ML19308C992

Petition Requesting Suspension of CP & Seeking Renotice of Hearing to Permit Further Intervention.Urges Acceptance of Late Intervention in Context of 10CFR2.714(a).Alleges Inadequacy of New Fes for Failure to Assess Environ

ML19308C992
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	01/24/1980
From:	Latham S SHOREHAM OPPONENTS COALITION, TWOMEY, LATHAM & SHEA
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 8002130048
Download: ML19308C992 (57)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y di BEFORE TIIE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS10N AND THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

________________x In the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-322 (shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)

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x PETITION OF Tile SIIOREllAM OPPONENTS COALITION (SOC) TO SUSPEND CONSTRUCTION PERMIT FOR THE LONG ISLAND LIGilTING COMPANY 'S SIIOREllAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION (UNIT 1) AND "JO RE-NOTICE HEARINGS IN DOCKET NO. 50-322, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO PERMIT LATE INTERVENTION OF SOC PURSUANT TO 10 CFR Part 2, SECTION 2.714.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS I. TiiE COMMISSION OR Ti!E BOARD S!!OULD ISSUE A NEW ORDER AND NOTICE OF llEARING TO  ;

PERMIT INTERVENTION BY ALL INTERESTED t AND QUALIFIED PARTIES IN TIIE S!!OREIIAM OPERATING LICENSE HEARINGS................... 7 ,

II. THE PETITION OF THE SHOREllAM OPