY:        MODE 11..
Exam Question Number: 86  
                      . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NOTE*
NOTE ........................ ---
Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during:
Pressurizer                                                                during:
: a.       THERMAL POWER ramp>          ramp > 5% RTP per minute; or            or
: b.       THERMAL POWER step>          step > 10% RTP.
ACTIONS CONDITION                                      REQUIRED ACTION                        COMPLETION COMPLETI    TIME ON TIME A.
A. One One oror more RCS DNB  DNB              A.1            Restore RCS DNB Restore                            22 hours hours parameters parameters not within                                  parameter(s) to limits.
limits.                                                 within limit.
within B.
B. Required Required Action Action and  and            B.1 8.1            Be in Be    in MODE MODE 2. 2.             66 hours hours associated associated Completion Completion Time Time not not met.
met.
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.
No. 22                                        3.4-1 3.4-1                                  Amendment No.
Amendment    No. 176 176
 
RCS PIT RCS  PIT Limits Limits 3.4.3 3.4.3 3.4 REACTOR 3.4    REACTOR COOLANT COOLANT SYSTEM  SYSTEM (RCS)  (RCS) 3.4.3 RCS 3.4.3    RCS Pressure Pressure and                Temperature (PIT) and Temperature          (P/T) Limits Limits LCO 3.4.3 LCO    3.4.3               RCS RCS pressure.
pressure, RCS    RCS temperature.
temperature, andand RCS RCS heatup heatup and and cool  down cooldown rates rates shall  shall be be maintained maintained within within the the limits limits specified specified in in Figures Figures 3.4.3-1  3.4.3-1 and and 3.4.3-2.
3.4.3-2.
APPLICABILITY:
APPLICABILITY:             At all At    all times.
times.
ACTIONS ACTIONS CONDITION CONDITION                                      REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION ACTION              COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME TIME A.
A.   - -- --- ---NOTENOTE ---- --- -- A.l        A.1      Restore parameter(s)        30 30 minutes minutes Required Action A.2 Required                                              to within limits.
shall be completed shall whenever whenever this                                AND Condition is entered.
Condition
      --_ ...... - .... - ....... __ ..... - .... A.2        Determine RCS is            72 72 hours hours acceptable for Requirements of LCO Requirements                                          continued operation.
not met in MODE 1. 2.
not                                  2, 3,
: 3. or or 4.4.
B.
B. Required Required Action and                          B.1 B.1      Be in MODE 3.
Be          3.                hours 66 hours associ  ated Completion associated        Completion Time Time ofof Condition Condition AA                    AND not not met.
met.
B.2 B.2        Be in Be in MODE MODE 55 with with RCS RCS    36 hours 36  hours pressure << 400 pressure    400 psig.
psig.
(continued)
(continued)
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.No. 22                                    3.4-5 3.4-5                          Amendment No.
Amendment      No. 176 176
 
Res RCS    P/T Limits PIT    Limits 3.4.3 3.4.3 MATERIALS PROPERTIES MATERIALS        PROPERTIES BASE BASE CONTROLL  ING      MATERIAL: Upper CONTROLLING MATERIAL:            Upper Shell Shell Plate Plate                Curves Curves applicable applicable forfor heatup heatup rates rates upup to to Limiting  ART    Values  at Limiting ART Values at 35 EFPY: 1/4T.
35    EFPY:    1!4T, 167&deg;F 167&deg;F          60&deg;F/Hr 6OF/Hr forfor service service period period up up to to 35 35 EFPY EFPY 314T, 14rF 3/4T. 147&deg;F          Heatup Heatup Curves Curves include include +10&deg;F
                                                                                                    +1OF and and -60
                                                                                                                -60 psig psig Allowance Allowance for for Instrumentation Instrumentation error.
error.
2750 2750 I                              F i          I                    H        HI 2500 2500 2250 2000 200!}      LeaK Test Imit Unacceptable Operation 0)
(J) 5V)
VI 1500 150!}
I
                              -Hj
                                          } H+ LH Heatup Rate to Acceptable Operation 4))
VI 0)
(J)
J4]          60F/Hr 5:. 1250 u      125!}
0)
(J)
          +>
            <0 0
U
          'r-
          "E i000 moo                                                Criticality [lint based on Inservice Hydrostatic test 7Cfl temeature (226F) for the 750                                                  vice neriod un to 35 EFP (
nn 500 250 250 0
0o      50 50      100 100    150 150    200 200  250 250    300 300    350 350    400 400    450 450    500 500    550 550 Indicated Indicated Temperature Temperature (&deg;F) (oF)
Figure Figure 3.4.3-1 3.4.3'1 Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant System System 1-leatup Heatup Limits Limits Applicable Applicable Up  Up to to 3535 EFFY EFPY HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22                                    3.4-7 3.4*7                                Amendment No.
Amendment      No. 202 202
 
Res RCS  P/T Limits PIT 3.4.3 MATERIALS MATERtALS PROPERTIES BASE Controlling Material: Upper Shell Plate                              Curves applicable for cool      down rates cooldown and nd Girth HeldWeld              up to 100100&deg;0 F/Hr for the service Limiting ART Values at 35 EFPY:
Liolting                                                              period up to 35 EFPY, EFPY.
1/4T. 167&deg;F and 242&deg;F          Curves include +10&deg;F and -60 PSIG 2750 Allowance for Instrurnentati Instruientatioon n error_
error.
2500 (0
(.!)
I14 U)
      -i LI)
CL.
0 2250 2000 1750
: i. Unacceptable Operation I
i L
II  1 20&deg;F/Hr Li)
(l) s- *1500
::s '1500 V)
Vl
                                                        /r            40&deg;F/Hr U)
Vl Li)
(l) s-CL.
0 u
ci)
(l)
    +>
1250
            '1250                                                IF!                                  t t'O 0
U
  'r-U        1000
  .....s:::                (&deg;F!Hr)
I          I      I                        100&deg;F/Kr.
750    LIII 1TF
                      -O  ani1 500 -                                                  Acceptable Operation rmL-                       I.             .i      W 250-250 o0 o0      50      100    150    200    250    300      350    400    450    500    550 Indicated Temperature (oF)      (&deg;F)
Figure 3.4.3-2 Reactor Coolant System Cooldown Limits Applicable Up to 35 EFPY HBRSEP Unit No. 22                                              3.4-8                              Amendment No. 202
 
SLs SLs 2.0 2.0 2.0 SAFETY 2.0  SAFETY LIMITS LIMITS (SLs)
(SLs) 2.1 SLs 2.1  SLs 2.1.1 Reactor 2.1.1    Reactor Core Core SLs SLs MODES 11 and In MODES In            and 2, 2, the the combination combination  of of THERMAL THERMAL POWER, POWER, Reactor Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
Coolant  System  (RCS) highest highest cold cold leg leg temperature, temperature, and and pressurizer pressurizer pressure shall pressure    shall not not exceed exceed the the SLs SLs specified specified in in Figure Figure 2.1.1-1.
2.1.1-1.
2.1.2 RCS 2.1.2    RCS Pressure Pressure SLSL In In MODES MODES 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4.
: 4. and and 5.5, the RCS RCS pressure shall shall be be maintained maintained 2735
              ~ 2735 psig.
psig.
2.2 SL Violations 2.2 2.2.1 If SL 2.1.1 is violated.
2.2.1                      violated, restore compliance and be in MODE 3        3 within 1 1 hour.
2.2.2 If SL 2.1.2 is violated:
2.2.2.1 In MODE 1    1 or 2.2, restore compliance and be in      MODE 33 in MODE within 1 1 hour.
2.2.2.2    In MODE 3,3. 4,
: 4. or 5,5. restore compliance within 55 minutes.
minutes.
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit  No. 22 Unit No.                            2.0-1 2.0-1                        Amendment No.
Amendment    No. 176 176
 
SG SG Secondary    Side PIT Secondary Side    P/T Limits Limits 3.3 3.3 3.3 STEAM 3.3  STEAM GENERATOR GENERATOR (SG)
(SG) SECONDARY SECONDARY SIDE    PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE (PIT)
SIDE PRESSUREITEMPERATURE      (PIT) LIMITS LIMITS TRMS TRMS 3.33.3        The The secondary secondary side side of of the the SGs SGs shall shall bebe maintained maintained within within the the (CTS  3.1.2.2) PIT (CTS 3.1.2.2)    P/T limits limits ofof Figure Figure 3.3-1.
3.3-1.
APPLICABILITY: At APPLICABILITY:      At all all times.
times.
COMPENSATORY MEASURES CONDITION              REQUIRED COMPENSATORY COMPENSATORY ACTION      COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements Requirements of TRMS        A.1 A.l      Initiate action to          Immediately not met.
met,                            restore SG secondary side PIT P/T to within imits.
1limits.
AND A.2      Initiate aa Condition      Immediately Report in accordance with the Corrective Action Program.
REQUIREMENTS TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST                                      FREQUENCY None.                                                                  NA HBRSEP Unit HBRSEP  Unit No.
No. 22                      3.3-1 3.3-1                          PLP-I00 Rev.
PLP-100  Rev. 22 22
 
  =
(/)
900                                                                ;::
  =                                                                        ~.s 800 Pressure Differential (PSI) 700                                  :;=; fl:.
                                                                          .r- ~
  .1.                                                                    o ~ 600 OJ c    (Secondary to Priniary)            c ct                                                                      5 8 500
                                                                          ~ ~ 400                                                                  1500 OJ'-'                                                  fa        f-    F-    I fl:. 300 C,)          U,                                                    1400
                                                                                                                                    ~ 1000 i-C                      0i        -  CX)      O        CD        I-  r\)  U, 0                                                                      CD    200 C)
CD  CD  CD    CD      CD      CD      CD        CD    1300 CD    CD r-;o .r-CD o    CD    100 CD      CD  CD  CD    CD      CD      CD      CD        CD    1200 C)    CD 40 HBRSEP Unit No. 2 C-,                                      60 (F,
CD                                                                                                                                      C-I-,
c-          --
CD CO 80 CD                                                                                                                                                    CD CD                                                                                                                                        CD C)
CD C--)
CC)                                                                                                                                                          -5.
0                                        CD 100                                                                                              0) I-Figure 3.3-1 (Page 1 of 1)
        )          -5 o
3.3-2                                                                                                                                                          _5 _t cD>                                                            0)
CD                                                          111111        III:CIIII                                                      -cR0 Cr)                                      I                                    Region of (I,                                      rz                ILItLI        IICD CO IH                                                                  CD CD                                        CD 120                                                                                              -H
: 0)        0 C-
_1                                                                            Acceptable 0)
                                                                                                                                                              --0 CD                                                                                                                                            -h I
Operation CD
_J.
C-,--
Steam Generator PIT Limits
                    -z                                                                                                                                        C/,
CD                                        CD 140
                    -5                                                                                                                                                                                  Cf CD C-,
                    -5 CD 0
160 C-)
0 0
0) 5 9
Steam Generator Vessel Temperature (OF)
-t,                                                                                                                                                                                                    C,,
SG Secondary Side PIT Limits 180                                                                                                                                      -C 0
CD
                                                                                                                                                                                                        -:5 r.)                                                                                                                                      -H CD                                                            CD 200 CD C-)
PLP-100 Rev. 22 F.                                                                                                          C-.) C,,
C1.
c-f 3.3
 
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08    NRC Written Written Exam Exam
: 86. Given the
: 86. Given  the following:
following:
The plant
      - The
        -      plant is is in in MODE MODE 44 at at 210 210 of  and 350
                                              &deg;F and      PSIG.
350 PSIG.
RCS isis solid.
      - RCS
        -          solid.
RHR Pump
      - RHR
        -      Pump "A" A and and RCP RCP "C"  are running.
C are running.
swapping Charging
      - While swapping
        -                      Charging Pumps, Pumps, the operator operator inadvertently inadvertently starts the Standby Standby Charging Pump with Pump    with the the speed speed controller controller set set at at maximum.
maximum.
Which ONE (1) of the following will occur to limit RCS pressure?
RHR-706, RHR A. RHR-706,      RHR SYSTEM RELIEF,RELIEF, will OPEN at 600 PSIG PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.
PRT.
Enter AOP-019, Enter  AOP-01 9, MALFUNCTION MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE PRESSURE CONTROL.
B. RHR-706, RHR SYSTEM RELIEF, will OPEN at 600 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.
Enter AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
C. PCV-455C and PCV-456, PZR PORVs will OPEN at 400 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.
Enter AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
D. PCV-455C and PCV-456, PZR PORVs will OPEN at 400 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.
Use APP-003-A2/A3, PCV-455C and PCV-456 LP PROT ACT/TROUB to direct operator actions.
86 86
 
00 1/PRT/QIJENCH TANKl2/1/3.6/3.9/SROIHIGH/43.5/NEW 007 A2.03 OOIIPRT/QUENCH    TANK/2/1/3 .6/3 .9/SROIHIGHJ43 .5/NEW - 2008IPZR-01O
                                                                  - 2008/PZR-0 10 Given the following:
    - The plant is in MODE
    -                MODE 4 at 210 210&deg;F              PSIG.
of and 350 PSIG.
    - RCS is solid.
    - RHR Pump "A"
    -              A and RCP "C" C are running.
    - While swapping Charging Pumps, the operator inadvertently starts the Standby Charging Pump with the speed controller set at maximum.
Which ONE (1) of the following will occur to limit RCS pressure?
A. RHR-706, RHR SYSTEM RELIEF, will OPEN at 600 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.
AOP-01 9, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL.
Enter AOP-019, B. RHR-706, RHR SYSTEM RELIEF, will OPEN at 600 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.
Enter AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
C. PCV-455C and PCV-456, PZR PORVs will OPEN at 400 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.
Enter AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
D~
D PCV-455C and PCV-456, PZR PORVs will OPEN at 400 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.
Use APP-003-A2/A3, PCV-455C and PCV-456 LP PROT ACTITROUB      ACT/TROUB to direct operator actions.
The correct answer is D.
A: Incorrect - RHR-706 is set to OPEN at 600 PSIG. AOP-019
              -                                            AOP-01 9 is applicable ONLY in MODES 1, 2and 1,2  and 3.
B: Incorrect - RHR-706 is set to OPEN at 600 PSIG, but entry conditions will NOT be met for AOP-020 unless RHR inventory loss occurs. AOP-033 will be used for shutdown LOCA with the RCS greater than 200 &deg;F. of.
C: Incorrect - PZR PORVs are set at 400 PSIG during LTOP
              -                                              LTOP conditions. AAOP-033 will be used for shutdown LOCA with the RCS greater than 200 &deg;F.      of.
D: Correct --    LTOP will actuate the PZR PORVs at 400 PSIG. APP-003-A2/A3 is the correct procedure to use.
 
Exam Question Exam                 Number: 86 Question Number:           86


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
APP-003-A2
==Reference:==
APP-003-A2 and      and A3; A3; AOP-019, AOP-019, PagePage 3;  AOP-020, Page 3; AOP-020,    Page 3; 3; SO-003, SD-003, RHR, RHR, Figure Figure 3.3.
KA Statement:
KA  Statement: Ability Ability to to (a)
(a) predict predict the the impacts impacts of  the following of the  following malfunctions malfunctions oror operations operations on on the PP S; the        and (b)
S; and        based on (b) based      those predictions, on those  predictions, use use procedures procedures toto correct, correct, control, control, or mitigate or mitigate the the consequences consequences of  of those those malfunctions malfunctions oror operations:
operations:
Overpressurization Overpressurization of    of the the PZR.
PZR.
History: New History:        - Written for New - Written      for HLC-08 HLC-08 NRCNRC exam.
exam.
SRO - Requires evaluation of plant SRO  -                                plant conditions and selection of the applicable procedure procedure to mitigate the event.
event.
KA Name:
KA                    PRT/QUENCH TANK PRT/QUENCH        TANK                Tier/Group:
Tier/Group:          2/1 2/1 Importance Rating:
Importance            3.6/3.9 3.6/3.9                              RO/SRO Level:
RO/SRO    Level:    SRO SRO Cognitive Level:      HIGH                                  10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43          43.5 Source:                NEW - 2008
                              -                            Learning Objective:  PZR-OlO PZR-01O
APP-003-A2 APP-003-A2 Page Page11 ofof22 ALARM ALARM PCV-455CLP PCV-455C        LPPROT PROTACTfTROUB ACT,TROUB                WILLREFLASH
                                                  *** WILL    REFLASH***
AUTOMATICACTIONS AUTOMATIC          ACTIONS 1.1.      PCV-455C, PZR PCV-455C,        PZRPORV, PORV, opens opensatat400 400psig psigwhen when inin Low LowPressure PressureModeMode CAUSE CAUSE 1.1.      RCS overpressure RCS      overpressure condition.
condition.
2.2.      Auctioneered low Auctioneered        lowTc Tc less less than than 360&deg;F 360&deg;F AND AND LTOPP LTOPP isis NOT NOT enabled.
enabled.
3.3.      RC-536, PORV RC-536,      PORV BLOCK, BLOCK, Closed Closed 4.
: 4.        RC-536, PRESSURIZER RC-536,      PRESSURIZER PORV      PORV PCV-455C PCV-455C BLOCK, BLOCK, Breaker Breaker Tripped/Open Tripped/Open OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS 1.1.      RCS Pressure RCS      Pressure (PR-444, (PR-444, PI-500, P1-500, PI-501, P1-501, PI-403)
P1-403) 2.
: 2.        RCS Temperature RCS      Temperature (TR-410)
(TR-410) 3.
: 3.        PRT Pressure PRT      Pressure (PI-472),
(P1-472), Temperature Temperature (TI-471),
(Tl-471), &  & Level Level (L1-470)
(LI-470) 4.
: 4.        RC-536 Position RC-536      Position indication indication 5.
: 5.        Position of Position  of RHR-759A, RHR-759A, RHR HX "A"      A DISCHARGE DISCHARGE and RHR-759B,  RHR-759B, RHR HX    HX "B" B DISCHARGE DISCHARGE ACTIONS ACTIONS 1.
: 1.        Stop pressure Stop    pressure increasing increasing activities.
2.
: 2.        IF require IF  required,d, THEN THEN turn the LTOP  LTOPP  P System OVER OVERPRESSURE            PROTECTION      Switches PRESSURE PROT        ECTION Switch  es to to LOW LOW PRESS PRESSURE. URE.
3.
: 3.      IF IF require required,d, THEN THEN OPEN OPEN RC-53 RC-536.6.
4.
: 4.      IF IF RCS RCS isis solid, solid, THEN THEN verify verify BOTH BOTH RHRRHR HX  HX A"A" AND AND B"B" DISCHARG DISCHARGE      OPEN::
E OPEN 1)
: 1)        RHR-759A RHR-759A 2)
: 2)        RHR-759B RHR-759B 5.
: 5.      IF IF require  d, THEN required,  THEN dispatc dispatchh operato operatorr to to check check Breake Breaker    Position r Positio    of RC-53 n of  RC-536,  PRESSURIZER    PORV 6, PRESS URIZER PORV PCV-4    55C PCV-455C BLOCK.BLOCK.
6.6. IF IF tripped tripped,, THEN THEN investi      gate the investigate  the cause cause of of trip.
trip.
IAPP-0 APP-00303                                                  Rev.
Rev.37    37                                    Page55ofof53 Page          531
APP-003-A2 APP-003-A2 Page Page 22 of of 22 ALARM ALARM PCV-455C LP PCV-455C  LP PROT PROT ACTfTROUB ACT/TROUB (Continued)
(Continued)
DEVICEISETPOINTS DEVICE/SETPOINTS 1.
: 1. TE-41 0, TE-420, TE-410,  TE-420, or or TE-430 TE-430 II 360&deg;F 360&deg;F 2.
: 2. RC-536 limit RC-536    limit switch switch 3.
: 3. QM-503 1400 QM-503    I 400 psig psig II variable variable (If  auctioneered low (If auctioneered  low Tc Tc isis greater greater than than 360&deg;F) 360&deg;F)
POSSIBLE PLANT POSSIBLE  PLANT EFFECTS EFFECTS 1.
: 1. Low RCS Low  RCS pressure pressure 2.
: 2. Failure of Failure  of LLTOPP TOPP toto actuate actuate when when required required REFERENCES REFERENCES
: 1. ITS LCO 3.4.12, LCO 3.4.3, LCO 3.4.11
: 2. CWD B-190628, Sheet 120, Cables J and M CWO
: 3. Hagan Wiring Diagram HBR2-8608 082          D82 IAPP-003 APP-003                                                Rev. 37 Rev. 37                            Page 66 of Page        53\
of 53
APP-003-A3 APP-00  3-A3 Page 1 1 of 2 ALARM ALARM PCV-456 LP PROT ACTfTACT/TROUB              *** WILL REFLASH ***
AUTOMATI AUTOM  ATICC ACTIO ACTIONSNS
: 1.      PCV-45 PCV-456,6, PZR PORV, PORV, opens at 400 psig when in Low Pressure Mode CAUSE CAUSE
: 1.      RCS overpre overpressure ssure conditio condition.
n.
: 2.      Auctioneered Auction  eered low Tc less than 360&deg;F AND L    LTOP TOPP  P is NOT enabled.
: 3.      RC-535 RC-535,, PORV BLOCK BLOCK,, Closed
: 4.      RC-535 RC-535,, PRESS PRESSURIZE URIZER PORV PCV-45 PCV-456  6 BLOCK BLOCK Breaker Tripped Tripped/Open
                                                                                      /Open OBSERVAT OBSER  VATIOIONS NS
: 1.      RCS Pressure (PR-444, PI-500, P1-500, PI-501 P1-501,, PI-403)
P1-403)
: 2.      RCS Temperature (TR-41 (TR-41 0)
. 3.      PRT Pressure (PI-472 (P1-472),
                                  ), Temperature (TI-471 (TI-471),
                                                              ), & Level (LI-470 (LI-470))
: 4.      RC-535 RC-535 Position indicati indication on
: 5.      Position of RHR-759A, RHR HX "A"    A DISCHARGE and RHR-759B, RHR HX "B"        B DISCHARGE ACTIONS
: 1.      Stop pressure increasing activitie activities.
s.
: 2.      IF required, THEN turn the L  LTOP TOPP  P System OVERP OVERPRESS RESSU URE RE PROTE PROTECTIO CTION  Switches N Switch es to LOW PRESS PRESSURE.
: 3.      IF required, THEN OPEN RC-535RC-535..
: 4.      IF RCS solid, THEN verify RHR HX "A"      A and "B" B DISCHARGE OPEN:OPEN:
: 1)        RHR-759A
: 2)        RHR-759B
: 5.      IF required, THEN dispatch operator to check Breaker Position of RC-535 RC-535,, PRESS PRESSURIZE URIZER PORV PCV PCV-4 -456 56 BLOCK BLOCK..
: 6.      IF tripped, THEN investig investigate ate the cause of trip.
IAPP-003                                                Rev. 37                                    Page 7 of 53531
APP-00  3-A3 APP-003-A3 Page Page 22 of of 22 ALARM ALARM PCV-456 PCV-4 56 LP LP PROT PROT ACTffR ACTITROIJBOUB (Contin (Continued) ued)
DEVICE/SETP DEVIC E/SETPOI OINTSNTS 1.
: 1.      TE-41 0,, TE-420 TE-410    TE-420,, or or TE-430 TE-430 II 360&deg;F 360&deg;F 2.
: 2.      RC-535 limit RC-535    limit switch switch 3.
: 3.      QM-5033 I/ 400 OM-50      400 psig psig II variabl variablee (If (If auction auctioneered eered low low Tc is is greater greater than than 360&deg;F) 360&deg;F)
POSSIBLE PLANT POSSI        PLANT EFFEC EFFECTS 1.
: 1.      Low RCS Low  RCS pressu pressure
: 2.      Failure of LLTOP Failure      TOPP  P to actuate when required ENCES REFERENCES
: 1.      ITS LCO 3.4.12, 3.4.12, LCO 3.4.3, LCO 3.4.11
: 2.      CWD B-1906 CWO    B-i 90628 28,, Sheet 119, Cables J and M
: 3. Hagan Wiring Diagram Diagram HBR2-HBR2-8608 8608 082 D82 IAPP APP-0-003 03                                              Rev. 37 Rev. 37 I            Page 88 of Page      531I of 53
Rev.
Rev. 13 13 AOP-019 AOP-019                MALFUNCTION OF MALFUNCTION    OF RCS RCS PRESSURE PRESSURE CONTROL CONTROL Page Page 33 of of 17 17 Purpose and Purpose  and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)
1.
: 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This  procedure provides provides instructions instructions in  in the the event event RCS RCS pressure pressure is is higher higher OR    lower  than required Q lower than    required forfor current current plant plant conditions.
conditions.
~
-    This procedure This  procedure isis applicable applicable in in Modes Modes 1,1,2,2, and and 3.
3.
2.
: 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY  CONDITIONS This procedure This  procedure may may be be entered entered when when RCS RCS pressure pressure deviates deviates from from the the desired  control band due desired control          due to to aa fault fault inin pressure pressure control control components. (AOP-025 components.  (AOP-025 covers covers Instrument Instrument Failure)
Failure)
                                          -  END --
AOP-020 20                                                                                  Rev. 29 LOSS LOSS OF  OF RESIDU RESIDUALAL HEAT HEAT REMOV  AL (SHUTD REMOVAL          OWN COOLIN (SHUTDOWN    COOLING)G)
Page 3 of 107 107 j STEP H                  INSTRU INSTRUCTIO CTIONSNS I I          RESPON RESPONSESE NOT OBTAIN OBTAINEDED H-1.
: 1.      PURPOS PURPOSEE This procedure provid provideses the instru instructio ction  s neces ns        sary to mitig ate the necessary loss of RHR in all condi loss                      condition tionss for which RHR can be aligne  aligned d to provid e shutdown coolincooling.g. This includ includeses loss of RHR coolincooling g for reason s such as RCS leakag leakage, e, loss of power power,, loss of Servic Service e Water or Component Cooling Water    Water,, RHR pump cavita cavitation tion,, and inade    quate inadequa    te RHR flow or abnorm al reduc    reduction tionss in RHR coolin    g.
cooling.
This proced ure is applic applicabl able e in Modes 4, 5, and 6 when fuel is in the vesse vessel.
l.
: 2.      ENTRY ENTRY CONDI CONDITION TIONSS Directt entry from any condi Direc                          condition tion result resulting ing in a loss of RHR pump( s), RHR pump cavita cavitation tion,, abnorm al RHR flow or tempe          rature temperatu    re contr control,ol, or exces excessive sive loss of RCS inven        tory while RHR is aligne inventory for shutdown coolin aligned d cooling.
g.
As direct directed ed by the follow following ing other other proce procedurdures:
es:
            **    AOP-005, RadiaRadiation tion Monit Monito  oring ring System , when a low level in the SFP SEP exists exists due to an RCS leak with the SFP GATE VALVE VALVE open.
            **      AOP-0 AOP-O14, Component Cooling Water System Malf Malfu  nction unct ion,, result  ing resulting in stopp stoppinging of the RHR Pumps while in CSD.
    ~.*            AOP-016, ExcesExcesssive ive Prima Primarryy Plant Plant Leaka Leakag ge, e, if less than 200&deg;F and leakage exceeds Charg  Chargiing ng Capac    ity.
Capacity.
          **      AOP-0 AOP-O17, Loss Of Instru  Instrumment ent Air, if the loss of Instru  Instrumement nt Air has affect affected ed core coolin cooling g while on RHR.
                                                        - END --
COLD LEG RECIRC - RHR FLOW        -              W>  >120 1200  0 GPM, RCS<  RCS<125 125 PSIG RHR RHR-F
                                                                    -FIGU IGURE RE-3
                                                                            -3
                  ..-- --. --- --- --- --- --- --- -11 /1                                                        . i 51-887 TO 51 PUMP B& C SUCTIONS TO 51 AND RHR-764                                RHR-757B      RHR-754B                        RHR-752B                    CONTAINMENT M                          SPRAY PUMP RHR-759B                                                                                            SUCTIONS
                                                                                                    ~liII  ~liII
* FROM RWST SI-862A 1-3::
                                                                                ---'0 MINI FLOW RECIRC      FROM CONTAINMENT SUMP RHR HEAT-UP LINE RHR-743 TO RC LOOP 1                                                                ~
COLD LEG                                                                  ':"
til TO RC LOOP 3 COLD LEG                                                                  ~
U1 o
TO RC LOOP 2 RHR-7448 COLD LEG RHR-744B SI-876B SI-8768    SI-875B                                                                        FROM RC LOOP 2 HOT HOT LEG LEG INFO INF    ORM RMA    ATITION ON USE ONLY


APP-003-A2 and A3; AOP-019, Page 3; AOP-020, Page 3; SO-003, RHR, Figure 3. KA Statement:
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08     NRC Written Written Exam Exam
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the P S; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
: 87. Given the
Overpressurization of the PZR. History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC exam. SRO -Requires evaluation of plant conditions and selection of the applicable procedure to mitigate the event. KA Name: PRT/QUENCH TANK Importance Rating: 3.6/3.9 Cognitive Level: HIGH Source: NEW -2008 Tier/Group:
: 87. Given  the following:
RO/SRO Level: lOCFR55.43 link: 2/1 SRO 43.5 Learning Objective:
following:
PZR-OlO ALARM PCV-455C LP PROT ACTfTROUB
The plant
*** WILL REFLASH *** AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1. PCV-455C, PZR PORV, opens at 400 psig when in Low Pressure Mode CAUSE 1. RCS overpressure condition.
      - The
: 2. Auctioneered low Tc less than 360&deg;F AND LTOPP is NOT enabled. 3. RC-536, PORV BLOCK, Closed 4. RC-536, PRESSURIZER PORV PCV-455C BLOCK, Breaker Tripped/Open OBSERVATIONS
      -                   in MODE plant isis in MODE 3. 3.
: 1. RCS Pressure (PR-444, PI-500, PI-501, PI-403) 2. RCS Temperature (TR-410) 3. PRT Pressure (PI-472), Temperature (TI-471), & Level (L1-470) 4. RC-536 Position indication APP-003-A2 Page 1 of 2 5. Position of RHR-759A, RHR HX "A" DISCHARGE and RHR-759B, RHR HX "B" DISCHARGE ACTIONS 1. Stop pressure increasing activities.
RCS heatup
: 2. IF required, THEN turn the L TOPP System OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION Switches to LOW PRESSURE.
      - RCS
: 3. IF required, THEN OPEN RC-536. 4. IF RCS is solid, THEN verify BOTH RHR HX "A" AND "B" DISCHARGE OPEN: 1) RHR-759A 2) RHR-759B 5. IF required, THEN dispatch operator to check Breaker Position of RC-536, PRESSURIZER PORV PCV-455C BLOCK. 6. IF tripped, THEN investigate the cause of trip. I APP-003 Rev. 37 Page 5 of 531 ALARM PCV-455C LP PROT ACTfTROUB (Continued)
      -       heatup and  and pressurization pressurization isis in in progress.
DEVICE/SETPOINTS
progress.
: 1. TE-410, TE-420, or TE-430 I 360&deg;F 2. RC-536 limit switch 3. QM-503 1400 psig I variable (If auctioneered low Tc is greater than 360&deg;F) POSSIBLE PLANT EFFECTS 1. Low RCS pressure 2. Failure of L TOPP to actuate when required REFERENCES
      - RCS
: 1. ITS LCO 3.4.12, LCO 3.4.3, LCO 3.4.11 2. CWO B-190628, Sheet 120, Cables J and M 3. Hagan Wiring Diagram HBR2-8608 082 I APP-003 Rev. 37 APP-003-A2 Page 2 of 2 Page 6 of 53\
      -       temperature isis 511 RCS temperature            511 of.
ALARM PCV-456 LP PROT ACTfTROUB AUTOMATIC ACTIONS *** WILL REFLASH *** 1. PCV-456, PZR PORV, opens at 400 psig when in Low Pressure Mode CAUSE 1. RCS overpressure condition.
                                          &deg;F.
: 2. Auctioneered low Tc less than 360&deg;F AND L TOPP is NOT enabled. 3. RC-535, PORV BLOCK, Closed 4. RC-535, PRESSURIZER PORV PCV-456 BLOCK Breaker Tripped/Open OBSERVATIONS
RCS pressure
: 1. RCS Pressure (PR-444, PI-500, PI-501 , PI-403) 2. RCS Temperature (TR-410) . 3. PRT Pressure (PI-472), Temperature (TI-471), & Level (LI-470) 4. RC-535 Position indication APP-003-A3 Page 1 of 2 5. Position of RHR-759A, RHR HX "A" DISCHARGE and RHR-759B, RHR HX "B" DISCHARGE ACTIONS 1. Stop pressure increasing activities.
      - RCS
: 2. IF required, THEN turn the L TOPP System OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION Switches to LOW PRESSURE.
      -       pressure is   is 2100 2100 PSIG.
: 3. IF required, THEN OPEN RC-535. 4. IF RCS solid, THEN verify RHR HX "A" and "B" DISCHARGE OPEN: 1) RHR-759A 2) RHR-759B 5. IF required, THEN dispatch operator to check Breaker Position of RC-535, PRESSURIZER PORV PCV -456 BLOCK. 6. IF tripped, THEN investigate the cause of trip. I APP-003 Rev. 37 Page 7 of 531 ALARM PCV-456 LP PROT ACTffROUB (Continued)
PSIG.
DEVICE/SETPOINTS
ONE (1)
: 1. TE-410, TE-420, or TE-430 I 360&deg;F 2. RC-535 limit switch 3. OM-503 I 400 psig I variable (If auctioneered low Tc is greater than 360&deg;F) POSSIBLE PLANT EFFECTS 1. Low RCS pressure 2. Failure of L TOPP to actuate when required REFERENCES
      - ONE
: 1. ITS LCO 3.4.12, LCO 3.4.3, LCO 3.4.11 2. CWO B-190628, Sheet 119, Cables J and M 3. Hagan Wiring Diagram HBR2-8608 082 I APP-003 Rev. 37 APP-003-A3 Page 2 of 2 Page 8 of 531 Rev. 13 AOP-019 MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL Page 3 of Purpose and Entry Conditions (Page 1 of 1) 1. PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions in the event RCS pressure is higher OR lower than required for current plant conditions. This procedure is applicable in Modes 1, 2, and 3. 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS This procedure may be entered when RCS pressure deviates from the desired control band due to a fault in pressure control components. (AOP-025 covers Instrument Failure) -END -17 Rev. 29 AOP-020 LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING) Page 3 of INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1. PURPOSE This procedure provides the instructions necessary to mitigate the loss of RHR in all conditions for which RHR can be aligned to provide shutdown cooling. This includes loss of RHR cooling for reasons such as RCS leakage, loss of power, loss of Service Water or Component Cooling Water, RHR pump cavitation, and inadequate RHR flow or abnormal reductions in RHR cooling. This procedure is applicable in Modes 4, 5, and 6 when fuel is in the vessel. 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS Direct entry from any condition resulting in a loss of RHR pump(s), RHR pump cavitation, abnormal RHR flow or temperature control, or excessive loss of RCS inventory while RHR is aligned for shutdown cooling. As directed by the following other procedures:
      -           safety valve (1) safety     valve on on S/G SIG "A" A fails fails partially partially OPEN.
* *
OPEN. When        reseats, the When itit reseats, the following following conditions exist:
* AOP-005, Radiation Monitoring System, when a low level in the SFP exists due to an RCS leak with the SFP GATE VALVE open. AOP-014, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, resulting in stopping of the RHR Pumps while in CSD. AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, if less than 200&deg;F and leakage exceeds Charging Capacity.
conditions   exist:
AOP-017, Loss Of Instrument Air, if the loss of Instrument Air has affected core cooling while on RHR. -END -107 TO 51 PUMP B& C SUCTIONS RHR-764 1-COLD LEG RECIRC -RHR FLOW> 1200 GPM, RCS<125 PSIG RHR -FIGURE-3 ..----.-------------------11/1 . i RHR-759B RHR-757B RHR-754B TO RC LOOP 1 COLD LEG TO RC LOOP 3 COLD LEG TO RC LOOP 2 COLD LEG MINI FLOW RECIRC RHR-743 3:: ---'0 * >>
RCS temperature
* 51-887 RHR-752B M FROM CONTAINMENT SUMP RHR HEAT-UP LINE TO 51 AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP SUCTIONS
            - RCS
* FROM RWST SI-862A ':" til ':" ..... U1 o RHR-744B SI-876B SI-875B FROM RC LOOP 2 HOT LEG INFORMATION USE ONLY HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 87. Given the following:
            -      temperature stabilized at 492 of.       &deg;F.
-The plant is in MODE 3. -RCS heatup and pressurization is in progress.
RCS pressure
-RCS temperature is 511 of. -RCS pressure is 2100 PSIG. -ONE (1) safety valve on S/G "A" fails partially OPEN. When it reseats, the following conditions exist: -RCS temperature stabilized at 492 of. -RCS pressure stabilized at 1700 PSIG. -S/Gs "S" and "C" pressures stabilized at 640 PSIG. -S/G "A" pressure is 520 PSIG and slowly increasing.
            - RCS
            -      pressure stabilized stabilized at at 1700 1700 PSIG.
PSIG.
S/Gs "S"
            - S/Gs
            -        B and "C"     pressures stabilized at 640 PSIG.
C pressures                        PSIG.
SIG "A"
            - S/G
            -      A pressure is    is 520 PSIG PSIG and slowly increasing.
increasing.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the actions required?
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the actions required?
A. Stabilize plant parameters.
A. Stabilize plant parameters. Allow S/G pressures to equalize prior to raising RCS pressure above 2000 PSIG.
Allow S/G pressures to equalize prior to raising RCS pressure above 2000 PSIG. B. Stabilize plant parameters.
B. Stabilize plant parameters. Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is NOT required.
Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is NOT required.
C. Initiate Main Steam Line Isolation. Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is NOT required.
C. Initiate Main Steam Line Isolation.
D. Initiate Safety Injection. Go to PATH-1. PATH-i.
Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is NOT required.
87 87
D. Initiate Safety Injection.
 
Go to PATH-1. 87 01302.1.7 001IESFAS/2/1/4.4/4.7/SROIHIOHJ43.5/SALEM  
013 G2. 1.7 001IESFAS/2/1/4.4/4.7/SROIHIOHJ43.5/SALEM 01302.1.7    00 1/ESFAS/2/ 1/4.4/4.7/SRO/HIGHI43 .5/SALEM - 20011ESF-006
-20011ESF-006 Given the following:  
                                                                  - 200 1/ESF-006 Given the Given    the following:
-The plant is in MODE 3. -RCS heatup and pressurization is in progress.  
following:
-RCS temperature is 511 of. -RCS pressure is 2100 PSIG. -ONE (1) safety valve on S/G "A" fails partially OPEN. When it reseats, the following conditions exist: -RCS temperature stabilized at 492 of. -RCS pressure stabilized at 1700 PSIG. -S/Gs "8" and "c" pressures stabilized at 640 PSIG. -S/G "A" pressure is 520 PSIG and slowly increasing.
The plant
    - The
    -      plant is is in in MODE MODE 3. 3.
RCS heatup
    - RCS
    -        heatup and and pressurization pressurization isis inin progress.
progress.
RCS temperature
    - RCS
    -        temperature is   is 511 511 of.
                                        &deg;F.
RCS pressure
    - RCS
    -        pressure is is 2100 2100 PSIG.
PSIG.
    - ONE (1) safety valve on S/G
    -                                  SIG "A" A fails partially partially OPEN.
OPEN. When itit reseats, reseats, the following conditions exist:
conditions    exist:
RCS temperature stabilized at 492 of.
          - RCS
          -                                              &deg;F.
          - RCS pressure stabilized at 1700
          -                                    1700 PSIG.
B and "c"
          - S/Gs "8"
          -                    C pressures stabilized at 640 PSIG.
SIG "A"
          - S/G
          -      A pressure     is 520 PSIG and slowly increasing.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the actions required?
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the actions required?
A. Stabilize plant parameters.
A. Stabilize plant parameters. Allow S/G pressures to equalize prior to raising RCS pressure above 2000 PSIG.
Allow S/G pressures to equalize prior to raising RCS pressure above 2000 PSIG. B. Stabilize plant parameters.
B. Stabilize plant parameters. Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is NOT required.
Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is NOT required.
C. Initiate Main Steam Line Isolation. Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is NOT required.
C. Initiate Main Steam Line Isolation.
D Initiate Safety Injection. Go to PATH-1.
Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is NOT required.
D!"                                            PATH-i.
D!" Initiate Safety Injection.
The correct answer is D.
Go to PATH-1. The correct answer is D. A: Incorrect  
A: Incorrect - Allowing S/G pressures to equalize is appropriate but SI needs to be initiated due to plant conditions.
-Allowing S/G pressures to equalize is appropriate but SI needs to be initiated due to plant conditions.
B:
8: Incorrect  
8: Incorrect - LCO action statement allows Safety Valve to be inoperable for a limited time prior to changing MODES.
-LCO action statement allows Safety Valve to be inoperable for a limited time prior to changing MODES. C: Incorrect  
C:
-Main Steam Line Isolation does NOT isolate the Main Steam Line Safety Valves. D: Correct -> 100 PSI D will result in Steamline Delta P SI and PZR Pressure SI should have occurred at 1715 PSIG. Since NO SI actuation has occurred, the SRO should direct SI initiation, and direct entry to the appropriate procedure (PATH-1).
C: Incorrect Incorrect - Main
Exam Question Number: 87  
                -   Main Steam Steam Line Isolation Isolation does NOT NOT isolate isolate the Main Main Steam Steam Line Safety Valves.
D: Correct - -    > 100 PSID
                  >100     PSI D will result in Steamline Delta P    P SI and PZR Pressure SI should have occurred at 1715         PSIG. Since NO 1715 PSIG.            NO SI actuation hashas occurred, the SRO should direct direct SISI initiation, initiation, and  direct entry and direct entry to to the appropriate procedure procedure (PATH-i).
(PATH-1).
 
Exam Question Exam               Number: 87 Question Number:     87


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
SD-006,
==Reference:==
SD-006, ESF,ESF, Pages Pages 12 12 and and 26, 26, Figure Figure 3;3; GP-007, GP-007, Page Page 25, 25, OMM-022, OMM-022, Page Page 31.
31.
KA Statement:
KA  Statement: Ability Ability to to evaluate evaluate plant plant performance performance and and make make operational operational judgments judgments based based on on operating characteristics, operating    characteristics, reactor reactor behavior behavior andand instrumentation instrumentation interpretation.
interpretation.
History:
History:
SRO - The SRO    - The SRO    must determine SRO must                  plant status, determine plant  status, the  fact that the fact  that no no actuations actuations have have occurred occurred but but should have, and that PATH-1PATH-i still applies applies in MODE MODE 3.
KA Name:
KAName:              ESFAS ESFAS                              Tier/Group:
Tier/Group:          2/1 2/1 Importance Rating:
Importance  Rating:  4.4/4.7 4.4/4.7                            ROISRO Level:
RO/SRO    Level:      SRO SRO Cognitive Level:    HIGH                                IOCFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43            43.5 Source:
Source:              SALEM - 2001
                                -                        Learning Objective:  ESF-006
SD-0066 SD-00                                                      ENGINEERE ENGIN      EERED  D SAFE SAFET  TYY FEAT FEATURES URES SYSTE SYSTEM 4.1.2 Reacto 4.1.2    Reactorr Coolan Coolant Tempe Temperature rature (ESF-F (ESF-Figure-1 igure- 1))
The RCS The  RCS LowLow Tavg Tavg signal signal (2(2 of of 33 channe channels below below 543&deg;F) 543&deg;F) isis used used to to initiate initiate the the Safety Safety Injection signal, signal, when when coincid coincident with highhigh steam steam flow; flow; and and close close the the Main Main Steam Steam Isolation Valves,, when Isolati                when coincid coincident with with high high steam steam flow flow (i.e.,
(i.e., generate the Steam Steam Line Isolation Signal Isolati    Signal).
4.1.3 Steam 4.1.3      Steam Flow Flow (ESF-Figure-1)
Hi Steam Steam Flow (37.25(37.25%  % flow at at no load load to 20 20%% load, load, increases linearly to 109  109%% at full load) detecte load)  detected by at least one sensor on two of three steam lines, coincid ent with low Tavg (543&deg;F) or low steam line pressu re (614 psig), generates a Safety Injection signal and closes all MSIVs MSIVs.. Two flow controllers on each steam line are used to sense high steam line flow. This circuit is designed to detect steam line breaks downstream of the MSIVs..
MSIVs 4.1.4 Steam Line Pressure (ESF-F igure-1 &              & 3)
Steam Line Pressure measuremen      rementt is utilized for steam line break protec protecttion.
ion. Low steam line pressure (614 psig) in two of three main steam lines or Low Tavg (543&deg;F) in two of three loops, coincident with high steam line flow in two-of-three main steam lines, will initiate the Steam Line Isolation and Safety Injection signals
                                                                                                    . This is to protectt against: a steam line break downstream of the main steam protec                                                                                check valves, a feed line break, and/or an inadvertent opening of a SG safety.
In addition, each steam line pressure measurement        rement is compared with a main steam header pressure measurement    rement to determine if a high steam line differential pressure
>      exists. A  A &#xe7;orncid
                      ~Qincidenceence of two-of-three steam line differential pressures (100 psid) in any one steam steam line, li!!e, that is, steam line pressure lower than main steam header pressu re, will Safety)njecti initiate a ~fe..ty    Injecti~J.l on sigllC:lt signaL The steam header pressure is electronically limited to a minim um value of 585 psig.
Therefore, this SI signal must be blocked before a plant cooldo wn is started to prevent SI actuation when S/G pressures drop below 485 psig(approximately                  ately 467&deg;F) 467&deg;F).. The steam steam line differential pressure circuit detects faults upstrea      upstreamm of the MSIVs MSIVs.. Since the steam line check valves prevent reverse flow to the faulted S/G, excessive steam line differential pressure    re does not close close the MSIVs.
4.1.5 Containmentnment Pressure (ESF-Figure-4 & 5)            5)
Containment nment Pressure    re measurement rement is utilized utilized to initiate Emergency Core  Core Coolin Coolingg in response to aa Loss of    of Coolant Accident (LOCA),), and to providee contain      containment ment pressu pressure re ESF ESP                                                      Page Page 12 12 of of 40 40                                      Revision Revisi    10 on 10 INF INFOR    ORM  MA  ATITIO  ON  N US  USE  E ON ONL  LY  Y
SD-006 SD-006                                                    ENGINEEREDSAFETY ENGINEERED              SAFETYFEATURES      FEATURESSYSTEM    SYSTEM
~ Low  Lowpressurizer pressurizerpressure pressureand and biglste i h steam lineI differential differential prssre res sure canh~~edcan be_bicked (provided    pressurizer (provided pressurizer pressure pressureisis <<2000      psigon 2000 psig    on2/32/3 channels) channels) and        andunblocked unblockedusing usingaa threeposition three    position(BLOCK, (BLOCK, unmarked unmarked(mid  (midposition),
position), UNBLOCK)
UNBLOCK) switch            switch located onthe located  on  the RTGB. These    SI initiation RTGB. These SI initiation signals are signals    are normally normally blocked blockedduringduring aa plant    plant cooldown cooldown whenwhen pressurizerpressure pressurizer      pressure isis less less than than 1950 1950 psig.
psig. ~~~lltomatikClllJ'.-
These signals will be aumaticaUy_
~ unblocked when pressurizer pressure isis increased
      ~
unblocked    when    pressurizer    pressure      incr edto2OJOpsi to .---..
2000... psig. g. These
                                                                                      -.-.~~".----
These signals signals can can also also be  unblocked with be unblocked      with aa switch switch onon the the RTGB.
RTGB. BeforeBefore these these signals signals are      are manually manually or  or automatically unblocked, automatically      unblocked, the the operator operator should should check check to  to see see ififthe  the bistables bistables forfor these these signals are signals    are cleared.
cleared.
6.5.2 High 6.5.2  High Steam Steam Line Line Flow Flow Coincident Coincident with with Low Low Steam Steam LineLine Pressure Pressure or        or Low Low Tavg Tavg High steam High    steam line line flow flow coincident coincident withwith low low steam steam line line pressure pressure or        or low low TTavg avg and and the the Hi-Hi Hi-Hi CV pressure CV    pressure SI SI signal signal can can be be blocked blocked (provided (provided thatthat Tavg        is    <  543  OF Tavg is <543&deg;F on 2/3 channels)on  2/3  channels) and unblocked and    unblocked using using aa three three position position (BLOCK, (BLOCK, unmarked unmarked (mid    (mid position),
position), UNBLOCK)
UNBLOCK) switch on switch    on the the RTGB.
RTGB. ThisThis signal signal isis automatically automatically unblocked unblocked when      when Tavg reaches 543 Tavg  reaches    543&deg;FOF or  can  be manually      unblocked with or can be manually unblocked              with the the switch switch onon the the RTGB.
RTGB. Before      Before these these signals signals are are manually or manually    or automatically automatically unblocked, the      the operator operator should should check check to see if the bistables to  see  if the for these for  these signals are cleared.
7.0 7.0    TECIIMCAL SPECIFICATIONS TECHNICAL            SPECifICATIONS ITS 3.3.2 ITS                Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation        Instrumentation ITS ITS 3.3.5          Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start Instrumentat    Instrumentation        ion ITS ITS 3.3.6          Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentat Instrumentation        ion ITS ITS 3.3.7          Control Room Emergency Filtration System Actuation Instrumentat                    Instrumentation ion 8.0 8.0  OPERATION OPERATIONAL        AL EVENTS EVENTS 8.1 8.1  Commitmen Commitments    ts NONE NONE 8.2 8.2  Plant Plant Specific Specific Events Events (Non-commi        tments)
(Non-commitments) 8.2.1 8.2.1 LER LER 88-026, 88-026, Inadvertent Inadvertent Safeguard Safeguard Actuation Actuation Brief BriefDescription Description of  ofthe the Event:
Event:
Miscommun Miscommunicationication resulted resulted in    SI actuation in SI  actuation during during preparation preparation for        for aa plant plant modification modification.  .
ESF ESF                                                    Page Page2626ofof40 40                                                , Revision Revision 1010 INFOR INFORMATION    MATION USE              USE ONLY    ONLY
HIGH HIG H STEA STEAMM LINE DIFFERENTIAL PRE            PRESSSU SURREE ESF-F ESF-FIGURE IGURE.-3
                                              -3 High Steam Line Differenti    rential Pressure LINE LINEAA              LINES LINE B                          LINE C C
iN  tN    /EN        tN      YN          tN                        (N
: 74)  75)  7)          84>)    85)                          4)
: 86)                        6)
S      S                55                                            S 0-Block Block SI 51 Actuat Actuatio ionn 2/3                              2/3 A
Safegu Safeguaards rds Logic INFO INFORM RMA  ATITION ON USE ONLY          Y
8.2.15 (Cont 8.2.15    (Continue inued d))
INIT NOTE: Adjus NOTE          Adjusting  PC-444J ting PC-44    4J setpoint poten  potentiom tiomeeter ter to 0.0 will reduc reduce e RCS pressure to psig. PC-44 1700 psig. PC-444J      controlle 4J contro      llerr setpoint shall be adjust adjusted ed SLOW SLOWLY to minim minimizeize the potential poten          causing tial for causin        PZR insurg g a PZR        insurge.e. An insurg insurge e could could occur occur if PC-44 PC-444J 4J setpoint is adjusted adjust ed too quickly.
The PZR cooldo cooldow wnn rate shall be    be less than or .equal equal to 200&deg;F 200&deg;F/hr/hr.. The PZR heatup rate shall be less than or equalequal to 100&deg;F100&deg;F/hr/hr.. (TRM (TRMS  S 3.4) following The follow  ing is a contin continuouousus action action step and shall be perfor    performed med when condi condition tionss require.
require.
: 3.        IF PZR Surge Surge line tempe temperatu raturere decre decreaseasess AND is not due to the norma normall tempe temperaturature re decre decreasease assoc associate iatedd with depressu depre  ssurizrizat ion, THEN stop adjust ation,                  adjusting ing PC-44 PC-444J 4J setpointint until PZR Surge Surge Line tempetemperatu raturere is increa increasing sing..
: 4.        Slowly adjusadjustt PC-44 PC-444J, 4J, PZR PRESPRESS  S 444J, 444J, contro controlle llerr setpoint setpo        potentiom int poten    tiomeeter ter to 0.0 withou withoutt excee exceedinding g 200&deg;F 200&deg;F/hr/hr cooldow cooldo    wn n rate on the PZR AND contin      continueue with this procedur proce  dure. e.
CAUTION prevent To preve  nt an SI Actua Actuation tion,, steam line pressure shall not be allowe        allowed d to drop below below 485 psig prior to blocki blocking ng the HI STM LINE DP SI Signa          Signal.l.
The PZR PRES  PRESS/HS/HII STM LINE DP SI Signa      Signall will autom automati aticall callyy unblo unblockck if RCS pressure increases increa        above 2000 psig.
ses above              psig. If this occur occurs, s, the signal signal should should be blocke blockedd when RCS pressure decre decrease ases s below below 2000 psig. psig.
8.2.16 WHEN RCS pressure is less than 2000 psig, 8.2.16                                                              psig, THEN perforperform m the follow ing:
: 1.      Displayy the following ERFIS Displa                          ERFIS points points:: (ACR 93-0  93-00  023))
0023
                            -    RCP RCP0    O49 496D, 6D, LO PRE PRES  SSS SI BLOC BLOCK    K TRAIN A "A"
                            -    RCPO49 RCP0      497D, 7D, LO PRE PRES  SSS SI BLOCK      K TRAIN B "B" IGP-007 GP-007 I                                          I Rev. 75                                      Page 25 of 77771 I


SD-006, ESF, Pages 12 and 26, Figure 3; GP-007, Page 25, OMM-022, Page 31. KA Statement:
8.3.3 8.3.3   AutomaticActions/Actuations{
Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and instrumentation interpretation.
Automatic   Actions/Actuations{TC          TC"Automatic AutomaticActions/Actuations"     \f C\l\1"3" Actions/Actuations\fC        3}}
History: SRO -The SRO must determine plant status, the fact that no actuations have occurred but should have, and that PATH-1 still applies in MODE 3. KAName: ESFAS Tier/Group:
(RAIL94R0928)
2/1 Importance Rating: 4.4/4.7 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH 10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 Source: SALEM -2001 Learning Objective:
(RAIL 94R0928) 1.1. Duringthe During       thecourse courseofofan  an event, event, should should the thesetpoint setpointfor foran an automaticprotective automatic         protective system system actuation actuation be be approached, the approached,         the Operat    or  should    ,
ESF-006 SD-006 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM 4.1.2 Reactor Coolant Temperature (ESF-Figure-1)
Operator should, if possible, if possible, manually manuallyinitiate initiate the the actuation actuation prior  prior to the to  the automatic automatic actuation.
The RCS Low Tavg signal (2 of 3 channels below 543&deg;F) is used to initiate the Safety Injection signal, when coincident with high steam flow; and close the Main Steam Isolation Valves, when coincident with high steam flow (i.e., generate the Steam Line Isolation Signal). 4.1.3 Steam Flow (ESF-Figure-1)
actuation. IfIf immediate immediate actions actions are    in  progress are in progress they should they    should be    be completed completed prior priorto to initiating initiating the the signal, signal, however however this isis not this       not considered considered performance performance of    of steps steps early early oror out of out     of order.
Hi Steam Flow (37.25 % flow at no load to 20 % load, increases linearly to 109 % at full load) detected by at least one sensor on two of three steam lines, coincident with low Tavg (543&deg;F) or low steam line pressure (614 psig), generates a Safety Injection signal and closes all MSIVs. Two flow controllers on each steam line are used to sense high steam line flow. This circuit is designed to detect steam line breaks downstream of the MSIVs. 4.1.4 Steam Line Pressure (ESF-Figure-1
order.
& 3) Steam Line Pressure measurement is utilized for steam line break protection.
Example: During Example:           During an  an RCS RCS leakage leakage transient, transient, after after entry entry to  to the the EOP Network, EOP       Network, pressure pressure isis slowly slowly decreasing decreasing and  and after     observing after observing the trend the   trend inin RCS RCS pressure pressure itit isis apparent apparent that that RCS RCS makeup makeup can    can not keep not  keep up up withwith leakage.
Low steam line pressure (614 psig) in two of three main steam lines or Low Tavg (543&deg;F) in two of three loops, coincident with high steam line flow in two-of-three main steam lines, will initiate the Steam Line Isolation and Safety Injection signals. This is to protect against: a steam line break downstream of the main steam check valves, a feed line break, and/or an inadvertent opening of a SG safety. In addition, each steam line pressure measurement is compared with a main steam header pressure measurement to determine if a high steam line differential pressure exists. A of two-of-three steam line differential pressures (100 psid) in any one steam li!!e, that is, steam line pressure lower than main steam header pressure, will initiate a sigllC:lt The steam header pressure is electronically limited to a minimum value of 585 psig. Therefore, this SI signal must be blocked before a plant cooldown is started to prevent SI actuation when S/G pressures drop below 485 psig(approximately 467&deg;F). The steam line differential pressure circuit detects faults upstream of the MSIV s. Since the steam line check valves prevent reverse flow to the faulted S/G, excessive steam line differential pressure does not close the MSIVs. 4.1.5 Containment Pressure (ESF-Figure-4
leakage. As As pressure pressure approaches approaches the   the lowlow pressure SI pressure       SI setpoint setpoint of  of 1715 1715 psig, psig, the the Operator Operator should should manually manually initiate Safety initiate    Safety Injection Injection prior prior to to reaching reaching the the setpoint.
& 5) ESF Containment Pressure measurement is utilized to initiate Emergency Core Cooling in response to a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), and to provide containment pressure Page 12 of 40 Revision 10 INFORMATION USE ONLY SD-006 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM Low pressurizer pressure and i h steam line differential res sure (provided pressurizer pressure is < 2000 psig on 2/3 channels) and unblocked using a three position (BLOCK, unmarked (mid position), UNBLOCK) switch located on the RTGB. These SI initiation signals are normally blocked during a plant cooldown when pressurizer pressure is less than 1950 psig. unblocked when pressurizer pressure is increased to 2000 psig. These signals can also .---.. ...
setpoint.
be unblocked with a switch on the RTGB. Before these signals are manually or automatically unblocked, the operator should check to see if the bistables for these signals are cleared. 6.5.2 High Steam Line Flow Coincident with Low Steam Line Pressure or Low Tavg High steam line flow coincident with low steam line pressure or low T avg and the Hi-Hi CV pressure SI signal can be blocked (provided that Tavg is < 543 OF on 2/3 channels) and unblocked using a three position (BLOCK, unmarked (mid position), UNBLOCK) switch on the RTGB. This signal is automatically unblocked when Tavg reaches 543 OF or can be manually unblocked with the switch on the RTGB. Before these signals are manually or automatically unblocked, the operator should check to see if the bistables for these signals are cleared.
        ~2.
7.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ITS 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation ITS 3.3.5 Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start Instrumentation ITS 3.3.6 Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation ITS 3.3.7 Control Room Emergency Filtration System Actuation Instrumentation 8.0 OPERATIONAL EVENTS 8.1 Commitments NONE 8.2 Plant Specific Events (Non-commitments) 8.2.1 LER 88-026, Inadvertent Safeguard Actuation Brief Description of the Event: Miscommunication resulted in SI actuation during preparation for a plant modification.
: 2. jp&#xe7;          nt for If the setRoint         for an an automatic automatic actuation actuation signal lijeis che reached   d andand thethe actuati  on  fails actuation fails to           occur, the to occur,    the Operator Qperator shouldshould manually manually initiate initiate thethe Signal. (SOER 93-1, Rec 2)                                                                     .
ESF Page 26 of40 , Revision 10 INFORMATION USE ONLY LINEA HIGH STEAM LINE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ESF-FIGURE-3 High Steam Line Differential Pressure LINES LINE C 2/3 2/3 Safeguards Logic INFORMATION USE ONLY Block 51 Actuation 8.2.15 (Continued)
Example: During the scenario Example:                          scenario described described above, the Operator Operator pressure has reached notes that pressure                   reached 1700 psig and a Safety Injection        Injection actuation has not occurred, actuation                    occurred, the Operator Operator should immediately immediately initiate the Safety Injection.Injection.
NOTE: Adjusting PC-444J setpoint potentiometer to 0.0 will reduce RCS pressure to 1700 psig. PC-444J controller setpoint shall be adjusted SLOWLY to minimize the potential for causing a PZR insurge. An insurge could occur if PC-444J setpoint is adjusted too quickly. The PZR cooldown rate shall be less than or .equal to 200&deg;F/hr.
Examp Example:  le: If an MSIV does not autom        automatically atically close from aa valid  valid signal and the RTGB contro        controll switch does not operate operate,, thenthen depres depressing sing the Steam Line Isolati    Isolation     pushbutton on pushbu    tton for that MSIV  MSIV should be   be perform performed. ed.
The PZR heatup rate shall be less than or equal to 100&deg;F/hr. (TRMS 3.4) The following is a continuous action step and shall be performed when conditions require. 3. IF PZR Surge line temperature decreases AND is not due to the normal temperature decrease associated with depressurization, THEN stop adjusting PC-444J setpoint until PZR Surge Line temperature is increasing.
Examp Example:   le: IfIf aa CV CV Ventil    ation Isolati Ventilation     Isolation     should have on should    have occurr occurred,        then ed, then depres depressing sing the the HIGH HIGH VOLT VOLTS       OFF on S OFF          R-11 or on fl-il    or R-12 R-12 maymay be   be succes successful.sful.
: 4. Slowly adjust PC-444J, PZR PRESS 444J, controller setpoint potentiometer to 0.0 without exceeding 200&deg;F/hr cooldown rate on the PZR AND continue with this procedure.
OMM-022 IOMM-022                                        Rev.
CAUTION To prevent an SI Actuation, steam line pressure shall not be allowed to drop below 485 psig prior to blocking the HI STM LINE DP SI Signal. The PZR PRESS/HI STM LINE DP SI Signal will automatically unblock if RCS pressure increases above 2000 psig. If this occurs, the signal should be blocked when RCS pressure decreases below 2000 psig. 8.2.16 WHEN RCS pressure is less than 2000 psig, THEN perform the following:
Rev.29 29                                     Page31 Page       31 ofof54541
I GP-007 1. Display the following ERFIS points: (ACR 93-00023)
-RCP0496D, LO PRESS SI BLOCK TRAIN "A" -RCP0497D, LO PRESS SI BLOCK TRAIN "B" Rev. 75 Page 25 of 771 8.3.3 Automatic Actions/Actuations{
TC "Automatic Actions/Actuations" \fC \l "3" } (RAIL 94R0928) 1. During the course of an event, should the setpoint for an automatic protective system actuation be approached, the Operator should, if possible, manually initiate the actuation prior to the automatic actuation.
If immediate actions are in progress they should be completed prior to initiating the signal, however this is not considered performance of steps early or out of order. Example: During an RCS leakage transient, after entry to the EOP Network, pressure is slowly decreasing and after observing the trend in RCS pressure it is apparent that RCS makeup can not keep up with leakage. As pressure approaches the low pressure SI setpoint of 1715 psig, the Operator should manually initiate Safety Injection prior to reaching the setpoint. If the setRoint for an automatic actuation signal is reached and the actuation fails to occur, the Operator should manually initiate the IOMM-022 Signal. (SOER 93-1, Rec 2) . Example: During the scenario described above, the Operator notes that pressure has reached 1700 psig and a Safety Injection actuation has not occurred, the Operator should immediately initiate the Safety Injection.
Example: If an MSIV does not automatically close from a valid signal and the RTGB control switch does not operate, then depressing the Steam Line Isolation pushbutton for that MSIV should be performed.
Example: If a CV Ventilation Isolation should have occurred, then depressing the HIGH VOLTS OFF on R-11 or R-12 may be successful.
Rev. 29 Page 31 of 541 Question Number: Question:
Answer: Justification:
Tier/Group lOCFR55.41 lOCFR55.43 BanklNew/


Modified KlA#: KIA Values: Cognitive Level:  
SALEM FOXT SALEM      FOXTRO  ROTT 2001 NRC 2001      NRC WRITT WRITTE  EN N EXAM EXAMIN  INATIATIO  ON N WORKSH WORK    SHEET EET Question Questi    on      SRO 86 SR08    6 Number:
Numbe    r:
Question:
Questio    n:      Unit 22 isis in Unit            in MODE MODE 33 duringduring aa plant plant startup startup.. RCS RCS heatup heatup and and pressur pressuriza ization tion isis in in progres progress. s.
* Tave isis5ll
* Tave      511 degF deg F
                                  *. RCS pressur RCS    pressure  e isis 1850 1850 psig psig One safety One    safety valvevalve onon 2222 SGSG fails fails partiall partially  open. When y open. When itit isis reseate reseated, d, the the follow followinging conditi conditiononss exist:
exist:
                                **    Tave isis 492 Tave      492 degdeg FF
                                **    RCS pressur RCS    pressure    is 1700 e is    1700 psig psig
                                **      21, 23, 24 21,23,    24 SGs SOs are are 640 640 psig psig
                                **      22SG 22  SG is52 is 520 Opsi psig g
                                **      All parame All  paramete    rs are STABL ters        STABLE    E Which one of the follow Which                      following      describes ing describ      es all of the actions actions require required?  d?
A.          Stabilize Stabili        plant parame ze plant    paramete      rs. Restor ters. Restoree OPERA OPERAB    BILITY ILITY of the affecte affected d safety valve and allow SG pressurpressures          equalizee prior to raising es to equaliz                  raising RCS pressur pressuree above above the P-ll P-li setpoin setpointt B.        Stabilize Stabili        plant parame ze plant    paramete      rs. Comm ters. Commen  encece RCS cooldo cooldow  wn n and depres depressusurizat rization to place plant in an operati the plant              operation  onalal MODE MODE wher wheree the safety safety valve valve is not require requiredd C.          Initiate Main Steam Initiate            Steam Line IsolatioIsolation.
: n. Comm Commen    ence ce RCS cool  cooldodowwnn and depress depressu    urizatio rizationn to place the plan plantt in an operati operationonal al MODE MODE where  where the safety safety valv valvee is not requ requireiredd D.          Initiate Safety Injectio Initiate              Injectionn and Main Steam Line Isola        Isolatio  n. Go to EOP tion.          EOP-T-TRI RIP-l, P- 1, REA REAC    CTOTORR TRIP OR SAF      SAFET  ETY Y INJE INJEC  CTIO TION N Answer:          D Justi ficat Justific    ion:
ation:  120 psid will resul 120                  resultt in strea streammlinlinee Delt Deltaa P SI and MSL MSLI. I. Sinc Since  e no actua actuati ons have occu tions          occurre  d, the rred, SRO shou should  ld direc directt initia initiatitions ons,, and direc directt entry entry to the appr appropopriariate  proced te proc edurure.  (TRIP-
: e. (TRI        I).
P-i).
Tier/
Tier/GGrou roupp    ill 111 10CFR 10CFR55.4155.41  43.5 43.5 beca becaus  usee the the SRO SRO mus mustt deter determ mine ine plan plantt statu status, s, the the fact thatthat no no actua actuattions ions have have 10CFR    55.43  occu occurr rred ed    but  shou  ld have should    have,, and that  that TRIP TRIP--i! still still appl 10CFR55.43                                                                                  applie  s in MOD ies in    MODE  E 33 Bank BanklN /Newew/ !  New New Mod Modifiified ed K/A KlA#: #:          040A 040AA  A2.02.04  4 Abil  ity to Ability    to deter determ mineine oror inter interpr pret et cond conditi ition ons  requiri s requ        ng ESF iring  ESFAS    initiati AS initia  tionon K/A KIA Valu Valueses:: 4.7 4.7 Cog nitiv Cognit  ivee    Anal Analysysisis Level:
Level:
Refe renc Refere      es:
nces:    NOSO NOS05  5FLUN FLUNCY-00  CY-00,, Obje Object ctive ive 2.c2.c and and 2.k 2.k            LP PROC LP    PROCEDO2  ED02,, Obj Obj 44


==References:==
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08      NRC Written Written Exam Exam
: 88. The cavitating
: 88. The              venturi is cavitating venturi      designed to is designed  to limit limit maximum maximum flow flow from from the the SDAFW SDAFW Pump Pump to to aa faulted faulted S/G  to less S/G to  less than than 630 630 GPM GPM.....
A. to prevent A. to  prevent water water hammer hammer on  on the the S/G    feed ring.
S/G feed    ring.
B. ensure adequate B. to ensure    adequate NPSHNPSH is is available to MDAFW MDAFW Pumps.
Pumps.
ensure that ReS C. to ensure        RCS cooldown rates rates are NOT NOT exceeded.
D. to D. to prevent SDAFW SDAFW Pump Pump runout    during low runout during      low S/G SIG pressure conditions.
88 88


SR086 SALEM FOXTROT 2001 NRC WRITTEN EXAMINATION WORKSHEET Unit 2 is in MODE 3 during a plant startup. RCS heatup and pressurization is in progress.
061 G2. 1.27 001/AFW/2/1/3.9/4.0/SROILOW/43.1INEW 061 G2.1.27  00 1/AFW/21113 .9/4.OISRO/L0W143. 1/NEW - 2008/AFW-002
* Tave is 511 deg F
                                                                  - 2008/AFW-002 The cavitating The  cavitating venturi venturi isis designed designed toto limit limit maximum maximum flow flow from from the the SDAFW SDAFW PumpPump to      faulted to aa faulted S/G  to  less  than    630  GPM S/G to less than 630 GPM .....
* RCS pressure is 1850 psig One safety valve on 22 SG fails partially open. When it is reseated, the following conditions exist:
A. to prevent A. to   prevent water water hammer hammer on       the S/G on the          feed ring.
* Tave is 492 deg F
S/G feed      ring.
* RCS pressure is 1700 psig
B. to ensure B. to  ensure adequate adequate NPSH NPSH isis available available to to MDAFW MDAFW Pumps.
* 21,23,24 SGs are 640 psig
Pumps.
* 22 SG is 520 psig
C. to ensure C. to   ensure thatthat RCS RCS cooldown cooldown rates rates are   NOT exceeded.
* All parameters are STABLE Which one of the following describes all of the actions required?
are NOT      exceeded.
A. Stabilize plant parameters.
D to DY   to prevent prevent SDAFW SDAFW Pump    Pump runout runout during during lowlow S/G    pressure conditions.
Restore OPERABILITY of the affected safety valve and allow SG pressures to equalize prior to raising RCS pressure above the P-ll setpoint B. Stabilize plant parameters.
S/G pressure     conditions.
Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is not required C. Initiate Main Steam Line Isolation.
The correct The  correct answer answer is  is D.
Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is not required D. Initiate Safety Injection and Main Steam Line Isolation.
D.
Go to EOP-TRIP-l, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION D 120 psid will result in streamline Delta P SI and MSLI. Since no actuations have occurred, the SRO should direct initiations, and direct entry to the appropriate procedure. (TRIP-I).
A: Incorrect - S/G is already hot and SDAFW Pump flow is less than original flow from feedwater system. Inverted J tubes on the feed ring          ring aid in preventing preventing water hammer.
111 43.5 because the SRO must determine plant status, the fact that no actuations have occurred but should have, and that TRIP-! still applies in MODE 3 New 040AA2.04 Ability to determine or interpret conditions requiring ESFAS initiation 4.7 Analysis NOS05FLUNCY
B: Incorrect - The SD and MDAFW Pumps do have a combined suction line, however SDAFW Pump flow will NOT impact MDAFW Pump NPSH due to the size of the combined suction line.
-00, Objective 2.c and 2.k LP PROCED02, Obj 4 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 88. The cavitating venturi is designed to limit maximum flow from the SDAFW Pump to a faulted S/G to less than 630 GPM ..... A. to prevent water hammer on the S/G feed ring. B. to ensure adequate NPSH is available to MDAFW Pumps. C. to ensure that ReS cooldown rates are NOT exceeded.
C: Incorrect - The faulted S/G has caused excessive RCS Cooldown, limiting SDAFW Pump flow will maintain the SDAFW Pump available for service.
D. to prevent SDAFW Pump runout during low S/G pressure conditions.
D: Correct - -
88 061 G2.1.27 001/AFW/2/1/3.9/4.0/SROILOW/43.1INEW  
The SDAFW Pump may experience pump runout if a faulted S/G                   SIG is at a low pressure and flow is NOT limited by the venturi.
-2008/AFW-002 The cavitating venturi is designed to limit maximum flow from the SDAFW Pump to a faulted S/G to less than 630 GPM ..... A. to prevent water hammer on the S/G feed ring. B. to ensure adequate NPSH is available to MDAFW Pumps. C. to ensure that RCS cooldown rates are NOT exceeded.
Exam Question Number: 88
DY to prevent SDAFW Pump runout during low S/G pressure conditions.
The correct answer is D. A: Incorrect  
-S/G is already hot and SDAFW Pump flow is less than original flow from feedwater system. Inverted J tubes on the feed ring aid in preventing water hammer. B: Incorrect  
-The SD and MDAFW Pumps do have a combined suction line, however SDAFW Pump flow will NOT impact MDAFW Pump NPSH due to the size of the combined suction line. C: Incorrect  
-The faulted S/G has caused excessive RCS Cooldown, limiting SDAFW Pump flow will maintain the SDAFW Pump available for service. D: Correct -The SDAFW Pump may experience pump runout if a faulted S/G is at a low pressure and flow is NOT limited by the venturi. Exam Question Number: 88  


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
USFAR, Section 10.4.8-1.
KA Statement: Knowledge of system purpose and/or function.
History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam.
SRO - understandin understanding    g conditions of the facility license.
KA Name:                AFW                                      Tier/Group:          2/1 Importance Rating:      3.9/4.0 3.9/4.0                                  RO/SRO Level:        SRO SRO Cognitive Level:        LOW                                      10CFR55.43 10CFR55.43 link:    43.1 Source:                  NEW - 2008 NEW    -
Learning Objective:  AFW-002


USFAR, Section 10.4.8-1.
HBR HBR 22 UPDATED UPDATED FSAR FSAR 10.4.8 Auxiliary 10.4.8      Auxiliary Feedwater Feedwater System System 10.4.8.1 Design 10.4.8.1     Design Basis Basis The design The    design parameters parameters for  for the the auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater system system components components are    are shown shown on Table on   Table 10.4.8-1.
KA Statement:
10.4.8-1. The  The auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater systemsystem is is designed designed and  and constructed constructed in accordance in   accordance withwith the the Seismic Seismic Class Class II requirements requirements presented presented in    in Section Section 3.2.3.2.
Knowledge of system purpose and/or function.
10.4.8.2 System 10.4.8.2     System Description Description The flow The   flow diagram diagram forfor the the auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater system system is is included included with with thethe condensate condensate and and feedwater feedwater flow  flow diagram diagram Figures Figures 10.1.0-4, 10.1.0-4, 10.1.0-5, 10.1.0-5, and     and 10.1.0-6.
History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam. SRO -understanding conditions of the facility license. KA Name: AFW Tier/Group:
10.1.0-6.
2/1 Importance Rating: 3.9/4.0 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: LOW lOCFR55.43 link: 43.1 Source: NEW -2008 Learning Objective:
The auxiliary The  auxiliary feedwater feedwater system system can  can provide provide feedwater feedwater to  to the the steam steam generators generators from anyone from    any one oror combination combination of    of three three auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater (AFW)(AFW) pumps, pumps, two  two are are motor driven motor    driven pumps pumps andand the the third third is  is steam steam driven.
AFW-002 HBR 2 UPDATED FSAR 10.4.8 Auxiliary Feedwater System 10.4.8.1 Design Basis The design parameters for the auxiliary feedwater system components are shown on Table 10.4.8-1.
driven.
The auxiliary feedwater system is designed and constructed in accordance with the Seismic Class I requirements presented in Section 3.2. 10.4.8.2 System Description The flow diagram for the auxiliary feedwater system is included with the condensate and feedwater flow diagram Figures 10.1.0-4, 10.1.0-5, and 10.1.0-6.
Two motor Two  motor driven driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater pumps  pumps areare supplied supplied power from     from thethe emergency busses E-1 and emergency                    and E-2. The emergency  emergency busses also    also supply supply power to the       the motor driven motor   driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater pump's pumps discharge discharge isolation isolation valvesvalves and  and the the steam driven steam    driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater pump's pumps steam supply and feedwater discharge           discharge isolation valves. The emergency
The auxiliary feedwater system can provide feedwater to the steam generators from anyone or combination of three auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps, two are motor driven pumps and the third is steam driven. Two motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps are supplied power from the emergency busses E-1 and E-2. The emergency busses also supply power to the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump's discharge isolation valves and the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump's steam supply and feedwater discharge . isolation valves. The emergency busses are supplied power either from offsite or plant diesel generators.
. isolation                        emergency busses are supplied      supplied power either either from  from offsite or plant diesel generators. The steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump can                                     can bebe operated independent of electrical ~ower operated                                              power where steam produced from decay heat                 heat drives the drives   the turbine. The auxiliary feedwater pum~s                pumps supply feedwater to the steam generators for decay heat removal if main feedwater is not available or                                       or steam generator steam   generator level is not adequate, as described below. The auxiliary feedwater pumps can be used to fill the steam generators under any plant feedwater condition, except that the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump requires the                                    the plant to be heated up above 350&deg;F, and the motor driven AFW pumps require power.
The steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump can be operated independent of electrical where steam produced from decay heat drives the turbine. The auxiliary feedwater supply feedwater to the steam generators for decay heat removal if main feedwater is not available or steam generator level is not adequate, as described below. The auxiliary feedwater pumps can be used to fill the steam generators under any plant condition, except that the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump requires the plant to be heated up above 350&deg;F, and the motor driven AFW pumps require power. Upon receipt of an auto start signal to the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the steam supply valves will open supplying steam to drive the pump. At the same time, the feedwater discharge valves open to the steam generators.
power.
The turbine-pump builds up speed and supplies 'feedwater to the steam generators  
Upon Upon receipt receipt of an auto start signal      signal to the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump, pump, the steam supply valves will open supplying steam to drive the                               the turbine-turbine-pump.
.. A cavitating venturi is located in the discharge piping of the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Its function is to prevent excess flow from the into a low pressure steam generator in the case of a failed discharge flow control valve. This prevents excess mass/flow into containment during a main steamline break and prevents steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump runout. Upon receipt of an auto start signal to the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, the feedwater discharge valves open while the motor is accelerating up to speed and supplies feedwater to the steam generators. . The motor driven auxiliary feedwater  
pump. At the same time, the feedwater discharge valves open to                               to the the steam steam generators.
'pumps are supplied with bearing cooling water from the service water system. The SDAFW pump is self-cooled using water from the CST. The capacity of the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump is based on preventing the water level in the steam generators from receding below the lowest level within the indicated level range in the event of a loss of offsite power. This will prevent the tube sheet from being uncovered.
generators. The turbine-pump builds up speed and supplies 'feedwater                    feedwater to the      the steam generators.
A signal indicating a low low steam generator water level in any two steam generators or a direct signal of undervoltage on 4160 buses 1 and 4 will automatically start the steam driven AFW pump by opening steam admission valves and auxiliary feedwater discharge valves to individual steam generators.
generators ..
The initiating signals for starting the motor driven AFW pumps 10.4.8-1 Revision No. 15 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 89. Given the following:  
A cavitating cavitating venturi is located in the discharge piping of the steam driven I  auxiliary feedwater pump. Its function is to prevent excess flow from the pump
-Instrument Air Compressor "0" is tagged out for maintenance.  
    ~ump into into aa low low pressure steam  steam generator generator in    in the case case of of aa failed discharge I  flow  control flow control valve. This    This prevents prevents excessexcess mass/flow mass/flow into containment during         during aa I  main main steamline steamline break break and prevents prevents steam steam driven driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater pump         pump (junout.
-The Primary Air Compressor (PAC) is running. -Oil intrusion has plugged the PAC Air Dryer. -IA header pressure is at 75 PSIG and decreasing.
runout.
Which ONE (1) of the following is the required procedural action lAW AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR? A. SHUT IA-47, TURBINE BUILDING ISOLATION to reduce air loss. B. OPEN IA-662, IA BACK-UP CV QCV-10374 ISOLATION Valve to cross-connect Condensate Polishing Air with IA. C. OPEN IA-3859, PAC DRYER BYPASS. D. Verify the Station Air Compressor is running and OPEN SA-220 and 221, STATION AIR TO INSTRUMENT AIR CROSS-CONNECT.
Upon Upon receipt receipt of    an auto of an   auto start start signal signal to  to the the motor motor driven driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater pumps, pumps, the the feedwater feedwater discharge discharge valves valves openopen while while thethe motor motor isis accelerating accelerating up     up to speed to speed and and supplies supplies feedwater feedwater to    to the the steam steam generators.
89 078 A2.0l OOI/INSTRUMENT AIRI2/l/2.412.9/SROIHIGHl43.5INEW  
generators.           .
-2008/AOP-017-006 Given the following:  
The motor The   motor driven driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater pumps 'pumps are are supplied supplied with with bearing bearing cooling cooling water water from from the the service service water water system.
-Instrument Air Compressor "0" is tagged out for maintenance.  
system. The   The SDAFW SDAFW pump pump is is self-cooled self-cooled using  using water water from from the the CST.
-The Primary Air Compressor (PAC) is running. -Oil intrusion has plugged the PAC Air Dryer. -IA header pressure is at 75 PSIG and decreasing.
CST.
Which ONE (1) of the following is the required procedural action lAW AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR? A. SHUT IA-47, TURBINE BUILDING ISOLATION to reduce air loss. B. OPEN IA-662, IA BACK-UP CV QCV-10374 ISOLATION Valve to cross-connect Condensate Polishing Air with IA. C. OPEN IA-3859, PAC DRYER BYPASS. DY' Verify the Station Air Compressor is running and OPEN SA-220 and 221, STATION AIR TO INSTRUMENT AIR CROSS-CONNECT.
The The capacity capacity of of the the steam steam driven driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater pump pump isis based based on  on preventing preventing thethe water water level level in  in the the steam steam generators generators from  from receding receding below below thethe lowest lowest level level within within thethe indicated indicated level  level range range in in the the event event of of aa loss loss of of offsite offsite power.
The correct answer is D. A: Incorrect  
power. ThisThis will will prevent prevent the   the tube tube sheet sheet from from being being uncovered.
-Shutting IA-47 will isolate ALL IA to the Turbine Building, and is NOT an action lAW AOP-017. B: Incorrect  
uncovered. AA signal signal indicating indicating aa low low lowlow steam steam generatorwat generator water         level in er level     in any any twotwo steam steam generators generators or or aa direct direct signal signal of   of undervoltage undervoltage on    on 4160 4160 buses buses 11 and and 44 will will automatically automatically startstart the the steam steam driven driven AFW  AFW pump pump byby opening opening steamsteam admission admission valves    and auxiliary valves and   auxiliary feedwater feedwater discharge discharge valvesvalves to to individual individual steam  steam generators.
-The Condensate Polishing Air system is normally cross-connected to lA, this valve is normally OPEN and is closed to separate the systems during AOP-017 actions. C: Incorrect  
generators. The  The initiating initiating signalssignals for  for starting starting the the motor motor driven driven AFN  AFW pumps pumps 10.4.8-1 10.4.8-1                                    Revision No.
-NO AOP-017 guidance exists for opening the PAC dryer bypass. 0: Correct -As the first attempt to maintain IA header pressure, AOP-017 actions cross-connect SA to IA. Exam Question Number: 89  
Revision       No. 15 15
 
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08     NRC Written Written Exam Exam Given the
: 89. Given
: 89.            following:
the following:
Instrument Air
      - Instrument
      -              Air Compressor Compressor "0" D is tagged out is tagged  out for for maintenance.
maintenance.
The Primary
      - The
      -      Primary AirAir Compressor Compressor (PAC) (PAC) isis running.
running.
Oil intrusion
      - Oil
      -      intrusion has has plugged plugged the PAC  PAC Air Dryer.
Dryer.
IA header
      - IA
      -    header pressure pressure is is at at 75 75 PSIG PSIG and and decreasing.
Which ONE Which  ONE (1)(1) of of the following is the following    is the the required required procedural procedural action action lAW lAW AOP-017, AOP-O1 7, LOSS LOSS OF OF INSTRUMENT AIR?
IA-47, TURBINE BUILDING A. SHUT IA-47,                   BUILDING ISOLATION ISOLATION to reduce reduce air loss.
loss.
IA-662, IA B. OPEN IA-662,       IA BACK-UP CV QCV-10374 QCV-1 0374 ISOLATION ISOLATION Valve to cross-connect Condensate Polishing Air with IA.
C. OPEN IA-3859, PAC DRYER BYPASS.
D. Verify the Station Air Compressor is running and OPEN SA-220 and 221, STATION AIR TO INSTRUMENT AIR CROSS-CONNECT.
89 89
 
078 A2.0l A2.0 1 OOI/INSTRUMENT 00 1/INSTRUMENT AIRI2/l/2.412.9/SROIHIGHl43.5INEW AIRI2/1/2.4/2.9/SRO/HIGHI43 .5/NEW - 2008/AOP-017-006
                                                                    - 2008/AOP-0 17-006 Given the following:
Instrument Air Compressor "0"
    - Instrument
    -                                  D is tagged out for maintenance.
    - The Primary Air Compressor (PAC) is running.
    - Oil intrusion has plugged the PAC Air Dryer.
    - IA header pressure is at 75 PSIG and decreasing.
Which ONE (1) of the following is the required procedural action lAW AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR?
A. SHUT IA-47, TURBINE BUILDING ISOLATION to reduce air loss.
B. OPEN IA-662, IA BACK-UP CV QCV-10374 ISOLATION Valve to cross-connect Condensate Polishing Air with IA.
C. OPEN IA-3859, PAC DRYER BYPASS.
D Verify the Station Air Compressor is running and OPEN SA-220 and 221, STATION AIR DY' TO INSTRUMENT AIR CROSS-CONNECT.
The correct answer is D.
A: Incorrect - Shutting IA-47 will isolate ALL IA to the Turbine Building, and is NOT an action lAW AOP-017.
B: Incorrect - The Condensate Polishing Air system is normally cross-connected to lA,
              -                                                                              IA, this valve is normally OPEN and is closed to separate the systems during AOP-017AOP-O1 7 actions.
C: Incorrect - NO AOP-017
              -        AOP-O1 7 guidance exists for opening the PAC dryer bypass.
D:
0: Correct - -    As the first attempt to maintain IA header pressure, AOP-O1 AOP-017 7 actions cross-connect SA to IA.
Exam Question Number: 89


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
AOP-O1 AOP-017,  7, Pages 4 and 5; SD-O1  7, Instrument Air, Figures 1 SD-017,                          1 and 4.
KA Statement: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the lAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Air dryer and filter malfunctions.
History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam.
SRO - Requires evaluation of plant conditions and selection of appropriate actions lAW station procedures.
KA Name:
KAName:            INSTRUMENT AIR INSTRUMENT    AIR Tier/Group:
Tier/Group:        2/1 2/1 Importance Rating:
Importance Rating: 2.4/2.9 2.4/2.9          RO/SRO Level:
RO/SRO  Level:    SRO SRO Cognitive Level:
Cognitive Level:  HIGH HIGH              10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43  link:  43.5 43.5 Source:
Source:            NEW - 2008 NEW    - 2008    Learning Objective:
Learning Objective: AOP-017-006 AOP-017-006


AOP-017, Pages 4 and 5; SD-017, Instrument Air, Figures 1 and 4. KA Statement:
Rev.
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the lAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
Rev. 35 35 AOP-017 AOP- 017                         LOSS LOSS OFOF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR Page Page 44 of of 61 61 STEP H              INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I H      RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
Air dryer and filter malfunctions.
1.
History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam. SRO -Requires evaluation of plant conditions and selection of appropriate actions lAW station procedures.
: 1. Check Plant Check    Plant Status Status - MODE MODE 11 OR         Go Go To  Step 4:
KAName: INSTRUMENT AIR Tier/Group:
To Step  4.
2/1 Importance Rating: 2.4/2.9 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH lOCFR55.43 link: 43.5 Source: NEW -2008 Learning Objective:
MODE 22 MODE
AOP-017-006 Rev. 35 AOP-017 LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INSTRUCTIONS
* 2.
: 1. Check Plant Status -MODE 1 OR MODE 2
: 2. Check IA Check    IA Header Header Pressure Pressure - LESS
* 2. Check IA Header Pressure -LESS THAN 60 PSIG 3. Perform The Following:
                                          -  LESS      IF IE IA IA pressure pressure decreases decreases to to less less THAN 60 THAN   60 PSIG PSIG                              than than 60 60 psig, psig, THEN THEN Go Go To To Step Step 3.
: a. Trip the Reactor b. Go To PATH-I, while continuing with this procedure
3.
: 4. Verify Instrument Air Compressor D -RUNNING 5. Verify The Primary Air Compressor  
Go Go To To Step Step 4.
-RUNNING
4.
* 6. Check IA Header Pressure -LESS THAN 80 PSIG Page 4 of RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Go To Step 4: IF IA pressure decreases to less than 60 psig, THEN Go To Step 3. Go To Step 4. IF IA pressure decreases to less than 80 psig, THEN observe NOTE prior to Steps 7 and 8 and perform Steps 7 and 8. Observe the NOTE Prior To Step 9 and Go To Step 9. 61 Rev. 35 AOP-017 LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR Page 5 of 61 INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IA-3821 is located on IA Dryer 7. Dispatch Operator (s) To Perform The Following: a. Verify Station Air Compressor  
3.
-IN SERVICE WITH DISCHARGE VALVE OPEN b. Verify the following SA TO IA CROSS CONNECT BYPASS FILTER ISOLATION Valves -OPEN: ->.It _ SA-220 SA-221 c. Verify IA-18, .AIR DRYER "A" & "B" BYPASS -OPEN d. Verify the following Compressors  
: 3. Perform The Perform   The Following:
-RUNNING -STATION AIR COMP -INST AIR COMP A -INST AIR COMP B e. Check FCV-1740, AIR DRYER HIGH DP FLOW CONTROL Valve -OPEN f. Open IA-3821, INSTRUMENT AIR DRYER "D" BYPASS a. Go To Step 7.c. b. Open SA-5, STATION AIR TO INST AIR CROSS CONNECT. e. Open IA-3665, AIR DRYER "A" & "B" BYPASS. 
Following:
-c IA A& B COMPRESSOR PACKAGE AIR-FIGURE-l I I DR1ERI---" -200 SCFM INFORMATION USE ONLY 400SCfM STATION AIR COMPRESSOR PACKAGE AIR -FIGURE-4 AIR RECEIVER SA-37 SA-270 SA CONSTRUCTION AIR CONNECT FILTER I AFTERCOOLER It---t  
: a. Trip
... -"" SEPARATOR i I .. DISTRIBUTION 0 1 SERVICE WATER SERVICE WATER 150 FT3 REF. DWG: G-190200 SHEET 3 INFORMATION USE ONLY SA-5 HEADER .. -.. ) TO IAA & B AIR DRYERS HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 90. Given the following:  
: a. Trip the the Reactor Reactor PATH-l, while
-The plant is operating at 50% RTP. -Power ascension in progress lAW GP-005, POWER OPERATION, following a refueling outage. -During paperwork reviews, Maintenance Supervision has discovered that the blind flange on the Refueling Transfer Tube was installed but has NOT been properly torqued. -The Containment has been declared INOPERABLE and the plant must be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours. Which ONE (1) of the following is the required Notification to be made to agencies or organizations outside of the RNP organization?
: b. Go To PATH-I, continuing with this procedure continuing
A. Load dispatcher must be notified of LCO condition that affects the unit output. B. State and County Emergency Operation Centers must be notified of a potential breach of Containment that may impact off-site doses in the event of an RCS leak. C. NRC Operations Center must be notified PRIOR to initiation of any Tech Spec required shutdown.
: 4. Verify Instrument Air Compressor DD - RUNNING
: 5. Verify The Primary Air Compressor - RUNNING
~
* 6.
* 6. Check IA Header Pressure - LESS-IF IA pressure decreases to less THAN THAN 80 PSIG                                  than 80 psig, psig. THEN observe NOTE prior to Steps 77 and 88 and perform Steps 77 and 8.
Observe the NOTE Prior ToTo Step 99 and Go To Step 9.
 
Rev.
Rev. 35 35 AOP-O17 AOP-017                                 LOSS LOSS OF OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR Page 55 of Page    of 61 61
 
STEP H____            INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I      RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED IA-3821 is located on IA Dryer         D~
  .7*
  ~  7. Dispatch Operator Dispatch      Operator(s) (s) ToTo Perform Perform The     Following:
The Following:
    ~ a. a. Verify Verify Station Station Air Air Compressor Compressor        a.
: a. Go Go To To Step Step 7.c.
7.c.
                - IN SERVICE
                -      SERVICE WITH DISCHARGE DISCHARGE VALVE OPEN VALVE   OPEN
    ~
: b. b. Verify the following SA TO IA                   b. Open SA-5, STATION AIR TO  TO CROSS CONNECT BYPASS FILTER                       INST AIR CROSS CONNECT.
ISOLATION Valves - OPEN:-
          ->.It _*    SA-220 SA-22O
                        .        SA-221
: c. Verify IA-18,IA-iS, .AIRAIR DRYER "A" A & &
B BYPASS - OPEN "B"           -
d.
: d. Verify the following Compressors - RUNNING
                *-   STATION STATION AIR COMP
                *-   INST INST AIR AIR COMP COMP AA
                *-   INST INST AIR AIR COMP COMP BB e.
: e. Check Check FCV-174O.
FCV-1740, AIR AIR DRYER DRYER           e. Open
: e. Open IA-3665, IA-3665, AIR AIR DRYER   "A" &&
DRYER A HIGH  DP HIGH DP FLOW CONTROL Valve FLOW    CONTROL    Valve - -              BYPASS.
                                                                  "B" BYPASS.
B OPEN OPEN f.
: f. OpenOpen IA-3821, IA-3821, INSTRUME INSTRUMENT    AIR NT AIR DRYER DRYER D    BYPASS "D" BYPASS
 
IA IA A&
A& BB COMPRESSOR COMPRESSOR PACKAGE PACKAGE AIR-FIGURE-l AIR-FIGURE-i FILTER 23 SW 200 SCFM IA AIR RECEIVER SUPPLY HEADER F I LTER SW
-6
  -c fr~ER I I DR1ERI---"
200SCFM SCFM 200 INFORMATION INFORMATIONUSE        USEONLY ONLY
 
STATION AIR COMPRESSOR PACKAGE AIR-FIGURE-4 AIR-FIGURE-4 CONSTRUCTION AIR CROSS-CONNECT SA-37 SA-270 400 SCFM 400SCfM AIR RECEIVER AFTERCOOLER It---t                                     SA FILTER    ~---a:::c::
                ...- " "I SEPARATOR                           i I         .. DISTRIBUTION HEADER 0       1 150 FT3 SERVICE WATER                                                 -
                                                                                  .. ..-.-------~--
                                                                                          )
SERVICE WATER                                                                       TO IAA & B AIR DRYERS SA-5 REF. DWG: G-         90200 SHEET 3 G-1190200 INFORMATION USE ONLY
 
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08   NRC Written Written Exam Exam
: 90. Given the
: 90. Given  the following:
following:
The plant
      - The
        -      plant is is operating operating at at 50% RTP.
50% RTP.
Power ascension
      - Power
        -        ascension in   progress lAW in progress      GP-005, POWER lAW GP-005,              OPERATION, following POWER OPERATION,       following aa refueling refueling outage.
During paperwork
      - During
      -          paperwork reviews, reviews, Maintenance Maintenance Supervision Supervision has has discovered that the the blind blind flange flange on the on the Refueling Refueling Transfer Transfer Tube Tube was installed installed but but has has NOT NOT been been properly properly torqued.
torqued.
        - The Containment has been declared INOPERABLE and the plant must be placed in in MODE 3 within 6 hours.
Which ONE (1) of the following is the required Notification Notification to be made to agencies or organizations outside of the RNP organization?
A. Load dispatcher must be notified of LCO condition that affects the unit output.
B. State and County Emergency Operation Centers must be notified of a potential breach of Containment that may impact off-site doses in the event of an RCS leak.
C. NRC Operations Center must be notified PRIOR to initiation of any Tech Spec required shutdown.
D. American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) must be notified of a breach of the Primary Reactor Containment.
D. American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) must be notified of a breach of the Primary Reactor Containment.
90 103 G2.4.20 OOllCONTAINMENT/2/112.7/4.lISROILOW/43.5INEW  
90 90
-2008/0MM-007-002 Given the following:  
 
-The plant is operating at 50% RTP. -Power ascension in progress lAW GP-005, POWER OPERATION, following a refueling outage. -During paperwork reviews, Maintenance Supervision has discovered that the blind flange on the Refueling Transfer Tube was installed but has NOT been properly torqued. -The Containment has been declared INOPERABLE and the plant must be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours. Which ONE (1) of the following is the required Notification to be made to agencies or organizations outside of the RNP organization?
103 G2.4.20 OOllCONTAINMENT/2/112.7/4.lISROILOW/43.5INEW 103          00 1/CONTAINMENT/2/1/2.7/4. 1/SRO/LOW/43 .5/NEW - 2008/0MM-007-002
A':I Load dispatcher must be notified of LCO condition that affects the unit output. B. State and County Emergency Operation Centers must be notified of a potential breach of Containment that may impact off-site doses in the event of an RCS leak. c. NRC Operations Center must be notified PRIOR to initiation of any Tech Spec required shutdown.
                                                                - 2008/OMM-007-002 Given the following:
RTP.
    - The plant is operating at 50% RTP.
    - Power ascension in progress lAW GP-005, POWER
      -                                                POWER OPERATION, following a refueling outage.
    - During paperwork reviews, Maintenance Supervision has discovered that the blind flange on the Refueling Transfer Tube was installed but has NOT been properly torqued.
    - The Containment has been declared INOPERABLE and the plant must be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours.
Which ONE (1) of the following is the required Notification to be made to agencies or organizations outside of the RNP organization?
A':I A Load dispatcher must be notified of LCO condition that affects the unit output.
B. State and County Emergency Operation Centers must be notified of a potential breach of Containment that may impact off-site doses in the event of an RCS leak.
c.
C. NRC Operations Center must be notified PRIOR to initiation of any Tech Spec required shutdown.
D. American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) must be notified of a breach of the Primary Reactor Containment.
D. American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) must be notified of a breach of the Primary Reactor Containment.
The correct answer is A. A: Correct -OMM-007 requires that load dispatcher be notified of any LCO that can affect load. B: Incorrect  
The correct answer is A.
-State and County EOCs are notified when the plant enters EAL condition reportable events. C: Incorrect  
A: Correct - -    OMM-007 requires that load dispatcher be notified of any LCO that can affect load.
-NRC Operations Center is notified per AP-030 of reportable events, but does NOT have to be notified PRIOR to initiation of plant shutdown.
B: Incorrect - State and County EOCs are notified when the plant enters EAL condition reportable events.
D: Incorrect  
C: Incorrect - NRC Operations Center is notified per AP-030 of reportable events, but does NOT have to be notified PRIOR to initiation of plant shutdown.
-ANI is notified of any declared emergency at an Alert level or higher. Exam Question Number: 90  
D: Incorrect - ANI is notified of any declared emergency at an Alert level or higher.
Exam Question Number: 90


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
AP-030, Pages 11 and 12;    12; OMM-007, Pages 13, 13, 23, 28, 31.
KA Statement: Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator.
History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC exam.
SRO - Requires evaluation of station reporting requirements.
KA Name:
KAName:            CONTAINMENT CONT    AINMENT Tier/Group:
Tier/Group:        2/1 2/1 Importance Rating:
Importance Rating: 2.7/4.1 2.7/4.1        RO/SRO Level:
RO/SRO  Level:    SRO SRO Cognitive Level:
Cognitive Level:  LOW LOW            10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43  link:  43.5 43.5 Source:
Source:            NEW - 2008 NEW    - 2008  Learning Objective:
Learning Objective: OMM-007-002 OMM-007-002
9.0 9.0        PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NOTES: The NOTES:        The NRC NRC shall shall be  notified of be notified    of those those non-emergency non-emergency events  events discovered discovered andand reportable    in  accordance      with  10  CFR reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR  50.72  and    10  CFR 50.73 50.73 within within three three years years from from the time the    time that that the the event event occurred.
occurred. IfIf more more than than three three years years have have lapsed lapsed before before the the event event isis discovered, discovered, the    the event event need need not not be be reported.
reported. IfIf the the event event was was aa condition condition reportable reportable by  Technical Specifications by Technical          Specifications andand the the Technical Technical Specifications Specifications havehave since since been been amended amended to  remove    the    requirement,    the  event    need to remove the requirement, the event need not be reported. not  be  reported.
NUREG-1022 provides NUREG-1022              provides clarifications clarifications forfor 10 10 CFR CFR 50.72 50.72 and and 1010 CFR CFR 50.73.
50.73.
The NRC The            Operations Center NRC Operations          Center may may bebe contacted contacted via via the the NRC NRC Emergency Emergency Telecommun        ications    System    (ETS)
Telecommunications System (ETS) telephones. The    telephones.      The commercial commercial telephone telephone system system may also may      also be be used.
used. TheThe NRC NRC Operations Operations Center Center telephone telephone numbers numbers are are found found inin the the ERO ERO      Telephone        Book  and  in  Attachment    11.13  of Book and in Attachment 11.13 of this procedure. procedure.
Attachment 11.13, Attachment        11.13, Event Event Notification Notification Worksheet, should be completed for each one-hour hour    or four-hour      Report  of  a significant event made to the NRC in accordance with this procedure.
procedure.
When making an immediate notification, the caller shall identify:
(i) The Emergency Class declared; or (i)
(ii) The paragraph of 10 CFR 50.72 requiring notification of the Non-Emergency      Non-Emergency Event.
9.1        Immediate and One-Hour Notifications 9.1 .1 Notifications listed in Attachment 11.1 9.1.1                                                11.1 shall be performed immediately and no later than one hour following the event to the NRC          NRC locations locations specified in in the attachment. This attachment attachment is organized organized by subject (left handhand column) column) asas  follows:
* Notification Notification requirements requirements of  of 10 10 CFR CFR 50.72 50.72
                      **    10 CFR 10  CFR 50.36 50.36 Notification Notification Requirement Requirements    s
                      **  Security/Safe    guards Notification Security/Safeguards        Notification Requirement Requirements    from 10 s from    10 CFR CFR 73 73
                    **    Source, Source, byprodut byproduct material, material, and and SNMSNM notification notification requirements requirements of  of 10 CFR 10  CFR 30,30, 40, 40, and and 7070
                    ** ISFSI ISFSI Notifications Notifications
                    ** SNM SNM Shipments Shipments Notification Notification Requirement Requirements    s
                    ** Follow-up Follow-up Notifications Notifications IAP-030 AP-030                                                  Rev Rev 40 40                                    Page 111 Page        of 57 1 of  57
                **    Notifications to Notifications      to NRC NRC Region Region IIII from from 1010 CFR CFR 20,20, 30 30 and and 4040 requirements requirements
                **    FED Notification FFD    Notification Requirements Requirements
                **    IAEA Notification IAEA    Notification Requirements Requirements 9.2 9.2    Four Hour Four    Hour Notifications Notifications Notifications listed Notifications      listed inin Attachment Attachment 11.2  11.2 shall shall be be performed performed no  no later later than than four four hours  after the hours after      the event event or or discovery discovery of    the condition of the condition to to the the NRC NRC locations locations specified specified inin the the attachment.
attachment.
9.3 9.3    Eight Hour Eight  Hour Notifications Notifications Notifications listed Notifications      listed inin Attachment 11    11.3
                                                          .3 shall be performed no later than eight hours hours    after        event or discovery of the condition to the NRC locations specified the event in the attachment.
9.4  Twenty-Four Hour Notifications Notifications listed in Attachment 11.4 shall be performed no later than twenty-four hours after the event or discovery of the condition to the NRC locations specified in the attachment.
9.5  Two-Working Day Notifications Two-Working Notifications listed in Attachment 11          11.5.5 shall be performed no later  later. than two working days after the event or discovery of the condition to the NRC locations specified in the attachment.
9.6  Thirty-Day Notifications/Reports Notifications/Reports The notifications/reports notifications/reports listed in Attachment 11              .6 shall be performed no later 11.6 than thirty days after the event or discovery of the condition by either phone notification or written report as specified.
9.7  Licensee Event Reports HBRSEP HBRSEP shall  shall submit submit an  an LER LER for anyany event event ofof the type described described in  in Attachment 11.7  11.7 within 60 days days after the discovery of    of the event.
event. In In the case of an invalid actuation actuation reported under  under 10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i 50.73(a)(2)(iv),v), other than actuation other        actuation of of the the reactor protection protection system system (RPS)
(RPS) when when thethe reactor reactor isis critical, critical, HBRSEP HBRSEP may, at may,    at its its option, option, provide aa telephone notification to the        the NRC NRC Operations Center Center within 60      days after 60 days      after discovery discovery of of the the event event instead instead ofof submitting submitting aa written written LER.
LER.
Unless Unless otherwise otherwise specified specified in in this this section, section, the the HBRSEP HBRSEP shall shall report report anan event event ifif itit occurred occurred within within three three years years of of the the date date of of discovery, discovery, regardless regardless of  of the the plant plant mode mode or or power power level, level, and and regardless regardless of  of the the significance Significance of of the the structure, structure, system, system, oror component component that  that initiated initiated the the event.
event. This This attachment attachment is  is organized organized by  by subject subject as as follows:
follows:
IAP-030 AP-030                                              Rev Rev 4040                                            12 of Page 12 Page      of 57  57
8.2.6 (Continued) 8.2.6  (Continued)
                -    Item 44 - Enter Item      - Enterthe the maximum maximum time time the the equipment equipment isis allowed allowed to to be be inoperable inin the inoperable              applicable blank.
the applicable    blank. Circle Circle hrs/days hrs/days as  as they apply to they  apply    to the  Special Report.
the Special      Report.
                -    Item 55 - Enter Item      - Enter thethe Time Time AND AND Date Date that that item item 44 isis required required inin the the applicable blank.
applicable      blank.
NOTE:
NOTE:          ODCM required ODCM        required compensatory compensatory actions actions and and initial initial sampling sampling lack  lack aa "grace grace period.
period".
                -    Item 66 - Enter Item      - Enter anyany applicable applicable surveillances surveillances or or activities activities andand required required frequencies      which frequencies which are    are required required asas aa result result of of the the component component inoperability.
inoperability.
Examples:
Examples:            ITS LCO "ITS  LCO 3.2.4 3.2.4 REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION  ACTION A.3 requiresrequires SR SR 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.2.1 3.2.1.1        3.2.2.1 once once per per 7 days."
days.
ITS LCO 3.6.3 REQUIRED ACTION A.2 requires the "ITS                                                                the affected penetration flow path verified isolated once per 31 days for isolation devices outside CV."        CV.
TRM TRMS 3.11 REQUIRED COMPENSATORY "TRM                                    COMPENSATORY MEASURE requires obtaining and analyzing grab samples once per 24 hours thereafter, when degassing is not in progress."
progress.
8.2.7    IF the component is an ITS Support System component, THEN perform Attachment 10.11,10.11, which is provided to ensure Safety Function Determinatio Determinations    ns are performed consistently. The TRM contains in-depth guidance for performing Safety Function Determinatio  Determinations. ns.
[CAPR 193057]
193057]
8.2.8 8.2.8    IF IF the the component component is  is an an ITS ITS Supported Supported System System Component, Component, THEN    THEN review review openopen Loss Loss of of Safety Safety Function Function Worksheets Worksheets (Attachment (Attachment 10.11)10.11) forfor impact.      {CAPR impact. [CAPR 193057]  193057]
  > 8.2.9 "7  8.2.9    Initial Initial the the blank blank in in Section Section H "H" when when the the Load Load Dispatcher Dispatcher has  has been been notified    when    the  component notified when the component inoperability inoperability could could force force plant plant shutdown shutdown or    or load load reduction.
reduction. [SOER
[SOER 99-1, 99-1, Rec.
Rec. 10]
1C]
8.2.10 8.2.10 Initial Initial the the blank blank in in Section Section I "I" when when Planning Planning andand Scheduling Scheduling has  has been been notified notified when when ITS/TRM/OD ITSITRM/ODCM/RG CM/RG 1.97 1.97 actions actions have have beenbeen entered entered andand plant plant shutdown shutdown isis anticipated.
anticipated.
OMM-007 IOMM-007                            I            Rev.
Rev. 7676                                      Page 13 Page    13 of of 85 851 I
8.6.3.2 (Continued) 8.6.3.2  (Continued)
                          -  Review plant Review      plant logs, logs, EIRs, EIRs, and and scheduled scheduled work work activities activities since since the  Engineering the Engineering memo  memo was  was initiated initiated to to assure assure any any maintenance that maintenance        that was was performed performed on on the the listed listed heat heat exchangers      DID  NOT exchangers DID NOT involve    involve tube tube plugging plugging and and that that the the components are components        are OPERABLE OPERABLE AND    AND thethe SSO SSO OR  OR the the CRSS CRSS will will sign  when  the  initial check sign when the initial      check isis completed.
completed.
                          -  Record completion Record      completion of  of reviews reviews andand equipment equipment checkschecks inin Auto Auto Log Log 8.6.4 8.6.4      Place the Place    the unit  in the unit in      appropriate Mode the appropriate      Mode as as required required byby ITS ITS LCO LCO 3.7.8 3.7.8 REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTIONS ifif the              above requirements the above      requirements are are not not met.
met.
8.6.5
  .-78.6.5      Initial the blank in Section Initial                  Section "C" C when the Load Load Dispatcher Dispatcher has been  been notified of the REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION entry which could force plant shutdown or load reduction.
8.6.6    Initial the blank in Section "0"    D when Planning and Scheduling has been notified plant shutdown is anticipated.
8.6.7    Once every 12 hours, Section "E"          E is completed as follows:
Verify the affected document revisions are current with the memo AND the SSO OR the CRSS will sign when the check is completed.
Review plant logs, EIRs, and scheduled work activities for the previous 12 hours to assure no maintenance was performed on the listed heat exchangers that would affect OPERABILI  OPERABILITY    TY AND that the components are OPERABLE AND the SSO OR the CRSS will sign when the check is completed.
Record completion of checks in Auto Log.
OMM-007 IOMM-007                                        Rev.
Rev. 7676                                    Page 23 Page  23 of of 85 851
8.9.10 IF 8.9.10      the inoperable IF the    inoperable component component isis aa Radiation Radiation Monitor, Monitor, Flowrate Flowrate Monitor Monitoror or Tank    Level  Monitor, THEN Tank Level Monitor,          THEN notify notify E&C E&C..
8.9.11 IF
    .---;> 8.9.11      the component IF the    component inoperability inoperability could could force force aa plant plant shutdown shutdown or or load load reduction, THEN reduction,      THEN notify notify the the Load Load Dispatcher.
Dispatcher. [SOER
[SOER 99-1, 99-1, Rec. C]
Rec. 1101 8.9.12 IF 8.9.12      ITSITRM!ODCM/RG 1.97 IF ITSITRM/ODCM/RG              1.97 actions actions have have been been entered    AND aa plant entered AND        plant shutdown isis anticipated, shutdown          anticipated, THEN THEN notify notify Planning Planning and and Scheduling.
Scheduling.
8.9.13 WHEN 8.9.13  WHEN the    the equipment equipment isis returned returned to to service service OROR the the equipment equipment isis nono longer required longer      required due due to to aa change change in  in plant plant conditions,  THEN perform conditions, THEN      perform thethe following:
following:
IF    the equipment IF the  equipment isis declared declared operable,      THEN perform operable, THEN      perform the the following:
following:
oo    Enter in Enter  in AUTO AUTO log.log.
oo IF    the equipment IF the  equipment is  is aa Radiation Radiation Monitor, Monitor, Flowrate Flowrate Monitor Monitor oror Tank Tank Level Monitor, Level  Monitor, THEN THEN notify notify E&C.
E&C.
                  -    IF the equipment is no  no longer required, required, THEN enter the reason reason inin AUTO log (such as, MODE 5 entered).
[ OMM-007 IOMM-007                                          Rev.
Rev. 7676                                  Page 28 Page    28 of of 85 851


AP-030, Pages 11 and 12; OMM-007, Pages 13, 23, 28, 31. KA Statement:
ATTACHMENT 10.1 ATTACHMENT              10.1 Page   2 Page 2 of of 22 EIR    - ITSITRM/ODCM/RG 1.97 EIR - ITSfTRM/ODCM/RG                   1.97 F. IF F.       this isis an IF this       an ITS ITS Support Support System System Component, Component, THEN         perform Attachment THEN perform        Attachment 10.11.
Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator.
10.11.
History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC exam. SRO -Requires evaluation of station reporting requirements.
[CAPR 193057]
KAName: CONT AINMENT Tier/Group:
[CAPR        1 93057j G. IF G. IF this this isis an an ITS ITS Supported Supported System System Component, Component, THEN THEN review review open open Loss Loss ofof Safety Safety Function Function Worksheets (Attachment Worksheets           (Attachment 10.11)10.11) forfor impact.
2/1 Importance Rating: 2.7/4.1 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: LOW lOCFR55.43 link: 43.5 Source: NEW -2008 Learning Objective:
impact.
OMM-007-002 9.0 PROCEDURE NOTES: The NRC shall be notified of those non-emergency events discovered and reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 within three years from the time that the event occurred.
~ H. Load Dispatcher H. Load     Dispatcher notified notified of of REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION  ACTION which which could could force force plant plant shutdown/load shutdown/load reduction.
If more than three years have lapsed before the event is discovered, the event need not be reported.
reduction.                                                      Initials) [SOER (SSO/CRSS Initials)         [SOER 99-1, 99-1, Rec.
If the event was a condition reportable by Technical Specifications and the Technical Specifications have since been amended to remove the requirement, the event need not be reported.
Rec. 11 C]
NUREG-1022 provides clarifications for 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. The NRC Operations Center may be contacted via the NRC Emergency Telecommunications System (ETS) telephones.
C]
The commercial telephone system may also be used. The NRC Operations Center telephone numbers are found in the ERO Telephone Book and in Attachment 11.13 of this procedure.
I.I. Planning and Planning       and Scheduling Scheduling notified notified toto develop develop Forced Forced Outage Outage Schedule Schedule ifif ITS/TRM/OD ITSITRM/ODCM/RG                  1.97 CM/RG 1.97 actionsactions are      entered AND are entered           plant shutdown AND plant     shutdown anticipated.
Attachment 11.13, Event Notification Worksheet, should be completed for each hour or four-hour Report of a significant event made to the NRC in accordance with this procedure.
anticipated.
When making an immediate notification, the caller shall identify: (i) The Emergency Class declared; or (ii) The paragraph of 10 CFR 50.72 requiring notification of the Non-Emergency Event. 9.1 Immediate and One-Hour Notifications 9.1.1 Notifications listed in Attachment 11.1 shall be performed immediately and no later than one hour following the event to the NRC locations specified in the attachment.
_ _ _ _ _ _(SSO/CRSS         (SSO/CRSS Initials)Initials)
This attachment is organized by subject (left hand column) as follows: I AP-030
J. IF J.        this EIR IF this    EIR isis for for aa Radiation Radiation Monitor, Monitor, Flowrate Flowrate Monitor Monitor or or Tank Tank Level Level Monitor, Monitor, THEN THEN notify notify E&C    of  equipment E&C of equipment inoperability:inoperability  :
* Notification requirements of 10 CFR 50.72
Time _ _ _ _ Date          Date _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
* 10 CFR 50.36 Notification Requirements
E&C Shift E&C    Shift Technician Technician (Print (Print name) name)
* Security/Safeguards Notification Requirements from 10 CFR 73
K. IF a Maintenance Rule System Function is affected, THEN record Allowed Unavailability                  Unavailability Unavailability Hours, and Unavailability Hours, Actual Unavailability                              Unavailability Hours Remaining.
* Source, byproduct material, and SNM notification requirements of 10 CFR 30, 40, and 70
_ _Hours Allowed -             -              Hours Actual     =
* ISFSI Notifications
                                                                            =             Hours Remaining IF unplanned and less than 72 Hours remaining, THEN notify the RES Duty Manager.
* SNM Shipments Notification Requirements
Name                                                   Date                     Time L. Completed By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
* Follow-up Notifications Rev 40 Page 11 of 57
SSO/CRSS                                 Date M. Comments: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
* Notifications to NRC Region II from 10 CFR 20, 30 and 40 requirements
N. Restoration N.
* FFD Notification Requirements
1.
* IAEA Notification Requirements 9.2 Four Hour Notifications Notifications listed in Attachment 11.2 shall be performed no later than four hours after the event or discovery of the condition to the NRC locations specified in the attachment.
: 1. Equipment operable: Time _ _ _ _ Date _ _ __
9.3 Eight Hour Notifications Notifications listed in Attachment 11 .3 shall be performed no later than eight hours after the event or discovery of the condition to the NRC locations specified in the attachment.
: 2. IF this EIR is for a Radiation Monitor, Flowrate Monitor IF                                                                Monitor or Tank Level Monitor, THEN notify E&C        E&C of equipment return to service:
9.4 Twenty-Four Hour Notifications Notifications listed in Attachment 11.4 shall be performed no later than four hours after the event or discovery of the condition to the NRC locations specified in the attachment.
Time ____ Date           Date _ _ __
9.5 Two-Working Day Notifications Notifications listed in Attachment 11 .5 shall be performed no later than two working days after the event or discovery of the condition to the NRC locations specified in the attachment.
E&C E&C Shift Shift Technician Technician (Print (Print Name)
9.6 Thirty-Day Notifications/Reports The notifications/reports listed in Attachment 11 .6 shall be performed no later than thirty days after the event or discovery of the condition by either phone notification or written report as specified.
Name) 3.
9.7 Licensee Event Reports HBRSEP shall submit an LER for any event of the type described in Attachment 11.7 within 60 days after the discovery of the event. In the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, HBRSEP may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. Unless otherwise specified in this section, the HBRSEP shall report an event if it occurred within three years of the date of discovery, regardless of the plant mode or power level, and regardless of the Significance of the structure, system, or component that initiated the event. This attachment is organized by subject as follows: I AP-030 Rev 40 Page 12 of 57 8.2.6 (Continued)
: 3. Equipment Equipment no      no longer longer required due   due toto plant plant conditions:
NOTE: period". -Item 4 -Enter the maximum time the equipment is allowed to be inoperable in the applicable blank. Circle hrs/days as they apply to the Special Report. -Item 5 -Enter the Time AND Date that item 4 is required in the applicable blank. ODCM required compensatory actions and initial sampling lack a "grace -Item 6 -Enter any applicable surveillances or activities and required frequencies which are required as a result of the component inoperability.
Time Time                      Date _ _ __
Examples: "ITS LCO 3.2.4 REQUIRED ACTION A.3 requires SR 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.2.1 once per 7 days." "ITS LCO 3.6.3 REQUIRED ACTION A.2 requires the affected penetration flow path verified isolated once per 31 days for isolation devices outside CV." "TRM TRMS 3.11 REQUIRED COMPENSATORY MEASURE requires obtaining and analyzing grab samples once per 24 hours thereafter, when degassing is not in progress." 8.2.7 IF the component is an ITS Support System component, THEN perform Attachment 10.11, which is provided to ensure Safety Function Determinations are performed consistently.
Date Reason: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
The TRM contains in-depth guidance for performing Safety Function Determinations.
Reason:
[CAPR 193057] 8.2.8 IF the component is an ITS Supported System Component, THEN review open Loss of Safety Function Worksheets (Attachment 10.11) for impact. [CAPR 193057] "7 8.2.9 Initial the blank in Section "H" when the Load Dispatcher has been notified when the component inoperability could force plant shutdown or load reduction.
4.
[SOER 99-1, Rec. 1 C] 8.2.10 Initial the blank in Section "I" when Planning and Scheduling has been notified when ITSITRM/ODCM/RG 1 .97 actions have been entered and plant shutdown is anticipated.
: 4. Completed By:
IOMM-007 Rev. 76 Page 13 of 851 8.6.3.2 (Continued)
Completed          By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
-Review plant logs, EIRs, and scheduled work activities since the Engineering memo was initiated to assure any maintenance that was performed on the listed heat exchangers DID NOT involve tube plugging and that the components are OPERABLE AND the SSO OR the CRSS will sign when the initial check is completed.
SSO/CRSS SSO/CRSS                              Date Date OMM-007 IOMM-007                                                     Rev.
-Record completion of reviews and equipment checks in Auto Log 8.6.4 Place the unit in the appropriate Mode as required by ITS LCO 3.7.8 REQUIRED ACTIONS if the above requirements are not met. .-78.6.5 Initial the blank in Section "C" when the Load Dispatcher has been notified of the REQUIRED ACTION entry which could force plant shutdown or load reduction.
Rev. 7676                                            31 of Page 31 Page          851 of 85
8.6.6 Initial the blank in Section "0" when Planning and Scheduling has been notified plant shutdown is anticipated.
 
8.6.7 Once every 12 hours, Section "E" is completed as follows: IOMM-007 -Verify the affected document revisions are current with the memo AND the SSO OR the CRSS will sign when the check is completed.
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08       NRC Written Written ExamExam
-Review plant logs, EIRs, and scheduled work activities for the previous 12 hours to assure no maintenance was performed on the listed heat exchangers that would affect OPERABILITY AND that the components are OPERABLE AND the SSO OR the CRSS will sign when the check is completed.
: 91. Given
-Record completion of checks in Auto Log. Rev. 76 Page 23 of 851 8.9.10 IF the inoperable component is a Radiation Monitor, Flowrate Monitor or Tank Level Monitor, THEN notify E&C . .---;> 8.9.11 IF the component inoperability could force a plant shutdown or load reduction, THEN notify the Load Dispatcher.
: 91. Given the the following:
[SOER 99-1, Rec. 1 C] 8.9.12 IF ITSITRM/ODCM/RG 1.97 actions have been entered AND a plant shutdown is anticipated, THEN notify Planning and Scheduling.
following:
8.9.13 WHEN the equipment is returned to service OR the equipment is no longer required due to a change in plant conditions, THEN perform the following:
The Plant
IOMM-007 -IF the equipment is declared operable, THEN perform the following:
        - The
o Enter in AUTO log. o IF the equipment is a Radiation Monitor, Flowrate Monitor or Tank Level Monitor, THEN notify E&C. -IF the equipment is no longer required, THEN enter the reason in AUTO log (such as, MODE 5 entered).
        -        Plant isis inin MODE MODE 33 at      547 of at 547      following aa reactor
Rev. 76 Page 28 of 851 ATTACHMENT 10.1 Page 2 of 2 EIR -ITSfTRM/ODCM/RG 1.97 F. IF this is an ITS Support System Component, THEN perform Attachment 10.11. [CAPR 193057] G. IF this is an ITS Supported System Component, THEN review open Loss of Safety Function Worksheets (Attachment 10.11) for impact. H. Load Dispatcher notified of REQUIRED ACTION which could force plant shutdown/load reduction. (SSO/CRSS Initials)
                                                        &deg;F following      reactor trip trip from from 100%
[SOER 99-1, Rec. 1 C] I. Planning and Scheduling notified to develop Forced Outage Schedule if ITSITRM/ODCM/RG 1.97 actions are entered AND plant shutdown anticipated.
100% RTP.
______ (SSO/CRSS Initials)
RTP.
J. IF this EIR is for a Radiation Monitor, Flowrate Monitor or Tank Level Monitor, THEN notify E&C of equipment inoperability:
        - RCS
Time ____ Date ___________________
        -        chemistry sample RCS chemistry          sample indicates indicates DOSE DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT 1-131    1-131 isis 73 73 Micro-Curies/gram.
_ E&C Shift Technician (Print name) K. IF a Maintenance Rule System Function is affected, THEN record Allowed Unavailability Hours, Actual Unavailability Hours, and Unavailability Hours Remaining.
Micro-Curies/gram.
__ Hours Allowed -Hours Actual = Hours Remaining IF unplanned and less than 72 Hours remaining, THEN notify the RES Duty Manager. Name Date Time L. Completed By: _____________
Which ONE Which    ONE (1)      of the (1) of    the following following applies    to the applies to  the current current condition, condition, andand thethe basis basis for for that that requirement?
_ SSO/CRSS Date M. Comments:
requirement?
___________________________
A. Be A. Be inin MODE MODE 44 within within 48 48 hours, hours, to to place place the the plant plant inin aa MODE MODE wherewhere the the 1-131 1-131 limit limit isis NOT NOT APPLICABL APPLICABLE.        E.
_ N. Restoration
B. Reduce B. Reduce TTAVO AVG to        500 of to << 500        within 66 hours,
: 1. Equipment operable:
                                            &deg;F within      hours, toto ensure ensure RCS RCS saturation saturation pressure pressure isis below below the the S/G    Safety  Valve      lift S/G Safety Valve lift setpoint. setpoint.
Time ____ Date ___ _ 2. IF this EIR is for a Radiation Monitor, Flowrate Monitor or Tank Level Monitor, THEN notify E&C of equipment return to service: Time ____ Date ___ _ E&C Shift Technician (Print Name) 3. Equipment no longer required due to plant conditions:
C. Be C. Be inin MODE MODE 44 within within 66 hours, hours, toto place place the the plant plant in in aa MODE MODE wherewhere thethe 1-131 1-131 limit limit isis NOT NOT APPLICABLE.
Time Date ___ _ Reason: ______________________
APPLICABLE.
_ 4. Completed By: ___________________
D. Reduce D. Reduce TTAVG  AVG to <    < 500 of &deg;F within 6 hours, to ensure RCS saturation pressure is                 is below the S/G PORV lift setpoint.
_ SSO/CRSS Date IOMM-007 Rev. 76 Page 31 of 851 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 91. Given the following:  
91 91
-The Plant is in MODE 3 at 547 of following a reactor trip from 100% RTP. -RCS chemistry sample indicates DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 is 73 Micro-Curies/gram.
 
Which ONE (1) of the following applies to the current condition, and the basis for that requirement?
002 G2.2.40 002 G2.2.40 OOlfREACTOR          COOLANTI2I2I3.414.7ISRO/HIGHJ432143.5INEW - 20081RCS-015 OO1IREACTOR COOLANT/212/3.4/4.7/SROIHIGHl43.2/43.5INEW                  - 2008IRCS-015 Given the Given  the following:
A. Be in MODE 4 within 48 hours, to place the plant in a MODE where the 1-131 limit is NOT APPLICABLE.
following:
B. Reduce T AVG to < 500 of within 6 hours, to ensure RCS saturation pressure is below the S/G Safety Valve lift setpoint.
The Plant
    - The
    -      Plant isis in in MODE MODE 33 atat 547 &deg;F following 547 of following aa reactor reactor trip trip from from 100%
100% RTP.
RTP.
    - RCS
    -        chemistry sample RCS chemistry                  indicates DOSE sample indicates  DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT 1-131 1-131 isis 73 73 Micro-Curies/gram.
Micro-Curies/gram.
Which ONE Which   ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following applies applies to to the the current current condition, condition, and and the the basis basis for for that that requirement?
requirement?
A. BeBe in in MODE MODE 4 within 48     48 hours, hours, to place the plant inin a MODE MODE where the 1-131  1-131 limit is is NOT NOT APPLICABLE.
B B~  Reduce TTAVG Reduce       AVG to < < 500  F within 66 hours, 0
500 of           hours, to ensure ensure RCS RCS saturation pressure pressure isis below below the S/G Safety Valve lift setpoint.
C. Be in MODE 4 within 6 hours, to place the plant in a MODE where the 1-131 limit is NOT APPLICABLE.
C. Be in MODE 4 within 6 hours, to place the plant in a MODE where the 1-131 limit is NOT APPLICABLE.
D. Reduce T AVG to < 500 of within 6 hours, to ensure RCS saturation pressure is below the S/G PORV lift setpoint.
D. Reduce T       AVG to < 500 of TAVG                &deg;F within 6 hours, to ensure RCS saturation pressure is below the S/G PORV lift setpoint.
91 002 G2.2.40 OOlfREACTOR COOLANT/212/3.4/4.7/SROIHIGHl43.2/43.5INEW
The correct answer is B.
-20081RCS-015 Given the following:
A: Incorrect - This is the partial LCO applicable to 1-131 greater than 0.25, and less than 60 Micro-Curies/gm, except LCO requires MODE 3.
-The Plant is in MODE 3 at 547 of following a reactor trip from 100% RTP. -RCS chemistry sample indicates DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 is 73 Micro-Curies/gram.
B: Correct - -    ITS for 1-131 is applicable in MODE 3 with T       AVG >
Which ONE (1) of the following applies to the current condition, and the basis for that requirement?
TAVG  > 500 of. &deg;F. Saturation pressure for 500 &deg;F of is 665 PSIG which is below the S/G PORV and S/G Safety Valve setpoint.
A. Be in MODE 4 within 48 hours, to place the plant in a MODE where the 1-131 limit is NOT APPLICABLE. Reduce T AVG to < 500 of within 6 hours, to ensure RCS saturation pressure is below the S/G Safety Valve lift setpoint.
C: Incorrect - No MODE 4 requirements. Basis is for conditions below S/G safety valve setpoint.
C. Be in MODE 4 within 6 hours, to place the plant in a MODE where the 1-131 limit is NOT APPLICABLE.
D: Incorrect - Action is correct. Basis is to be below the S/G Safety Valve setpoint, NOT the S/G PORV setpoint.
D. Reduce T AVG to < 500 of within 6 hours, to ensure RCS saturation pressure is below the S/G PORV lift setpoint.
 
The correct answer is B. A: Incorrect  
Exam Question Exam               Number: 91 Question Number:       91
-This is the partial LCO applicable to 1-131 greater than 0.25, and less than 60 Micro-Curies/gm, except LCO requires MODE 3. B: Correct -ITS for 1-131 is applicable in MODE 3 with T AVG > 500 of. Saturation pressure for 500 of is 665 PSIG which is below the S/G PORV and S/G Safety Valve setpoint.
 
C: Incorrect  
==Reference:==
-No MODE 4 requirements.
ITS
Basis is for conditions below S/G safety valve setpoint.
D: Incorrect  
-Action is correct. Basis is to be below the S/G Safety Valve setpoint, NOT the S/G PORV setpoint.
Exam Question Number: 91  


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
3.4.16; ITS ITS 3.4.16;    ITS 3.4.16  BD.
3.4.16 BO.
KA Statement:
KA  Statement: Ability Ability to to apply  Technical Specifications apply Technical  Specifications for for aa system.
system.
History: New History:  New - Written
                - Written for for HLC-08    NRC exam.
HLC-08 NRC    exam.
SRO - Knowledge SRO    - Knowledge of  of ITS ITS beyond beyond 11 hour hour action action statements.
statements.
KA Name:
KAName:              REACTOR COOLANT                    Tier/Group:        2/2 212 Importance Rating:    3.4/4.7                            RO/SRO Level:      SRO Cognitive Level:      HIGH                              10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43          43.2/43.5 Source:              NEW -2008
                              - 2008                    Learning Objective: RCS-015 RCS-OI5


ITS 3.4.16; ITS 3.4.16 BO. KA Statement:
RCS RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity 3.4.16 3.4.16 3.4 3.4 REACTOR REACTOR COOLANT COOLANT SYSTEM SYSTEM (RCS)
Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system. History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC exam. SRO -Knowledge of ITS beyond 1 hour action statements.
(RCS) 3.4.16 3.4.16 RCS Specific Specific Activity LCO LCO 3.4.16 3.4.16         The The specific specific activity of the reactor coolant                 coolant shall shall be within limits.
KAName: REACTOR COOLANT Tier/Group:
APPLICABILITY:     MODES 11 and 2, MODE 33 with RCS average temperature (Tavg)               (TavQ)      ~ 500&deg;F.
212 Importance Rating: 3.4/4.7 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH lOCFR55.43 link: 43.2/43.5 Source: NEW -2008 Learning Objective:
ACTIONS CONDITION                       REQUIRED ACTION                                   COMPLETION TIME A. DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131         - -----------Note    Note ------- -----
RCS-OI5 RCS Specific Activity 3.4.16 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity LCO 3.4.16 The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be within limits. APPLICABILITY:
    > 0.25 MCi/gm.
MODES 1 and 2, MODE 3 with RCS average temperature (Tavg) 500&deg;F. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 ------------
j.lCi/gm.             LCO 3.0.4.c is applicable.
Note ------------
A.1        Verify DOSE                                      Once per 4 hours EQUIVALENT 1-131
> 0.25 j.lCi/gm.
                                            $ 60 uCi/gm.j.lCi Igm.
LCO 3.0.4.c is applicable.  
                                -AND AND A.2      Restore DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 to                              48 hours within limit.
.._----_ ................
B. Gross specific activity B.1            Be in MODE 33 with                              66 hours of the reactor coolant                Tavg << 500&deg;F.
_ .........  
not within limit.
--_ .............
(continued)
A.1 Verify DOSE Once per 4 hours EQUIVALENT 1-131 $ 60 j.lCi Igm. AND -A.2 Restore DOSE 48 hours EQUIVALENT 1-131 to within limit. B. Gross specific activity B.1 Be in MODE 3 with 6 hours of the reactor coolant Tavg < 500&deg;F. not within limit. (continued)
(continued)
HBRSEP Unit No. 2 3.4-45 Amendment No. 203 ACTIONS (continued)
HBRSEP Unit HBRSEP  Unit No.
CONDITION C. Requi red Acti on and C.1 associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. OR DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 > 60 f,lCi/gm.
No. 22                      3.4-45 3.4-45                                              Amendment No.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED ACTION Be in MODE 3 with Tav9 < 500&deg;F. SR 3.4.16.1 Verify reactor coolant gross specific activity 100/E f,lCi/gm.
Amendment  No. 203 203
RCS Specific Activity 3.4.16 COMPLETION TIME 6 hours FREQUENCY 7 days SR 3.4.16.2 -------------------
 
NOTE --------------------
RCS RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity 3.4.16 3.4.16 ACTIONS (continued)
Only required to be performed in MODE 1. Verify reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 specific activity 0.25 f,lCi/gm.
ACTIONS    (continued)
HBRSEP Unit No. 2 3.4-46 14 days AND Between 2 and 6 hours after a THERMAL POWER change of 15% RTP within a 1 hour period (continued)
CONDITION CONDITION                          REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION ACTION          COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME TIME
Amendment No. 201 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) B 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity BASES RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.16 BACKGROUND The LCO contains specific activity limits for both DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 and gross specific activity in the reactor coolant. The allowable levels are intended to limit the offsite dose to less than the limits of 10 CFR 50.67 for analyzed accidents.
"'~
APPLICABLE The LCO limits on the specific activity of the reactor SAFETY ANALYSES coolant ensure that the resulting offsite doses will not exceed the 10 CFR 50.67 dose limits following an analyzed accident.
C. Requi C. Required red Acti  on and Action    and      C.1 C.1       Be Be in in MODE MODE 33 with with     66 hours hours associated associ ated Completion Cornpl eti on              Tav9 Tavg << 500&deg;F.
The limiting accident analysis used in establishing the specified activity limits is the SGTR. Other accidents, such as the Main Steam Line Break accident also use the limits from this LCO in the dose analysis.
500&deg;F.
The SGTR dose analysis (Ref. 2) assumes the specific activity of the reactor coolant at the LCO limit and an existing reactor coolant steam generator (SG) tube leakage rate of 0.3 gpm. The analysis assumes the specific activity of the secondary coolant at its limit of 0.1 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 from LCO 3.7.15, "Secondary Specific Activity." (continued)
Time of Time  of Condition Condition A  A not met.
HBRSEP Unit No. 2 B 3.4-98 Revision No. 31 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)
not  met.
HBRSEP Unit No. 2 RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.16 The SGTR event is assumed to be caused by the instantaneous rupture of a steam generator tube which relieves to the faulted steam generator.
OR OR DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT 1-131 1-131 CiIgm.
The primary consequence of this event is the release of radioactivity from the reactor coolant. The analysis also assumes a concurrent loss of power, from which the loss of circulating water through the condenser eventually results in the loss of condenser vacuum. Valves in the condenser bypass lines would automatically close to protect the condenser, thereby causing steam relief directly to the atmosphere from the steam generator PORVs or safety valves. This direct relief of activity from the ruptured tube would continue until the faulted steam generator is isolated.
        > 60 f,lCi/gm.
Additional releases due to primary to secondary LEAKAGE would continue from the SG PORVs or safety valves on the intact SGs until they were isolated.
60 SURVEI LLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE   REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SURVEI LLANCE                                    FREQUENCY FREQUENCY SR 3.4.16.1       Verify reactor coolant gross specific                   77 days days activity ~ 100/E     f,lCi/gm.
Since no fuel failures are assumed to occur from the event, the specific activity at the LCO limit, and the amount of coolant released would determine the radioactivity that was released to the atmosphere.
100/ jtCi/gm.
The safety analysis shows the radiological consequences of an SGTR accident are within the dose limits of 10 CFR50.67.
SR 3.4.16.2       ----------- --------NOTENOTE ------ ----- ---- -----
Operation with iodine specific activity levels greater than the LCO limit is permissible for 48 hours, if the activity level does not exceed 60 The permissible iodine level of 60 or less is acceptable because of the low probability of a SGTR accident occurring during the established 48 hour time limit. The occurrence of an SGTR accident at 60 would increase the calculated site boundary dose levels, but still be within 10 CFR 50.67 dose limits. Limits on RCS specific activity also ensure the radiation shielding design of the plant remains acceptable for plant personnel radiation protection.
Only required to be performed in MODE 1.
RCS specific activity satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement. (continued)
Verify reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALE EQUIVALENTNT      14 days 14  days 1-131 specific activity ~ 0.25 MCi/gm. f,lCi/gm.
B 3.4-99 Revision No. 26 BASES (Continued)
AND Between 22 and Between      and 66 hours hours after after aa THERMAL POWER change of of 15% RTP
LCO APPLICABILITY ACTIONS HBRSEP Unit No. 2 RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.16 The specific iodine activity is limited to 0.25 DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131, and the gross specific activity in the reactor coolant is limited to the number of equal to 100 divided by E (average disintegration energy of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies of the coolant nuclides).
                                                                                ~ 15%   RTP within aa 11 hour within        hour period period (continued)
The limits on DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 and gross specific activity ensure the 2 hour dose to an individual at the site boundary during the DBA will be less than the allowed dose. The SGTR accident analysis (Ref. 2) shows that the 2 hour site boundary dose levels are within acceptable limits. Violation of the LCO may result in reactor coolant radioactivity levels that could, in the event of an SGTR, lead to site boundary doses that exceed the 10 CFR 50.67 dose limits. In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with RCS average temperature 500&deg;F, operation within the LCO limits for DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 and gross specific activity are necessary to contain the potential consequences of an SGTR to within the acceptable site boundary dose values. For operation in MODE 3 with RCS average temperature  
(continued)
< 500&deg;F, and in MODES 4 and 5, the release of radioactivity in the event of a SGTR is unlikely since the saturation pressure of the reactor coolant is below the lift pressure settings of the main steam safety valves. A Note permits the use of the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.c. This allowance permits entry into the applicable MODE(S) while relying on the ACTIONS. This allowance is acceptable due to the significant conservatism incorporated into the specific activity limit, the low probability of an event which is limiting due to exceeding this limit, and the ability to restore transient specific activity excursions while the plant remains at, or proceeds to power operation. (continued)
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.
B 3.4-100 Revision No. 28 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 92. Given the following:  
No. 22                        3.4-46 3.4-46                        Amendment No.
-The plant is operating at 100% RTP. -APP-003-ES, PZR CONTROL HIILO LVL is illuminated.  
Amendment    No. 201 201
-APP-003-F4, CHG PMP HI SPEED is illuminated.  
 
-ALL Pressurizer Level channels indicate 47% Level. -RCS Pressure is 2215 PSIG and decreasing slowly. -T AVG is equal to T REF. Which ONE (1) of the following is the appropriate action? A. Implement AOP-015, SECONDARY LOAD REJECTION.
RCS RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity B
B. Implement AOP-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY LEAKAGE. C. Implement AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE. D. Implement AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL. 92 011 G2.4.50 OOllPZR L VL CONTROLl2/2/4.2/4.0ISROIHIGHl43.5INEW  
B 3.4.16 3.4.16 B
-20081PZR-008 Given the following:  
B 3.4 3.4 REACTOR REACTOR COOLANT COOLANT SYSTEM SYSTEM (RCS)
-The plant is operating at 100% RTP. -APP-003-ES, PZR CONTROL HIILO LVL is illuminated.  
(RCS)
-APP-003-F4, CHG PMP HI SPEED is illuminated.  
B B 3.4.16 3.4.16 RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity BASES BASES BACKGROUND          The LCO contains contains specific specific activity activity limits for for both DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 1-131 and gross specific activity in the reactor coolant.
-ALL Pressurizer Level channels indicate 47% Level. -RCS Pressure is 2215 PSIG and decreasing slowly. -T AVG is equal to T REF' Which ONE (1) of the following is the appropriate action? A. Implement AOP-015, SECONDARY LOAD REJECTION. Implement AOP-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY LEAKAGE. C. Implement AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE. D. Implement AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL. The correct answer is B. A: Incorrect -A Secondary load rejection would cause PZR level to increase and a Charging pump Low speed alarm would be illuminated.
coolant. The allowable levels are intended to limit the offsite dose to less than the limits of 10 CFR 50.67 for analyzed accidents.
B: Correct -ALL indications indicate an RCS leak is in progress.
APPLICABLE          The LCO limits on the specific activity of the reactor SAFETY ANALYSES    coolant ensure that the resulting offsite doses will not exceed the 10 CFR 50.67 dose limits following an analyzed accident. The limiting accident analysis used in establishing the specified activity limits is the SGTR.
C: Incorrect  
Other accidents, such as the Main Steam Line Break accident also use the limits from this LCO in the dose analysis. The SGTR dose analysis (Ref. 2) assumes the specific activity of the reactor coolant at the LCO limit and an existing reactor coolant steam generator (SG) tube leakage rate of 0.3 gpm.
-ALL PZR level channels indicate the same value, therefore NO instrument failure is in progress.
The analysis assumes the specific activity of the secondary coolant at its limit of 0.1 ~Ci/gm jiCi!gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 1-131 from LCO 3.7.15, "Secondary Secondary Specific Activity."
D: Incorrect
Activity.
-Pressure is decreasing due to a loss of inventory, NOT due to a pressure malfunction or accident.
(continued)
Exam Question Number: 92  
HBRSEP Unit HBRSEP Unit No.
No. 22                BB 3.4-98 3.4-98                         Revision No. 31 Revision      31
 
RCS RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity BB 3.4.16 3.4.16 BASES BASES APPLICABLE APPLICABLE          The The SGTR SGTR event event is is assumed assumed to to be be caused caused byby the the instantaneous instantaneous SAFETY ANALYSES SAFETY  ANALYSES    rupture rupture of of aa steam steam generator generator tube tube which which relieves relieves to to the the (continued)
(continued)        faulted steam faulted steam generator.
generator. TheThe primary primary consequence consequence of  of this this event is event is the the release release of of radioactivity radioactivity from from the the reactor reactor coolant.
coolant. TheThe analysis analysis also also assumes assumes aa concurrent concurrent lossloss ofof power, power, from from which which the the loss loss of of circulating circulating water water through through the the condenser condenser eventually eventually results results in in the the loss loss of of condenser condenser vacuum. Valves in  in the condenser condenser bypass bypass lines lines would automatically automatically close close to to protect protect the the condenser, condenser, thereby thereby causing steam causing steam relief directly to the atmosphere from     from the the steam steam generator PORVs or   or safety safety valves. This direct relief  relief of activity from the ruptured tube would continue until     until thethe faulted steam generator is isolated. Additional releases    releases due to primary to secondary LEAKAGE would continue from       from thethe SG PORVs or safety valves on the intact SGs until they       they were were isolated.
Since no fuel failures are assumed to occur from the       the event, event, the specific activity at the LCO limit, and the amount   amount of of coolant released would determine the radioactivity that was          was released to the atmosphere.
The safety analysis shows the radiological consequences consequences of  of an SGTR accident are within the dose limits of 10 CFR50.67. CFR5O.67.
Operation with iodine specific activity levels greater than        than the LCO limit is permissible for 48 hours, if the       the activity activity level does not exceed 60 jiCi/gm.
                                                  ~Ci/gm.
The permissible iodine level of 60 iCi/gm ~Ci/gm or less is  is acceptable because of the low probability of       of aa SGTR SGTR accident accident occurring during the established occurring                established 4848 hour time time limit.
limit. The The occurrence of an SGTR occurrence          SGTR accident at 60 60 tCi!gm          increase
                                                                ~Ci/gm would increase boundary dose levels, but the calculated site boundary                       but still still bebe within 10 within 10 CFR CFR 50.67 50.67 dose dose limits.
limits.
Limits on Limits on RCS RCS specific specific activity activity also ensure the radiation radiation shielding design shielding   design ofof the the plant  remains acceptable plant remains   acceptable for plantplant personnel radiation personnel   radiation protection.
protection.
RCS specific RCS specific activity activity satisfies satisfies Criterion Criterion 22 ofof the the NRC NRC Policy Statement.
Policy Statement.
(continued)
(continued)
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.
No. 22                    BB 3.4-99 3.4-99                         Revision No.
Revision    No. 26 26
 
RCS RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity BB 3.4.16 3.4.16 BASES (Continued)
BASES  (Continued)
LCO LCO                  The specific The   specific iodine iodine activity activity isis limited limited toto 0.25   iCi/gm DOSE 0.25 ~Ci/gm      DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT 1-131, 1-131, and and the the gross gross specific specific activity activity in in the the reactor    coolant is reactor coolant     is limited limited toto the the number number of    iCi/gm equal of ~Ci/gm    equal toto 100 100 divided divided byby E (average (average disintegration disintegration energy energy ofof the the sum sum of of the the average average beta beta andand gamma gamma energies energies ofof the the coolant coolant nuclides).
nuclides). The  The limits limits onon DOSE DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT 1-131 1-131 and and gross gross specific specific activity activity ensure ensure the the 22 hour hour dose dose to an individual at to an individual     at the site the    site boundary boundary during during the the DBA DBA will will be be less less than than the the allowed dose.
allowed    dose.
The The SGTR SGTR accident accident analysis analysis (Ref.
(Ref. 2)
: 2) shows shows that that the the 22 hour hour site site boundary boundary dose dose levels are are within within acceptable acceptable limits.
limits.
Violation of the LCO  LCO may result in reactor coolant radioactivity levels that could, could, inin the event event ofof an an SGTR, SGTR, lead to site boundary doses that exceed the 10 CFR 50.67          50.67 dose limits.
APPLICABILITY APPLICABILITY        In MODES 11 and 2, and in MODE 3 with RCS average temperature   temperature
                    ~  500&deg;F, operation within the LCO limits for DOSE EQUIVALENT    EQUIVALENT 1-131 and gross specific activity are necessary to contain        contain the potential consequences consequences of an SGTR to within the acceptable site boundary dose values.
For operation in MODE 33 with RCS average temperature
                    < 500&deg;F, and in MODES 44 and 5, the release of         of radioactivity radioactivity in the event of aa SGTR is unlikely since the saturation  saturation pressure of the reactor coolant is below the lift pressure settings of of the main steam safety valves.
ACTIONS ACTIONS                Note permits AA Note   permits the useuse of of the the provisions provisions ofof LCO LCO 3.O.4.c.
3.0.4.c.
This This allowance allowance permits permits entry entry into into the the applicable applicable MODE(S)
MODE(S) while relying while   relying onon the the ACTIONS.
ACTIONS. ThisThis allowance allowance is  is acceptable acceptable due to the significant conservatism due to the significant     conservatism incorporated incorporated into into the the activity limit, specific activity specific                limit, the the low low probability probability of of anan event event which is which    is limiting limiting duedue to to exceeding exceeding this this limit, limit, and and the the ability to ability   to restore restore transient transient specific specific activity activity excursions excursions while the while   the plant plant remains remains at,at, oror proceeds proceeds toto power power operation.
operation.
(continued)
(continued)
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.
No. 22                      3.4-100 BB3.4-100                               Revision No.
Revision     No. 28 28
 
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08     NRC Written Written ExamExam
: 92. Given
: 92. Given the the following:
following:
The plant
      - The
        -      plant isis operating operating at at 100%    RTP.
100% RTP.
APP-003-E8, PZR
      - APP-003-ES,
        -                    PZR CONTROL CONTROL HIILO       LVL isis illuminated.
HI/LO LVL      illuminated.
APP-003-F4, CHG
      - APP-003-F4,
        -                    CHG PMP PMP HIHI SPEED SPEED isis illuminated.
illuminated.
ALL Pressurizer
      - ALL
        -      Pressurizer Level Level channels channels indicate indicate 47%
47% Level.
Level.
RCS Pressure
      - RCS
        -      Pressure isis 2215      PSIG and 2215 PSIG     and decreasing decreasing slowly.
slowly.
      - TTAVG
        - AVG isis equal equal to to TTREF.
REF.
Which ONE Which  ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following is is the the appropriate appropriate action?
action?
Implement AOP-015, SECONDARY LOAD A. Implement                                        LOAD REJECTION.
B. Implement AOP-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY LEAKAGE.
C. Implement AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE.
D. Implement AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL.
92 92
 
011 G2.4.50 011 G2.4.50 OOllPZR 001/PZR LLVL      CONTROL/2/2/4.2/40/SRO/HIGHI43.5/NEW - 20081PZR-008 VL CONTROLl2/2/4.2/4.0ISROIHIGHl43.5INEW           - 20081PZR-008 Given the Given    the following:
following:
The plant
    - The
    -      plant is is operating operating at at 100%    RTP.
100% RTP.
APP-003-E8, PZR
    - APP-003-ES,
    -                    PZR CONTROL CONTROL HIILO         LVL isis illuminated.
HI/LO LVL       illuminated.
    - APP-003-F4, CHG
    -                    CHG PMPPMP HI HI SPEED SPEED is is illuminated.
illuminated.
Pressurizer Level
    - ALL Pressurizer
    -                        Level channels channels indicate indicate 47% Level.Level.
RCS Pressure
    - RCS
    -        Pressure is   is 2215 2215 PSIG PSIG and    decreasing slowly.
and decreasing     slowly.
    -T
    - TAvG AVG isis equal to TTREF.REF' Which ONEONE (1)  (1) of the following is is the appropriate action?
A. Implement AOP-015, SECONDARY LOAD REJECTION.
B B~  Implement AOP-016,AOP-01 6, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY LEAKAGE.
C. Implement AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE.
D. Implement AOP-019, AOP-01 9, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL.
The correct answer is B.
A: Incorrect - A Secondary load rejection would cause PZR level to increase and a Charging pump Low speed alarm would be illuminated.
B: Correct - -
ALL indications indicate an RCS leak is in progress.
C: Incorrect - ALL PZR level channels indicate the same value, therefore NO instrument failure is in progress.
D: Incorrect -   -   Pressure is decreasing due to a loss of inventory, NOT due to a pressure malfunction or accident.
Exam Question Number: 92


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
APP-003-E8 APP-003-ES and F4.
KA Statement:
Statement: Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in    in the alarm response manual.
History:
History: New New - Written for HLC-08
                  -                HLC-OS NRC NRC exam.
exam.
SRO SRO - Diagnosis
      - Diagnosis of    of plant  event, selection plant event,  selection ofof correct procedure procedure to to mitigate.
mitigate.


APP-003-ES and F4. KA Statement:
KA Name:
Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. History: New -Written for HLC-OS NRC exam. SRO -Diagnosis of plant event, selection of correct procedure to mitigate.
KAName:           PZR LVL PZR  LVL CONTROL CONTROL Tier/Group:
KAName: PZR LVL CONTROL Tier/Group:
Tier/Group:        2/2 2/2 Importance Rating:
2/2 Importance Rating: 4.2/4.0 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH lOCFR55.43 link: 43.5 Source: NEW -2008 Learning Objective:
Importance Rating: 4.2/4.0 4.2/4.0            RO/SRO Level:
PZR-008 PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL *** WILL REFLASH *** AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1. High Level energizes Back-up Group "A" and "B" Heaters CAUSE 1. Letdown, Charging mismatch 2. Malfunction of Level Control System 3. Plant transient  
RO/SRO   Level:    SRO SRO Cognitive Level:
"'5. Excessive RCS leakage 6. Channel failure OBSERVATIONS
Cognitive Level:   HIGH HIGH               10CFR55.43 link:
: 1. Pressurizer Level (LI-460, LI-461 and LI-459A) 2. Charging and Letdown Flow (FI-122A and FI-150) 3. Generator Load 4. Tavg ACTIONS 1. IF a load rejection has occurred, THEN Refer To AOP-015. 2. IF excessive RCS leakage exists, THEN Refer To AOP-016. APP-003-E8
10CFR55.43  link:  43.5 43.5 Source:
: 3. IF a level controller has failed, THEN manually adjust Charging and/or Letdown to maintain PZR level. 4. IF, a level channel failure has occurred, THEN refer to AOP-025. OEVICE/SETPOINTS
Source:           NEW - 2008 NEW   - 2008     Learning Objective:
: 1. LC-4590, LC-459E I 5% above or below program level POSSIBLE PLANT EFFECTS 1. PZR high or low level alarm (protection)
Learning Objective: PZR-008 PZR-008
REFERENCES
 
: 1. ITS LCO 3.4.9 2. AOP-015, Secondary Load Rejection
APP-003-E8 APP-003-E8 PZRPZRCONTROL CONTROLHI/LO Hl/LOLVLLVL    ***
: 3. AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage 4. AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure 4. OWP-030, Pressurizer Level Transmitters (PLT) 5. CWO B-190628, Sheet 459, Cables J, N, L I APP-003 Rev. 37 Page 46 of 531 ALARM CHG PMP HI SPEED AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1. Not Applicable CAUSE 1. Charging Pump Speed Control Failure
WILLREFLASH
* Controller failure (RTGB OR local)
                                      *** WILL   REFLASH***
* Air Pressure Regulator Failure 2. Low Pressurizer Level RCS leakage 4. Charging Pump recirculation valve open OR leaking OBSERVATIONS
AUTOMATICACTIONS AUTOMATIC       ACTIONS 1.1.      High Level High    Level energizes energizes Back-up Back-up Group Group"A"A and and "B" B Heaters Heaters CAUSE CAUSE 1.1.      Letdown, Charging Letdown,      Charging mismatch mismatch 2.2.     Malfunction of Malfunction         Level Control of Level Control System System 3.3.      Plant transient Plant    transient
: 1. Pressurizer Level (LI-460, LI-461 and LI-459A) 2. Charging and Letdown Flow (FI-122 and FI-150) 3. Charging Pump Recirculation Valves (local) ACTIONS 1. IF RCS leakage is indicated, THEN Refer To AOP-016. 2. IF required to maintain level, THEN start standby Charging pump(s). 3. Check RTGB Charging Pump Speed Controls for possible failure. 4. IF required, THEN dispatch operator to check Charging Pump Speed controller:
-5.
: 1) Speed control swing arm 2) Air Pressure Regulator for the affected Charging Pump
"'5.         Excessive RCS Excessive     RCS leakage leakage 6.6.     Channel failure Channel      failure OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS 1.1.     Pressurizer Level Pressurizer     Level (LI-460, (LI-460, LI-461 Ll-461 and and LI-459A)
* IA-3892, CHARGING PUMP A REGULATOR
Ll-459A) 2.
* IA-3897, CHARGING PUMP B REGULATOR
: 2.       Charging and Charging            Letdown Flow and Letdown    Flow (FI-122A (FI-122A and and FI-150)
* IA-3902, CHARGING PUMP C REGULATOR APP-003-F4 Page 1 of 2 3. IF Charging Pump Recirculation Valve is open OR leaking, THEN close the effected valve OR isolate the effected pump. 4. IF Charging Pump Speed Controller has failed, THEN perform either of the following:
Fl-150) 3.
* Operate pumps in manual to control Charging Flow (RTGB failure).
: 3.      Generator Load Generator      Load 4.
OR
: 4.       Tavg Tavg ACTIONS ACTIONS 1.1. IF a load rejection has occurred, THEN Refer To AOP-015.
* Stop the affected Charging Pump AND start a standby Charging Pump. I APP-003 Rev. 37 Page 48 of 531 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 93. Which ONE (1) of the following describes the basis for the limit of Oxygen permitted in each Waste Gas Decay Tank? Oxygen is maintained less than or equal to ... A. 6% to ensure carbon steel corrosion does NOT degrade the WGDT and allow radioactive gas release. B. 6% to ensure potentially explosive gas mixture is maintained below the flammability limit. C. 4% to ensure potentially explosive gas mixture is maintained below the flammability limit. D. 4% to ensure carbon steel corrosion does NOT degrade the WGDT and allow radioactive gas release. 93 071 G2.2.25 OOl/WASTE GAS DISPOSAL/2/2/3.2/4.2/SROfLOW/43.2INEW  
IF                                                        AOP-O1 5.
-2008/wD-008 Which ONE (1) of the following describes the basis for the limit of Oxygen permitted in each Waste Gas Decay Tank? Oxygen is maintained less than or equal to ... A. 6% to ensure carbon steel corrosion does NOT degrade the WGDT and allow radioactive gas release. B. 6% to ensure potentially explosive gas mixture is maintained below the flammability limit. 4% to ensure potentially explosive gas mixture is maintained below the flammability limit. D. 4% to ensure carbon steel corrosion does NOT degrade the WGDT and allow radioactive gas release. The correct answer is C. A: Incorrect
2.
-TRM 3.20, Condition B, Upper Oxygen limit, if exceeded, must immediately suspend ALL additions of Waste Gas AND restore compliance with the Oxygen limit. WGDT are carbon steel, but corrosion is NOT a concern. B: Incorrect  
: 2.      IF excessive IF excessive RCSRCS leakage exists, THEN Refer  Refer To AOP-016.
-TRM 3.20, Condition B, Upper Oxygen limit, if exceeded, must immediately suspend ALL additions of Waste Gas AND restore compliance with the Oxygen limit. Explosive mixture is the correct basis for limiting Oxygen concentration.
AOP-O1 6.
C: Correct -TRM 3.20, Condition A limits Oxygen :5. 4% to eliminate the hazard of Hydrogen and Oxygen combining to form an explosive mixture. D: Incorrect
3.
-TRM 3.20, Condition A limits Oxygen :5. 4%, but carbon steel corrosion is NOT a concern. Exam Question Number: 93  
: 3.       IF aa level IF    level controller controller has failed, THEN manually adjust Charging and/or Letdown to maintain PZR level.
PZR 4.
: 4.       IF, a level channel failure has occurred, THEN refer to AOP-025.
DEVICE/SETPOINTS OEVICE/SETPOINTS 1.
: 1.       LC-459D, LC-4590, LC-459E /I 5% above or below program level POSSIBLE POSSIBLE PLANT EFFECTS 1.
: 1. PZR PZR high high or or low low level level alarm alarm (protection)
(protection)
REFERENC REFERENCES   ES 1.
: 1.     ITS ITS LCO LCO 3.4.9 3.4.9 2.
: 2.     AOP-O1 AOP-015,  5, Secondary Secondary Load Load Rejection Rejection 3.
: 3.     AOP-016, AOP-016, Excessive Excessive Primary Primary Plant Plant Leakage Leakage 4.
: 4.      AOP-025, AOP-025, RTGB RTGB Instrument Instrument Failure Failure 4.
: 4.      OWP-030, OWP-030, Pressurizer Pressurizer Level Level Transmitters Transmitters (PLT)
(PLT) 5.5. CWD CWO B-190628, B-190628, Sheet Sheet 459, 459, CablesJ, Cables J, N, N, LL IAPP-003 APP-003                                                 Rev.
Rev. 37 37                        Page 46 Page   46 of 531 of 53
 
APP-003-F4 APP-003-F4 Page Page 11 ofof 22 ALARM ALARM CHG  PMP HI CHG PMP   HI SPEED SPEED AUTOMATIC ACTIONS AUTOMATIC      ACTIONS 1.
: 1.      Not Applicable Not   Applicable CAUSE CAUSE 1.
: 1.      Charging Pump Charging      Pump Speed Speed Control Control Failure Failure
* Controller failure Controller  failure (RTGB (RTGB OROR local) local)
* Air Pressure Air  Pressure Regulator Regulator Failure Failure 2.
: 2.     Low Pressurizer Low     Pressurizer Level Level
~3.      RCS leakage RCS    leakage 4.
: 4.      Charging PumpPump recirculation valve openopen OR leaking OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS
: 1.     Pressurizer Level (LI-460, LI-461 and LI-459A) 2.
: 2.      Charging and Letdown Flow (FI-122 (Fl-i 22 and FI-150)
Fl-i 50)
: 3.     Charging Pump Recirculation Valves (local)
ACTIONS ACTIONS 1.
: 1.      IF RCS leakage is indicated, THEN Refer To AOP-01 IF                                                      AOP-016. 6.
2.
: 2.     IF required to maintain level, THEN start standby Charging pump(s).
IF
: 3.     Check RTGB Charging Pump Speed Controls for possible failure.
: 4.     IF IF required, THEN dispatch operator to check Charging Pump Speed controller:
1)
: 1) Speed control swing arm 2)
: 2) Air Air Pressure Pressure Regulator Regulator for for the the affected affected Charging Pump  Pump
* IA-3892, IA-3892, CHARGING CHARGING PUMP PUMP A   A REGULATO REGULATOR       R
* IA-3897, IA-3897, CHARGING CHARGING PUMP PUMP BB REGULATO REGULATOR       R
* IA-3902, IA-3902, CHARGING CHARGING PUMP PUMP C   C REGULATO REGULATOR       R 3.
: 3. IF IF Charging Charging PumpPump Recirculation Recirculation Valve Valve is    open OR is open         leaking, THEN OR leaking,           close the THEN close     the effected effected valve valve OR OR isolate  the  effected  pump.
isolate the effected pump.
4.
: 4. IF IF Charging Charging PumpPump Speed Speed Controller Controller has hasfailed, failed, THEN      perform either THEN perform     either of of the the following:
following:
        **  Operate Operate pumps pumps inin manual manual to to control control Charging Charging FlowFlow (RTGB (RTGB failure).
failure).
OR OR
        **   Stop the Stop   the affected affected Charging Charging Pump Pump AND AND start start aa standby standby Charging Charging Pump.
Pump.
IAPP-003 APP-003                                                 Rev.
Rev. 37 37                                        Page 48 Page    48 of of 53 531
 
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08   NRC Written Written Exam Exam
: 93. Which ONE
: 93. Which  ONE (1)
(1) of of the the following following describes describes the the basis  for the basis for the limit limit of of Oxygen Oxygen permitted permitted in in each each Waste Gas Waste  Gas Decay     Tank?
Decay Tank?
Oxygen  is maintained Oxygen is maintained lessless than than or or equal equal to to ...
A. 6% to A. 6%  to ensure ensure carbon carbon steel  corrosion does steel corrosion does NOTNOT degrade degrade thethe WGDT and and allow allow radioactive radioactive gas release.
gas  release.
B. 6% to ensure B. 6%              potentially explosive ensure potentially    explosive gas  mixture is gas mixture       maintained below is maintained     below the the flammability flammability limit.
limit.
C. 4% to ensure potentially C.                  potentially explosive gas mixture mixture isis maintained maintained below below the flammability flammability limit.
limit.
D. 4% to ensure D.        ensure carbon steel corrosion corrosion does NOT degrade the WGDT and allow radioactive gas release.
gas  release.
93 93
 
071 G2.2.25 071  G22.25 OOl/WASTE 001/WASTE GAS  GAS DISPOSAL/2/2/3.2/4.2/SROfLOW/43.2INEW DISPOSAL/2/2/3.2/4.2/SRO/LOW/43.2INEW - 2008/wD-008
                                                                                  - 2008/WD-008 Which ONE Which    ONE (1)  (1) of of the the following following describes describes the the basis basis for for the the limit limit of of Oxygen Oxygen permitted permitted in in each each Waste   Gas   Decay Waste Gas Decay Tank?      Tank?
Oxygen isis maintained Oxygen       maintained less less than than or or equal equal to to ...
A. 6%
A. 6% toto ensure ensure carbon carbon steel    corrosion does steel corrosion does NOT NOT degrade degrade the the WGDT WGDT and  and allow allow radioactive radioactive release.
gas release.
gas B. 6% to ensure B. 6%                  potentially explosive ensure potentially       explosive gas gas mixture mixture is is maintained maintained belowbelow thethe flammability flammability limit.
limit.
c~
C 4% to ensure potentially explosive gas mixture is          is maintained below the flammability limit.
D. 4% to ensure carbon D.                      carbon steel corrosion corrosion does NOT NOT degrade degrade the WGDT and allow      allow radioactive radioactive gas release.
gas   release.
The correct answer is C.
incorrect - TRM 3.20, Condition B, Upper Oxygen limit, if exceeded, must immediately A: Incorrect    -
suspend ALL additions of Waste Gas AND restore compliance with the Oxygen limit. WGDT are carbon steel, but corrosion is NOT a concern.
B: Incorrect - TRM 3.20, Condition B, Upper Oxygen limit, if exceeded, must immediately suspend ALL additions of Waste Gas AND restore compliance with the Oxygen limit. Explosive mixture is the correct basis for limiting Oxygen concentration.
C: Correct - -    TRM 3.20, Condition A limits Oxygen :5.     <4%4% to eliminate the hazard of Hydrogen and Oxygen combining to form an explosive mixture.
incorrect - TRM 3.20, Condition A limits Oxygen :5.
D: Incorrect    -                                                <4%,
4%, but carbon steel corrosion is NOT a concern.
Exam Question Number: 93


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
TRM 3.20; TRM 3.20 BD.
KA Statement: Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam.
SRO - Knowledge of application of required actions of ITS.
      -                                                            ITS.
KA  Name:
KAName:                  WASTE GAS GAS DISPOSAL            Tier/Group:
Tier/Group:              2/2 2/2 Importance Importance Rating:
Rating:      3.2/4.2 3.2/4.2                          RO/SRO Level:
Level:        SRO SRO Cognitive Cognitive Level:
Level:        LOW LOW                                10CFR55.43 10CFR55.43 link:
link:      43.2 43.2 Source:
Source:                  NEW NEW - 2008
                                - 2008                    Learning Learning Objective:
Objective:    WD-008 WD-008
Waste Waste Gas Gas Decay Decay Tanks Tanks - Oxygen
                                                                      -  Oxygen Concentration Concentration 3.20 3.20 3.20 WASTE 3.20  WASTE GAS GAS DECAY DECAY TANKS TANKS - OXYGEN
                                  -  OXYGEN CONCENTRATION CONCENTRATION TRMS 3.20 TRMS  3.20          The The oxygen oxygen concentration concentration in  in the the four four Waste Waste Gas Gas Decay Decay Tanks Tanks (CTS (CTS 3. 16.4. 1) 3.16.4.1)      shall shall be be ~4%4%
                                .-.-.. by by volume.
volume.
APPLICABILITY:
APPLICABILITY:      At At all all times.
times.
COMPENSATORY MEASURES COMPENSATORY
-------------- --- ----------------NOTE  NOTE - ------- ----- -- -------- --- ------ ---------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each tank.
CONDITION                REQUIRED COMPENSATORY COMPENSATORY MEASURE        COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME A. Oxygen concentration            A.1      Restore compliance          48 hours in aa Waste Gas Decay                    with the requirements Tank > ~ by vol
            >4%          ume volume                  of TRMS.
and ~ 6% by volume.
B. Oxygen concentration          B.1      Suspend all additions        Immediately in aa Waste Gas Decay                    of waste gas to the Tank            volume.
Tank>> 6% by volume,                    affected tank.
AND B.2 B.2      Initiate action to          Immediately restore compliance with TRMS.
AND B.3 8.3      Reduce oxygen Reduce  oxygen              24 hours 24 concentration to concentration    to  ~  6%
6%
by volume.
by  volume.
(continued)
(continued)
HBRSEP Unit HBRSEP  Unit No.
No. 22                        3.20-1 3.20-1                            PLP-100 Rev.
PLP-100  Rev. 25 25
Waste Waste Gas Gas Decay Decay Tanks Tanks - Oxygen
                                                              -  Oxygen Concentration Concentration B
B 3.20 3.20 B
B 3.20 3.20 WASTE WASTE GAS GAS DECAY DECAY TANKS TANKS - OXYGEN
                                  - OXYGEN CONCENTRATION CONCENTRATION BASES BASES This This specification specification isis provided to ensure ensure that the concentration concentration ofof potentially explosive gas explosive  gas mixtures mixtures contained contained in in the Waste Gas Holdup System System is maintained below the below  the flammability flammability limits limits of of hydrogen hydrogen and and oxygen.
oxygen. This This is is accomplished accomplished byby maintaining the maintaining  the oxygen oxygen concentration concentration less less than 4%
4% through through procedural controls.
Maintaining the concentration of oxygen oxygen below the flammability limit provides assurance that the releases of radioactive materials will be controlled in assurance conformance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A        A to 10 CFR Part 50.
TR 3.20.1 specifies that monitoring be performed on the in-service tank, as that is the tank with the potential for changing gas concentrations.
concentrations.
Technical Specification Section 5.5.12, "Explosive Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program,"
Program, states that this program shall include concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen in the Waste Gas Decay Tanks limits for concentrations that are appropriate to the system's systems design criteria. By always requiring the  the oxygen concentration to be less than 4%, this TRM limit fully meets the requirement to establish appropriate limits for the concentration of the mixture of hydrogen and oxygen to preclude an explosive mixture.
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.
No. 22                  BB 3.20-1 3.20-1                      PLP-100 Rev.
PLP-100  Rev. 25 25


TRM 3.20; TRM 3.20 BD. KA Statement:
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08     NRC Written Written Exam Exam
Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam. SRO -Knowledge of application of required actions of ITS. KAName: WASTE GAS DISPOSAL Tier/Group:
: 94. Given the
2/2 Importance Rating: 3.2/4.2 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: LOW lOCFR55.43 link: 43.2 Source: NEW -2008 Learning Objective:
: 94. Given      the following:
WD-008 Waste Gas Decay Tanks -Oxygen Concentration 3.20 3.20 WASTE GAS DECAY TANKS -OXYGEN CONCENTRATION TRMS 3.20 (CTS 3. 16.4. 1) The oxygen concentration in the four Waste Gas Decay Tanks shall be 4% by volume. .-.-.. APPLICABILITY:
following:
At all times. COMPENSATORY MEASURES ---------------------------------
            - The
NOTE -----------------------------------------
            -     plant is The plant    is in in Mode Mode 66 forfor Refueling.
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each tank. CONDITION REQUIRED COMPENSATORY MEASURE COMPLETION TIME A. Oxygen concentration A.1 Restore compliance 48 hours in a Waste Gas Decay with the requirements Tank > by vol ume of TRMS. and 6% by volume. B. Oxygen concentration B.1 Suspend all additions Immediately in a Waste Gas Decay of waste gas to the Tank> 6% by volume. affected tank. AND -B.2 Initiate action to Immediately restore compliance with TRMS. AND -B.3 Reduce oxygen 24 hours concentration to 6% by volume. (continued)
Refueling.
HBRSEP Unit No. 2 3.20-1 PLP-100 Rev. 25 Waste Gas Decay Tanks -Oxygen Concentration B 3.20 B 3.20 WASTE GAS DECAY TANKS -OXYGEN CONCENTRATION BASES This specification is provided to ensure that the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in the Waste Gas Holdup System is maintained below the flammability limits of hydrogen and oxygen. This is accomplished by maintaining the oxygen concentration less than 4% through procedural controls.
Core offload
Maintaining the concentration of oxygen below the flammability limit provides assurance that the releases of radioactive materials will be controlled in conformance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. TR 3.20.1 specifies that monitoring be performed on the in-service tank, as that is the tank with the potential for changing gas concentrations.
            - Core
Technical Specification Section 5.5.12, "Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program," states that this program shall include limits for concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen in the Waste Gas Decay Tanks that are appropriate to the system's design criteria.
            -       offload is  is in progress with in progress            Fuel Assembly with aa Fuel Assembly on on the the Manipulator.
By always requiring the oxygen concentration to be less than 4%, this TRM limit fully meets the requirement to establish appropriate limits for the concentration of the mixture of hydrogen and oxygen to preclude an explosive mixture. HBRSEP Unit No. 2 B 3.20-1 PLP-100 Rev. 25 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 94. Given the following:
Manipulator.
-The plant is in Mode 6 for Refueling.
The Transfer Cart
-Core offload is in progress with a Fuel Assembly on the Manipulator.  
            - The
-The Transfer Cart is loaded with a fuel assembly, enroute to the SFP. -You are the Refueling SRO. It is reported to you that Refueling Cavity level has dropped ONE (1) foot in the last 5 minutes. Which ONE (1) of the following is the required action? Place the Fuel Assembly from the Manipulator in the ... A. RCC change fixture. B. core in it's original location.
            -                    Cart is   loaded with aa fuel is loaded          fuel assembly, assembly, enroute enroute to      SEP.
C. Upender. D. core in any location that is bordered by 2 other assemblies.
to the SFP.
94 G2.1.41 OOl/CONDUCT OF OPERATION/3/2.S/3.7/SROILOW/43.6INEW  
            - You are
-200S/AOP-020-004 Given the following:  
            -                  Refueling SRO.
-The plant is in Mode 6 for Refueling.  
are the Refueling ItIt is is reported reported toto you you that that Refueling Refueling Cavity   level has Cavity level  has dropped dropped ONE ONE (1)
-Core offload is in progress with a Fuel Assembly on the Manipulator.  
(1) foot in in the the last last 55 minutes.
-The Transfer Cart is loaded with a fuel assembly, enroute to the SFP. -You are the Refueling SRO. It is reported to you that Refueling Cavity level has dropped ONE (1) foot in the last 5 minutes. Which ONE (1) of the following is the required action? Place the Fuel Assembly from the Manipulator in the ... A. RCC change fixture. BY' core in it's original location.
minutes.
C. Upender. D. core in any location that is bordered by 2 other assemblies.
Which ONE (1) of the following is the required        required action?
The correct answer is B. A: Incorrect  
Place the Fuel  Fuel Assembly from the Manipulator Manipulator in the ...
-RCC Change fixture has a basket that is available to receive the fuel assembly.
A. RCC change fixture.
B. core in it's   its original location.
C. Upender.
D. core in any location that is bordered by 2 other assemblies.
94 94
 
G2. 1.41 OOl/CONDUCT G2.1.41  001/CONDUCT OF OPERATION/3/2.S/3.7/SROILOW/43.6INEW OPERATION/3/2.8/3 .7/SRO/LOW/43 .6/NEW - 200S/AOP-020-004
                                                                      - 2008/AOP-020-004 Given the following:
    - The plant is in Mode 6 for Refueling.
    - Core offload is in progress with a Fuel Assembly on the Manipulator.
    - The Transfer Cart is loaded with a fuel assembly, enroute to the SFP.
    - You are the Refueling SRO.
ft is reported to you that Refueling Cavity level has dropped ONE (1) foot in the last 5 minutes.
It Which ONE (1) of the following is the required action?
Place the Fuel Assembly from the Manipulator in the ...
A. RCC change fixture.
B core in it's BY'            its original location.
C. Upender.
D. core in any location that is bordered by 2 other assemblies.
The correct answer is B.
A: Incorrect - RCC Change fixture has a basket that is available to receive the fuel assembly.
Placing the assembly in the RCC Change fixture while losing Refueling Cavity level could result in the fuel assembly being uncovered and cause excessive radiation exposure.
Placing the assembly in the RCC Change fixture while losing Refueling Cavity level could result in the fuel assembly being uncovered and cause excessive radiation exposure.
B: Correct -Place the fuel assembly back in a location where subcritical configuration was known. C: Incorrect  
B: Correct - -      Place the fuel assembly back in a location where subcritical configuration was known.
-The Transfer Cart is enroute to the SFP. There is NO basket available to place the fuel assembly in. D: Incorrect  
C: Incorrect - The Transfer Cart is enroute to the SFP. There is NO basket available to place the fuel assembly in.
-Placing a fuel assembly in an unanalyzed core position could result in a loss of the required shutdown margin. Exam Question Number: 94  
D: Incorrect - Placing a fuel assembly in an unanalyzed core position could result in a loss of the required shutdown margin.
Exam Question Number: 94


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
AOP-020, Section B.
KA Statement: Knowledge of the refueling process.
History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam.
SRO - Knowledge of Refueling Procedures
KA Name:
KAName:            CONDUCT OF CONDUCT      OF OPERATION OPERATION Tier/Group:
Tier/Group:        33 Importance Rating:
Importance  Rating: 2.8/3.7 2.S/3.7                    RO/SRO Level:
RO/SRO  Level:      SRO SRO Cognitive Level:
Cognitive Level:    LOW LOW                        10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43  link:  43.6 43.6 Source:
Source:            NEW    - 2008 NEW - 200S                Learning Objective:
Learning Objective: AOP-020-004 AOP-020-004
Rev.
Rev. 29 29 AOP-020 AOP-020            LOSS OF LOSS      OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEATHEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
COOLING)
Page Page 25 25 of of 107 107 STEP H              INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I        RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
Section Section BB Loss Of Loss    Of RHR RHR Inventory Inventory - Vessel
                                                          -  Vessel Head Head Off Off (Page (Page 11 of of 9) 9)
1.1. Evacuate Non-essential Evacuate    Non-essential Personnel Personnel From Containment From  Containment As    As Follows:
Follows:
: a. Place
: a. Place the the VLCVLC Switch Switch inin the the EMERG  positio EMERG position      n
: b. Depress
: b. Depress and and hold hold CVCV EVACUATION HORN EVACUATION        HORN Pushbutton Pushbutton for 15 for  15 seconds seconds
: c. Announce
: c. Announce The  The Following Following Over Over Plant PA Plant    PA System:
System:
ALL NON-ESSENTIAL "ALL  NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL PERSONNEL EVACUATE      CV  UNTIL EVACUATE CV UNTIL FURTHER  FURTHER NOTICE NOTICE"
: d. Depress
: d. Depress and and hold CV EVACUATION HORN EVACUATION      HORN Pushbutton Pushbutton for 15 for  15 seconds seconds e.
: e. Repeat Repeat PA PA announ    cement announcement 2.
: 2. Check Check Status Status Of  Of Fuel Fuel Handli Handlingng            Go To Step 5.5.
Activi  ties - IN Activities      -
IN PROGRESS PROGRESS
Rev.
Rev. 29 29 AOP-020 AOP-020              LOSS OF LOSS      OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
COOLING)
Page  26 of Page 26  of 107 107 STEP H                  INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I        RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
Section Section BB Loss Of Loss    Of RHR RHR Inventory Inventory - Vessel
                                                            -  Vessel Head Head Off Off (Page (Page 22 ofof 9) 9)
3.
: 3. Notify Refueling Notify      Refueling Personnel Personnel To To Perform The Perform        The Following:
Following:
~a.      a. Place Place anyany fuel fuel assembly assembly in in transit in transit        in one one ofof the the follow  ing  locatio following locations:        ns:
            **      Original Core Original      Core location location
            **      Upender Upender
            **      Storage location Storage      location approved approved by  FMP-019.
by FMP-019. Fuel  Fuel and and Insert Shuffle Insert      Shuffle
: b. Place
: b. Place any any Reactor Reactor Vessel Upper or Upper      or Lower Internals Internals in transit in transit      in one of the following locations:
following      locations:
            **    Reacto Reactorr Vessel        (preferred Vessel (preferred locatio location)  n)
            **      Design Designatedated storage storage locatio location  n in in transfe transfer    canal r canal c.
: c. Verify Verify FuelFuel Transf Transferer Conve Conveyer yer Car Car Locati Location on - IN IN CONTAINM CONTAINMENTENT d.
: d. Verify Verify CV  CV Upend Upender er Positio Position n --
HORIZONT HORIZONTAL  AL 4.
: 4. Verify Verify CLOSED CLOSED The The SFPSFP GATE GATE VALVE VALVE 5.
: 5. Check Check Cavity Cavity SealSeal OR SandSand Plug Plug          Observe Observ    the NOTE e the  NOTE prior prior  to to Failure Failure - IN -
IN PROGRESS PROGRESS                          Step 14 Step  14 and and Go Go To To*Step Step  14.
14.
6.
: 6. Contac Contact  t Outage Outage Management Management For  For Assista    nce Assistance In      In Restor    ation Of Restoration      Of The The Cavity Cavity Seal Seal OR Sand Sand Plugs Plugs
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08          Written Exam NRC Written      Exam
: 95. Given the
: 95. Given  the following:
following:
RC personnel
      - RC
        -    personnel needneed toto use  Demin Water use Demin    Water for for decon decon activities activities for for aa spent spent fuel fuel cask.
cask.
They will
      - They
        -      will need need to    operate one to operate    one valve valve for for about about an    hour and an hour        will finish and will  finish before before shift shift turnover.
turnover.
The valve
      - The
        -    valve manipulation manipulation is is NOT NOT covered covered byby an an approved approved procedure.
procedure.
Which ONE Which  ONE (1)(1) of of the the following following describes describes how how thethe status status of of this this manipulation manipulation is  is controlled?
controlled?
procedure must A. A temporary procedure          must be be approved approved by        SSO prior by the SSO    prior to operation operation ofof the valve.
valve.
B. Enter the valve valve alignment in  in Start/Stop Log Log of Autolog.
Issue Caution C. Issue  Caution TagsTags for any any component thatthat will be be realigned.
realigned.
D. The portion of the system to be realigned must be taken out of service and controlled with Danger Tags.
95 95


AOP-020, Section B. KA Statement:
G2.2. 18 001IEQUIPMENT G2.2.18    001/EQUIPMENT CONTROLl3/2.6/3.9/SROIHIGHJ43.5IRNP CONTROL/3/2 .613.9ISROJHIGHI43 5/RNP AUDIT    AUDIT - 2001l0MM-001-11-002
Knowledge of the refueling process. History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam. SRO -Knowledge of Refueling Procedures KAName: CONDUCT OF OPERATION Tier/Group:
                                                                                        - 200 1/OMM-001 002 Given the Given    the following:
3 Importance Rating: 2.S/3.7 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: LOW lOCFR55.43 link: 43.6 Source: NEW -200S Learning Objective:
following:
AOP-020-004 Rev. AOP-020 LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING) Page INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Section B Loss Of RHR Inventory
RC personnel
-Vessel Head Off (Page 1 of 9) 1. Evacuate Non-essential Personnel From Containment As Follows: a. Place the VLC Switch in the EMERG position b. Depress and hold CV EVACUATION HORN Pushbutton for 15 seconds c. Announce The Following Over Plant PA System: "ALL NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL EVACUATE CV UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE" d. Depress and hold CV EVACUATION HORN Pushbutton for 15 seconds e. Repeat PA announcement
    - RC
: 2. Check Status Of Fuel Handling Activities
    -       personnel need need to to use  Demin Water use Demin   Water for for decon decon activities activities for for aa spent spent fuel fuel cask.
-IN PROGRESS Go To Step 5. 29 25 of 107 Rev. AOP-020 LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING) Page INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Section B Loss Of RHR Inventory
cask.
-Vessel Head Off (Page 2 of 9) 3. Notify Refueling Personnel To Perform The Following: Place any fuel assembly in transit in one of the following locations:
They will
* Original Core location
    - They
* Upender
    -         will need need toto operate operate oneone valve valve for for about about anan hour hour and and will    finish before will finish   before shift shift turnover.
* Storage location approved by FMP-019. Fuel and Insert Shuffle b. Place any Reactor Vessel Upper or Lower Internals in transit in one of the following locations:
turnover.
* Reactor Vessel (preferred location)
The valve
* Designated storage location in transfer canal c. Verify Fuel Transfer Conveyer Car Location -IN CONTAINMENT
    - The
: d. Verify CV Upender Position -HORIZONTAL
    -        valve manipulation manipulation is is NOT NOT covered covered by   an approved by an  approved procedure.
: 4. Verify CLOSED The SFP GATE VALVE 5. Check Cavity Seal OR Sand Plug Failure -IN PROGRESS 6. Contact Outage Management For Assistance In Restoration Of The Cavity Seal OR Sand Plugs Observe the NOTE prior to Step 14 and Go To*Step 14. 29 26 of 107 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 95. Given the following:
procedure.
-RC personnel need to use Demin Water for decon activities for a spent fuel cask. -They will need to operate one valve for about an hour and will finish before shift turnover.  
Which ONE Which     ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following describes describes how how the    status of the status   of this this manipulation manipulation is  is controlled?
-The valve manipulation is NOT covered by an approved procedure.
controlled?
Which ONE (1) of the following describes how the status of this manipulation is controlled?
A. A temporary procedure must be approved by                   the SSO prior by the        prior to operation operation of the valve.
A. A temporary procedure must be approved by the SSO prior to operation of the valve. B. Enter the valve alignment in Start/Stop Log of Autolog. C. Issue Caution Tags for any component that will be realigned.
B B~    Enter the valve alignment in Enter                                in Start/Stop Log of Autolog.
D. The portion of the system to be realigned must be taken out of service and controlled with Danger Tags. 95 G2.2.18 001IEQUIPMENT CONTROLl3/2.6/3.9/SROIHIGHJ43.5IRNP AUDIT -2001l0MM-001-11-002 Given the following:
Caution Tags for any component issue Caution C. Issue                                    component that will be be realigned.
-RC personnel need to use Demin Water for decon activities for a spent fuel cask. -They will need to operate one valve for about an hour and will finish before shift turnover.  
realigned.
-The valve manipulation is NOT covered by an approved procedure.
D. The portion of the system to be realigned must          must be taken out of service and controlled with Danger Tags.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes how the status of this manipulation is controlled?
The correct answer is B.
A. A temporary procedure must be approved by the SSO prior to operation of the valve. Enter the valve alignment in Start/Stop Log of Autolog. C. Issue Caution Tags for any component that will be realigned.
A: Incorrect - A temporary procedure is NOT appropriate for single valve operation unless water is to be introduced into a system or within a clearance boundary.
D. The portion of the system to be realigned must be taken out of service and controlled with Danger Tags. The correct answer is B. A: Incorrect -A temporary procedure is NOT appropriate for single valve operation unless water is to be introduced into a system or within a clearance boundary.
B: Correct Correct--         Autolog entry will provide the necessary tracking to ensure proper alignment of the valve.
B: Correct -Autolog entry will provide the necessary tracking to ensure proper alignment of the valve. C: Incorrect
incorrect - Would use caution tags if the alignment would be in effect past the end of the C: Incorrect    -
-Would use caution tags if the alignment would be in effect past the end of the shift. D: Incorrect  
shift.
-Portion of system component requires caution tags if out of position past the end of the shift. Exam Question Number: 95  
D: Incorrect - Portion of system component requires caution tags if out of position past the end of the shift.
Exam Question Number: 95


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
OMM-QOl OMM-001-11,  -11, Pages 23-25.
KA Statement: Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, etc.
History:
SRO - Knowledge of administrative processes for controlling equipment status.
KA  Name:
KAName:                  EQUIPMENT CONTROLCONTROL            Tier/Group:            33 Importance Importance Rating:
Rating:      2.6/3.9 2.6/3.9                            RO/SRO Level:
Level:        SRO SRO Cognitive Cognitive Level:
Level:        HIGH HIGH                                10CFR55.43 10CFR55.43 link:
link:      43.5 43.5 Source:
Source:                  RNP AUDIT RNP  AUDIT -2001
                                        - 2001              Learning Learning Objective:
Objective:      OMM-00I-II-002 OMM-001-11-002


OMM-001-11, Pages 23-25. KA Statement:
8.3.4.1 (Continued) 8.3.4.1 (Continued)
Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, etc. History: SRO -Knowledge of administrative processes for controlling equipment status. KAName: EQUIPMENT CONTROL Tier/Group:
                      ** The The performance performance of   of AOPs AOPs and and EOPs.
3 Importance Rating: 2.6/3.9 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH lOCFR55.43 link: 43.5 Source: RNP AUDIT -2001 Learning Objective:
EOPs.
OMM-00I-II-002 8.3.4.1 (Continued)
                      ** The    Critical Data The Critical   Data Entry Entry shall shall be    placed in be placed   in the the CO's COs Log Log AND AND completed when completed    when E&CE&C isis taking taking thethe daily daily RCS RCS Boron Boron Concentration samples.
* The performance of AOPs and EOPs.
Concentration    samples. This This will will ensure ensure the the most most accurate accurate data is data is recorded.
* The Critical Data Entry shall be placed in the CO's Log AND completed when E&C is taking the daily RCS Boron Concentration samples. This will ensure the most accurate data is recorded.
recorded.
8.3.5 Other Logs The WCC SRO verifies that AutoLog entries are made for: IOMM-001-11 (NCR 81962) -* The placing and lifting of clearances
8.3.5 8.3.5  Other Logs Other Logs 1.
          ~1.        The WCC The   WCC SRO SRO verifies verifies that that AutoLog AutoLog entries entries are are made made for:
for:
(NCR 81962)
(NCR   81962)                     -
* lifting of clearances The placing and lifting
* Clearance boundary changes
* Clearance boundary changes
* The implementation and closeout of MMM-042 to control equipment that is NOT within clearance boundaries while in Modes 1 and 2
* implementation and closeout of MMM-042 to control The implementation equipment that is NOT within clearance boundaries while in Modes 11 and 2
* The Caution Tag number for MMM-042 controlled components that are not restored by the end of shift 2. The AOs, MWT AO, and FPAO maintain a narrative log to summarize the major evolutions performed, equipment status, and turnover items. This log is to be maintained in chronological sequence.
* The Caution Tag number for MMM-042 controlled components that are not restored by the end of shift
Log entries may include, but are not limited to, the following: (ACR 94-01584)
: 2. The AOs, MWT AO, and FPAO maintain a narrative log to summarize the major evolutions performed, equipment status, and turnover items. This log is to be maintained in chronologica  chronologicall sequence. Log entries may include, but are not limited to, the following: (ACR 94-01 94-01584) 584)
* Date
                      **  Date Date
* Starts/stops/trips of equipment controlled by the watch station, with a brief description of the reason. Manual starts/stops which are documented by initialing an approved procedure need not be logged. Example: 0957: Started Waste Gas Compressor "A" for observation by Engineering.
* Starts/stops/t  rips of Starts/stops/trips   of equipment equipment controlled controlled byby the watch station, station, with with a brief brief description description of of the the reason.
Rev. 39 Page 23 of 631 IOMM-001-11 8.3.5.2 (Continued)
reason. Manual Manual starts/stops starts/stops which  are documented which are     documented by  by initialing initialing an an approved approved procedure procedure need need not not bebe logged.
* Completion of procedures
logged.
* Change of auxiliary system and configuration.
Example:
* Surveillance tests started and completed.
Example: 0957:
Example: 0016: Completed partial OST-679 to return Detector number 16-10 to service.
0957: Started Started Waste Waste Gas  Gas Compressor Compressor A  "A" for for observation observation by by Engineering.
* Instrument or equipment malfunctions or failures.
Engineering.
The entry should include the time the component is removed from service, a brief description of the problem, any compensatory actions taken, and the number of any Work Request written. Example: 0330: Monitor Tank Pump "B" has excessive packing leakage. WR 99-ABCD1 was written and the pump was removed from service per Clearance 99-00395.Unusual trends or conditions observed.
OMM-001 -11 IOMM-001-11                                  Rev.
Rev. 3939                                    Page 23 Page   23 of of 63 631
 
(Continued) 8.3.5.2 (Continued) 8.3.5.2
                **  Completion of Completion     of procedures procedures
                ** Change of Change    of auxiliary auxiliary system system and  configuration.
and configuration.
                ** Surveillance tests Surveillance    tests started started and and completed.
completed.
Example: 0016:
Example:      0016: Completed Completed partial partial OST-679 OST-679 to to return return Detector Detector number 16-10 number    16-10 to service.
* Instrument or equipment malfunctions or failures. The entry    entry should include the time the component is      is removed from service, a brief description of the problem, any compensatory compensatory actions taken, and the number of any Work Request written.
Example: 0330: Monitor Tank Pump "B"         B has excessive packing leakage. WR 99-ABCD1 was written and the pump was removed from service per Clearance 99-00395.Unusual trends or conditions observed.
99-00395.Unusual
* Starting and stopping of Gaseous or Liquid Waste Releases (list Waste Release Permit Number).
* Starting and stopping of Gaseous or Liquid Waste Releases (list Waste Release Permit Number).
* Annunciators received that are not the result of operator action or are not expected as a result of evolutions in progress (such as surveillance tests, clearing of equipment or equipment manipUlation).
* Annunciators received that are not the result of operator action or are not expected as a result of evolutions in progress (such as surveillance tests, clearing of equipment or equipment manipulation). It is acceptable to use a rough log for the manipUlation).
It is acceptable to use a rough log for the accumulation of recurring annunciators and to document these annunciators as a single log entry near the end of shift.
accumulation of recurring annunciators and to document these annunciators as a single log entry near the end of shift.
* When annunciators are received and none of the actions specified in the APP are taken in response to the alarm because it is determined that none of the prescribed actions would be effective in eliminating the diagnosed cause, then the basis for not taking the prescribed actions should be logged. This basis should include the plant conditions, diagnosis of the event, conclusions of the diagnosis, and any alternate actions that are taken or justification for taking no actions at all.
* When annunciators are received and none of the actions specified in the APP are taken in response to the alarm because it is determined that none of the prescribed actions would be effective in eliminating the diagnosed cause, then the basis for not taking the prescribed actions should be logged. This basis should include the plant conditions, diagnosis of the event, conclusions of the diagnosis, and any alternate actions that are taken or justification for taking no actions at all.
* The performance of Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs), Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and any Fire Brigade response.
* The performance of Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOP5),    (AOPs),
Rev. 39 Page 24 of 631 8.3.5 (Continued)
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and any Fire Brigade response.
: 3. I OMM-001-11 Component manipulations which are NOT part of an approved procedure are to be entered as a component out of position entry in AutoLog. IF a component will remain out of its normal position past shift turnover, THEN a Caution Tag shall be installed, unless the evolution being performed is turned over on station. For turnover-on-station, the on coming watchstander must receive any applicable pre-job briefs prior to acceptance of an evolution in progress. (CR 96-00309) (NCR 16863) (NCR 26491) a. A PRR should be initiated to provide procedural guidance for components out of their normal position that meet any of the following critera:
OMM-001-1 1 IOMM-001-11                                Rev.
* involve safety related equipment
Rev. 39 39                            Page Page 24 24 of of 63 631
* involve complex tasks
 
* are frequently performed Components that are out of their normal position are entered into the Component Out of Position Log (Start/Stop Log) in AutoLog. This Log was originally used to document starting and stopping plant equipment in AutoLog. Although it is no longer used for this function, it is still labeled as the Start/Stop Log in the AutoLog program due to software limitations.
8.3.5 (Continued) 8.3.5   (Continued) 3.3. Componentmanipulations Component           manipulationswhich    whichare  areNOTNOTpartpartofofan  anapproved approved proced    ure  are   to  be procedure are to be entered as   entered    asaacomponent componentout    outofofposition position entry entry inin AutoLog.
Use of this log allows positive tracking of components that are out of their normal position during a and over shift turnover.
AutoLog. IF   IFaacomponent componentwill    will remain remain out outofof its its normal  position normal position pastshift past   shiftturnover, turnover, THEN THEN aaCaution Caution Tag   Tag shall shall bebe installed, instaNed, unless unless the evolution the   evolution being being performed performed isis turned turned over overon      station.
The component Out of ---7 Position Log @art/Stop Log) is solely for the purpose of tracking component manipulations that are performed the direction of an approved procedurgJNCR 16863 (CAPR)] c. Components out of their normal position SHALL be approved by the CRSS or SSO. d. The CRSS/SSO is responsible for ensuring that components out of their normal position are entered into the Component Out of Position Log (Start/Stop Log), and are subsequently removed from the log when they are restored to their normal positions.
on station. ForFor turnover-on-station, the turnover-on-station,            the on on coming coming watchstander watchstandermust      must receive receive any any applicable pre-job applicable       pre-job briefs briefs prior prior to to acceptance acceptance of       an   evolution of an evolution in    in progress. (CR progress.        (CR 96-00309) 96-00309) (NCR (NCR 16863) 16863) (NCR (NCR 26491) 26491) a.a. AA PRRPRR should should be  be initiated initiated to  to provide provide procedural procedural guidance guidance for components for    components out     out ofof their their normal normal position position thatthat meet any meet     any of  the    follow  ing of the following critera:: critera
Rev. 39 Page 25 of 631
                                  ** involve involve safety safety related related equipment equipment
: 1. G2.1.18 0011///////
                                  **     involve complex involve      complextask  taskss
QUESTIONS REPORT for AUDIT HP needs to use Demin water for decon activities for a spent fuel cask. They will need to operate one valve for about an hour and will finish before shift turnover.
                                  **    are frequently are   frequently performed performed
The valve manipulation is not covered by an approved procedure.
                      ~b.          Components that are out of their normal Components                                          normal position position are are entered into  into the Component Component Out of Position    Position Log (Start/Stop (Start/Stop Log) in AutoLog.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes how the status of this manipulation is controlled?
AutoLog. This Log was originally    originally used to document document starting and stopping starting            stopping plant equipment equipment in AutoLog.
A. A Temporary procedure must be approved by the SSO prior to operation of the valves. By Place a Position Tracking rubber stamp for the alignment in Autolog C. Issue Caution Tags for any component that will be realigned D. The portion of the system to be realigned must be taken out of service and controlled with Danger Tags B is correct. Would use caution tags if the alignment would be in effect past the end of the shift Common Question 067 Tier 3 KIA Importance Rating -RO 2.9/ SRO 2.9 Ability to make accurate, clear and concise logs, records, status boards, and reports. Reference(s)  
AutoLog. Although Although it is no longer used for this function,    function, it is still labeled as    as the the Start/Stop Log in the AutoLog Start/Stop                        AutoLog programprogram due to softwaresoftware limitations. Use of this log allows positive limitations.                                                    tracking positive trackin        of g of components that are out of their normal components                                                    position normal positio      n during aa during shift s~ift  and   over   shift turnov turnover.             component er. The compo        nent Out of   of
-OMM-001-11, pg 22 Proposed References to be provided to applicants during examination  
                          ---7 Positio Position   n Log @art/Stop   to      Log) is solely for the purpos Lo)                            purpose     of e of trackin tracking g compo component nent manip manipulations ulations    that   are  performed are performed withou
-None Learning Objective  
                                  ~hout      t the the directi    on of direction   of anan approv approved     procedurgJNCR edproc      edu[NCR 1686        3(CAPR)]
-Question Source -New Question History -Question Cognitive Level -Comprehension 10 CFR Part 55 Content -41 Comments -Category 1: Category 3: Category 5: Category 7: Saturday, June 14, 2008 8:41 :25 AM Category 2: Category 4: Category 6: Category 8: 1 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 96. Given the following:  
16863 (CAPR)]
-An operator is restoring the CV Spray System alignment following major maintenance.  
c.
-During system restoration, an operator found a valve which was inside the Clearance boundary out of alignment.  
: c.     Compo Components nents out out of of their their norma normall positio position n SHALSHALL    be L be approv approved   ed byby the the CRSS CRSS or    or SSO.
-It is believed that the valve was inadvertently moved during maintenance activities.  
SSO.
-There are other valves within the Clearance boundary within close proximity to the mispositioned valve. What minimum procedural actions are REQUIRED by OMM-001-8, CONTROL OF EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEM STATUS? A. Establish a multidiscipline team to establish the cause and determine required actions. B. Verify ONLY the mispositioned valve is returned to the correct position lAW the system Operating Procedure.
d.
: d.      The The CRSS/
CRSS/SSO SSO isis respon responsiblesible forfor ensurin ensuring     that g that compo        nents components out of   out  of their their norma normall positio positionn areare entered entered into into the the Compo Component nent OutOut of of Positio Position n LogLog (Start/S (Start/Stop     Log),
top Log), and and are are subseq      uently remov subsequently         removed       from    the  log  when ed from the log when they are   they  are restore restored d to to their their norma normal     positions.
l positio    ns.
IOMM-  001 -1 1 OMM-001-11                      I                  Rev.
Rev.3939 I                      Page25 Page     25ofof63 I
631
 
QUESTIONSREPORT QUESTIONS          REPORT f0rAU for AUDITDIT 1.1 . G2.1.180011///////
G2.1.18    OO1////IIII HPHPneeds needstotouse  useDemin Deminwater  waterforfordecon deconactivities activitiesforforaaspent spentfuel fuelcask.
cask. They Theywill willneed need totooperate operateone  onevalve valvefor foraboutaboutan an hour hourandandwill willfinish finishbefore before shift turnover. Thevalve shift  turnover. The   valve manipulation isisnot manipulation              notcovered coveredby    byanan approved approvedprocedure.
procedure.
Which ONE Which      ONE (1)  (1) of of the the following following describes describes howhow thethe status status of of this this manipulation manipulation isis contro controlled?lled?
A. AA Temporary A.        Temporary procedureprocedure must    must be be approved approved by by the the SSO SSO prior prior toto operation operation of of the the valves valves. .
BY Place By     Place aa Position Position Tracking Tracking rubberrubber stamp stamp for for the the alignment alignment inin Autolog Autolog C. Issue C. Issue Caution Caution Tags Tags for  for any any component component that that will will be be realigned realigned D. The D. The portion portion of  of the the system system to   to be be realigned realigned must must be  be taken taken out out of of service service and and contro  lled controlled with with Danger Danger Tags Tags BB is  correct. Would is correct. Would use caution tags if the alignment      alignment would be in effect past      past the the end end of of the shift the  shift Common Question Common        Question 067 Tier 33 Tier K/A Importance KIA   Importance Rating - RO 2.9/  -        2.9 / SRO 2.9 Ability to Ability      make accurate, to make       accurate, clear and concis    concisee logs, records, records, status boardsboards,, and reports reports..
Refere    nce(s) - OMM-Reference(s)        -            001 -11, pg 22 OMM-001-11, Propos Proposed   ed Refere Referencesnces to be     be provid  ed to applica provided       applicants     during examin nts during    examination ation - None None Learni    ng  Object Learning Objective -    ive    -
Questi Question on Source Source - New-New Questi    on  Histor Question History -     y  -
Questi Question on Cognit Cognitive ive Level Level - Compr
                                                      -          ehension Comprehension 10  CFR    Part  55  Conten 10 CFR Part 55 Content - 41       t  -  41 Comm Comments ents - -
Category Category 1:1:                                                    Category Category 2:2:
Category Category 3:3:                                                    Category Category4:4:
Category Category5:5:                                                     Category Category6:6:
Category Category7:7:                                                    Category Category8:8:
: Saturday, Saturday,JuneJune14,14,2008 20088:41:28 8:41 :25AM AM                                                                                       1
 
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08     NRC Written Written Exam Exam
: 96. Given the
: 96. Given     the following:
following:
An operator
      - An
        -        operator is is restoring restoring the the CV CV Spray Spray System  alignment following System alignment   following major major maintenance.
maintenance.
During system
      - During
        -            system restoration, restoration, an  operator found an operator found aa valve valve which which was was inside inside the the Clearance Clearance boundary out of alignment.
boundary
      - ItIt is
        -     is believed believed that the valve was inadvertently inadvertently moved moved during maintenance maintenance activities.
activities.
There are
      - There
        -                other valves are other valves within within the  Clearance boundary the Clearance   boundary within within close close proximity proximity toto the the mispositioned valve.
minimum procedural What minimum         procedural actions are REQUIRED REQUIRED by  by OMM-001-8, 0MM-CO 1 -8, CONTROL CONTROL OF  OF EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEM STATUS?
EQUIPMENT A. Establish a multidiscipline team to establish the cause and determine required actions.
B. Verify ONLY the mispositioned valve is returned to the correct position lAW the system Operating Procedure.
C. Initiate a full system lineup lAW the system Operating Procedure.
C. Initiate a full system lineup lAW the system Operating Procedure.
D. Initiate a valve lineup for ALL valves within the Clearance boundary lAW the system Operating Procedure.
D. Initiate a valve lineup for ALL valves within the Clearance boundary lAW the system Operating Procedure.
96 02.2.15 001IEQUIPMENT CONTROL/3/3.9/4.3/SRO/LOW/43.3/NEW  
96 96
-2008/0MM-001-8-002 Given the following:  
 
-An operator is restoring the CV Spray System alignment following major maintenance.  
G2.2. 15 001IEQUIPMENT 02.2.15     00 1/EQUIPMENT CONTROL/3/3.9/4.3/SRO/LOW/43.3/NEW CONTROL/3/3 .9/4.3ISROILOWI43 .3/NEW - 2008/0MM-001-8-002
-During system restoration, an operator found a valve which was inside the Clearance boundary out of alignment.  
                                                                                - 2008/OMM-00 1-8-002 Given the Given          following:
-It is believed that the valve was inadvertently moved during maintenance activities.  
the following:
-There are other valves within the Clearance boundary within close proximity to the mispositioned valve. What minimum procedural actions are REQUIRED by OMM-001-8, CONTROL OF EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEM STATUS? A. Establish a multidiscipline team to establish the cause and determine required actions. B. Verify ONLY the mispositioned valve is returned to the correct position lAW the system Operating Procedure.
    - An
C. Initiate a full system lineup lAW the system Operating Procedure.
      - An operator operator isis restoring restoring the    CV Spray the CV           System alignment Spray System       alignment following following major major maintenance.
01' Initiate a valve lineup for ALL valves within the Clearance boundary lAW the system Operating Procedure.
maintenance.
The correct answer is D. A: Incorrect  
During system
-OMM-001-8 specifies that a multidiscipline team be established to determine the cause if the cause is unknown and CANNOT be quickly determined.
    - During
B: Incorrect  
    -              system restoration, restoration, anan operator operator found found aa valve valve which which was was inside inside the the Clearance Clearance boundary out boundary        out of  alignment.
-If the cause of the mispositioning can be clearly identified, a single valve lineup is allowed. The stem does NOT clearly identify the cause. C: Incorrect -A full valve lineup is to be performed if the cause of the mispositioning is unknown and CANNOT be quickly determined.
of alignment.
A full valve lineup is NOT required because the valve is within the Clearance boundary.
    - ItIt is
D: Correct -OMM-001-8 specifies that a valve lineup of valves within the Clearance boundary is to be performed if maintenance activities were performed on valves within the Clearance boundary, and it is believed that those maintenance activities caused the mispositioning.
    -     is believed believed that that the the valve valve was was inadvertently inadvertently moved moved during during maintenance maintenance activities.
Exam Question Number: 96  
activities.
There are
    - There
    -            are other other valves valves within within the the Clearance Clearance boundary boundary within within close close proximity proximity to    the to the mispositioned valve.
mispositioned        valve.
What minimum minimum procedural procedural actions actions are are REQUIRED REQUIRED by      by OMM-001-8, OMM-OO1-8, CONTROL CONTROL OF    OF EQUIPMENT AND EQUIPMENT            AND SYSTEM SYSTEM STATUS?
STATUS?
A. Establish a multidiscipline multidiscipline team to establish establish the cause and determine determine required required actions.
B. Verify ONLY B.              ONLY the the mispositioned mispositioned valve is  is returned returned to the the correct correct position position lAW lAW the the system system Operating Procedure.
Initiate a full system lineup lAW the system Operating Procedure.
C. Initiate D Initiate a valve lineup for ALL valves within the Clearance boundary lAW the system 01' Operating Procedure.
The correct answer is D.
OMM-OO1-8 specifies that a multidiscipline A: Incorrect - OMM-001-8
                  -                                      multidiscipline team be established to determine the cause if the cause is unknown and CANNOT be quickly determined.
B: Incorrect - If the cause of the mispositionin mispositioning g can be clearly identified, a single valve lineup is allowed. The stem does NOT clearly identify the cause.
C: Incorrect - A full valve lineup is to be performed if the cause of the mispositionin
                  -                                                                          mispositioning g is unknown and CANNOT be quickly determined. A full valve lineup is NOT required because the valve is within the Clearance boundary.
D: Correct -
D:              -    OMM-OO1 OMM-001-8    -8 specifies that a valve lineup lineup of valves within the Clearance boundary is  is to be be performed ifif maintenance maintenance activities were performed performed on valves within within the the Clearance boundary, and   and itit is is believed believed that that those those maintenance maintenance activities activities caused caused thethe mispositionin mispositioning.g.
 
Exam Question Exam     Question Number:
Number: 96   96
 
==Reference:==
OMM-001-8,


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
OMM-OO1-8, Page      Page 17.
17.
KA  Statement: Ability KA Statement:      Ability to to determine determine the the expected expected plant plant configuration configuration using using design design and and configuration control configuration      control documentation, documentation, such such as  drawings, line-ups, as drawings,  line-ups, tag-outs, tag-outs, etc.
etc.
History: New History:  New - Written
                  - Written forfor HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC Exam.
Exam.
SRO - Requires SRO    - Requires analysis analysis of  of plant plant events events and and administrative administrative processes processes and and determination determination ofof required actions.
required    actions.
KA  Name:
KA Name:                EQUIPMENT CONTROL EQUIPMENT        CONTROL          Tier/Group:
Tier/Group:        33 Importance Rating:
Importance  Rating:    3.9/4.3 3.9/4.3                            RO/SRO RO/SRO Level:
Level:    SRO SRO Cognitive  Level:
Cognitive Level:        LOW LOW                                10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43  link:  43.3 43.3 Source:
Source:                NEW - 2008 NEW      - 2008                    Learning Objective:
Learning Objective: OMM-001-8-002 OMM-O0l-8-002


OMM-001-8, Page 17. KA Statement:
8.5.6 8.5.6 Mispositioned Valves Mispositioned    Valves
Ability to determine the expected plant configuration using design and configuration control documentation, such as drawings, line-ups, tag-outs, etc. History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam. SRO -Requires analysis of plant events and administrative processes and determination of required actions. KA Name: EQUIPMENT CONTROL Tier/Group:
        ~1. 1. When aa valve When          valve in in any any plant plant system system isis found found mispositioned, mispositioned, aa full full system      lineup  (including  independent system lineup (including independent verification verification where where applicable) shall applicable)      shall be be performed performed lAW JAW thethe appropriate appropriate OP OP with with the the following exemptions:
3 Importance Rating: 3.9/4.3 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: LOW lOCFR55.43 link: 43.3 Source: NEW -2008 Learning Objective:
following      exemptions:
OMM-001-8-002 8.5.6 Mispositioned Valves When a valve in any plant system is found mispositioned, a full system lineup (including independent verification where applicable) shall be performed lAW the appropriate OP with the following exemptions:
7 .*    IF the IF the component component waswas i~side inside aacearance clearance boundary boundary in in which which maintenance      was  being maintenance was being performed performed and and it~elieved it is believed that.
IOMM-001-8
that itit became misaligned gecame       misaligned during during that that time, THEN only timeTHE              the portion iytF    portion of of the   OP   dealing with the OP dealing with the  the valves valves inside inside that that clearance clearance boundary boundary need be need      be performed.
: 7. IF the component was a clearance boundary in which maintenance was being performed and that. it gecame misaligned during that time, THEN only the portion of the OP dealing with the valves inside that clearance boundary need be performed.
performed.
* Portions of the system that are known to be properly aligned due to normal system operation or performance of OSTs do not need to have their positions verified lAW the OP.
* Portions of the system that are known to be properly aligned due to normal system operation or        or performance of OSTs do need to have their positions verified lAW the OP.
not need
* Components whose positions can be determined from the RTGB (via switch positions or permissive/
* Components whose positions can be determined from the RTGB (via switch positions or permissive/
status lights) do not need to have their positions verified lAW an OP.
permissive! status lights) do not need to have their positions verified lAW an OP.
* IF the cause of the mispositioning can be clearly identified, THEN the scope of the lineup can be restricted to those valves subject to the same cause.
* mispositioning can be clearly identified, IF the cause of the mispositioning THEN the scope of the lineup can be restricted to            to those valves subject to the same cause.
* IF the cause of the mispositioning can NOT be immediately identified, THEN it is recommended that a multi-disciplined team (Event Review Team) be established to assist in determining the cause. 2. IF it is believed that the valve was deliberately mispositioned or tampered with, THEN Operational Response to Deliberate Acts Against Plant Equipment in this procedure should be reviewed for applicability (NRC IN 96-71). Rev 38 Page 17 of 491 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 97. Given the following:  
* IF the cause of the mispositioning mispositioning can NOT be immediately identified, THEN it is recommended recommended that a multi-disciplined multi-disciplined team (Event Review Team) be established to assist in determining the cause.
-The plant is operating at 100% RTP. -SI Pump "A" is INOPERABLE due to an emergent problem with repairs estimated to take 48 hours. -An audit of completed surveillance procedures has determined the last quarterly surveillance on SI Pump "C" was missed. Which ONE (1) of the following describes the appropriate action? A. Initiate an Operability Determination on SI Pump "C". B. Perform a Safety Function Determination.
: 2. IF it is believed that the valve was deliberately mispositione mispositioned d or tampered with, THEN Operational Response to Deliberate Acts Against Plant Equipment in this procedure should be reviewed for applicability (NRC IN 96-71).
C. Demonstrate the operability of SI Pump "c" within 24 hours OR be in MODE 4 within 13 hours. D. Demonstrate the operability of SI Pump "c" within 72 hours OR be in MODE 3 within 6 hours. 97 02.2.36 OOllEQUIPMENT CONTROL/3/3.114.2/SRO/LOW/43.2/SALEM  
f  OMM-OO1 -8 IOMM-001-8                  I              Rev Rev 38 38                                  Page 17 Page  17 ofof 49 491 I
-2001lITS INTRO-005 Given the following:  
 
-The plant is operating at 100% RTP. -SI Pump "A" is INOPERABLE due to an emergent problem with repairs estimated to take 48 hours. -An audit of completed surveillance procedures has determined the last quarterly surveillance on SI Pump "c" was missed. Which ONE (1) of the following describes the appropriate action? A. Initiate an Operability Determination on SI Pump "C". B. Perform a Safety Function Determination.
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08    NRC Written Written Exam Exam
C'r Demonstrate the operability of SI Pump "c" within 24 hours OR be in MODE 4 within 13 hours. D. Demonstrate the operability of SI Pump "c" within 72 hours OR be in MODE 3 within 6 hours. The correct answer is C. A: Incorrect  
: 97. Given the
-Inappropriate application of operability determination procedure OPS-NGGC-130S.
: 97. Given   the following:
B: Incorrect  
following:
-Inappropriate application of TS S.S.1S. C: Correct -Conditions in excess of LCO (TWO ECCS trains inoperable), refer to LCO 3.0.3. Enter TS 3.0.3, but operability of SI Pump C can be demonstrated within 24 hours per SR 3.0.3, since the action statement is less than 24 hours. D: Incorrect  
      - The
-Represents inappropriate application of TS 3.S.2, Condition A.
        -        plant isis operating The plant        operating atat 100%
Exam Question Number: 97  
100% RTP.
RTP.
      - SI
        - SI Pump Pump "A"A isis INOPERABLE INOPERABLE due       to an due to  an emergent emergent problem problem with with repairs repairs estimated estimated to to take take 48 hours.
48  hours.
      - An
        -  An audit audit of of completed completed surveillance surveillance procedures procedures has has determined determined the the last last quarterly quarterly surveillance on surveillance      on SISI Pump Pump "C"   was missed.
C was missed.
Which ONE Which     ONE (1)(1) ofof the the following following describes describes the the appropriate appropriate action?
action?
Initiate an A. Initiate       Operability Determination an Operability     Determination onon SI SI Pump Pump "C".
C.
Perform a Safety Function Determination.
B. Perform C. Demonstrate the operability of SI Pump "c"         C within 24 hours OR OR be in MODE 4 within 13 hours.
D. Demonstrate the operability of SI Pump "c"         C within 72 hours OR be in MODE 3 within 6 hours.
97 97
 
G2.2.36 OOllEQUIPMENT 02.2.36   00 1/EQUIPMENT CONTROL/3/3.114.2/SRO/LOW/43.2/SALEM CONTROL/3/3. 1/4.2/SROILOW/43 .2/SALEM - 2001lITS
                                                                                - 2001/ITS INTRO-005 INTRO-005 Given the Given    the following:
following:
The plant
    - The
    -        plant isis operating operating at at 100%
100% RTP.
RTP.
    - SI
    -  SI Pump Pump "A"           INOPERABLE due A isis INOPERABLE       due to an emergent to an  emergent problem problem with with repairs repairs estimated estimated to to take take 48 hours.
48  hours.
    - An
    -  An audit audit of of completed completed surveillance surveillance procedures procedures has     determined the has determined    the last last quarterly quarterly surveillance on surveillance      on SI     Pump "c" SI Pump        was missed.
C was   missed.
Which ONE Which      ONE (1)  (1) of of the the following following describes describes the the appropriate appropriate action?
action?
Initiate an A. Initiate     an Operability Operability Determination Determination on     SI Pump on SI  Pump "C".
C.
Perform aa Safety B. Perform B.                    Safety Function Function Determination.
Determination.
C'r   Demonstrate the C Demonstrate            the operability operability of of SI Pump "c" SI Pump    C within 2424 hours hours OROR be be in in MODE MODE 44 within 13 13 hours.
D. Demonstrate the operability of SI Pump "c"             C within 72 hours OR be in MODE 3 within 6 hours.
The correct answer is C.
A: Incorrect - Inappropriate application of operability determination
                  -                                                    determination procedure OPS-NG GO-i 305.
OPS-NGGC-130S.
B: Incorrect - Inappropriate application of TS S.S.1S.
                  -                                          5.5.15.
C: Correct -   -      Conditions in excess of LCO (TWO ECCS trains inoperable), refer to LCO 3.0.3.
Enter TS 3.0.3, but operability of SI Pump C can be demonstrated within 24 hours per SR 3.0.3, since the action statement is less than 24 hours.
D: Incorrect - Represents inappropriate application of TS 3.5.2, 3.S.2, Condition A.
 
Exam Question Exam   Question Number:
Number: 97  97
 
==Reference:==
ITS


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
ITS 3.0.3; 3.0.3; SRSR 3.0.3;  ITS 5.5.15; 3.0.3; ITS  5.5.15; ITSITS 3.5.2; 3.5.2; OMM-007, OMM-007, OPS-NGGC-1305, OPS-NGGC-1305, Page  Page 77 and 8.
and  8.
KA  Statement: Ability KA Statement:            to analyze Ability to  analyze the the effect effect ofof maintenance maintenance activities, activities, such such as as degraded degraded power power sources, on sources,    on the the status status ofof limiting limiting conditions conditions for for operations.
operations.
History:
History:
SRO  - Requires a 'from SRO - Requires                memory application from memory'      application of Tech Tech Specs Specs in      situation where TS in a situation        TS 3.0.3 3.0.3 is is but the 24 hour applied but          hour exception exception perper SR SR 3.0.3 will also apply. The SRO    SRO has has to determine    the appropriate appropriate  course  of  action.
KA Name:
KAName:              EQUIPMENT CONTROL                    Tier/Group:          3 Importance Rating:    3.1/4.2 3.114.2                              RO/SRO Level:        SRO Cognitive Level:    LOW                                    10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43            43.2 Source:              SALEM - 2001 Learning Objective:  ITS INTRO-005


ITS 3.0.3; SR 3.0.3; ITS 5.5.15; ITS 3.5.2; OMM-007, OPS-NGGC-1305, Page 7 and 8. KA Statement:
LCO LCO Applicability Applicability 3.0 3.0 3.0 LIMITING 3.0   LIMITING CONDITION CONDITION FOR FOR OPERATION OPERATION (LCO) (LCO) APPLICABILITY APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.1 LCO    3.0.1          LCOs shall LCOs    shall be be met met during during thethe MODES MODES oror other other specified specified conditions conditions intheA in the App    1i cabi 1ility, pplicab      ity, except except as as provi providded ed in in LCO LCO 3.0.2 3.O.2a andnd3.0.7 3.0.7..
Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.
LCO 3.0.2 LCO    3.0.2          Upon di Upon    discov scoveryery ofof aa fai 1ure to failure    to meet meet an an LCO, LCO, the the Requi Requirred ed Acti Actiononss of the of   the associated associated Conditions Conditions shallshall be be met, met, except      as  provided except as provided in LCO in    LCO 3.0.5 3.0.5 and and LCO LCO 3.0.6.
History: SRO -Requires a 'from memory' application of Tech Specs in a situation where TS 3.0.3 is applied but the 24 hour exception per SR 3.0.3 will also apply. The SRO has to determine the appropriate course of action. KAName: EQUIPMENT CONTROL Tier/Group:
3.0.6.
3 Importance Rating: 3.114.2 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: LOW lOCFR55.43 link: 43.2 Source: SALEM -2001 Learning Objective:
If the If  the LCO LCO isis met met or or is is no no longer longer applicable applicable priorprior toto expiration expiration of the of  the specified specified Completion Completion Time(s),
ITS INTRO-005 LCO Applicability 3.0 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.1 LCO 3.0.2 LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.4 HBRSEP Unit No. 2 LCOs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the App 1 i cabi 1 ity, except as provi ded in LCO 3.0.2 and 3.0.7. Upon di scovery of a fai 1 ure to meet an LCO, the Requi red Acti ons of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.0.5 and LCO 3.0.6. If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Time(s), completion of the Required Action(s) is not required unless otherwise stated. When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associ ated ACTIONS, the uni t shall be placed ina MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable.
Time(s), completion completion of  of the the Required Required Action(s)
Action shall be i niti ated withi n 1 hour to pl ace the unit, as appl i cabl e, in: a. MODE 3 within 7 hours; b. MODE 4 within 13 hours; and c. MODE 5 within 37 hours. Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.
Action(s) is    is not not required required unless        otherwise unless otherwise stated.stated.
Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LCO or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required.
LCO 3.0.3 LCO  3.0.3          When an LCO is not    not met and the associated associated ACTIONS ACTIONS are are notnot met, met, associated ACTION is not provided, an associated                              provided, or  or if if directed        by directed by the the associaated associ    ted ACTIONS, the uni    unitt shall be placed ina    in a MODE MODE or or other other specified condition specified      condition in which the LCO is not applicable. applicable. Action Action shall be    i nitiatedwi beiniti    ated withi    n 1 hour to pl thinl                ace the place  the unit, unit, asas appl  i cabl applica      e, ble, in:
LCO 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES I, 2, 3, and 4. When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made: (continued) 3.0-1 Amendment No. 203 SR Applicability 3.0 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.1 SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.3 HBRSEP Unit No. 2 SRs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for individual LCOs, unless otherwise stated in the SR. Failure to meet a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the Survei 11 ance or between performances of the Survei 11 ance , shall be failure to meet the LCD. Failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency shall be failure to meet the LCD except as provided in SR 3.0.3. Surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment or variables outside specified limits. The specified Frequency for each SR is met if the Surveillance is performed within 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured from the previous performance or as measured from the time a specified condition of the Frequency is met. For Frequencies specified as "once," the above interval extension does not apply. If a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a "once per ... " basis, the above Frequency extension applies to each performance after the initial performance.
in:
Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.
: a.     MODE 33 within 77 hours;
If it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the LCD not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is less. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the Surveillance. (continued) 3.0-4 Amendment No. 203 Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.13 5.5.14 '7 5.5.15 Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program (continued)
: b.      MODE 44 within 13    13 hours; and c.
: b. Acceptability of fuel oil for use by testing the following parameters at a 31 day frequency:
: c.      MODE MODE 55 within 37        hours.
API or specific gravity, viscosity, water and sediment, and cloud point. The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program surveillance frequencies.
37 hours.
Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program This program provides controls for processing changes to the Bases of these Technical Specifications.
Except Exceptions ions to to this this Specif Specification ication are are stated stated in  in the the individ individualual Specif Specifications.
: a. Changes to the Bases of the TS shall be made under appropriate administrative controls and reviews. b. Licensees may make changes to Bases without prior NRC approval provided the changes do not involve either of the foll owing: 1. a change in the TS incorporated in the license; or 2. a change to the updated FSAR or Bases that requires NRC approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. c. The Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure that the Bases are maintained consistent with the UFSAR. d. Proposed changes that meet the criteria of Specification 5.5.14b above shall,bereviewed and approved by the NRC prior to implementation.
ications.
Changes to the Bases implemented without prior NRC approval shall be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.l1(e).
Where Where correct corrective       measures ive measu            are comple res are    completed     that permit ted that      permit operati operationon in in accord accordance       with the ance with      the LCO LCO oror ACTIONS, ACTIONS, comple completion tion ofof the the actions actions require required d byby LCO LCO 3.0.3 3.0.3 is is not not require required.d.
Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) This program provides controls to ensure loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions taken. Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other appropriate actions HBRSEP Unit No. 2 5.0-20 (continued)
LCO LCO 3.0.3 3.0.3 is is only only applica applicable ble in  in MODES MODES 1,I, 2,2, 3,3, and and 4.4.
Amendment No. 212 Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.15 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) (continued) may be taken as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Condition and Required Actions. This program implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6. a. The SFDP shall contain the following:
LCO LCO 3.0.4 3.0.4          When When an an LCO LCO isis not not met, met, entry entry intointo aa MODE MODE oror other other specifi specifieded conditi condition in the Applic on    in  the  Applicability         shall only ability shall       only bebe made:
: 1. Provisions for cross train checks to ensure a loss of the capability to perform the safety function assumed in the accident analysis does not go undetected;
made:
: 2. Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a loss of function condition exists; 3. Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support system inoperabilities; and 4. Other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions. b. A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed.
(continued)
For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and: 1. A required system redundant to the system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or 2. A required system redundant to the system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or 3. A required system redundant to the support system(s) for the supported systems described in b.l and b.2 above is also inoperable.
(contin  ued)
: c. The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered. HBRSEP Unit No. 2 5.0-21 (continued)
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.
Amendment No. 212
No. 22                            3.0-1 3.0-1                                Amendment No.
*-ECCS -Operati ng 3.5.2 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.2 ECCS-Operating LCO 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE.
Amendment        No. 203 203
APPLICABILITY:
 
MODES 1. 2. and 3 ...........................
SR SR Applicability AppHcability 3.0 3.0 3.0 SURVEILLANCE 3.0    SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT (SR) (SR) APPLICABILITY APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.1 SR   3.0.1            SRs SRs shall shall be be met met during during the the MODES MODES or or other other specified specified conditions conditions inin the the Applicability Applicability for  for individual individual LCOs, LCOs, unless unless otherwise otherwise stated stated in      the SR.
NOTES* ... --. -. -.........  
in the   SR. Failure Failure to to meet meet aa Surveillance, Surveillance, whether whether such such failure failure is  is experienced experienced during during thethe performance performance of   of the the Survei   11 ance or Surveillance        or between between performances performances of  of the the Survei   11 ance , shall Surveillance,      shall be be failure failure to to meet meet the the LCD.
-...... . 1. In MODE 3. one cold leg safety injection (SI) pump flow path may be isolated by closing the isolation valves for up to 24 hours to perform pressure isolation valve testing per SR 3.4.14.1.
LCO. Failure Failure toto perform perform aa Surveillance Surveillance within within the the specified specified Frequency Frequency shall shall bebe failure failure to to meet meet the the LCD LCO except except as as provided provided inin SR   3.0.3. Surveillances SR 3.0.3. Surveillances do    do not not have have to to bebe performed performed on on inoperable inoperable equipment equipment or  or variables variables outside outside specified specified limits.
: 2. Operation in MODE 3 with one required SI pump declared inoperable pursuant to LCO 3.4.12. "Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System." is allowed for up to 4 hours or until the temperature of all RCS cold legs exceeds 375&deg;F. whichever comes first. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more trains A.1 Restore train(s) to 72 hours inoperable.
limits.
OPERABLE status. AND At least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available.
SR 3.0.2 SR  3.0.2            The The specified specified Frequency Frequency forfor each each SR SR is is met met ifif the the Surveillance Surveillance is performed within 1.25     1.25 times times the interval interval specified specified in in the the Frequency, Frequency,      as   measured   from the previous performance performance or    or as as measured from the time a specified  specified condition of     of the the Frequency Frequency is met.
B. One valve identified B.1 Verify control power is Immediately in SR 3.5.2.1 or SR removed to all valves 3.5.2.7 with control identified in SR power or air 3.5.1.5. restored.
For Frequencies specifiedspecified as "once,"
AND (continued)
once, the aboveabove interval interval extension does not apply.
HBRSEP Unit No. 2 3.5*4 Amendment No. 176   
If a a Completion Time requires periodic performance    performance on   on aa "once once per . . . " basis, the above Frequency extension applies
                            .  .  .                                                    applies to to each each performance after the initial performance   performance..
Exceptions to this Specif  Specification           stated in ication are stated       in the the individual individual Specif Specifications.
ications.
SR SR 3.0.3 3.0.3            If it If   it is is discovered discovered thatthat aa Surveillance Surveillance was was not not performed performed within within its specifi its    specified     Frequency, then ed Frequency,      then compliance compliance with with the the requirement requirement to declare to  declare the       LCD not the LCO    not met met maymay be be delayed, delayed, from from the the time time ofof discovery, up discovery,       up to to 24   hours or 24 hours    or up up to to the the limit limit of of the the specifi specified ed Frequency, whichever Frequency,        whichever is is less.
less. ThisThis delay delay period period is is permitted permitted allow performance to allow to            performance of of the the Surveillance.
Surveillance.
(continued)
(continued)
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.
No. 22                          3.0-4 3.04                              Amendment No.
Amendment       No. 203 203
 
Programs Programs and and Manuals Manuals 5.5 5.5 5.5 Programs 5.5   Programs andand Manuals Manuals 5.5.13 5.5.13        Diesel Fuel Diesel     Fuel OilOil Testing Testing Program Program (continued)
(continued) b.b. Acceptability of Acceptability      of fuel fuel oil oil forfor use use by by testing testing thethe following following parameters at parameters    at aa 31 31 day day frequency:
frequency:
API or API  or specific specific gravity, gravity, viscosity, viscosity, water water andand sediment, sediment, and  and cloud point.
cloud    point.
The provisions The    provisions of  of SR SR 3.0.2 3.0.2 and and SRSR 3.0.3 3.0.3 are are applicable applicable to    to the the Diesel Fuel Diesel    Fuel Oil Oil Testing Testing Program Program surveillance surveillance frequencies.
frequencies.
5.5.14 5.5.14        Technical Specifications Technical      Specifications (TS) (IS) Bases Bases Control Control Program Program This program This    program provides provides controls controls for for processing processing changes changes to to the the Bases Bases of of   these Technical Specifications.
Specifications.
a.
: a.      Changes to the Bases of the TS shall be made under           under appropriate administrative appropriate     administrative controls controls and reviews.
: b.     Licensees may make changes to Bases without      without prior prior NRCNRC approval provided the changes do not involve      involve either either of  of the the follow foll owing:
ing:
: 1. aa change in the TS incorp incorporated         the license; orated in the     license; or   or
: 2. aa change to the updated FSAR or Bases that         that require requiress NRC NRC pursuant approval pursua      nt to 10 CFR 50.59.
c.
: c. The Bases Control ProgramProgram shall contain contain provis provisions ions to  to ensure ensure that the Bases are mainta maintained     consistent ined consis          with the tent with    the UFSAR.
UFSAR.
d.
: d. Proposed Proposed changes changes that that meet meet thethe criteria criteria ofof Specif Specification ication 5.5.14 5.5.14b     above shallbe b above  shall,bereviewed reviewed and and approved approved by by the the NRCNRC prior prior to to implementat implementation.       Changes to ion. Changes       to the the Bases Bases implemented implemented withou withoutt prior prior NRC NRC approval approval shall shall be be provided provided to to the the NRCNRC on on aa frequency frequency consist consistent     with 10 ent with     10 CFR CFR 50.71(
50.l1(e).
e).
' 7 5.5.15 5.5.15        Safety Safety Function Function Determinatio Determination     Program (SFDP) n Program    (SFDP)
This This program program provid provides   controls es contro    ls toto ensure ensure loss loss ofof safety safety functio functionn is  detecte is detected d andand approp appropriate     actions taken.
riate actions      taken. Upon Upon entry entry intointo
[CO LCO 3.0.6, 3.0.6, an an evalua evaluation   shall be tion shall      be made made to to determine determine if  if loss loss ofof safety safety functio function   exists. Additi n exists.      Additionally,       other approp onally, other      appropriate       actions riate actions (continued)
(contin  ued)
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.
No. 22                          5.0-20 5.0-20                             Amendment      No.
Amendment No. 212     212
 
Programs Programs and and Manuals Manuals 5.5 5.5 5.5 Programs 5.5    Programs andand Manuals Manuals 5.5.15 5.5.15        Safety Function Safety      Function Determination Determination Program Program (SFDP)
(SFDP) (continued)
(continued) may be may    be taken taken as as aa result result ofof the the support support system system inoperability inoperability and  and corresponding exception corresponding          exception to  to entering entering supported supported system Condition system    Condition and  and Required Actions.
Required      Actions. This  This program program implements implements thethe requirements requirements of  of LCO 3.0.6.
LCO    3.0.6.
a.a. The SFDP The    SFDP shall shall contain contain thethe following:
following:
1.1.     Provisions Provisions for for cross cross train train checks checks toto ensure ensure aa loss loss of of the capability the  capability to  to perform perform the the safety safety function function assumed assumed in the in the accident accident analysis analysis does does not not go go undetected; undetected; 2.
: 2.       Provisions Provisions for  for ensuring ensuring the plant is maintained in         in aa safe condition safe   condition if if aa loss of of function function condition         exists; condition exists;
: 3.       Provisions Provisions to ensure that an inoperableinoperable supported supported system's systems Completion Time is not inappropriately inappropriately extended as a result of multiplemultiple support support system system inoperabilities; inoperabilities; and
: 4.       Other appropriate appropriate limitations limitations and remedial or    or compensatory compensatory actions.
actions.
: b.     AA loss of safety functio  functionn exists when, assuming assuming no no concur concurrent rent single failure, failure, a  a safety functio functionn assumed assumed in     the in the accide accident       analysis nt analys  is cannot be performed. For     For the the purpose purpose of  of this program, aa loss of safety functio    function   may exist n may   exist when when aa suppor supportt system is inoper  inoperable, able, and:
1.
: 1.      AA require required     system redundant to the d system                    the system system(s)     supported (s) suppor    ted by the by   the inoper inoperable     supportt system able suppor      system isis also also inoper inoperable; able; oror 2.
: 2. AA require required     system redundant d system     redundant toto the the system system(s)
(s) inin turn turn supported suppor  ted byby the the inoper inoperable   supported able suppor        system is ted system     is also also inoperable; inoper  able; or or 3.
: 3. AA require required     system redundant d system    redundant toto the the suppor supportt  system(s) system   (s) for the for    the suppor supported     systems describ ted systems     described ed inin b.1 b.l   and b.2 and    b.2 above is above      is also also inoper inoperable.
able.
c.
: c. The The SFDP SFDP identif identifies     where aa loss ies where      loss of of safety safety functio function     exists.
n exists.
If If aa loss loss ofof safety safety functio function   is determined n is   determined to  to exist exist by by this this program, program, the   the approp appropriate     Conditions and riate Conditions    and Required Required Actions Actions of  of the     LCO in the LCO      in which which thethe loss loss ofof safety safety functio function   exists are n exists      are require required   d to   be entered to be  entered..
(continued)
(contin  ued)
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.
No. 22                              5.0-21 5.0-21                          Amendment    No.
Amendment No. 212   212
 
ECCS ECCS - Opera ti ng Operating 3.5.2 3.5.2 3.5 3.5 EMERG      ENCYY CORE EMERGENC    CORE COOLIN COOLINGG SYSTEM SYSTEMS S (ECCS)
(ECCS) 3.5.2 3.5.2 ECCS       -Operrating ECCSOpe      ating LCO LCO 3.5.2 3.5.2          Two ECCS ECCS train trains shall shall be OPERA OPERABLEBLE..
APPLI CABILITY:         MODES MODES 1. 1, 2.
2, and 3
                            ...... ...... ...... ...... ... NOTES  NOTES * ... - -. -. -..... .... -..... . .
1.
: 1. In MODE 3. 3, one cold leg safety safety injec tion (SI) pump flow path may be isolat          ed by closin isolated               g the isolat closing               ion isolation valves valves for up to 24 hours    hours to perfor    m pressure perform isolat  ion valve isolation     valve testin testing g per SR 3.4.14.1.
: 2. Opera      tion in MODE 3 with one requir Operation                                          ed SI pump required declar declareded inope    rable inoperab    le pursu  ant to LCO 3.4.12.
pursuant "Low Low Temp Tempera erature ture Overp    ressur Overpress    e Prote ure          ctionn (LTOP)
Protectio System System.  ." is allowe allowed   d for up to 4 hours hours or until the tempe    rature temperatu    re of all RCS cold legs excee          ds exceeds 375&deg;F 375&deg;F,. which    everr comes first.
whicheve                first.
ACTIO  NS ACTI ONS
*-              CONDI  TION CONDITION                             REQUIR REQUIRED ED ACTION ACTION               COMPL  ETIONN TIME COMPLETIO A. One or more trains trains          A.1 Resto Restore re train (s) to               72 hours inope  rable.
inoperab  le.                                                                    hours OPERA OPERABLEBLE status.
AND At least 100% of the ECCS flow equiv      alentt equivalen to aa single    OPERAABLE single OPER    BLE ECCS train availa      ble.
available.
B.           valvee iden One valv      identtified ified              Verify B.1 Veri          contro fy cont  roll power is in SR 3.5.2.1 or SR                                                             Imme Imm    diately ediat ely removeedd to all valv remov                  valveess 3.5.2.7 .7 with cont contro roll            identtified iden    ified in SR power or air                           3.5.1.5. .5.
restorred.
resto    ed.
AND (conti (con    nued) tinue d)
HBRSE HBRS EPP Unit Unit No.
No. 22                            3.5*4 3.5-4                              Amendment No. 176 Amend              176
 
,~8.88.8    Loss  of Safety Loss of  Safety Function Function Worksheet Worksheet [CAPR
[CAPR 193057]
193057] {TC { TC "Loss Loss Of Of Safety Safety Function Function
                                \l 2 }}
Worksheet \f\f CC \1"2" Worksheet" NOTE:
NOTE:          These instructions These        instructions do    do not not supersede supersede any  any instructions instructions contained contained in  in the the TRM  regarding  how      to  perform TRM regarding how to perform aa Safety          Safety Function Function Determination Determination (SFD). (S ED). These These instructions supplement instructions  supplement the      the TRM TRM instructions instructions and and provide provide an      aid in an aid  in completing completing the  the Loss Loss of Safety  Function    (LOSE) of Safety Function (LOSF) Worksheet. Worksheet.
This determination This  determination shouldshould be    be performed performed by by aa licensed licensed Senior Senior Reactor Reactor Operator Operator and  and reviewed any reviewed        time additional any time    additional inoperabilities inoperabilities occur occur OR OR an an ITS ITS Supported Supported Feature Feature isis declared  inoperable.
declared inoperable.
8.8.1 8.8.1    Complete plant Complete          plant conditions conditions table.
table.
8.8.2 8.8.2    Record the ITS Record                    Support Feature ITS Support    Feature which is    is inoperable inoperable by  by ITS ITS LCO LCO number number and describe the inoperability.
inoperability.
8.8.3    Determine if the ITS Support Feature inoperability causes an ITS Supported Feature to not meet its LCO AND record as applicable.
8.8.4    IF no ITS Supported Feature is inoperable due to the ITS Support Feature being inoperable, THEN perform the following:
: 1.          N/A the remaining steps and sign Completed By.
: 2.          Forward the attachment to the SSO for review.
: 3.          IF the Support Feature will NOT be returned to service prior to end of shift, THEN attach the LOSE      LOSF Worksheet to the EIR for the ITS Support Feature.
4.
: 4.          IF IF the Support Support Feature Feature will be be returned to  to service prior prior to to end end ofof shift, shift, THEN file LOSE  LOSF Worksheet in      in EIR EIR notebook.
notebook.
8.8.5 8.8.5    Determine Determine ifif ITS    ITS Support Support Features Feature's LCO LCO requires CASCADIN "CASCADING"    G to to ITS ITS Supported Supported Feature(s)Feature(s)    REQUIRED        ACTION and ACTION      and record record as as applicable.
applicable.
1.
: 1.          IF IF ITS ITS Support Support Features Feature's LCO LCO requires requires CASCADIN "CASCADING"    G toto ITS ITS Supported Supported Feature(s)
Feature(s) REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION,  ACTION, THEN  THEN the the SFD SFD is  is complete.
complete.
2.
: 2.          N/A the N/A    the remaining remaining steps steps and and sign sign Completed Completed By. By.
3.
: 3.          Forward Forward the  the attachment attachment to  to the the SSO SSO for for review.
review. Attach Attach thethe LOSE LOSF Worksheet Worksheet to    to the the EIR EIR for for the the ITS ITS Support Support Feature.
Feature.
OMM-007 IOMM-007                                              Rev. 76 Rev. 76                                        Page 25 Page    25 of  85\
of 85
 
8.8.6 8.8.6    Determine ififany Determine          anyother otherITSITS Support Support LCOs LCOs are  are not not met, met, and and record record the the impact impact of  ofthe the inoperabilities inoperabilities on  on all all applicable applicable ITS  ITS Supported Supported Features.
Features.
8.8.7 8.8.7  Determine ifif any Determine          any redundant redundant ITS ITS Supported Supported FeaturesFeatures are are inoperable.
inoperable.
1.1. IFIF no no redundant redundant ITS    ITS Supported Supported Features Features are  are inoperable, inoperable, THEN THEN the SFD the    SFD isis complete.
complete.
2.
: 2.        N/A the N/A    the remaining remaining stepssteps and and sign sign Completed Completed By. By.
3.
: 3.        Forward the Forward        the attachment attachment to  to the the SSO SSO for  for review.
review. Attach Attach the the LOSF LOSE Works Worksheet  heet to    the ITS to the  ITS Supported Supported Feature's Features EIR. EIR.
8.8.8 8.8.8  IF aa redundant IF    redundant ITS    ITS Supported Supported Feature Feature isis inoperable, inoperable, THEN THEN determine determine ifif a  Loss a Loss of  of Safety Safety Function Function (LOSF)
(LOSF) exists exists for for the the ITS ITS Supported Supported Feature.
Feature.
8.8.9 8.8.9  IF there IF  there isis no  LOSE, THEN no LOSF,        THEN perform perform the following:
following:
11..      Calculate and record Calculate              record the maximum maximum completion completion time to restore restore the the ITS  Suppo    rt ITS Support Feature Featur  e  AND    associated associated ITS Supported Supported Feature(s)
Feature(s) toto operable status.
operable
: 2.                    remaining steps and sign Completed N/A the remaining                                Completed By.
: 3.        Forward the attachment Forward            attachment to the SSO for review.      review. Attach the LOSF  LOSF Worksheet to the ITS Supported Worksheet                      Supported Feature's Features EIR.
8.8.10 8.8.10 IF there is aa LOSE LOSF,, THEN perform the following:
1.
: 1.      Calcul Calculateate andand record the maximmaximum          completion um compl      etion time to restore the the ITS ITS Suppo Support  rt Featur Feature  e and and associa associated ted ITSITS Suppo Supported    Feature(s) rted Featur        to e(s) to operab operable  le status.
status.
2.
: 2.      Enter Enter thethe applica applicableble ITS ITS LCO LCO for for the the ITS ITS Suppo Supported    Feature rted Featur    OR e OR ITS ITS LCO LCO 3.0.33.0.3 as as applica applicable.
ble.
3.
: 3.      Attach Attach the the LOSE LOSF Works Worksheet heet to to the the ITS ITS Suppo Supported      Feature's rted Featur      EIR.
es EIR.
8.8.11 8.8.11 The The individ    ual who individual      who comple completedted the the worksh worksheet        shall sign eet shall    sign and and date date the the worksh worksheet.eet.
8.8.12 8.8.12 The The SSO SSO shall shall sign sign and and date date the the worksh worksheet.eet.
[ OMM-007 IOMM-007                                        Rev.
Rev. 76 76                                        Page26 Page          851 26ofof85


Loss of Safety Function Worksheet [CAPR 193057]
8.9 8.9  InoperableITSITRM/ODCM/RG Inoperable     ITSITRM/ODCM/RG1.97          1.97Components ComponentsThat      ThatWill  WillBe  BeReturned Returnedtoto ServicePrior Service   PriortotoEndEndofofShift Shift[CAPR
{TC "Loss Of Safety Function Worksheet" \f C \1"2" } NOTE: These instructions do not supersede any instructions contained in the TRM regarding how to perform a Safety Function Determination (SFD). These instructions supplement the TRM instructions and provide an aid in completing the Loss of Safety Function (LOSF) Worksheet.
[CAPR193057]193057] { {TC TC"Inoperable Inoperable ITS!TRM/ODCM/RG1.97 ITSfTRM/ODCM/RG             1.97 ComponentsThat Components     ThatWill WillBeBeReturned ReturnedtotoService ServicePrior PriortotoEnd        Shift \f\fCC\1\l"2" EndofofShift"                    }
This determination should be performed by a licensed Senior Reactor Operator and reviewed any time additional inoperabilities occur OR an ITS Supported Feature is declared inoperable.
2) 8.9.1 8.9.1     Enterthe Enter     the name name of ofthe the equipment equipmentAND      ANDthethe reason reason for   forthe the equipment equipment inoper  ability inoperability inin AUTO AUTO log. log.
8.8.1 Complete plant conditions table. 8.8.2 Record the ITS Support Feature which is inoperable by ITS LCO number and describe the inoperability.
8.9.2 8.9.2     Verify aa Work Verify        Work Request Request has  has been been initiated initiated (if(if applicable) applicable) AND      AND enter enterthethe WR    numbe WR numberr inin AUTO    AUTO log. log.
8.8.3 Determine if the ITS Support Feature inoperability causes an ITS Supported Feature to not meet its LCO AND record as applicable.
8.9.3 8.9.3  IF IF the the unavailability unavailability isis unplanned, unplanned, AND     AND thethe component component isis part      part of of aa system listed system        listed on on Attachment Attachment 10.10,  10.10, THEN THEN reviewreview OMM-048OMM-048 AND the AND      the Mainte  nance    Rule Maintenance Rule Scopingg andScopin        and Performance Performance Criteria  Criteria Basis Basis section section of of the Maintenance the    Maintenance Rule  Rule Database Database to     to determine determine ifif the    the listed listed function(s) of function(s)     of the  system    is/are the system is/are affected.affecte    d.
8.8.4 IF no ITS Supported Feature is inoperable due to the ITS Support Feature being inoperable, THEN perform the following:
8.9.4 8.9.4  IFIF aa system system function function isis affected, affected, THEN THEN initiate initiate an  an NCRNCR statingstating aa Safety Safety Significant Functional Significant        Functional Failure Failure hashas occurred occurred lAW OMM-048, and lAW      OMM-048,            and enter enter the the NCR#
: 1. N/A the remaining steps and sign Completed By. 2. Forward the attachment to the SSO for review. 3. IF the Support Feature will NOT be returned to service prior to end of shift, THEN attach the LOSF Worksheet to the EIR for the ITS Support Feature. 4. IF the Support Feature will be returned to service prior to end of shift, THEN file LOSF Worksheet in EIR notebook.
NCR      # in  AUTO log.
8.8.5 Determine if ITS Support Feature's LCO requires "CASCADING" to ITS Supported Feature(s)
in AUTO       log.
REQUIRED ACTION and record as applicable.
8.9.5 8.9.5             applicable LCO, TRMS or Specification Enter applicable                                Specification number  number in AUTO log.         log. BeBe specifi specific. c. For   example, provide example,    provide table number number and item number          number where where applicable.
IOMM-007 1. IF ITS Support Feature's LCO requires "CASCADING" to ITS Supported Feature(s) REQUIRED ACTION, THEN the SFD is complete.
applicable.
: 2. N/A the remaining steps and sign Completed By. 3. Forward the attachment to the SSO for review. Attach the LOSF Worksheet to the EIR for the ITS Support Feature. Rev. 76 Page 25 of 85\
8.8.6 Determine if any other ITS Support LCOs are not met, and record the impact of the inoperabilities on all applicable ITS Supported Features.
8.8.7 Determine if any redundant ITS Supported Features are inoperable.
: 1. IF no redundant ITS Supported Features are inoperable, THEN the SFD is complete.
: 2. N/A the remaining steps and sign Completed By. 3. Forward the attachment to the SSO for review. Attach the LOSF Worksheet to the ITS Supported Feature's EIR. 8.8.8 IF a redundant ITS Supported Feature is inoperable, THEN determine if a Loss of Safety Function (LOSF) exists for the ITS Supported Feature. 8.8.9 IF there is no LOSF, THEN perform the following: 1 . Calculate and record the maximum completion time to restore the ITS Support Feature AND associated ITS Supported Feature(s) to operable status. 2. N/A the remaining steps and sign Completed By. 3. Forward the attachment to the SSO for review. Attach the LOSF Worksheet to the ITS Supported Feature's EIR. 8.8.10 IF there is a LOSF, THEN perform the following: 1 . Calculate and record the maximum completion time to restore the ITS Support Feature and associated ITS Supported Feature(s) to operable status. 2. Enter the applicable ITS LCO for the ITS Supported Feature OR ITS LCO 3.0.3 as applicable.
: 3. Attach the LOSF Worksheet to the ITS Supported Feature's EIR. 8.8.11 The individual who completed the worksheet shall sign and date the worksheet.
8.8.12 The SSO shall sign and date the worksheet.
IOMM-007 Rev. 76 Page 26 of 851 8.9 Inoperable ITSITRM/ODCM/RG 1.97 Components That Will Be Returned to Service Prior to End of Shift [CAPR 193057] { TC "Inoperable ITSfTRM/ODCM/RG 1.97 Components That Will Be Returned to Service Prior to End of Shift" \f C \1 "2" } 8.9.1 Enter the name of the equipment AND the reason for the equipment inoperability in AUTO log. 8.9.2 Verify a Work Request has been initiated (if applicable)
AND enter the WR number in AUTO log. 8.9.3 IF the unavailability is unplanned, AND the component is part of a system listed on Attachment 10.10, THEN review OMM-048 AND the Maintenance Rule Scoping and Performance Criteria Basis section of the Maintenance Rule Database to determine if the listed function(s) of the system is/are affected.
8.9.4 IF a system function is affected, THEN initiate an NCR stating a Safety Significant Functional Failure has occurred lAW OMM-048, and enter the NCR # in AUTO log. 8.9.5 Enter applicable LCO, TRMS or Specification number in AUTO log. Be specific.
For example, provide table number and item number where applicable.
Examples:
Examples:
LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1 Item 7.a TRMS 3.10, Table 3.10-1 Item 3 Specification 2.6.3, Table 2.6-1 Item 4.c 8.9.6 Determine the maximum time the equipment is allowed to be inoperable.
Examples:            LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1 Item 7.a TRMS 3.10, Table 3.10-1 Item 3 Specif  ication 2.6.3, Table 2.6-1 Item Specification                                      Item 4.c 8.9.6 8.9.6    Determ Determine ine the maxim maximum   um time time the equipm equipment ent is   is allowe allowed     d to bebe inoper inoperable.
8.9.7 Determine applicable surveillances or activities and required frequencies which are required as a result of the component inoperability.
able.
8.9.8 IF the component is an ITS Support System component, THEN perform Attachment 10.11, Loss of Safety Function Worksheet AND file worksheet in EIR notebook.
8.9.7 8.9.7    Determ Determine ine applica    ble surveil applicable               lances or surveillances       or activit activities     and require ies and        required     frequencies d freque    ncies which      are  require  d  as which are required as aa result    result ofof the the compo component           inoperability.
8.9.9 IF the component is an ITS Supported System Component, THEN review open Loss of Safety Function Worksheets for impact AND enter in AUTO log to document review. IOMM-007 Rev. 76 Page 27 of 851 ATTACHMENT 10.11 Page 1 of 4 LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION WORKSHEET
nent inoper          ability.
[CAPR 193057] {TC "LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION WORKSHEET" \f C \1 "2" } CONTINUOUS USE NOTE: The numbers in the flow chart correspond to the description of SFD steps in Appendix C of the TRM. 8. DETERMINE TIlE IMPACT THE INOPERABlLITIES HAVE ON ALL APPLICABLE SUPPORTED FEATURES YES 12. CALCULATE AND TRACK TIlE MAXIMUM COMPLETION TIME TO RESTORE TIlE SUPPORT FEATURE AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORTED FEATURE(S)
8.9.8 8.9.8   IF IF the the compo component nent isis an an ITS ITS Suppo Support     System compo rt System        component, nent, THEN          perform THEN perform Attach    ment    10.11, Attachment 10.11, Loss     Loss of of Safety Safety Functi Function     Worksheet on Works          heet AND         file AND file Works worksheet heet inin EIR EIR notebo notebook. ok.
TO OPERABLE STATUS IOMM-007 YES NO 2. DETERMINE TIlE IMPACT TIlE INOPERABlLITY HAS ON APPLICABLE SUPPORTED FEATURES 10. SFD IS COMPLETE.
8.9.9 8.9.9  IF IF the the compo component nent isis an an ITS ITS Suppo Supported       System Compo rted System          Component,            THEN nent, THEN review review openopen LossLoss ofof Safety Safety Functi Function     Worksheets            for on Worksheets for impact AND     impact            enter AND enter inin AUTO AUTO log  log to to docum document ent review review..
REVIEW TIlE SFD ANY TIME AN ADDITIONAL INOPERABlLITY OCCURS OR A SUPPORTED FEATURE IS DECLARED INOPERABLE
OMM-007 IOMM-007                                         Rev.
: 13. ENTER TIlE APPLICABLE TS ACTIONS OF TIlE SUPPORTED FEATURETS.
Rev.76 76                                                Page27 Page     27ofof85851
Rev. 76 NO 3. DOES TIlE TSSUPPORT FEATURE RESULT IN A SUPPORTED FEATURE LCO NOT 5. DOES TIlE SUPPORT FEATURE TS ACTIONS REQUIRE "CASCADING" TO TIlE SUPPORTED FEATURE(S)
 
: 14. TS ACTIONS? YES 6. ENTER TIlE APPLICABLE TS ACTIONS OF TIlE SUPPORTED FEATURETS NO 15. CALCULATE AND TRACK THE MAXIMUM COMPLETION TIME TO RESTORE TIlE SUPPORT FEATURE AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORTED FEATURE(S)
ATTACHMENT 10.11 ATTACHMENT                     10.11 Page 11 of Page          of 44 LOSS OF LOSS   OF SAFETY SAFETY FUNCTION    FUNCTION WORKSHEET WORKSHEET
TO OPERABLE STATUS. REVIEW THE SFD ANY TIME AN ADDITIONAL INOPERABlLITY OCCURS OR A SUPPORTED FEATURE IS DECLARED INOPERABLE.
[CAPR 193057]
Page 56 of 85 3.7. Operability Concern Review (OCR) This is an action to resolve an operability concern that has been identified through initiation of an NCR per CAP-NGGC-0200.
[CAPR                    { TC "LOSS 193057] {TC    LOSS OF    OF SAFETY SAFETY FUNCTION FUNCTION WORKSHEET" WORKSHEET \f\f C          C \1\I "2" 2)}
This is also referred to as an Operability Concern Response.
CONTINUOUS USE CONTINUOUS                     USE NOTE:
An OCR is a PassPort assignment used to document the results of an Operability Review for NCRs where either the attribute for an OCR or OPER ISSUE is checked Y. This is the assignment type used to document the basis for an Operability Determination . . 3.B. Operability Determination The actual determination of Operability must be made by a licensed individual.
NOTE:                The numbers The      numbers in in the the flow flow chartchart correspond correspond to  to the the description description of      of SFD SFD stepssteps inin Appendix CC of Appendix             the TRM.
Routine confirmation of Operability is usually made with out an OCR while screening Work Requests and NCRs. If required an OCR is prepared to assist Operations.
of the     TRM.
An Operability Determination typically starts when Operations determines that an OCR is required and it typically ends when the applicable on-shift licensed operator accepts the OCR basis. -7 3.9. Quality-Related The term "quality-related" encompasses the NRC quality assurance controls and requirements imposed on a nuclear power plant. This specifically includes those activities, services, and equipment associated with safety-related structures, systems and components such as environmental and effluent monitoring; Technical Specification surveillance; operations; radiological emergency planning; fire protection; radiation protection; packaging radioactive material for transport; radioactive waste management systems; security systems; anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) equipment; and environmentally qualified components.
3.
3.10. Safety-Related Those SSCs relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and the ability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 10 CFR 50.67. I OPS-NGGC-1305 Rev. 1 Page 7 of 50 I 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1. Manager-Operations 4.1.1. Ensures that an Operability Determination completion time is established and communicated to the SSO for entry into the shift logs. 4.1.2. Ensures that a completed Operability Determination is reviewed by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) per site specific procedures.
DOES TIlE 2.
4.1.3. Should ensure the following actions are taken: 1. Obtain a copy of the NCR. 2. Determine the allowed time limit for completion of the Operability Concern Review (OCR). 3. Inform affected personnel of any time limits for completing the OCR. 4.2. Superintendent
: 2.                                                                    NO NO TS SUPPORT                                                                          TSSUPPORT DETERMINE TIlE DETERMINE              IMPACT THE IMPACT FEATURE IS                  TIlE    INOPERABILITY HAS THE INOPERABlLITY        HAS FEATURE RESULT            N
-Shift Operations (SSO) The Superintendent
            &#xe7;BLE                                                                                      IN A SUPPORTED ON APPLICABLE ON  APPLICABLE FEATURE LCO NOT SUPPORTED FEATURES SUPPORTED        FEATURES YES 5.
-Shift Operations (SSO) is responsible for determining the operability of SSC. In order to carry out this responsibility, the SSO should take or verify that the following actions are promptly taken as needed: 4.2.1. Routine screening of deficiencies (including WRs, WO tasks, NCRs, observations and notifications) should ensure that items have been appropriately dispositioned with respect to Operability and degraded or non-conforming conditions.
5.
Items will typically be dispositioned as follows: 2. 3. If Operability can be readily confirmed and the item is not a degraded or conforming condition, this procedure can be used for guidance but no specific actions to comply with this procedure are required.
: 8.                                                                                DOES TIlE DOES  THE 8.
Documentation of the determination should be included in the WR, NCR or in a log entry. If Operability can not be readily confirmed, or the item is a degraded or conforming condition, an NCR is required and the provisions of this procedure are applicable.
DETERMINE TIlETHE IMPACT IMPACT      YES                                                          SUPPORT FEATURE SUPPORT  FEATURE DETERMINE THE INOPERABlLITIES INOPERABILITIES                                                                        TS ACTIONS TS ACTIONS REQUIRE REQUIRE THE HAVE ON  ALL APPLICABLE ON ALL    APPLICABLE                                                                CASCADING TO "CASCADING"    TO TIlE THE HAVE SUPPORTED FEATURES FEATURES                                                                  SUPPORTED FEATURE(S)
If there is not a reasonable expectation that the SSC is Operable, then the applicable SSC shall be declared inoperable.
SUPPORTED TS ACTIONS?
An NCR is required and the provisions of this procedure are applicable.
[    NO YES
4.2.2. Logging in the shift logs the initiation of an Operability Determination, the time and date of initiation, and the allowed completion time determined by the Manager-Operations.
: 9.                                        10.
IOPS-NGGC-1305 Rev. 1 Page 8 of 50 I Question Number: Question:
ARE ANY              NO NO      SFD IS COMPLETE.
Answer: Justification:
REDUNDANT SUPPORTED                                                                                     6.
Tier/Group lOCFR55.41 lOCFR55.43 BanklNew/
REVIEW THE  TIlE SFD ANY FEATURES INOPERABLE?                  TIME AN ADDITIONAL ENTER THE TIlE APPLICABLE TS INOPERABILITY OCCURS OR INOPERABlLITY ACTIONS OF TIlE THE A SUPPORTED FEATURE IS SUPPORTED DECL4RED DECLARED INOPERABLE FEATURETS FEATURE    TS YES YES 11.
Modified KlA#: KIA Values: Cognitive Level:  
DOES A                NO LOSF EXIST FOR THE SUPPORTED FEATURE TS?
YES CALCULATE 12.
12.
AND TRACK CALCULATE AND      TRACK THETIlE    ENTER ENTER THE I13.
13.
TIlE APPLICABLE APPLICABLE TS     TS          CALCULATE 14.
14.
AND TRACK CALCULATE AND     TRACK THE THE          REVIEW REVIEW THE 15.
15.
THE SFD SFD ANY ANY TIME TIME MAXIMUM COMPLETION MAXIMUM    COMPLETION              ACTIONS  OFTHE ACTIONS OF  TIlE SUPPORTED SUPPORTED             MAXIMUM MAXIMUM COMPLETION COMPLETION                    AN ADDITIONAL AN    ADDITIONAL TIME TO TIME    RESTORE THE TO RESTORE      TIlE          FEATURE  TS.
FEATURETS.                               TIME TO TIME    RESTORE THE TO RESTORE    TIlE                INOPERABlLITY OCCURS INOPERABILITY      OCCURS OR OR SUPPORT  FEATURE AND SUPPORT FEATURE      AND                                                    SUPPORT  FEATURE AND SUPPORT FEATURE      AND                AA SUPPORTED SUPPORTED FEATURE FEATURE ISIS ASSOCIATED ASSOCIATED SUPPORTED SUPPORTED                                                        ASSOCIATED ASSOCIATED SUPPORTED SUPPORTED                  DECLARED INOPERABLE.
DECLARED    INOPERABLE.
FEATURE(S)
FEATURE(S) TO TO OPERABLE OPERABLE                                                    FEATURE(S)
FEATURE(S) TO TO OPERABLE OPERABLE STATUS STATUS                                                                        STATUS.
STATUS.
OMM-007 IOMM-007                                                    Rev.
Rev. 76  76                                                  Page 56 Page      56 ofof 8585
 
3.7.
3.7. OperabilityConcern Operability           ConcernReview  Review(OCR) (OCR)
Thisisisan This          anaction actiontotoresolve resolvean  anoperability operabilityconcern concernthat    thathashasbeen beenidentified identifiedthrough through initiationof initiation      ofan an NCRNCRper perCAP-NGGC-0200.
CAP-NGGC-0200. This        Thisisisalso also referred toas referred    to  asan anOperability Operability Concern Response.
Concern          Response. An       An OCR OCRisisaaPassPort PassPortassignment assignmentused      usedtotodocument documentthe      the results results of    ofanan Operability OperabilityReview Reviewfor  forNCRs NCRswherewhereeither eitherthe  theattribute attributefor  foran an OCROCRor  or OPER ISSUE OPER          ISSUE isis checked checked Y. Y. This Thisisisthe theassignment assignmenttype      type used used totodocument documentthe      the basisfor basis      foran an Operability Operability Determination Determination..
3.8.
  .~ 3.B.
Operability Determination Operability          Determination The actual The     actual determination determination of      of Operability Operability must  must bebe made made by      by aa licensed licensed individual.
individual.
Routin    e  confirm      ation Routine confirmation of Operability of  Operab  ility isis usually usually made made with    with out out an an OCR OCR whilewhile screening screening Work Requests Work      Requests and     and NCRs.
NCRs. IfIf required required an  an OCR OCR isis prepared prepared to  to assist assist Operations. An Operations.         An Operability Determination Operability        Determination typically typically starts starts when when Operations Operations determinesdetermines that  that anan OCR OCR is  required and is required        and itit typically typically ends ends when when the the applicable applicable on-shifton-shift licensed licensed operator operator accept    s accepts the OCRthe  OCR basis.basis.
3.9.
    -7 3.9.
    -        Quality-Related Quality-Related The term The    term "quality-related" quality-related encompasses encompasses the NRC quality assurance            assurance controls controls and  and requirements imposed requirements          imposed on a nuclear nuclear power plant. This specifically    specifically includes those includes      those activities, services, activities,    services, and equipmentequipment associated associated with safety-related safety-related structures, structures, system      s  and systems and componentscomponents such as environmentalenvironmental and effluent    effluent monitoring; monitoring; Technical Technical Specification surveillance; Specification        surveillance; operations; operations; radiological radiological emergency emergency planning;planning; firefire protect  ion; radiati protection;      radiation on protection; protection; packag packaging  ing radioac radioactive tive material              transport; material for transpo        rt; radioac radioactive tive waste manag  managementement system systems;  s; securit security    systems; y system            anticipated s; anticip          transient ated transie      nt withou withoutt scram scram (ATW (ATWS)  S) equipm equipment;ent; and enviro environmentally nmentally qualifi  qualified    components.
ed compo      nents.
3.10.
3.10. Safety      -Related Safety-Related Those Those SSCs SSCs reliedrelied upon upon to to remain remain functio functionalnal during during and    and follow following    design basis ing design        basis events events to  to ensure ensure the  the integri  ty of integrity  of the the reactor reactor coolan coolantt pressupressure      boundary, re boundary, the    the capabi    lity to capability      to shut shut down down the the reactor reactor andand mainta maintainin itit inin aa safe safe shutdo shutdown        condition, wn condit            and ion, and the the ability ability to to preven prevent  t or or mitiga  te the mitigate    the conseq      uences of consequences            of accide accidents      that could nts that    could result result in in potenti potential al offsite offsite exposu exposuresres compa comparablerable to to the the guideli guideline        exposures        of  10 ne exposures of 10 CFR 50.67. CFR      50.67.
II OPS-N  GGC-1 305 OPS-NGGC-1305                      I                    Rev.
Rev.I 1 I                              Page77ofof50 Page            50 II
 
4.0  RESPO RESP      NSIBIILITIE ONSIB    LITIES  S 4.1. Manag Mana      er-Ope ger-O        rations perati  ons 4.1.1. Ensur Ensure ess that an Opera Operabbility ility Determination completion time is establ    establiished shed and communicat unicate  edd to the SSO for entry into the shift logs.
4.1.2. Ensur Ensureess that a compl completedeted Opera Operabbility ility Determination is reviewrevieweded by the Plant Nucle Nucleaarr Safety Comm ittee (PNSC) per site specif          specifiicc procedures.
4.1.3. Shoul Should d ensure the following action      actionss are taken:
: 1.      Obtain a copy of the NCR.
: 2.      Determine the allowe d time limit for completion of the Opera              Operabbility ility Concern Review Revie  w (OCR).
: 3.       Inform affected personnel of any time limits for completing the OCR.
4.2. Superi Supe    ntende rinten    dentnt - Shift Opera
                                        -          Operattions ions (SSO)
Superiintend The Super      ntende    nt - Shift Opera ent            Operattions ions (SSO) is responsible for determining ining the operabbility opera    ility of SSC. In order to carry out this respon        responsibility sibility, the SSO should take or verify that the following action  actionss are promptly    tly taken as neede neededd::
4.2.1. Routin Routinee screening of deficie  deficiencies ncies (including WRs, WO tasks, NCRs        NCRs,, observations and notific notifications ations)) should ensure that items have been appro            approppriate riately ly dispositioned with respect to OperaOperabbilityility and degra degrad    ed or non-c ded      non-coonform nformiingng conditions. Items will typicallly typica  ly be dispositioned as follow    follows:s:
          ~1. 1.          Operabbility If Opera    ility can be readily confirmconfirmed  ed and the item is not a degradegrad  ed or non-ded    non conforming condition, this proce      proced  ure can be used for guidance but no specif dure                                            specifiicc actionss to comply with this procedure are required. Documentation action of the determination should be included in the WR, NCR or in a log entry.
        ~
r,  2.          Operabbility If Opera    ility can not be readily confirm confirmed, ed, or the item is a degra degrad  ed or non-ded      non conforming condition, an NCR is requir          require edd and the provisions of this procedure applica are applic      ble.
able.
: 3.      If there is not a reasonable expec      expecttation ation that the SSC is Opera Operab  le, then the ble, applica applic    ble SSC shall be declar able                        declare edd inoperable. An NCR is requir  require edd and the provisiions provis    ons of this proce proced  ure are applic dure        applica  ble.
able.
4.2.2. Logging in the shift logs the initiati    initiation on of an Opera Operabbility ility Determination, the time and date of initiati initiation, on, and the allowed compl    comple    tion time determined by the etion Manager-Op er-Ope    rationss..
eration
[dSNGGC IOPS- NGGC-1    305
            -1305                                        Rev. 1 1                                            Page 8 of 50    I
 
SALEMFOXTROT SALEM      FOXTROT 2001 NRC 2001    NRCWRITTEN WRITTENEXAMINATION EXAMINATION WORKSHEET WORKSHEET Question Question        SRO 71 SR071 Number:
Number:
Question:
Question:      Unit 11 isis operating Unit          operating atat 100%
100% power.
power.
                          **    11 SI 11  SI pump pump isis INOPERABLE INOPERABLEdue      due to to repairs repairs estimated estimated toto take take 48 48 hours hours
                          **    An audit An  audit of ofcompleted completed surveillance surveillance procedures procedures hashas determined determined the the quarterly quarterly surveillance performed surveillance    perfonned on on 1212 SI SI pump pump 37  37 days ago was improperly completed.
days  ago  was  improperly    completed.
Which one Which      one ofof the the following following describes describes the the appropriate appropriate action action per per Technical Technical Specifications?
Specifications?
A.
A.          Commence aa plant Commence          plant shutdown shutdown within within 11 hour hour B.
B.          Demonstrate the Demonstrate      the operability operability of of 1212 SI SI pump pump within within 11 hour hour or or commence commence aa plant plant shutdown shutdown c.
C.        Demonstrate the operability of 12        12 SI SI pump pump within within 24 hours hours oror commence commence aa plant plant shutdown shutdown D.
D.          Demonstrate the operability of 12        12 SI pump within 72 hours or commence a plant shutdown Answer:
Answer:        C Justification:
Justification: Enter TS 3.0.3, but operability can be demonstrated within 24 hours per TS 4.0.3, since the Enter action action statement is less than 24 hours. A and B            B represent inappropriate application of      ofTS TS 3.0.3 3.0.3 and D represents inappropriate application of and                                                    ofTSTS 3.5.2 Tier/Group Tier/Group    33 10CFR55.41 10CFR55.41    43.2 43.2 Because it requires a from      'from memory memory' application of      of Tech Tech Specs in a situation where where 10CFRSS        TS 3.0.3 3.0.3 is applied but the 24 hour exception per 4.0.3 will also apply. The SRO has to 10CFR55.43    determine determine the  the appropriate course        of action course of  action Bank/New!
BanklNew/      Modified Modified Modified Modified K/A KlA#:#:        2.2.24, 2.2.24, Knowledge Knowledge of    of effects effects ofof maintenance maintenance activities activities on on LCOs LCOs K/A KIA Values:
Values:  RO 2.6 RO    2.6 SROSRO 3.83.8 Cognitive Cognitive      Application Application Level:
Level:
 
==References:==


==References:==
==References:==
TS TS 3.0.3, 3.0.3, 4.0.3 4.0.3 LP 0300-000-OO LP                      S-TECHSP-01, Objectives 0300-000-00S-TECHSP-Ol,                Objectives 13  13 and and 1414


SR071 SALEM FOXTROT 2001 NRC WRITTEN EXAMINATION WORKSHEET Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08           Written Exam NRC Written   Exam
* 11 SI pump is INOPERABLE due to repairs estimated to take 48 hours
: 98. Given the
* An audit of completed surveillance procedures has determined the quarterly surveillance performed on 12 SI pump 37 days ago was improperly completed.
: 98. Given   the following:
Which one of the following describes the appropriate action per Technical Specifications?
following:
A. Commence a plant shutdown within 1 hour B. Demonstrate the operability of 12 SI pump within 1 hour or commence a plant shutdown c. Demonstrate the operability of 12 SI pump within 24 hours or commence a plant shutdown D. Demonstrate the operability of 12 SI pump within 72 hours or commence a plant shutdown C Enter TS 3.0.3, but operability can be demonstrated within 24 hours per TS 4.0.3, since the action statement is less than 24 hours. A and B represent inappropriate application ofTS 3.0.3 and D represents inappropriate application ofTS 3.5.2 3 43.2 Because it requires a 'from memory' application of Tech Specs in a situation where TS 3.0.3 is applied but the 24 hour exception per 4.0.3 will also apply. The SRO has to determine the appropriate course of action Modified 2.2.24, Knowledge of effects of maintenance activities on LCOs RO 2.6 SRO 3.8 Application TS 3.0.3, 4.0.3 LP 0300-000-00S-TECHSP-Ol, Objectives 13 and 14 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 98. Given the following:  
The Reactor
-The Reactor has tripped from 100% RTP. -RCS temperature is 430 of. -RCS pressure is 635 PSIG. -S/G "A" pressure is 100 PSIG. -S/G "B" pressure is 50 PSIG. -S/G "C" pressure is 50 PSIG. -CV pressure is approximately 38 PSIG. Which ONE (1) of the following describes the correct mitigation strategy?
      - The
A. Throttle Feedwater to ALL S/Gs to 80 to 90 GPM lAW Foldout A. B. Isolate Feedwater to S/Gs "B" and "C" lAW Foldout A. C. Isolate Feedwater to ALL S/Gs lAW EPP-16, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS.
        -      Reactor hashas tripped tripped from from 100%
D. Throttle Feedwater to ALL S/Gs to 80 to 90 GPM lAW EPP-16, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS.
100% RTP.
98 02.4.6 OOlJEMERO PROCIPLAN/3/3.7/4.7/SRO/HIGH/43.S/NEW  
RTP.
-200SJEPP-16-003 Given the following:  
RCS temperature
-The Reactor has tripped from 100% RTP. -RCS temperature is 430 of. -RCS pressure is 635 PSIG. -S/G "A" pressure is 100 PSIG. -S/G "8" pressure is 50 PSIG. -S/G "c" pressure is 50 PSIG. -CV pressure is approximately 38 PSIG. Which ONE (1) of the following describes the correct mitigation strategy?
      - RCS
A. Throttle Feedwater to ALL S/Gs to 80 to 90 GPM lAW Foldout A. B. Isolate Feedwater to S/Gs "8" and "c" lAW Foldout A. C. Isolate Feedwater to ALL S/Gs lAW EPP-16, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS. Throttle Feedwater to ALL S/Gs to 80 to 90 GPM lAW EPP-16, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS.
        -      temperature isis 430430 of.
The correct answer is D. A: Incorrect  
                                        &deg;F.
-Correct mitigative strategy, but Foldout A requires 1 intact S/G. Stem conditions indicate that ALL S/Gs are faulted and EPP-16 will be used. 8: Incorrect  
RCS pressure
-Correct mitigative strategy and correct procedure for 2 faulted S/Gs. Stem conditions indicate that ALL S/Gs are faulted and EPP-16 will be used. C: Incorrect  
      - RCS
-EPP-16 is the correct procedure to enter, however, the mitigative strategy is incorrect, Feedwater would NOT be isolated to ALL S/Gs. D: Correct -Stem conditions indicate that ALL S/Gs are faulted and EPP-16 will be used. EPP-16 throttles flow to ALL S/Gs to 80 to 90 GPM. This ensures S/G internals are kept wet.
        -        pressure isis 635  PSIG.
Exam Question Number: 98  
635 PSIG.
      - S/G
        -     A pressure S/G "A"   pressure isis 100 100 PSIG.
PSIG.
S/G "B"
      - S/G
        -            pressure isis 50 B pressure          PSIG.
50 PSIG.
SIG "C"
      - S/G
        -            pressure is C pressure     is 50 PSG.
50 PSIG.
CV pressure
      - CV
      -      pressure is is approximately approximately 38 38 PSIG.
PSIG.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the correct mitigation strategy?
strategy?
Throttle Feedwater A. Throttle   Feedwater to ALL S/Gs      to 80 S/Gs to 80 to to 90 90 GPM  lAW Foldout GPM lAW   Foldout A.
B. Isolate Feedwater to S/Gs "B"     B and "C" C lAW Foldout A.
C. Isolate Feedwater to ALL S/Gs lAW EPP-16,   EPP-1 6, UNCONTROLLED UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS.
GENERATORS.
D. Throttle Feedwater to ALL S/Gs to 80 to 90 GPM lAW EPP-16, UNCONTROLLEDUNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS.
DEPRESSURIZATION                                GENERATORS.
98 98
 
G2.4.6 OOlJEMERO 02.4.6 00 1JEMERG PROCIPLAN/3/3.7/4.7/SRO/HIGH/43.S/NEW PROC/PLAN/3/3.7/4.7/SROIHIGHJ43 .5/NEW - 200SJEPP-16-003
                                                                      - 2008/EPP- 16-003 Given the Given    the following:
following:
    - The
    -     Reactor has The Reactor           tripped from has tripped   from 100%
100% RTP.
RTP.
    - RCS
    -       temperature isis 430 RCS temperature             430 of.
                                      &deg;F.
    - RCS
    -        pressure isis 635 RCS pressure                 PSIG.
635 PSIG.
    - S/G
    -       A pressure S/G "A"     pressure isis 100 100 PSIG.
PSIG.
S/G "8"
    - S/G
    -      B pressure pressure isis 50 50 PSIG.
PSIG.
SIG "c"
    - S/G
    -              pressure is C pressure       is 50  PSIG.
50 PSIG.
    - CV
    -     pressure isis approximately CV pressure         approximately 38       PSIG.
38 PSIG.
Which ONE (1)     (1) of of the following describes the correct mitigation strategy?
strategy?
Feedwater to ALL S/Gs to 80 to 90 GPM A. Throttle Feedwater                                      GPM lAWlAW Foldout Foldout A.
B. Isolate Feedwater to S/Gs "8"       B and "c" C lAW Foldout A.
C. Isolate Feedwater to ALL S/Gs lAW EPP-16,       EPP-1 6, UNCONTROLLED UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION DEPRESSURIZATION OF GENERATORS.
ALL STEAM GENERATORS.
D Throttle Feedwater to ALL S/Gs to 80 to 90 GPM lAW EPP-16, UNCONTROLLED D~                                                                                  UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS.
DEPRESSURIZATION                                  GENERATORS.
The correct answer is D.
A: Incorrect - Correct mitigative strategy, but Foldout A requires 1 1 intact S/G. Stem conditions indicate that ALL S/Gs are faulted and EPP-16 will be used.
B:
8: Incorrect - Correct mitigative strategy and correct procedure for 22 faulted S/Gs. Stem conditions indicate that ALL S/Gs are faulted and EPP-1    EPP-16 6 will be used.
C: Incorrect - EPP-16 is the correct procedure to enter, however, C:              -
however, the mitigative mitigative strategy strategy is is incorrect, incorrect,   Feedwater   would   NOT be isolated to ALL S/Gs. S/Gs.
D:
D: Correct - -    Stem Stem conditions conditions indicate indicate that ALL S/Gs S/Gs are faulted and and EPP-16 will be be used.
used.
EPP-16 EPP-16 throttles throttles flow to ALL S/Gs flow to      S/Gs to  80 to to 80 to 9090 GPM. This ensures GPM. This   ensures S/G S/G internals internals are are kept kept wet.
wet.
 
Exam Question Exam     Question Number:
Number: 98  98
 
==Reference:==
EPP-16,


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
EPP-1 6, Pages Pages 33 and and 8;  EPP-1 6 SO, 8; EPP-16    BD, Page Page 18; 18; Foldout Foldout A,A, Pages Pages 3-8.
3-8.
KA Statement:
KA  Statement: Knowledge Knowledge of      EOP mitigation of EOP    mitigation strategies.
strategies.
History: New History:    New - Written
                  - Written for for HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC exam.
exam.
SRO - Detailed SRO    -  Detailed knowledge knowledge and and implementation implementation of of the the EOP EOP network network mitigation mitigation strategy strategy past past the the Immediate Actions.
Immediate    Actions.
KA Name:
KA  Name:              EMERG PROCIPLAN EMERG    PROC/PLAN                Tier/Group:
Tier/Group:        33 Importance Rating:
Importance  Rating:  3.7/4.7 3.7/4.7                            RO/SRO Level:
RO/SRO    Level:    SRO SRO Cognitive  Level:
Cognitive Level:      HIGH HIGH                                10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43  link:  43.5 43.5 Source:
Source:                NEW - 2008 NEW    - 2008                      Learning Objective:
Learning  Objective:  EPP-16-003 EPP-16-003
UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION Rev.
Rev. 16 16 E P -16          UNCONTROLLED  DEPRESSURIZATION OF  OF ALL ALL STEAM STEAM EPP-16 GENERATORS GENERATORS Page Page 33 of of 33 33 Purpose Purpose and and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)
1.
: 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This  procedure provides provides actions actions for for aa loss loss of of secondary secondary coolant coolant which affects which  affects all all Steam Steam Generators.
Generators.
2.
: 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY  CONDITIONS EPP-11, Faulted EPP-11,  Faulted Steam Steam Generator Generator Isolation, Isolation, when when an an uncontrolled uncontrolled depressurizat  ion of depressurization      all Steam of all  Steam Generators Generators occurs.
occurs.
                                          - END
                                          - END --
UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION Rev.
Rev. 1616 EPP-lo              UNCONTROLLED      DEPRESSURIZATION OF  OF ALL ALL STEAM STEAM EPP-16 GENERATORS GENERATORS Page Page 8 8 of of 33 33 H STEP H              INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I L        RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT  NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 9.9. Control Feed Control    Feed Flow Flow ToTo Minimize Minimize RCS  Cooldown    As  Follow RCS Cooldown As Follows:s:
: a. Throttle
: a. Throttle feed feed flow flow to to between      a.
: a. Establish Establish between between                          between 80  80 gpm gpm and and 80 gpm  and  90  gpm  to each 80 gpm and 90 gpm to each SIG                  90 90 gpm gpm feed S/G                    feed flow flow toto each each SIG S/G using MDAFW using    MDAFW FLOW FLOW CONTROLLER:
CONTROLLER:            as as follows:
follows:
              **    FIC-l424, AFW FIC-1424,    AFW PUMP PUMP AA              1)
: 1) Open Open the the breakers breakers for  for DISCH    FLOW DISCH FLOW                                  MDAFW MDAFW HEADER HEADER DISCHARGE DISCHARGE Valves:
Valves:
OR
                                                                  **    V2-16A V2-16A (MCC-9, (MCC9,
              **    FIC-1425, AFW FIC-142S,    AFW PUMP PUMP BB                          COMPT-2ML)
COMPT-2ML)
DISCH FLOW DISCH  FLOW
                                                                  **    V2-16C V2lGC (MCC-9, (MCC-9, COMPT-3J)
COMPT-3J)
                                                                  **    V2-16A V2-l6A (MCC-I0, (MCC-l0, COMPT-4C)
COMPT -4 C)
* V2-16B (MCC-I0, (MCC-10, COMPT-4F)
COMPT-4F)
: 2) Locally      throttle AFW Locally throttle              HDR AFW HDR DISCH Valves DISCH    Valves to to establi establish sh 80 gpm 80  gpm toto 90 90 gpm gpm to to each each S/G:
S/G:
                                                                  **    AFW-V2-16A - S/G AFW-V2-l6A      -
SIG "A" A
                                                                  **    AFW-V2-16B - S/G AFW-V2-l6B      -
SIG "B" TI
                                                                  **    AFW-V2-16C - S/C AFW-V2-l6C      -
                                                                                                  "c" SIG C
: 3) Go
: 3)  Go ToTo Step Step 11.
11.
b.
: b. Go Go ToTo Step Step 1111


EPP-16, Pages 3 and 8; EPP-16 SO, Page 18; Foldout A, Pages 3-8. KA Statement:
RNP    WOO WOG      BASIS/
Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.
BASIS/DIFFE DIFFER  ENCES RENC STEP ES STEP 7      2      WOG BASIS PURPOSE:
History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC exam. SRO -Detailed knowledge and implementation of the EOP network mitigation strategy past the Immediate Actions. KA Name: EMERG PROCIPLAN Importance Rating: Cognitive Level: Source: 3.7/4.7 HIGH NEW -2008 Tier/Group:
PURPO      SE:        control feed flow to minimiz To control                      minimize e the effects of the cooldow cooldown  n due to the secondary depresdepressurizat surizatiion on and to subseq subsequently uently control control the transien transient. t.
RO/SRO Level: lOCFR55.43 link: 3 SRO 43.5 Learning Objective:
BASIS:
EPP-16-003 UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM Rev. EPP-16 GENERATORS Page Purpose and Entry Conditions (Page 1 of 1) 1. PURPOSE This procedure provides actions for a loss of secondary coolant which affects all Steam Generators.
BASIS:
: 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS EPP-11, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, when an uncontrolled depressurization of all Steam Generators occurs. -END -16 3 of 33 Rev. 16 UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM EPP-16 GENERATORS INSTRUCTIONS
Depending Depend    ing upon the size of the effectiv effective e break areas for the steam generators, the cooldow cooldown  n rate experienced after reactor trip could exceed 100&deg;F/h        100&deg;F/hr. r. A reductio reduction  n of feed flow to the steam generators has three primary      primary effects:
: 9. Control Feed Flow To Minimize RCS Cooldown As Follows: a. Throttle feed flow to between 80 gpm and 90 gpm to each SIG using MDAFW FLOW CONTROLLER:
effects:
*
: 1. To minimiz minimize e any addition additional  cooldown al cooldow        resulting n resultin  g from the addition addition of feedwater,
* FIC-1424, AFW PUMP A DISCH FLOW FIC-142S, AFW PUMP B DISCH FLOW b. Go To Step 11 Page 8 of RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED a. Establish between 80 gpm and 90 gpm feed flow to each SIG as follows: 1) Open the breakers for MDAFW HEADER DISCHARGE Valves:
: 2. To prevent steam generator tube dryout by maintai        maintaining ning a minimu minimum  m feed flow to the steam generators and,
* V2-16A (MCC-9, COMPT-2ML)
: 3. To minimiz minimize e the water invento inventory ry in the steam generators that eventua  eventually lly is the source additional of addition al steam flow to containment or the environ      environment ment..
* V2-16C (MCC-9, COMPT-3J)
The minimu minimum  m feed flow of (S.04) gpm represents the value in plant specific          specific units corresponding to 25 gpm. The 25 gpm value is representative of a minimum minimu    m measurable feed flow to a steam genera        generator. Plant specific specific values may depend upon flow instrumentation and the sensitiv          sensitivity ity of the controls controls on the feed flow.
* V2-16A (MCC-I0, COMPT-4C)
As steam flow rate drops, the feed flow will eventua      eventually lly increase the steam generator inventory.
* V2-16B (MCC-I0, COMPT-4F)
invento  ry. Feed flow is control controlled led to maintai maintain  n steam generator    tor narrow range level less than 50% to prevent overfee  overfeeding ding the steam generators.
: 2) Locally throttle AFW HDR DISCH Valves to establish 80 gpm to 90 gpm to each S/G:
addition,, as SG pressure and steam flow rate drop, RCS hot leg In addition temperatures will stabilize and .start start increasing. The operator controls  controls feed flow or dumps steam to stabilize the RCS hot leg temperatures. This allows the safety injectio            injectionn flow to establis establish h conditions conditio  ns for SI termina terminationtion and minimiz minimizes es thermal stresses that may be generated.
* AFW-V2-16A
RNP DIFFER DIFFERENC ENCES ES/RE/REASASONONS S Step 7 of the RNP procedure represents step 2.a of the ERG. The RNP step has been split into multiple multiple steps in order to eliminaeliminatete the actions contained in the ERG Caution      Caution at step 2 and to provide provide for other Human Factors  Factors concern concernss associated with the ERG step.
-SIG "A"
SSD DETER DETERMIN  MINAT ATION ION This is an SSD per criterion criterion 11.
* AFW-V2-16B
8-11   C2    WOG BASIS PURPOSE:
-SIG "B"
PURPO      SE:   To alert the operator to maintai maintain n a minimu minimum  m feed flow to minimiz minimize   e any subsequent thermal shock to SG compon        components ents BASIS:
* AFW-V2-16C
BASIS:
-SIG "c" 3) Go To Step 11. 33 RNP WOG BASIS/DIFFERENCES STEP STEP 7 2 WOG BASIS 8-11 C2 -?[ I EPP-16-BD PURPOSE: To control feed flow to minimize the effects of the cooldown due to the secondary depressurization and to subsequently control the transient.
        -?[    If feed flow to a SG is isolated Maintai Maintaining a "wet" ning a minimu wet conditio minimum condition, isolated and the SG is allowed feed flow to the SG could create signific m verifia verifiab n, thereby minimiz ble significant allowed to dry out, subsequent reinitiat ant thermal stress conditio conditionsns on SG compon le feed flow to the SG allows the compo nents to remain in minimizing ing any thermal shock effects if feed flow is increased.
BASIS: Depending upon the size of the effective break areas for the steam generators, the cooldown rate experienced after reactor trip could exceed 100&deg;F/hr.
reinitiation ion of components.
A reduction of feed flow to the steam generators has three primary effects: 1. To minimize any additional cooldown resulting from the addition of feedwater, 2. To prevent steam generator tube dryout by maintaining a minimum feed flow to the steam generators and, 3. To minimize the water inventory in the steam generators that eventually is the source of additional steam flow to containment or the environment.
ents.
The minimum feed flow of (S.04) gpm represents the value in plant specific units corresponding to 25 gpm. The 25 gpm value is representative of a minimum measurable feed flow to a steam generator.
RNP DIFFER DIFFERENC ENCES ES/RE/REASASONONS  S The RNP procedure places the caution or note in an action step to prevent actions within cautions and noted as required by the writer's      writers guide. The RNP steps for throttlin throttling g have been split since the throttle valves are differen  differentt for the SDAFW SDAFW Pumps and the MDAFW        MDAFW Pumps.
Plant specific values may depend upon flow instrumentation and the sensitivity of the controls on the feed flow. As steam flow rate drops, the feed flow will eventually increase the steam generator inventory.
I EPP-16-BD EPP-16-BD I                      Rev16 Rev 16                                                            Page 18 of 441 44 I
Feed flow is controlled to maintain steam generator narrow range level less than 50% to prevent overfeeding the steam generators.
 
In addition, as SG pressure and steam flow rate drop, RCS hot leg temperatures will stabilize and .start increasing.
Rev.
The operator controls feed flow or dumps steam to stabilize the RCS hot leg temperatures.
Rev. 2727 EPP-Foldouts EPP-Foldouts                              FOLDOUTS FOLDOUTS Page Page 33 ofof 16 16 Purpose and Purpose  and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)
This allows the safety injection flow to establish conditions for SI termination and minimizes thermal stresses that may be generated.
1.
RNP DIFFERENCES/REASONS Step 7 of the RNP procedure represents step 2.a of the ERG. The RNP step has been split into multiple steps in order to eliminate the actions contained in the ERG Caution at step 2 and to provide for other Human Factors concerns associated with the ERG step. SSD DETERMINATION This is an SSD per criterion
: 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This  procedure provides provides actions actions to to respond respond to to circumstances circumstances within within the EOP the   EOP Network Network which which are are time time independent.
: 11. WOG BASIS PURPOSE: To alert the operator to maintain a minimum feed flow to minimize any subsequent thermal shock to SG components BASIS: If feed flow to a SG is isolated and the SG is allowed to dry out, subsequent reinitiation of feed flow to the SG could create significant thermal stress conditions on SG components.
independent.
Maintaining a minimum verifiable feed flow to the SG allows the components to remain in a "wet" condition, thereby minimizing any thermal shock effects if feed flow is increased.
NOTE The Foldouts The  Foldouts do do NOT apply apply during during performance performance ofof the the FRPs.
RNP DIFFERENCES/REASONS The RNP procedure places the caution or note in an action step to prevent actions within cautions and noted as required by the writer's guide. The RNP steps for throttling have been split since the throttle valves are different for the SDAFW Pumps and the MDAFW Pumps. Rev16 Page 18 of 441 Rev. 27 EPP-Foldouts FOLDOUTS Page 3 of Purpose and Entry Conditions (Page 1 of 1) 1. PURPOSE This procedure provides actions to respond to circumstances within the EOP Network which are time independent.
FRPs.
The Foldouts do NOT apply during performance of the FRPs. 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS When directed by the EOP Network. Only one Foldout is applicable at a time. -END -16 Rev. 27 EPP-Foldouts FOLDOUTS Page 4 of CONTINUOUS USE FOLDOUT A (Page 1 of 5) 1. RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF BOTH conditions below are met. THEN stop all RCPs:
2.
* SI Pumps -AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW TO THE CORE
: 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY    CONDITIONS When directed When  directed by the EOPEOP Network. Only Only one Foldout is applicable at aa time.
* RCS Subcooling
at    time.
-LESS THAN 35&deg;F [55&deg;F] 2. SI ACTUATION CRITERIA IF EITHER condition below occurs. THEN Actuate SI and Go To PATH-l. Entry Point A:
                                            - END -
* RCS Subcooling
 
-LESS THAN 35&deg;F [55&deg;F]
Rev.
* PZR Level -CAN NOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER THAN 10% [32%] 3. AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA IF CST level decreases to less than 10%. THEN switch to backup water supply using OP-402. Auxiliary Feedwater System. 4. EMERGENCY COOLING WATER SWITCHOVER CRITERIA IF normal cooling is lost to any of the following components.
Rev. 27 27 EPP-Foldouts EPP-Foldouts                                    FOLDOUTS FOLDOUTS Page  4 off 16 Page4o    16 CONTINUOUS CONTINUOUS USE    USE FOLDOUT FOLDOUT A  A (Page (Page 11 of of 5) 5)
THEN establish emergency cooling water using the referenced procedure:
1.
* Charging Pump Oil Coolers -Use Attachment 1 of AOP-014. Component Cooling Water System Malfunction.
: 1. RCP TRIP RCP    TRIP CRITERIA CRITERIA
* SI Pump Thrust Bearing -Use Attachment 1 of AOP-022. Loss of Service Water.
                                                                                                        \
* MDAFW Pumps -Use Attachment 2 of AOP-022. Loss of Service Water. 16 \
IFIF BOTH BOTH conditions conditions below below are are met.
Rev. 27 EPP-Foldouts FOLDOUTS Page 5 of CONTINUOUS USE FOLDOUT A (Page 2 of 5) 5. DC BUS OR INSTRUMENT BUS FAILURE CRITERIA a. IF DC Bus failure has occurred.
met, THEN THEN stop stop all all RCPs:
THEN perform the following:
RCPs:
: 1) IF DC Bus A fails. THEN perform the following:
        **      SI Pumps SI  Pumps - AT
a) In the Charging Pump Room. Open CVC-35S. RWST TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION. b) WHEN CVC-3S8 is open. THEN close LCV-llSC.
                          -  AT LEAST LEAST ONE ONE RUNNING RUNNING AND CAPABLE CAPABLE OF OF DELIVERING DELIVERING FLOW FLOW TO THE TO  THE CORE CORE
VCT OUTLET from RTGB. c) In the E-l/E-2 Room. transfer Instrument Bus 2 to MCC-S. d) In the 4l60V Bus Room. trip the Exciter Field Breaker. e) In EDG A Room perform the following:
        **    RCS Subcooling RCS  Subcooling - LESS
* Trip EDG A Fuel Racks.
                                  -  LESS THAN THAN 35&deg;F 35&deg;F [55&deg;F]
* Close DA-21A AND DA-2SA. DG "A" AIR START OUTLET ISOLATION valves. 2) IF DC Bus B fails. THEN perform the following:
[55&deg;F]
a) In the E-l/E-2 Room. transfer Instrument Bus 3 to MCC-S. b) In EDG B Room. perform the following:
2.
* Trip EDG B Fuel Racks.
: 2. SI ACTUATION SI  ACTUATION CRITERIA CRITERIA IF EITHER IF  EITHER condition condition below below occurs.
* Close DA-21B AND DA-2SB. DG "B" AIR START OUTLET ISOLATION valves. c) Close CVC-460 A & B. LTDN LINE STOPs. b. IF MCC-S is de-energized.
occurs, THEN Actuate SI    SI and Go Go To To PATH-l, Entry PATH-l. Entry Point A:  A:
THEN transfer power source to DS Bus using the posted instructions at the Kirk Key Interlocked Breakers. (CONTINUED NEXT PAGE) 16 EPP-Foldouts FOLDOUTS CONTINUOUS USE FOLDOUT A (Page 3 of 5) 5 . (CONTINUED)
        **    RCS Subcooling RCS  Subcooling - LESS THAN 35&deg;F [55&deg;F]
: c. IF Instrument Bus failure has occurred.
        **    PZR Level PZR  Level - CAN NOT BE MAINTAINED MAINTAINED GREATER THAN 10% [32%]    [32%]
THEN perform the following:
3.
Rev. Page 1) IF Instrument Bus 4 fails. THEN maintain Steam Dump in the Tavg Mode of operation.
: 3. AFW  SUPPLY SWITCHOVER AFW SUPPLY    SWITCHOVER CRITERIA IF IF CST CST level level decreases to less than 10%.       10%, THEN switch to  to backup backup water water supply supply using using OP-402. Auxiliary Feedwater System.
: 2) IF a failure of only ONE of the below Instrument Busses occurs. THEN transfer the failed bus .to MCC-8.
4.
* Instrument Bus 1
: 4. EMERGENC EMERGENCY Y COOLING COOLING WATER WATER SWITCHOV SWITCHOVER  ER CRITERIA IF normal normal cooling cooling isis lost lost to to any any of of the the following components, components. THEN THEN establish establish emergency emergency cooling cooling water water using using the the referenced referenced procedure:
* Instrument Bus 2
procedure:
* Instrument Bus 3
        **    Charging Charging Pump Pump Oil Oil Coolers Coolers - Use
* Instrument Bus 4 27 6 of 3) IF more than ONE Instrument Bus requires transfer to MCC-8 for Nuclear Safety Concerns.
                                                    -  Use Attachment Attachment 11 ofof AOP-Ol4, AOP-014.
THEN strip the affected Busses using Attachment 14 of AOP-024. Loss of Instrument Bus. prior to transferring the Buss(es) to MCC-8. 16 Rev. 27 EPP-Foldouts FOLDOUTS Page 7 of CONTINUOUS USE FOLDOUT A (Page 4 of 5) 6. MSR ISOLATION CRITERIA IF ANY Purge OR Shutoff Valve does not indicate fully closed, THEN place the associated RTGB Switch to CLOSE. 7. EXCESS LETDOWN ISOLATION CRITERIA IF a Phase A Isolation signals occurs, THEN verify:
Component Component Cooling Cooling Water Water System System Malfunction.
* CVC-387, EXCESS LTDN STOP -CLOSED
Malfunction.
* HIC-I37, EXCESS LTDN FLOW -CONTROLLER AT 0% 8. INADVERTENT CV SPRAY ACTUATION CRITERIA IF a CV Spray Actuation occurs AND Containment Pressure has remained below 10 psig, THEN perform the following:
        **    SI SI Pump Pump Thrust Thrust Bearing Bearing - Use-Use Attachment Attachment 11 ofof AOP-O22, AOP-022. Loss Loss of of Service Service Water.
: a. Stop ALL RCPs. b. Stop CV Spray Pumps As Follows: 1) Momentarily place the CONTAINMENT SPRAY Key Switch to the OVRD/RESET position AND return to the NORMAL position.
Water.
: 2) Stop CV Spray Pumps 3) Close CV SPRAY PUMP DISCH Valves:
        **    MDAFW MDAFW Pumps Pumps - Use Use Attachment Attachment 22 of  of AOP-022, AOP-022. Loss Loss of of Service Service Water.
* SI-880A
Water.
* SI-880B
 
* SI-880C
EPP-F oldouts                                                                              Rev. 27 FOLDOU FOLDOUTS TS Page 55 of 16 CONTI CONTINUOUNUOUS USE FOLDOU FOLDOUT  T AA (Page 22 of 5)
* SI-880D 16 EPP-Foldouts FOLDOUTS CONTINUOUS USE FOLDOUT A (Page 5 of 5) 9. FAULTED S/G ISOLATION CRITERIA Rev. 27 Page 8 of IF both the conditions below are met, THEN perform the following:
: 5. DC BUS OR INSTRU INSTRUMEMENT NT BUS FAILURFAILURE  E CRITER CRITERIAIA
* Any S/G pressure is decreasing in an uncontrolled manner OR Any S/G has completely depressurized.
: a. .L IF DC Bus failurfailure  e has occur occurrred.
AND
ed, THEN perfor performm the follow ing:
* At least ONE S/G is intact. a. Reset SI. b. CLOSE the appropriate Auxiliary Feedwater isolation valves to the faulted S/Gs AND OPEN the associated breaker for the valves closed. S/G "A"
: 1) IF DC Bus A      A fails.
* V2-14A, SDAFW PUMP DISCH MCC-IO, CMPT -3C
fails, THEN perfor  performm the follow ing:
* V2-16A, AFW HDR DISCH(Norm Pwr) MCC-IO, CMPT -4C (Emerg Pwr MCC-9, CMPT -2ML) S/G "B"
a) In the Charg Chargiing ng Pump Room.Room, Open CVC-35S. 58, RWST TO CHARG    ING CHARGING PUMP SUCTIO SUCTION. N.
* V2-14B, SDAFW PUMP DISCH MCC-9, CMPT -lC
b) WHEN CVC-3 S8      58 is open.
* V2-16B, AFW HDR DISCH MCC-IO, CMPT -4F S/G "C"
open, THEN close LCV-l  LCV-1lSC.
* V2-14C, SDAFW PUMP DISCH MCC-IO, CMPT -4M
15C. VCT OUTLE OUTLETT from RTGB.
* V2-16C, AFW HDR DISCH MCC-9, CMPT -3J c. WHEN the faulted S/Gs dry out, THEN dump steam from intact S/G to control RCS repressurization.  
c) In the E-l/E-E-1/E-2 Room. Room, trans    ferr Instru transfe    Instrumment ent Bus 2 2 to MCC-S MCC-8..
-END -16 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 99. Given the following:  
d) In the 4l60V 416OV Bus Room. Room, trip the Excit      err Field Break Excite          Breakeer.
-The plant was operating at 100% RTP, when a Seismic event occurred and caused a leak in the Instrument Air header. -The crew has implemented AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR and AOP-021, SEISMIC DISTURBANCE.  
r.
-The reactor has been manually tripped and all PATH-1 Immediate Actions have been completed and verified.
e) In EDG A    A Room perforperformm the follow ing:
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the correct procedures the CRSS will direct or perform? A. Perform the actions of PATH-1 and AOP-021 concurrently.
* Trip EDG A    A Fuel Racks Racks..
B. Perform PATH-1 actions ONLY. AOP-017 and AOP-021 are NO longer applicable.
* Close DA-21A DA-21A AND DA-2SA  DA-25A.. DG DC "A" A AIR START OUTLE  T OUTLET ISOLAT ISOLATIONION valve valvess..
C. Perform the actions of PATH-1 and AOP-017 concurrently.
: 2) IF DC Bus B      B fails.
D. Perform the actions of PATH-1, AOP-017 and AOP-021 concurrently.
fails, THEN perfor  performm the follow ing:
99 G2.4.S OOlfEMERG PROCIPLAN/3/3.S/4.5/SROIHIGHl43.5INEW  
a) In the E-l/E-E-1/E-2 Room. Room, trans transfeferr Instru Instrumment ent Bus 3 to MCC-S MCC-8..
-200S/OMM-022-009 Given the following:  
b) In EDG B    B Room.
-The plant was operating at 100% RTP when a Seismic event occurred and caused a leak in the Instrument Air header. -The crew has implemented AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR and AOP-021, SEISMIC DISTURBANCE.  
Room, perforperform m the follow ing:
-The reactor has been manually tripped and all PATH-1 Immediate Actions have been completed and verified.
* Trip EDG BOG B  B Fuel Racks Racks..
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the correct procedures the CRSS will direct or perform? A. Perform the actions of PATH-1 and AOP-021 concurrently.
* Close DA-21B DA21B AND DA-2SB  DA-25B,. DG "B"B AIR START OUTLET ISOLAT ISOLATIONION valve valves s..
B. Perform PATH-1 actions ONLY. AOP-017 and AOP-021 are NO longer applicable.
c) Close CVC-4 CVC-46O 60 A  A && B.
C:I Perform the actions of PATH-1 and AOP-017 concurrently.
B, LTDN LINE STOPs.
D. Perform the actions of PATH-1, AOP-017 and AOP-021 concurrently.
: b. IF MCC-S MCC-5 is de-en de-ene  ergize rgized, d. THEN trans transfeferr power source to DS Bus using the posted instru    instruc  ction tions  s at the Kirk Key Interl      ocked Interlo cked Break Breake  ers.
The correct answer is C. A: Incorrect  
rs.
-PATH-1 is a higher priority procedure that will be implemented to verify the reactor is shutdown and the plant stabilized.
(CONTI NUED (CONTINUE    D NEXT PAGE)
AOP-021 is NOT a concurrent use procedure and is NOT required to be performed.
 
B: Incorrect
EPP-Foldout EPP-F  oldouts                                                                        Rev. 2727 FOLDO FOLDOUTS UTS Page 6 of 16 CONTINUOUS USE FOLDOU FOLDOUTT AA (Page 3 of 5) 55..   (CONTI NUED))
-AOP-017 is a concurrent use procedure and will be performed by a licensed operator when directed by the CRSS, concurrent with PATH-1 actions. AOP-021 is NOT a concurrent use procedure.
(CONTINUED
C: Correct -AOP-017 is a concurrent use procedure and will be performed by a licensed operator when directed by the CRSS, concurrent with PATH-1 actions. D: Incorrect
: c. IF Instru Instrume ment nt Bus failur failure e has occur occurred, red. THEN perfor performm the follow following ing::
-PATH-1 is a higher priority procedure that will be implemented to verify the reactor is shutdown and the plant stabilized.
: 1) IFIF Instru Instrume mentnt Bus 4 fails.
AOP-017 is a concurrent use procedure and will be performed by a licensed operator when directed by the CRSS, concurrent with PATH-1 actions. AOP-021 is NOT a concurrent use procedure and is NOT required to be performed.
fails, THEN maint    ain Steam Dump in the maintain Tavg Mode of operaoperation tion..
Exam Question Number: 99  
: 2) j IF a failur failuree of only ONE of the below Instru        ment Instrume  nt Busse Bussess occur occurs,s. THEN trans fer the failed failed bus .toto MCC-8 MCC-8..
* Instrume Instru mentnt Bus 11
* Instrume Instru mentnt Bus 22
* Instrume Instru mentnt Bus 33
* Instrume Instru ment nt Bus 4
: 3) IF more than ONE InstruInstrume ment nt Bus requi  res trans fer to MCC-8 requires                MCC-8 for Nucle Nucleaarr Safety Safety Conce rns.rns, THEN strip the affect      ed Busse affected  Bussess using Attach ment 14 of AOP-024.     24, Loss of Instru  ment Instrume  nt Bus.
Bus, prior to trans ferri ferrin ngg the Buss(
Buss(e es)     MCC-8.
s) to MCC8
 
Rev.
Rev. 2727 EPP-Foldouts EPP-Foldouts                                     FOLDOUTS FOLDOUTS Page 77 of Page      of 1616 CONTINUOUS USE CONTINUOUS          USE FOLDOUT FOLDOUT AA (Page 44 of (Page       of 5) 5)
6.6. MSR MSR ISOLATION ISOLATION CRITERIA CRITERIA IF ANY Purge Purge OR   Shutoff Valve
                            . Shutoff    Valve does does notnot indicate indicate fully fully closed, closed, THEN THEN place the place      the associated associated RTGB RTGB Switch Switch to to CLOSE.
CLOSE.
7.
: 7. EXCESS LETDOWN EXCESS      LETDOWN ISOLATION ISOLATION CRITERIA CRITERIA IF aa Phase IF      Phase A   Isolation signals A Isolation  signals occurs, occurs, THEN THEN verify:
verify:
        **    CVC-387, EXCESS CVC-387,     EXCESS LTDN LTDN STOP STOP - CLOSED
                                                  -  CLOSED
        **     HIC-137, EXCESS HIC-I37,      EXCESS LTDN LTDN FLOW FLOW - CONTROLLER
                                                  -  CONTROLLER AT AT 0%
0%
8.
: 8. INADVERTENT CV INADVERTENT        CV SPRAY SPRAY ACTUATION ACTIJATIONCRITERIA CRITERIA IF aa CVCV Spray Spray Actuation Actuation    occurs AND Containment Containment Pressure Pressure has has remain    ed  below remained below 10    10 psig, psig,  THEN perform the following:
following:
: a. Stop
: a. Stop ALL ALL RCPs.
RCPs.
: b. Stop CV
: b. Stop          Spray Pumps CV Spray   Pumps As Follow Follows: s:
: 1) Mome
: 1)          ntarily place Momentarily   place the CONTAINM CONTAINMENT             Key Switch ENT SPRAY Key   Switch to to the the OVRD/RESE OVRD/RESET T positio positionn AND return to the    the NORMAL NORMAL positio position.
n.
2)
: 2) Stop Stop CVCV Spray Spray Pumps Pumps
: 3) Close
: 3)    Close CVCV SPRAY SPRAY PUMP PUMP DISCH DISCH Valves Valves::
                  **    SI-88O SI-880AA
                  **   SI-880 SI-880BB
                  **   SI-88O SI-880CC
                  **    SI-880 SI-880DD
 
Rev.
Rev. 2727 EPP-Foldouts EPP-Foldouts                                    FOLDOUTS FOLDOUTS Page Page 88 ofof 1616 CONTINUOUS CONTINUOUS USE        USE FOLDOUT FOLDOUT AA (Page 55 of (Page         of 5)5)
~ 9.9. FAULTED FAULTED    S/C ISOLATION S/G     ISOLATION CRITERIA CRITERIA IF both IF   both the   conditions below the conditions          below areare met,met, THEN THEN perform perform the the following:
following:
                  ** Any Any S/GS/G pressure pressure is is decreasing decreasing in   in anan uncontrolled uncontrolled manne    r      Any manner OR Any S/G hasS/C  has completely completely depressurized.
depressurized.
AND AND
            ~
* At least ONE
* At  least    ONE S/G S/C is is intact.
intact.
: a. Reset
: a. Reset SI.
SI.
: b. CLOSE
: b. CLOSE the the appropriate appropriate Auxiliary Auxiliary Feedwater Feedwater isolation isolation valvesvalves toto the  faulted the faulted S/Gs S/Cs ANDAND OPEN OPEN thethe associated associated breaker breaker for for thethe valves valves closed.
closed.
S/C "A" S/G  A
* V2-14  A, SDAFW SDAFW PUMP DISCH
* V2-14A,                                            MCC-IO, MCC-1O, CMPT - 3C    -  3C
            **   V2-16A, AFW V2-16A,    AFW HDRHDR DISCH(Norm DISCH(Norm Pwr) MCC-IO,    MCC-1O, CMPT - 4C  -  4C (Emerg Pwr MCC-9,  MCC-9, CMPT - 2ML)
                                                                                      -    2ML)
S/C S/G B "B"
* V2-14 V2-14B,B, SDAFW SDAFW PUMP PUMP DISCH                   MCC-9, MCC-  9,    CMPT - 1C CMPT    -
lC
* V2-16  B, AFW AFW HDR
* V2-16B,           HDR DISCH DISCH                      MCC-IO, CMPT MCC-1O,    CMPT - 4F 4F S/C S/G C "C"
* V2-l4C V2-14C,. SDAFW SDAFW PUMP
* PUMP DISCH DISCH                  MCC-IO, CMPT MCC-1O,    CMPT - 4M
* V2-16 V2-16C,C, AFW AFW HDRHDR DISCH
* DISCH                     MCC-9, MCC-  9,    CMPT - 3J CMPT    -
3J c.
: c. WHEN WHEN the the faulted faulted S/Cs S/Gs dry dry out, out, THEN THEN dump dump steam steam from from intact intact S/C S/G to to contro control l RCS RCS repress    urization.
repressurization.
                                                    - - END END --
 
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08   NRC Written Written Exam Exam Given the
: 99. Given
: 99.          the following:
following:
The plant
        - The
        -              was operating plant was   operating atat 100%
100% RTP, RTP when when aa Seismic Seismic event event occurred occurred and and caused caused aa leak leak in the in  the Instrument Instrument Air Air header.
header.
The crew
        - The
        -        crew has has implemented implemented AOP-017, AOP-017, LOSS LOSS OFOF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR and and AOP-021, AOP-021, SEISMIC DISTURBANCE.
SEISMIC       DISTURBANCE.
The reactor
        - The
        -        reactor has has been been manually manually tripped tripped and and all all PATH-1 PATH-i Immediate Immediate Actions Actions have have been been completed and completed      and verified.
verified.
Which ONE Which      ONE (1)    of the (1) of the following following describes describes the the correct correct procedures procedures the the CRSS CRSS will will direct direct or or perform?
perform?
A. Perform the actions of PATH-1   PATH-i and AOP-021 concurrently.
concurrently.
B. Perform PATH-1 B. Perform        PATH-i actions ONLY. AOP-017AOP-Oi 7 and and AOP-021 AOP-02i are NO NO longer applicable.
C. Perform the actions of PATH-1   PATH-i and AOP-017 concurrently.
concurrently.
D. Perform the actions of PATH-1, PATH-i, AOP-017 AOP-Oi 7 and AOP-021 AOP-02i concurrently.
concurrently.
99 99
 
02.4.8OOlfEMERG G2.4.S     00 1/EMERGPROCIPLAN/3/3.S/4.5/SROIHIGHl43.5INEW PROC/PLAN/3/3.8/45/SRO/HIGHI43.5/NEW- 200S/OMM-022-009- 2008/OMM-022-009 Given the Given      thefollowing:
following:
The plant
    - The
      -        plantwas  was operating operating atat 100%100% RTP RTP when when aa Seismic Seismic event eventoccurred occurred andand caused caused aa leak leak inin the the Instrument Instrument Air  Air header.
header.
The crew
    - The
      -        crew has  has implemented implemented AOP-017,AOP-0i 7, LOSS LOSS OF  OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR      AIR and and AOP-021, AOP-021, SEISMIC DISTURBANCE.
SEISMIC           DISTURBANCE.
The reactor
    - The
      -        reactor has has been been manually manually tripped tripped and and all all PATH-1 PATH-i Immediate Immediate Actions Actions have have been been completed and completed          and verified.
verified.
Which ONE Which      ONE (1)  (i) of   the following of the  following describes describes thethe correct correct procedures procedures the the CRSS CRSS will will direct direct or or perform?
perform?
A. Perform the A. Perform          the actions actions of  of PATH-1 PATH-i and and AOP-021 AOP-02i concurrently.
concurrently.
B. Perform PATH-1 B. Perform          PATH-i actions actions ONLY.ONLY. AOP-017 AOP-0i7 and  and AOP-021 AOP-021 are are NO NO longer longer applicable.
applicable.
Cv Perform C:I   Perform the actions  actions of  of PATH-1 PATH-i andand AOP-017 AOP-0i7 concurrently.
concurrently.
D. Perform D. Perform the    the actions actions of PATH-1, PATH-i, AOP-017 AOP-0i7 and AOP-021 concurrently.
concurrently.
The correct The   correct answer answer is C.
A: Incorrect - PATH-1 A: Incorrect      -    PATH-i is a higher priority procedure that will be implemented to verify the reactor reactor is shutdown and the plant stabilized. AOP-021         AOP-02i is NOT a concurrent use      use procedure and is NOT required to be performed.
B:
B: Incorrect Incorrect - AOP-017 is a concurrent use procedure and will be performed by a licensed licensed operator when directed by the CRSS, concurrent with PATH-i              PATH-1 actions. AOP-02i AOP-021 is NOT a concurrent use procedure.
C: Correct C: Correct -   -      AOP-0i7 AOP-017 is     is aa concurrent concurrent use use procedure procedure and  and will be performed performed by by aa licensed operator when directed directed byby the CRSS, CRSS, concurrent concurrent with PATH-i PATH-1 actions.
actions.
D:
D: Incorrect Incorrect - PATH-i PATH-1 is   is aa higher higher priority priority procedure procedure thatthat will will be be implemented implemented to  to verify verify the the reactor    is  shutdown reactor is shutdown and     and thethe plant plant stabilized.
stabilized. AOP-0i7 AOP-017 is is aa concurrent concurrent useuse procedure procedure and    and will   be performed will be  performed by  by aa licensed licensed operator operator when when directed directed byby the the CRSS, CRSS, concurrent concurrent with  with PATH-i PATH-1 actions.
actions. AOP-021 AOP-021 isis NOT NOT aa concurrent concurrent useuse procedure procedure and   and isis NOT NOT required required toto be be performed.
performed.
 
Exam Question Exam     Question Number:
Number: 99 99


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
OMM-022,


OMM-022, Page 3S. KA Statement:
==Reference:==
Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs. History: New -Written for HLC-OS NRC exam. SRO -Assessment of plant conditions and determination of procedures required for mitigating those events. KAName: EMERGPROCIPLAN Tier/Group:
OMM-022, Page  Page 3S.38.
3 Importance Rating: 3.8/4.5 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH lOCFR55.43 link: 43.5 Source: NEW -2008 Learning Objective:
KA Statement:
OMM-022-009 8.3.14 Interface Between EOP Network and AOPs/Concurrent AOPs{ TC "Interface Between EOP Network and AOPs/Concurrent AOPs" \f C \l "3" } IOMM-022 1. Events which result in utilization of AOPs may later deteriorate to the point of implementing the procedures of the EOP Network. When this occurs, the potential exists for equipment to be improperly utilized and for resources to be unnecessarily diluted by continuing the subsequent actions of AOPs in effect or implementing AOPs which may become applicable while trying to concurrently proceed through the EOP Network. 2. With the exception of concurrent AOPs, the immediate and subsequent actions of AOPs need not be continued while within the EOP Network since the procedures of the EOP Network have been constructed to address critical safety functions without these AOPs. 3. The following AOPs are considered concurrent AOPs and should be performed while in the EOP Network:
KA  Statement: Knowledge Knowledge of of how how abnormal abnormal operating operating procedures procedures areare used used inin conjunction conjunction with with EOPs.
EOPs.
History: New History:   New - Written
                  - Written for for HLC-OS HLC-08 NRCNRC exam.
exam.
SRO - Assessment SRO   - Assessment of   of plant plant conditions conditions and and determination determination ofof procedures procedures required required forfor mitigating mitigating those events.
those    events.
KA Name:
KAName:               EMERG PROC/PLAN EMERGPROCIPLAN                   Tier/Group:
Tier/Group:          33 Importance Rating:
Importance Rating:     3.8/4.5 3.8/4.5                         RO/SRO Level:
RO/SRO   Level:     SRO SRO Cognitive Level:
Cognitive Level:     HIGH HIGH                             10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43  link:  43.5 43.5 Source:
Source:               NEW      2008 NEW - 2008 Learning Objective:
Learning Objective:  OMM-022-009 OMM-022-009
 
8.3.14 Interface 8.3.14  Interface Between Between EOP EOP Network Network and  and AOPs/Concurrent AOPs/Concurrent AOPs{         AOP5{Tc TC InterfaceBetween "Interface   BetweenEOP EOP Network Networkand and AOPs/Concurrent     AOPs \f\fCC \l\1 "3" AOPs/ConcurrentAOPs"                  3 } }
1.
: 1.         Events which Events     which result result in in utilization utilization of of AOPs AOPs may may later later deteriorate deteriorate to to the point the   point of of implementing implementing the   the procedures procedures of  of the the EOP        Network.
EOP Network.
When this When     this occurs, occurs, the    potential exists the potential     exists for for equipment equipment to      to be be improperly utilized improperly     utilized and and forfor resources resources to to be be unnecessarily unnecessarily diluted  diluted by   continuing the by continuing    the subsequent subsequent actionsactions of    AOPs in of AOPs         in effect effect or or implementing AOPs implementing        AOPs which which may may become become applicable applicable while    while trying trying toto concurrently    proceed    through concurrently proceed through the         the EOP EOP Network.
Network.
2.
: 2.        With the With    the exception exception of of concurrent concurrent AOPs, AC Ps, the the immediate immediate and    and subsequent actions subsequent      actions of of AOPs AOPs need need not be continued while within not  be  continued        while  within EOP Network the EOP     Network since since the procedures procedures of the EOP       EOP Network Network have have been constructed been     constructed to to address address critical critical safety safety  functions         without   these these AOPs.
: 3.       The following AOPs are considered concurrent AOPs and should be performed while in the EOP Network:
* AOP-005
* AOP-005
* AOP-014
* AOP-014
          ~>        *
* AOP-017
* AOP-017
* AOP-018
* AOP-018
* AOP-034 * .AOP-041 4. In the case of the above referenced AOPs, it is expected that the CRSS will continue with the EOPs while another licensed operator implements the AOP after any applicable immediate actions of the EOPs have been completed.
* AOP-034
The operator performing the AOP will notify the CRSS and RTGB operator of all RTGB controls to be manipulated and/or local actions to be taken which could impact the performance of the EOPs. Rev. 29 Page 38 of 541 HLC-08 NRC Written Exam 100. Which ONE (1) of the following is the basis for stopping ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) in FRP-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK? A. Subsequent actions will cause RCP operating requirements to be exceeded.
                    * .AOP-041 AOP-041 4.
B. It eliminates the heat input from the RCPs to extend the time available to restore feed flow before bleed and feed criteria is met. C. It minimizes the loss of RCS inventory when the PZR PORVs are OPENED to initiate bleed and feed. D. Stopping the RCPs reduces RCS pressure in the Cold Legs to maximize injection flow. 100 G2.4.1S 001IEMERG PROCfPLAN/3/3.3/4.0/SROILOW/43.1INEW  
: 4.        In In the case of of the the above referenced AOPs, itit is          is expected expected that the CRSS will continue with the EOP5        EOPs while another another licensedlicensed operator operator implements implements the  the AOP AOP after after any any applicable applicable immediate immediate actions of          of the the EOPs EOPs havehave been been completed. The      The operator operator performing the       the AOP AOP will will notify notify the the CRSS CRSS and and RTGB RTGB operator operator of  of all all RTGB RTGB controls controls toto be  manipulated be manipulated and/orand/or local local actions actions toto be be taken taken which  which could could impact impact thethe performance performance of   of the the EQ EOPs.
-200S/FRP-H.I-003 Which ONE (1) of the following is the basis for stopping ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) in FRP-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK? A. Subsequent actions will cause RCP operating requirements to be exceeded.
Ps.
By It eliminates the heat input from the RCPs to extend the time available to restore feed flow before bleed and feed criteria is met. C. It minimizes the loss of RCS inventory when the PZR PORVs are OPENED to initiate bleed and feed. D. Stopping the RCPs reduces RCS pressure in the Cold Legs to maximize injection flow. The correct answer is B. A: Incorrect  
QMM-022 IOMM-022                                      Rev.
-Depressurization of S/Gs is performed in an attempt to restore feed for core cooling, but these actions would NOT lower RCS pressure to below RCP operating conditions.
Rev. 29 29                                          Page 38 Page   38 ofof 54 541
B: Correct -Elimination of the RCPs as a heat source extends the time available before bleed and feed criteria is met by as much as 9 minutes. C: Incorrect  
 
-RCS pressure will decrease when the PZR PORVs are opened. Stopping the RCPs to eliminate the heat input to the RCS is the primary reason. D: Incorrect  
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08         NRC Written Written Exam Exam 100. Which 100. Which ONE      (1) of ONE (1)   of the the following following isis the the basis basis for for stopping stopping ALL ALL Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant Pumps Pumps (RCPs)
-Stopping the RCP does reduce pressure, but does NOT have an impact on injection flow. Exam Question Number: 100  
(RCPs)
FRP-H.1 inin FRP-H.1, RESPONSE RESPONSE TO       TO LOSS LOSS OF  OF SECONDARY SECONDARY HEAT  HEAT SINK?
SINK?
A. Subsequent actions A. Subsequent       actions will will cause cause RCP RCP operating operating requirements requirements to to be be exceeded.
exceeded.
B. ItIt eliminates B.       eliminates the the heat heat input input from from the the RCPs RCPs to to extend extend the the time time available available to to restore restore feed feed flow flow before bleed before  bleed and and feed feed criteria criteria isis met.
met.
C. ItIt minimizes C.       minimizes thethe loss loss of of RCS    inventory when RCS inventory       when thethe PZR PZR PORVs PORVs are are OPENED OPENED to    to initiate initiate bleed bleed and feed.
and  feed.
D. Stopping D. Stopping thethe RCPs RCPs reduces reduces RCS RCS pressure pressure inin the the Cold Cold Legs Legs toto maximize maximize injection injection flow.
flow.
100 100
 
G2.4. 18 001IEMERG G2.4.1S     00 1/EMERG PROCfPLAN/3/3.3/4.0/SROILOW/43.1INEW PROCIPLAN/3/3 .3/4.OISRO/L0W143. 1/NEW - 200S/FRP-H.I-003
                                                                                - 2008/FRP-H. 1-003 Which ONE Which       ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following isis the the basis basis for for stopping stopping ALLALL Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant Pumps Pumps (RCPs)
(RCPs) in FRP-H.1,        RESPONSE in FRP-H.1, RESPONSE TO              TO LOSS LOSS OF  OF SECONDARY SECONDARY HEAT   HEAT SINK?
SINK?
A. Subsequent actions A. Subsequent           actions willwill cause cause RCP RCP operating operating requirements requirements to  to be be exceeded.
exceeded.
B ItIt eliminates By       eliminates the the heat heat input input from from the the RCPs RCPs to to extend extend the the time time available available toto restore restore feed feed flow flow before bleed before      bleed andand feed      criteria isis met.
feed criteria       met.
C.        minimizes the C. ItIt minimizes       the loss loss of of RCS    inventory when RCS inventory       when the the PZR PZR PORVs PORVs are are OPENED OPENED to   to initiate initiate bleed bleed and feed.
and     feed.
D. Stopping D. Stopping the    the RCPs RCPs reduces reduces RCSRCS pressure pressure inin the the Cold Cold Legs Legs to to maximize maximize injection injection flow.
The correct answer is The                            is B.
A: Incorrect Incorrect - Depressurization
                  -   Depressurization of S/Gs is         is performed performed in in an an attempt attempt to restore restore feed for corecore cooling, but cooling,     but these actions would NOT            lower RCS NOT lower     RCS pressure to belowbelow RCPRCP operating conditions.
B: Correct -
B:              -
Elimination of the RCPs as a heat source extends the time available before bleed and feed criteria is met by as much as 9 minutes.
C: Incorrect C:   Incorrect - RCS pressure will decrease when the PZR PORVs are opened. Stopping the RCPs to eliminate the heat input to the RCS is the primary reason.
D: Incorrect - Stopping the RCP does reduce pressure, but does NOT have an impact on injection flow.
Exam Question Number: 100


==Reference:==
==Reference:==
FRP-H.1 BD, Pages 15, 16 and 48.
KA Statement: Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.
History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC exam.
SRO - Knowledge of of strategy strategy or or action in emergency procedures beyond immediate    immediate actions.
KA  Name:
KAName:                    EMERG      PROC/PLAN EMERGPROCfPLAN                          Tier/Group:
Tier/Group:          33 Importance Importance Rating:
Rating:      3.3/4.0 3.3/4.0                                  RO/SRO RO/SRO Level:
Level:        SRO SRO Cognitive    Level:
Cognitive Level:          LOW LOW                                      10CFR55.43 10CFR55.43 link:
link:    43.1 43.1 Source:
Source:                    NEW NEW - 2008 200S                            Learning Learning Objective:
Objective:  FRP-H.I-003 FRP-H. 1-003
2.4 Feeding 2.4      FeedingaaDry    DrySteam SteamGenerator Generator IfIfbleed bleedand andfeedfeedhas hasbeen beeninitiated, initiated,during duringrestoration restorationofofsecondary secondaryheat  heatsink, sink,feeding feedingaadry  drysteam steamgenerator generatormay      maybe  be necessary. IfIfthe necessary.            theevent eventwas  wasinitiated initiatedfrom fromhighhightemperature temperatureand      andhighhighdecay decayheat    heatconditions conditionsititisislikely        that  feedwater likely that feedwater flowwill willhave havetotobe  beestablished establishedtotoaahot,      hot,drydrysteam steamgenerator.
generator. AAhot,                                              definedas flow                                                                                                      hot,dry drysteam steamgenerator generatorisisdefined              asaasteam steam generator    in  which generator in which the primary  the    primaryside  sideofofthe thesteam steamgenerator generatorisisabove  above550 550F** F**and  andthethesecondary secondaryside      sidehas hasno  noliquid liquid inventory. Reestablishment inventory.        Reestablishmentofoffeedwater      feedwaterisisthe    themore moredesirable desirablemode  modeofofrecovery recoveryfrom    fromaalosslossof  ofsecondary secondaryheat      heatsinksink thanremaining remainingon      onbleed bleedand    andfeed feedand andestablishing establishingcold    coldleglegrecirculation recirculationfor  forlong longterm termcooling coolingbecause than                                                                                                                                                    becausethis    thiswill willbe be morelikely more      likelytotoavoid avoid corecoreuncovery.
uncovery. However, However, care    caremust mustbe  betaken takenwhenwhen re-establishing re-establishingfeedwaterfeedwaterflow      flowtoto minimize minimize the  effectsof the effects      ofthermal thermal shock  shockconsistent consistentwith  withthetheurgency urgencyofofthe  theneed needtotorestore restorethe    thesecondary secondaryside    side heatsink.
heat    sink.
Sincethe Since          heatremoval the heat    removal capability capabilityof    ofone one steam steam generator generatorisis alwaysalways greater greaterthan  thandecay decayheat,heat, ititisisadvisable advisabletoto reestablish feedwater feedwatertoto only    onlyoneone steam steam generator generatorregardless regardless of    ofthe the size sizeof  ofthe the plant plantorornumber numberof reestablish                                                                                                                                                ofloops.
loops. Thus, Thus, ifif aafailure failureinin an an SGSG occurs occurs due  due toto excessive excessivethermalthermal stresses, stresses,the  the failure failureisis isolated isolated toto oneone steam        generator.
steam generator.
IfIfbleed bleed and and feed feed has has beenbeen initiated initiated andand RCS RCS temperature temperature isis increasing, increasing, the  the re-establishment re-establishment of        offeedwater feedwaterflow    flow should be be limited limited to  to one one steamsteam generator generator and  and the the flow flow rate rate used used should                  high as as can can bebe made made available should                                                                                                    should be be as as high                                  available due  due to  to the urgency the    urgency of      the situation.
ofthe      situation. IfIf RCS RCS temperatures temperatures are        are stable stable or or decreasing decreasing when  when feedwater feedwater flow  flow is restored the flow is  restored      the    flow should be should          directed to be directed        to one one steam steam generator generator and    and the the rate rate should should be  be limited limited to to the the plant-specific plant-specific equivalent equivalent of      of25 25 - 100 100 gpm until  wide    range      level gpm until wide range level isis established. established. With    With stable stable or or decreasing decreasing RCS  RCS temperatures, temperatures, the      the feedwater feedwater flow    flow raterate isis limited to limited    to minimize minimize the  the potential potential impact impact of        excessive thermal of excessive          thermal stresses stresses since since aa direct direct measure measure of    of thethe steam steam generator generator temperature isis not temperature            not available.
available. Once  Once an  an indicated indicated wide  wide range range level level isis achieved achieved in    in the  affected    steam the affected steam generator,  generator, feedwater flow feedwater        flow can can be  be adjusted adjusted as    as necessary necessary to      to restore restore level level into into the the narrow narrow range range and and thereby thereby satisfying satisfying the  the requirements        for  a  secondary requirements for a secondary heat                heat sink.
sink.
Once feedwater Once    feedwater is        established, the is established,          the feeding feeding process process should  should continue continue until until the the RCSRCS temperature temperature indications indications are    are decreasing.
decreasing. At      At that that time time the the active active steam steam generator generator should  should be  be checked checked for  for symptoms symptoms indicating indicating aa faultedfaulted or  or ruptured condition.
condition. IfIf the  the active active steam steam generator generator is      is faulted or      ruptured, then or ruptured,      then feedwater feedwater shouldshould be ruptured                                                                                                                                              be established established to    to another    intact    steam      generator.
another intact steam generator. IfIf an intact              intact steam generator does          does notnot exist, then a decision should be                  be made made to    to use the use  the best best available available steam steam generator, which may be the active steam generator. Once the heat load                                              load has has beenbeen transferred to transferred      to aa backup backup steam  steam generator, the original steam generator should be isolated to prevent                                              further prevent further radiation releases.
radiation    releases.
Thus, the Thus,    the process process of        initiating feedwater to a dry ste~m of initiating                                      steam generator, as described here, is one that accounts                    accounts for  for the the fact that fact  that the the steam steam generator generator temperature may be above 550 F. The number of steam generators that                                                    that may be may      be fed fed inin a hot, a  hot, dry dry condition condition are  are limited limited and if RCS temperature is decreasing the flow rate is also limited so                                        so as as to to limit    the limit the thermal thermal shock shock to  to the    steam generator being fed. Subsequent the steam                                            Subsequent to securing SI and exiting FR-H.1 the                          the remaining remaining dry    dry steam steam generators generators may    may havehave their levels recovered at the direction of the plant engineering                    engineering staff in      in aa manner manner that  that will will minimize minimize thermal thermal shock shock to the steam generators. generators. This evaluation should consider              consider steam  steam generator generator materials materials and  and properties, properties, Technical Technical Specification Specification consideration considerations,        s, etc.
etc.
2.5 2.5 Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant Pump  Pump Operation Operation r
Operation Operation of 1
of reactor reactor coolant coolant pumps pumps will will affect affect the the dryout dryout time time of of the the steam steam generators generators due    due toto RCP RCP heat  heat addition addition and,  and, therefore, therefore, willwill affect affect the the time time at at which which operator operator actionaction to  to initiate initiate bleed bleed andand feed feed mustmust occur.
occur.
Studies Studies havehave beenbeen performed performed using    using thethe LOFTRAN LOFTRAN code      code (Reference (Reference 2)    2) to to assess assess the  the impact impact of  of RCP RCP operation operation on    on thethe time time PORVs PORVs will  will open open without without operator operator actionaction andand the  the time time to to steam steam generator generator dryout dryout forfor aa loss loss of of main main feedwater feedwater event event without without AFW AFW available.
available. AA four-loop four-loop plant plant typical typical of  ofcurrent current Westinghous Westinghouse            design was e design      was used.
used. ItIt had  had aa core core power    of  3411 power of 3411 Mwt      Mwt and and an  an RCPRCP steady steady statestate power power of    of 14 14 Mwt.
Mwt. Model Model FF steam steam generators generators were  were also also assumed.
assumed.
Thus, Thus, while while this this plant plant isis notnot identical identical to  to the the one one usedused inin References References 1,1, 33 and  and 4,  4, the the study studywill will bebe representativ representative          of e of Westinghous Westinghouse      e plant plant response response and    and sufficient sufficient to  to determine determinethe    the impact impactof  ofRCP RCP statusstatus on on the the time time available available before before operator operatoractionaction to to initiate initiate bleed bleed andand feed feed isis required.
required.
The The cases cases analyzed analyzedwere:  were:
Case Case 1:1:            RCPs RCPs running runningthroughout throughouttransienttransient Case Case2:2:            RCPs RCPstrippedtripped atatreactor reactortrip trip Case Case3:3:            RCPs RCPstrippedtripped55minutes minutesafter  afterreactor reactortrip trip
* 550&deg;F 550&deg;FisisaCltemperature temperatureevaluated evaluatedtotobe      below lowenough enoughthat  thatthermal thermalstress stresswould wouldnot  notlead leadtotoaafailurefailurewhen when feedwater      is  established feedwater is establishedtotoany              anyremaining remainingdry      drysteam steamgenerator.
generator.
IFRP-H.1-BD FRP-H.1-BD                                                                            Rev Rev22    22                                                              Page15 Page          15ofof70  70  I
~I The focus The    focus of  ofthe the analysis analysis was wasto      determinethe to determine      the additional additional time time available available to  to the the operator operator as  as aa result result of ofeliminating eliminating
>    RCP    heat  from    the RCP heat from the system before system    before action action to to initiate initiate bleed    and feed bleed and    feed became became necessary.
necessary. Thus,  Thus, thethe time time ofoftwo two events events was used to was used        to determine determine the  the impact impact of  of RCP RCP trip trip time.
time. TheThe two two events events areare 1)1) the the time time when when PORVs PORVs automatically automatically open open asas aa result result ofofthethe degraded degraded heat  heat transfer transfer capability capability of      the steam ofthe  steam generator generator and  and 2) 2) the the time time when when steam steam generator generator secondaries dry secondaries          dry out.
out.
Table 11 shows Table        shows aa comparison comparison of    of the the three three cases.
cases. Case  Case 11 represents represents aa situation situation wherewhere steam steam generators generators would would experience the experience        the earliest earliest dryout dryout due  due toto the  RCP heat the RCP      heat load load and and Case Case 22 isis where where the  the steam steam generators generators wouldwould experience the experience        the latest latest dryout.
dryout. The        extension inin dryout The extension          dryout time time from from Case Case 11 to  to Case Case 22 isis between between 77 and  and 99 minutes, minutes, depending upon depending          upon the the indication indication of      dryout that of dryout  that isis chosen.
chosen. The  The use use ofof the the time time to to PORV PORV opening opening willwill have have some some uncertainty due uncertainty        due to to the the uncertainty uncertainty inin predicting predicting non-equilibrium non-equilibrium effects effects inin the the pressurizer.
pressurizer. However, However, PORV PORV opening opening time isis probably time        probably the  the best best indicator indicator obtainable obtainable fromfrom thethe LOFTRAN LOFTRAN analysis analysis of  of the the time time available available untiluntil bleed bleed and and feed feed must be must          initiated.
be initiated.
TABLE 1I TABLE IMPACT OF IMPACT            RCP TRIP OF RCP      TRIP ON      LOSS OF ON LOSS      OF HEAT HEAT SINK SINK PARAMETER PARAMETER                                            CASE 1*
CASE      1*                        CASE2*
CASE    2*                                CASE CASE 3*  3*
PORVs OPEN PORVs        OPEN                                  30.75    mm 30.75 min                          37.83 37.83 min mm                                35.80 35.80 min mm STEAM GENERATOR STEAM        GENERATOR                              33.10 min 33.10    mm                          42.50 42.50 min mm                                40.93 40.93 min mm DRY DRY    OUT
* CASE 1:
CASE      1: All RCPs RCPs Running Running CASE 2: All RCPs Tripped at Reactor Trip CASE CASE 3: All RCPs Tripped 5 Minutes After Reactor Trip Reactor trip occurred at 28 seconds.
Loss of main feed occurred at 10 seconds.
Case 3, where the RCPs are tripped 5 minutes after reactor trip, is a best estimate expectation of when the operator                                        operator can can be expected to trip RCPs following a reactor trip based on guidance provided in this guideline. Thus, the                                            the extension extension in time to loss of heat sink symptoms is the most realistic that could be expected based on anticipated operator operator response. The extension to loss of secondary heat sink symptoms is about 5 minutes based on                                                  on PORV PORV opening time. This compares favorably with the extension already seen between Cases 11 and 2. Thus, operator opening action action to trip RCPs upon entering this guideline for loss of secondary heat sink can appreciably delay the need for                                            for bleed bleed and feed and the loss of secondary heat sink. Thus, time can be gained for the operator to establish aa means                                          means of of supplying supplying feedwater.
Delaying Delaying the loss of secondary heat            heat sink is not not the only reason for tripping RCPs. RCPs running can also                        also reduce reduce the the effectiveness effectiveness of      of bleed bleed andand feed. RCP    RCP heat heat input input toto the the RCS willwill result result inin increased increased steam  steam generation generation hindering hindering the the depressurizat depressurization    ion ofof the the RCS during during bleed bleed and and feed. The    The higher higher pressure pressure produced produced by    by RCP RCP operation operation will reduce reduce SI SI flow andand increase increase inventory inventory lostlost through through thethe PORVs.
PORVs. Therefore, Therefore, RCPs RCPs should should be  be tripped tripped ifif AFW AFW flow cannot cannot bebe established established immediately immediately after  after entering entering this this guideline.
guideline.
3.
: 3. RECOVERY            /RESTORATION TECHNIQU RECOVERY/RESTORATION                          TECHNIQUE      E The The objective objective of  of the the recovery/rest      oration technique recovery/restoration        technique incorporated incorporated intointo guideline guideline FR-H.1 FR-H.1 is  is to to restore restore and/or and/or maintain maintain adequate adequate secondary secondary heat    heat removal removal capability capability andand to to establish establish RCS RCS bleed bleed and and feed feed heat heat removal removal ifif secondary secondary heatheat removal removal capability capability cannotcannot be be maintained.
maintained.
The The following following subsections subsections provideprovide aa summary summary of    of the the major major categories categories of  of operator operator actions actions and and key key utility utility decision decision points points forfor guideline guideline FR-H.1, FR-H.1, RESPONSE RESPONSE TO      TO LOSS LOSS OF  OF SECONDAR SECONDARY            HEAT SINK.
Y HEAT        SINK.
3.1    High Level 3.1 High      Level Action Action Summary Summary AA high high level level summary summary of    of the the actions actions performed performed in    in FR-H.1 FR-H.1 isis given given below below in  in the the form form of of major major action action categories.
categories.
These      are These are described described below below inin more more detail.
detail.
MAJOR MAJOR ACTION ACTION CATEGORICATEGORIES    ES IN IN FR-H.1 FR-H.1 oo Attempt Attempt Restoration Restoration of    of Feed Feed Flow Flow To To Steam Steam Generators Generators oo    Initiation Initiation of  RCS Bleed of RCS      Bleed and and Feed Feed Heat Heat Removal Removal IFRP-H.1-BD FRP-H .1-80                                                                    Rev Rev 22 22                                                          Page 16 Page          of 70 16 of  70 I


FRP-H.1 BD, Pages 15, 16 and 48. KA Statement:
RNP    WOG    BASIS/DIFFERENCES RNP     WOG   BASISIDIFFERENCES STEP STEP     STEP STEP RNPDIFFERENCES/REASONS RNP       DIFFERENCES/REASONS TheRNP The     RNPprocedure procedurehas      hasbeenbeensplit splitinto intoseveral several steps stepsininorder ordertotoprovide providethe  thelevel levelofof detail required detail    requiredtoto satisfy satisfyNUREG-1358.
Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. History: New -Written for HLC-08 NRC exam. SRO -Knowledge of strategy or action in emergency procedures beyond immediate actions. KAName: EMERGPROCfPLAN Tier/Group:
NUREG-1358. The           Theintent intentofofthethe ERG ERG has has been been maintained maintained inin the   steps. Specifically thesteps.      Specificallyeach    each step step performs performsthe    thefollowing:
3 Importance Rating: 3.3/4.0 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: LOW lOCFR55.43 link: 43.1 Source: NEW -200S Learning Objective:
following:
FRP-H.I-003 r 1 2.4 Feeding a Dry Steam Generator If bleed and feed has been initiated, during restoration of secondary heat sink, feeding a dry steam generator may be necessary.
Step 7:7: Satisfies Step          Satisfiesthe  the ERG ERG step step2.a2.a Step 8:8: This Step          This step step determines determines and    and attempts attempts to     to isolate isolate an an AFW AFW pipe  pipe break break ififthis this isis the the cause of cause          the loss ofthe    loss of offunction.
If the event was initiated from high temperature and high decay heat conditions it is likely that feedwater flow will have to be established to a hot, dry steam generator.
function.
A hot, dry steam generator is defined as a steam generator in which the primary side of the steam generator is above 550 F** and the secondary side has no liquid inventory.
Step 9:9: Attempts Step        Attempts aa restartrestart of ofthe the MDAFW MDAFW Pumps. Pumps. Start Start of ofthethe pumps pumps should should havehave already been already       been attempted attempted inin Path-1.Path-I. This This step step will will also also attempt attempt to   to reset reset aa tripped tripped breaker breaker ifif that isis the that             reason the the reason       the pumps pumps have  have not not started.
Reestablishment of feedwater is the more desirable mode of recovery from a loss of secondary heat sink than remaining on bleed and feed and establishing cold leg recirculation for long term cooling because this will be more likely to avoid core uncovery.
started. IfIf the the start start isis successful successful the  the operator operator verifies flow verifies     flow and and exits exits thethe procedure.
However, care must be taken when re-establishing feedwater flow to minimize the effects of thermal shock consistent with the urgency of the need to restore the secondary side heat sink. Since the heat removal capability of one steam generator is always greater than decay heat, it is advisable to reestablish feedwater to only one steam generator regardless of the size of the plant or number of loops. Thus, if a failure in an SG occurs due to excessive thermal stresses, the failure is isolated to one steam generator.
procedure.
If bleed and feed has been initiated and RCS temperature is increasing, the re-establishment of feedwater flow should be limited to one steam generator and the flow rate used should be as high as can be made available due to the urgency of the situation.
Step 10:
If RCS temperatures are stable or decreasing when feedwater flow is restored the flow should be directed to one steam generator and the rate should be limited to the plant-specific equivalent of 25 -100 gpm until wide range level is established.
Step      10: Attempts Attempts to    to start start the the SDAFW SDAFW pump. pump. The  The action action verb verb isis listed listed asas "verify" verify therefore ifif local therefore         local actions actions are are required required to  to open open the  the valves, valves, this this should should be  be attempted.
With stable or decreasing RCS temperatures, the feedwater flow rate is limited to minimize the potential impact of excessive thermal stresses since a direct measure of the steam generator temperature is not available.
attempted. IfIf the the SDAFW pump SDAFW         pump overspeed overspeed tripped tripped has has actuated, actuated, even  even locally locally opening opening the  the steam steam supply supply valves will valves      will not not start start the the pumppump unless unless the the trip trip can can be  be reset.
Once an indicated wide range level is achieved in the affected steam generator, feedwater flow can be adjusted as necessary to restore level into the narrow range and thereby satisfying the requirements for a secondary heat sink. Once feedwater is established, the feeding process should continue until the RCS temperature indications are decreasing.
reset. IfIf the the start start is is successful successful the   the operator verifies operator       verifies flowflow andand exits exits the    procedure.
At that time the active steam generator should be checked for symptoms indicating a faulted or ruptured condition.
the procedure.
If the active steam generator is faulted or ruptured, then feedwater should be established to another intact steam generator.
Step 11:
If an intact steam generator does not exist, then a decision should be made to use the best available steam generator, which may be the active steam generator.
Step    Ii: This This step step provides provides local local actions actions for  for valve valve alignment alignment and   and local      start of local start   of the the MDAFW pumps.
Once the heat load has been transferred to a backup steam generator, the original steam generator should be isolated to prevent further radiation releases.
MDAFW         pumps. The    The local local start start function function over-rides over-rides many many of  of the the trip trip features features for for the the pumps and may be successful in                  in starting the pump.
Thus, the process of initiating feedwater to a dry generator, as described here, is one that accounts for the fact that the steam generator temperature may be above 550 F. The number of steam generators that may be fed in a hot, dry condition are limited and if RCS temperature is decreasing the flow rate is also limited so as to limit the thermal shock to the steam generator being fed. Subsequent to securing SI and exiting FR-H.1 the remaining dry steam generators may have their levels recovered at the direction of the plant engineering staff in a manner that will minimize thermal shock to the steam generators.
Step 12:
This evaluation should consider steam generator materials and properties, Technical Specification considerations, etc. 2.5 Reactor Coolant Pump Operation Operation of reactor coolant pumps will affect the dryout time of the steam generators due to RCP heat addition and, therefore, will affect the time at which operator action to initiate bleed and feed must occur. Studies have been performed using the LOFTRAN code (Reference
Step     12: Satisfies Satisfies the ERG    ERG step 2.d.
: 2) to assess the impact of RCP operation on the time PORVs will open without operator action and the time to steam generator dryout for a loss of main feedwater event without AFW available.
Step 13: Satisfies the ERG step 2.e.
A four-loop plant typical of current Westinghouse design was used. It had a core power of 3411 Mwt and an RCP steady state power of 14 Mwt. Model F steam generators were also assumed. Thus, while this plant is not identical to the one used in References 1, 3 and 4, the study will be representative of Westinghouse plant response and sufficient to determine the impact of RCP status on the time available before operator action to initiate bleed and feed is required.
Step DETERMINATION SSD DETERMINATION This is an SSD per criterion 4, 10, and 11.
The cases analyzed were: Case 1: RCPs running throughout transient Case 2: RCPs tripped at reactor trip Case 3: RCPs tripped 5 minutes after reactor trip
14 14    33    WOG WOG BASIS
* 550&deg;F is Cl temperature evaluated to be low enough that thermal stress would not lead to a failure when feedwater is established to any remaining dry steam generator.
          .-    PURPOSE:
I FRP-H.1-BD Rev 22 Page 15 of 70 I The focus of the analysis was to determine the additional time available to the operator as a result of eliminating RCP heat from the system before action to initiate bleed and feed became necessary.
          ~ PURPOSE:                  To stop RCPs in order to extend the time to restore feed flow to the SGs                                     SGs BASIS:
Thus, the time of two events was used to determine the impact of RCP trip time. The two events are 1) the time when PORVs automatically open as a result of the degraded heat transfer capability of the steam generator and 2) the time when steam generator secondaries dry out. Table 1 shows a comparison of the three cases. Case 1 represents a situation where steam generators would experience the earliest dryout due to the RCP heat load and Case 2 is where the steam generators would experience the latest dryout. The extension in dryout time from Case 1 to Case 2 is between 7 and 9 minutes, depending upon the indication of dryout that is chosen. The use of the time to PORV opening will have some uncertainty due to the uncertainty in predicting non-equilibrium effects in the pressurizer.
BASIS:
However, PORV opening time is probably the best indicator obtainable from the LOFTRAN analysis of the time available until bleed and feed must be initiated.
RCP RCP operation results in            in heat heat addition addition to the RCS    RCS water. By      By tripping the RCPs, the        the effectiveness effectiveness of    of the the remaining remaining water  water inventory inventory in    in the SGs SGs is  is extended, extended, which which extends extends the    the time time atat which which thethe operator operator actionaction to to initiate initiate bleed bleed and and feed must must occur.
TABLE 1 IMPACT OF RCP TRIP ON LOSS OF HEAT SINK PARAMETER PORVs OPEN STEAM GENERATOR DRY OUT
occur. ThisThis extension extension of    of time time isis additional additional time time forfor the the operator operator to    to restore restore feedwater feedwater flow  flow to to the the SGs.
* CASE 1: All RCPs Running CASE 1* 30.75 min 33.10 min CASE 2: All RCPs Tripped at Reactor Trip CASE 2* 37.83 min 42.50 min CASE 3: All RCPs Tripped 5 Minutes After Reactor Trip Reactor trip occurred at 28 seconds. Loss of main feed occurred at 10 seconds. CASE 3* 35.80 min 40.93 min Case 3, where the RCPs are tripped 5 minutes after reactor trip, is a best estimate expectation of when the operator can be expected to trip RCPs following a reactor trip based on guidance provided in this guideline.
SGs. Additional Additional information information is    is provided provided in    in subsection subsection 2.5,  2.5, Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant Pump Pump Operation, Operation, of  of this this background background document.
Thus, the extension in time to loss of heat sink symptoms is the most realistic that could be expected based on anticipated operator response.
document.
The extension to loss of secondary heat sink symptoms is about 5 minutes based on PORV opening time. This compares favorably with the extension already seen between Cases 1 and 2. Thus, operator action to trip RCPs upon entering this guideline for loss of secondary heat sink can appreciably delay the need for bleed and feed and the loss of secondary heat sink. Thus, time can be gained for the operator to establish a means of supplying feedwater.
KNOWLED KNOWLEDGE:      GE:
Delaying the loss of secondary heat sink is not the only reason for tripping RCPs. RCPs running can also reduce the effectiveness of bleed and feed. RCP heat input to the RCS will result in increased steam generation hindering the depressurization of the RCS during bleed and feed. The higher pressure produced by RCP operation will reduce SI flow and increase inventory lost through the PORVs. Therefore, RCPs should be tripped if AFW flow cannot be established immediately after entering this guideline.
Stopping Stopping all   all RCPs RCPs will  will result result inin an an interim interim plantplant transient transient on on RCSRCS pressure pressure and and temperature temperature as      as natural natural circulation circulation flow flow conditions conditions are   are established established inin the  the RCS.
: 3. RECOVERY/RESTORATION TECHNIQUE The objective of the recovery/restoration technique incorporated into guideline FR-H.1 is to restore and/or maintain adequate secondary heat removal capability and to establish RCS bleed and feed heat removal if secondary heat removal capability cannot be maintained.
RCS. An  An example example of   ofthis        shown inin Figures this isis shown           Figures 66 and  and 77 where where RCS  RCS pressure pressure and    and temperature temperature rise     rise and and reestablish reestablish new   new steady steady state state conditions conditions prior prior to to steam steam generator generator dryoutdryout occurring.
The following subsections provide a summary of the major categories of operator actions and key utility decision points for guideline FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK. 3.1 High Level Action Summary A high level summary of the actions performed in FR-H.1 is given below in the form of major action categories.
occurring. IfIf rising rising RCSRCS pressure pressure and   and hothot leg leg temperatures temperatures are      are the the criteria criteria forfor initiation initiation ofofbleed bleed and   and feed    heat feed heat removal, removal, the   the operator operator mustmust evaluate evaluate whether whether these these conditions conditions are  are caused caused by     by an an RCP RCP trip trip or orbyby aa loss loss of ofsecondary secondary heat   heatsink sink inin order orderto to determine determine ififbleedbleed andand feedfeed heat heatremoval removal isis to  to bebe established.
These are described below in more detail. MAJOR ACTION CATEGORIES IN FR-H.1 o Attempt Restoration of Feed Flow To Steam Generators o Initiation of RCS Bleed and Feed Heat Removal I FRP-H .1-80 Rev 22 Page 16 of 70 I RNP WOG BASISIDIFFERENCES STEP STEP 14 3 RNP DIFFERENCES/REASONS The RNP procedure has been split into several steps in order to provide the level of detail required to satisfy NUREG-1358.
established.
The intent of the ERG has been maintained in the steps. Specifically each step performs the following:
RNP RNP DIFFERENC DIFFERENCES/REASONS ES/REASONS There There are  are essentially essentiallyno      nodifferences.
Step 7: Satisfies the ERG step 2.a Step 8: This step determines and attempts to isolate an AFW pipe break if this is the cause of the loss of function.
differences.
Step 9: Attempts a restart of the MDAFW Pumps. Start of the pumps should have already been attempted in Path-1. This step will also attempt to reset a tripped breaker if that is the reason the pumps have not started. If the start is successful the operator verifies flow and exits the procedure.
SSD SSD DETERMIN DETERMINATION   ATION This Thisisisnot notananSSD.
Step 10: Attempts to start the SDAFW pump. The action verb is listed as "verify" therefore if local actions are required to open the valves, this should be attempted.
SSD.
If the SDAFW pump overspeed tripped has actuated, even locally opening the steam supply valves will not start the pump unless the trip can be reset. If the start is successful the operator verifies flow and exits the procedure.
IFRP-H.1-BD FRP-H .1-80                                                          Rev Rev22    22                                                             Page48 Page       48of of70 70 I}}
Step 11: This step provides local actions for valve alignment and local start of the MDAFW pumps. The local start function over-rides many of the trip features for the pumps and may be successful in starting the pump. Step 12: Satisfies the ERG step 2.d. Step 13: Satisfies the ERG step 2.e. SSD DETERMINATION This is an SSD per criterion 4, 10, and 11. WOG BASIS PURPOSE: To stop RCPs in order to extend the time to restore feed flow to the SGs BASIS: I FRP-H .1-80 RCP operation results in heat addition to the RCS water. By tripping the RCPs, the effectiveness of the remaining water inventory in the SGs is extended, which extends the time at which the operator action to initiate bleed and feed must occur. This extension of time is additional time for the operator to restore feedwater flow to the SGs. Additional information is provided in subsection 2.5, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation, of this background document.
KNOWLEDGE:
Stopping all RCPs will result in an interim plant transient on RCS pressure and temperature as natural circulation flow conditions are established in the RCS. An example of this is shown in Figures 6 and 7 where RCS pressure and temperature rise and reestablish new steady state conditions prior to steam generator dryout occurring.
If rising RCS pressure and hot leg temperatures are the criteria for initiation of bleed and feed heat removal, the operator must evaluate whether these conditions are caused by an RCP trip or by a loss of secondary heat sink in order to determine if bleed and feed heat removal is to be established.
RNP DIFFERENCES/REASONS There are essentially no differences.
SSD DETERMINATION This is not an SSD. Rev 22 Page 48 of 70 I}}

Latest revision as of 21:10, 11 March 2020

Initial Exam 2008-301 Draft SRO Written Exam
ML101970337
Person / Time
Site: Robinson Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/28/2010
From:
NRC/RGN-II
To:
Progress Energy Carolinas
References
50-261/08-301 50-261/08-301
Download: ML101970337 (183)
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Text

HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC Written Written Exam Exam Given the

76. Given
76. the following:

following:

- The

- plant isis operating The plant operating at at 100% RTP.

100% RTP.

All control

- All

- control systems systems areare in their normal in their normal alignments, alignments, with with the the exception exception of of PC-444J, PC-444J, PZR PZR PRESSURE which PRESSURE which isis in MANUAL.

in MANUAL.

PC-444J is

- PC-444J

- is in in MANUAL MANUAL due due to to erratic erratic control control when when in in AUTO.

AUTO.

The output

- The

- output of of PC-444J PC-444J driftsdrifts down down to to 20-25%.

20-25%.

MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL.

AOP-019, MALFUNCTION CONTROL.

AOP-025, RTGB RTGB INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT FAILURE. FAILURE.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on RCS pressure and the procedure used to mitigate the transient?

A. RCS Pressure increases. Enter AOP-019. AOP-01 9.

B. RCS Pressure increases. Enter AOP-025.

C. RCS Pressure decreases. Enter AOP-019.

D. RCS Pressure decreases. Enter AOP-025.

76 76

000008 G2.4.11 000008 G2.4. 11 OOllPZR 001/PZR VAPOR VAPOR SPACESPACE ACCI/l/l/4.0/4.2/SRO/HIGH/43.S/RNP ACCII1!l/4.0/4.2/SROIHIGHI43.5/RNP AUDIT AUDIT - 2007/AOP-019-002

- 20071A0P-019-002 Given the following:

Given The plant

- The

- plant is is operating operating at at 100%

100% RTP.

RTP.

All control

- All

- systems are control systems are in in their their normal normal alignments, alignments, with with the the exception exception of of PC-444J, PC-444J, PZR PZR PRESSURE which is PRESSURE is in in MANUAL.

MANUAL.

PC-444J is

- PC-444J

- is in in MANUAL MANUAL due due to erratic erratic control control when in in AUTO.

- The output of

- of PC-444J PC-444J drifts down down to 20-25%.

AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS RCS PRESSURE CONTROL.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENTfNSTRUMENT FAILURE. FAILURE.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on RCS pressure and the procedure used to mitigate the transient?

A RCS Pressure increases. Enter AOP-019.

A'I AOP-01 9.

B. RCS Pressure increases. Enter AOP-025.

C. RCS Pressure decreases. Enter AOP-019. AOP-01 9.

D. RCSRC5 Pressure decreases. Enter AOP-025.

The correct answer is A.

A: Correct - - As PC-444J output is reduced, it is calling for pressure to be raised. Pressure will rise as heaters turn ON and spray valves CLOSE. Malfunction is on the controller (NOT the instrument), AOP-01 AOP-019 9 should be used.

B: Incorrect - Transient direction is correct, but mitigating procedure is incorrect. (AOP-025 is for instrument failures)

C: Incorrect - Pressure transient direction is incorrect, procedure is correct.

D:

0: Incorrect Incorrect - BOTH

- BOTH transient direction and and procedure areare incorrect.

incorrect.

Exam Question Number: 76

Reference:

AOP-019, AOP-019, PagesPages 3-4;3-4; SD-059, SO-059, Page Page 17, 17, Figures Figures 66 and and 7, 7, AOP-025, AOP-025, Page Page 3.

3.

KA KA Statement:

Statement: Knowledge Knowledge of of abnormal abnormal condition condition procedures.

procedures.

History:

History: Modified Modified from RNP RNP bank changed stem bank - changed

- stem toto make make A A correct SRO SRO - Required

- Required to to assess assess conditions conditions and and select select appropriate appropriate procedure.

Qprocedure.

KA Name:

KAName: PZR V PZR VAPOR SPACE ACCI AFOR SPACE ACCI Tier/Group:

Tier/Group: 1/1 111 Importance Rating:

Importance Rating: 4.0/4.2 4.0/4.2 RO/SRO Level:

RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level:

Cognitive Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 link:

10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 43.5 Source:

Source: RNP AUDIT RNP AUDIT - 2007

- 2007 Learning Objective:

Learning Objective: AOP-019-002 AOP-019-002

Rev.

Rev. 13 13 AOP-019 AOP-019 MALFUNCTION MALFUNCTION OF OF RCS RCS PRESSURE PRESSURE CONTROL CONTROL Page Page 33 of of 17 17 Purpose Purpose and and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)

1.

1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This This procedure provides instructions instructions in in the event event RCS RCS pressure isis higher ORQ. lower than required for for current current plant conditions.

conditions.

This procedure is applicable in Modes 1, 2, and 3.

2. ENTRY CONDITIONS This procedure may be entered when RCS pressure deviates from the desired control band due to aa fault in pressure control components. (AOP-025 covers Instrument Failure)

- END -

Ai , i.* s,, C 2 AlL /

,/

1_i i/j zJ 7 9> c)

/.__t 7 ,

-;2 z,w,1

Rev.

Rev. 13 13 AOP-019 CONTROL MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL Page 44 of 17 17 STEP H INSTRUCTIONS I RESPONSE NOT RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I

NOTE Steps 1 and 22 are Immediate Action steps.

  • 1.
  • Determine If PZR PORVs Should Be Closed:
a. Check PZR pressure - LESS

- a. Verify OPEN at least one PZR THAN 2335 PSIG PORV and associated PORV BLOCK Valve:

  • PCV-455C AND 2 RC-536 OR
  • PCV-456 AND RC-535 WHEN RCS pressure is less than 2335 psig, THEN perform Step Lb.

l.b.

Go To Step 2.

b. Verify Both PZR PORVs - CLOSED

- b. IF any PZR PORV can NOT Qff be closed, THEN close its PORV BLOCK Valve.

2. Control The PZR SPRAY VALVES AND PZR Heaters To Restore RCS Pressure To The Desired Control Band
    • 3. Check PZR Pressure - UNDER

- IF PZR Pressure approaches a I

OPERATOR CONTROL Reactor Trip Setpoint, THEN trip the Reactor and Go To Path-1.

Path-l.

  • Low PZR Pressure - 1844 psig
  • High PZR Pressure - 2376 psig
    • OT~T OTT - Variable (TR-412)

- (TR-4l2)

SD-059 SD-059 PRESSURIZER PRESSURIZER SYSTEM SYSTEM 5.1.1 PZR 5.1.1 PZR Pressure Pressure Control (PZR-Figure 66 && PZR-Figure Control (PZR-Figure PZR-Figure 7) 7)

Pressure control Pressure control is is accomplished accomplished via via pressure pressure controller controller PC-444A PC-444A which which isis aa Proportional Proportional

++ Integral Integral controller; controller; the the Derivative Derivative section section has has been been defeated.

defeated. This This means means the the controller controller develops an develops an output output signal that is signal that is determined determined by by how how far far pressure is is from from setpoint setpoint (Proportional) and (Proportional) and how long the pressure how long pressure hashas been away away from from setpoint setpoint (Integral).

(Integral).

PT-444 PT -444 sends a pressure signal to PC-444A which is compared to the pressure setpoint PC-444J which is controlled on the RTGB. PC-444J is a Hagan Manual-developed by PC:-444J Auto station with a 10 10 turn pot capable of developing a control setpoint over the entire pressure range of PT PT-444.

-444. PTPT-444

-444 ranges from 2500 to 1700 1700 psig therefore PC-444J is capable of 800 psi range of control. For Example if the operator desires the controller to maintain normal pressure of 2235 psig the pot setting would be determined as follows:

2235 - 1700 ** 10 == 6.69 on the 10 turn pot.

800 PC-4441 (setpoint signal) is sent to PC-444A to be compared to the actual The output of PC-444J pressure. PC-444A has a gain of 2 which effectively cuts in half the range of control of PZR pressure to 400 psi around the setpoint determined by PC-444J. The controller output is then directed to the proportional heaters, spray valves via controllers PC-444C and PC- PC 444D, backup heaters, PZR PORV 456 and PI-458 P1-458 and is displayed on the meter on PC-4441 444J The components operated by PC-444A operate at a fixed deviation from setpoint or controller output as observed on the meter on PC-4441, PC-444J, no matter what setpoint is dialed in on PC-444J. For example the backup heaters are set to turn on 25 psi below set pressure.

If set pressure is 2235 psig, their setpoint would be 2210 psig and the control output when they came on would be as follows:

2210-2035 =

= .4375 or 43.75% demand 400 If the pot on PC-444J were then set at 6.25 this would give a set pressure of 2200 psig.

If When the output of PC-444A PC-444A was at 43.75% the backup heaters would come on, pressure would be 2175 psig; 25 psi below set pressure. The setpoints normally listed for heater, spray, and PCV-456 PCV-456 setpoints are based on a set pressure of 2235 psig where PC-4441 PC-444J is normally set.

As stated stated before, PC-444A PC-444A is is a Proportional + + Integral controller, therefore controller output may not correspond exactly to the pressure monitored monitored by the operator.

operator. If If pressure pressure is away from setpoint for an extended extended period of time the controller output may saturate satunite while increasing increasing its output trying to return pressure to setpoint.

setpoint.

PZR PZR Page Page 17 of 27 17 of 27 Revision 99 Revision INFORMAT INFORMATION ION USE ONLY

PRES SURE CONTROLLER PRESSURE CONTROLLER PZR-FIGURE-6 PZR-FIGURE-6 PZR Press PZR Press Lo Press La Press (213)

(2/3)

< 2000 psiu

<2000 psiO PZR Press PZR Press Channel 445 Channel 445 PZR Press Channel 444 Adjustable Press

}~.-- Re'erence Setpoint Satpoint

, .....;.. . Normal 2236 PZR Control HilLo Press Manual 2310/2185 L-(!) 'I 2336 PZR Press ControBer Controller PCV-455C PCV-4S6 Hi Output BUH', on I-li Output PCV-453C PCV-456 2310 2310 2210 Spray Spray Proportional Proportonat Valva Valve Heaters Helter.

I pzrfoa pzrfO8 I INFORMATION INFORMATION USE USE ONLY ONLY

PC-444A CONTROLLER PC-444A CONTROLLER PZR-FIGURE-7 PZR-FIGURE-7

-2500--

PC+44J P0444J smolm SETPOINT 243m.

)?j/~ \. 2235-170Q535 2235-1700 .. 535

'i:l3fff ' ,,

535/800 ...669 535/B0Q.66Q W!.#4." "

203~ I .660 X

.669 6.69 TO 6.119 X 10 TURN POT=

10 TURN POT=

MAINTAIN 2235 TO MAINTAIN 2235 I

I

,I

\

I

\

1700 1700-- \

\

\

\

\ 2035 - 2435 (pC444J@6.fi9) 1__ ( 400 POUND RANGE)  : I I - - -_ _ L_----I-T---~

CONTROL Hill.

MODULATION ON 43.75%

ON-43.75%

- ON -46.25% - 46.25% OPEN - 66.75%

OPEN-Sl.75% 70% 75%

OFF -4625%

OFF-46.25% OFF -53.75%

OFF-5l.75% - 66.25%

CLOSED - 56.25%

OETERMINAT1ON PETERMINATION OF EXPECTED COHTROti.R CONTROlLER OUTPUT

1. Btu flU HEATERS --ON ON =2210 3. PCV-4S5C PCV-455C OPENS",

OPENS = 2335 2210-2035 .. 175 2335-2035 ..x 300 300 175/400 '" .4375 OR 43.75% 300/400 300/400 = ....75 75 OR 75%

Z. SPRAY VALVE OPENING

2. 2260 OpENING'" 2250 2260-2035 .. 225 2260-2035 5625 OR 225/400 -**.5625 OR S&15%56.2S%

pzrf09 INFORMAT INFORMATION ION USE ONLY

Rev.

Rev. 10 10 AOP-025 AOP-025 RTGB RTGB INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT FAILURE FAILURE Page 33 of Page of 27 27 Purpose &

Purpose & Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)

1.

1. PURPOSE PURPOSE ThisThis procedure procedure provides provides instructions instructions for for failure failure of of process process variable transmitters variable transmitters which which provide input iEo RTGB provide input'to RTGB controllers.

controllers.

IF

j. an applicable transmitter an applicable transmitter fails fails while while the the controller controller is is operating operating in in manual manual OR is is being being fed fed from from an an alternate alternate channel.

channel, THENTHEN entry entry to to this procedure is is NOT required.

This procedure is applicable in Modes 1. 1, 2.

2, 3.

3, and 4.

2. CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS Failure of any process variable transmitter which affects Failure automatic operation of RTGB controllers with the following exceptions:

exceptions:

    • FT-6O5, RHR Flow FT-605.
    • LT-1l5, LT-115. VCT Level
    • LT-ll2, LT-112. VCT Level
    • PR PR NIS (NI-4l. 43. && 44)
42. 43, (NI-41. 42,

- END -

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2007 ROBINSON - REV FINAL

>'3034 034

.i ,,__ c'

\.Allel'tthe following: q4

  • The plant is at 100% power.
  • All control systems are in their normal alignments, with the exception of the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller, which is in MANUAL.
  • The Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller output drifts to2C. t~~. Lf)

L{J ~D

. Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on RCS pressure and the correct procedure actions to mitigate the transient?

pressure increases. Enter AOP-01 9, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control.

AOP-019, erify closed PZR PORV PCV-455C and control heaters and spray manually.

RCS pressure increases. Enter AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failures. Verify closed PZR PORV PCV-455C and control heaters and spray manually. Place bistables in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

C. RCS pressure decreases. Enter AOP-01 AOP-019,9, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control.

Verify closed PZR PORV PCV-455C and control heaters and spray manually.

D. RCS pressure decreases. Enter AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failures. Verify closed PZR PORV PCV-455C and control heaters and spray manually. Place bistables in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

~7b Tuesday, May 27, 2008 2:58:50 PM 4

HLC-08 NRC Written Exam

77. Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% RTP.

- VCT makeup is in progress.

- BOTH VCT level channels indicate 19 inches.

- The following indications are noted:

- BA Transfer Pump "A"

- A is running.

- PW Pump "A"

- A is running.

- FCV-113A, BA FLOW, OPEN.

FCV-1 1 3B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, CLOSED.

- FCV-113B,

- FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE, OPEN.

- FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, CLOSED.

- 45 seconds later:

- APP-003-D5, BA FLOW DEV alarm has illuminated.

- APP-003-E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV alarm has illuminated.

Which ONE (1) of the following has caused the alarms and what actions, if any, are required to mitigate the event?

A. The Charging Pump suction has swapped to the RWST. No actions required. Ensure LCO 3.5.4, RWST OPERABILITY is met.

B. FCV-113B FCV-1 13B has failed CLOSED. Implement AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL.

C. The Charging Pump suction has swapped to the RWST. Implement AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL.

FCV-1 13B has failed CLOSED. Implement AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR.

D. FCV-113B 77

000022 A2.03 000022 001/LOSS OF A2.03 OOllLOSS OFRX MAKE/1/1/3.1/3.6/SRO/HIGHI43.5JNEW - 2008/AOP-003-002 COOL MAKE/1I1I3.1I3.6/SROIHIGHJ43.5INEW RX COOL - 2008/AOP-003-002 Given the Given following:

the following:

The plant

- The

- plant isis operating operating at at 100%

100% RTP.RTP.

VCT makeup

- VCT

- makeup isis in in progress.

progress.

BOTH VCT

- BOTH

- level channels VCT level indicate 19 channels indicate 19 inches.

inches.

The following

- The

- following indications indications areare noted:

noted:

- BA

- Transfer Pump BA Transfer Pump "A" is running.

A is running.

PW Pump

- PW

- Pump "A"A is running.

is running.

FCV-113A, BA FLOW,

- FCV-113A,

- FLOW, OPEN.

- FCV-113B,

- BLENDED MU FCV-1 1 3B, BLENDED MU TO CHGCHG SUCT, SUCT, CLOSED.

CLOSED.

FCV-114A, PRIMARY

- FCV-114A,

- PRIMARY WTR FLOW FLOW DILUTE DILUTE MODE, MODE, OPEN.

FCV-1 14B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, CLOSED.

- FCV-114B, 45 seconds later:

- 4S APP-003-D5, BA FLOW DEV alarm has illuminated.

- APP-003-DS, APP-003-E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV alarm has illuminated.

- APP-003-ES, Which ONE (1) of the following has caused the alarms and what actions, if any, are required to mitigate the event?

A. The Charging Pump suction has swapped to the RWST. No actions required. Ensure LCO 3.5.4, RWST OPERABILITY is met.

3.S.4, FCV-1 1 3B has failed CLOSED. Implement AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR B FCV-113B B!'"

MAKEUP CONTROL.

C. The Charging Pump suction has swapped to the RWST. Implement AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL.

D. FCV-113B FCV-1 13B has failed CLOSED. Implement AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR.

The correct The correct answer answer isis B.B.

A: Incorrect A: Incorrect - Swapover

- Swapover setpoint setpoint isis 12.5 12.5 inches.

inches. NO NO swapover swapover should should have have occurred.

occurred. Action Action isis appropriate for swapover appropriate for swapover on on VCT VCT low low level.

level.

B: Correct B: Correct -- FCV-1 1 3B is FCV-113B is the the ONLY ONLY valve valve listed listed that that isis out out of position. Since of position. Since FCV-113B FCV-1 1 3B isis NOT operating NOT operating as as expected, expected, AOP-003 is is the the correct correct procedure procedure toto use.

use. VCT is is NOT at the swapover setpoint.

NOT setpoint.

C: Incorrect C: Incorrect - Swapover

- Swapover setpoint setpoint isis 12.5 inches. NO 12.5 inches. NO swapover swapover should should have have occurred.

occurred. Action Action isis appropriate for swapover appropriate swapover on on VCT low level.

low level.

- FCV-1 1 3B is D: Incorrect - FCV-113B is the ONLY valve listed that is out of position. Since FCV-113B FCV-1 1 3B isis NOT operating as expected, AOP-003 is is the correct procedure procedure to use.

use. AOP-017 is the appropriate procedure if air header pressure pressure was low, low, but FCV-114A FCV-1 1 4A fails CLOSED on a loss of instrument air.

Exam Question Number: 77

Reference:

APP-003-D5 and E5; AOP-003, Pages 3 and 10, AOP-017, Page 3, ITS 3.5.4.

KA Statement: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Failures of flow control valve or controller.

History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam.

SRO - Requires analysis of plant conditions and selection of mitigating procedure.

KA Name: LOSS OF RX COOL MAKE Tier/Group: III 1/1 Importance Rating: 3.1/3.6 3.113.6 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH IOCFR55.43 link:

10CFR55.43 43.5 Source: NEW - 2008

- Learning Objective: AOP-003-002

APP-003-D5 APP-003-D5 ALARM ALARM BABAFLOW FLOWDEV DEV ***

WILLREFLASH

      • WILL REFLASH***

AUTOMATICACTIONS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1.1. FCV-1 1 3B, BLENDED FCV-113B, BLENDEDMU MUTOTOCHGCHG SUCT, SUCT, CLOSES CLOSES CAUSE CAUSE 1.1. Improper blended Improper blended makeup makeup concentration concentration 2.2. Improper Boric Improper Boric Acid Acid Pump Pump operation operation 3.3. Improper control Improper control of of FCV-113A FCV-1 1 3A or positioner failure or positioner failure (BA (B.A. flow) flow) 4.

4. Excessive LIP Excessive AP across across Boric Boric Acid Acid Filter Filter OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS 1.
1. Boric Acid Boric Acid Flow Flow (FR-113)

(FR-i 13) 2.

2. Position of Position of FCV-113A FCV-1 1 3A 3.
3. RCS Temperature RCS Temperature (Tavg)

(Tavg) 4.

4. Reactor Power Reactor Power ACTIONS ACTIONS 1.
1. alarm is due to intentional operator action, THEN no other actions are necessary.

IF alarm IF 2.

2. required, THEN verify Boric Acid makeup stopped.

IF required, IF 3.

3. IF the IF the alarm alarm isis due due to a Malfunction of Makeup Control, THEN Refer to AOP-003.

4.

4. IF the IF alarm is the alarm is due to low boron concentration, concentration, THEN take manual control of RCS makeup, makeup, as as required.

required.

DEVICE/S ETPOINTS DEVICE/SETPOINTS 1.

1. FC-1 FC-113 13 /+/-0.2 1+/-0.2 gpm (Alarm will activate 45 seconds after Boric Boric Acid flow deviation of of 0.2 0.2 gpm gpm from from the the controller controller setpoint.)

setpoint.)

POSSIBLE POSSIBLE PLANT PLANT EFFECTS EFFECTS 1.

1. Inadvertent Inadvertent RCSRCS dilution dilution 2.
2. Tavg-Tref Tavg-Tref Deviation Deviation alarm alarm REFERENC REFERENCES ES 1.1. AOP-003, AOP-003, Malfunction Malfunction of of Reactor Reactor Makeup Makeup Control Control 2.2. CWD CWD B-i 90628, Sheet B-190628, Sheet 481, 481, Cable Cable XX IAPP-0 03 APP-003 Rev.

Rev. 37 37 I Page35 Page 35 of of53 I

531

APP-003-E5 APP-003-E5 ALARM ALARM MAKEUP WATER MAKEUP WATER DEV DEV AUTOMATIC ACTIONS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1.1. DILUTE MODE:

DILUTE MODE: FCV-114B, FCV-114B, BLENDED BLENDED MU MU TOTO VCT, VCT, closes closes 2.

2. ALT DILUTE ALT DILUTE MODE:

MODE: FCV-113B, FCV-113B, BLENDED BLENDED MU MUTOTO CHGCHG SUCT, AND FCV-114B, SUCT, AND FCV-114B, BLENDED BLENDED MUMU TO VCT, TO VCT, close close 3.

3. AUTO MODE:

AUTO MODE: FCV-113B, FCV-113B, BLENDED BLENDED MU MU TOTO CHG CHG SUCT, SUCT, closes closes CAUSE CAUSE 1.

1. Improper control Improper control ofof FCV-114A FCV-1 14A or or positioner positioner failure failure (P.W.

(P.W. flow) flow) 2.

2. Inadequate flow Inadequate flow from from Primary Primary Water Water Makeup Makeup Pumps Pumps 3.
3. Measured PW Measured PW flow flow isis not not within within 55 gpm gpm ofof set set PW PW flow flow (45 (45 sec.

sec. TD).

TD).

OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS 1.

1. Primary Water FlowFlow (FR-114)

(FR-i 14)

2. Position of FCV-114A Position FCV-i 1 4A for Primary Primary Water FlowFlow
3. Primary Water Makeup Pumps operating ACTIONS
1. IF alarm is due to intentional operator action, THEN no other actions are necessary.
2. IF the alarm is due to a Malfunction of Makeup Control, THEN Refer to AOP-003.

IF DEVICE/S ETPOI NTS DEVICE/SETPOINTS 1..

1 FC-114/+/-5gp FC-114 1+/-5 gpm m POSSIBLE PLANT EFFECTS 1.

1. Overboration of RCS during during blended makeup REFERENC REFERENCES ES 1.
1. AOP-003, Malfunction Malfunction of of Reactor Reactor Makeup Makeup Control Control 2.
2. CWD CWD B-i 90628, Sheet B-190628, Sheet 481, 481 , Cable Cable ZZ 1 APP-003 APP-003 Rev.

Rev. 37 37 43 of Page 43 Page 531 of 53

Rev.

Rev. 12 12 AOP-003 AOP-003 MALFUNCTION OF MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR REACTOR MAKEUP MAKEUP CONTROL CONTROL Page of 43 Page 33 of 43 Puroose and Purpose and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)

1.

1. PURPOSE PURPOSE The purpose The purpose of this procedure of this procedure is is to to provide provide instructions instructions inin the the event of event of aa malfunction malfunction of of the the Reactor Reactor Makeup Makeup Control Control System.

System.

2.

2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS This procedure This procedure is entered upon is entered upon VCT VCT level level OR makeup makeup anomalies.

anomalies.

- END

- END --

Rev.

Rev. 12 12 AOP-003 AOP-003 MALFUNCTION OF MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR REACTOR MAKEUP MAKEUP CONTROL CONTROL Page Page 10 10 of of 4343

STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I

19.

19. (CONTINUED)

(CONTINUED)

.~ e.

e. At the RTGB, At the RTGB, Verify Verify FCV-113B, FCV-113B, ~e.
e. II IF FCV-113B FCV-113B has has failed, failed, THEN THEN BLENDED BLENDED MU MU TO TO CHG CHG SUCT SUCT - OPEN

- OPEN perform perform the the following:

following:

1)

1) Place Place FCV-114B, FCV-ll4B. BLENDED BLENDED MUMU TO TO VCT, VCT, Control Control Switch Switch toto OPEN OPEN 2)
2) Restart Restart Automatic Automatic Makeup Makeup As Follows:

As Follows:

a) a) Momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM SYSTEM Switch to STOP b) Momentarily place the b)

RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch to START c) Verify Automatic Makeup is initiated d) Return to procedure and step in effect

f. Verify LCV-115A, LCV-IISA, VCT/HLDP TK DIV Valve - CLOSED (Positioned To The VCT)
g. Go To Step 21

Rev.

Rev. 35 35 AOP-017 AOP-017 LOSS LOSS OF OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR Page Page 33 of of 61 61 Purpose and Purpose and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)

1.

1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This procedure provides provides instructions instructions in in the the event event aa loss loss of of Instrument Air Instrument Air occurs.

occurs.

~

-*2.

2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS

~ a. Instrument

a. Instrument Air Air Header Header pressure pressure less less than than 85 85 psig.

psig.

~ System pipe break.

b. Instrument Air System

- END -

RWST RWST 3.5.4 3.5.4 3.5 EMERGENCY 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE CORE COOLING COOLING SYSTEMS SYSTEMS (ECCS)

(ECCS) 3.5.4 Refueling 3.5.4 Refueling Water Water Storage Storage Tank Tank (RWST)

(RWST)

LCO 3.5.4 LCO 3.5.4 The The RWST RWST shall shall bebe OPERABLE.

OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

APPLICABILITY: MODES MODES 1.

1, 2. 3. and 2, 3. and 4.

4.

ACTIONS ACTIONS CONDITION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION ACTION COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME TIME A. RWST boron A. A.1 Restore RWST to 88 hours0.00102 days <br />0.0244 hours <br />1.455026e-4 weeks <br />3.3484e-5 months <br /> concentration not OPERABLE status.

  • within limits.

OR OR RWST borated water RWST temperature not within 1limits.

imits.

B.

B. RWST RWST inoperable for B.1 8.1 Restore RWST to 11 hour1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> hour reasons reasons other than OPERABLE status.

Condition Condition A.

C.

C. Required Required Action Action and and C.1 C.1 Be in Be in MODE MODE 3.

3. 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> hours associated associated Completion Completion Time Time not not met.

met. AND AND C.2 C.2 Be in Be in MODE MODE 5.

5. .3636 hours0.0421 days <br />1.01 hours <br />0.00601 weeks <br />0.00138 months <br /> hours HBRSEP HBRSEP UnitUnit No.

No. 22 3.5-10 3.5-10 Amendment No.

Amendment No. 176 176

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam

78. During Mid-Loop
78. During Mid-Loop operations, operations, the the following following indications indications andand conditions conditions are are noted:

noted:

RHR Pump

- RHR

- Pump "A"A is is operating, operating, FCV-605, FCV-605, RHR HEAT EXCHANGER RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASSBYPASS is is in in AUTO.

AUTO.

FI-605 indicates

- FI-605

- indicates 3600 GPM and 3600 GPM oscillating +/-

and isis oscillating 100 GPM.

+/- 100 GPM.

RHR Pump

- RHR

- Pump discharge pressure is discharge pressure oscillating +/-

is oscillating +/- 30 PSIG.

30 PSIG.

RCS standpipes

- RCS

- standpipes indicate indicate -73 inches inches (RTGB)

(RTGB) and and -74 inches (LOCAL).

inches (LOCAL).

What conditions areare causing causing the oscillations oscillations and and the the actions actions necessary necessary to to stabilize stabilize the the RHR RHR system parameters?

RHR Pump The RHR Pump...

A. is in runout due to excessive flow. Reduce Reduce flow lAW GP-OOS, DRAINING THE REACTOR GP-008, DRAINING REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.

B. is cavitating due to limited suction and vortexing. Stop RHR Pump "A" A lAW AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).

C. is in runout due to excessive flow. Stop RHR Pump "A" A lAW GP-OOS.

GP-008.

D. is cavitating due to limited suction and vortexing. Reduce flow lAW AOP-020.

78 78

000025 A2.07 OOllLOSS 001/LOSS OF OF RHR/l/l/3.4J3.7/SROIHIGHl43.5INEW RHRI1/l/3.4/3.7/SRO/HIGHI43.5/NEW - 200S/AOP-020-002

- 2008/AOP-020-002 During Mid-Loop operations, the following indications and conditions are noted:

RHR Pump

- RHR

- Pump "A" A is operating, FCV-605, RHR HEAT FCV-605, RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS BYPASS is in in AUTO.

FI-605 indicates 3600 GPM and is oscillating +/-

- FI-605

- 100 GPM.

+/- 100

- RHR Pump discharge pressure is oscillating +/-

+/- 30 PSIG.

- RCS standpipes indicate -73 inches (RTGB) and -74 inches (LOCAL).

What conditions are causing the oscillations and the actions necessary to stabilize the RHR system parameters?

The RHR PumpPump... ...

A. is in runout due to excessive flow. Reduce flow lAW GP-008, DRAINING THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.

Bt B is cavitating due to limited suction and vortexing. Stop RHR Pump "A" A lAW AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).

C. is in runout due to excessive flow. Stop RHR Pump "A" A lAW GP-008.

D. is cavitating due to limited suction and vortexing. Reduce flow lAW AOP-020.

The correct answer is B.

A: Incorrect - Flow is NOT excessive, pump runout does NOT occur until greater than the design flowrate of 3750 GPM, therefore reducing flow is NOT necessary.

B: Correct - - Standpipe levels indicate -73 inches, which is below the point where pump cavitation is likely and is an entry condition for AOP-020. The first two steps of AOP-020 direct stopping the RHR pumps if below -72 inches, with flow instability or pump cavitation.

C: Incorrect - Flow is at the upper range, but NOT excessive or at runout conditions.

D: Incorrect - Standpipe levels indicate -73, which is below the point where pump cavitation is likely and is an entry condition for AOP-020. The first two steps of AOP-020 direct stopping the RHR pumps if below -72 inches, with flow instability or pump cavitation, not reducing flow. AOP-020 does NOT direct a reduction of flow.

Exam Question Number: 78

Reference:

SD-003, RHR, Pages 22 and 23, Figure 1; 1; AOP-020, Pages 3-4.

KA Statement: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Pump Cavitation.

History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC exam.

SRO - Requires analysis of plant conditions and selection of mitigating procedure.

KA Name:

KAName: LOSS OFRHR LOSS OF RHR Tier/Group:

Tier/Group: III 1/1 Importance Rating:

Importance Rating: 3.4/3.7 3.4/3.7 RO/SRO Level:

RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level:

Cognitive Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 link:

10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 43.5 Source:

Source: NEW - 2008 NEW - 2008 Learning Objective:

Learning Objective: AOP-020-002 AOP-020-002

SD-003 SD-003 RESIDUAL HEAT RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL SYSTEM SYSTEM limits. The limits. The RHRRHR System System can can be used to be used fast fill to fast fill the the Refueling Refueling Canal.

Canal.

For fast For fast fill fill of of the the refueling refueling cavity, cavity, the the RHR RHR System System isis lined lined upup for for the the RHR RHR PumpsPumps to to take suction take suction from from thethe RWST RWST through through Valves Valves SI-862A SI-862A and and B. B. The The reactor reactor vessel vessel head head isis removed and removed and used used for for shielding.

shielding. TheThe Refueling Refueling Canal Canal isis filled filled by by pumping pumping water water from from the RWST the RWST into theinto the system.

system. TheThe slow fill method slow fill method uses uses thethe SISI pumps pumps through through thethe RCS RCS hot leg.

hot leg.

In order In order to to drain drain thethe Refueling Refueling Canal, Canal, the the system system will will bebe lined lined up up to to take take water water from from thethe RCS hot leg through Valves RCS hot leg through Valves RHR-750 RHR-750 and and RHR-751 RHR-751 and and pump pump itit back back toto the the RWST RWST through Valves through Valves SI-863A SI-863A andand B.

B. When When the the level level in in the the Refueling Refueling Canal Canal isis equal equal toto aa prescribed value, the remainder prescribed value, the remainder of of the the water water in in the the Refueling Refueling CanalCanal will will be be removed removed by by draining to draining to the the Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant Drain Drain Tank Tank and/or and/or containment containment sump. sump.

6.5 6.5 Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant System/RHR System/RHR Level Level Monitoring Monitoring During outage conditions when the RCS/RHR level is is required to be maintained below the vessel flange, the level is monitored by RCS Loop 2 & & 3 standpipes in the containment and LT-403 and LT-404, which indicate level on the RTGB. This monitored level range is from the vessel flange down to the upper core plate (-125"). (-125).

The level at the center line of the RCS piping is -82 inches of water. If the level is

~

lowered below -72 inches, cavitation cavitation_of of the RHR Pumps is likely to occur. RHR pump tIiEtirge pressur iomtored.

discharge pressure is monitored on the IeTby RTGB oy P1-602A PI-602A and PI-602B. Recent Westinghouse studies have shown that vortexing could occur above -72 inches.

Westinghouse 6.6 Initiation of an S S Signal when aligned to the Injection Phase In the event of a SI signal, the RHR pumps A and B B will start and RHR-744 A and B B will open. The system will take suction from the RWST and circulate borated RWST water through the recirc. lines until RCS pressure decreases to a point where RHR pump shutoff head can force open the check valves to the RCS cold legs ( (-130 psig),

130 psig),

or until or until the operator secures the RHR system.

6.7 6.7 Precautions Precautions and and Operational Operational Limitations Limitations on on RHR

    • RCS RCS temperature temperature and and pressure pressure shall shall bebe less less than than 350°F 350°F and and 375 375 psig psig before before thethe R}{R RHR System System isis putput in in service, and the service, and the RHR RHR system system will will be be removed removed from from service service before before RCS RCS pressure pressure and and temperature temperature are are raised raised above above these these values.

values.

    • ToTo prevent prevent boiling boiling the the CCW CCW liquid liquid contained contained in in an an RHR RHR HX, HX, CCW CCW flowflow should should notnot be isolated be isolated to an RHR to an RHR HX HX when when thethe temperature temperature of of the the RHR RHR System System isis greater greater than than 200°F.

200°F. (CR (CR 95-00565) 95-00565)

RHR RHR Page 22 Page 22 of of45 45 Revision 14 Revision 14 INFORMAT INFORMATION ION USE USE ONLY ONLY

SD-003 SD-003 RESIDUAL HEAT RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL SYSTEM SYSTEM

    • Neither RHR-750 Neither RHR-750 nor nor RHR-751 RHR-75 1 will open unless will open unless the following conditions the following conditions areare satisfied:

satisfied:

The breakers

- The

- breakers forfor SI-862A SI-862A && Band B and SI-863 SI-863 A A && BB are are closed.

closed.

The control

- The

- control power power switches switches for SI-862A && Band for SI-862A B and SI-863 SI-863 A A && B B are are in in NORMAL.

NORMAL.

Valves SI-862A

- Valves SI-862A and and B are closed.

B are closed.

Valves SI-863A

- Valves

- SI-863A and and B B are are closed.

closed.

RCS pressure

- RCS

- pressure isis less less than than 445 psig.

445 psig.

    • SI-862A &

SI-862A & B, and SI-863A B, and SI-863A && B are interlocked B are interlocked so they cannot so they cannot bebe opened opened unless unless the the RHR loop RHR pressure is loop pressure less than is less than 210 210 psig.

psig.

    • When the the Residual Heat Removal System System is providing Core Core Cooling Cooling ANDANTI seal seal injection injection flow is desired desired to maintain a positive AP across a positive L'lP across the Thermal Thermal Barrier of the Reactor Coolant Pumps, letdown flow through HCV-142 and PCV-145 should be maintained to provide makeup to the VCT.
  • When RHR-757C or RHR-757D is closed, 3,350 gpm flow, indicated on FI-605, with one RHR pump running or 6,700 gpm flow with two RHR pumps running allowed/required by approved test procedures for shall not be exceeded, except as allowedlrequired which flowrates on FI-605 may be as high as 3800 gpm for one pump or 7600 gpm for two pumps.

~ .* When both RHR-757C and RHR-757D are open, 7Qgptotal as read from FI-605, FI-608A and FI-608B, 3750 gpm total per running pump FI-608B shall not be exceeded, except as allowed/required by approved test procedures for which total flowrates may be as allowedlrequired high as 4200 gpm for one pump or 8400 gpm for two pumps.

  • When running R}{R RHR Pumps with SI-863A and/or SI-863B open, RHR-744A and RHR-744B should be closed to prevent excessive RHR pump runout.
  • If CCW is not available to the RHR pump seal coolers, the RHR pumps pumps shall not be operated with pump discharge temperature greater than 135 OF. With CCW 135 °F.

available to the RHR pump seal coolers there is no time limit for running aa single pump pump with flow only only through the heatup recirculation line. It It will will be necessary necessary to rotate the the RHR pumps to avoid exceeding the 50°F 50°F ATL'lT limit limit between between RHR loops as stated stated inin GP-007.

GP-007.

~.

  • R}IR RHR pumppump flowrates of of less less than than 2,800 2,800 gpm have been gpm have been shown shown toto increase increase pressure pressure and and flow fluctuations fluctuations and and should should bebe avoided avoided when when plant plant conditions conditions permit.

permit. This This does not apply does not apply during during recirculation recirculation operation.

operation. (ACR (ACR 91-078)91-078)

RHR RHR Page Page 23 23 of of 45 45 Revision 14 Revision 14 INFORMAT INFORMATION ION USE ONLY ONLY

RHR RHRSYSTE M-CORE COOL SYSTEM-CORE ING LINEU COOLING LINEUPP RHR-FIGUR E- 1 RHR-FIGURE-l I *.. . 1/1-1-~--,

SI-887 TOTOSI AND SIANO CONTAINM ENT RHR*754B CONTAINMENT SPRAY SPRAYPUMP PUMP SUCTIONS SUCTIONS t.o l,.. -.'4! I FROM RWST

.;......:..--'-,,-"-FA

. ~~

MINIFLO'NRECIRC FROM CONTAINMENT SUMP RHR. HEAT.UP LINE

~

?"

~

""?"

t Ul o

FR.OMRCReLOOP FROM LOOP RHR-7448 51.8768 SI875B 2 2HOTHOTLEG lEG rhrfol rhrf01 INFOR MATION USE INFORMATION USE ONLY ONLY

Rev.

Rev. 2929 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS OF LOSS RESIDUAL HEAT OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)

COOLING)

Page Page 33 ofof 107 107

__STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I

1.

1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This procedure provides provides the the instructions instructions necessary necessary toto mitigate mitigate the the loss of loss of RHR RHR in in all all conditions conditions for for which which RHR RHR can can be be aligned aligned to to provide shutdown provide shutdown cooling.

cooling. This This includes includes loss loss of of RHR RHR cooling cooling for for reasons such as RCS reasons such as RCS leakage, leakage, loss loss of of power, power. loss loss of of Service Service Water Water or Component Cooling or Component Cooling Water, Water, RHR RHR pump pump cavitation, cavitation, and and inadequate inadequate flow or RHR flow abnormal reductions or abnormal reductions in in RHR RHR cooling.

cooling.

This procedure This procedure is is applicable applicable inin Modes Modes 4,4, 5,

5. and and 66 when when fuel fuel is is in in vessel.

the vessel.

the 2.

2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS Direct entry from any condition resulting in a loss of RHR

~ pump(s), ~HR HR pump cavitation, abnormal RHR flow or temperature eF3sive loss control, or excessive If of RCS inventory while RHR is aligned for shutdown cooling.

As directed by the following other procedures:

    • AOP-O05, Radiation Monitoring System, when a low level in the AOP-005, SEP exists due to an RCS leak with the SFP SFP SEP GATE VALVE open.
  • AOP-014, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, resulting in stopping of the RHR Pumps while in CSD.
  • AOP-016, AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, if less than 200°F and leakage exceeds Charging Capacity.
    • AOP-017, AOP-017, Loss Of Instrument Air, if the loss of Instrument Air has affected core cooling while on RHR.

- END

- END --

Rev.

Rev. 2929 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS OF LOSS OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)

COOLING)

Page Page 44 ofof 107 107

STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I

1.

1. Check RCS Check RCS Level Level - LESS LESS THAN THAN IF IF RCS RCS Level Level becomes becomes less less than than

-72 INCHES

-72 INCHES (69% FULL RANGE (69% FULL RANGE RVLIS)

RVLIS) -72

-72 inches inches (69% FULL RANGE (69% FULL RANGE RVLIS).

RVLIS), THENTHEN verify verify BOTH BOTH RHRRHR Pumps Pumps stopped.

stopped.

Go Go ToTo Step Step 3.

3.

~

- 2.

2. Verify BOTH Verify BOTH RHR RHR Pumps Pumps - STOPPED

- STOPPED 3.

3. Make PA Make Announcement For PA Announcement For Procedure Entry Procedure Entry NOTE FRP-S.1 is FRP-S.1 is NOT NQI applicable applicable forfor this event unless unless directed by the the CSFSTs.

CSFSTs.

4.

4. From The RTGB.

From RTGB, Verify Reactor IF the reactor does iQ

.LE NOT trip.

trip, Tripped As Follows:

Tripped THEN dispatch an Operator to to the the Rod Drive MG Set Room to to Open Open

REACTOR -

REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS A A AND AND B.B.

OPEN OPEN

    • Rod Position Rod Position indication - -

ZERO ZERO

    • Rod Rod Bottom Bottom lights - -

ILLUMINAT ILLUMINATED ED 5.

5. Check Check RCS RCS Level Level - DECREASIN DECREASING: G: IF either IF either PZR PZR PORV PORV isis failed failed open due open due to to loss loss of of input input from from
    • Pressurizer Pressurizer level level PT-500 OR PT-500 OR PT-5O1, PT-501. THEN THEN place place the the associated LTOPP associated LTOPP Arming Arming Switch Switch to the to the NORMAL NORMAL position.

position.

    • RCS RCS loop loop standpipe standpipe level level IF the the event event does does NOT involve involve aa loss of loss of Inventory, Inventory. THEN THEN GoGo To To OR Section E, Section E. Loss Loss OfOf RHR RHR Flow Flow OrOr Temperature Control.

Temperature Control.

,IF RHR RHR Pumps Pumps have have been been stopped stopped due to due to loss loss of of Inventory, Inventory. THENTHEN Go To Go To Step Step 6.

6.

    • Refueling Refueling Cavity Cavity Watch Watch report report

HLC-08 NRC Written Exam

79. Given the following:

in MODE 3.

- The plant is in

- The plant experiences a loss of 480V Bus E-1 and EDG "A"

- A does NOT start.

COW Pump "C"

- CCW

- C breaker has tripped on overload.

- CCW Pump "A"

- A is running.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the required actions?

A. Enter LCO 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM; Place the plant in MODE 5 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

B. Enter LCO 3.0.3; Place the plant in MODE 4 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.

C. Enter LCO 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM; Restore 11 CCW Train to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

D. Enter LCO 3.0.3; Place the plant in MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.

79

000026 G2.2.38 000026 G2.2.38 001ILOSS 001/LOSS OF OF CCW/1/1/3.6/4.5/SROIHIGH/43.1INEW CCW/1/1/3.6/4.5/SRO/HIGHJ43. 1/NEW - 2008/CCW-012

- 2008/CCW-012 Given the Given the following:

following:

The plant

- The

- plant isis inin MODE MODE 3. 3.

The plant

- The

- plant experiences experiences aa loss loss of of 480V 480V Bus Bus E-1 E-1 and and EDG EDG "A" A does does NOT NOT start.

start.

COW Pump

- CCW

- Pump "c" breaker has C breaker has tripped tripped on overload.

on overload.

CCW Pump

- CCW

- Pump "A" A isis running.

running.

Which ONE Which ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following describes describes the the required required actions?

actions?

A. Enter LCO A. Enter LCO 3.7.6,3.7.6, COMPONENT COMPONENT COOLING COOLING WATER WATER SYSTEM; SYSTEM; Place Place the the plant plant in in MODE MODE 55 within 72 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

hours.

B. Enter LCO 3.0.3; Place B. Enter Place the plant in MODE MODE 4 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.

Enter LCO C. Enter LCO 3.7.6, COMPONENT COMPONENT COOLING COOLING WATER SYSTEM; Restore Restore 11 CCW CCW Train to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

D Enter LCO 3.0.3; Place the plant in MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.

Dy The correct answer is D.

A: Incorrect - LCO 3.7.6 is correct entry for a single train of CCW INOPERABLE. INOPERABLE. LCO 3.7.6 Condition A is actually to restore an OPERABLE train of CCW within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

B: Incorrect - BOTH trains INOPERABLE

- INOPERABLE therefore LCO 3.0.3 must be entered, but time to get to MODE 4 is actually 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />, 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br /> is correct time to get to MODE 5.

C: Incorrect - LCO 3.7.6 is correct entry and action for a single train of CCW INOPERABLE.

INOPERABLE.

D: Correct - - CCW Pump A "A" is powered from the DS Bus, which is NOT a credited Safeguards power source. Both B "B" and C "C" Pumps are INOPERABINOPERABLE LE and LCO 3.7.6 does NOT NOT contain a condition for BOTH trains INOPERAB INOPERABLE, LE, therefore LCO 3.0.3 must be entered and the plant must be in MODE 55 in 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.

Exam Exam Question Question Number: 79

Reference:

Reference:

ITS 3.7.6; ITS ITS 3.7.6; 3.0.3, ITS ITS 3.0.3, 3.7.6 BD.

ITS 3.7.6 BD.

KA KA Statement:

Statement: Knowledge Knowledge of of conditions and limitations conditions and limitations inin the the facility license.

license.

History:

History: New New - Written Written for for HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC exam.

exam.

SRO SRO - Analysis Analysis of of current current plantplant conditions and application conditions and application ofof generic generic LCOLCO requirements requirements..

KA KA Name:

Name: LOSS LOSS OF OF CCW CCW Tier/Group:

Tier/Group: 1/1 1/1 Importance Rating:

Importance Rating: 3.6/4.5 3.6/4.5 RO/SRO RO/SRO Level:

Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Cognitive Level:

Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 link:

10CFR55.43link: 43.1 43.1 Source:

Source: NEW NEW - 2008 2008 Learning Learning Objective:

Objective: CCW-012 CCW-012

CCW CCW System System 3.7.6 3.7.6 3.7 PLANT 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Component 3.7.6 Component Cooling Cooling Water Water (CCW)

(CCW) System System LCO 3.7.6 LCO 3.7.6 Two Two CCW CCW trains trains powered powered from from emergency emergency power power supplies supplies shall shall be be OPERABLE.

OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

APPLICABILITY: MODES MODES 1.

1, 2.

2, 3.

3, and and 4.

4.

ACTIONS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME TIME A. One required CCW train A.1 ........ NOTE*

NOTE ........

inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS RCS Loops LoopsMO- MODE 4, for DE 4."

residual heat removal loops made inoperable

. - by CCW CCW..

Restore required CCW hours 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> train to OPERABLE status.

B.

B. Required Action Action and B.1 B.1 Be in Be in MODE 3. 3. 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> hours associated associated Completion Time Time of of Condition Condition AA AND AND not met.

not met.

8.2 B.2 Be in Be in MODE MODE 5.5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> 36 hours HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.

No. 22 3.7*16 3.7-16 Amendment No.

Amendment No. 176 176

LCO LCO Applicability Applicability 3.0 3.0 3.0 LIMITING 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION CONDITION FORFOR OPERATION OPERATION (LCO) (LCO) APPLICABILITY APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.1 LCO 3.0.1 LCOs LCOs shall shall bebe met met during during thethe MODES MODES oror other other specified specified conditions conditions in in the the App 1i cabi 1i ty,, except Applicability except as as provi ded in provided in LCO 3.0.2 and LCO 3.0.2 and 3.0.7.

3.0.7.

LCO 3.0.2 LCO 3.0.2 Upon Upon di scovery of discovery of aa fai 1ure to failure to meet meet anan LCO, LCO, the the Requi red Acti Required ons Actions of of the the associated associated Conditions Conditions shall be met, except as shall be met, except as provided provided in LCO in 3.0.5 and LCO 3.0.5 and LCOLCO 3.0.6.

3.0.6.

If the If the LCO LCO is is met met oror isis no no longer longer applicable applicable priorprior to to expiration expiration of of the the specified specified Completion Completion Time(s),

Time(s), completion completion of of the Required the Required Action(s) is not required required unless otherwise otherwise stated.

stated.

LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.3 When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are are not not met, met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE MODE oror other other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action Action sha shall11 be i ni ti ated wi thin beinitiatedwi thi n 1ihourtoplacet hour to place the unit, as app heunit, 1i cab1e, applicable, in:

a. MODE 3 3 within 7 7 nours; hours;
b. MODE 44 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />; and
c. MODE 55 within 37 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.

Specification are stated Exceptions to this Specification stated in in the the individual individual Specification Specifications. s.

Where corrective Where corrective measures measures are are completed completed thatthat permit permit operation operation accordance with in accordance in wi th the the LCO LCO or or ACTIONS, ACTIONS, completion comp1et i on of of the the actions act ions required by required by LCO LCO 3.0.3 3.0.3 is is not not required.

required.

LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.3 isis only only applicable applicable in in MODES MODES 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, and 4.

3, and 4.

LCO LCO 3.0.4 3.0.4 When an When an LCO LCO isis notnot met, met, entry entry intointo aa MODE MODE oror other other specified specified condition in condition in the the Applicability Applicability shall shall only only bebe made:

made:

(continued)

(continued)

HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.

No. 22 3.0-1 3.0-1 Amendment No.

Amendment No. 203 203

CCW CCW System System 8B 3.7.6 3.7.6 BB 3.7 3.7 PLANT PLANT SYSTEMS SYSTEMS 8B 3.7.6 3.7.6 Component Component Cooling Cooling Water Water (CCW)

(CCW) System System BASES BASES BACKGROUND BACKGROUND The The CCW CCW System System provides provides aa heatheat sink sink for for the the removal removal of of process process and and operating operating heatheat from from safety safety related related components components during during aa Design Design Basis Basis Accident Accident (DBA)

(DBA) or or transient.

transient. DuringDuring normal normal operation.

operation. the the CCW CCW System System also also provides provides this this function function for for various nonessential components.

various nonessential components, as as well well as as the the spent spent fuel fuel storage storage pool.

pool. TheThe CCW CCW System System serves serves asas aa barrier barrier to to the the release release of of radioactive byproducts byproducts between between potentially potentially radioactive systems radioactive systems and and the the Service Service Water Water System.

System, and and thus thus to the environment.

environment.

The CCW System consists of three pumps. pumps, two heat exchangers.

exchangers.

supply and return header.

a supply header, a surge tank.

tank, and associated associated piping. valves, and instrumentation.

piping, valves. instrumentation. The TjjB and "c" "B" and C CCVI CCW pumps are each powered by a separate safety separate..safe y related relatRcl blJs Liits..

_> The "A" A CCW Dump u is powered owered by the nonsafety nons related e ica e shutdown b~s.

aedlcafed b s. lfiee surge tank accommodates accommodates changes changes in water wa er volume vo ume in the system and ensures that sufficient sufficient net positive suction head is available for the the CCW CCW pumps.

pumps.

All CCW pumps automatically start on low pump discharge discharge header pressure. All CCW pumps in operation upon upon initiati initiation on of aa Safety Injection (SI) signal will continue to to operate operate as long as normal power is available. Upon loss loss ofof normal normal power. the B power, "8" and C "c" CCW pumps are automatically loaded loaded onto the emergency diesel generator (EDG) (EDG) buses buses asas long long as as present. If aa Containment Spray an SI signal is not present. Spray signal signal occurs after the EDG loading sequence sequence has beenbeen completed, completed.

the CCW the CCW pumps pumps are are stripped stripped from the buses. The The B "B" and and C "C" CCW pumps CCW pumps are not loaded onto onto the EDG buses as as part part ofof the the 51 loading SI loading sequence, sequence. however, however. they they are capable capable of of manual manual start when start when EDG EDG loads loads allow.

allow.

Additional information Additional information on on the the design design and and operation operation of of the the system. along system, along with with aa list list of of the the components components served, served. is is presented in presented in the the UFSAR, UFSAR. Section Section 9.2.2 9.2.2 (Ref.

(Ref. 1).

1). TheThe principal safety principal safety related re'lated function function of of the the CCW CCW System System is is the the removal of removal of decay decay heatheat from from the the reactor reactor via via the the Residual Residual Heat Heat Removal (RHR)

Removal (RHR) System.

System. This This may may bebe during during aa normal normal or or post post cooldown and accident cooldown accident and shutdown.

shutdown.

(continued)

(conti nued)

HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.

No. 22 BB3.7-36 3.7*36 Revision No.

Revision No. 00

HLC-08 NRC Written Exam

80. Given the following:

- The plant is in MODE 5 with RHR Pump "A"

- A in service.

- A loss of the Startup Transformer has occurred.

- ALL equipment functioned as designed.

- NO local actions have been performed.

- The Instrument Air Header is depressurized.

- The crew has implemented AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR.

AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING)

What is the plant response and what actions are required to restore core cooling?

FCV-605, RHR BYPASS FLOW and HCV-758, RHR DISCH FLOW fail... fail ...

A. OPEN; AOP-017 performs ALL required actions.

B. OPEN; Perform AOP-020 and AOP-017 concurrently.

C. CLOSED; AOP-01 AOP-017 7 performs ALL required actions.

D. CLOSED; Perform AOP-020 and AOP-017 concurrently.

80

000055 EA2.01 000055 EA2.0 1 ~Ol/STATION 001/STATION BLACKOUT/l/l/3.4/3.7/SROIHIGHl43.5INEW BLACKOUT/l/ 1/3.4/3 .7/SROIHIGH]43 .5/NEW - 2008/AOP-024-007

- 20081A0P-024-007 Given the Given the following:

following:

The plant

- The

- plant isis in in MODE MODE 55 with with RHR RHR Pump Pump "A" in service.

A in service.

A loss

- A

- loss of of the the Startup Startup Transformer Transformer has has occurred.

occurred.

ALL equipment

- ALL

- equipment functioned functioned as as designed.

designed.

NO local

- NO

- local actions actions have have been performed.

been performed.

The Instrument

- The

- Instrument Air Air Header is depressurized.

Header is depressurized.

The crew has implemented AOP-017, LOSS

- The

- LOSS OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR.

AOP-020, LOSS LOSS OF OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEATHEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)

COOLING)

What is the plant response and what actions are required to restore core cooling?

FCV-605, RHR BYPASS FLOW and HCV-758, RHR DISCH FLOW fail ...

fail...

A. OPEN; AOP-017 performs ALL required actions.

B. OPEN; Perform AOP-020 and AOP-017 concurrently.

C. CLOSED; AOP-017 performs ALL required actions.

D CLOSED; Perform AOP-020 and AOP-017 concurrently.

D~

The correct answer is D.

A: Incorrect - FCV-605 and HCV-758 both fail CLOSED on a loss of instrument air. AOP-017 will restore Instrument Air, but does NOT restart the non-running RHR pump.

B: Incorrect - FCV-605 and HCV-758 both fail CLOSED on a loss of instrument air. AOP-020 and AOP-017 must be used concurrently to restore core cooling. Correct procedure, but incorrect failure of RHR valves.

C: Incorrect - FCV-605 and HCV-758 both fail CLOSED on a loss of instrument air, but AOP-017 will NOT restart the non-running RHR pump.

D: Correct - - FCV-605 and HCV-758 both fail CLOSED on a loss of instrument air, AOP-017 and AOP-020 must be used concurrently to restore IA and restart the RHR pump because the SI sequencer is defeated when in MODE 5.

Exam Question Exam Question Number:

Number: 80 80

Reference:

AOP-017,

Reference:

AOP-017, Pages Pages 33 and and 36; AOP-020, Pages 36; AOP-020, Pages 3, 3, 4,60-62 4, 60-62.. ..

KA Statement: Ability KA Statement: Ability to to determine determine or or interpret interpret the the following following as they apply as they apply to to aa Station Station Blackout:

Blackout:

Existing valve positioning Existing positioning onon aa loss loss of of instrument instrument air air system.

system.

History: New History: - Wriffen for New - Written for HLC-08 HLC-08 NRCNRC Exam.

Exam.

SRO - Requires analysis SRO - Requires analysis of of plant conditions, prediction plant conditions, prediction of of subsequent subsequent failures failures during during abnormal abnormal and emergency plant plant conditions, conditions, selection selection of mitigating mitigating procedures.

procedures.

KA Name:

KAName: STATION BLACKOUT STATION Tier/Group:

Tier/Group: 111 ill Importance Rating: 3.4/3.7 Level:

RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level:

Cognitive Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 link:

10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 43.5 Source:

Source: NEW - 2008 Learning Objective:

Learning Objective: AOP-024-007 AOP-024-007

Rev.

Rev. 35 35 AOP-017 AOP 017 LOSS OF LOSS OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR Page Page 33 of of 61 61 Purpose and Purpose and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)

1.1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This procedure provides provides instructions instructions in in the the event event aa loss loss of of Instrument Air Instrument Air occurs.

occurs.

2.

2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS
a. Instrument
a. Instrument Air Air Header Header pressure pressure less less than than 85 85 psig.

psig.

b. Instrument
b. Instrument Air Air System System pipe pipe break.

break.

- END

- END - -

Rev.

Rev. 35 35 AOP-017 AOP-017 LOSS LOSS OF OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR Page 36 of Page 36 of 61 61 ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 11 MAJOR COMPONENTS MAJOR COMPONENTS AFFECTED AFFECTED BY BY LOSS LOSS OF OF IA IA (Page (Page 33 of of 5) 5)

6.

6. Isolation Valve Isolation Valve Seal Seal Water Water System System Components Components FAILFAIL POSITION POSITION
a. PCV-1922 A
a. PCV-1922 A &

& B, B, IVSW IVSW AUTO AUTO HEADER HEADER ISOLs ISOLs - OPEN

- OPEN 7.

7. Main Steam Main Steam System System Components Components FAIL FAIL POSITION POSITION
a. MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES - CLOSED -

LINE PORVs

b. STEAM LINE PORVs - CLOSED
8. Primary Sample System Components FAIL POSITION Primary PS-956 A
a. PS-956 A through H, PRIMARY SAMPLE ISOLATIONS ISOLATIONS - CLOSED 9.
9. Radiation Monitoring System Components FAIL POSITION
a. RMS-1,2,3 & & 4, R-11/R-12 ISOL VALVES - CLOSED -

10.

10. Reactor Coolant System Components FAIL POSITION a.
a. PCV-455 AA && B.

B, PZR SPRAYS - CLOSED

b. RC-516 && 553, 553, PRT TO GAS ANALYZER ANALYZER - CLOSED
c. RC-519
c. B, PW TO CV ISOs - CLOSED RC-519 AA && B, -

d.

d. RC-544, RV FLANGE FLANGE LEAKOFF - OPEN -

e.

e. RC-550, PRT NITROGEN RC-550, PRT NITROGEN SUPPLY SUPPLY - CLOSED

- CLOSED 11.

II. Residual Residual Heat Heat Removal Removal System System Components Components FAIL FAIL POSITION POSITION

a. HCV-142,
a. HCV-142, PURIFICAT PURIFICATION FLOW - CLOSED ION FLOW - CLOSED
b. HCV-758,
b. HCV-758, RHR RHR HX HX DISCH DISCH FLOWFLOW - CLOSED

- CLOSED c.

c. FCV-605, FCV-605, RHR RHR HX HX BYPASS BYPASS FLOW FLOW - CLOSED

- CLOSED

Rev, Rev. 2929 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS OF LOSS OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)

COOLING)

Page Page 33 ofof 107 107

[ STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I H RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 1.

1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This procedure provides provides the the instructions instructions necessary necessary toto mitigate mitigate the the loss of RHR loss of RHR in allin all conditions conditions for for which which RHR RHR can can be be aligned aligned to to provide shutdown provide shutdown cooling.

cooling. This This includes includes loss loss of of RHR RHR cooling cooling for for reasons such reasons such as as RCS leakage, loss RCS leakage, loss of of power, power. loss loss of of Service Water Service Water or Component or Component Cooling Cooling Water, Water, RHR RHR pump pump cavitation, cavitation, and and inadequate inadequate RI-JR flow RHR flow or abnormal reductions or abnormal reductions in in RHR RHR cooling.

cooling.

This procedure This procedure isis applicable applicable in in Modes Modes 4,4. 5, 5, and and 66 when when fuel fuel is is in in the vessel.

the vessel.

2.

2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS Direct entry from any condition resulting in a loss of RHR pump(s), RHR pump cavitation, abnormal RHR flow or temperature control, or excessive loss of RCS inventory while RHR is aligned for shutdown cooling.

As directed by the following other procedures:

  • AOPOO5, Radiation Monitoring System, when a low level in the AOP-005, 5FF exists due to an RCS leak with the SFP SFP 5FF GATE VALVE open.
  • AOPO14, AOP-014, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, resulting in stopping of the RHR Pumps while in CSD.

AOP-016. Excessive Primary Primary Plant Leakage, Leakage. if less than 200°F 200°F and leakage exceeds Charging Capacity.

    • AOP-O17, AOP-017. Loss Of Instrument Air, Air. if the loss of Instrument Air has affected core cooling while on on RHR.

- END

- END --

Rev.

Rev. 2929 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS LOSS OF OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)

COOLING)

Page 44 of Page of 107 107

STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 1.

1. Check Check RCS RCS Level Level - LESS LESS THAN THAN II IF RCS RCS Level Level becomes becomes less less than than 72 INCHES

-72 INCHES (69%

(69% FULL FULL RANGE RANGE RVLIS)

RVLIS) -72

-72 inches inches (69%

(69% FULL FULL RANGE RANGE RVLIS).

RVLIS), THEN THEN verify verify BOTH BOTH RHR RHR Pumps Pumps stopped.

stopped.

Go Go To To Step Step 3.

3.

2. Verify BOTH RHR Pumps - STOPPED

- STOPPED

3. Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry NOTE FRP-S.1 is NOT NQI applicable for this event unless directed by the CSFSTs.
4. From The RTGB.RTGB, Verify Reactor IF the reactor does NOT trip.

IE trip, Tripped As Follows: THEN dispatch an Operator to the Rod Drive MG Set Room to Open

OPEN

  • Rod Position indication - -

ZERO

  • Rod Bottom lights - -

ILLUMINATED

5. Check RCS Level - DECREASING:

IF either PZR PORV is failed open due to loss of input from

    • Pressurizer level PT-SOO OR PT-5O1, PT-500 PT-S01. THEN place the the associated LTOPP Arming Switch OR to the NORMAL position.
    • RCS loop standpipe level IF the event does NOT involve aa j.

Inventory. THEN Go loss of Inventory, Go To OR Secti~. Loss Of RHR Flow SectionE, Flow Or Temperature Control.

Temperature

    • RVLIS RVLIS IF RHR Pumps have been been stopped stopped OR due to loss loss of Inventory, Inventory. THEN THEN To Step Go To Step 6.

6.

    • Refueling Cavity Cavity Watch report

Rev.

Rev. 29 29 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS LOSS OFOF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)

COOLING)

Page 60 Page 60 of of 107 107 j STEP 1[ INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS Section Section E E

RESPONSE

RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED Loss Of Loss RHR Flow Of RHR Flow Or Or Temperature Temperature Control Control (Page (Page 11 of of 20) 20) 1.

1. Implement the Implement EALs the EALs 2.
2. Check CV Check Closure Status CV Closure Status -- Go Go To To Step Step 8.

8.

PENETRATIONS PENETRATIONS OPEN OPEN 3.

3. Check Refueling Check Refueling Cavity Cavity Level Level - - Go Go To To Step Step 8.

8.

29 INCHES OR GREATER BELOW THE OPERATING DECK 4.

4. Initiate CV Closure Initiate Closure Using OMM-033, CV Closure
5. Check SI Pumps - ONE SI PUMP

- Dispatch an operator to the AVAILABLE TO START FROM RTGB E-l/E-2 Room to prepare to E-1/E-2 verify the breaker Racked In AND Fuses Installed for ONE SI Pump when notified by the Control Room.

  • 6.

Check Core Exit TiCs T/Cs - LESS THAN Verify ONE SI Pump breaker is 200 FF 200°0 Racked In AND Fuses Installed.

Go To Step 44.

  • 7. Check Core Exit T/Cs TiCs - LESS THAN

- Verify ONE SI Pump breaker is 175° 175 0 FF Racked In AND Fuses Installed while continuing with step in effect.

8.

8. Check Reason For Check For Entry: Step 19.

Go To Step 19.

. LOW LOW FLOW FLOW OR

~.

. RHR RHR PUMP PUMP TRIP TRIP

Rev.

Rev. 2929 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS OF LOSS OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)

COOLING)

Page Page 6161 of of 107 107 H__STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS Section I I Section EE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED Loss Of Loss Of RHR RHR Flow Flow Or Or Temperature Temperature Control Control (Page (Page 22 of of 20) 20)

CAUTION CAUTION Changes in Changes in RCS RCS ptessure pressure may may result result in in inaccuracies inaccuracies in in RCS RCS Loop Loop Standpipe Standpipe indications.

indications.

9.

9. Check RHR Pumps - ALL STOPPED Observe the NOTE prior to to Step 1212 and Go To Step 12.

NOTE The intent of this procedure is to maintain the CV Purge in service if if Equipment Hatch is not installed.

the Equipment

10. Check power supply to at least Initiate CV Closure Using one RHR Pump - AVAILABL AVAILABLE: E: OMM-033. CV Closure.

OMM-O33,

- E-1 E-l (CMPT-22A (CMPT-22A))

OR

    • RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL PUMP PUMP BB

- E-2 (CMPT-26B))

E-2 (CMPT-26B

Rev.

Rev. 29 2,9 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS OF LOSS OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOwN COOLING)

COOLING)

Page 62 of Page 62 of 107 107 j__STEP_H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS Section Section EE I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I

Loss Of Loss Of RHR RHR Flow Flow Or Or Temperature Temperature Control Control (Page (Page 33 of of 20) 20) 11.

11. Determine RHR Determine RHR Status Status As As Follows:

Follows:

a. Check
a. Check CCW CCW - AVAILABLE

- AVAILABLE a.

a. GoGo To To Step Step 23.

23.

b. Adjust
b. Adjust FC-60S, FC-605, RHR RHR HX HX BYPASS BYPASS FLOW Controller FLOW Controller 0% 0% (Closed)

(Closed)

c. Adjust
c. Adjust HIC-7S8, HIC-758, RHR RHR HX HX DISCH DISCH FLOW, 0% (Closed)

> d. Attempt to start the standby d.

RHR pump Check RHR Pumps - ONE RUNNING

e. Check -
e. Observe the NOTE prior to to Step 10 and Go To Step 10.
f. Adjust
f. Adjust FC-605, FC-60S, RHR HX BYPASS FLOW Controller. To Restore Flow Between 3000 gpm And 3750 gpm 37S0 gpm
g. Adjust Adjust HIC-758, HIC-7S8. RHR HX DISCH FLOW, FLOW. To Obtain Desired Cooling Cooling

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Exam Exam

81. EPP-26,
81. EPP-26, LOSSLOSS OF OF DC DC BUS BUS "A" A contains contains this CAUTION CAUTION prior prior to to Step Step 1:

1:

CAUTION CAUTION Restoration of "Restoration of DC DC Control Control Power Power to to aa de-energized de-energized AC Bus Bus before before Steps Steps 16 16 through through 23 23 have have been completed may result in uncontrolled equipment starts."

starts.

41 60V Busses 11 and 2, 480V Busses 11 and 2A).

(Steps 16-23 strips all load breakers on 4160V Which ONE (1) of the following describes the basis for this CAUTION?

A. DC start contactors on some AC equipment may have latched to the START condition, allowing restart on restoration of AC power.

B. Breaker anti-pump features will NOT be available to protect the breakers and equipment upon restart.

41 60V Busses 11 and 2 and the busses downstream are de-energized with load breakers C. 4160V still closed. On power restoration, auto transfer could occur before the load breakers trip on Undervoltage, allowing connected equipment to start.

D. Breakers on equipment connected to busses downstream of 4160V 41 60V Busses 11 and 2 automatically re-close on restoration of AC power if their Undervoltage relays have been re-energized.

81 81

000058 G2.1.32 000058 G2.1.32 001ILOSS 001/LOSS OF OF DCDC POWERllI1I3.8/4.0/SROILOW/43.5INEW POWERI1/1/3.8/4.0/SROILOW/43.5/NEW - 2008/EPP-26-003

- 2008IEPP-26-003 EPP-26, LOSS EPP-26, LOSS OF OF DCDC BUS BUS "A" A contains contains this this CAUTION CAUTION prior prior to to Step Step 1: 1:

CAUTION CAUTION Restoration of "Restoration of DC DC Control Control PowerPower toto aa de-energized de-energized AC AC BusBus before before Steps Steps 1616 through through 23 23 have have been completed may result in uncontrolled been completed may result in uncontrolled equipment starts." equipment starts.

(Steps 16-23 (Steps 16-23 strips strips all load breakers all load breakers on on 4160V Busses 11 and 41 60V Busses and 2,2, 480V 480V Busses Busses 11 and and 2A).

2A).

Which ONE Which ONE (1)(1) of of the following describes the following describes thethe basis basis for for this this CAUTION?

CAUTION?

A. DC A. DC start contactors on start contactors on some some AC AC equipment equipment maymay have have latched latched to to the the START START condition, condition, allowing restart allowing restart on restoration of on restoration of AC power.

power.

B. Breaker anti-pump B. Breaker anti-pump features features will NOTNOT be be available to to protect protect the breakers breakers and and equipment upon restart.

C'r' 41 60V Busses C 4160V Busses 11 and 2 and and the busses busses downstream are are de-energized de-energized with load load breakers breakers still closed. On power restoration, auto transfer could occur before the load breakers trip on Undervoltage, allowing connected equipment to start.

Undervoltage, D. Breakers on equipment connected to busses downstream of 4160V Busses 11 and 2 automatically re-close on restoration of AC power if their Undervoltage relays have been re-energized.

The correct answer is C.

A: Incorrect - DC start contactors do NOT have latch conditions.

B: Incorrect - Breaker anti-pump circuits are restored as soon as DC power is restored.

C: Correct - - Potential for uncontrolled start of equipment upon power restoration.

D: Incorrect - Upon power restoration, loads should strip, NOT re-energize if DC UV coils are energized.

Exam Question Question Number: 81

Reference:

Reference:

EPP-26, EPP-26, Page 4; 4; EPP-26-BD, Page 4.

KA Statement:

KA Statement: AbilityAbility to explain and to explain apply system and apply system limits and precautions.

limits and History:

History: New New - Written Written for for HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC Exam.

Exam.

SRO - Knowledge SRO -

Knowledge of of cautions cautions and and basis basis for for cautions cautions in in procedures procedures past past Immediate Immediate Action Action steps.

steps.

KA Name:

KAName: LOSS LOSS OF OF DC DC POWER POWER Tier/Group:

Tier/Group: III 1/1 Importance Rating:

Importance Rating: 3.8/4.0 3.8/4.0 RO/SRO RO/SRO Level:

Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Cognitive Level:

Level: LOW LOW 10CFR55.43 10CFR55.43link:

link: 43.5 43.5 Source:

Source: NEW - 2008 NEW -

2008 Learning Objective:

Learning Objective: EPP-26-003 EPP-26-003

Rev.

Rev. 77 EPP-26 EPP-26 LOSS OF LOSS OF DC BUS "A" DC BUS A Page Page 44 ofof 47 47 STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED CAUTION CAUTION Restoration of Restoration of DC DC Control Control Power Power to to aa deenergized deenergized AC AC Bus Bus before before Steps Steps 16 16 through 23 through 23 have have been been completed completed may may result result in in uncontrolled uncontrolled equipment equipment starts.

starts.

  • 1. Check The The Cause
  • 1. Check Cause Of Of The The DCDC Bus Bus WHEN WHEN the the cause cause is is determined.

determined, Failure - KNOWN Failure KNOWN THEN THEN notify notify Maintenance Maintenance to to correct correct the the problem.

problem.

NOTE AFW PUMP AFW PUMP AA will will not not be available available due due to to loss loss ofof control control power to to the the breaker.

breaker.

2.

2. Maintain S/G Maintain S/C Levels Between 8%

And 50%

And 50% Using Available AFW Pumps:

Pumps:

    • STEAM DRIVEN STEAM DRIVEN AFW PUMP 3.
3. Check Check SISI Signal - INITIATED Go To Step 5.

STEP SPECIFIC STEP SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION AND AND RNP RNP DIFFERENCES DIFFERENCES The following The following pagespages willwill provide provide the the RNPRNP step step number.

number. There There isis no no ERG ERG for for this this procedure.

procedure.

RNP RNP BASIS BASIS STEP STEP PEC PEC This procedure This procedure will will bebe entered entered from from EPP-4 EPP-4 or or EPP-7 EPP-7 based based on on thethe initial initial conditions conditions at at the the time time of of the the loss loss of DC.of DC. IfIf thethe pant pant isis at at power power (> (> 100 100 MW)

MW) itit isis expected ex ected thatt the the ent.!'L~ill entry will be via EPP-7.

be via EPP-7.

~:-, -'-'-----~

Cl C1 The Caution The Caution isis provided provided to warn the to warn Operator of the Operator the possibility of the possibility of of equipment equipment performing performing uncontrolled uncontrTh equipment starts.

equipment starts. IfIf the the loss loss ofof DCDC BusBus AA occurred occurred from from an an at at power power condition condition the the busses busses fed fed downstream of downstream of 4160V 41 60V BussesBusses 11 and and 22 are deenergized with are deenergized with load load breakers breakers still still closed.

closed. IfIf DC DC Control Control Power isis restored Power restored to to the the 4160V 41 60V busses busses and and anan automatic automatic transfer transfer occurs occurs before before the the load load breakers trip on undervoltageundervoltage all all equipment equipment will will start start simultaneously.

simultaneously. The The stepstep below below the the Caution Caution will wi,J initiate efforts to restore the faulted DC Bus.

1 This step This step isis provided provided to initiate initiate efforts efforts to repair repair thethe faulted faulted DC DC Bus.Bus. ItIt is is placed placed early early inin the the procedure procedure so that efforts so that efforts can can bebe made made to contactcontact Maintenance Maintenance personnel.

personnel. The The high high level level step provides direction step provides direction toto diagnose diagnose the the cause cause and and provides provides transitional transitional guidance.

guidance. There There are are three three possible possible failure failure mechanisms that are the most likely causes:

    • FaultonABat Fault on A Battery tery
    • Fault on A Battery Bus Fault
    • Fault on MCC-5 Fault MCC-5 The failure, or tripping, of the in-service Battery Charger, is not a likely cause of the loss of DC since warning would be provided via an annunciator with ample time for Operator action to transfer the chargers.

N2 N2 The note reminds the Operator that since DC BUS A has been lost, no control power is available for for AFW PUMP A. The subsequent step will control SIG S/G level.

22 S/G level is maintained in order to provide a heat sink. BB AFW pump and the SDAFW pump are specified specified because because A A AFW AFW pump pump is is not not available available due due to to the the loss loss of of DC.

DC.

33 Subsequent Subsequent steps steps will reset an an SI SI Signal. This diagnostic diagnostic step step provides Transitional direction provides Transitional direction should should the the event event have have occurred occurred with with the Unit Auxiliaries the Unit Auxiliaries being being powered powered from from the the SUT.

SUT. In In this this case case the the RNORNO bypasses bypasses the the steps steps to to reset SI and restore SI and restore Instrument Instrument Air Air to to the the CV.

CV.

44 ItIf an an SISI has has occurred occurred itit willwill be be necessary necessary to to restore restore Instrument Instrument Air Air to to the the CV CV in in order order toto perform perform subsequent subsequent steps steps such such as as placing placing Excess Excess Letdown Letdown in in service.

service. TheThe step step provided provided resets resets SI SI and and Phase Phase AA then then restores restores IA IA toto the the CV.CV. PCV-1716 PCV-1716 should should be be available available during during aa lossloss ofof DCDC BusBus A A since since itsits solenoid solenoid isis powered powered from from Auxiliary Auxiliary PanelPanel GC GC (DC (DC BusBus B). B). Resetting Resetting SI SI isis possible possible since since Train Train AA has has not initiated not initiated and and Train Train BB has has control control Power.

Power. IfIf resetting resetting the the Isolation Isolation Signal Signal is is unsuccessful unsuccessful in in restoring restoring IAIA toto the the CV, CV, the the valve valve is is placed placed in in the the Override Override position position whichwhich places places control control power power fromfrom AuxAux Panel Panel GCGC directly directly onon thethe solenoid solen'oid for for opening opening the the valve.

valve. Instrument Instrument Air Air pressure pressure isis verified prior to verified prior to attempting attempting toto place place airair inin the the CV CV in in order order to to assure assure airair pressure pressure isis higherhigher than than potential potential CV CV pressure.

pressure. IfIf IA IA isis not not established established the the steps steps for for placing placing Excess Excess letdown letdown inin service service are are also also bypassed bypassed since since this this also also requires requires air air inin the the CV.

CV.

55 This This stepstep provides provides the the means means to to control control PZR PZR level level during during thethe loss loss ofof DC.

DC. Excess Excess Letdown Letdown isis usedused because because power power isis lostlost to to the the Normal Normal Letdown Letdown Valves.

Valves. Letdown Letdown isis necessary necessaryto to control control PZRPZR level level since since Seal Seal Injection Injection must must be be maintained.

maintained.

IEPP-26-BD EPP-26-BD Rev.

Rev. 77 Page 44 of Page of 1111

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam

82. Given
82. Given the the following:

following:

-A

- A Reactor Reactor Trip Trip has has occurred occurred from 100% RTP.

from 100% RTP.

The BA

- The

- Transfer Pump BA Transfer Pump aligned aligned toto BLEND BLEND hashas tripped.

tripped.

- The crew

- crew isis implementing implementing EPP-4, EPP-4, REACTOR REACTOR TRIP TRIP RESPONSE.

RESPONSE.

- At Step 13,

- 13, "Check Check ALLALL rods rods fully inserted" inserted the following following is is noted:

noted:

Rod M-6

- Rod

- M-6 isis at at 99 inches.

inches.

Rod H-4 is

- Rod

- is at 14 14 inches.

inches.

F-i 2 is at 20 inches.

- Rod F-12 Which ONE (1) (1) of the following is the action required?

A. Begin Boration by OPENING LCV-115B, LCV-i 15B, EMER MU TO CHG SUCT AND CLOSING LCV-1 1 LCV-115C, 5C, VCT OUTLET.

B. Begin Boration using Normal Boration path via FCV-113A, FCV-1 13A, BA FLOW and FCV-113B, FCV-i 13B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT.

C. Borate using EMER BORATION, MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT.

D. Continue to Step 14 (No boration is required).

82 82

000024 A2.02 000024 A2.02 OOllEMERG 001/EMERG BORATION/1I2/3.9/4.4/SROIHIGHJ43.5INEW BORATION/1/2/3.9/4.4/SRO/HIGHJ43 .5/NEW - 200SIEPP-4-003

- 2008!EPP-4-003 Given the following:

Given Reactor Trip

- A Reactor

- Trip has has occurred occurred from from 100%

100% RTP.

RTP.

- The BA

- BA Transfer Transfer Pump Pump aligned aligned to BLEND BLEND hashas tripped.

tripped.

- The crew is implementing EPP-4, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE.

13, "Check

- At Step 13,

- Check ALL rods fully inserted" inserted the following is noted:

- Rod M-6 is at 9 inches.

- Rod H-4 is at 14 14 inches.

- Rod F-12 is at

- at2O 20 inches.

Which ONE (1) of the following is the action required?

A Begin Boration by OPENING LCV-115B, A'I LCV-1 1 5B, EMER MU TO CHG SUCT AND CLOSING LCV-1 1 5C, VCT OUTLET.

LCV-115C, B. Begin Boration using Normal Boration path via FCV-113A, BA FLOW and FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT.

C. Borate using EMER BORATION, MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT.

D. Continue to Step 14 (No boration is required).

The correct answer is A.

A: Correct -- lAW EPP-4, boration must be initiated if 2 rods are NOT fully inserted. NOT fully inserted is any rod above 12.0 inches as defined in OMM-022. The ONLY correct flowpath available is the Emergency Makeup flowpath using LCV -115B, LCV-1 1 5B, LCV-1 150 must be closed to cause water to enter Charging Pump suction, since LCV-115C there is NO BA transfer pump aligned to BLEND.

B: Incorrect - Flowpath is a viable flowpath as listed in EPP-4 if there is a BA transfer pump aligned to BLEND. The stem indicates there is NO pump available, therefore opening these valves would NOT initiate a boration.

C: Incorrect - Flowpath is a viable flowpath as listed in EPP-4 if there is a BA transfer pump aligned to BLEND. The stem indicates there is NO pump available, therefore opening this valve would NOT initiate a boration.

D: Incorrect - lAW EPP-4,

- EPP-4, boration must be initiated if 2 rods are NOT fully inserted. NOT fully inserted is any rod above 12.012.0 inches as defined in OMM-022. This action would be correct ifif ONLY 11 rod were NOT NOT fully inserted.

Exam Question Exam Number: 82 Question Number: 82

Reference:

EPP-4,

Reference:

EPP-4, Pages Pages 10-11; 1 0-1 1; SO-021, SD-021, CVCS, CVCS, Figure Figure 2; 2; OMM-022, OMM-022, Page Page 53.

53.

KA Statement:

KA Statement: Ability to determine determine and and interpret interpret the the following as they apply as they apply to the Emergency Emergency Boration: When use of manual boration valve is needed.

History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC exam.

SRO - Requires analysis of plant conditions and selection of mitigating procedure.

KA Name:

KAName: EMERG BORATION Tier/Group: 1/2 112 Importance Rating: 3.9/4.4 ROISRO Level:

RO/SRO SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH 10CFR55.43 link:

10CFR55.43 43.5 Source: NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: EPP-4-003

rt, c s

2 xoZcf 4ZoZ Rev.

Rev. 2222 EPP-4 EPP-4 REACTOR REACTOR TRIP TRIP RESPONSE

RESPONSE

Page Page 1010 of of 28 28 STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED CAUTION CAUTION The boration The boration pathway pathway through through FCV-114B FCV-114B does does NOT NQI have have heat heat trace.

trace. Use Use of of this pathway this pathway without without flush water flush water could could result result inin blockage blockage of of the the pathway.

pathway.

.~ 13.

13. Check All Check Control Rods All Control Rods - FULLY FULLY ~ IF j only only one one Control Control Rod Rod is is stuck stuck INSERTED INSERTED out, out, THEN Th Go Go To To Step Step 14.

14.

~

-IFIF two two or or more more Control Control Rods Rods are are stuck stuck out, out, THEN ThEN perform perform the the following:

following:

a. Verify at least one one Charging Charging Pump is RUNNING.

RUIINING.

b. Borate to cold shutdown shutdown boron boron concentration using using one one ofof the following:
  • Blender to Charging Pump Charging Pump suction:
1) Open FCV-ll3A,
1) FCV-113A, BA TO BA TO BLENDER.

BLENDER.

2)" Openl13B,B enFCV FCV-l13B, LENDBLENDED ED MU TO CHG CHG SUCT.

SUCT.

3)

3) Start Boric Start Boric Acid Acid Pump Pump aligned for aligned for blend.

blend.

OR

  • RWST to RWST to Charging Charging Pump Pump suction:

suction:

1) Open
1) Open LCV-ll5B, LCV-11SB, EMERG EMERG MU TO MU TO CHG CHG SUCT, SUCT, OR OR locally open locally open CVC-358, CVC-3S8, RWST TO RWST TO CHARGING CHARGING PUMP PUMP SUCTION.

SUCTION.

2) Close
2) Close LCV-llSC, LCV-11SC, VCT VCT OUTLET.

OUTLET.

OR (CONTINUED (CONTINUE NEXT PAGE)

D NEXT PAGE)

Rev.

Rev. 22 22 EPP-4 EPP-4 REACTOR REACTOR TRIP TRIP RESPONSE

RESPONSE

Page 11 of Page 11 of 28 28

-j STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 13.

13. (CONTINUED)

(CONTINUED)

    • Blender Blender toto VCT:

VCT:

1)

1) Open Open FCV-113A, FCV113A, BABA TO TO BLENDER.

BLENDER.

2)

2) Open Open FCV-114B, FCV-114B, BLENDED BLENDED MU MU TO TO VCT.

VCT.

3) Start
3) Start Boric Boric Acid Acid Pump Pump aligned for blend.

blend.

OR

  • Emergency boration:
1) Open MOV-350, MOV350, BABA TO TO CHARGING PMPPMP SUCT.

SUCT.

2) Start Boric Boric Acid Pump Acid Pump aligned forfor blend.

blend.

3)

3) boric acid Verify boric acid flow flow FI-110.

on Fl-lb.

c. Open
c. Open CVC-310B, LOOP LOOP 22 COLD COLD LEG CHG.

LEG CHG.

IF CVC-3bOB iE CVC-310B will will NQI NOT open, open, THEN open Tii open CVC-310A, CVC-310A, LOOP LOOP 11 HOT LEG HOT LEG CHG.

CHG.

d. Verify
d. Verify charging charging flow flow on on FI-122A.

FI-122A.

14.

14. Check Check PZR PZR Level Level - LESS LESS THAN THAN 14%

14% Go To Go To Step Step 16.

16.

evesFLOW CVCS FLOWDIAGRAM, DIAGRAM, SIMPLIFIED SIMPLIFIED CVCS-FIGURE-2 CVCS-FIGURE-2 TO PRT ......--,---,

Mixed LOOP 1 Bed COLDLEG~ Demins.

Analyzer LOOP 1 Deborating HOTLEG4t~ Demins AUX SPRA,(4t...rf .'. I Cation LOOP 2 Bed COLD LEG Demin.

EXCESS FCV*

FromLoop From Loop 2 LTDN HX

~~~

114A ColdLeg Cold Leg ./T iii _ From Primary 137 Y Water Pumps To RCDT- . I '

FromRCP From RCPSeals Seals I~

Pulse Dampener To Rep Seals 1~ From RWST

PI FromBA From BA Transfer TransferPumps Pumps INFORMA INFORMATION HON USEUSE ONLY ONLY

ATTACHMENT 10.4 ATTACHMENT 10.4 Page 22 of Page of 33 GLOSSARY (Continued)

GLOSSARY (Continued) 1.1.9 1.1.9 Recirculation Mode Recirculation Mode - When

- When referenced referenced for for thethe current current status status ofof the the RHR System, RHR System, the the system system isis aligned aligned to to take take aa suction suction onon the the CVCV Sump Sump and discharge and discharge to to the the loops.

loops.

1.1.10 Redundant 1.1.10 Redundant - (In - reference to (In reference to an an indication) indication) Having Having multiple multiple indications indications of the same type for of the same type for the same the same parameter.

parameter. An An example example of of redundant redundant indication isis verification indication verification of of S/G S/G level level using using all all three three narrow narrow range range level level channels.

channels.

~

--- 1.1.11 1.1 Rod On

.11 Rod On Bottom Bottom - AA Control

- Control Rod Rod is is defined defined as as "on on the the bottom" bottom when when NARPI indication shows NARPI indication shows aa position position of of less less than than or or equal equal to to 12".

12. This This originates from originates from Westinghouse Westinghouse Documentation Documentation ESBU/wOG ESBU/WOG 96-0080, 96-0080, which defines which defines rod rod bottom bottom occurring occurring at at entry entry to to the the dash dash pot.

pot. Dash Dash PotPot entry occurs entry occurs at at 20 20 steps steps fromfrom thethe bottom bottom which which is is equal equal to to 12.5".

12.5. The The value isis rounded rounded down down to the nearest nearest legible legible increment increment on the NARPI.

1.1.12 S/G 1.1.12 S/GSta tus:

Status:

1. Ruptured S/G SIG - Any generator with failed tubes resulting in aa loss of the RCS pressure boundary greater than RCS makeup capability.
2. Faulted S/G SIG - A faulted S/G is any generator with a steam line or

- or feedwater line break associated with it.

3. Leaking SIG S/G - Any generator with failed tubes resulting in a loss of the RCS pressure boundary within RCS makeup capability.

1.1.13 1.1.13 SIG S/G Level - Unless otherwise stated, a step which refers to S/G level means means narrow narrow range S/G S/G level.

level. A step which requires the use use of of wide range S/GS/G level level will state state specifically specifically to to use use widewide range S/G S/G level.

level.

1.1.14 1.1.14 Stable Stable - (In (In reference reference to to aa parameter) parameter) To To be be within within the the normal normal control control band band oror controllable controllable within within somesome desired desired range.

range.

1.1.15 1.1.15 Uncontrolled Uncontrolled - Refers

- Refers to to aa condition condition that that isis not not under under the the control control of of the the operator operator andand isis incapable incapable of of being being controlled controlled by by the the operator operator using using available available equipment.

equipment.

OMM-022 IOMM-022 Rev.

Rev. 29 29 I Page 53 Page 53 of 54\

of 54 I

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Exam Exam

83. Given
83. Given the following:

Plant startup

- Plant

- startup is is in in progress progress lAW lAW GP-005, GP-005, POWER POWER OPERATION.

OPERATION.

- Reactor

- is at Reactor is at 8%

8% RTP.

RTP.

- Reactor Engineering has notified the SSO that BOTH Intermediate Range High Flux Trip setpoints were determined to be set non-conservative.

SSQ has declared BOTH IR Channels INOPERABLE.

- The SSO Which ONE (1) of the following describes the action(s) that must be taken in order to comply with Technical Specification requirements?

A. Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions AND reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

B. Reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> OR increase thermal power to> P-10 P-1O within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

C. Place channels in TRIP within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or be in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

D. Open the Reactor Trip Breakers immediately.

83 83

000033 A2.10 000033 A2.10 OOIILOSS 001/LOSS ON ON IR IR NI/1/2/3.1/3.8/SROILOW/43.5IFARLEY-N1111213.113.8ISRO/LOW/43.5/FARLEY- 20011NIS-01l 2001/NIS-Ol 1 Given the Given the following:

following:

Plant startup

- Plant

- startup isis in in progress progress lAWlAW GP-005, POWER OPERATION.

GP-005, POWER OPERATION.

Reactor isis at

- Reactor

- at 8% RTP.

8% RTP.

Reactor Engineering

- Reactor

- Engineering has has notified notified the SSO that the SSO that BOTH BOTH Intermediate Intermediate Range Range HighHigh Flux Flux Trip Trip setpoints were setpoints were determined determined to to be be set non-conservative.

set non-conservative.

The SSO

- The

- SSO has has declared declared BOTHBOTH IR IR Channels Channels INOPERABLE.

INOPERABLE.

Which ONEONE (1) (1) of of the following describes the action(s) that must must bebe taken inin order to comply requirements?

with Technical Specification requirements?

A'I Immediately suspend A Immediately suspend operations operations involving involving positive positive reactivity reactivity additions additions AND reduce reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

B. Reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> OR increase thermal power to> P-10 P-i 0 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

C. Place channels in TRIP within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or be in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

D. Open the Reactor Trip Breakers immediately. immediately.

The correct answer is A.

A: Correct - -

LCO 3.3.1, Condition G actions required if TWO IR channels INOPERABLE INOPERABLE with power> P-6, but < P-10. P-ic.

B: Incorrect - LCO 3.3.1, Condition F actions required if ONE IR channel INOPERABLE INOPERABLE with power> P-6, but < P-10. P-i 0.

C: Incorrect - Actions required for most INOPERABLE

- INOPERABLE instrument channels to remove the channel from service, NIs Nls would be BYPASSED instead of removed from service in this manner.

D: Incorrect - LCO 3.3.1, Condition J action for TWO Source Range Channels INOPERABLE.

INOPERABLE.

This action is NOT applicable because both SR instruments are deenergized.

Exam Question Exam Number: 83 Question Number: 83

Reference:

ITS

Reference:

ITS 3.3.1, 3.3.1, Page Page 3.3-1, 3.3-1, 3.3-3 3.3-3 KA Statement:

KA Statement: Ability Ability to to determine determine and and interpret interpret the the following following as they apply as they apply to to the the Loss Loss ofof Intermediate Range Intermediate Nuclear Instrumentation:

Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Tech-Spec Tech-Spec limits limits ifif both both intermediate range intermediate range channels channels have have failed.

failed.

History: Modified History: Modified by by changing changing distractors distractors Band B and 0,D, Removed Removed Subsequent Subsequent actions actions and and reference reference to procedures.

to procedures.

SRO - application of required actions AND application of ITS

- ITS Conditions for Table 3.3.1-13.3.1-1 for Conditions in excess of of LCO.

KA Name:

KAName: ON JR NI LOSS ONIRNI Tier/Group: 1/2 112 Importance Rating: 3.1/3.8 3.113.8 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: LOW IOCFR55.43 link:

10CFR55.43 43.5 Source: FARLEY- 2001 Learning Objective: NIS-011 NIS-Ol 1

RPS Instru menta Instrume tion ntati on 3.3.1 3.3 INSTRU MENTA INSTRUMEN TIONN TATIO 3.3.1 Reactor Prote ctionn System (RPS) Instru Protectio Instrum menta tionn entatio LCO 3.3.1 The RPS instru menta instrum entatiotionn for each FunctFunctiion on in Table 3.3.1-shall be OPERA 3.3.1-11 BLE..

OPERABLE APPLIC ABILIT APPLICABIL Y:

ITY: Accor Accord ding ing to Table 3.3.1-1.

ACTION ACTIONSS

- -..... ... -... -.. -... --.. -... -..... .. NOTE*

NOTE ...... ...... .... -. -..... ..... -... -..

Separ Separa ate te Condi Condittion ion entry is allowed for each Funct Functiion.

on.

CONDI TION CONDITION REQUIR REQUIRED ED ACTION ACTION COMPL ETIONN TIME COMPLETIO A. One or more Funct Functiions ons A.1 Enter the Condi Condittion ion Imme Immed diately iately with one or more

  • ---- requir require inope edd chann inoperrable.

channe able, els ls refere referen nced ced in Table 3.3.1-3.3.1-11 for the chann channeell (s).

Cs).

B. One Manual Reactor B.1 Resto Restorree chann channeell to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Trip chann channeell OPERA BLE status.

OPERABLE inope rable.

I nopera bi e.

OR B.2.1 8.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> V

AND B.2.2 Open reacto reactorr trip 55 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br /> break breake ers rs (RTBs).

(conti nued)

(contin ued)

HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit No. 2 2 3.3*1 3.3-1 Amendment No. 176

RPS Instrumentation I nstrunientati on 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued) fcont niiHi CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One channel E.1 Place channel in 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> inoperable.

inoperable, trip.

OR E.2 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> F, THERMAL POWER>

F. POWER > P-6 F.l F.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> and << P-b, polO. one to < P-6.

Intermediate I ntermedi ate Range Neutron Flux channel OR inoperable.

F.2 Increase THERMAL 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> POWER to > > polO.

P-1O.

~ -~ ..

G. THERMAL POWER>

POWER > P-6 G.l G.1 . -------NOTE NOTE -.. ------

and < P-1O, polO. two Limited boron Intermediate Range concentration changes Neutron Flux channels 1I associated with ReS RCS inoperable.~

inoperable. inventory control or limited plant temperature changes are allowed allowed..

Suspend operations Immediately Iniinedi atel y involving positive reactivity additions.

Mill.

ANU G.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> to < P-6.

(continued)

HBRSEP Unit No. 22 3.3-3 Amendment No. tTfr.190

+/-7,19O

- Correct, If BB - Correct, If one one SRSR isis lost lost all all fuel fuel movement movement must must bebe suspended suspended per per TS TS 3.9.2.

3.9.2. Must Must have two SR and one audible have two SR and one audible count rate count rate operable.

operable.

Source: Farley Source: Farley Exam Exam Bank Bank Question Question #052302M04007

  1. 052302M04007 Answer: CC Answer:

,3EG2.1.12

53. 033EG2.1.1211 AA Unit reactor startup Unit 11 reactor startup isis in in progress.

progress. One One hour hour ago ago Intermediate Intermediate Range, Range, IR,IR, channel channel N-36 N-36 was was taken out taken of service out of service due due toto aa power power supply supply problem.

problem. The The decision decision waswas made made to to continue continue with with the reactor the startup, power reactor startup, power is currently at is currently at 8%.

8%.

It is It estimated that is estimated that N-36 N-36 willwill be be returned returned to service in to service in the the next 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />.

hours. TheThe technician working working on the N-36 power supply on supply performed an an action action that that resulted resulted in in Intermediate Range, Range, IR,IR, N-35 failing low.

failing low.

Which ONE of the following describes describes the action(s) that must be taken in in order to comply with Technical Specification Specification requirements?

requirements?

A. Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions AND reduce thermal power to < <P-6 P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

B. Place IR JR N-36 channel level trip switch in the 'BYPASS' T position within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and be in BYPASS Mode 3, Hot Standby, within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

C. Do NOT change power level until at least one IR JR channel is restored to operable status. status D. Place the IR N-35 channel level trip switch in the 'BYPASS' BYPASS position and increase thermal power to>

to > P-lO P-1O within TWO hours.

A - Correct, Actions required by TS 3.3.1.G.

3.3.l.G. with 2 JR IR channels lost.

B - Incorrect, Action required if two SR channels were lost.

C - Incorrect, Action if power level was below P-6.

C -

D - Incorrect, Action that was in progress with just the one JR IR channel was out of service, TS 3.3.1.F.

Source: New 54.

54. 033K3.O1 033K3.01 11 Annunciator Annunciator FH5, "SFP AREA FR5, SFP AREA RE25 RE25 A OR OR B HI RAD B HI RAD" is in alarm is in alarm onon Unit Unit 1.1.

It has It has been been determined determined that Spent Fuel that Spent Pool Exhaust Fuel Pool Exhaust Flow Flow GasGas monitors R-25AR-25A and and R-25B R-25B indicate high activity.

indicate high activity.

Which ONE Which ONE of of the the following following describes describes thethe automatic automatic action(s) action(s) that that occur occur asas aa result result of of this this alarm?

alarm?

The SFP A. The A. SFP supply and exhaust supply and exhaust fansfans shift to the shift to the recirculation recirculation mode.

mode.

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam

84. Given
84. Given the the following:

following:

The plant

- The

- plant isis operating operating atat 100%

100% RTP.

RTP.

The Inside

- The

- Inside AO AO has reported aa 100 has reported 100 GPM GPM leakleak from from the the RWST.

RWST.

The leak

- The

- leak isis into into the the storm storm drains drains and and appears appears to to be be unisolable.

unisolable.

Which ONE Which ONE (1)(1) of of the the following following actions actions isis required required for this event?

for this event?

A. Implement AOP-008, A. Implement AOP-008, ACCIDENTAL ACCIDENTAL RELEASE RELEASE OF OF LIQUID WASTE. Initiate LIQUID WASTE. Initiate LOCAL LOCAL evacuation using EVACUATI evacuation using EVACUATION ON ALARM and and PA announceme PA announcement. nt.

B. Implement AOP-008, B. Implement AOP-008, ACCIDENTAL ACCIDENTAL RELEASE RELEASE OF OF LIQUID LIQUID WASTE.

WASTE. Send Send personnel personnel to to isolate the Settling isolate Settling Ponds Ponds and and establish access access control.

control.

C. Implement PLP-021, C. Implement PLP-021, CHEMICAL CHEMICAL STORAGE, STORAGE, INVENTORY, INVENTORY, SPILL SPILL AND HAZARD HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROGRAM, Initiate LOCAL evacuation using EVACUATION COMMUNICATION EVACUATION ALARM announcement.

and PA announcement.

D. Implement PLP-021, CHEMICAL STORAGE, INVENTORY, INVENTORY, SPILL AND HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROGRAM, send personnel to isolate the Settling Ponds and establish COMMUNICATION access control.

84 84

000059 G2.4.4 000059 G2.4.4 OOl/ACC 00 1/ACC RADWASTE RADWASTE RELEASE/l/2/4.5/4.7/SROILOW/43.5/NEW RELEASEI1/2/4.5/4.7/SRO/LOW/43 .5/NEW - 2008/AOP-008-004

- 2008/AOP-008-004 Given the following:

Given

- The plant

- plant is is operating at at 100%

100% RTP.

RTP.

The Inside

- The

- Inside AO AC has has reported reported a 100 100 GPM GPM leak leak from the RWST.

RWST.

- The leak is into the storm drains and appears to be unisolable.

Which ONE (1) of the following actions is required for this event?

A A ':I Implement AOP-OOB, AOP-008, ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF LIQUID WASTE. Initiate LOCAL evacuation using EVACUATION ALARM and PA announcement.

B. Implement AOP-OOB,AOP-008, ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF LIQUID WASTE. Send personnel to isolate the Settling Ponds and establish access control.

C. Implement PLP-021, CHEMICAL STORAGE, INVENTORY, SPILL AND HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROGRAM, Initiate LOCAL evacuation using EVACUATION ALARM and PA announcement.

D. Implement PLP-021, CHEMICAL STORAGE, INVENTORY, SPILL AND HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROGRAM, send personnel to isolate the Settling Ponds and establish access control.

The correct answer is A.

A: Correct - - Leakage from RWST, Monitor Tanks or Waste Condensate Tanks requires entry into AOP-008.

AOP-OOB. Steps 3,4,5 3, 4, 5 & 6 of AOP-008 AOP-OOB are paraphrased in "A".A.

B: Incorrect - Leakage from RWST, Monitor Tanks or Waste Condensate Tanks requires entry into AOP-008.

AOP-OOB. AOP-008 AOP-OOB does NOT isolate the Settling Ponds or establish access control.

C: Incorrect - PLP-021 is used for Chemical spills, but borated water is NOT considered a hazardous liquid.

D: Incorrect - PLP-021 is used for Chemical spills

- spills, but borated water is NOT considered a hazardous liquid.

Exam Question Number: 84 B4

Reference:

AOP-008, AOP-OOB, Pages 3 and 4, PLP-021, Pages 4 and 38. 3B.

KA Statement:

Statement: Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters parameters that are entry-level conditions conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.

History: New New - Written for HLC-08

- HLC-OB NRC Exam.

SRO SRO - Requires

- Requires analysis of of plant conditions conditions and selection of mitigating mitigating procedure.

procedure.

KA Name:

KAName: RADWASTE ACC RADW ASTE RELEASE Tier/Group: 1/2 112 Importance Rating: 4.5/4.7 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: LOW 10CFR55.43 link:

10CFR55.43 43.5 Source: NEW -2008

- 2008 Learning Objective: AOP-008-004

Rev.

Rev. 99 AOP-008 AOP-008 ACCIDENTAL ACCIDENTAL RELEASE RELEASE OF OF LIQUID LIQUID WASTE WASTE Page Page 33 ofof 25 25 STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I

1.

1. PURPOSE PURPOSE To To provide provide the instruction instruction necessary to to respond respond to aa leak leak from from the the RWST, RWST, Monitor Monitor Tank Tank AA or or B, B, or or Waste Waste Condensate Condensate Tank Tank C, C, D, D, or or E.

E.

2. ENTRY CONDITIONS Any Any unexplained indication indication ofof aa decrease decrease inin any any of of the following following tanks oror upon receiving aa report that leakage leakage has developed developed from from any any of of the following following tanks:

,..... .* RWST

    • Monitor Tank A or B
  • Waste Condensate Tank C, D, or E

- END -

Rev.

Rev. 99 AOP-008 AOP-008 ACCIDENTAL ACCIDENTAL RELEASE RELEASE OF OF LIQUID LIQUID WASTE WASTE Page 44 of Page of 25 25 H STEP 1

H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 1.

1. Check Check Leak Leak Status Status -- CONFIRMED CONFIRMED BYBY Perform Perform the the following:

following:

LOCAL LOCAL VISUAL VISUAL INSPECTION INSPECTION a.

a. Perform Perform aa local local visual visual inspection inspection for for leakage leakage prior prior to continuing.

continuing.

b. IF external leakage is found, THEN Go Go To To Step Step 2.

2.

c. IF leakage is NOT jjQ found, THEN perform the following:
1) Contact I&C to determine the problem with level indication.
2) Return to procedure and and step in effect.

~2.

r-2. Locally Identify The Source Of Leakage To Determine If It Is Isolable Is o labl e

~3.

? 3. Evacuate Unnecessary Personnel From The Affected Area As Follows:

a. Place the VLC switch in EMERG
b. Place and hold the EVACUATION ALARM switch in the LOCAL position for 15 position 15 seconds
c. Make a PA System
c. System announcement unnecessary personnel for all unnecessary personnel stand clear of to stand of the the area due affected area due to to a leak leak in progress in progress
d. Place and Place and hold hold the EVACUATION switch in ALARM switch in the the LOCAL position for 15 position 15 seconds seconds
e. Repeat
e. Repeat the the announcement announcement f.
f. Place the Place the VLC VLC switch switch in in NORM NORM

1.0 1.0 PURPOSE{

PURPOSE{ TC PURPOSE \f TC "PURPOSE" c \1

\f C 1 }

\1 "1" }

1.1 1.1 This procedure implements the Chemical Safety and Health Health Management Management Program, the U. U. S. Hazard Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200) 1910.1200) as adopted by the South Carolina Department of Labor, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act and the Emergency Planning and Community Right To Know Act. The procedure also provides chemical storage, handling, hazard, and spill information.

1.2 This procedure provides guidance for:

1.2.1 Emergency plans for accidental chemical release.

chemical_releas 1.2.2 calpllsat Chemical spills at RNP and Robinson Unit II and Darlington County

,Electric Plant.

1.2.3 The preparation of Tier II EPCRA reports and 90 day inventory change EPCRA reporting requirements.

11.2.4

.2.4 Employee Right to Know Requirements NOTE: The Robinson/Darlington Co. Fossil Plants SHOULD comply with applicable portions of this procedure.

2.0 REFERENCES

{ REFERENCES TC "REFERENCES" \f C \1 "1" }

1 }

2.1 SAF-SUBS-0001 6, Hazard Communication SAF-SUBS-00016, 2.2 EVC-SUBS-00018, Oil Spill and Chemical Release Notification and EmergencxEmergency Res~n~

Response .

2.3 U. S. Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200) 1910.1200) 2.4 Emergency Response Community Right to Know Act Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Title Ill III 2.5 Emergency Preparedness Procedures 2.6 PLP-022, Environmental Regulatory Compliance Responsibilities, Guidelines and Disposal of Hazardous Waste/Surplus Chemicals 2.7 MCP-NGGC-0402, Material Material Management Management (Storage, Issue, Issue, and Maintenance)

Maintenance) 2.8 MCP-NGGC-0401, Material Material Acquisition (Procurement, Receiving, and Shipping)

Shipping) 2.9 CHE-NGGC-0045, NGG Chemical Control Program Procedure 1PLP-021 PLP-021 Rev. 26 Page Page 44 of of 38 381

\

ATTACHMENT 10.9 ATTACHMENT 10.9 Page 11 of Page of 11 CHEMICAL SPILL CHEMICAL SPILL REPORTABLE REPORTABLE QUANTITY QUANTITY LlST{ LIST{ TC TC "CHEMICAL CHEMICAL SPILL SPILL REPORTABLE REPORTABLE QUANTITY LIST" QUANTITY LIST \f

\f C C \l

\1 "2" }

2 }

APPROXIMATE REPORTABLE REPORTABLE QUANTITY QUANTITY QUANTITY QUANTITY CHEMICAL NAME POUNDS GALLONS AMMONIUM HYDROXIDE (28%) 1,000.

1,000. 478 ETHYLENE GLYCOL (88-90%) 5000. 540 HYDRAZINE (35%) 1. 0.33 SODIUM HYDROXIDE (50%) 1,000. 157 (1 2-1 5%)

SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE (12-15%) 100. 74 SULFURIC ACID (93%) 1,000. 70 POTASSIUM DI-CHROMATE 10. **

POTASSIUM CHROMATE 10. **

SODIUM DI-CHROMATE 10. **

SODIUM CHROMATE 10. **

  • Dependent on concentration (PPM) in solution.

1PLP-021 PLP-021 Rev.

Rev. 26 26 Page Page 38 38 of of 38 381

HLC-08 NRC Written Exam Given the following:

85. Given 85.

FRP-C.1, RESPONSE

- The crew has entered FRP-C.1,

- RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE INADEQUATE CORE COOLING.

- RCS temperature by CETC is 750

- 750 of.

°F.

- Step 21 of the procedure directs the crew to depressurize all intact S/Gs to 140 140 PSIG.

Which ONE (1) of the following conditions would be entered/violated while performing the procedure actions of Step 21?

2.1 .1, Reactor Core Safety Limits. (Combination of Thermal Power, RCS Cold Leg A. ITS 2.1.1, 2.1 .1 .1).

Temperature, and Pressurizer Pressure within limits of Figure 2.1.1.1).

B. ITS 3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT)(P/T) Limits. (RCS pressure, Temperature, and Heatup and Cooldown rates within limits of Figures 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2).

C. TRM 3.3, Steam Generator Secondary Side PressurelTemperature Pressure/Temperature (P/T)(PIT) Limits.

SIGs maintained within PIT limits of Figure 3.3.1).

(Secondary side of S/Gs D. ITS 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB)

Limits.

85

000074 G2.2.42 000074 G2.2.42 OOllINAD 001/INAD CORECORE COOLING/1I2/3.9/4.6/SRO/HIGH/43.2/43.3/NEW COOLING/1/2/3.9/4.6/SRO/HIGHJ43.2/43.3/NEW- 2008IRCS-013- 2008/RCS-013 Given the Given the following:

following:

The crew

- The

- crew has has entered entered FRP-C.1, FRP-C.1, RESPONSE RESPONSE TO TO INADEQUATE INADEQUATE CORE CORE COOLING.

COOLING.

RCS temperature

- RCS

- temperature by CETC isis 750 by CETC F.

0 750 of.

Step 21

- Step

- 21 of of the the procedure procedure directs the crew directs the crew toto depressurize depressurize allall intact intact S/Gs S/Gs to to 140 140 PSIG.

PSIG.

Which ONE Which ONE (1) (1) ofof the the following following conditions conditions would would be be entered/violated entered/violated while while performing performing the the procedure actions procedure actions of of Step Step 21?

21?

A. ITS A. ITS 2.1.1, 2.1 .1, Reactor Reactor Core Safety Limits. Limits. (Combination (Combination of Thermal Power, Power, RCSRCS Cold Cold Leg Leg Temperature, and Temperature, and Pressurizer Pressurizer Pressure Pressure within within limits limits of of Figure Figure 2.1.1.1).

2.1.1.1).

B ITS 3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT)

B!'" (P/T) Limits. (RCS pressure, Temperature, and Heatup and Cooldown rates rates within limits of Figures 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2).

C. TRM 3.3, Steam Generator Secondary Side PressurelTemperature Pressure/Temperature (P/T) (PIT) Limits.

(Secondary side of S/Gs maintained within PIT limits of Figure 3.3.1).

D. ITS 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB)

Limits.

The correct answer is B.

A: Incorrect - LCO 2.1.1 is applicable in MODES 11 and 2, since the plant has been shutdown due to an accident and is in MODE 3, 4 or 5, this LCO does NOT apply.

B: Correct - - Cooldown limit for the RCS is 100 °F/hr. of/hr. Step 21 of FRP-C.1 will depressurize S/Gs and cooldown the RCS to 365 °F. of. This action will exceed the cooldown limit of Figure 3.4.3-2.

C: Incorrect Incorrect - TRM 3.3 is applicable at ALL times, but << 1350 1350 PSID will be established with depressurization depressurization of S/Gs to 140 PSIG. This ensures 140 PSIG. ensures that the SteamSteam Generator Generator Vessel temperature remains in in the acceptable region.

D:

D: Incorrect Incorrect - LCO 3.4.1 3.4.1 is applicable in is applicable in MODE MODE 1, 1, since the plant plant has has been been shutdown shutdown due due to an an accident accident andand is is in in MODE MODE 3, 3,44 or 5, this or 5, this LCO LCO does does NOTNOT apply.

apply.

Exam Question Number:

Exam Question Number: 85 85

Reference:

Reference:

FRP-C.1, FRP-C.1 , Page Page 10;10; ITS ITS 3.4.1, 3.4.1, 3.4.3, 3.4.3, 2.1 .1; TRM 2.1.1; TRM 3.3.

3.3.

KA Statement:

KA Statement: AbilityAbility to to recognize recognize system system parameters parameters that are entry-level that are entry-level conditions conditions for for Technical Technical Specifications.

Specifications.

History:

History: New New - Written Written forfor HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC exam.

exam.

SRO SRO - requires requires analysis analysis ofof plant plant conditions conditions andand selection selection ofof applicable applicable ITSITS condition.

condition.

KA Name:

KAName: INAD CORE COOLING Tier/Group: 1/2 112 Importance Rating: 3.9/4.6 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH 10CFR55.43 linle 10CFR55.43 link: 43.2/43.3 Source: NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: RCS-013

Rev.

Rev. 17 17 FRP-C.l FRP-C.1 RESPONSE RESPONSE TOTO INADEQUATE INADEQUATE CORE CORE COOLING COOLING Page Page 10 10 of of 2828 STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I

NOTE

  • Partial uncovery of SIG S/G tubes is acceptable in the following steps due to steaming faster faster than feeding.

feeding.

  • After the Low Steamline Pressure SI Signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam flow rate setpoint is exceeded.
  • ~*21.

-.*2l. Depressurize All Intact SIGs S/Gs To 140 PSIG As Follows:

a. Check Steam Dump to Condenser a. Dump steam at maximum rate

- AVAILABLE

- using STEAM LINE PORVs.

PORV5.

Go To Step 21.c.

2l.c.

b. Dump steam to Condenser at maximum rate
c. Check RCS Hot Leg c. NWHEN RCS hot leg temperatures Temperatures - LESS THAN 543°F less than 543°F, THEN perform Step 21.d.
21. d.

Go To Step 21.e.

d. Defeat Low Tavg Safety Injection Signal as follows:

1)

1) place SAFETY Momentarily place T-AVG Selector INJECTION TAVG position Switch to BLOCK position
2) Verify LO TEMP SAFETY INJECTION BLOCKED status light - ILLUMINATED light - ILLUMINATED e.
e. SIG pressures - LESS Check S/G - e. IF S/G SIG pressure isis THAN 140 THAN 140 PSIG PSIG decreasing, THEN decreasing, THEN observe observe NOTE NOTE prior to prior to Step Step 19 19 and and Go Go To To Step 19.

Step 19.

IF S/G IE pressure is SIG pressure is increasing, THEN increasing, THEN Go Go To To Step 28.

Step 28.

(CONTINUED NEXT (CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)

PAGE)

RCS RCS Pressure.

Pressure, Temperature.

Temperature, and and Flow Flow DNB DNB Limits Limits 3.4.1 3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT COOLANT SYSTEMSYSTEM (RCS) (RCS) 3.4.1 RCS 3.4.1 RCS Pressure.

Pressure. Temperature.

Temperature, and and FlowFlow Departure Departure from from Nucleate Nucleate Boiling Boiling (ONB)

(DNB) Limits Limits LCO 3.4.1 LCO 3.4.1 RCS RCS DNB DNB parameters parameters for for pressurizer pressurizer pressure.

pressure, RCS RCS average average temperature.

temperature, and and RCS RCS total total flow flow rate rate shall shall be be within within the the limits limits specified specified below: below:

a.a. Pressurizer Pressurizer pressure pressure ~> 2205 2205 pSig; psig; b.

b. RCS RCS average average temperature temperature s 579.4°F; 579.4°F; andand c.
c. RCS RCS total total flow flow rate rate ~ 97.3 97.3 xx 101066 lbm/hr.

lbm/hr.

APPLICABILITY:

APPLICABILITY: MODE 11..

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NOTE*

NOTE ........................ ---

Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during:

Pressurizer during:

a. THERMAL POWER ramp> ramp > 5% RTP per minute; or or
b. THERMAL POWER step> step > 10% RTP.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION COMPLETI TIME ON TIME A.

A. One One oror more RCS DNB DNB A.1 Restore RCS DNB Restore 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> hours parameters parameters not within parameter(s) to limits.

limits. within limit.

within B.

B. Required Required Action Action and and B.1 8.1 Be in Be in MODE MODE 2. 2. 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> hours associated associated Completion Completion Time Time not not met.

met.

HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.

No. 22 3.4-1 3.4-1 Amendment No.

Amendment No. 176 176

RCS PIT RCS PIT Limits Limits 3.4.3 3.4.3 3.4 REACTOR 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT COOLANT SYSTEM SYSTEM (RCS) (RCS) 3.4.3 RCS 3.4.3 RCS Pressure Pressure and Temperature (PIT) and Temperature (P/T) Limits Limits LCO 3.4.3 LCO 3.4.3 RCS RCS pressure.

pressure, RCS RCS temperature.

temperature, andand RCS RCS heatup heatup and and cool down cooldown rates rates shall shall be be maintained maintained within within the the limits limits specified specified in in Figures Figures 3.4.3-1 3.4.3-1 and and 3.4.3-2.

3.4.3-2.

APPLICABILITY:

APPLICABILITY: At all At all times.

times.

ACTIONS ACTIONS CONDITION CONDITION REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION ACTION COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME TIME A.

A. - -- --- ---NOTENOTE ---- --- -- A.l A.1 Restore parameter(s) 30 30 minutes minutes Required Action A.2 Required to within limits.

shall be completed shall whenever whenever this AND Condition is entered.

Condition

--_ ...... - .... - ....... __ ..... - .... A.2 Determine RCS is 72 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> hours acceptable for Requirements of LCO Requirements continued operation.

not met in MODE 1. 2.

not 2, 3,

3. or or 4.4.

B.

B. Required Required Action and B.1 B.1 Be in MODE 3.

Be 3. hours 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> associ ated Completion associated Completion Time Time ofof Condition Condition AA AND not not met.

met.

B.2 B.2 Be in Be in MODE MODE 55 with with RCS RCS 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> 36 hours pressure << 400 pressure 400 psig.

psig.

(continued)

(continued)

HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.No. 22 3.4-5 3.4-5 Amendment No.

Amendment No. 176 176

Res RCS P/T Limits PIT Limits 3.4.3 3.4.3 MATERIALS PROPERTIES MATERIALS PROPERTIES BASE BASE CONTROLL ING MATERIAL: Upper CONTROLLING MATERIAL: Upper Shell Shell Plate Plate Curves Curves applicable applicable forfor heatup heatup rates rates upup to to Limiting ART Values at Limiting ART Values at 35 EFPY: 1/4T.

35 EFPY: 1!4T, 167°F 167°F 60°F/Hr 6OF/Hr forfor service service period period up up to to 35 35 EFPY EFPY 314T, 14rF 3/4T. 147°F Heatup Heatup Curves Curves include include +10°F

+1OF and and -60

-60 psig psig Allowance Allowance for for Instrumentation Instrumentation error.

error.

2750 2750 I F i I H HI 2500 2500 2250 2000 200!} LeaK Test Imit Unacceptable Operation 0)

(J) 5V)

VI 1500 150!}

I

-Hj

} H+ LH Heatup Rate to Acceptable Operation 4))

VI 0)

(J)

J4] 60F/Hr 5:. 1250 u 125!}

0)

(J)

+>

<0 0

U

'r-

"E i000 moo Criticality [lint based on Inservice Hydrostatic test 7Cfl temeature (226F) for the 750 vice neriod un to 35 EFP (

nn 500 250 250 0

0o 50 50 100 100 150 150 200 200 250 250 300 300 350 350 400 400 450 450 500 500 550 550 Indicated Indicated Temperature Temperature (°F) (oF)

Figure Figure 3.4.3-1 3.4.3'1 Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant System System 1-leatup Heatup Limits Limits Applicable Applicable Up Up to to 3535 EFFY EFPY HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 3.4-7 3.4*7 Amendment No.

Amendment No. 202 202

Res RCS P/T Limits PIT 3.4.3 MATERIALS MATERtALS PROPERTIES BASE Controlling Material: Upper Shell Plate Curves applicable for cool down rates cooldown and nd Girth HeldWeld up to 100100°0 F/Hr for the service Limiting ART Values at 35 EFPY:

Liolting period up to 35 EFPY, EFPY.

1/4T. 167°F and 242°F Curves include +10°F and -60 PSIG 2750 Allowance for Instrurnentati Instruientatioon n error_

error.

2500 (0

(.!)

I14 U)

-i LI)

CL.

0 2250 2000 1750

i. Unacceptable Operation I

i L

II 1 20°F/Hr Li)

(l) s- *1500

s '1500 V)

Vl

/r 40°F/Hr U)

Vl Li)

(l) s-CL.

0 u

ci)

(l)

+>

1250

'1250 IF! t t'O 0

U

'r-U 1000

.....s::: (°F!Hr)

I I I 100°F/Kr.

750 LIII 1TF

-O ani1 500 - Acceptable Operation rmL- I. .i W 250-250 o0 o0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 Indicated Temperature (oF) (°F)

Figure 3.4.3-2 Reactor Coolant System Cooldown Limits Applicable Up to 35 EFPY HBRSEP Unit No. 22 3.4-8 Amendment No. 202

SLs SLs 2.0 2.0 2.0 SAFETY 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS LIMITS (SLs)

(SLs) 2.1 SLs 2.1 SLs 2.1.1 Reactor 2.1.1 Reactor Core Core SLs SLs MODES 11 and In MODES In and 2, 2, the the combination combination of of THERMAL THERMAL POWER, POWER, Reactor Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

Coolant System (RCS) highest highest cold cold leg leg temperature, temperature, and and pressurizer pressurizer pressure shall pressure shall not not exceed exceed the the SLs SLs specified specified in in Figure Figure 2.1.1-1.

2.1.1-1.

2.1.2 RCS 2.1.2 RCS Pressure Pressure SLSL In In MODES MODES 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4.

4. and and 5.5, the RCS RCS pressure shall shall be be maintained maintained 2735

~ 2735 psig.

psig.

2.2 SL Violations 2.2 2.2.1 If SL 2.1.1 is violated.

2.2.1 violated, restore compliance and be in MODE 3 3 within 1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

2.2.2 If SL 2.1.2 is violated:

2.2.2.1 In MODE 1 1 or 2.2, restore compliance and be in MODE 33 in MODE within 1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

2.2.2.2 In MODE 3,3. 4,

4. or 5,5. restore compliance within 55 minutes.

minutes.

HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit No. 22 Unit No. 2.0-1 2.0-1 Amendment No.

Amendment No. 176 176

SG SG Secondary Side PIT Secondary Side P/T Limits Limits 3.3 3.3 3.3 STEAM 3.3 STEAM GENERATOR GENERATOR (SG)

(SG) SECONDARY SECONDARY SIDE PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE (PIT)

SIDE PRESSUREITEMPERATURE (PIT) LIMITS LIMITS TRMS TRMS 3.33.3 The The secondary secondary side side of of the the SGs SGs shall shall bebe maintained maintained within within the the (CTS 3.1.2.2) PIT (CTS 3.1.2.2) P/T limits limits ofof Figure Figure 3.3-1.

3.3-1.

APPLICABILITY: At APPLICABILITY: At all all times.

times.

COMPENSATORY MEASURES CONDITION REQUIRED COMPENSATORY COMPENSATORY ACTION COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements Requirements of TRMS A.1 A.l Initiate action to Immediately not met.

met, restore SG secondary side PIT P/T to within imits.

1limits.

AND A.2 Initiate aa Condition Immediately Report in accordance with the Corrective Action Program.

REQUIREMENTS TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST FREQUENCY None. NA HBRSEP Unit HBRSEP Unit No.

No. 22 3.3-1 3.3-1 PLP-I00 Rev.

PLP-100 Rev. 22 22

=

(/)

900  ;::

= ~.s 800 Pressure Differential (PSI) 700  :;=; fl:.

.r- ~

.1. o ~ 600 OJ c (Secondary to Priniary) c ct 5 8 500

~ ~ 400 1500 OJ'-' fa f- F- I fl:. 300 C,) U, 1400

~ 1000 i-C 0i - CX) O CD I- r\) U, 0 CD 200 C)

CD CD CD CD CD CD CD CD 1300 CD CD r-;o .r-CD o CD 100 CD CD CD CD CD CD CD CD CD 1200 C) CD 40 HBRSEP Unit No. 2 C-, 60 (F,

CD C-I-,

c- --

CD CO 80 CD CD CD CD C)

CD C--)

CC) -5.

0 CD 100 0) I-Figure 3.3-1 (Page 1 of 1)

) -5 o

3.3-2 _5 _t cD> 0)

CD 111111 III:CIIII -cR0 Cr) I Region of (I, rz ILItLI IICD CO IH CD CD CD 120 -H

0) 0 C-

_1 Acceptable 0)

--0 CD -h I

Operation CD

_J.

C-,--

Steam Generator PIT Limits

-z C/,

CD CD 140

-5 Cf CD C-,

-5 CD 0

160 C-)

0 0

0) 5 9

Steam Generator Vessel Temperature (OF)

-t, C,,

SG Secondary Side PIT Limits 180 -C 0

CD

-:5 r.) -H CD CD 200 CD C-)

PLP-100 Rev. 22 F. C-.) C,,

C1.

c-f 3.3

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam

86. Given the
86. Given the following:

following:

The plant

- The

- plant is is in in MODE MODE 44 at at 210 210 of and 350

°F and PSIG.

350 PSIG.

RCS isis solid.

- RCS

- solid.

RHR Pump

- RHR

- Pump "A" A and and RCP RCP "C" are running.

C are running.

swapping Charging

- While swapping

- Charging Pumps, Pumps, the operator operator inadvertently inadvertently starts the Standby Standby Charging Pump with Pump with the the speed speed controller controller set set at at maximum.

maximum.

Which ONE (1) of the following will occur to limit RCS pressure?

RHR-706, RHR A. RHR-706, RHR SYSTEM RELIEF,RELIEF, will OPEN at 600 PSIG PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.

PRT.

Enter AOP-019, Enter AOP-01 9, MALFUNCTION MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE PRESSURE CONTROL.

B. RHR-706, RHR SYSTEM RELIEF, will OPEN at 600 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.

Enter AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).

C. PCV-455C and PCV-456, PZR PORVs will OPEN at 400 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.

Enter AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).

D. PCV-455C and PCV-456, PZR PORVs will OPEN at 400 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.

Use APP-003-A2/A3, PCV-455C and PCV-456 LP PROT ACT/TROUB to direct operator actions.

86 86

00 1/PRT/QIJENCH TANKl2/1/3.6/3.9/SROIHIGH/43.5/NEW 007 A2.03 OOIIPRT/QUENCH TANK/2/1/3 .6/3 .9/SROIHIGHJ43 .5/NEW - 2008IPZR-01O

- 2008/PZR-0 10 Given the following:

- The plant is in MODE

- MODE 4 at 210 210°F PSIG.

of and 350 PSIG.

- RCS is solid.

- RHR Pump "A"

- A and RCP "C" C are running.

- While swapping Charging Pumps, the operator inadvertently starts the Standby Charging Pump with the speed controller set at maximum.

Which ONE (1) of the following will occur to limit RCS pressure?

A. RHR-706, RHR SYSTEM RELIEF, will OPEN at 600 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.

AOP-01 9, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL.

Enter AOP-019, B. RHR-706, RHR SYSTEM RELIEF, will OPEN at 600 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.

Enter AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).

C. PCV-455C and PCV-456, PZR PORVs will OPEN at 400 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.

Enter AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).

D~

D PCV-455C and PCV-456, PZR PORVs will OPEN at 400 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.

Use APP-003-A2/A3, PCV-455C and PCV-456 LP PROT ACTITROUB ACT/TROUB to direct operator actions.

The correct answer is D.

A: Incorrect - RHR-706 is set to OPEN at 600 PSIG. AOP-019

- AOP-01 9 is applicable ONLY in MODES 1, 2and 1,2 and 3.

B: Incorrect - RHR-706 is set to OPEN at 600 PSIG, but entry conditions will NOT be met for AOP-020 unless RHR inventory loss occurs. AOP-033 will be used for shutdown LOCA with the RCS greater than 200 °F. of.

C: Incorrect - PZR PORVs are set at 400 PSIG during LTOP

- LTOP conditions. AAOP-033 will be used for shutdown LOCA with the RCS greater than 200 °F. of.

D: Correct -- LTOP will actuate the PZR PORVs at 400 PSIG. APP-003-A2/A3 is the correct procedure to use.

Exam Question Exam Number: 86 Question Number: 86

Reference:

APP-003-A2

Reference:

APP-003-A2 and and A3; A3; AOP-019, AOP-019, PagePage 3; AOP-020, Page 3; AOP-020, Page 3; 3; SO-003, SD-003, RHR, RHR, Figure Figure 3.3.

KA Statement:

KA Statement: Ability Ability to to (a)

(a) predict predict the the impacts impacts of the following of the following malfunctions malfunctions oror operations operations on on the PP S; the and (b)

S; and based on (b) based those predictions, on those predictions, use use procedures procedures toto correct, correct, control, control, or mitigate or mitigate the the consequences consequences of of those those malfunctions malfunctions oror operations:

operations:

Overpressurization Overpressurization of of the the PZR.

PZR.

History: New History: - Written for New - Written for HLC-08 HLC-08 NRCNRC exam.

exam.

SRO - Requires evaluation of plant SRO - plant conditions and selection of the applicable procedure procedure to mitigate the event.

event.

KA Name:

KA PRT/QUENCH TANK PRT/QUENCH TANK Tier/Group:

Tier/Group: 2/1 2/1 Importance Rating:

Importance 3.6/3.9 3.6/3.9 RO/SRO Level:

RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH 10CFR55.43 link:

10CFR55.43 43.5 Source: NEW - 2008

- Learning Objective: PZR-OlO PZR-01O

APP-003-A2 APP-003-A2 Page Page11 ofof22 ALARM ALARM PCV-455CLP PCV-455C LPPROT PROTACTfTROUB ACT,TROUB WILLREFLASH

      • WILL REFLASH***

AUTOMATICACTIONS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1.1. PCV-455C, PZR PCV-455C, PZRPORV, PORV, opens opensatat400 400psig psigwhen when inin Low LowPressure PressureModeMode CAUSE CAUSE 1.1. RCS overpressure RCS overpressure condition.

condition.

2.2. Auctioneered low Auctioneered lowTc Tc less less than than 360°F 360°F AND AND LTOPP LTOPP isis NOT NOT enabled.

enabled.

3.3. RC-536, PORV RC-536, PORV BLOCK, BLOCK, Closed Closed 4.

4. RC-536, PRESSURIZER RC-536, PRESSURIZER PORV PORV PCV-455C PCV-455C BLOCK, BLOCK, Breaker Breaker Tripped/Open Tripped/Open OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS 1.1. RCS Pressure RCS Pressure (PR-444, (PR-444, PI-500, P1-500, PI-501, P1-501, PI-403)

P1-403) 2.

2. RCS Temperature RCS Temperature (TR-410)

(TR-410) 3.

3. PRT Pressure PRT Pressure (PI-472),

(P1-472), Temperature Temperature (TI-471),

(Tl-471), & & Level Level (L1-470)

(LI-470) 4.

4. RC-536 Position RC-536 Position indication indication 5.
5. Position of Position of RHR-759A, RHR-759A, RHR HX "A" A DISCHARGE DISCHARGE and RHR-759B, RHR-759B, RHR HX HX "B" B DISCHARGE DISCHARGE ACTIONS ACTIONS 1.
1. Stop pressure Stop pressure increasing increasing activities.

2.

2. IF require IF required,d, THEN THEN turn the LTOP LTOPP P System OVER OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION Switches PRESSURE PROT ECTION Switch es to to LOW LOW PRESS PRESSURE. URE.

3.

3. IF IF require required,d, THEN THEN OPEN OPEN RC-53 RC-536.6.

4.

4. IF IF RCS RCS isis solid, solid, THEN THEN verify verify BOTH BOTH RHRRHR HX HX A"A" AND AND B"B" DISCHARG DISCHARGE OPEN::

E OPEN 1)

1) RHR-759A RHR-759A 2)
2) RHR-759B RHR-759B 5.
5. IF IF require d, THEN required, THEN dispatc dispatchh operato operatorr to to check check Breake Breaker Position r Positio of RC-53 n of RC-536, PRESSURIZER PORV 6, PRESS URIZER PORV PCV-4 55C PCV-455C BLOCK.BLOCK.

6.6. IF IF tripped tripped,, THEN THEN investi gate the investigate the cause cause of of trip.

trip.

IAPP-0 APP-00303 Rev.

Rev.37 37 Page55ofof53 Page 531

APP-003-A2 APP-003-A2 Page Page 22 of of 22 ALARM ALARM PCV-455C LP PCV-455C LP PROT PROT ACTfTROUB ACT/TROUB (Continued)

(Continued)

DEVICEISETPOINTS DEVICE/SETPOINTS 1.

1. TE-41 0, TE-420, TE-410, TE-420, or or TE-430 TE-430 II 360°F 360°F 2.
2. RC-536 limit RC-536 limit switch switch 3.
3. QM-503 1400 QM-503 I 400 psig psig II variable variable (If auctioneered low (If auctioneered low Tc Tc isis greater greater than than 360°F) 360°F)

POSSIBLE PLANT POSSIBLE PLANT EFFECTS EFFECTS 1.

1. Low RCS Low RCS pressure pressure 2.
2. Failure of Failure of LLTOPP TOPP toto actuate actuate when when required required REFERENCES REFERENCES
1. ITS LCO 3.4.12, LCO 3.4.3, LCO 3.4.11
2. CWD B-190628, Sheet 120, Cables J and M CWO
3. Hagan Wiring Diagram HBR2-8608 082 D82 IAPP-003 APP-003 Rev. 37 Rev. 37 Page 66 of Page 53\

of 53

APP-003-A3 APP-00 3-A3 Page 1 1 of 2 ALARM ALARM PCV-456 LP PROT ACTfTACT/TROUB *** WILL REFLASH ***

AUTOMATI AUTOM ATICC ACTIO ACTIONSNS

1. PCV-45 PCV-456,6, PZR PORV, PORV, opens at 400 psig when in Low Pressure Mode CAUSE CAUSE
1. RCS overpre overpressure ssure conditio condition.

n.

2. Auctioneered Auction eered low Tc less than 360°F AND L LTOP TOPP P is NOT enabled.
3. RC-535 RC-535,, PORV BLOCK BLOCK,, Closed
4. RC-535 RC-535,, PRESS PRESSURIZE URIZER PORV PCV-45 PCV-456 6 BLOCK BLOCK Breaker Tripped Tripped/Open

/Open OBSERVAT OBSER VATIOIONS NS

1. RCS Pressure (PR-444, PI-500, P1-500, PI-501 P1-501,, PI-403)

P1-403)

2. RCS Temperature (TR-41 (TR-41 0)

. 3. PRT Pressure (PI-472 (P1-472),

), Temperature (TI-471 (TI-471),

), & Level (LI-470 (LI-470))

4. RC-535 RC-535 Position indicati indication on
5. Position of RHR-759A, RHR HX "A" A DISCHARGE and RHR-759B, RHR HX "B" B DISCHARGE ACTIONS
1. Stop pressure increasing activitie activities.

s.

2. IF required, THEN turn the L LTOP TOPP P System OVERP OVERPRESS RESSU URE RE PROTE PROTECTIO CTION Switches N Switch es to LOW PRESS PRESSURE.
3. IF required, THEN OPEN RC-535RC-535..
4. IF RCS solid, THEN verify RHR HX "A" A and "B" B DISCHARGE OPEN:OPEN:
1) RHR-759A
2) RHR-759B
5. IF required, THEN dispatch operator to check Breaker Position of RC-535 RC-535,, PRESS PRESSURIZE URIZER PORV PCV PCV-4 -456 56 BLOCK BLOCK..
6. IF tripped, THEN investig investigate ate the cause of trip.

IAPP-003 Rev. 37 Page 7 of 53531

APP-00 3-A3 APP-003-A3 Page Page 22 of of 22 ALARM ALARM PCV-456 PCV-4 56 LP LP PROT PROT ACTffR ACTITROIJBOUB (Contin (Continued) ued)

DEVICE/SETP DEVIC E/SETPOI OINTSNTS 1.

1. TE-41 0,, TE-420 TE-410 TE-420,, or or TE-430 TE-430 II 360°F 360°F 2.
2. RC-535 limit RC-535 limit switch switch 3.
3. QM-5033 I/ 400 OM-50 400 psig psig II variabl variablee (If (If auction auctioneered eered low low Tc is is greater greater than than 360°F) 360°F)

POSSIBLE PLANT POSSI PLANT EFFEC EFFECTS 1.

1. Low RCS Low RCS pressu pressure
2. Failure of LLTOP Failure TOPP P to actuate when required ENCES REFERENCES
1. ITS LCO 3.4.12, 3.4.12, LCO 3.4.3, LCO 3.4.11
2. CWD B-1906 CWO B-i 90628 28,, Sheet 119, Cables J and M
3. Hagan Wiring Diagram Diagram HBR2-HBR2-8608 8608 082 D82 IAPP APP-0-003 03 Rev. 37 Rev. 37 I Page 88 of Page 531I of 53

Rev.

Rev. 13 13 AOP-019 AOP-019 MALFUNCTION OF MALFUNCTION OF RCS RCS PRESSURE PRESSURE CONTROL CONTROL Page Page 33 of of 17 17 Purpose and Purpose and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)

1.

1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This procedure provides provides instructions instructions in in the the event event RCS RCS pressure pressure is is higher higher OR lower than required Q lower than required forfor current current plant plant conditions.

conditions.

~

- This procedure This procedure isis applicable applicable in in Modes Modes 1,1,2,2, and and 3.

3.

2.

2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS This procedure This procedure may may be be entered entered when when RCS RCS pressure pressure deviates deviates from from the the desired control band due desired control due to to aa fault fault inin pressure pressure control control components. (AOP-025 components. (AOP-025 covers covers Instrument Instrument Failure)

Failure)

- END --

AOP-020 20 Rev. 29 LOSS LOSS OF OF RESIDU RESIDUALAL HEAT HEAT REMOV AL (SHUTD REMOVAL OWN COOLIN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)G)

Page 3 of 107 107 j STEP H INSTRU INSTRUCTIO CTIONSNS I I RESPON RESPONSESE NOT OBTAIN OBTAINEDED H-1.

1. PURPOS PURPOSEE This procedure provid provideses the instru instructio ction s neces ns sary to mitig ate the necessary loss of RHR in all condi loss condition tionss for which RHR can be aligne aligned d to provid e shutdown coolincooling.g. This includ includeses loss of RHR coolincooling g for reason s such as RCS leakag leakage, e, loss of power power,, loss of Servic Service e Water or Component Cooling Water Water,, RHR pump cavita cavitation tion,, and inade quate inadequa te RHR flow or abnorm al reduc reduction tionss in RHR coolin g.

cooling.

This proced ure is applic applicabl able e in Modes 4, 5, and 6 when fuel is in the vesse vessel.

l.

2. ENTRY ENTRY CONDI CONDITION TIONSS Directt entry from any condi Direc condition tion result resulting ing in a loss of RHR pump( s), RHR pump cavita cavitation tion,, abnorm al RHR flow or tempe rature temperatu re contr control,ol, or exces excessive sive loss of RCS inven tory while RHR is aligne inventory for shutdown coolin aligned d cooling.

g.

As direct directed ed by the follow following ing other other proce procedurdures:

es:

    • AOP-005, RadiaRadiation tion Monit Monito oring ring System , when a low level in the SFP SEP exists exists due to an RCS leak with the SFP GATE VALVE VALVE open.
    • AOP-0 AOP-O14, Component Cooling Water System Malf Malfu nction unct ion,, result ing resulting in stopp stoppinging of the RHR Pumps while in CSD.

~.* AOP-016, ExcesExcesssive ive Prima Primarryy Plant Plant Leaka Leakag ge, e, if less than 200°F and leakage exceeds Charg Chargiing ng Capac ity.

Capacity.

    • AOP-0 AOP-O17, Loss Of Instru Instrumment ent Air, if the loss of Instru Instrumement nt Air has affect affected ed core coolin cooling g while on RHR.

- END --

COLD LEG RECIRC - RHR FLOW - W> >120 1200 0 GPM, RCS< RCS<125 125 PSIG RHR RHR-F

-FIGU IGURE RE-3

-3

..-- --. --- --- --- --- --- --- -11 /1 . i 51-887 TO 51 PUMP B& C SUCTIONS TO 51 AND RHR-764 RHR-757B RHR-754B RHR-752B CONTAINMENT M SPRAY PUMP RHR-759B SUCTIONS

~liII ~liII

  • FROM RWST SI-862A 1-3::

---'0 MINI FLOW RECIRC FROM CONTAINMENT SUMP RHR HEAT-UP LINE RHR-743 TO RC LOOP 1 ~

COLD LEG ':"

til TO RC LOOP 3 COLD LEG ~

U1 o

TO RC LOOP 2 RHR-7448 COLD LEG RHR-744B SI-876B SI-8768 SI-875B FROM RC LOOP 2 HOT HOT LEG LEG INFO INF ORM RMA ATITION ON USE ONLY

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam

87. Given the
87. Given the following:

following:

The plant

- The

- in MODE plant isis in MODE 3. 3.

RCS heatup

- RCS

- heatup and and pressurization pressurization isis in in progress.

progress.

- RCS

- temperature isis 511 RCS temperature 511 of.

°F.

RCS pressure

- RCS

- pressure is is 2100 2100 PSIG.

PSIG.

ONE (1)

- ONE

- safety valve (1) safety valve on on S/G SIG "A" A fails fails partially partially OPEN.

OPEN. When reseats, the When itit reseats, the following following conditions exist:

conditions exist:

RCS temperature

- RCS

- temperature stabilized at 492 of. °F.

RCS pressure

- RCS

- pressure stabilized stabilized at at 1700 1700 PSIG.

PSIG.

S/Gs "S"

- S/Gs

- B and "C" pressures stabilized at 640 PSIG.

C pressures PSIG.

SIG "A"

- S/G

- A pressure is is 520 PSIG PSIG and slowly increasing.

increasing.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the actions required?

A. Stabilize plant parameters. Allow S/G pressures to equalize prior to raising RCS pressure above 2000 PSIG.

B. Stabilize plant parameters. Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is NOT required.

C. Initiate Main Steam Line Isolation. Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is NOT required.

D. Initiate Safety Injection. Go to PATH-1. PATH-i.

87 87

013 G2. 1.7 001IESFAS/2/1/4.4/4.7/SROIHIOHJ43.5/SALEM 01302.1.7 00 1/ESFAS/2/ 1/4.4/4.7/SRO/HIGHI43 .5/SALEM - 20011ESF-006

- 200 1/ESF-006 Given the Given the following:

following:

The plant

- The

- plant is is in in MODE MODE 3. 3.

RCS heatup

- RCS

- heatup and and pressurization pressurization isis inin progress.

progress.

RCS temperature

- RCS

- temperature is is 511 511 of.

°F.

RCS pressure

- RCS

- pressure is is 2100 2100 PSIG.

PSIG.

- ONE (1) safety valve on S/G

- SIG "A" A fails partially partially OPEN.

OPEN. When itit reseats, reseats, the following conditions exist:

conditions exist:

RCS temperature stabilized at 492 of.

- RCS

- °F.

- RCS pressure stabilized at 1700

- 1700 PSIG.

B and "c"

- S/Gs "8"

- C pressures stabilized at 640 PSIG.

SIG "A"

- S/G

- A pressure is 520 PSIG and slowly increasing.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the actions required?

A. Stabilize plant parameters. Allow S/G pressures to equalize prior to raising RCS pressure above 2000 PSIG.

B. Stabilize plant parameters. Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is NOT required.

C. Initiate Main Steam Line Isolation. Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is NOT required.

D Initiate Safety Injection. Go to PATH-1.

D!" PATH-i.

The correct answer is D.

A: Incorrect - Allowing S/G pressures to equalize is appropriate but SI needs to be initiated due to plant conditions.

B:

8: Incorrect - LCO action statement allows Safety Valve to be inoperable for a limited time prior to changing MODES.

C:

C: Incorrect Incorrect - Main

- Main Steam Steam Line Isolation Isolation does NOT NOT isolate isolate the Main Main Steam Steam Line Safety Valves.

D: Correct - - > 100 PSID

>100 PSI D will result in Steamline Delta P P SI and PZR Pressure SI should have occurred at 1715 PSIG. Since NO 1715 PSIG. NO SI actuation hashas occurred, the SRO should direct direct SISI initiation, initiation, and direct entry and direct entry to to the appropriate procedure procedure (PATH-i).

(PATH-1).

Exam Question Exam Number: 87 Question Number: 87

Reference:

SD-006,

Reference:

SD-006, ESF,ESF, Pages Pages 12 12 and and 26, 26, Figure Figure 3;3; GP-007, GP-007, Page Page 25, 25, OMM-022, OMM-022, Page Page 31.

31.

KA Statement:

KA Statement: Ability Ability to to evaluate evaluate plant plant performance performance and and make make operational operational judgments judgments based based on on operating characteristics, operating characteristics, reactor reactor behavior behavior andand instrumentation instrumentation interpretation.

interpretation.

History:

History:

SRO - The SRO - The SRO must determine SRO must plant status, determine plant status, the fact that the fact that no no actuations actuations have have occurred occurred but but should have, and that PATH-1PATH-i still applies applies in MODE MODE 3.

KA Name:

KAName: ESFAS ESFAS Tier/Group:

Tier/Group: 2/1 2/1 Importance Rating:

Importance Rating: 4.4/4.7 4.4/4.7 ROISRO Level:

RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH IOCFR55.43 link:

10CFR55.43 43.5 Source:

Source: SALEM - 2001

- Learning Objective: ESF-006

SD-0066 SD-00 ENGINEERE ENGIN EERED D SAFE SAFET TYY FEAT FEATURES URES SYSTE SYSTEM 4.1.2 Reacto 4.1.2 Reactorr Coolan Coolant Tempe Temperature rature (ESF-F (ESF-Figure-1 igure- 1))

The RCS The RCS LowLow Tavg Tavg signal signal (2(2 of of 33 channe channels below below 543°F) 543°F) isis used used to to initiate initiate the the Safety Safety Injection signal, signal, when when coincid coincident with highhigh steam steam flow; flow; and and close close the the Main Main Steam Steam Isolation Valves,, when Isolati when coincid coincident with with high high steam steam flow flow (i.e.,

(i.e., generate the Steam Steam Line Isolation Signal Isolati Signal).

4.1.3 Steam 4.1.3 Steam Flow Flow (ESF-Figure-1)

Hi Steam Steam Flow (37.25(37.25%  % flow at at no load load to 20 20%% load, load, increases linearly to 109 109%% at full load) detecte load) detected by at least one sensor on two of three steam lines, coincid ent with low Tavg (543°F) or low steam line pressu re (614 psig), generates a Safety Injection signal and closes all MSIVs MSIVs.. Two flow controllers on each steam line are used to sense high steam line flow. This circuit is designed to detect steam line breaks downstream of the MSIVs..

MSIVs 4.1.4 Steam Line Pressure (ESF-F igure-1 & & 3)

Steam Line Pressure measuremen rementt is utilized for steam line break protec protecttion.

ion. Low steam line pressure (614 psig) in two of three main steam lines or Low Tavg (543°F) in two of three loops, coincident with high steam line flow in two-of-three main steam lines, will initiate the Steam Line Isolation and Safety Injection signals

. This is to protectt against: a steam line break downstream of the main steam protec check valves, a feed line break, and/or an inadvertent opening of a SG safety.

In addition, each steam line pressure measurement rement is compared with a main steam header pressure measurement rement to determine if a high steam line differential pressure

> exists. A A çorncid

~Qincidenceence of two-of-three steam line differential pressures (100 psid) in any one steam steam line, li!!e, that is, steam line pressure lower than main steam header pressu re, will Safety)njecti initiate a ~fe..ty Injecti~J.l on sigllC:lt signaL The steam header pressure is electronically limited to a minim um value of 585 psig.

Therefore, this SI signal must be blocked before a plant cooldo wn is started to prevent SI actuation when S/G pressures drop below 485 psig(approximately ately 467°F) 467°F).. The steam steam line differential pressure circuit detects faults upstrea upstreamm of the MSIVs MSIVs.. Since the steam line check valves prevent reverse flow to the faulted S/G, excessive steam line differential pressure re does not close close the MSIVs.

4.1.5 Containmentnment Pressure (ESF-Figure-4 & 5) 5)

Containment nment Pressure re measurement rement is utilized utilized to initiate Emergency Core Core Coolin Coolingg in response to aa Loss of of Coolant Accident (LOCA),), and to providee contain containment ment pressu pressure re ESF ESP Page Page 12 12 of of 40 40 Revision Revisi 10 on 10 INF INFOR ORM MA ATITIO ON N US USE E ON ONL LY Y

SD-006 SD-006 ENGINEEREDSAFETY ENGINEERED SAFETYFEATURES FEATURESSYSTEM SYSTEM

~ Low Lowpressurizer pressurizerpressure pressureand and biglste i h steam lineI differential differential prssre res sure canh~~edcan be_bicked (provided pressurizer (provided pressurizer pressure pressureisis <<2000 psigon 2000 psig on2/32/3 channels) channels) and andunblocked unblockedusing usingaa threeposition three position(BLOCK, (BLOCK, unmarked unmarked(mid (midposition),

position), UNBLOCK)

UNBLOCK) switch switch located onthe located on the RTGB. These SI initiation RTGB. These SI initiation signals are signals are normally normally blocked blockedduringduring aa plant plant cooldown cooldown whenwhen pressurizerpressure pressurizer pressure isis less less than than 1950 1950 psig.

psig. ~~~lltomatikClllJ'.-

These signals will be aumaticaUy_

~ unblocked when pressurizer pressure isis increased

~

unblocked when pressurizer pressure incr edto2OJOpsi to .---..

2000... psig. g. These

-.-.~~".----

These signals signals can can also also be unblocked with be unblocked with aa switch switch onon the the RTGB.

RTGB. BeforeBefore these these signals signals are are manually manually or or automatically unblocked, automatically unblocked, the the operator operator should should check check to to see see ififthe the bistables bistables forfor these these signals are signals are cleared.

cleared.

6.5.2 High 6.5.2 High Steam Steam Line Line Flow Flow Coincident Coincident with with Low Low Steam Steam LineLine Pressure Pressure or or Low Low Tavg Tavg High steam High steam line line flow flow coincident coincident withwith low low steam steam line line pressure pressure or or low low TTavg avg and and the the Hi-Hi Hi-Hi CV pressure CV pressure SI SI signal signal can can be be blocked blocked (provided (provided thatthat Tavg is < 543 OF Tavg is <543°F on 2/3 channels)on 2/3 channels) and unblocked and unblocked using using aa three three position position (BLOCK, (BLOCK, unmarked unmarked (mid (mid position),

position), UNBLOCK)

UNBLOCK) switch on switch on the the RTGB.

RTGB. ThisThis signal signal isis automatically automatically unblocked unblocked when when Tavg reaches 543 Tavg reaches 543°FOF or can be manually unblocked with or can be manually unblocked with the the switch switch onon the the RTGB.

RTGB. Before Before these these signals signals are are manually or manually or automatically automatically unblocked, the the operator operator should should check check to see if the bistables to see if the for these for these signals are cleared.

7.0 7.0 TECIIMCAL SPECIFICATIONS TECHNICAL SPECifICATIONS ITS 3.3.2 ITS Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation Instrumentation ITS ITS 3.3.5 Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start Instrumentat Instrumentation ion ITS ITS 3.3.6 Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentat Instrumentation ion ITS ITS 3.3.7 Control Room Emergency Filtration System Actuation Instrumentat Instrumentation ion 8.0 8.0 OPERATION OPERATIONAL AL EVENTS EVENTS 8.1 8.1 Commitmen Commitments ts NONE NONE 8.2 8.2 Plant Plant Specific Specific Events Events (Non-commi tments)

(Non-commitments) 8.2.1 8.2.1 LER LER 88-026,88-026, Inadvertent Inadvertent Safeguard Safeguard Actuation Actuation Brief BriefDescription Description of ofthe the Event:

Event:

Miscommun Miscommunicationication resulted resulted in SI actuation in SI actuation during during preparation preparation for for aa plant plant modification modification. .

ESF ESF Page Page2626ofof40 40 , Revision Revision 1010 INFOR INFORMATION MATION USE USE ONLY ONLY

HIGH HIG H STEA STEAMM LINE DIFFERENTIAL PRE PRESSSU SURREE ESF-F ESF-FIGURE IGURE.-3

-3 High Steam Line Differenti rential Pressure LINE LINEAA LINES LINE B LINE C C

iN tN /EN tN YN tN (N

74) 75) 7) 84>) 85) 4)
86) 6)

S S 55 S 0-Block Block SI 51 Actuat Actuatio ionn 2/3 2/3 A

Safegu Safeguaards rds Logic INFO INFORM RMA ATITION ON USE ONLY Y

8.2.15 (Cont 8.2.15 (Continue inued d))

INIT NOTE: Adjus NOTE Adjusting PC-444J ting PC-44 4J setpoint poten potentiom tiomeeter ter to 0.0 will reduc reduce e RCS pressure to psig. PC-44 1700 psig. PC-444J controlle 4J contro llerr setpoint shall be adjust adjusted ed SLOW SLOWLY to minim minimizeize the potential poten causing tial for causin PZR insurg g a PZR insurge.e. An insurg insurge e could could occur occur if PC-44 PC-444J 4J setpoint is adjusted adjust ed too quickly.

The PZR cooldo cooldow wnn rate shall be be less than or .equal equal to 200°F 200°F/hr/hr.. The PZR heatup rate shall be less than or equalequal to 100°F100°F/hr/hr.. (TRM (TRMS S 3.4) following The follow ing is a contin continuouousus action action step and shall be perfor performed med when condi condition tionss require.

require.

3. IF PZR Surge Surge line tempe temperatu raturere decre decreaseasess AND is not due to the norma normall tempe temperaturature re decre decreasease assoc associate iatedd with depressu depre ssurizrizat ion, THEN stop adjust ation, adjusting ing PC-44 PC-444J 4J setpointint until PZR Surge Surge Line tempetemperatu raturere is increa increasing sing..
4. Slowly adjusadjustt PC-44 PC-444J, 4J, PZR PRESPRESS S 444J, 444J, contro controlle llerr setpoint setpo potentiom int poten tiomeeter ter to 0.0 withou withoutt excee exceedinding g 200°F 200°F/hr/hr cooldow cooldo wn n rate on the PZR AND contin continueue with this procedur proce dure. e.

CAUTION prevent To preve nt an SI Actua Actuation tion,, steam line pressure shall not be allowe allowed d to drop below below 485 psig prior to blocki blocking ng the HI STM LINE DP SI Signa Signal.l.

The PZR PRES PRESS/HS/HII STM LINE DP SI Signa Signall will autom automati aticall callyy unblo unblockck if RCS pressure increases increa above 2000 psig.

ses above psig. If this occur occurs, s, the signal signal should should be blocke blockedd when RCS pressure decre decrease ases s below below 2000 psig. psig.

8.2.16 WHEN RCS pressure is less than 2000 psig, 8.2.16 psig, THEN perforperform m the follow ing:

1. Displayy the following ERFIS Displa ERFIS points points:: (ACR 93-0 93-00 023))

0023

- RCP RCP0 O49 496D, 6D, LO PRE PRES SSS SI BLOC BLOCK K TRAIN A "A"

- RCPO49 RCP0 497D, 7D, LO PRE PRES SSS SI BLOCK K TRAIN B "B" IGP-007 GP-007 I I Rev. 75 Page 25 of 77771 I

8.3.3 8.3.3 AutomaticActions/Actuations{

Automatic Actions/Actuations{TC TC"Automatic AutomaticActions/Actuations" \f C\l\1"3" Actions/Actuations\fC 3 (RAIL94R0928) (RAIL 94R0928) 1.1. Duringthe During thecourse courseofofan an event, event, should should the thesetpoint setpointfor foran an automaticprotective automatic protective system system actuation actuation be be approached, the approached, the Operat or should , Operator should, if possible, if possible, manually manuallyinitiate initiate the the actuation actuation prior prior to the to the automatic automatic actuation. actuation. IfIf immediate immediate actions actions are in progress are in progress they should they should be be completed completed prior priorto to initiating initiating the the signal, signal, however however this isis not this not considered considered performance performance of of steps steps early early oror out of out of order. order. Example: During Example: During an an RCS RCS leakage leakage transient, transient, after after entry entry to to the the EOP Network, EOP Network, pressure pressure isis slowly slowly decreasing decreasing and and after observing after observing the trend the trend inin RCS RCS pressure pressure itit isis apparent apparent that that RCS RCS makeup makeup can can not keep not keep up up withwith leakage. leakage. As As pressure pressure approaches approaches the the lowlow pressure SI pressure SI setpoint setpoint of of 1715 1715 psig, psig, the the Operator Operator should should manually manually initiate Safety initiate Safety Injection Injection prior prior to to reaching reaching the the setpoint. setpoint. 

       ~2.
2. jpç nt for If the setRoint for an an automatic automatic actuation actuation signal lijeis che reached d andand thethe actuati on fails actuation fails to occur, the to occur, the Operator Qperator shouldshould manually manually initiate initiate thethe Signal. (SOER 93-1, Rec 2) .

Example: During the scenario Example: scenario described described above, the Operator Operator pressure has reached notes that pressure reached 1700 psig and a Safety Injection Injection actuation has not occurred, actuation occurred, the Operator Operator should immediately immediately initiate the Safety Injection.Injection. Examp Example: le: If an MSIV does not autom automatically atically close from aa valid valid signal and the RTGB contro controll switch does not operate operate,, thenthen depres depressing sing the Steam Line Isolati Isolation pushbutton on pushbu tton for that MSIV MSIV should be be perform performed. ed. Examp Example: le: IfIf aa CV CV Ventil ation Isolati Ventilation Isolation should have on should have occurr occurred, then ed, then depres depressing sing the the HIGH HIGH VOLT VOLTS OFF on S OFF R-11 or on fl-il or R-12 R-12 maymay be be succes successful.sful. OMM-022 IOMM-022 Rev. Rev.29 29 Page31 Page 31 ofof54541

SALEM FOXT SALEM FOXTRO ROTT 2001 NRC 2001 NRC WRITT WRITTE EN N EXAM EXAMIN INATIATIO ON N WORKSH WORK SHEET EET Question Questi on SRO 86 SR08 6 Number: Numbe r: Question: Questio n: Unit 22 isis in Unit in MODE MODE 33 duringduring aa plant plant startup startup.. RCS RCS heatup heatup and and pressur pressuriza ization tion isis in in progres progress. s.

  • Tave isis5ll
  • Tave 511 degF deg F
                                 *. RCS pressur RCS     pressure  e isis 1850 1850 psig psig One safety One    safety valvevalve onon 2222 SGSG fails fails partiall partially  open. When y open. When itit isis reseate reseated, d, the the follow followinging conditi conditiononss exist:

exist: 

                                **     Tave isis 492 Tave       492 degdeg FF
                                **     RCS pressur RCS    pressure     is 1700 e is    1700 psig psig
                               **      21, 23, 24 21,23,     24 SGs SOs are are 640 640 psig psig
                               **      22SG 22  SG is52 is 520 Opsi psig g
                               **      All parame All  paramete     rs are STABL ters         STABLE    E Which one of the follow Which                      following       describes ing describ      es all of the actions actions require required?  d?

A. Stabilize Stabili plant parame ze plant paramete rs. Restor ters. Restoree OPERA OPERAB BILITY ILITY of the affecte affected d safety valve and allow SG pressurpressures equalizee prior to raising es to equaliz raising RCS pressur pressuree above above the P-ll P-li setpoin setpointt B. Stabilize Stabili plant parame ze plant paramete rs. Comm ters. Commen encece RCS cooldo cooldow wn n and depres depressusurizat rization to place plant in an operati the plant operation onalal MODE MODE wher wheree the safety safety valve valve is not require requiredd C. Initiate Main Steam Initiate Steam Line IsolatioIsolation.

n. Comm Commen ence ce RCS cool cooldodowwnn and depress depressu urizatio rizationn to place the plan plantt in an operati operationonal al MODE MODE where where the safety safety valv valvee is not requ requireiredd D. Initiate Safety Injectio Initiate Injectionn and Main Steam Line Isola Isolatio n. Go to EOP tion. EOP-T-TRI RIP-l, P- 1, REA REAC CTOTORR TRIP OR SAF SAFET ETY Y INJE INJEC CTIO TION N Answer: D Justi ficat Justific ion:

ation: 120 psid will resul 120 resultt in strea streammlinlinee Delt Deltaa P SI and MSL MSLI. I. Sinc Since e no actua actuati ons have occu tions occurre d, the rred, SRO shou should ld direc directt initia initiatitions ons,, and direc directt entry entry to the appr appropopriariate proced te proc edurure. (TRIP-

e. (TRI I).

P-i). Tier/ Tier/GGrou roupp ill 111 10CFR 10CFR55.4155.41 43.5 43.5 beca becaus usee the the SRO SRO mus mustt deter determ mine ine plan plantt statu status, s, the the fact thatthat no no actua actuattions ions have have 10CFR 55.43 occu occurr rred ed but shou ld have should have,, and that that TRIP TRIP--i! still still appl 10CFR55.43 applie s in MOD ies in MODE E 33 Bank BanklN /Newew/ ! New New Mod Modifiified ed K/A KlA#: #: 040A 040AA A2.02.04 4 Abil ity to Ability to deter determ mineine oror inter interpr pret et cond conditi ition ons requiri s requ ng ESF iring ESFAS initiati AS initia tionon K/A KIA Valu Valueses:: 4.7 4.7 Cog nitiv Cognit ivee Anal Analysysisis Level: Level: Refe renc Refere es: nces: NOSO NOS05 5FLUN FLUNCY-00 CY-00,, Obje Object ctive ive 2.c2.c and and 2.k 2.k LP PROC LP PROCEDO2 ED02,, Obj Obj 44

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam

88. The cavitating
88. The venturi is cavitating venturi designed to is designed to limit limit maximum maximum flow flow from from the the SDAFW SDAFW Pump Pump to to aa faulted faulted S/G to less S/G to less than than 630 630 GPM GPM.....

A. to prevent A. to prevent water water hammer hammer on on the the S/G feed ring. S/G feed ring. B. ensure adequate B. to ensure adequate NPSHNPSH is is available to MDAFW MDAFW Pumps. Pumps. ensure that ReS C. to ensure RCS cooldown rates rates are NOT NOT exceeded. D. to D. to prevent SDAFW SDAFW Pump Pump runout during low runout during low S/G SIG pressure conditions. 88 88

061 G2. 1.27 001/AFW/2/1/3.9/4.0/SROILOW/43.1INEW 061 G2.1.27 00 1/AFW/21113 .9/4.OISRO/L0W143. 1/NEW - 2008/AFW-002 

                                                                 - 2008/AFW-002 The cavitating The   cavitating venturi venturi isis designed designed toto limit limit maximum maximum flow flow from from the the SDAFW SDAFW PumpPump to      faulted to aa faulted S/G  to  less  than    630  GPM S/G to less than 630 GPM .....

A. to prevent A. to prevent water water hammer hammer on the S/G on the feed ring. S/G feed ring. B. to ensure B. to ensure adequate adequate NPSH NPSH isis available available to to MDAFW MDAFW Pumps. Pumps. C. to ensure C. to ensure thatthat RCS RCS cooldown cooldown rates rates are NOT exceeded. are NOT exceeded. D to DY to prevent prevent SDAFW SDAFW Pump Pump runout runout during during lowlow S/G pressure conditions. S/G pressure conditions. The correct The correct answer answer is is D. D. A: Incorrect - S/G is already hot and SDAFW Pump flow is less than original flow from feedwater system. Inverted J tubes on the feed ring ring aid in preventing preventing water hammer. B: Incorrect - The SD and MDAFW Pumps do have a combined suction line, however SDAFW Pump flow will NOT impact MDAFW Pump NPSH due to the size of the combined suction line. C: Incorrect - The faulted S/G has caused excessive RCS Cooldown, limiting SDAFW Pump flow will maintain the SDAFW Pump available for service. D: Correct - - The SDAFW Pump may experience pump runout if a faulted S/G SIG is at a low pressure and flow is NOT limited by the venturi. Exam Question Number: 88

Reference:

USFAR, Section 10.4.8-1. KA Statement: Knowledge of system purpose and/or function. History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam. SRO - understandin understanding g conditions of the facility license. KA Name: AFW Tier/Group: 2/1 Importance Rating: 3.9/4.0 3.9/4.0 RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: LOW 10CFR55.43 10CFR55.43 link: 43.1 Source: NEW - 2008 NEW - Learning Objective: AFW-002

HBR HBR 22 UPDATED UPDATED FSAR FSAR 10.4.8 Auxiliary 10.4.8 Auxiliary Feedwater Feedwater System System 10.4.8.1 Design 10.4.8.1 Design Basis Basis The design The design parameters parameters for for the the auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater system system components components are are shown shown on Table on Table 10.4.8-1. 10.4.8-1. The The auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater systemsystem is is designed designed and and constructed constructed in accordance in accordance withwith the the Seismic Seismic Class Class II requirements requirements presented presented in in Section Section 3.2.3.2. 10.4.8.2 System 10.4.8.2 System Description Description The flow The flow diagram diagram forfor the the auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater system system is is included included with with thethe condensate condensate and and feedwater feedwater flow flow diagram diagram Figures Figures 10.1.0-4, 10.1.0-4, 10.1.0-5, 10.1.0-5, and and 10.1.0-6. 10.1.0-6. The auxiliary The auxiliary feedwater feedwater system system can can provide provide feedwater feedwater to to the the steam steam generators generators from anyone from any one oror combination combination of of three three auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater (AFW)(AFW) pumps, pumps, two two are are motor driven motor driven pumps pumps andand the the third third is is steam steam driven. driven. Two motor Two motor driven driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater pumps pumps areare supplied supplied power from from thethe emergency busses E-1 and emergency and E-2. The emergency emergency busses also also supply supply power to the the motor driven motor driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater pump's pumps discharge discharge isolation isolation valvesvalves and and the the steam driven steam driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater pump's pumps steam supply and feedwater discharge discharge isolation valves. The emergency 

. isolation                        emergency busses are supplied      supplied power either either from  from offsite or plant diesel generators. The steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump can                                     can bebe operated independent of electrical ~ower operated                                              power where steam produced from decay heat                 heat drives the drives    the turbine. The auxiliary feedwater pum~s                 pumps supply feedwater to the steam generators for decay heat removal if main feedwater is not available or                                       or steam generator steam    generator level is not adequate, as described below. The auxiliary feedwater pumps can be used to fill the steam generators under any plant feedwater condition, except that the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump requires the                                    the plant to be heated up above 350°F, and the motor driven AFW pumps require power.

power. Upon Upon receipt receipt of an auto start signal signal to the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump, pump, the steam supply valves will open supplying steam to drive the the turbine-turbine-pump. pump. At the same time, the feedwater discharge valves open to to the the steam steam generators. generators. The turbine-pump builds up speed and supplies 'feedwater feedwater to the the steam generators. generators .. A cavitating cavitating venturi is located in the discharge piping of the steam driven I auxiliary feedwater pump. Its function is to prevent excess flow from the pump 

   ~ump into into aa low low pressure steam  steam generator generator in    in the case case of of aa failed discharge I   flow  control flow control valve. This     This prevents prevents excessexcess mass/flow mass/flow into containment during          during aa I   main main steamline steamline break break and prevents prevents steam steam driven driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater pump         pump (junout.

runout. Upon Upon receipt receipt of an auto of an auto start start signal signal to to the the motor motor driven driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater pumps, pumps, the the feedwater feedwater discharge discharge valves valves openopen while while thethe motor motor isis accelerating accelerating up up to speed to speed and and supplies supplies feedwater feedwater to to the the steam steam generators. generators. . The motor The motor driven driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater pumps 'pumps are are supplied supplied with with bearing bearing cooling cooling water water from from the the service service water water system. system. The The SDAFW SDAFW pump pump is is self-cooled self-cooled using using water water from from the the CST. CST. The The capacity capacity of of the the steam steam driven driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater pump pump isis based based on on preventing preventing thethe water water level level in in the the steam steam generators generators from from receding receding below below thethe lowest lowest level level within within thethe indicated indicated level level range range in in the the event event of of aa loss loss of of offsite offsite power. power. ThisThis will will prevent prevent the the tube tube sheet sheet from from being being uncovered. uncovered. AA signal signal indicating indicating aa low low lowlow steam steam generatorwat generator water level in er level in any any twotwo steam steam generators generators or or aa direct direct signal signal of of undervoltage undervoltage on on 4160 4160 buses buses 11 and and 44 will will automatically automatically startstart the the steam steam driven driven AFW AFW pump pump byby opening opening steamsteam admission admission valves and auxiliary valves and auxiliary feedwater feedwater discharge discharge valvesvalves to to individual individual steam steam generators. generators. The The initiating initiating signalssignals for for starting starting the the motor motor driven driven AFN AFW pumps pumps 10.4.8-1 10.4.8-1 Revision No. Revision No. 15 15

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam Given the

89. Given
89. following:

the following: Instrument Air 

      - Instrument
      -               Air Compressor Compressor "0"  D is  tagged out is tagged   out for for maintenance.

maintenance. The Primary 

      - The
      -       Primary AirAir Compressor Compressor (PAC) (PAC) isis running.

running. Oil intrusion 

      - Oil
      -      intrusion has has plugged plugged the PAC  PAC Air Dryer.

Dryer. IA header 

      - IA
      -     header pressure pressure is is at at 75 75 PSIG PSIG and and decreasing.

Which ONE Which ONE (1)(1) of of the following is the following is the the required required procedural procedural action action lAW lAW AOP-017, AOP-O1 7, LOSS LOSS OF OF INSTRUMENT AIR? IA-47, TURBINE BUILDING A. SHUT IA-47, BUILDING ISOLATION ISOLATION to reduce reduce air loss. loss. IA-662, IA B. OPEN IA-662, IA BACK-UP CV QCV-10374 QCV-1 0374 ISOLATION ISOLATION Valve to cross-connect Condensate Polishing Air with IA. C. OPEN IA-3859, PAC DRYER BYPASS. D. Verify the Station Air Compressor is running and OPEN SA-220 and 221, STATION AIR TO INSTRUMENT AIR CROSS-CONNECT. 89 89

078 A2.0l A2.0 1 OOI/INSTRUMENT 00 1/INSTRUMENT AIRI2/l/2.412.9/SROIHIGHl43.5INEW AIRI2/1/2.4/2.9/SRO/HIGHI43 .5/NEW - 2008/AOP-017-006 

                                                                   - 2008/AOP-0 17-006 Given the following:

Instrument Air Compressor "0" 

   - Instrument
   -                                   D is tagged out for maintenance.
   - The Primary Air Compressor (PAC) is running.
   - Oil intrusion has plugged the PAC Air Dryer.
   - IA header pressure is at 75 PSIG and decreasing.

Which ONE (1) of the following is the required procedural action lAW AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR? A. SHUT IA-47, TURBINE BUILDING ISOLATION to reduce air loss. B. OPEN IA-662, IA BACK-UP CV QCV-10374 ISOLATION Valve to cross-connect Condensate Polishing Air with IA. C. OPEN IA-3859, PAC DRYER BYPASS. D Verify the Station Air Compressor is running and OPEN SA-220 and 221, STATION AIR DY' TO INSTRUMENT AIR CROSS-CONNECT. The correct answer is D. A: Incorrect - Shutting IA-47 will isolate ALL IA to the Turbine Building, and is NOT an action lAW AOP-017. B: Incorrect - The Condensate Polishing Air system is normally cross-connected to lA, 

              -                                                                              IA, this valve is normally OPEN and is closed to separate the systems during AOP-017AOP-O1 7 actions.

C: Incorrect - NO AOP-017 

              -         AOP-O1 7 guidance exists for opening the PAC dryer bypass.

D: 0: Correct - - As the first attempt to maintain IA header pressure, AOP-O1 AOP-017 7 actions cross-connect SA to IA. Exam Question Number: 89

Reference:

AOP-O1 AOP-017, 7, Pages 4 and 5; SD-O1 7, Instrument Air, Figures 1 SD-017, 1 and 4. KA Statement: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the lAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Air dryer and filter malfunctions. History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam. SRO - Requires evaluation of plant conditions and selection of appropriate actions lAW station procedures.

KA Name: KAName: INSTRUMENT AIR INSTRUMENT AIR Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 2/1 2/1 Importance Rating: Importance Rating: 2.4/2.9 2.4/2.9 RO/SRO Level: RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: Cognitive Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 43.5 Source: Source: NEW - 2008 NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: Learning Objective: AOP-017-006 AOP-017-006

Rev. Rev. 35 35 AOP-017 AOP- 017 LOSS LOSS OFOF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR Page Page 44 of of 61 61 STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I H RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I 1.

1. Check Plant Check Plant Status Status - MODE MODE 11 OR Go Go To Step 4:

To Step 4. MODE 22 MODE

  • 2.
2. Check IA Check IA Header Header Pressure Pressure - LESS
                                         -  LESS       IF IE IA IA pressure pressure decreases decreases to to less less THAN 60 THAN   60 PSIG PSIG                               than than 60 60 psig, psig, THEN THEN Go Go To To Step Step 3.

3. Go Go To To Step Step 4. 4. 3.

3. Perform The Perform The Following:

Following:

a. Trip
a. Trip the the Reactor Reactor PATH-l, while
b. Go To PATH-I, continuing with this procedure continuing
4. Verify Instrument Air Compressor DD - RUNNING
5. Verify The Primary Air Compressor - RUNNING

~

  • 6.
  • 6. Check IA Header Pressure - LESS-IF IA pressure decreases to less THAN THAN 80 PSIG than 80 psig, psig. THEN observe NOTE prior to Steps 77 and 88 and perform Steps 77 and 8.

Observe the NOTE Prior ToTo Step 99 and Go To Step 9.

Rev. Rev. 35 35 AOP-O17 AOP-017 LOSS LOSS OF OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR Page 55 of Page of 61 61

STEP H____ INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED IA-3821 is located on IA Dryer D~ 

 .7*
 ~  7. Dispatch Operator Dispatch       Operator(s) (s) ToTo Perform Perform The      Following:

The Following: 

   ~ a. a. Verify Verify Station Station Air Air Compressor Compressor        a.
a. Go Go To To Step Step 7.c.

7.c. 

                - IN SERVICE
                -      SERVICE WITH DISCHARGE DISCHARGE VALVE OPEN VALVE    OPEN
    ~
b. b. Verify the following SA TO IA b. Open SA-5, STATION AIR TO TO CROSS CONNECT BYPASS FILTER INST AIR CROSS CONNECT.

ISOLATION Valves - OPEN:- 

         ->.It _*    SA-220 SA-22O
                       .        SA-221
c. Verify IA-18,IA-iS, .AIRAIR DRYER "A" A & &

B BYPASS - OPEN "B" - d.

d. Verify the following Compressors - RUNNING
               *-    STATION STATION AIR COMP
               *-    INST INST AIR AIR COMP COMP AA
               *-    INST INST AIR AIR COMP COMP BB e.
e. Check Check FCV-174O.

FCV-1740, AIR AIR DRYER DRYER e. Open

e. Open IA-3665, IA-3665, AIR AIR DRYER "A" &&

DRYER A HIGH DP HIGH DP FLOW CONTROL Valve FLOW CONTROL Valve - - BYPASS. 

                                                                 "B" BYPASS.

B OPEN OPEN f.

f. OpenOpen IA-3821, IA-3821, INSTRUME INSTRUMENT AIR NT AIR DRYER DRYER D BYPASS "D" BYPASS

IA IA A& A& BB COMPRESSOR COMPRESSOR PACKAGE PACKAGE AIR-FIGURE-l AIR-FIGURE-i FILTER 23 SW 200 SCFM IA AIR RECEIVER SUPPLY HEADER F I LTER SW -6 

  -c fr~ER I I DR1ERI---"

200SCFM SCFM 200 INFORMATION INFORMATIONUSE USEONLY ONLY

STATION AIR COMPRESSOR PACKAGE AIR-FIGURE-4 AIR-FIGURE-4 CONSTRUCTION AIR CROSS-CONNECT SA-37 SA-270 400 SCFM 400SCfM AIR RECEIVER AFTERCOOLER It---t SA FILTER ~---a:::c:: 

                ...- " "I SEPARATOR                           i I          .. DISTRIBUTION HEADER 0       1 150 FT3 SERVICE WATER                                                  -
                                                                                  .. ..-.-------~--
                                                                                         )

SERVICE WATER TO IAA & B AIR DRYERS SA-5 REF. DWG: G- 90200 SHEET 3 G-1190200 INFORMATION USE ONLY

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam

90. Given the
90. Given the following:

following: The plant 

      - The
       -      plant is is operating operating at at 50%  RTP.

50% RTP. Power ascension 

      - Power
       -         ascension in   progress lAW in progress       GP-005, POWER lAW GP-005,              OPERATION, following POWER OPERATION,        following aa refueling refueling outage.

During paperwork 

      - During
      -          paperwork reviews, reviews, Maintenance Maintenance Supervision Supervision has has discovered that the the blind blind flange flange on the on the Refueling Refueling Transfer Transfer Tube Tube was installed installed but but has has NOT NOT been been properly properly torqued.

torqued. 

       - The Containment has been declared INOPERABLE and the plant must be placed in in MODE 3 within 6 hours.

Which ONE (1) of the following is the required Notification Notification to be made to agencies or organizations outside of the RNP organization? A. Load dispatcher must be notified of LCO condition that affects the unit output. B. State and County Emergency Operation Centers must be notified of a potential breach of Containment that may impact off-site doses in the event of an RCS leak. C. NRC Operations Center must be notified PRIOR to initiation of any Tech Spec required shutdown. D. American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) must be notified of a breach of the Primary Reactor Containment. 90 90

103 G2.4.20 OOllCONTAINMENT/2/112.7/4.lISROILOW/43.5INEW 103 00 1/CONTAINMENT/2/1/2.7/4. 1/SRO/LOW/43 .5/NEW - 2008/0MM-007-002 

                                                               - 2008/OMM-007-002 Given the following:

RTP. 

    - The plant is operating at 50% RTP.
    - Power ascension in progress lAW GP-005, POWER
     -                                                POWER OPERATION, following a refueling outage.
    - During paperwork reviews, Maintenance Supervision has discovered that the blind flange on the Refueling Transfer Tube was installed but has NOT been properly torqued.
    - The Containment has been declared INOPERABLE and the plant must be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours.

Which ONE (1) of the following is the required Notification to be made to agencies or organizations outside of the RNP organization? A':I A Load dispatcher must be notified of LCO condition that affects the unit output. B. State and County Emergency Operation Centers must be notified of a potential breach of Containment that may impact off-site doses in the event of an RCS leak. c. C. NRC Operations Center must be notified PRIOR to initiation of any Tech Spec required shutdown. D. American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) must be notified of a breach of the Primary Reactor Containment. The correct answer is A. A: Correct - - OMM-007 requires that load dispatcher be notified of any LCO that can affect load. B: Incorrect - State and County EOCs are notified when the plant enters EAL condition reportable events. C: Incorrect - NRC Operations Center is notified per AP-030 of reportable events, but does NOT have to be notified PRIOR to initiation of plant shutdown. D: Incorrect - ANI is notified of any declared emergency at an Alert level or higher. Exam Question Number: 90

Reference:

AP-030, Pages 11 and 12; 12; OMM-007, Pages 13, 13, 23, 28, 31. KA Statement: Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator. History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC exam. SRO - Requires evaluation of station reporting requirements.

KA Name: KAName: CONTAINMENT CONT AINMENT Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 2/1 2/1 Importance Rating: Importance Rating: 2.7/4.1 2.7/4.1 RO/SRO Level: RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: Cognitive Level: LOW LOW 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 43.5 Source: Source: NEW - 2008 NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: Learning Objective: OMM-007-002 OMM-007-002

9.0 9.0 PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NOTES: The NOTES: The NRC NRC shall shall be notified of be notified of those those non-emergency non-emergency events events discovered discovered andand reportable in accordance with 10 CFR reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 50.73 within within three three years years from from the time the time that that the the event event occurred. occurred. IfIf more more than than three three years years have have lapsed lapsed before before the the event event isis discovered, discovered, the the event event need need not not be be reported. reported. IfIf the the event event was was aa condition condition reportable reportable by Technical Specifications by Technical Specifications andand the the Technical Technical Specifications Specifications havehave since since been been amended amended to remove the requirement, the event need to remove the requirement, the event need not be reported. not be reported. NUREG-1022 provides NUREG-1022 provides clarifications clarifications forfor 10 10 CFR CFR 50.72 50.72 and and 1010 CFR CFR 50.73. 50.73. The NRC The Operations Center NRC Operations Center may may bebe contacted contacted via via the the NRC NRC Emergency Emergency Telecommun ications System (ETS) Telecommunications System (ETS) telephones. The telephones. The commercial commercial telephone telephone system system may also may also be be used. used. TheThe NRC NRC Operations Operations Center Center telephone telephone numbers numbers are are found found inin the the ERO ERO Telephone Book and in Attachment 11.13 of Book and in Attachment 11.13 of this procedure. procedure. Attachment 11.13, Attachment 11.13, Event Event Notification Notification Worksheet, should be completed for each one-hour hour or four-hour Report of a significant event made to the NRC in accordance with this procedure. procedure. When making an immediate notification, the caller shall identify: (i) The Emergency Class declared; or (i) (ii) The paragraph of 10 CFR 50.72 requiring notification of the Non-Emergency Non-Emergency Event. 9.1 Immediate and One-Hour Notifications 9.1 .1 Notifications listed in Attachment 11.1 9.1.1 11.1 shall be performed immediately and no later than one hour following the event to the NRC NRC locations locations specified in in the attachment. This attachment attachment is organized organized by subject (left handhand column) column) asas follows:

  • Notification Notification requirements requirements of of 10 10 CFR CFR 50.72 50.72
                     **    10 CFR 10  CFR 50.36 50.36 Notification Notification Requirement Requirements     s
                     **   Security/Safe     guards Notification Security/Safeguards         Notification Requirement Requirements     from 10 s from    10 CFR CFR 73 73
                    **    Source, Source, byprodut byproduct material, material, and and SNMSNM notification notification requirements requirements of  of 10 CFR 10  CFR 30,30, 40, 40, and and 7070
                    ** ISFSI ISFSI Notifications Notifications
                    ** SNM SNM Shipments Shipments Notification Notification Requirement Requirements    s
                    ** Follow-up Follow-up Notifications Notifications IAP-030 AP-030                                                  Rev Rev 40 40                                     Page 111 Page        of 57 1 of  57

               **     Notifications to Notifications      to NRC NRC Region Region IIII from from 1010 CFR CFR 20,20, 30 30 and and 4040 requirements requirements
               **     FED Notification FFD    Notification Requirements Requirements
               **     IAEA Notification IAEA    Notification Requirements Requirements 9.2 9.2    Four Hour Four    Hour Notifications Notifications Notifications listed Notifications      listed inin Attachment Attachment 11.2  11.2 shall shall be be performed performed no   no later later than than four four hours   after the hours after       the event event or or discovery discovery of     the condition of the condition to to the the NRC NRC locations locations specified specified inin the the attachment.

attachment. 9.3 9.3 Eight Hour Eight Hour Notifications Notifications Notifications listed Notifications listed inin Attachment 11 11.3 

                                                         .3 shall be performed no later than eight hours hours    after        event or discovery of the condition to the NRC locations specified the event in the attachment.

9.4 Twenty-Four Hour Notifications Notifications listed in Attachment 11.4 shall be performed no later than twenty-four hours after the event or discovery of the condition to the NRC locations specified in the attachment. 9.5 Two-Working Day Notifications Two-Working Notifications listed in Attachment 11 11.5.5 shall be performed no later later. than two working days after the event or discovery of the condition to the NRC locations specified in the attachment. 9.6 Thirty-Day Notifications/Reports Notifications/Reports The notifications/reports notifications/reports listed in Attachment 11 .6 shall be performed no later 11.6 than thirty days after the event or discovery of the condition by either phone notification or written report as specified. 9.7 Licensee Event Reports HBRSEP HBRSEP shall shall submit submit an an LER LER for anyany event event ofof the type described described in in Attachment 11.7 11.7 within 60 days days after the discovery of of the event. event. In In the case of an invalid actuation actuation reported under under 10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i 50.73(a)(2)(iv),v), other than actuation other actuation of of the the reactor protection protection system system (RPS) (RPS) when when thethe reactor reactor isis critical, critical, HBRSEP HBRSEP may, at may, at its its option, option, provide aa telephone notification to the the NRC NRC Operations Center Center within 60 days after 60 days after discovery discovery of of the the event event instead instead ofof submitting submitting aa written written LER. LER. Unless Unless otherwise otherwise specified specified in in this this section, section, the the HBRSEP HBRSEP shall shall report report anan event event ifif itit occurred occurred within within three three years years of of the the date date of of discovery, discovery, regardless regardless of of the the plant plant mode mode or or power power level, level, and and regardless regardless of of the the significance Significance of of the the structure, structure, system, system, oror component component that that initiated initiated the the event. event. This This attachment attachment is is organized organized by by subject subject as as follows: follows: IAP-030 AP-030 Rev Rev 4040 12 of Page 12 Page of 57 57

8.2.6 (Continued) 8.2.6 (Continued) 

                -    Item 44 - Enter Item      - Enterthe the maximum maximum time time the the equipment equipment isis allowed allowed to to be be inoperable inin the inoperable               applicable blank.

the applicable blank. Circle Circle hrs/days hrs/days as as they apply to they apply to the Special Report. the Special Report. 

                -    Item 55 - Enter Item      - Enter thethe Time Time AND AND Date Date that that item item 44 isis required required inin the the applicable blank.

applicable blank. NOTE: NOTE: ODCM required ODCM required compensatory compensatory actions actions and and initial initial sampling sampling lack lack aa "grace grace period. period". 

                -    Item 66 - Enter Item      - Enter anyany applicable applicable surveillances surveillances or or activities activities andand required required frequencies      which frequencies which are     are required required asas aa result result of of the the component component inoperability.

inoperability. Examples: Examples: ITS LCO "ITS LCO 3.2.4 3.2.4 REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION ACTION A.3 requiresrequires SR SR 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.2.1 3.2.1.1 3.2.2.1 once once per per 7 days." days. ITS LCO 3.6.3 REQUIRED ACTION A.2 requires the "ITS the affected penetration flow path verified isolated once per 31 days for isolation devices outside CV." CV. TRM TRMS 3.11 REQUIRED COMPENSATORY "TRM COMPENSATORY MEASURE requires obtaining and analyzing grab samples once per 24 hours thereafter, when degassing is not in progress." progress. 8.2.7 IF the component is an ITS Support System component, THEN perform Attachment 10.11,10.11, which is provided to ensure Safety Function Determinatio Determinations ns are performed consistently. The TRM contains in-depth guidance for performing Safety Function Determinatio Determinations. ns. [CAPR 193057] 193057] 8.2.8 8.2.8 IF IF the the component component is is an an ITS ITS Supported Supported System System Component, Component, THEN THEN review review openopen Loss Loss of of Safety Safety Function Function Worksheets Worksheets (Attachment (Attachment 10.11)10.11) forfor impact. {CAPR impact. [CAPR 193057] 193057] 

  > 8.2.9 "7   8.2.9    Initial Initial the the blank blank in in Section Section H "H" when when the the Load Load Dispatcher Dispatcher has   has been been notified    when    the  component notified when the component inoperability inoperability could could force force plant plant shutdown shutdown or    or load load reduction.

reduction. [SOER [SOER 99-1, 99-1, Rec. Rec. 10] 1C] 8.2.10 8.2.10 Initial Initial the the blank blank in in Section Section I "I" when when Planning Planning andand Scheduling Scheduling has has been been notified notified when when ITS/TRM/OD ITSITRM/ODCM/RG CM/RG 1.97 1.97 actions actions have have beenbeen entered entered andand plant plant shutdown shutdown isis anticipated. anticipated. OMM-007 IOMM-007 I Rev. Rev. 7676 Page 13 Page 13 of of 85 851 I

8.6.3.2 (Continued) 8.6.3.2 (Continued) 

                         -   Review plant Review      plant logs, logs, EIRs, EIRs, and and scheduled scheduled work work activities activities since since the  Engineering the Engineering memo   memo was  was initiated initiated to to assure assure any any maintenance that maintenance        that was was performed performed on on the the listed listed heat heat exchangers      DID   NOT exchangers DID NOT involve     involve tube tube plugging plugging and and that that the the components are components        are OPERABLE OPERABLE AND     AND thethe SSO SSO OR  OR the the CRSS CRSS will will sign   when   the  initial check sign when the initial       check isis completed.

completed. 

                         -   Record completion Record      completion of  of reviews reviews andand equipment equipment checkschecks inin Auto Auto Log Log 8.6.4 8.6.4      Place the Place     the unit   in the unit in       appropriate Mode the appropriate      Mode as as required required byby ITS ITS LCO LCO 3.7.8 3.7.8 REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTIONS ifif the               above requirements the above      requirements are are not not met.

met. 8.6.5 

  .-78.6.5      Initial the blank in Section Initial                   Section "C" C when the Load Load Dispatcher Dispatcher has been  been notified of the REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION entry which could force plant shutdown or load reduction.

8.6.6 Initial the blank in Section "0" D when Planning and Scheduling has been notified plant shutdown is anticipated. 8.6.7 Once every 12 hours, Section "E" E is completed as follows: Verify the affected document revisions are current with the memo AND the SSO OR the CRSS will sign when the check is completed. Review plant logs, EIRs, and scheduled work activities for the previous 12 hours to assure no maintenance was performed on the listed heat exchangers that would affect OPERABILI OPERABILITY TY AND that the components are OPERABLE AND the SSO OR the CRSS will sign when the check is completed. Record completion of checks in Auto Log. OMM-007 IOMM-007 Rev. Rev. 7676 Page 23 Page 23 of of 85 851

8.9.10 IF 8.9.10 the inoperable IF the inoperable component component isis aa Radiation Radiation Monitor, Monitor, Flowrate Flowrate Monitor Monitoror or Tank Level Monitor, THEN Tank Level Monitor, THEN notify notify E&C E&C.. 8.9.11 IF 

   .---;> 8.9.11       the component IF the     component inoperability inoperability could could force force aa plant plant shutdown shutdown or or load load reduction, THEN reduction,       THEN notify notify the the Load Load Dispatcher.

Dispatcher. [SOER [SOER 99-1, 99-1, Rec. C] Rec. 1101 8.9.12 IF 8.9.12 ITSITRM!ODCM/RG 1.97 IF ITSITRM/ODCM/RG 1.97 actions actions have have been been entered AND aa plant entered AND plant shutdown isis anticipated, shutdown anticipated, THEN THEN notify notify Planning Planning and and Scheduling. Scheduling. 8.9.13 WHEN 8.9.13 WHEN the the equipment equipment isis returned returned to to service service OROR the the equipment equipment isis nono longer required longer required due due to to aa change change in in plant plant conditions, THEN perform conditions, THEN perform thethe following: following: IF the equipment IF the equipment isis declared declared operable, THEN perform operable, THEN perform the the following: following: oo Enter in Enter in AUTO AUTO log.log. oo IF the equipment IF the equipment is is aa Radiation Radiation Monitor, Monitor, Flowrate Flowrate Monitor Monitor oror Tank Tank Level Monitor, Level Monitor, THEN THEN notify notify E&C. E&C. 

                  -     IF the equipment is no   no longer required, required, THEN enter the reason reason inin AUTO log (such as, MODE 5 entered).

[ OMM-007 IOMM-007 Rev. Rev. 7676 Page 28 Page 28 of of 85 851

ATTACHMENT 10.1 ATTACHMENT 10.1 Page 2 Page 2 of of 22 EIR - ITSITRM/ODCM/RG 1.97 EIR - ITSfTRM/ODCM/RG 1.97 F. IF F. this isis an IF this an ITS ITS Support Support System System Component, Component, THEN perform Attachment THEN perform Attachment 10.11. 10.11. [CAPR 193057] [CAPR 1 93057j G. IF G. IF this this isis an an ITS ITS Supported Supported System System Component, Component, THEN THEN review review open open Loss Loss ofof Safety Safety Function Function Worksheets (Attachment Worksheets (Attachment 10.11)10.11) forfor impact. impact. ~ H. Load Dispatcher H. Load Dispatcher notified notified of of REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION ACTION which which could could force force plant plant shutdown/load shutdown/load reduction. reduction. Initials) [SOER (SSO/CRSS Initials) [SOER 99-1, 99-1, Rec. Rec. 11 C] C] I.I. Planning and Planning and Scheduling Scheduling notified notified toto develop develop Forced Forced Outage Outage Schedule Schedule ifif ITS/TRM/OD ITSITRM/ODCM/RG 1.97 CM/RG 1.97 actionsactions are entered AND are entered plant shutdown AND plant shutdown anticipated. anticipated. _ _ _ _ _ _(SSO/CRSS (SSO/CRSS Initials)Initials) J. IF J. this EIR IF this EIR isis for for aa Radiation Radiation Monitor, Monitor, Flowrate Flowrate Monitor Monitor or or Tank Tank Level Level Monitor, Monitor, THEN THEN notify notify E&C of equipment E&C of equipment inoperability:inoperability  : Time _ _ _ _ Date Date _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ E&C Shift E&C Shift Technician Technician (Print (Print name) name) K. IF a Maintenance Rule System Function is affected, THEN record Allowed Unavailability Unavailability Unavailability Hours, and Unavailability Hours, Actual Unavailability Unavailability Hours Remaining. _ _Hours Allowed - - Hours Actual = 

                                                                           =             Hours Remaining IF unplanned and less than 72 Hours remaining, THEN notify the RES Duty Manager.

Name Date Time L. Completed By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SSO/CRSS Date M. Comments: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ N. Restoration N. 1.

1. Equipment operable: Time _ _ _ _ Date _ _ __
2. IF this EIR is for a Radiation Monitor, Flowrate Monitor IF Monitor or Tank Level Monitor, THEN notify E&C E&C of equipment return to service:

Time ____ Date Date _ _ __ E&C E&C Shift Shift Technician Technician (Print (Print Name) Name) 3.

3. Equipment Equipment no no longer longer required due due toto plant plant conditions:

Time Time Date _ _ __ Date Reason: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Reason: 4.

4. Completed By:

Completed By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SSO/CRSS SSO/CRSS Date Date OMM-007 IOMM-007 Rev. Rev. 7676 31 of Page 31 Page 851 of 85

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written ExamExam

91. Given
91. Given the the following:

following: The Plant 

       - The
        -        Plant isis inin MODE MODE 33 at      547 of at 547       following aa reactor
                                                        °F following       reactor trip trip from from 100%

100% RTP. RTP. 

       - RCS
        -         chemistry sample RCS chemistry           sample indicates indicates DOSE DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT 1-131     1-131 isis 73 73 Micro-Curies/gram.

Micro-Curies/gram. Which ONE Which ONE (1) of the (1) of the following following applies to the applies to the current current condition, condition, andand thethe basis basis for for that that requirement? requirement? A. Be A. Be inin MODE MODE 44 within within 48 48 hours, hours, to to place place the the plant plant inin aa MODE MODE wherewhere the the 1-131 1-131 limit limit isis NOT NOT APPLICABL APPLICABLE. E. B. Reduce B. Reduce TTAVO AVG to 500 of to << 500 within 66 hours, 

                                           °F within       hours, toto ensure ensure RCS RCS saturation saturation pressure pressure isis below below the the S/G     Safety   Valve      lift S/G Safety Valve lift setpoint. setpoint.

C. Be C. Be inin MODE MODE 44 within within 66 hours, hours, toto place place the the plant plant in in aa MODE MODE wherewhere thethe 1-131 1-131 limit limit isis NOT NOT APPLICABLE. APPLICABLE. D. Reduce D. Reduce TTAVG AVG to < < 500 of °F within 6 hours, to ensure RCS saturation pressure is is below the S/G PORV lift setpoint. 91 91

002 G2.2.40 002 G2.2.40 OOlfREACTOR COOLANTI2I2I3.414.7ISRO/HIGHJ432143.5INEW - 20081RCS-015 OO1IREACTOR COOLANT/212/3.4/4.7/SROIHIGHl43.2/43.5INEW - 2008IRCS-015 Given the Given the following: following: The Plant 

   - The
   -       Plant isis in in MODE MODE 33 atat 547 °F following 547 of  following aa reactor reactor trip trip from from 100%

100% RTP. RTP. 

   - RCS
   -        chemistry sample RCS chemistry                  indicates DOSE sample indicates   DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT 1-131  1-131 isis 73 73 Micro-Curies/gram.

Micro-Curies/gram. Which ONE Which ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following applies applies to to the the current current condition, condition, and and the the basis basis for for that that requirement? requirement? A. BeBe in in MODE MODE 4 within 48 48 hours, hours, to place the plant inin a MODE MODE where the 1-131 1-131 limit is is NOT NOT APPLICABLE. B B~ Reduce TTAVG Reduce AVG to < < 500 F within 66 hours, 0 500 of hours, to ensure ensure RCS RCS saturation pressure pressure isis below below the S/G Safety Valve lift setpoint. C. Be in MODE 4 within 6 hours, to place the plant in a MODE where the 1-131 limit is NOT APPLICABLE. D. Reduce T AVG to < 500 of TAVG °F within 6 hours, to ensure RCS saturation pressure is below the S/G PORV lift setpoint. The correct answer is B. A: Incorrect - This is the partial LCO applicable to 1-131 greater than 0.25, and less than 60 Micro-Curies/gm, except LCO requires MODE 3. B: Correct - - ITS for 1-131 is applicable in MODE 3 with T AVG > TAVG > 500 of. °F. Saturation pressure for 500 °F of is 665 PSIG which is below the S/G PORV and S/G Safety Valve setpoint. C: Incorrect - No MODE 4 requirements. Basis is for conditions below S/G safety valve setpoint. D: Incorrect - Action is correct. Basis is to be below the S/G Safety Valve setpoint, NOT the S/G PORV setpoint.

Exam Question Exam Number: 91 Question Number: 91

Reference:

ITS

Reference:

3.4.16; ITS ITS 3.4.16; ITS 3.4.16 BD. 3.4.16 BO. KA Statement: KA Statement: Ability Ability to to apply Technical Specifications apply Technical Specifications for for aa system. system. History: New History: New - Written 

                - Written for for HLC-08    NRC exam.

HLC-08 NRC exam. SRO - Knowledge SRO - Knowledge of of ITS ITS beyond beyond 11 hour hour action action statements. statements. KA Name: KAName: REACTOR COOLANT Tier/Group: 2/2 212 Importance Rating: 3.4/4.7 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 43.2/43.5 Source: NEW -2008 

                             - 2008                     Learning Objective: RCS-015 RCS-OI5

RCS RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity 3.4.16 3.4.16 3.4 3.4 REACTOR REACTOR COOLANT COOLANT SYSTEM SYSTEM (RCS) (RCS) 3.4.16 3.4.16 RCS Specific Specific Activity LCO LCO 3.4.16 3.4.16 The The specific specific activity of the reactor coolant coolant shall shall be within limits. APPLICABILITY: MODES 11 and 2, MODE 33 with RCS average temperature (Tavg) (TavQ) ~ 500°F. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 - -----------Note Note ------- ----- 

    > 0.25 MCi/gm.

j.lCi/gm. LCO 3.0.4.c is applicable. A.1 Verify DOSE Once per 4 hours EQUIVALENT 1-131 

                                           $ 60 uCi/gm.j.lCi Igm.
                                -AND AND A.2       Restore DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 to                              48 hours within limit.

B. Gross specific activity B.1 Be in MODE 33 with 66 hours of the reactor coolant Tavg << 500°F. not within limit. (continued) (continued) HBRSEP Unit HBRSEP Unit No. No. 22 3.4-45 3.4-45 Amendment No. Amendment No. 203 203

RCS RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity 3.4.16 3.4.16 ACTIONS (continued) ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION CONDITION REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION ACTION COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME TIME "'~ C. Requi C. Required red Acti on and Action and C.1 C.1 Be Be in in MODE MODE 33 with with 66 hours hours associated associ ated Completion Cornpl eti on Tav9 Tavg << 500°F. 500°F. Time of Time of Condition Condition A A not met. not met. OR OR DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT 1-131 1-131 CiIgm. 

        > 60 f,lCi/gm.

60 SURVEI LLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SURVEI LLANCE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY SR 3.4.16.1 Verify reactor coolant gross specific 77 days days activity ~ 100/E f,lCi/gm. 100/ jtCi/gm. SR 3.4.16.2 ----------- --------NOTENOTE ------ ----- ---- ----- Only required to be performed in MODE 1. Verify reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALE EQUIVALENTNT 14 days 14 days 1-131 specific activity ~ 0.25 MCi/gm. f,lCi/gm. AND Between 22 and Between and 66 hours hours after after aa THERMAL POWER change of of 15% RTP 

                                                                               ~ 15%   RTP within aa 11 hour within        hour period period (continued)

(continued) HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 3.4-46 3.4-46 Amendment No. Amendment No. 201 201

RCS RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity B B 3.4.16 3.4.16 B B 3.4 3.4 REACTOR REACTOR COOLANT COOLANT SYSTEM SYSTEM (RCS) (RCS) B B 3.4.16 3.4.16 RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity BASES BASES BACKGROUND The LCO contains contains specific specific activity activity limits for for both DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 1-131 and gross specific activity in the reactor coolant. coolant. The allowable levels are intended to limit the offsite dose to less than the limits of 10 CFR 50.67 for analyzed accidents. APPLICABLE The LCO limits on the specific activity of the reactor SAFETY ANALYSES coolant ensure that the resulting offsite doses will not exceed the 10 CFR 50.67 dose limits following an analyzed accident. The limiting accident analysis used in establishing the specified activity limits is the SGTR. Other accidents, such as the Main Steam Line Break accident also use the limits from this LCO in the dose analysis. The SGTR dose analysis (Ref. 2) assumes the specific activity of the reactor coolant at the LCO limit and an existing reactor coolant steam generator (SG) tube leakage rate of 0.3 gpm. The analysis assumes the specific activity of the secondary coolant at its limit of 0.1 ~Ci/gm jiCi!gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 1-131 from LCO 3.7.15, "Secondary Secondary Specific Activity." Activity. (continued) HBRSEP Unit HBRSEP Unit No. No. 22 BB 3.4-98 3.4-98 Revision No. 31 Revision 31

RCS RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity BB 3.4.16 3.4.16 BASES BASES APPLICABLE APPLICABLE The The SGTR SGTR event event is is assumed assumed to to be be caused caused byby the the instantaneous instantaneous SAFETY ANALYSES SAFETY ANALYSES rupture rupture of of aa steam steam generator generator tube tube which which relieves relieves to to the the (continued) (continued) faulted steam faulted steam generator. generator. TheThe primary primary consequence consequence of of this this event is event is the the release release of of radioactivity radioactivity from from the the reactor reactor coolant. coolant. TheThe analysis analysis also also assumes assumes aa concurrent concurrent lossloss ofof power, power, from from which which the the loss loss of of circulating circulating water water through through the the condenser condenser eventually eventually results results in in the the loss loss of of condenser condenser vacuum. Valves in in the condenser condenser bypass bypass lines lines would automatically automatically close close to to protect protect the the condenser, condenser, thereby thereby causing steam causing steam relief directly to the atmosphere from from the the steam steam generator PORVs or or safety safety valves. This direct relief relief of activity from the ruptured tube would continue until until thethe faulted steam generator is isolated. Additional releases releases due to primary to secondary LEAKAGE would continue from from thethe SG PORVs or safety valves on the intact SGs until they they were were isolated. Since no fuel failures are assumed to occur from the the event, event, the specific activity at the LCO limit, and the amount amount of of coolant released would determine the radioactivity that was was released to the atmosphere. The safety analysis shows the radiological consequences consequences of of an SGTR accident are within the dose limits of 10 CFR50.67. CFR5O.67. Operation with iodine specific activity levels greater than than the LCO limit is permissible for 48 hours, if the the activity activity level does not exceed 60 jiCi/gm. 

                                                 ~Ci/gm.

The permissible iodine level of 60 iCi/gm ~Ci/gm or less is is acceptable because of the low probability of of aa SGTR SGTR accident accident occurring during the established occurring established 4848 hour time time limit. limit. The The occurrence of an SGTR occurrence SGTR accident at 60 60 tCi!gm increase 

                                                               ~Ci/gm would increase boundary dose levels, but the calculated site boundary                       but still still bebe within 10 within  10 CFR CFR 50.67 50.67 dose dose limits.

limits. Limits on Limits on RCS RCS specific specific activity activity also ensure the radiation radiation shielding design shielding design ofof the the plant remains acceptable plant remains acceptable for plantplant personnel radiation personnel radiation protection. protection. RCS specific RCS specific activity activity satisfies satisfies Criterion Criterion 22 ofof the the NRC NRC Policy Statement. Policy Statement. (continued) (continued) HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 BB 3.4-99 3.4-99 Revision No. Revision No. 26 26

RCS RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity BB 3.4.16 3.4.16 BASES (Continued) BASES (Continued) LCO LCO The specific The specific iodine iodine activity activity isis limited limited toto 0.25 iCi/gm DOSE 0.25 ~Ci/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT 1-131, 1-131, and and the the gross gross specific specific activity activity in in the the reactor coolant is reactor coolant is limited limited toto the the number number of iCi/gm equal of ~Ci/gm equal toto 100 100 divided divided byby E (average (average disintegration disintegration energy energy ofof the the sum sum of of the the average average beta beta andand gamma gamma energies energies ofof the the coolant coolant nuclides). nuclides). The The limits limits onon DOSE DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT 1-131 1-131 and and gross gross specific specific activity activity ensure ensure the the 22 hour hour dose dose to an individual at to an individual at the site the site boundary boundary during during the the DBA DBA will will be be less less than than the the allowed dose. allowed dose. The The SGTR SGTR accident accident analysis analysis (Ref. (Ref. 2)

2) shows shows that that the the 22 hour hour site site boundary boundary dose dose levels are are within within acceptable acceptable limits.

limits. Violation of the LCO LCO may result in reactor coolant radioactivity levels that could, could, inin the event event ofof an an SGTR, SGTR, lead to site boundary doses that exceed the 10 CFR 50.67 50.67 dose limits. APPLICABILITY APPLICABILITY In MODES 11 and 2, and in MODE 3 with RCS average temperature temperature 

                    ~  500°F, operation within the LCO limits for DOSE EQUIVALENT     EQUIVALENT 1-131 and gross specific activity are necessary to contain         contain the potential consequences consequences of an SGTR to within the acceptable site boundary dose values.

For operation in MODE 33 with RCS average temperature 

                    <  500°F, and in MODES 44 and 5, the release of         of radioactivity radioactivity in the event of aa SGTR is unlikely since the saturation  saturation pressure of the reactor coolant is below the lift pressure settings of of the main steam safety valves.

ACTIONS ACTIONS Note permits AA Note permits the useuse of of the the provisions provisions ofof LCO LCO 3.O.4.c. 3.0.4.c. This This allowance allowance permits permits entry entry into into the the applicable applicable MODE(S) MODE(S) while relying while relying onon the the ACTIONS. ACTIONS. ThisThis allowance allowance is is acceptable acceptable due to the significant conservatism due to the significant conservatism incorporated incorporated into into the the activity limit, specific activity specific limit, the the low low probability probability of of anan event event which is which is limiting limiting duedue to to exceeding exceeding this this limit, limit, and and the the ability to ability to restore restore transient transient specific specific activity activity excursions excursions while the while the plant plant remains remains at,at, oror proceeds proceeds toto power power operation. operation. (continued) (continued) HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 3.4-100 BB3.4-100 Revision No. Revision No. 28 28

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written ExamExam

92. Given
92. Given the the following:

following: The plant 

      - The
       -      plant isis operating operating at at 100%    RTP.

100% RTP. APP-003-E8, PZR 

      - APP-003-ES,
       -                    PZR CONTROL CONTROL HIILO        LVL isis illuminated.

HI/LO LVL illuminated. APP-003-F4, CHG 

      - APP-003-F4,
       -                    CHG PMP PMP HIHI SPEED SPEED isis illuminated.

illuminated. ALL Pressurizer 

      - ALL
       -      Pressurizer Level Level channels channels indicate indicate 47%

47% Level. Level. RCS Pressure 

      - RCS
       -       Pressure isis 2215       PSIG and 2215 PSIG      and decreasing decreasing slowly.

slowly. 

      - TTAVG
       -  AVG isis equal equal to to TTREF.

REF. Which ONE Which ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following is is the the appropriate appropriate action? action? Implement AOP-015, SECONDARY LOAD A. Implement LOAD REJECTION. B. Implement AOP-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY LEAKAGE. C. Implement AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE. D. Implement AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL. 92 92

011 G2.4.50 011 G2.4.50 OOllPZR 001/PZR LLVL CONTROL/2/2/4.2/40/SRO/HIGHI43.5/NEW - 20081PZR-008 VL CONTROLl2/2/4.2/4.0ISROIHIGHl43.5INEW - 20081PZR-008 Given the Given the following: following: The plant 

   - The
    -       plant is is operating operating at at 100%    RTP.

100% RTP. APP-003-E8, PZR 

   - APP-003-ES,
    -                     PZR CONTROL CONTROL HIILO         LVL isis illuminated.

HI/LO LVL illuminated. 

   - APP-003-F4, CHG
    -                     CHG PMPPMP HI HI SPEED SPEED is is illuminated.

illuminated. Pressurizer Level 

   - ALL Pressurizer
    -                         Level channels channels indicate indicate 47% Level.Level.

RCS Pressure 

   - RCS
    -        Pressure is    is 2215 2215 PSIG PSIG and     decreasing slowly.

and decreasing slowly. 

   -T
    - TAvG AVG isis equal to TTREF.REF' Which ONEONE (1)  (1) of the following is is the appropriate action?

A. Implement AOP-015, SECONDARY LOAD REJECTION. B B~ Implement AOP-016,AOP-01 6, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY LEAKAGE. C. Implement AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE. D. Implement AOP-019, AOP-01 9, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL. The correct answer is B. A: Incorrect - A Secondary load rejection would cause PZR level to increase and a Charging pump Low speed alarm would be illuminated. B: Correct - - ALL indications indicate an RCS leak is in progress. C: Incorrect - ALL PZR level channels indicate the same value, therefore NO instrument failure is in progress. D: Incorrect - - Pressure is decreasing due to a loss of inventory, NOT due to a pressure malfunction or accident. Exam Question Number: 92

Reference:

APP-003-E8 APP-003-ES and F4. KA Statement: Statement: Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in in the alarm response manual. History: History: New New - Written for HLC-08 

                  -                HLC-OS NRC NRC exam.

exam. SRO SRO - Diagnosis 

      - Diagnosis of    of plant  event, selection plant event,   selection ofof correct procedure procedure to to mitigate.

mitigate.

KA Name: KAName: PZR LVL PZR LVL CONTROL CONTROL Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 2/2 2/2 Importance Rating: Importance Rating: 4.2/4.0 4.2/4.0 RO/SRO Level: RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: Cognitive Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 43.5 Source: Source: NEW - 2008 NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: Learning Objective: PZR-008 PZR-008

APP-003-E8 APP-003-E8 PZRPZRCONTROL CONTROLHI/LO Hl/LOLVLLVL *** WILLREFLASH 

                                      *** WILL    REFLASH***

AUTOMATICACTIONS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1.1. High Level High Level energizes energizes Back-up Back-up Group Group"A"A and and "B" B Heaters Heaters CAUSE CAUSE 1.1. Letdown, Charging Letdown, Charging mismatch mismatch 2.2. Malfunction of Malfunction Level Control of Level Control System System 3.3. Plant transient Plant transient -5. "'5. Excessive RCS Excessive RCS leakage leakage 6.6. Channel failure Channel failure OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS 1.1. Pressurizer Level Pressurizer Level (LI-460, (LI-460, LI-461 Ll-461 and and LI-459A) Ll-459A) 2.

2. Charging and Charging Letdown Flow and Letdown Flow (FI-122A (FI-122A and and FI-150)

Fl-150) 3.

3. Generator Load Generator Load 4.
4. Tavg Tavg ACTIONS ACTIONS 1.1. IF a load rejection has occurred, THEN Refer To AOP-015.

IF AOP-O1 5. 2.

2. IF excessive IF excessive RCSRCS leakage exists, THEN Refer Refer To AOP-016.

AOP-O1 6. 3.

3. IF aa level IF level controller controller has failed, THEN manually adjust Charging and/or Letdown to maintain PZR level.

PZR 4.

4. IF, a level channel failure has occurred, THEN refer to AOP-025.

DEVICE/SETPOINTS OEVICE/SETPOINTS 1.

1. LC-459D, LC-4590, LC-459E /I 5% above or below program level POSSIBLE POSSIBLE PLANT EFFECTS 1.
1. PZR PZR high high or or low low level level alarm alarm (protection)

(protection) REFERENC REFERENCES ES 1.

1. ITS ITS LCO LCO 3.4.9 3.4.9 2.
2. AOP-O1 AOP-015, 5, Secondary Secondary Load Load Rejection Rejection 3.
3. AOP-016, AOP-016, Excessive Excessive Primary Primary Plant Plant Leakage Leakage 4.
4. AOP-025, AOP-025, RTGB RTGB Instrument Instrument Failure Failure 4.
4. OWP-030, OWP-030, Pressurizer Pressurizer Level Level Transmitters Transmitters (PLT)

(PLT) 5.5. CWD CWO B-190628, B-190628, Sheet Sheet 459, 459, CablesJ, Cables J, N, N, LL IAPP-003 APP-003 Rev. Rev. 37 37 Page 46 Page 46 of 531 of 53

APP-003-F4 APP-003-F4 Page Page 11 ofof 22 ALARM ALARM CHG PMP HI CHG PMP HI SPEED SPEED AUTOMATIC ACTIONS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1.

1. Not Applicable Not Applicable CAUSE CAUSE 1.
1. Charging Pump Charging Pump Speed Speed Control Control Failure Failure
  • Controller failure Controller failure (RTGB (RTGB OROR local) local)
  • Air Pressure Air Pressure Regulator Regulator Failure Failure 2.
2. Low Pressurizer Low Pressurizer Level Level

~3. RCS leakage RCS leakage 4.

4. Charging PumpPump recirculation valve openopen OR leaking OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS
1. Pressurizer Level (LI-460, LI-461 and LI-459A) 2.
2. Charging and Letdown Flow (FI-122 (Fl-i 22 and FI-150)

Fl-i 50)

3. Charging Pump Recirculation Valves (local)

ACTIONS ACTIONS 1.

1. IF RCS leakage is indicated, THEN Refer To AOP-01 IF AOP-016. 6.

2.

2. IF required to maintain level, THEN start standby Charging pump(s).

IF

3. Check RTGB Charging Pump Speed Controls for possible failure.
4. IF IF required, THEN dispatch operator to check Charging Pump Speed controller:

1)

1) Speed control swing arm 2)
2) Air Air Pressure Pressure Regulator Regulator for for the the affected affected Charging Pump Pump
  • IA-3892, IA-3892, CHARGING CHARGING PUMP PUMP A A REGULATO REGULATOR R
  • IA-3897, IA-3897, CHARGING CHARGING PUMP PUMP BB REGULATO REGULATOR R
  • IA-3902, IA-3902, CHARGING CHARGING PUMP PUMP C C REGULATO REGULATOR R 3.
3. IF IF Charging Charging PumpPump Recirculation Recirculation Valve Valve is open OR is open leaking, THEN OR leaking, close the THEN close the effected effected valve valve OR OR isolate the effected pump.

isolate the effected pump. 4.

4. IF IF Charging Charging PumpPump Speed Speed Controller Controller has hasfailed, failed, THEN perform either THEN perform either of of the the following:

following: 

        **   Operate Operate pumps pumps inin manual manual to to control control Charging Charging FlowFlow (RTGB (RTGB failure).

failure). OR OR 

        **    Stop the Stop   the affected affected Charging Charging Pump Pump AND AND start start aa standby standby Charging Charging Pump.

Pump. IAPP-003 APP-003 Rev. Rev. 37 37 Page 48 Page 48 of of 53 531

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam

93. Which ONE
93. Which ONE (1)

(1) of of the the following following describes describes the the basis for the basis for the limit limit of of Oxygen Oxygen permitted permitted in in each each Waste Gas Waste Gas Decay Tank? Decay Tank? Oxygen is maintained Oxygen is maintained lessless than than or or equal equal to to ... A. 6% to A. 6% to ensure ensure carbon carbon steel corrosion does steel corrosion does NOTNOT degrade degrade thethe WGDT and and allow allow radioactive radioactive gas release. gas release. B. 6% to ensure B. 6% potentially explosive ensure potentially explosive gas mixture is gas mixture maintained below is maintained below the the flammability flammability limit. limit. C. 4% to ensure potentially C. potentially explosive gas mixture mixture isis maintained maintained below below the flammability flammability limit. limit. D. 4% to ensure D. ensure carbon steel corrosion corrosion does NOT degrade the WGDT and allow radioactive gas release. gas release. 93 93

071 G2.2.25 071 G22.25 OOl/WASTE 001/WASTE GAS GAS DISPOSAL/2/2/3.2/4.2/SROfLOW/43.2INEW DISPOSAL/2/2/3.2/4.2/SRO/LOW/43.2INEW - 2008/wD-008 

                                                                                  -  2008/WD-008 Which ONE Which    ONE (1)  (1) of of the the following following describes describes the the basis basis for for the the limit limit of of Oxygen Oxygen permitted permitted in in each each Waste   Gas    Decay Waste Gas Decay Tank?      Tank?

Oxygen isis maintained Oxygen maintained less less than than or or equal equal to to ... A. 6% A. 6% toto ensure ensure carbon carbon steel corrosion does steel corrosion does NOT NOT degrade degrade the the WGDT WGDT and and allow allow radioactive radioactive release. gas release. gas B. 6% to ensure B. 6% potentially explosive ensure potentially explosive gas gas mixture mixture is is maintained maintained belowbelow thethe flammability flammability limit. limit. c~ C 4% to ensure potentially explosive gas mixture is is maintained below the flammability limit. D. 4% to ensure carbon D. carbon steel corrosion corrosion does NOT NOT degrade degrade the WGDT and allow allow radioactive radioactive gas release. gas release. The correct answer is C. incorrect - TRM 3.20, Condition B, Upper Oxygen limit, if exceeded, must immediately A: Incorrect - suspend ALL additions of Waste Gas AND restore compliance with the Oxygen limit. WGDT are carbon steel, but corrosion is NOT a concern. B: Incorrect - TRM 3.20, Condition B, Upper Oxygen limit, if exceeded, must immediately suspend ALL additions of Waste Gas AND restore compliance with the Oxygen limit. Explosive mixture is the correct basis for limiting Oxygen concentration. C: Correct - - TRM 3.20, Condition A limits Oxygen :5. <4%4% to eliminate the hazard of Hydrogen and Oxygen combining to form an explosive mixture. incorrect - TRM 3.20, Condition A limits Oxygen :5. D: Incorrect - <4%, 4%, but carbon steel corrosion is NOT a concern. Exam Question Number: 93

Reference:

TRM 3.20; TRM 3.20 BD. KA Statement: Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam. SRO - Knowledge of application of required actions of ITS. 

      -                                                            ITS.

KA Name: KAName: WASTE GAS GAS DISPOSAL Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 2/2 2/2 Importance Importance Rating: Rating: 3.2/4.2 3.2/4.2 RO/SRO Level: Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Cognitive Level: Level: LOW LOW 10CFR55.43 10CFR55.43 link: link: 43.2 43.2 Source: Source: NEW NEW - 2008 

                               - 2008                     Learning Learning Objective:

Objective: WD-008 WD-008

Waste Waste Gas Gas Decay Decay Tanks Tanks - Oxygen 

                                                                     -  Oxygen Concentration Concentration 3.20 3.20 3.20 WASTE 3.20   WASTE GAS GAS DECAY DECAY TANKS TANKS - OXYGEN
                                  -   OXYGEN CONCENTRATION CONCENTRATION TRMS 3.20 TRMS   3.20          The The oxygen oxygen concentration concentration in  in the the four four Waste Waste Gas Gas Decay Decay Tanks Tanks (CTS (CTS 3. 16.4. 1) 3.16.4.1)      shall shall be be ~4%4%
                                .-.-.. by by volume.

volume. APPLICABILITY: APPLICABILITY: At At all all times. times. COMPENSATORY MEASURES COMPENSATORY

--- ----------------NOTE NOTE - ------- ----- -- -------- --- ------ ---------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each tank. CONDITION REQUIRED COMPENSATORY COMPENSATORY MEASURE COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME A. Oxygen concentration A.1 Restore compliance 48 hours in aa Waste Gas Decay with the requirements Tank > ~ by vol 

           >4%           ume volume                   of TRMS.

and ~ 6% by volume. B. Oxygen concentration B.1 Suspend all additions Immediately in aa Waste Gas Decay of waste gas to the Tank volume. Tank>> 6% by volume, affected tank. AND B.2 B.2 Initiate action to Immediately restore compliance with TRMS. AND B.3 8.3 Reduce oxygen Reduce oxygen 24 hours 24 concentration to concentration to ~ 6% 6% by volume. by volume. (continued) (continued) HBRSEP Unit HBRSEP Unit No. No. 22 3.20-1 3.20-1 PLP-100 Rev. PLP-100 Rev. 25 25

Waste Waste Gas Gas Decay Decay Tanks Tanks - Oxygen 

                                                              -  Oxygen Concentration Concentration B

B 3.20 3.20 B B 3.20 3.20 WASTE WASTE GAS GAS DECAY DECAY TANKS TANKS - OXYGEN 

                                 - OXYGEN CONCENTRATION CONCENTRATION BASES BASES This This specification specification isis provided to ensure ensure that the concentration concentration ofof potentially explosive gas explosive  gas mixtures mixtures contained contained in in the Waste Gas Holdup System System is maintained below the below  the flammability flammability limits limits of of hydrogen hydrogen and and oxygen.

oxygen. This This is is accomplished accomplished byby maintaining the maintaining the oxygen oxygen concentration concentration less less than 4% 4% through through procedural controls. Maintaining the concentration of oxygen oxygen below the flammability limit provides assurance that the releases of radioactive materials will be controlled in assurance conformance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A A to 10 CFR Part 50. TR 3.20.1 specifies that monitoring be performed on the in-service tank, as that is the tank with the potential for changing gas concentrations. concentrations. Technical Specification Section 5.5.12, "Explosive Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program," Program, states that this program shall include concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen in the Waste Gas Decay Tanks limits for concentrations that are appropriate to the system's systems design criteria. By always requiring the the oxygen concentration to be less than 4%, this TRM limit fully meets the requirement to establish appropriate limits for the concentration of the mixture of hydrogen and oxygen to preclude an explosive mixture. HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 BB 3.20-1 3.20-1 PLP-100 Rev. PLP-100 Rev. 25 25

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam

94. Given the
94. Given the following:

following: 

           - The
           -      plant is The plant    is in in Mode Mode 66 forfor Refueling.

Refueling. Core offload 

           - Core
           -        offload is  is in  progress with in progress            Fuel Assembly with aa Fuel  Assembly on on the the Manipulator.

Manipulator. The Transfer Cart 

           - The
           -                     Cart is    loaded with aa fuel is loaded           fuel assembly, assembly, enroute enroute to       SEP.

to the SFP. 

           - You are
           -                   Refueling SRO.

are the Refueling ItIt is is reported reported toto you you that that Refueling Refueling Cavity level has Cavity level has dropped dropped ONE ONE (1) (1) foot in in the the last last 55 minutes. minutes. Which ONE (1) of the following is the required required action? Place the Fuel Fuel Assembly from the Manipulator Manipulator in the ... A. RCC change fixture. B. core in it's its original location. C. Upender. D. core in any location that is bordered by 2 other assemblies. 94 94

G2. 1.41 OOl/CONDUCT G2.1.41 001/CONDUCT OF OPERATION/3/2.S/3.7/SROILOW/43.6INEW OPERATION/3/2.8/3 .7/SRO/LOW/43 .6/NEW - 200S/AOP-020-004 

                                                                      - 2008/AOP-020-004 Given the following:
    - The plant is in Mode 6 for Refueling.
    - Core offload is in progress with a Fuel Assembly on the Manipulator.
    - The Transfer Cart is loaded with a fuel assembly, enroute to the SFP.
    - You are the Refueling SRO.

ft is reported to you that Refueling Cavity level has dropped ONE (1) foot in the last 5 minutes. It Which ONE (1) of the following is the required action? Place the Fuel Assembly from the Manipulator in the ... A. RCC change fixture. B core in it's BY' its original location. C. Upender. D. core in any location that is bordered by 2 other assemblies. The correct answer is B. A: Incorrect - RCC Change fixture has a basket that is available to receive the fuel assembly. Placing the assembly in the RCC Change fixture while losing Refueling Cavity level could result in the fuel assembly being uncovered and cause excessive radiation exposure. B: Correct - - Place the fuel assembly back in a location where subcritical configuration was known. C: Incorrect - The Transfer Cart is enroute to the SFP. There is NO basket available to place the fuel assembly in. D: Incorrect - Placing a fuel assembly in an unanalyzed core position could result in a loss of the required shutdown margin. Exam Question Number: 94

Reference:

AOP-020, Section B. KA Statement: Knowledge of the refueling process. History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam. SRO - Knowledge of Refueling Procedures

KA Name: KAName: CONDUCT OF CONDUCT OF OPERATION OPERATION Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 33 Importance Rating: Importance Rating: 2.8/3.7 2.S/3.7 RO/SRO Level: RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: Cognitive Level: LOW LOW 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 link: 43.6 43.6 Source: Source: NEW - 2008 NEW - 200S Learning Objective: Learning Objective: AOP-020-004 AOP-020-004

Rev. Rev. 29 29 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS OF LOSS OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEATHEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING) COOLING) Page Page 25 25 of of 107 107 STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I Section Section BB Loss Of Loss Of RHR RHR Inventory Inventory - Vessel 

                                                         -  Vessel Head Head Off Off (Page (Page 11 of of 9) 9)

1.1. Evacuate Non-essential Evacuate Non-essential Personnel Personnel From Containment From Containment As As Follows: Follows:

a. Place
a. Place the the VLCVLC Switch Switch inin the the EMERG positio EMERG position n
b. Depress
b. Depress and and hold hold CVCV EVACUATION HORN EVACUATION HORN Pushbutton Pushbutton for 15 for 15 seconds seconds
c. Announce
c. Announce The The Following Following Over Over Plant PA Plant PA System:

System: ALL NON-ESSENTIAL "ALL NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL PERSONNEL EVACUATE CV UNTIL EVACUATE CV UNTIL FURTHER FURTHER NOTICE NOTICE"

d. Depress
d. Depress and and hold CV EVACUATION HORN EVACUATION HORN Pushbutton Pushbutton for 15 for 15 seconds seconds e.
e. Repeat Repeat PA PA announ cement announcement 2.
2. Check Check Status Status Of Of Fuel Fuel Handli Handlingng Go To Step 5.5.

Activi ties - IN Activities - IN PROGRESS PROGRESS

Rev. Rev. 29 29 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS OF LOSS OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING) COOLING) Page 26 of Page 26 of 107 107 STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I Section Section BB Loss Of Loss Of RHR RHR Inventory Inventory - Vessel 

                                                           -  Vessel Head Head Off Off (Page (Page 22 ofof 9) 9)

3.

3. Notify Refueling Notify Refueling Personnel Personnel To To Perform The Perform The Following:

Following: ~a. a. Place Place anyany fuel fuel assembly assembly in in transit in transit in one one ofof the the follow ing locatio following locations: ns: 

           **      Original Core Original       Core location location
           **      Upender Upender
           **      Storage location Storage      location approved approved by   FMP-019.

by FMP-019. Fuel Fuel and and Insert Shuffle Insert Shuffle

b. Place
b. Place any any Reactor Reactor Vessel Upper or Upper or Lower Internals Internals in transit in transit in one of the following locations:

following locations: 

            **     Reacto Reactorr Vessel        (preferred Vessel (preferred locatio location)  n)
           **      Design Designatedated storage storage locatio location   n in in transfe transfer     canal r canal c.
c. Verify Verify FuelFuel Transf Transferer Conve Conveyer yer Car Car Locati Location on - IN IN CONTAINM CONTAINMENTENT d.
d. Verify Verify CV CV Upend Upender er Positio Position n --

HORIZONT HORIZONTAL AL 4.

4. Verify Verify CLOSED CLOSED The The SFPSFP GATE GATE VALVE VALVE 5.
5. Check Check Cavity Cavity SealSeal OR SandSand Plug Plug Observe Observ the NOTE e the NOTE prior prior to to Failure Failure - IN -

IN PROGRESS PROGRESS Step 14 Step 14 and and Go Go To To*Step Step 14. 14. 6.

6. Contac Contact t Outage Outage Management Management For For Assista nce Assistance In In Restor ation Of Restoration Of The The Cavity Cavity Seal Seal OR Sand Sand Plugs Plugs

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 Written Exam NRC Written Exam

95. Given the
95. Given the following:

following: RC personnel 

      - RC
       -     personnel needneed toto use  Demin Water use Demin    Water for for decon decon activities activities for for aa spent spent fuel fuel cask.

cask. They will 

      - They
       -       will need need to    operate one to operate    one valve valve for for about about an    hour and an hour         will finish and will   finish before before shift shift turnover.

turnover. The valve 

      - The
       -     valve manipulation manipulation is is NOT NOT covered covered byby an an approved approved procedure.

procedure. Which ONE Which ONE (1)(1) of of the the following following describes describes how how thethe status status of of this this manipulation manipulation is is controlled? controlled? procedure must A. A temporary procedure must be be approved approved by SSO prior by the SSO prior to operation operation ofof the valve. valve. B. Enter the valve valve alignment in in Start/Stop Log Log of Autolog. Issue Caution C. Issue Caution TagsTags for any any component thatthat will be be realigned. realigned. D. The portion of the system to be realigned must be taken out of service and controlled with Danger Tags. 95 95

G2.2. 18 001IEQUIPMENT G2.2.18 001/EQUIPMENT CONTROLl3/2.6/3.9/SROIHIGHJ43.5IRNP CONTROL/3/2 .613.9ISROJHIGHI43 5/RNP AUDIT AUDIT - 2001l0MM-001-11-002 

                                                                                        - 200 1/OMM-001 002 Given the Given    the following:

following: RC personnel 

    - RC
    -       personnel need need to to use   Demin Water use Demin    Water for for decon decon activities activities for for aa spent spent fuel fuel cask.

cask. They will 

    - They
    -          will need need toto operate operate oneone valve valve for for about about anan hour hour and and will    finish before will finish   before shift shift turnover.

turnover. The valve 

    - The
    -        valve manipulation manipulation is  is NOT NOT covered covered by   an approved by an   approved procedure.

procedure. Which ONE Which ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following describes describes how how the status of the status of this this manipulation manipulation is is controlled? controlled? A. A temporary procedure must be approved by the SSO prior by the prior to operation operation of the valve. B B~ Enter the valve alignment in Enter in Start/Stop Log of Autolog. Caution Tags for any component issue Caution C. Issue component that will be be realigned. realigned. D. The portion of the system to be realigned must must be taken out of service and controlled with Danger Tags. The correct answer is B. A: Incorrect - A temporary procedure is NOT appropriate for single valve operation unless water is to be introduced into a system or within a clearance boundary. B: Correct Correct-- Autolog entry will provide the necessary tracking to ensure proper alignment of the valve. incorrect - Would use caution tags if the alignment would be in effect past the end of the C: Incorrect - shift. D: Incorrect - Portion of system component requires caution tags if out of position past the end of the shift. Exam Question Number: 95

Reference:

OMM-QOl OMM-001-11, -11, Pages 23-25. KA Statement: Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, etc. History: SRO - Knowledge of administrative processes for controlling equipment status. KA Name: KAName: EQUIPMENT CONTROLCONTROL Tier/Group: 33 Importance Importance Rating: Rating: 2.6/3.9 2.6/3.9 RO/SRO Level: Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Cognitive Level: Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 10CFR55.43 link: link: 43.5 43.5 Source: Source: RNP AUDIT RNP AUDIT -2001 

                                        - 2001               Learning Learning Objective:

Objective: OMM-00I-II-002 OMM-001-11-002

8.3.4.1 (Continued) 8.3.4.1 (Continued) 

                      ** The The performance performance of   of AOPs AOPs and and EOPs.

EOPs. 

                      ** The    Critical Data The Critical   Data Entry Entry shall shall be     placed in be placed    in the the CO's COs Log Log AND AND completed when completed     when E&CE&C isis taking taking thethe daily daily RCS RCS Boron Boron Concentration samples.

Concentration samples. This This will will ensure ensure the the most most accurate accurate data is data is recorded. recorded. 8.3.5 8.3.5 Other Logs Other Logs 1. 

          ~1.         The WCC The   WCC SRO SRO verifies verifies that that AutoLog AutoLog entries entries are are made made for:

for: (NCR 81962) (NCR 81962) -

  • lifting of clearances The placing and lifting
  • Clearance boundary changes
  • implementation and closeout of MMM-042 to control The implementation equipment that is NOT within clearance boundaries while in Modes 11 and 2
  • The Caution Tag number for MMM-042 controlled components that are not restored by the end of shift
2. The AOs, MWT AO, and FPAO maintain a narrative log to summarize the major evolutions performed, equipment status, and turnover items. This log is to be maintained in chronologica chronologicall sequence. Log entries may include, but are not limited to, the following: (ACR 94-01 94-01584) 584)
                     **  Date Date
  • Starts/stops/t rips of Starts/stops/trips of equipment equipment controlled controlled byby the watch station, station, with with a brief brief description description of of the the reason.

reason. Manual Manual starts/stops starts/stops which are documented which are documented by by initialing initialing an an approved approved procedure procedure need need not not bebe logged. logged. Example: Example: 0957: 0957: Started Started Waste Waste Gas Gas Compressor Compressor A "A" for for observation observation by by Engineering. Engineering. OMM-001 -11 IOMM-001-11 Rev. Rev. 3939 Page 23 Page 23 of of 63 631

(Continued) 8.3.5.2 (Continued) 8.3.5.2 

                **  Completion of Completion      of procedures procedures
                **  Change of Change     of auxiliary auxiliary system system and   configuration.

and configuration. 

                **  Surveillance tests Surveillance     tests started started and and completed.

completed. Example: 0016: Example: 0016: Completed Completed partial partial OST-679 OST-679 to to return return Detector Detector number 16-10 number 16-10 to service.

  • Instrument or equipment malfunctions or failures. The entry entry should include the time the component is is removed from service, a brief description of the problem, any compensatory compensatory actions taken, and the number of any Work Request written.

Example: 0330: Monitor Tank Pump "B" B has excessive packing leakage. WR 99-ABCD1 was written and the pump was removed from service per Clearance 99-00395.Unusual trends or conditions observed. 99-00395.Unusual

  • Starting and stopping of Gaseous or Liquid Waste Releases (list Waste Release Permit Number).
  • Annunciators received that are not the result of operator action or are not expected as a result of evolutions in progress (such as surveillance tests, clearing of equipment or equipment manipulation). It is acceptable to use a rough log for the manipUlation).

accumulation of recurring annunciators and to document these annunciators as a single log entry near the end of shift.

  • When annunciators are received and none of the actions specified in the APP are taken in response to the alarm because it is determined that none of the prescribed actions would be effective in eliminating the diagnosed cause, then the basis for not taking the prescribed actions should be logged. This basis should include the plant conditions, diagnosis of the event, conclusions of the diagnosis, and any alternate actions that are taken or justification for taking no actions at all.
  • The performance of Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOP5), (AOPs),

Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and any Fire Brigade response. OMM-001-1 1 IOMM-001-11 Rev. Rev. 39 39 Page Page 24 24 of of 63 631

8.3.5 (Continued) 8.3.5 (Continued) 3.3. Componentmanipulations Component manipulationswhich whichare areNOTNOTpartpartofofan anapproved approved proced ure are to be procedure are to be entered as entered asaacomponent componentout outofofposition position entry entry inin AutoLog. AutoLog. IF IFaacomponent componentwill will remain remain out outofof its its normal position normal position pastshift past shiftturnover, turnover, THEN THEN aaCaution Caution Tag Tag shall shall bebe installed, instaNed, unless unless the evolution the evolution being being performed performed isis turned turned over overon station. on station. ForFor turnover-on-station, the turnover-on-station, the on on coming coming watchstander watchstandermust must receive receive any any applicable pre-job applicable pre-job briefs briefs prior prior to to acceptance acceptance of an evolution of an evolution in in progress. (CR progress. (CR 96-00309) 96-00309) (NCR (NCR 16863) 16863) (NCR (NCR 26491) 26491) a.a. AA PRRPRR should should be be initiated initiated to to provide provide procedural procedural guidance guidance for components for components out out ofof their their normal normal position position thatthat meet any meet any of the follow ing of the following critera:: critera 

                                 ** involve involve safety safety related related equipment equipment
                                 **     involve complex involve      complextask  taskss
                                 **     are frequently are    frequently performed performed
                     ~b.          Components that are out of their normal Components                                           normal position position are are entered into   into the Component Component Out of Position    Position Log (Start/Stop (Start/Stop Log) in AutoLog.

AutoLog. This Log was originally originally used to document document starting and stopping starting stopping plant equipment equipment in AutoLog. AutoLog. Although Although it is no longer used for this function, function, it is still labeled as as the the Start/Stop Log in the AutoLog Start/Stop AutoLog programprogram due to softwaresoftware limitations. Use of this log allows positive limitations. tracking positive trackin of g of components that are out of their normal components position normal positio n during aa during shift s~ift and over shift turnov turnover. component er. The compo nent Out of of 

                          ---7 Positio Position   n Log @art/Stop    to       Log) is solely for the purpos Lo)                            purpose     of e of trackin tracking  g compo component nent manip manipulations ulations     that   are   performed are performed withou
                                 ~hout      t the the directi    on of direction    of anan approv approved      procedurgJNCR edproc      edu[NCR 1686        3(CAPR)]

16863 (CAPR)] c.

c. Compo Components nents out out of of their their norma normall positio position n SHALSHALL be L be approv approved ed byby the the CRSS CRSS or or SSO.

SSO. d.

d. The The CRSS/

CRSS/SSO SSO isis respon responsiblesible forfor ensurin ensuring that g that compo nents components out of out of their their norma normall positio positionn areare entered entered into into the the Compo Component nent OutOut of of Positio Position n LogLog (Start/S (Start/Stop Log), top Log), and and are are subseq uently remov subsequently removed from the log when ed from the log when they are they are restore restored d to to their their norma normal positions. l positio ns. IOMM- 001 -1 1 OMM-001-11 I Rev. Rev.3939 I Page25 Page 25ofof63 I 631

QUESTIONSREPORT QUESTIONS REPORT f0rAU for AUDITDIT 1.1 . G2.1.180011/////// G2.1.18 OO1////IIII HPHPneeds needstotouse useDemin Deminwater waterforfordecon deconactivities activitiesforforaaspent spentfuel fuelcask. cask. They Theywill willneed need totooperate operateone onevalve valvefor foraboutaboutan an hour hourandandwill willfinish finishbefore before shift turnover. Thevalve shift turnover. The valve manipulation isisnot manipulation notcovered coveredby byanan approved approvedprocedure. procedure. Which ONE Which ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following describes describes howhow thethe status status of of this this manipulation manipulation isis contro controlled?lled? A. AA Temporary A. Temporary procedureprocedure must must be be approved approved by by the the SSO SSO prior prior toto operation operation of of the the valves valves. . BY Place By Place aa Position Position Tracking Tracking rubberrubber stamp stamp for for the the alignment alignment inin Autolog Autolog C. Issue C. Issue Caution Caution Tags Tags for for any any component component that that will will be be realigned realigned D. The D. The portion portion of of the the system system to to be be realigned realigned must must be be taken taken out out of of service service and and contro lled controlled with with Danger Danger Tags Tags BB is correct. Would is correct. Would use caution tags if the alignment alignment would be in effect past past the the end end of of the shift the shift Common Question Common Question 067 Tier 33 Tier K/A Importance KIA Importance Rating - RO 2.9/ - 2.9 / SRO 2.9 Ability to Ability make accurate, to make accurate, clear and concis concisee logs, records, records, status boardsboards,, and reports reports.. Refere nce(s) - OMM-Reference(s) - 001 -11, pg 22 OMM-001-11, Propos Proposed ed Refere Referencesnces to be be provid ed to applica provided applicants during examin nts during examination ation - None None Learni ng Object Learning Objective - ive - Questi Question on Source Source - New-New Questi on Histor Question History - y - Questi Question on Cognit Cognitive ive Level Level - Compr 

                                                     -           ehension Comprehension 10   CFR     Part   55   Conten 10 CFR Part 55 Content - 41        t   -   41 Comm Comments  ents - -

Category Category 1:1: Category Category 2:2: Category Category 3:3: Category Category4:4: Category Category5:5: Category Category6:6: Category Category7:7: Category Category8:8:

Saturday, Saturday,JuneJune14,14,2008 20088:41:28 8:41 :25AM AM 1

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam

96. Given the
96. Given the following:

following: An operator 

      - An
       -        operator is is restoring restoring the the CV CV Spray Spray System   alignment following System alignment    following major major maintenance.

maintenance. During system 

      - During
       -             system restoration, restoration, an  operator found an operator  found aa valve valve which which was was inside inside the the Clearance Clearance boundary out of alignment.

boundary 

      - ItIt is
       -      is believed believed that the valve was inadvertently inadvertently moved moved during maintenance maintenance activities.

activities. There are 

      - There
       -                other valves are other  valves within within the  Clearance boundary the Clearance   boundary within within close close proximity proximity toto the the mispositioned valve.

minimum procedural What minimum procedural actions are REQUIRED REQUIRED by by OMM-001-8, 0MM-CO 1 -8, CONTROL CONTROL OF OF EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEM STATUS? EQUIPMENT A. Establish a multidiscipline team to establish the cause and determine required actions. B. Verify ONLY the mispositioned valve is returned to the correct position lAW the system Operating Procedure. C. Initiate a full system lineup lAW the system Operating Procedure. D. Initiate a valve lineup for ALL valves within the Clearance boundary lAW the system Operating Procedure. 96 96

G2.2. 15 001IEQUIPMENT 02.2.15 00 1/EQUIPMENT CONTROL/3/3.9/4.3/SRO/LOW/43.3/NEW CONTROL/3/3 .9/4.3ISROILOWI43 .3/NEW - 2008/0MM-001-8-002 

                                                                                - 2008/OMM-00 1-8-002 Given the Given           following:

the following: 

   - An
     - An operator operator isis restoring restoring the    CV Spray the CV            System alignment Spray System        alignment following following major major maintenance.

maintenance. During system 

   - During
    -              system restoration, restoration, anan operator operator found found aa valve valve which which was was inside inside the the Clearance Clearance boundary out boundary        out of  alignment.

of alignment. 

   - ItIt is
    -      is believed believed that that the the valve valve was was inadvertently inadvertently moved moved during during maintenance maintenance activities.

activities. There are 

    - There
    -            are other other valves valves within within the the Clearance Clearance boundary boundary within within close close proximity proximity to    the to the mispositioned valve.

mispositioned valve. What minimum minimum procedural procedural actions actions are are REQUIRED REQUIRED by by OMM-001-8, OMM-OO1-8, CONTROL CONTROL OF OF EQUIPMENT AND EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEM SYSTEM STATUS? STATUS? A. Establish a multidiscipline multidiscipline team to establish establish the cause and determine determine required required actions. B. Verify ONLY B. ONLY the the mispositioned mispositioned valve is is returned returned to the the correct correct position position lAW lAW the the system system Operating Procedure. Initiate a full system lineup lAW the system Operating Procedure. C. Initiate D Initiate a valve lineup for ALL valves within the Clearance boundary lAW the system 01' Operating Procedure. The correct answer is D. OMM-OO1-8 specifies that a multidiscipline A: Incorrect - OMM-001-8 

                 -                                       multidiscipline team be established to determine the cause if the cause is unknown and CANNOT be quickly determined.

B: Incorrect - If the cause of the mispositionin mispositioning g can be clearly identified, a single valve lineup is allowed. The stem does NOT clearly identify the cause. C: Incorrect - A full valve lineup is to be performed if the cause of the mispositionin 

                 -                                                                          mispositioning g is unknown and CANNOT be quickly determined. A full valve lineup is NOT required because the valve is within the Clearance boundary.

D: Correct - D: - OMM-OO1 OMM-001-8 -8 specifies that a valve lineup lineup of valves within the Clearance boundary is is to be be performed ifif maintenance maintenance activities were performed performed on valves within within the the Clearance boundary, and and itit is is believed believed that that those those maintenance maintenance activities activities caused caused thethe mispositionin mispositioning.g.

Exam Question Exam Question Number: Number: 96 96

Reference:

OMM-001-8,

Reference:

OMM-OO1-8, Page Page 17. 17. KA Statement: Ability KA Statement: Ability to to determine determine the the expected expected plant plant configuration configuration using using design design and and configuration control configuration control documentation, documentation, such such as drawings, line-ups, as drawings, line-ups, tag-outs, tag-outs, etc. etc. History: New History: New - Written 

                 - Written forfor HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC Exam.

Exam. SRO - Requires SRO - Requires analysis analysis of of plant plant events events and and administrative administrative processes processes and and determination determination ofof required actions. required actions. KA Name: KA Name: EQUIPMENT CONTROL EQUIPMENT CONTROL Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 33 Importance Rating: Importance Rating: 3.9/4.3 3.9/4.3 RO/SRO RO/SRO Level: Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: Cognitive Level: LOW LOW 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 link: 43.3 43.3 Source: Source: NEW - 2008 NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: Learning Objective: OMM-001-8-002 OMM-O0l-8-002

8.5.6 8.5.6 Mispositioned Valves Mispositioned Valves 

        ~1. 1. When aa valve When          valve in in any any plant plant system system isis found found mispositioned, mispositioned, aa full full system      lineup  (including  independent system lineup (including independent verification verification where where applicable) shall applicable)       shall be be performed performed lAW JAW thethe appropriate appropriate OP OP with with the the following exemptions:

following exemptions: 7 .* IF the IF the component component waswas i~side inside aacearance clearance boundary boundary in in which which maintenance was being maintenance was being performed performed and and it~elieved it is believed that. that itit became misaligned gecame misaligned during during that that time, THEN only timeTHE the portion iytF portion of of the OP dealing with the OP dealing with the the valves valves inside inside that that clearance clearance boundary boundary need be need be performed. performed.

  • Portions of the system that are known to be properly aligned due to normal system operation or or performance of OSTs do need to have their positions verified lAW the OP.

not need

  • Components whose positions can be determined from the RTGB (via switch positions or permissive/

permissive! status lights) do not need to have their positions verified lAW an OP.

  • mispositioning can be clearly identified, IF the cause of the mispositioning THEN the scope of the lineup can be restricted to to those valves subject to the same cause.
  • IF the cause of the mispositioning mispositioning can NOT be immediately identified, THEN it is recommended recommended that a multi-disciplined multi-disciplined team (Event Review Team) be established to assist in determining the cause.
2. IF it is believed that the valve was deliberately mispositione mispositioned d or tampered with, THEN Operational Response to Deliberate Acts Against Plant Equipment in this procedure should be reviewed for applicability (NRC IN 96-71).

f OMM-OO1 -8 IOMM-001-8 I Rev Rev 38 38 Page 17 Page 17 ofof 49 491 I

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam

97. Given the
97. Given the following:

following: 

      - The
       -        plant isis operating The plant        operating atat 100%

100% RTP. RTP. 

      - SI
       -  SI Pump Pump "A"A isis INOPERABLE INOPERABLE due       to an due to  an emergent emergent problem problem with with repairs repairs estimated estimated to to take take 48 hours.

48 hours. 

      - An
       -  An audit audit of of completed completed surveillance surveillance procedures procedures has has determined determined the the last last quarterly quarterly surveillance on surveillance      on SISI Pump Pump "C"   was missed.

C was missed. Which ONE Which ONE (1)(1) ofof the the following following describes describes the the appropriate appropriate action? action? Initiate an A. Initiate Operability Determination an Operability Determination onon SI SI Pump Pump "C". C. Perform a Safety Function Determination. B. Perform C. Demonstrate the operability of SI Pump "c" C within 24 hours OR OR be in MODE 4 within 13 hours. D. Demonstrate the operability of SI Pump "c" C within 72 hours OR be in MODE 3 within 6 hours. 97 97

G2.2.36 OOllEQUIPMENT 02.2.36 00 1/EQUIPMENT CONTROL/3/3.114.2/SRO/LOW/43.2/SALEM CONTROL/3/3. 1/4.2/SROILOW/43 .2/SALEM - 2001lITS 

                                                                                - 2001/ITS INTRO-005 INTRO-005 Given the Given     the following:

following: The plant 

   - The
    -        plant isis operating operating at  at 100%

100% RTP. RTP. 

   - SI
    -  SI Pump Pump "A"            INOPERABLE due A isis INOPERABLE        due to  an emergent to an  emergent problem problem with with repairs repairs estimated estimated to to take take 48 hours.

48 hours. 

   - An
    -  An audit audit of of completed completed surveillance surveillance procedures procedures has     determined the has determined     the last last quarterly quarterly surveillance on surveillance      on SI     Pump "c" SI Pump        was missed.

C was missed. Which ONE Which ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following describes describes the the appropriate appropriate action? action? Initiate an A. Initiate an Operability Operability Determination Determination on SI Pump on SI Pump "C". C. Perform aa Safety B. Perform B. Safety Function Function Determination. Determination. C'r Demonstrate the C Demonstrate the operability operability of of SI Pump "c" SI Pump C within 2424 hours hours OROR be be in in MODE MODE 44 within 13 13 hours. D. Demonstrate the operability of SI Pump "c" C within 72 hours OR be in MODE 3 within 6 hours. The correct answer is C. A: Incorrect - Inappropriate application of operability determination 

                 -                                                    determination procedure OPS-NG GO-i 305.

OPS-NGGC-130S. B: Incorrect - Inappropriate application of TS S.S.1S. 

                 -                                           5.5.15.

C: Correct - - Conditions in excess of LCO (TWO ECCS trains inoperable), refer to LCO 3.0.3. Enter TS 3.0.3, but operability of SI Pump C can be demonstrated within 24 hours per SR 3.0.3, since the action statement is less than 24 hours. D: Incorrect - Represents inappropriate application of TS 3.5.2, 3.S.2, Condition A.

Exam Question Exam Question Number: Number: 97 97

Reference:

ITS

Reference:

ITS 3.0.3; 3.0.3; SRSR 3.0.3; ITS 5.5.15; 3.0.3; ITS 5.5.15; ITSITS 3.5.2; 3.5.2; OMM-007, OMM-007, OPS-NGGC-1305, OPS-NGGC-1305, Page Page 77 and 8. and 8. KA Statement: Ability KA Statement: to analyze Ability to analyze the the effect effect ofof maintenance maintenance activities, activities, such such as as degraded degraded power power sources, on sources, on the the status status ofof limiting limiting conditions conditions for for operations. operations. History: History: SRO - Requires a 'from SRO - Requires memory application from memory' application of Tech Tech Specs Specs in situation where TS in a situation TS 3.0.3 3.0.3 is is but the 24 hour applied but hour exception exception perper SR SR 3.0.3 will also apply. The SRO SRO has has to determine the appropriate appropriate course of action. KA Name: KAName: EQUIPMENT CONTROL Tier/Group: 3 Importance Rating: 3.1/4.2 3.114.2 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: LOW 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 43.2 Source: SALEM - 2001 Learning Objective: ITS INTRO-005

LCO LCO Applicability Applicability 3.0 3.0 3.0 LIMITING 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION CONDITION FOR FOR OPERATION OPERATION (LCO) (LCO) APPLICABILITY APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.1 LCO 3.0.1 LCOs shall LCOs shall be be met met during during thethe MODES MODES oror other other specified specified conditions conditions intheA in the App 1i cabi 1ility, pplicab ity, except except as as provi providded ed in in LCO LCO 3.0.2 3.O.2a andnd3.0.7 3.0.7.. LCO 3.0.2 LCO 3.0.2 Upon di Upon discov scoveryery ofof aa fai 1ure to failure to meet meet an an LCO, LCO, the the Requi Requirred ed Acti Actiononss of the of the associated associated Conditions Conditions shallshall be be met, met, except as provided except as provided in LCO in LCO 3.0.5 3.0.5 and and LCO LCO 3.0.6. 3.0.6. If the If the LCO LCO isis met met or or is is no no longer longer applicable applicable priorprior toto expiration expiration of the of the specified specified Completion Completion Time(s), Time(s), completion completion of of the the Required Required Action(s) Action(s) is is not not required required unless otherwise unless otherwise stated.stated. LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.3 When an LCO is not not met and the associated associated ACTIONS ACTIONS are are notnot met, met, associated ACTION is not provided, an associated provided, or or if if directed by directed by the the associaated associ ted ACTIONS, the uni unitt shall be placed ina in a MODE MODE or or other other specified condition specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. applicable. Action Action shall be i nitiatedwi beiniti ated withi n 1 hour to pl thinl ace the place the unit, unit, asas appl i cabl applica e, ble, in: in:

a. MODE 33 within 77 hours;
b. MODE 44 within 13 13 hours; and c.
c. MODE MODE 55 within 37 hours.

37 hours. Except Exceptions ions to to this this Specif Specification ication are are stated stated in in the the individ individualual Specif Specifications. ications. Where Where correct corrective measures ive measu are comple res are completed that permit ted that permit operati operationon in in accord accordance with the ance with the LCO LCO oror ACTIONS, ACTIONS, comple completion tion ofof the the actions actions require required d byby LCO LCO 3.0.3 3.0.3 is is not not require required.d. LCO LCO 3.0.3 3.0.3 is is only only applica applicable ble in in MODES MODES 1,I, 2,2, 3,3, and and 4.4. LCO LCO 3.0.4 3.0.4 When When an an LCO LCO isis not not met, met, entry entry intointo aa MODE MODE oror other other specifi specifieded conditi condition in the Applic on in the Applicability shall only ability shall only bebe made: made: (continued) (contin ued) HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 3.0-1 3.0-1 Amendment No. Amendment No. 203 203

SR SR Applicability AppHcability 3.0 3.0 3.0 SURVEILLANCE 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT (SR) (SR) APPLICABILITY APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.1 SR 3.0.1 SRs SRs shall shall be be met met during during the the MODES MODES or or other other specified specified conditions conditions inin the the Applicability Applicability for for individual individual LCOs, LCOs, unless unless otherwise otherwise stated stated in the SR. in the SR. Failure Failure to to meet meet aa Surveillance, Surveillance, whether whether such such failure failure is is experienced experienced during during thethe performance performance of of the the Survei 11 ance or Surveillance or between between performances performances of of the the Survei 11 ance , shall Surveillance, shall be be failure failure to to meet meet the the LCD. LCO. Failure Failure toto perform perform aa Surveillance Surveillance within within the the specified specified Frequency Frequency shall shall bebe failure failure to to meet meet the the LCD LCO except except as as provided provided inin SR 3.0.3. Surveillances SR 3.0.3. Surveillances do do not not have have to to bebe performed performed on on inoperable inoperable equipment equipment or or variables variables outside outside specified specified limits. limits. SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.2 The The specified specified Frequency Frequency forfor each each SR SR is is met met ifif the the Surveillance Surveillance is performed within 1.25 1.25 times times the interval interval specified specified in in the the Frequency, Frequency, as measured from the previous performance performance or or as as measured from the time a specified specified condition of of the the Frequency Frequency is met. For Frequencies specifiedspecified as "once," once, the aboveabove interval interval extension does not apply. If a a Completion Time requires periodic performance performance on on aa "once once per . . . " basis, the above Frequency extension applies 

                            .  .  .                                                    applies to to each each performance after the initial performance   performance..

Exceptions to this Specif Specification stated in ication are stated in the the individual individual Specif Specifications. ications. SR SR 3.0.3 3.0.3 If it If it is is discovered discovered thatthat aa Surveillance Surveillance was was not not performed performed within within its specifi its specified Frequency, then ed Frequency, then compliance compliance with with the the requirement requirement to declare to declare the LCD not the LCO not met met maymay be be delayed, delayed, from from the the time time ofof discovery, up discovery, up to to 24 hours or 24 hours or up up to to the the limit limit of of the the specifi specified ed Frequency, whichever Frequency, whichever is is less. less. ThisThis delay delay period period is is permitted permitted allow performance to allow to performance of of the the Surveillance. Surveillance. (continued) (continued) HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 3.0-4 3.04 Amendment No. Amendment No. 203 203

Programs Programs and and Manuals Manuals 5.5 5.5 5.5 Programs 5.5 Programs andand Manuals Manuals 5.5.13 5.5.13 Diesel Fuel Diesel Fuel OilOil Testing Testing Program Program (continued) (continued) b.b. Acceptability of Acceptability of fuel fuel oil oil forfor use use by by testing testing thethe following following parameters at parameters at aa 31 31 day day frequency: frequency: API or API or specific specific gravity, gravity, viscosity, viscosity, water water andand sediment, sediment, and and cloud point. cloud point. The provisions The provisions of of SR SR 3.0.2 3.0.2 and and SRSR 3.0.3 3.0.3 are are applicable applicable to to the the Diesel Fuel Diesel Fuel Oil Oil Testing Testing Program Program surveillance surveillance frequencies. frequencies. 5.5.14 5.5.14 Technical Specifications Technical Specifications (TS) (IS) Bases Bases Control Control Program Program This program This program provides provides controls controls for for processing processing changes changes to to the the Bases Bases of of these Technical Specifications. Specifications. a.

a. Changes to the Bases of the TS shall be made under under appropriate administrative appropriate administrative controls controls and reviews.
b. Licensees may make changes to Bases without without prior prior NRCNRC approval provided the changes do not involve involve either either of of the the follow foll owing:

ing:

1. aa change in the TS incorp incorporated the license; orated in the license; or or
2. aa change to the updated FSAR or Bases that that require requiress NRC NRC pursuant approval pursua nt to 10 CFR 50.59.

c.

c. The Bases Control ProgramProgram shall contain contain provis provisions ions to to ensure ensure that the Bases are mainta maintained consistent ined consis with the tent with the UFSAR.

UFSAR. d.

d. Proposed Proposed changes changes that that meet meet thethe criteria criteria ofof Specif Specification ication 5.5.14 5.5.14b above shallbe b above shall,bereviewed reviewed and and approved approved by by the the NRCNRC prior prior to to implementat implementation. Changes to ion. Changes to the the Bases Bases implemented implemented withou withoutt prior prior NRC NRC approval approval shall shall be be provided provided to to the the NRCNRC on on aa frequency frequency consist consistent with 10 ent with 10 CFR CFR 50.71(

50.l1(e). e). ' 7 5.5.15 5.5.15 Safety Safety Function Function Determinatio Determination Program (SFDP) n Program (SFDP) This This program program provid provides controls es contro ls toto ensure ensure loss loss ofof safety safety functio functionn is detecte is detected d andand approp appropriate actions taken. riate actions taken. Upon Upon entry entry intointo [CO LCO 3.0.6, 3.0.6, an an evalua evaluation shall be tion shall be made made to to determine determine if if loss loss ofof safety safety functio function exists. Additi n exists. Additionally, other approp onally, other appropriate actions riate actions (continued) (contin ued) HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 5.0-20 5.0-20 Amendment No. Amendment No. 212 212

Programs Programs and and Manuals Manuals 5.5 5.5 5.5 Programs 5.5 Programs andand Manuals Manuals 5.5.15 5.5.15 Safety Function Safety Function Determination Determination Program Program (SFDP) (SFDP) (continued) (continued) may be may be taken taken as as aa result result ofof the the support support system system inoperability inoperability and and corresponding exception corresponding exception to to entering entering supported supported system Condition system Condition and and Required Actions. Required Actions. This This program program implements implements thethe requirements requirements of of LCO 3.0.6. LCO 3.0.6. a.a. The SFDP The SFDP shall shall contain contain thethe following: following: 1.1. Provisions Provisions for for cross cross train train checks checks toto ensure ensure aa loss loss of of the capability the capability to to perform perform the the safety safety function function assumed assumed in the in the accident accident analysis analysis does does not not go go undetected; undetected; 2.

2. Provisions Provisions for for ensuring ensuring the plant is maintained in in aa safe condition safe condition if if aa loss of of function function condition exists; condition exists;
3. Provisions Provisions to ensure that an inoperableinoperable supported supported system's systems Completion Time is not inappropriately inappropriately extended as a result of multiplemultiple support support system system inoperabilities; inoperabilities; and
4. Other appropriate appropriate limitations limitations and remedial or or compensatory compensatory actions.

actions.

b. AA loss of safety functio functionn exists when, assuming assuming no no concur concurrent rent single failure, failure, a a safety functio functionn assumed assumed in the in the accide accident analysis nt analys is cannot be performed. For For the the purpose purpose of of this program, aa loss of safety functio function may exist n may exist when when aa suppor supportt system is inoper inoperable, able, and:

1.

1. AA require required system redundant to the d system the system system(s) supported (s) suppor ted by the by the inoper inoperable supportt system able suppor system isis also also inoper inoperable; able; oror 2.
2. AA require required system redundant d system redundant toto the the system system(s)

(s) inin turn turn supported suppor ted byby the the inoper inoperable supported able suppor system is ted system is also also inoperable; inoper able; or or 3.

3. AA require required system redundant d system redundant toto the the suppor supportt system(s) system (s) for the for the suppor supported systems describ ted systems described ed inin b.1 b.l and b.2 and b.2 above is above is also also inoper inoperable.

able. c.

c. The The SFDP SFDP identif identifies where aa loss ies where loss of of safety safety functio function exists.

n exists. If If aa loss loss ofof safety safety functio function is determined n is determined to to exist exist by by this this program, program, the the approp appropriate Conditions and riate Conditions and Required Required Actions Actions of of the LCO in the LCO in which which thethe loss loss ofof safety safety functio function exists are n exists are require required d to be entered to be entered.. (continued) (contin ued) HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 5.0-21 5.0-21 Amendment No. Amendment No. 212 212

ECCS ECCS - Opera ti ng Operating 3.5.2 3.5.2 3.5 3.5 EMERG ENCYY CORE EMERGENC CORE COOLIN COOLINGG SYSTEM SYSTEMS S (ECCS) (ECCS) 3.5.2 3.5.2 ECCS -Operrating ECCSOpe ating LCO LCO 3.5.2 3.5.2 Two ECCS ECCS train trains shall shall be OPERA OPERABLEBLE.. APPLI CABILITY: MODES MODES 1. 1, 2. 2, and 3 

                            ...... ...... ...... ...... ... NOTES   NOTES * ... - -. -. -..... .... -..... . .

1.

1. In MODE 3. 3, one cold leg safety safety injec tion (SI) pump flow path may be isolat ed by closin isolated g the isolat closing ion isolation valves valves for up to 24 hours hours to perfor m pressure perform isolat ion valve isolation valve testin testing g per SR 3.4.14.1.
2. Opera tion in MODE 3 with one requir Operation ed SI pump required declar declareded inope rable inoperab le pursu ant to LCO 3.4.12.

pursuant "Low Low Temp Tempera erature ture Overp ressur Overpress e Prote ure ctionn (LTOP) Protectio System System. ." is allowe allowed d for up to 4 hours hours or until the tempe rature temperatu re of all RCS cold legs excee ds exceeds 375°F 375°F,. which everr comes first. whicheve first. ACTIO NS ACTI ONS

  • - CONDI TION CONDITION REQUIR REQUIRED ED ACTION ACTION COMPL ETIONN TIME COMPLETIO A. One or more trains trains A.1 Resto Restore re train (s) to 72 hours inope rable.

inoperab le. hours OPERA OPERABLEBLE status. AND At least 100% of the ECCS flow equiv alentt equivalen to aa single OPERAABLE single OPER BLE ECCS train availa ble. available. B. valvee iden One valv identtified ified Verify B.1 Veri contro fy cont roll power is in SR 3.5.2.1 or SR Imme Imm diately ediat ely removeedd to all valv remov valveess 3.5.2.7 .7 with cont contro roll identtified iden ified in SR power or air 3.5.1.5. .5. restorred. resto ed. AND (conti (con nued) tinue d) HBRSE HBRS EPP Unit Unit No. No. 22 3.5*4 3.5-4 Amendment No. 176 Amend 176

,~8.88.8 Loss of Safety Loss of Safety Function Function Worksheet Worksheet [CAPR [CAPR 193057] 193057] {TC { TC "Loss Loss Of Of Safety Safety Function Function 

                               \l 2 }}

Worksheet \f\f CC \1"2" Worksheet" NOTE: NOTE: These instructions These instructions do do not not supersede supersede any any instructions instructions contained contained in in the the TRM regarding how to perform TRM regarding how to perform aa Safety Safety Function Function Determination Determination (SFD). (S ED). These These instructions supplement instructions supplement the the TRM TRM instructions instructions and and provide provide an aid in an aid in completing completing the the Loss Loss of Safety Function (LOSE) of Safety Function (LOSF) Worksheet. Worksheet. This determination This determination shouldshould be be performed performed by by aa licensed licensed Senior Senior Reactor Reactor Operator Operator and and reviewed any reviewed time additional any time additional inoperabilities inoperabilities occur occur OR OR an an ITS ITS Supported Supported Feature Feature isis declared inoperable. declared inoperable. 8.8.1 8.8.1 Complete plant Complete plant conditions conditions table. table. 8.8.2 8.8.2 Record the ITS Record Support Feature ITS Support Feature which is is inoperable inoperable by by ITS ITS LCO LCO number number and describe the inoperability. inoperability. 8.8.3 Determine if the ITS Support Feature inoperability causes an ITS Supported Feature to not meet its LCO AND record as applicable. 8.8.4 IF no ITS Supported Feature is inoperable due to the ITS Support Feature being inoperable, THEN perform the following:

1. N/A the remaining steps and sign Completed By.
2. Forward the attachment to the SSO for review.
3. IF the Support Feature will NOT be returned to service prior to end of shift, THEN attach the LOSE LOSF Worksheet to the EIR for the ITS Support Feature.

4.

4. IF IF the Support Support Feature Feature will be be returned to to service prior prior to to end end ofof shift, shift, THEN file LOSE LOSF Worksheet in in EIR EIR notebook.

notebook. 8.8.5 8.8.5 Determine Determine ifif ITS ITS Support Support Features Feature's LCO LCO requires CASCADIN "CASCADING" G to to ITS ITS Supported Supported Feature(s)Feature(s) REQUIRED ACTION and ACTION and record record as as applicable. applicable. 1.

1. IF IF ITS ITS Support Support Features Feature's LCO LCO requires requires CASCADIN "CASCADING" G toto ITS ITS Supported Supported Feature(s)

Feature(s) REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION, ACTION, THEN THEN the the SFD SFD is is complete. complete. 2.

2. N/A the N/A the remaining remaining steps steps and and sign sign Completed Completed By. By.

3.

3. Forward Forward the the attachment attachment to to the the SSO SSO for for review.

review. Attach Attach thethe LOSE LOSF Worksheet Worksheet to to the the EIR EIR for for the the ITS ITS Support Support Feature. Feature. OMM-007 IOMM-007 Rev. 76 Rev. 76 Page 25 Page 25 of 85\ of 85

8.8.6 8.8.6 Determine ififany Determine anyother otherITSITS Support Support LCOs LCOs are are not not met, met, and and record record the the impact impact of ofthe the inoperabilities inoperabilities on on all all applicable applicable ITS ITS Supported Supported Features. Features. 8.8.7 8.8.7 Determine ifif any Determine any redundant redundant ITS ITS Supported Supported FeaturesFeatures are are inoperable. inoperable. 1.1. IFIF no no redundant redundant ITS ITS Supported Supported Features Features are are inoperable, inoperable, THEN THEN the SFD the SFD isis complete. complete. 2.

2. N/A the N/A the remaining remaining stepssteps and and sign sign Completed Completed By. By.

3.

3. Forward the Forward the attachment attachment to to the the SSO SSO for for review.

review. Attach Attach the the LOSF LOSE Works Worksheet heet to the ITS to the ITS Supported Supported Feature's Features EIR. EIR. 8.8.8 8.8.8 IF aa redundant IF redundant ITS ITS Supported Supported Feature Feature isis inoperable, inoperable, THEN THEN determine determine ifif a Loss a Loss of of Safety Safety Function Function (LOSF) (LOSF) exists exists for for the the ITS ITS Supported Supported Feature. Feature. 8.8.9 8.8.9 IF there IF there isis no LOSE, THEN no LOSF, THEN perform perform the following: following: 11.. Calculate and record Calculate record the maximum maximum completion completion time to restore restore the the ITS Suppo rt ITS Support Feature Featur e AND associated associated ITS Supported Supported Feature(s) Feature(s) toto operable status. operable

2. remaining steps and sign Completed N/A the remaining Completed By.
3. Forward the attachment Forward attachment to the SSO for review. review. Attach the LOSF LOSF Worksheet to the ITS Supported Worksheet Supported Feature's Features EIR.

8.8.10 8.8.10 IF there is aa LOSE LOSF,, THEN perform the following: 1.

1. Calcul Calculateate andand record the maximmaximum completion um compl etion time to restore the the ITS ITS Suppo Support rt Featur Feature e and and associa associated ted ITSITS Suppo Supported Feature(s) rted Featur to e(s) to operab operable le status.

status. 2.

2. Enter Enter thethe applica applicableble ITS ITS LCO LCO for for the the ITS ITS Suppo Supported Feature rted Featur OR e OR ITS ITS LCO LCO 3.0.33.0.3 as as applica applicable.

ble. 3.

3. Attach Attach the the LOSE LOSF Works Worksheet heet to to the the ITS ITS Suppo Supported Feature's rted Featur EIR.

es EIR. 8.8.11 8.8.11 The The individ ual who individual who comple completedted the the worksh worksheet shall sign eet shall sign and and date date the the worksh worksheet.eet. 8.8.12 8.8.12 The The SSO SSO shall shall sign sign and and date date the the worksh worksheet.eet. [ OMM-007 IOMM-007 Rev. Rev. 76 76 Page26 Page 851 26ofof85

8.9 8.9 InoperableITSITRM/ODCM/RG Inoperable ITSITRM/ODCM/RG1.97 1.97Components ComponentsThat ThatWill WillBe BeReturned Returnedtoto ServicePrior Service PriortotoEndEndofofShift Shift[CAPR [CAPR193057]193057] { {TC TC"Inoperable Inoperable ITS!TRM/ODCM/RG1.97 ITSfTRM/ODCM/RG 1.97 ComponentsThat Components ThatWill WillBeBeReturned ReturnedtotoService ServicePrior PriortotoEnd Shift \f\fCC\1\l"2" EndofofShift" } 2) 8.9.1 8.9.1 Enterthe Enter the name name of ofthe the equipment equipmentAND ANDthethe reason reason for forthe the equipment equipment inoper ability inoperability inin AUTO AUTO log. log. 8.9.2 8.9.2 Verify aa Work Verify Work Request Request has has been been initiated initiated (if(if applicable) applicable) AND AND enter enterthethe WR numbe WR numberr inin AUTO AUTO log. log. 8.9.3 8.9.3 IF IF the the unavailability unavailability isis unplanned, unplanned, AND AND thethe component component isis part part of of aa system listed system listed on on Attachment Attachment 10.10, 10.10, THEN THEN reviewreview OMM-048OMM-048 AND the AND the Mainte nance Rule Maintenance Rule Scopingg andScopin and Performance Performance Criteria Criteria Basis Basis section section of of the Maintenance the Maintenance Rule Rule Database Database to to determine determine ifif the the listed listed function(s) of function(s) of the system is/are the system is/are affected.affecte d. 8.9.4 8.9.4 IFIF aa system system function function isis affected, affected, THEN THEN initiate initiate an an NCRNCR statingstating aa Safety Safety Significant Functional Significant Functional Failure Failure hashas occurred occurred lAW OMM-048, and lAW OMM-048, and enter enter the the NCR# NCR # in AUTO log. in AUTO log. 8.9.5 8.9.5 applicable LCO, TRMS or Specification Enter applicable Specification number number in AUTO log. log. BeBe specifi specific. c. For example, provide example, provide table number number and item number number where where applicable. applicable. Examples: Examples: LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1 Item 7.a TRMS 3.10, Table 3.10-1 Item 3 Specif ication 2.6.3, Table 2.6-1 Item Specification Item 4.c 8.9.6 8.9.6 Determ Determine ine the maxim maximum um time time the equipm equipment ent is is allowe allowed d to bebe inoper inoperable. able. 8.9.7 8.9.7 Determ Determine ine applica ble surveil applicable lances or surveillances or activit activities and require ies and required frequencies d freque ncies which are require d as which are required as aa result result ofof the the compo component inoperability. nent inoper ability. 8.9.8 8.9.8 IF IF the the compo component nent isis an an ITS ITS Suppo Support System compo rt System component, nent, THEN perform THEN perform Attach ment 10.11, Attachment 10.11, Loss Loss of of Safety Safety Functi Function Worksheet on Works heet AND file AND file Works worksheet heet inin EIR EIR notebo notebook. ok. 8.9.9 8.9.9 IF IF the the compo component nent isis an an ITS ITS Suppo Supported System Compo rted System Component, THEN nent, THEN review review openopen LossLoss ofof Safety Safety Functi Function Worksheets for on Worksheets for impact AND impact enter AND enter inin AUTO AUTO log log to to docum document ent review review.. OMM-007 IOMM-007 Rev. Rev.76 76 Page27 Page 27ofof85851

ATTACHMENT 10.11 ATTACHMENT 10.11 Page 11 of Page of 44 LOSS OF LOSS OF SAFETY SAFETY FUNCTION FUNCTION WORKSHEET WORKSHEET [CAPR 193057] [CAPR { TC "LOSS 193057] {TC LOSS OF OF SAFETY SAFETY FUNCTION FUNCTION WORKSHEET" WORKSHEET \f\f C C \1\I "2" 2)} CONTINUOUS USE CONTINUOUS USE NOTE: NOTE: The numbers The numbers in in the the flow flow chartchart correspond correspond to to the the description description of of SFD SFD stepssteps inin Appendix CC of Appendix the TRM. of the TRM. 3. DOES TIlE 2.

2. NO NO TS SUPPORT TSSUPPORT DETERMINE TIlE DETERMINE IMPACT THE IMPACT FEATURE IS TIlE INOPERABILITY HAS THE INOPERABlLITY HAS FEATURE RESULT N
            çBLE                                                                                      IN A SUPPORTED ON APPLICABLE ON   APPLICABLE FEATURE LCO NOT SUPPORTED FEATURES SUPPORTED        FEATURES YES 5.

5.

8. DOES TIlE DOES THE 8.

DETERMINE TIlETHE IMPACT IMPACT YES SUPPORT FEATURE SUPPORT FEATURE DETERMINE THE INOPERABlLITIES INOPERABILITIES TS ACTIONS TS ACTIONS REQUIRE REQUIRE THE HAVE ON ALL APPLICABLE ON ALL APPLICABLE CASCADING TO "CASCADING" TO TIlE THE HAVE SUPPORTED FEATURES FEATURES SUPPORTED FEATURE(S) SUPPORTED TS ACTIONS? [ NO YES

9. 10.

ARE ANY NO NO SFD IS COMPLETE. REDUNDANT SUPPORTED 6. REVIEW THE TIlE SFD ANY FEATURES INOPERABLE? TIME AN ADDITIONAL ENTER THE TIlE APPLICABLE TS INOPERABILITY OCCURS OR INOPERABlLITY ACTIONS OF TIlE THE A SUPPORTED FEATURE IS SUPPORTED DECL4RED DECLARED INOPERABLE FEATURETS FEATURE TS YES YES 11. DOES A NO LOSF EXIST FOR THE SUPPORTED FEATURE TS? YES CALCULATE 12. 12. AND TRACK CALCULATE AND TRACK THETIlE ENTER ENTER THE I13. 13. TIlE APPLICABLE APPLICABLE TS TS CALCULATE 14. 14. AND TRACK CALCULATE AND TRACK THE THE REVIEW REVIEW THE 15. 15. THE SFD SFD ANY ANY TIME TIME MAXIMUM COMPLETION MAXIMUM COMPLETION ACTIONS OFTHE ACTIONS OF TIlE SUPPORTED SUPPORTED MAXIMUM MAXIMUM COMPLETION COMPLETION AN ADDITIONAL AN ADDITIONAL TIME TO TIME RESTORE THE TO RESTORE TIlE FEATURE TS. FEATURETS. TIME TO TIME RESTORE THE TO RESTORE TIlE INOPERABlLITY OCCURS INOPERABILITY OCCURS OR OR SUPPORT FEATURE AND SUPPORT FEATURE AND SUPPORT FEATURE AND SUPPORT FEATURE AND AA SUPPORTED SUPPORTED FEATURE FEATURE ISIS ASSOCIATED ASSOCIATED SUPPORTED SUPPORTED ASSOCIATED ASSOCIATED SUPPORTED SUPPORTED DECLARED INOPERABLE. DECLARED INOPERABLE. FEATURE(S) FEATURE(S) TO TO OPERABLE OPERABLE FEATURE(S) FEATURE(S) TO TO OPERABLE OPERABLE STATUS STATUS STATUS. STATUS. OMM-007 IOMM-007 Rev. Rev. 76 76 Page 56 Page 56 ofof 8585

3.7. 3.7. OperabilityConcern Operability ConcernReview Review(OCR) (OCR) Thisisisan This anaction actiontotoresolve resolvean anoperability operabilityconcern concernthat thathashasbeen beenidentified identifiedthrough through initiationof initiation ofan an NCRNCRper perCAP-NGGC-0200. CAP-NGGC-0200. This Thisisisalso also referred toas referred to asan anOperability Operability Concern Response. Concern Response. An An OCR OCRisisaaPassPort PassPortassignment assignmentused usedtotodocument documentthe the results results of ofanan Operability OperabilityReview Reviewfor forNCRs NCRswherewhereeither eitherthe theattribute attributefor foran an OCROCRor or OPER ISSUE OPER ISSUE isis checked checked Y. Y. This Thisisisthe theassignment assignmenttype type used used totodocument documentthe the basisfor basis foran an Operability Operability Determination Determination.. 3.8. 

  .~ 3.B.

Operability Determination Operability Determination The actual The actual determination determination of of Operability Operability must must bebe made made by by aa licensed licensed individual. individual. Routin e confirm ation Routine confirmation of Operability of Operab ility isis usually usually made made with with out out an an OCR OCR whilewhile screening screening Work Requests Work Requests and and NCRs. NCRs. IfIf required required an an OCR OCR isis prepared prepared to to assist assist Operations. An Operations. An Operability Determination Operability Determination typically typically starts starts when when Operations Operations determinesdetermines that that anan OCR OCR is required and is required and itit typically typically ends ends when when the the applicable applicable on-shifton-shift licensed licensed operator operator accept s accepts the OCRthe OCR basis.basis. 3.9. 

   -7 3.9.
   -        Quality-Related Quality-Related The term The     term "quality-related" quality-related encompasses encompasses the NRC quality assurance            assurance controls controls and  and requirements imposed requirements           imposed on a nuclear nuclear power plant. This specifically    specifically includes those includes      those activities, services, activities,     services, and equipmentequipment associated associated with safety-related safety-related structures, structures, system      s  and systems and componentscomponents such as environmentalenvironmental and effluent     effluent monitoring; monitoring; Technical Technical Specification surveillance; Specification         surveillance; operations; operations; radiological radiological emergency emergency planning;planning; firefire protect   ion; radiati protection;       radiation on protection; protection; packag packaging  ing radioac radioactive tive material              transport; material for transpo         rt; radioac radioactive tive waste manag  managementement system systems;   s; securit security    systems; y system             anticipated s; anticip           transient ated transie      nt withou withoutt scram scram (ATW (ATWS)   S) equipm equipment;ent; and enviro environmentally nmentally qualifi  qualified    components.

ed compo nents. 3.10. 3.10. Safety -Related Safety-Related Those Those SSCs SSCs reliedrelied upon upon to to remain remain functio functionalnal during during and and follow following design basis ing design basis events events to to ensure ensure the the integri ty of integrity of the the reactor reactor coolan coolantt pressupressure boundary, re boundary, the the capabi lity to capability to shut shut down down the the reactor reactor andand mainta maintainin itit inin aa safe safe shutdo shutdown condition, wn condit and ion, and the the ability ability to to preven prevent t or or mitiga te the mitigate the conseq uences of consequences of accide accidents that could nts that could result result in in potenti potential al offsite offsite exposu exposuresres compa comparablerable to to the the guideli guideline exposures of 10 ne exposures of 10 CFR 50.67. CFR 50.67. II OPS-N GGC-1 305 OPS-NGGC-1305 I Rev. Rev.I 1 I Page77ofof50 Page 50 II

4.0 RESPO RESP NSIBIILITIE ONSIB LITIES S 4.1. Manag Mana er-Ope ger-O rations perati ons 4.1.1. Ensur Ensure ess that an Opera Operabbility ility Determination completion time is establ establiished shed and communicat unicate edd to the SSO for entry into the shift logs. 4.1.2. Ensur Ensureess that a compl completedeted Opera Operabbility ility Determination is reviewrevieweded by the Plant Nucle Nucleaarr Safety Comm ittee (PNSC) per site specif specifiicc procedures. 4.1.3. Shoul Should d ensure the following action actionss are taken:

1. Obtain a copy of the NCR.
2. Determine the allowe d time limit for completion of the Opera Operabbility ility Concern Review Revie w (OCR).
3. Inform affected personnel of any time limits for completing the OCR.

4.2. Superi Supe ntende rinten dentnt - Shift Opera 

                                       -           Operattions ions (SSO)

Superiintend The Super ntende nt - Shift Opera ent Operattions ions (SSO) is responsible for determining ining the operabbility opera ility of SSC. In order to carry out this respon responsibility sibility, the SSO should take or verify that the following action actionss are promptly tly taken as neede neededd:: 4.2.1. Routin Routinee screening of deficie deficiencies ncies (including WRs, WO tasks, NCRs NCRs,, observations and notific notifications ations)) should ensure that items have been appro approppriate riately ly dispositioned with respect to OperaOperabbilityility and degra degrad ed or non-c ded non-coonform nformiingng conditions. Items will typicallly typica ly be dispositioned as follow follows:s: 

         ~1. 1.           Operabbility If Opera     ility can be readily confirmconfirmed  ed and the item is not a degradegrad   ed or non-ded     non conforming condition, this proce       proced   ure can be used for guidance but no specif dure                                             specifiicc actionss to comply with this procedure are required. Documentation action of the determination should be included in the WR, NCR or in a log entry.
        ~

r, 2. Operabbility If Opera ility can not be readily confirm confirmed, ed, or the item is a degra degrad ed or non-ded non conforming condition, an NCR is requir require edd and the provisions of this procedure applica are applic ble. able.

3. If there is not a reasonable expec expecttation ation that the SSC is Opera Operab le, then the ble, applica applic ble SSC shall be declar able declare edd inoperable. An NCR is requir require edd and the provisiions provis ons of this proce proced ure are applic dure applica ble.

able. 4.2.2. Logging in the shift logs the initiati initiation on of an Opera Operabbility ility Determination, the time and date of initiati initiation, on, and the allowed compl comple tion time determined by the etion Manager-Op er-Ope rationss.. eration [dSNGGC IOPS- NGGC-1 305 

            -1305                                        Rev. 1 1                                            Page 8 of 50     I

SALEMFOXTROT SALEM FOXTROT 2001 NRC 2001 NRCWRITTEN WRITTENEXAMINATION EXAMINATION WORKSHEET WORKSHEET Question Question SRO 71 SR071 Number: Number: Question: Question: Unit 11 isis operating Unit operating atat 100% 100% power. power. 

                          **     11 SI 11   SI pump pump isis INOPERABLE INOPERABLEdue       due to to repairs repairs estimated estimated toto take take 48 48 hours hours
                          **     An audit An   audit of ofcompleted completed surveillance surveillance procedures procedures hashas determined determined the the quarterly quarterly surveillance performed surveillance     perfonned on on 1212 SI SI pump pump 37  37 days ago was improperly completed.

days ago was improperly completed. Which one Which one ofof the the following following describes describes the the appropriate appropriate action action per per Technical Technical Specifications? Specifications? A. A. Commence aa plant Commence plant shutdown shutdown within within 11 hour hour B. B. Demonstrate the Demonstrate the operability operability of of 1212 SI SI pump pump within within 11 hour hour or or commence commence aa plant plant shutdown shutdown c. C. Demonstrate the operability of 12 12 SI SI pump pump within within 24 hours hours oror commence commence aa plant plant shutdown shutdown D. D. Demonstrate the operability of 12 12 SI pump within 72 hours or commence a plant shutdown Answer: Answer: C Justification: Justification: Enter TS 3.0.3, but operability can be demonstrated within 24 hours per TS 4.0.3, since the Enter action action statement is less than 24 hours. A and B B represent inappropriate application of ofTS TS 3.0.3 3.0.3 and D represents inappropriate application of and ofTSTS 3.5.2 Tier/Group Tier/Group 33 10CFR55.41 10CFR55.41 43.2 43.2 Because it requires a from 'from memory memory' application of of Tech Tech Specs in a situation where where 10CFRSS TS 3.0.3 3.0.3 is applied but the 24 hour exception per 4.0.3 will also apply. The SRO has to 10CFR55.43 determine determine the the appropriate course of action course of action Bank/New! BanklNew/ Modified Modified Modified Modified K/A KlA#:#: 2.2.24, 2.2.24, Knowledge Knowledge of of effects effects ofof maintenance maintenance activities activities on on LCOs LCOs K/A KIA Values: Values: RO 2.6 RO 2.6 SROSRO 3.83.8 Cognitive Cognitive Application Application Level: Level:

References:

References:

TS TS 3.0.3, 3.0.3, 4.0.3 4.0.3 LP 0300-000-OO LP S-TECHSP-01, Objectives 0300-000-00S-TECHSP-Ol, Objectives 13 13 and and 1414

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 Written Exam NRC Written Exam

98. Given the
98. Given the following:

following: The Reactor 

      - The
       -      Reactor hashas tripped tripped from from 100%

100% RTP. RTP. RCS temperature 

      - RCS
       -       temperature isis 430430 of.
                                       °F.

RCS pressure 

      - RCS
       -        pressure isis 635   PSIG.

635 PSIG. 

      - S/G
       -      A pressure S/G "A"    pressure isis 100 100 PSIG.

PSIG. S/G "B" 

      - S/G
       -            pressure isis 50 B pressure           PSIG.

50 PSIG. SIG "C" 

      - S/G
       -            pressure is C pressure     is 50 PSG.

50 PSIG. CV pressure 

      - CV
      -      pressure is is approximately approximately 38 38 PSIG.

PSIG. Which ONE (1) of the following describes the correct mitigation strategy? strategy? Throttle Feedwater A. Throttle Feedwater to ALL S/Gs to 80 S/Gs to 80 to to 90 90 GPM lAW Foldout GPM lAW Foldout A. B. Isolate Feedwater to S/Gs "B" B and "C" C lAW Foldout A. C. Isolate Feedwater to ALL S/Gs lAW EPP-16, EPP-1 6, UNCONTROLLED UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS. GENERATORS. D. Throttle Feedwater to ALL S/Gs to 80 to 90 GPM lAW EPP-16, UNCONTROLLEDUNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS. DEPRESSURIZATION GENERATORS. 98 98

G2.4.6 OOlJEMERO 02.4.6 00 1JEMERG PROCIPLAN/3/3.7/4.7/SRO/HIGH/43.S/NEW PROC/PLAN/3/3.7/4.7/SROIHIGHJ43 .5/NEW - 200SJEPP-16-003 

                                                                     -  2008/EPP- 16-003 Given the Given    the following:

following: 

   - The
    -      Reactor has The Reactor            tripped from has tripped   from 100%

100% RTP. RTP. 

   - RCS
    -        temperature isis 430 RCS temperature             430 of.
                                      °F.
   - RCS
    -        pressure isis 635 RCS pressure                 PSIG.

635 PSIG. 

   - S/G
   -        A pressure S/G "A"     pressure isis 100 100 PSIG.

PSIG. S/G "8" 

   - S/G
    -      B pressure pressure isis 50 50 PSIG.

PSIG. SIG "c" 

   - S/G
   -              pressure is C pressure       is 50  PSIG.

50 PSIG. 

   - CV
   -      pressure isis approximately CV pressure         approximately 38       PSIG.

38 PSIG. Which ONE (1) (1) of of the following describes the correct mitigation strategy? strategy? Feedwater to ALL S/Gs to 80 to 90 GPM A. Throttle Feedwater GPM lAWlAW Foldout Foldout A. B. Isolate Feedwater to S/Gs "8" B and "c" C lAW Foldout A. C. Isolate Feedwater to ALL S/Gs lAW EPP-16, EPP-1 6, UNCONTROLLED UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION DEPRESSURIZATION OF GENERATORS. ALL STEAM GENERATORS. D Throttle Feedwater to ALL S/Gs to 80 to 90 GPM lAW EPP-16, UNCONTROLLED D~ UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS. DEPRESSURIZATION GENERATORS. The correct answer is D. A: Incorrect - Correct mitigative strategy, but Foldout A requires 1 1 intact S/G. Stem conditions indicate that ALL S/Gs are faulted and EPP-16 will be used. B: 8: Incorrect - Correct mitigative strategy and correct procedure for 22 faulted S/Gs. Stem conditions indicate that ALL S/Gs are faulted and EPP-1 EPP-16 6 will be used. C: Incorrect - EPP-16 is the correct procedure to enter, however, C: - however, the mitigative mitigative strategy strategy is is incorrect, incorrect, Feedwater would NOT be isolated to ALL S/Gs. S/Gs. D: D: Correct - - Stem Stem conditions conditions indicate indicate that ALL S/Gs S/Gs are faulted and and EPP-16 will be be used. used. EPP-16 EPP-16 throttles throttles flow to ALL S/Gs flow to S/Gs to 80 to to 80 to 9090 GPM. This ensures GPM. This ensures S/G S/G internals internals are are kept kept wet. wet.

Exam Question Exam Question Number: Number: 98 98

Reference:

EPP-16,

Reference:

EPP-1 6, Pages Pages 33 and and 8; EPP-1 6 SO, 8; EPP-16 BD, Page Page 18; 18; Foldout Foldout A,A, Pages Pages 3-8. 3-8. KA Statement: KA Statement: Knowledge Knowledge of EOP mitigation of EOP mitigation strategies. strategies. History: New History: New - Written 

                 - Written for for HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC exam.

exam. SRO - Detailed SRO - Detailed knowledge knowledge and and implementation implementation of of the the EOP EOP network network mitigation mitigation strategy strategy past past the the Immediate Actions. Immediate Actions. KA Name: KA Name: EMERG PROCIPLAN EMERG PROC/PLAN Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 33 Importance Rating: Importance Rating: 3.7/4.7 3.7/4.7 RO/SRO Level: RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: Cognitive Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 43.5 Source: Source: NEW - 2008 NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: Learning Objective: EPP-16-003 EPP-16-003

UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. Rev. 16 16 E P -16 UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF OF ALL ALL STEAM STEAM EPP-16 GENERATORS GENERATORS Page Page 33 of of 33 33 Purpose Purpose and and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1) 1.

1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This procedure provides provides actions actions for for aa loss loss of of secondary secondary coolant coolant which affects which affects all all Steam Steam Generators.

Generators. 2.

2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS EPP-11, Faulted EPP-11, Faulted Steam Steam Generator Generator Isolation, Isolation, when when an an uncontrolled uncontrolled depressurizat ion of depressurization all Steam of all Steam Generators Generators occurs.

occurs. 

                                         - END
                                         - END --

UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. Rev. 1616 EPP-lo UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF OF ALL ALL STEAM STEAM EPP-16 GENERATORS GENERATORS Page Page 8 8 of of 33 33 H STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I L RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 9.9. Control Feed Control Feed Flow Flow ToTo Minimize Minimize RCS Cooldown As Follow RCS Cooldown As Follows:s:

a. Throttle
a. Throttle feed feed flow flow to to between a.
a. Establish Establish between between between 80 80 gpm gpm and and 80 gpm and 90 gpm to each 80 gpm and 90 gpm to each SIG 90 90 gpm gpm feed S/G feed flow flow toto each each SIG S/G using MDAFW using MDAFW FLOW FLOW CONTROLLER:

CONTROLLER: as as follows: follows: 

              **    FIC-l424, AFW FIC-1424,     AFW PUMP PUMP AA               1)
1) Open Open the the breakers breakers for for DISCH FLOW DISCH FLOW MDAFW MDAFW HEADER HEADER DISCHARGE DISCHARGE Valves:

Valves: OR 

                                                                 **     V2-16A V2-16A (MCC-9, (MCC9,
              **    FIC-1425, AFW FIC-142S,     AFW PUMP PUMP BB                          COMPT-2ML)

COMPT-2ML) DISCH FLOW DISCH FLOW 

                                                                  **    V2-16C V2lGC (MCC-9, (MCC-9, COMPT-3J)

COMPT-3J) 

                                                                  **    V2-16A V2-l6A (MCC-I0, (MCC-l0, COMPT-4C)

COMPT -4 C)

  • V2-16B (MCC-I0, (MCC-10, COMPT-4F)

COMPT-4F)

2) Locally throttle AFW Locally throttle HDR AFW HDR DISCH Valves DISCH Valves to to establi establish sh 80 gpm 80 gpm toto 90 90 gpm gpm to to each each S/G:

S/G: 

                                                                 **     AFW-V2-16A - S/G AFW-V2-l6A      -

SIG "A" A 

                                                                 **     AFW-V2-16B - S/G AFW-V2-l6B      -

SIG "B" TI 

                                                                 **     AFW-V2-16C - S/C AFW-V2-l6C      -
                                                                                                  "c" SIG C
3) Go
3) Go ToTo Step Step 11.

11. b.

b. Go Go ToTo Step Step 1111

RNP WOO WOG BASIS/ BASIS/DIFFE DIFFER ENCES RENC STEP ES STEP 7 2 WOG BASIS PURPOSE: PURPO SE: control feed flow to minimiz To control minimize e the effects of the cooldow cooldown n due to the secondary depresdepressurizat surizatiion on and to subseq subsequently uently control control the transien transient. t. BASIS: BASIS: Depending Depend ing upon the size of the effectiv effective e break areas for the steam generators, the cooldow cooldown n rate experienced after reactor trip could exceed 100°F/h 100°F/hr. r. A reductio reduction n of feed flow to the steam generators has three primary primary effects: effects:

1. To minimiz minimize e any addition additional cooldown al cooldow resulting n resultin g from the addition addition of feedwater,
2. To prevent steam generator tube dryout by maintai maintaining ning a minimu minimum m feed flow to the steam generators and,
3. To minimiz minimize e the water invento inventory ry in the steam generators that eventua eventually lly is the source additional of addition al steam flow to containment or the environ environment ment..

The minimu minimum m feed flow of (S.04) gpm represents the value in plant specific specific units corresponding to 25 gpm. The 25 gpm value is representative of a minimum minimu m measurable feed flow to a steam genera generator. Plant specific specific values may depend upon flow instrumentation and the sensitiv sensitivity ity of the controls controls on the feed flow. As steam flow rate drops, the feed flow will eventua eventually lly increase the steam generator inventory. invento ry. Feed flow is control controlled led to maintai maintain n steam generator tor narrow range level less than 50% to prevent overfee overfeeding ding the steam generators. addition,, as SG pressure and steam flow rate drop, RCS hot leg In addition temperatures will stabilize and .start start increasing. The operator controls controls feed flow or dumps steam to stabilize the RCS hot leg temperatures. This allows the safety injectio injectionn flow to establis establish h conditions conditio ns for SI termina terminationtion and minimiz minimizes es thermal stresses that may be generated. RNP DIFFER DIFFERENC ENCES ES/RE/REASASONONS S Step 7 of the RNP procedure represents step 2.a of the ERG. The RNP step has been split into multiple multiple steps in order to eliminaeliminatete the actions contained in the ERG Caution Caution at step 2 and to provide provide for other Human Factors Factors concern concernss associated with the ERG step. SSD DETER DETERMIN MINAT ATION ION This is an SSD per criterion criterion 11. 8-11 C2 WOG BASIS PURPOSE: PURPO SE: To alert the operator to maintai maintain n a minimu minimum m feed flow to minimiz minimize e any subsequent thermal shock to SG compon components ents BASIS: BASIS: 

        -?[     If feed flow to a SG is isolated Maintai Maintaining a "wet" ning a minimu wet conditio minimum condition, isolated and the SG is allowed feed flow to the SG could create signific m verifia verifiab n, thereby minimiz ble significant allowed to dry out, subsequent reinitiat ant thermal stress conditio conditionsns on SG compon le feed flow to the SG allows the compo nents to remain in minimizing ing any thermal shock effects if feed flow is increased.

reinitiation ion of components. ents. RNP DIFFER DIFFERENC ENCES ES/RE/REASASONONS S The RNP procedure places the caution or note in an action step to prevent actions within cautions and noted as required by the writer's writers guide. The RNP steps for throttlin throttling g have been split since the throttle valves are differen differentt for the SDAFW SDAFW Pumps and the MDAFW MDAFW Pumps. I EPP-16-BD EPP-16-BD I Rev16 Rev 16 Page 18 of 441 44 I

Rev. Rev. 2727 EPP-Foldouts EPP-Foldouts FOLDOUTS FOLDOUTS Page Page 33 ofof 16 16 Purpose and Purpose and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1) 1.

1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This procedure provides provides actions actions to to respond respond to to circumstances circumstances within within the EOP the EOP Network Network which which are are time time independent.

independent. NOTE The Foldouts The Foldouts do do NOT apply apply during during performance performance ofof the the FRPs. FRPs. 2.

2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS When directed When directed by the EOPEOP Network. Only Only one Foldout is applicable at aa time.

at time. 

                                            - END -

Rev. Rev. 27 27 EPP-Foldouts EPP-Foldouts FOLDOUTS FOLDOUTS Page 4 off 16 Page4o 16 CONTINUOUS CONTINUOUS USE USE FOLDOUT FOLDOUT A A (Page (Page 11 of of 5) 5) 1.

1. RCP TRIP RCP TRIP CRITERIA CRITERIA
                                                                                                       \

IFIF BOTH BOTH conditions conditions below below are are met. met, THEN THEN stop stop all all RCPs: RCPs: 

       **      SI Pumps SI  Pumps - AT
                         -   AT LEAST LEAST ONE ONE RUNNING RUNNING AND CAPABLE CAPABLE OF OF DELIVERING DELIVERING FLOW FLOW TO THE TO  THE CORE CORE
       **     RCS Subcooling RCS  Subcooling - LESS
                                  -  LESS THAN THAN 35°F 35°F [55°F]

[55°F] 2.

2. SI ACTUATION SI ACTUATION CRITERIA CRITERIA IF EITHER IF EITHER condition condition below below occurs.

occurs, THEN Actuate SI SI and Go Go To To PATH-l, Entry PATH-l. Entry Point A: A: 

        **    RCS Subcooling RCS  Subcooling - LESS THAN 35°F [55°F]
        **    PZR Level PZR  Level - CAN NOT BE MAINTAINED MAINTAINED GREATER THAN 10% [32%]    [32%]

3.

3. AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA IF IF CST CST level level decreases to less than 10%. 10%, THEN switch to to backup backup water water supply supply using using OP-402. Auxiliary Feedwater System.

4.

4. EMERGENC EMERGENCY Y COOLING COOLING WATER WATER SWITCHOV SWITCHOVER ER CRITERIA IF normal normal cooling cooling isis lost lost to to any any of of the the following components, components. THEN THEN establish establish emergency emergency cooling cooling water water using using the the referenced referenced procedure:

procedure: 

       **     Charging Charging Pump Pump Oil Oil Coolers Coolers - Use
                                                   -  Use Attachment Attachment 11 ofof AOP-Ol4, AOP-014.

Component Component Cooling Cooling Water Water System System Malfunction. Malfunction. 

       **     SI SI Pump Pump Thrust Thrust Bearing Bearing - Use-Use Attachment Attachment 11 ofof AOP-O22, AOP-022. Loss Loss of of Service Service Water.

Water. 

       **     MDAFW MDAFW Pumps Pumps - Use Use Attachment Attachment 22 of   of AOP-022, AOP-022. Loss Loss of of Service Service Water.

Water.

EPP-F oldouts Rev. 27 FOLDOU FOLDOUTS TS Page 55 of 16 CONTI CONTINUOUNUOUS USE FOLDOU FOLDOUT T AA (Page 22 of 5)

5. DC BUS OR INSTRU INSTRUMEMENT NT BUS FAILURFAILURE E CRITER CRITERIAIA
a. .L IF DC Bus failurfailure e has occur occurrred.

ed, THEN perfor performm the follow ing:

1) IF DC Bus A A fails.

fails, THEN perfor performm the follow ing: a) In the Charg Chargiing ng Pump Room.Room, Open CVC-35S. 58, RWST TO CHARG ING CHARGING PUMP SUCTIO SUCTION. N. b) WHEN CVC-3 S8 58 is open. open, THEN close LCV-l LCV-1lSC. 15C. VCT OUTLE OUTLETT from RTGB. c) In the E-l/E-E-1/E-2 Room. Room, trans ferr Instru transfe Instrumment ent Bus 2 2 to MCC-S MCC-8.. d) In the 4l60V 416OV Bus Room. Room, trip the Excit err Field Break Excite Breakeer. r. e) In EDG A A Room perforperformm the follow ing:

  • Trip EDG A A Fuel Racks Racks..
  • Close DA-21A DA-21A AND DA-2SA DA-25A.. DG DC "A" A AIR START OUTLE T OUTLET ISOLAT ISOLATIONION valve valvess..
2) IF DC Bus B B fails.

fails, THEN perfor performm the follow ing: a) In the E-l/E-E-1/E-2 Room. Room, trans transfeferr Instru Instrumment ent Bus 3 to MCC-S MCC-8.. b) In EDG B B Room. Room, perforperform m the follow ing:

  • Trip EDG BOG B B Fuel Racks Racks..
  • Close DA-21B DA21B AND DA-2SB DA-25B,. DG "B"B AIR START OUTLET ISOLAT ISOLATIONION valve valves s..

c) Close CVC-4 CVC-46O 60 A A && B. B, LTDN LINE STOPs.

b. IF MCC-S MCC-5 is de-en de-ene ergize rgized, d. THEN trans transfeferr power source to DS Bus using the posted instru instruc ction tions s at the Kirk Key Interl ocked Interlo cked Break Breake ers.

rs. (CONTI NUED (CONTINUE D NEXT PAGE)

EPP-Foldout EPP-F oldouts Rev. 2727 FOLDO FOLDOUTS UTS Page 6 of 16 CONTINUOUS USE FOLDOU FOLDOUTT AA (Page 3 of 5) 55.. (CONTI NUED)) (CONTINUED

c. IF Instru Instrume ment nt Bus failur failure e has occur occurred, red. THEN perfor performm the follow following ing::
1) IFIF Instru Instrume mentnt Bus 4 fails.

fails, THEN maint ain Steam Dump in the maintain Tavg Mode of operaoperation tion..

2) j IF a failur failuree of only ONE of the below Instru ment Instrume nt Busse Bussess occur occurs,s. THEN trans fer the failed failed bus .toto MCC-8 MCC-8..
  • Instrume Instru mentnt Bus 11
  • Instrume Instru mentnt Bus 22
  • Instrume Instru mentnt Bus 33
  • Instrume Instru ment nt Bus 4
3) IF more than ONE InstruInstrume ment nt Bus requi res trans fer to MCC-8 requires MCC-8 for Nucle Nucleaarr Safety Safety Conce rns.rns, THEN strip the affect ed Busse affected Bussess using Attach ment 14 of AOP-024. 24, Loss of Instru ment Instrume nt Bus.

Bus, prior to trans ferri ferrin ngg the Buss( Buss(e es) MCC-8. s) to MCC8

Rev. Rev. 2727 EPP-Foldouts EPP-Foldouts FOLDOUTS FOLDOUTS Page 77 of Page of 1616 CONTINUOUS USE CONTINUOUS USE FOLDOUT FOLDOUT AA (Page 44 of (Page of 5) 5) 6.6. MSR MSR ISOLATION ISOLATION CRITERIA CRITERIA IF ANY Purge Purge OR Shutoff Valve 

                            . Shutoff     Valve does does notnot indicate indicate fully fully closed, closed, THEN THEN place the place       the associated associated RTGB RTGB Switch Switch to to CLOSE.

CLOSE. 7.

7. EXCESS LETDOWN EXCESS LETDOWN ISOLATION ISOLATION CRITERIA CRITERIA IF aa Phase IF Phase A Isolation signals A Isolation signals occurs, occurs, THEN THEN verify:

verify: 

        **     CVC-387, EXCESS CVC-387,      EXCESS LTDN LTDN STOP STOP - CLOSED
                                                  -  CLOSED
        **     HIC-137, EXCESS HIC-I37,      EXCESS LTDN LTDN FLOW FLOW - CONTROLLER
                                                  -  CONTROLLER AT AT 0%

0% 8.

8. INADVERTENT CV INADVERTENT CV SPRAY SPRAY ACTUATION ACTIJATIONCRITERIA CRITERIA IF aa CVCV Spray Spray Actuation Actuation occurs AND Containment Containment Pressure Pressure has has remain ed below remained below 10 10 psig, psig, THEN perform the following:

following:

a. Stop
a. Stop ALL ALL RCPs.

RCPs.

b. Stop CV
b. Stop Spray Pumps CV Spray Pumps As Follow Follows: s:
1) Mome
1) ntarily place Momentarily place the CONTAINM CONTAINMENT Key Switch ENT SPRAY Key Switch to to the the OVRD/RESE OVRD/RESET T positio positionn AND return to the the NORMAL NORMAL positio position.

n. 2)

2) Stop Stop CVCV Spray Spray Pumps Pumps
3) Close
3) Close CVCV SPRAY SPRAY PUMP PUMP DISCH DISCH Valves Valves::
                  **    SI-88O SI-880AA
                  **    SI-880 SI-880BB
                  **    SI-88O SI-880CC
                  **    SI-880 SI-880DD

Rev. Rev. 2727 EPP-Foldouts EPP-Foldouts FOLDOUTS FOLDOUTS Page Page 88 ofof 1616 CONTINUOUS CONTINUOUS USE USE FOLDOUT FOLDOUT AA (Page 55 of (Page of 5)5) ~ 9.9. FAULTED FAULTED S/C ISOLATION S/G ISOLATION CRITERIA CRITERIA IF both IF both the conditions below the conditions below areare met,met, THEN THEN perform perform the the following: following: 

                  ** Any Any S/GS/G pressure pressure is is decreasing decreasing in    in anan uncontrolled uncontrolled manne    r      Any manner OR Any S/G hasS/C   has completely completely depressurized.

depressurized. AND AND 

           ~
  • At least ONE
  • At least ONE S/G S/C is is intact.

intact.

a. Reset
a. Reset SI.

SI.

b. CLOSE
b. CLOSE the the appropriate appropriate Auxiliary Auxiliary Feedwater Feedwater isolation isolation valvesvalves toto the faulted the faulted S/Gs S/Cs ANDAND OPEN OPEN thethe associated associated breaker breaker for for thethe valves valves closed.

closed. S/C "A" S/G A

  • V2-14 A, SDAFW SDAFW PUMP DISCH
  • V2-14A, MCC-IO, MCC-1O, CMPT - 3C - 3C
           **    V2-16A, AFW V2-16A,     AFW HDRHDR DISCH(Norm DISCH(Norm Pwr) MCC-IO,    MCC-1O, CMPT - 4C   -   4C (Emerg Pwr MCC-9,  MCC-9, CMPT - 2ML)
                                                                                     -     2ML)

S/C S/G B "B"

  • V2-14 V2-14B,B, SDAFW SDAFW PUMP PUMP DISCH MCC-9, MCC- 9, CMPT - 1C CMPT -

lC

  • V2-16 B, AFW AFW HDR
  • V2-16B, HDR DISCH DISCH MCC-IO, CMPT MCC-1O, CMPT - 4F 4F S/C S/G C "C"
  • V2-l4C V2-14C,. SDAFW SDAFW PUMP
  • PUMP DISCH DISCH MCC-IO, CMPT MCC-1O, CMPT - 4M
  • V2-16 V2-16C,C, AFW AFW HDRHDR DISCH
  • DISCH MCC-9, MCC- 9, CMPT - 3J CMPT -

3J c.

c. WHEN WHEN the the faulted faulted S/Cs S/Gs dry dry out, out, THEN THEN dump dump steam steam from from intact intact S/C S/G to to contro control l RCS RCS repress urization.

repressurization. 

                                                    - - END END --

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam Given the

99. Given
99. the following:

following: The plant 

       - The
        -               was operating plant was    operating atat 100%

100% RTP, RTP when when aa Seismic Seismic event event occurred occurred and and caused caused aa leak leak in the in the Instrument Instrument Air Air header. header. The crew 

       - The
        -        crew has has implemented implemented AOP-017, AOP-017, LOSS LOSS OFOF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR  AIR and and AOP-021, AOP-021, SEISMIC DISTURBANCE.

SEISMIC DISTURBANCE. The reactor 

       - The
       -         reactor has has been been manually manually tripped tripped and and all all PATH-1 PATH-i Immediate Immediate Actions Actions have have been been completed and completed       and verified.

verified. Which ONE Which ONE (1) of the (1) of the following following describes describes the the correct correct procedures procedures the the CRSS CRSS will will direct direct or or perform? perform? A. Perform the actions of PATH-1 PATH-i and AOP-021 concurrently. concurrently. B. Perform PATH-1 B. Perform PATH-i actions ONLY. AOP-017AOP-Oi 7 and and AOP-021 AOP-02i are NO NO longer applicable. C. Perform the actions of PATH-1 PATH-i and AOP-017 concurrently. concurrently. D. Perform the actions of PATH-1, PATH-i, AOP-017 AOP-Oi 7 and AOP-021 AOP-02i concurrently. concurrently. 99 99

02.4.8OOlfEMERG G2.4.S 00 1/EMERGPROCIPLAN/3/3.S/4.5/SROIHIGHl43.5INEW PROC/PLAN/3/3.8/45/SRO/HIGHI43.5/NEW- 200S/OMM-022-009- 2008/OMM-022-009 Given the Given thefollowing: following: The plant 

    - The
     -         plantwas  was operating operating atat 100%100% RTP RTP when when aa Seismic Seismic event eventoccurred occurred andand caused caused aa leak leak inin the the Instrument Instrument Air   Air header.

header. The crew 

    - The
     -         crew has  has implemented implemented AOP-017,AOP-0i 7, LOSS LOSS OF  OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR      AIR and and AOP-021, AOP-021, SEISMIC DISTURBANCE.

SEISMIC DISTURBANCE. The reactor 

    - The
     -         reactor has  has been been manually manually tripped tripped and and all all PATH-1 PATH-i Immediate Immediate Actions Actions have have been been completed and completed          and verified.

verified. Which ONE Which ONE (1) (i) of the following of the following describes describes thethe correct correct procedures procedures the the CRSS CRSS will will direct direct or or perform? perform? A. Perform the A. Perform the actions actions of of PATH-1 PATH-i and and AOP-021 AOP-02i concurrently. concurrently. B. Perform PATH-1 B. Perform PATH-i actions actions ONLY.ONLY. AOP-017 AOP-0i7 and and AOP-021 AOP-021 are are NO NO longer longer applicable. applicable. Cv Perform C:I Perform the actions actions of of PATH-1 PATH-i andand AOP-017 AOP-0i7 concurrently. concurrently. D. Perform D. Perform the the actions actions of PATH-1, PATH-i, AOP-017 AOP-0i7 and AOP-021 concurrently. concurrently. The correct The correct answer answer is C. A: Incorrect - PATH-1 A: Incorrect - PATH-i is a higher priority procedure that will be implemented to verify the reactor reactor is shutdown and the plant stabilized. AOP-021 AOP-02i is NOT a concurrent use use procedure and is NOT required to be performed. B: B: Incorrect Incorrect - AOP-017 is a concurrent use procedure and will be performed by a licensed licensed operator when directed by the CRSS, concurrent with PATH-i PATH-1 actions. AOP-02i AOP-021 is NOT a concurrent use procedure. C: Correct C: Correct - - AOP-0i7 AOP-017 is is aa concurrent concurrent use use procedure procedure and and will be performed performed by by aa licensed operator when directed directed byby the CRSS, CRSS, concurrent concurrent with PATH-i PATH-1 actions. actions. D: D: Incorrect Incorrect - PATH-i PATH-1 is is aa higher higher priority priority procedure procedure thatthat will will be be implemented implemented to to verify verify the the reactor is shutdown reactor is shutdown and and thethe plant plant stabilized. stabilized. AOP-0i7 AOP-017 is is aa concurrent concurrent useuse procedure procedure and and will be performed will be performed by by aa licensed licensed operator operator when when directed directed byby the the CRSS, CRSS, concurrent concurrent with with PATH-i PATH-1 actions. actions. AOP-021 AOP-021 isis NOT NOT aa concurrent concurrent useuse procedure procedure and and isis NOT NOT required required toto be be performed. performed.

Exam Question Exam Question Number: Number: 99 99

Reference:

OMM-022,

Reference:

OMM-022, Page Page 3S.38. KA Statement: KA Statement: Knowledge Knowledge of of how how abnormal abnormal operating operating procedures procedures areare used used inin conjunction conjunction with with EOPs. EOPs. History: New History: New - Written 

                 - Written for for HLC-OS HLC-08 NRCNRC exam.

exam. SRO - Assessment SRO - Assessment of of plant plant conditions conditions and and determination determination ofof procedures procedures required required forfor mitigating mitigating those events. those events. KA Name: KAName: EMERG PROC/PLAN EMERGPROCIPLAN Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 33 Importance Rating: Importance Rating: 3.8/4.5 3.8/4.5 RO/SRO Level: RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: Cognitive Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 43.5 Source: Source: NEW 2008 NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: Learning Objective: OMM-022-009 OMM-022-009

8.3.14 Interface 8.3.14 Interface Between Between EOP EOP Network Network and and AOPs/Concurrent AOPs/Concurrent AOPs{ AOP5{Tc TC InterfaceBetween "Interface BetweenEOP EOP Network Networkand and AOPs/Concurrent AOPs \f\fCC \l\1 "3" AOPs/ConcurrentAOPs" 3 } } 1.

1. Events which Events which result result in in utilization utilization of of AOPs AOPs may may later later deteriorate deteriorate to to the point the point of of implementing implementing the the procedures procedures of of the the EOP Network.

EOP Network. When this When this occurs, occurs, the potential exists the potential exists for for equipment equipment to to be be improperly utilized improperly utilized and and forfor resources resources to to be be unnecessarily unnecessarily diluted diluted by continuing the by continuing the subsequent subsequent actionsactions of AOPs in of AOPs in effect effect or or implementing AOPs implementing AOPs which which may may become become applicable applicable while while trying trying toto concurrently proceed through concurrently proceed through the the EOP EOP Network. Network. 2.

2. With the With the exception exception of of concurrent concurrent AOPs, AC Ps, the the immediate immediate and and subsequent actions subsequent actions of of AOPs AOPs need need not be continued while within not be continued while within EOP Network the EOP Network since since the procedures procedures of the EOP EOP Network Network have have been constructed been constructed to to address address critical critical safety safety functions without these these AOPs.
3. The following AOPs are considered concurrent AOPs and should be performed while in the EOP Network:
  • AOP-005
  • AOP-014
          ~>        *
  • AOP-017
  • AOP-018
  • AOP-034
                    * .AOP-041 AOP-041 4.
4. In In the case of of the the above referenced AOPs, itit is is expected expected that the CRSS will continue with the EOP5 EOPs while another another licensedlicensed operator operator implements implements the the AOP AOP after after any any applicable applicable immediate immediate actions of of the the EOPs EOPs havehave been been completed. The The operator operator performing the the AOP AOP will will notify notify the the CRSS CRSS and and RTGB RTGB operator operator of of all all RTGB RTGB controls controls toto be manipulated be manipulated and/orand/or local local actions actions toto be be taken taken which which could could impact impact thethe performance performance of of the the EQ EOPs.

Ps. QMM-022 IOMM-022 Rev. Rev. 29 29 Page 38 Page 38 ofof 54 541

HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam 100. Which 100. Which ONE (1) of ONE (1) of the the following following isis the the basis basis for for stopping stopping ALL ALL Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant Pumps Pumps (RCPs) (RCPs) FRP-H.1 inin FRP-H.1, RESPONSE RESPONSE TO TO LOSS LOSS OF OF SECONDARY SECONDARY HEAT HEAT SINK? SINK? A. Subsequent actions A. Subsequent actions will will cause cause RCP RCP operating operating requirements requirements to to be be exceeded. exceeded. B. ItIt eliminates B. eliminates the the heat heat input input from from the the RCPs RCPs to to extend extend the the time time available available to to restore restore feed feed flow flow before bleed before bleed and and feed feed criteria criteria isis met. met. C. ItIt minimizes C. minimizes thethe loss loss of of RCS inventory when RCS inventory when thethe PZR PZR PORVs PORVs are are OPENED OPENED to to initiate initiate bleed bleed and feed. and feed. D. Stopping D. Stopping thethe RCPs RCPs reduces reduces RCS RCS pressure pressure inin the the Cold Cold Legs Legs toto maximize maximize injection injection flow. flow. 100 100

G2.4. 18 001IEMERG G2.4.1S 00 1/EMERG PROCfPLAN/3/3.3/4.0/SROILOW/43.1INEW PROCIPLAN/3/3 .3/4.OISRO/L0W143. 1/NEW - 200S/FRP-H.I-003 

                                                                                - 2008/FRP-H. 1-003 Which ONE Which       ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following isis the the basis basis for for stopping stopping ALLALL Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant Pumps Pumps (RCPs)

(RCPs) in FRP-H.1, RESPONSE in FRP-H.1, RESPONSE TO TO LOSS LOSS OF OF SECONDARY SECONDARY HEAT HEAT SINK? SINK? A. Subsequent actions A. Subsequent actions willwill cause cause RCP RCP operating operating requirements requirements to to be be exceeded. exceeded. B ItIt eliminates By eliminates the the heat heat input input from from the the RCPs RCPs to to extend extend the the time time available available toto restore restore feed feed flow flow before bleed before bleed andand feed criteria isis met. feed criteria met. C. minimizes the C. ItIt minimizes the loss loss of of RCS inventory when RCS inventory when the the PZR PZR PORVs PORVs are are OPENED OPENED to to initiate initiate bleed bleed and feed. and feed. D. Stopping D. Stopping the the RCPs RCPs reduces reduces RCSRCS pressure pressure inin the the Cold Cold Legs Legs to to maximize maximize injection injection flow. The correct answer is The is B. A: Incorrect Incorrect - Depressurization 

                  -    Depressurization of S/Gs is         is performed performed in in an an attempt attempt to restore restore feed for corecore cooling, but cooling,     but these actions would NOT            lower RCS NOT lower      RCS pressure to belowbelow RCPRCP operating conditions.

B: Correct - B: - Elimination of the RCPs as a heat source extends the time available before bleed and feed criteria is met by as much as 9 minutes. C: Incorrect C: Incorrect - RCS pressure will decrease when the PZR PORVs are opened. Stopping the RCPs to eliminate the heat input to the RCS is the primary reason. D: Incorrect - Stopping the RCP does reduce pressure, but does NOT have an impact on injection flow. Exam Question Number: 100

Reference:

FRP-H.1 BD, Pages 15, 16 and 48. KA Statement: Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC exam. SRO - Knowledge of of strategy strategy or or action in emergency procedures beyond immediate immediate actions. KA Name: KAName: EMERG PROC/PLAN EMERGPROCfPLAN Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 33 Importance Importance Rating: Rating: 3.3/4.0 3.3/4.0 RO/SRO RO/SRO Level: Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: Cognitive Level: LOW LOW 10CFR55.43 10CFR55.43 link: link: 43.1 43.1 Source: Source: NEW NEW - 2008 200S Learning Learning Objective: Objective: FRP-H.I-003 FRP-H. 1-003

2.4 Feeding 2.4 FeedingaaDry DrySteam SteamGenerator Generator IfIfbleed bleedand andfeedfeedhas hasbeen beeninitiated, initiated,during duringrestoration restorationofofsecondary secondaryheat heatsink, sink,feeding feedingaadry drysteam steamgenerator generatormay maybe be necessary. IfIfthe necessary. theevent eventwas wasinitiated initiatedfrom fromhighhightemperature temperatureand andhighhighdecay decayheat heatconditions conditionsititisislikely that feedwater likely that feedwater flowwill willhave havetotobe beestablished establishedtotoaahot, hot,drydrysteam steamgenerator. generator. AAhot, definedas flow hot,dry drysteam steamgenerator generatorisisdefined asaasteam steam generator in which generator in which the primary the primaryside sideofofthe thesteam steamgenerator generatorisisabove above550 550F** F**and andthethesecondary secondaryside sidehas hasno noliquid liquid inventory. Reestablishment inventory. Reestablishmentofoffeedwater feedwaterisisthe themore moredesirable desirablemode modeofofrecovery recoveryfrom fromaalosslossof ofsecondary secondaryheat heatsinksink thanremaining remainingon onbleed bleedand andfeed feedand andestablishing establishingcold coldleglegrecirculation recirculationfor forlong longterm termcooling coolingbecause than becausethis thiswill willbe be morelikely more likelytotoavoid avoid corecoreuncovery. uncovery. However, However, care caremust mustbe betaken takenwhenwhen re-establishing re-establishingfeedwaterfeedwaterflow flowtoto minimize minimize the effectsof the effects ofthermal thermal shock shockconsistent consistentwith withthetheurgency urgencyofofthe theneed needtotorestore restorethe thesecondary secondaryside side heatsink. heat sink. Sincethe Since heatremoval the heat removal capability capabilityof ofone one steam steam generator generatorisis alwaysalways greater greaterthan thandecay decayheat,heat, ititisisadvisable advisabletoto reestablish feedwater feedwatertoto only onlyoneone steam steam generator generatorregardless regardless of ofthe the size sizeof ofthe the plant plantorornumber numberof reestablish ofloops. loops. Thus, Thus, ifif aafailure failureinin an an SGSG occurs occurs due due toto excessive excessivethermalthermal stresses, stresses,the the failure failureisis isolated isolated toto oneone steam generator. steam generator. IfIfbleed bleed and and feed feed has has beenbeen initiated initiated andand RCS RCS temperature temperature isis increasing, increasing, the the re-establishment re-establishment of offeedwater feedwaterflow flow should be be limited limited to to one one steamsteam generator generator and and the the flow flow rate rate used used should high as as can can bebe made made available should should be be as as high available due due to to the urgency the urgency of the situation. ofthe situation. IfIf RCS RCS temperatures temperatures are are stable stable or or decreasing decreasing when when feedwater feedwater flow flow is restored the flow is restored the flow should be should directed to be directed to one one steam steam generator generator and and the the rate rate should should be be limited limited to to the the plant-specific plant-specific equivalent equivalent of of25 25 - 100 100 gpm until wide range level gpm until wide range level isis established. established. With With stable stable or or decreasing decreasing RCS RCS temperatures, temperatures, the the feedwater feedwater flow flow raterate isis limited to limited to minimize minimize the the potential potential impact impact of excessive thermal of excessive thermal stresses stresses since since aa direct direct measure measure of of thethe steam steam generator generator temperature isis not temperature not available. available. Once Once an an indicated indicated wide wide range range level level isis achieved achieved in in the affected steam the affected steam generator, generator, feedwater flow feedwater flow can can be be adjusted adjusted as as necessary necessary to to restore restore level level into into the the narrow narrow range range and and thereby thereby satisfying satisfying the the requirements for a secondary requirements for a secondary heat heat sink. sink. Once feedwater Once feedwater is established, the is established, the feeding feeding process process should should continue continue until until the the RCSRCS temperature temperature indications indications are are decreasing. decreasing. At At that that time time the the active active steam steam generator generator should should be be checked checked for for symptoms symptoms indicating indicating aa faultedfaulted or or ruptured condition. condition. IfIf the the active active steam steam generator generator is is faulted or ruptured, then or ruptured, then feedwater feedwater shouldshould be ruptured be established established to to another intact steam generator. another intact steam generator. IfIf an intact intact steam generator does does notnot exist, then a decision should be be made made to to use the use the best best available available steam steam generator, which may be the active steam generator. Once the heat load load has has beenbeen transferred to transferred to aa backup backup steam steam generator, the original steam generator should be isolated to prevent further prevent further radiation releases. radiation releases. Thus, the Thus, the process process of initiating feedwater to a dry ste~m of initiating steam generator, as described here, is one that accounts accounts for for the the fact that fact that the the steam steam generator generator temperature may be above 550 F. The number of steam generators that that may be may be fed fed inin a hot, a hot, dry dry condition condition are are limited limited and if RCS temperature is decreasing the flow rate is also limited so so as as to to limit the limit the thermal thermal shock shock to to the steam generator being fed. Subsequent the steam Subsequent to securing SI and exiting FR-H.1 the the remaining remaining dry dry steam steam generators generators may may havehave their levels recovered at the direction of the plant engineering engineering staff in in aa manner manner that that will will minimize minimize thermal thermal shock shock to the steam generators. generators. This evaluation should consider consider steam steam generator generator materials materials and and properties, properties, Technical Technical Specification Specification consideration considerations, s, etc. etc. 2.5 2.5 Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant Pump Pump Operation Operation r Operation Operation of 1 of reactor reactor coolant coolant pumps pumps will will affect affect the the dryout dryout time time of of the the steam steam generators generators due due toto RCP RCP heat heat addition addition and, and, therefore, therefore, willwill affect affect the the time time at at which which operator operator actionaction to to initiate initiate bleed bleed andand feed feed mustmust occur. occur. Studies Studies havehave beenbeen performed performed using using thethe LOFTRAN LOFTRAN code code (Reference (Reference 2) 2) to to assess assess the the impact impact of of RCP RCP operation operation on on thethe time time PORVs PORVs will will open open without without operator operator actionaction andand the the time time to to steam steam generator generator dryout dryout forfor aa loss loss of of main main feedwater feedwater event event without without AFW AFW available. available. AA four-loop four-loop plant plant typical typical of ofcurrent current Westinghous Westinghouse design was e design was used. used. ItIt had had aa core core power of 3411 power of 3411 Mwt Mwt and and an an RCPRCP steady steady statestate power power of of 14 14 Mwt. Mwt. Model Model FF steam steam generators generators were were also also assumed. assumed. Thus, Thus, while while this this plant plant isis notnot identical identical to to the the one one usedused inin References References 1,1, 33 and and 4, 4, the the study studywill will bebe representativ representative of e of Westinghous Westinghouse e plant plant response response and and sufficient sufficient to to determine determinethe the impact impactof ofRCP RCP statusstatus on on the the time time available available before before operator operatoractionaction to to initiate initiate bleed bleed andand feed feed isis required. required. The The cases cases analyzed analyzedwere: were: Case Case 1:1: RCPs RCPs running runningthroughout throughouttransienttransient Case Case2:2: RCPs RCPstrippedtripped atatreactor reactortrip trip Case Case3:3: RCPs RCPstrippedtripped55minutes minutesafter afterreactor reactortrip trip

  • 550°F 550°FisisaCltemperature temperatureevaluated evaluatedtotobe below lowenough enoughthat thatthermal thermalstress stresswould wouldnot notlead leadtotoaafailurefailurewhen when feedwater is established feedwater is establishedtotoany anyremaining remainingdry drysteam steamgenerator.

generator. IFRP-H.1-BD FRP-H.1-BD Rev Rev22 22 Page15 Page 15ofof70 70 I

~I The focus The focus of ofthe the analysis analysis was wasto determinethe to determine the additional additional time time available available to to the the operator operator as as aa result result of ofeliminating eliminating 

>    RCP     heat   from    the RCP heat from the system before system     before action action to to initiate initiate bleed     and feed bleed and     feed became became necessary.

necessary. Thus, Thus, thethe time time ofoftwo two events events was used to was used to determine determine the the impact impact of of RCP RCP trip trip time. time. TheThe two two events events areare 1)1) the the time time when when PORVs PORVs automatically automatically open open asas aa result result ofofthethe degraded degraded heat heat transfer transfer capability capability of the steam ofthe steam generator generator and and 2) 2) the the time time when when steam steam generator generator secondaries dry secondaries dry out. out. Table 11 shows Table shows aa comparison comparison of of the the three three cases. cases. Case Case 11 represents represents aa situation situation wherewhere steam steam generators generators would would experience the experience the earliest earliest dryout dryout due due toto the RCP heat the RCP heat load load and and Case Case 22 isis where where the the steam steam generators generators wouldwould experience the experience the latest latest dryout. dryout. The extension inin dryout The extension dryout time time from from Case Case 11 to to Case Case 22 isis between between 77 and and 99 minutes, minutes, depending upon depending upon the the indication indication of dryout that of dryout that isis chosen. chosen. The The use use ofof the the time time to to PORV PORV opening opening willwill have have some some uncertainty due uncertainty due to to the the uncertainty uncertainty inin predicting predicting non-equilibrium non-equilibrium effects effects inin the the pressurizer. pressurizer. However, However, PORV PORV opening opening time isis probably time probably the the best best indicator indicator obtainable obtainable fromfrom thethe LOFTRAN LOFTRAN analysis analysis of of the the time time available available untiluntil bleed bleed and and feed feed must be must initiated. be initiated. TABLE 1I TABLE IMPACT OF IMPACT RCP TRIP OF RCP TRIP ON LOSS OF ON LOSS OF HEAT HEAT SINK SINK PARAMETER PARAMETER CASE 1* CASE 1* CASE2* CASE 2* CASE CASE 3* 3* PORVs OPEN PORVs OPEN 30.75 mm 30.75 min 37.83 37.83 min mm 35.80 35.80 min mm STEAM GENERATOR STEAM GENERATOR 33.10 min 33.10 mm 42.50 42.50 min mm 40.93 40.93 min mm DRY DRY OUT

  • CASE 1:

CASE 1: All RCPs RCPs Running Running CASE 2: All RCPs Tripped at Reactor Trip CASE CASE 3: All RCPs Tripped 5 Minutes After Reactor Trip Reactor trip occurred at 28 seconds. Loss of main feed occurred at 10 seconds. Case 3, where the RCPs are tripped 5 minutes after reactor trip, is a best estimate expectation of when the operator operator can can be expected to trip RCPs following a reactor trip based on guidance provided in this guideline. Thus, the the extension extension in time to loss of heat sink symptoms is the most realistic that could be expected based on anticipated operator operator response. The extension to loss of secondary heat sink symptoms is about 5 minutes based on on PORV PORV opening time. This compares favorably with the extension already seen between Cases 11 and 2. Thus, operator opening action action to trip RCPs upon entering this guideline for loss of secondary heat sink can appreciably delay the need for for bleed bleed and feed and the loss of secondary heat sink. Thus, time can be gained for the operator to establish aa means means of of supplying supplying feedwater. Delaying Delaying the loss of secondary heat heat sink is not not the only reason for tripping RCPs. RCPs running can also also reduce reduce the the effectiveness effectiveness of of bleed bleed andand feed. RCP RCP heat heat input input toto the the RCS willwill result result inin increased increased steam steam generation generation hindering hindering the the depressurizat depressurization ion ofof the the RCS during during bleed bleed and and feed. The The higher higher pressure pressure produced produced by by RCP RCP operation operation will reduce reduce SI SI flow andand increase increase inventory inventory lostlost through through thethe PORVs. PORVs. Therefore, Therefore, RCPs RCPs should should be be tripped tripped ifif AFW AFW flow cannot cannot bebe established established immediately immediately after after entering entering this this guideline. guideline. 3.

3. RECOVERY /RESTORATION TECHNIQU RECOVERY/RESTORATION TECHNIQUE E The The objective objective of of the the recovery/rest oration technique recovery/restoration technique incorporated incorporated intointo guideline guideline FR-H.1 FR-H.1 is is to to restore restore and/or and/or maintain maintain adequate adequate secondary secondary heat heat removal removal capability capability andand to to establish establish RCS RCS bleed bleed and and feed feed heat heat removal removal ifif secondary secondary heatheat removal removal capability capability cannotcannot be be maintained.

maintained. The The following following subsections subsections provideprovide aa summary summary of of the the major major categories categories of of operator operator actions actions and and key key utility utility decision decision points points forfor guideline guideline FR-H.1, FR-H.1, RESPONSE RESPONSE TO TO LOSS LOSS OF OF SECONDAR SECONDARY HEAT SINK. Y HEAT SINK. 3.1 High Level 3.1 High Level Action Action Summary Summary AA high high level level summary summary of of the the actions actions performed performed in in FR-H.1 FR-H.1 isis given given below below in in the the form form of of major major action action categories. categories. These are These are described described below below inin more more detail. detail. MAJOR MAJOR ACTION ACTION CATEGORICATEGORIES ES IN IN FR-H.1 FR-H.1 oo Attempt Attempt Restoration Restoration of of Feed Feed Flow Flow To To Steam Steam Generators Generators oo Initiation Initiation of RCS Bleed of RCS Bleed and and Feed Feed Heat Heat Removal Removal IFRP-H.1-BD FRP-H .1-80 Rev Rev 22 22 Page 16 Page of 70 16 of 70 I

RNP WOG BASIS/DIFFERENCES RNP WOG BASISIDIFFERENCES STEP STEP STEP STEP RNPDIFFERENCES/REASONS RNP DIFFERENCES/REASONS TheRNP The RNPprocedure procedurehas hasbeenbeensplit splitinto intoseveral several steps stepsininorder ordertotoprovide providethe thelevel levelofof detail required detail requiredtoto satisfy satisfyNUREG-1358. NUREG-1358. The Theintent intentofofthethe ERG ERG has has been been maintained maintained inin the steps. Specifically thesteps. Specificallyeach each step step performs performsthe thefollowing: following: Step 7:7: Satisfies Step Satisfiesthe the ERG ERG step step2.a2.a Step 8:8: This Step This step step determines determines and and attempts attempts to to isolate isolate an an AFW AFW pipe pipe break break ififthis this isis the the cause of cause the loss ofthe loss of offunction. function. Step 9:9: Attempts Step Attempts aa restartrestart of ofthe the MDAFW MDAFW Pumps. Pumps. Start Start of ofthethe pumps pumps should should havehave already been already been attempted attempted inin Path-1.Path-I. This This step step will will also also attempt attempt to to reset reset aa tripped tripped breaker breaker ifif that isis the that reason the the reason the pumps pumps have have not not started. started. IfIf the the start start isis successful successful the the operator operator verifies flow verifies flow and and exits exits thethe procedure. procedure. Step 10: Step 10: Attempts Attempts to to start start the the SDAFW SDAFW pump. pump. The The action action verb verb isis listed listed asas "verify" verify therefore ifif local therefore local actions actions are are required required to to open open the the valves, valves, this this should should be be attempted. attempted. IfIf the the SDAFW pump SDAFW pump overspeed overspeed tripped tripped has has actuated, actuated, even even locally locally opening opening the the steam steam supply supply valves will valves will not not start start the the pumppump unless unless the the trip trip can can be be reset. reset. IfIf the the start start is is successful successful the the operator verifies operator verifies flowflow andand exits exits the procedure. the procedure. Step 11: Step Ii: This This step step provides provides local local actions actions for for valve valve alignment alignment and and local start of local start of the the MDAFW pumps. MDAFW pumps. The The local local start start function function over-rides over-rides many many of of the the trip trip features features for for the the pumps and may be successful in in starting the pump. Step 12: Step 12: Satisfies Satisfies the ERG ERG step 2.d. Step 13: Satisfies the ERG step 2.e. Step DETERMINATION SSD DETERMINATION This is an SSD per criterion 4, 10, and 11. 14 14 33 WOG WOG BASIS 

         .-    PURPOSE:
         ~ PURPOSE:                  To stop RCPs in order to extend the time to restore feed flow to the SGs                                     SGs BASIS:

BASIS: RCP RCP operation results in in heat heat addition addition to the RCS RCS water. By By tripping the RCPs, the the effectiveness effectiveness of of the the remaining remaining water water inventory inventory in in the SGs SGs is is extended, extended, which which extends extends the the time time atat which which thethe operator operator actionaction to to initiate initiate bleed bleed and and feed must must occur. occur. ThisThis extension extension of of time time isis additional additional time time forfor the the operator operator to to restore restore feedwater feedwater flow flow to to the the SGs. SGs. Additional Additional information information is is provided provided in in subsection subsection 2.5, 2.5, Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant Pump Pump Operation, Operation, of of this this background background document. document. KNOWLED KNOWLEDGE: GE: Stopping Stopping all all RCPs RCPs will will result result inin an an interim interim plantplant transient transient on on RCSRCS pressure pressure and and temperature temperature as as natural natural circulation circulation flow flow conditions conditions are are established established inin the the RCS. RCS. An An example example of ofthis shown inin Figures this isis shown Figures 66 and and 77 where where RCS RCS pressure pressure and and temperature temperature rise rise and and reestablish reestablish new new steady steady state state conditions conditions prior prior to to steam steam generator generator dryoutdryout occurring. occurring. IfIf rising rising RCSRCS pressure pressure and and hothot leg leg temperatures temperatures are are the the criteria criteria forfor initiation initiation ofofbleed bleed and and feed heat feed heat removal, removal, the the operator operator mustmust evaluate evaluate whether whether these these conditions conditions are are caused caused by by an an RCP RCP trip trip or orbyby aa loss loss of ofsecondary secondary heat heatsink sink inin order orderto to determine determine ififbleedbleed andand feedfeed heat heatremoval removal isis to to bebe established. established. RNP RNP DIFFERENC DIFFERENCES/REASONS ES/REASONS There There are are essentially essentiallyno nodifferences. differences. SSD SSD DETERMIN DETERMINATION ATION This Thisisisnot notananSSD. SSD. IFRP-H.1-BD FRP-H .1-80 Rev Rev22 22 Page48 Page 48of of70 70 I}}

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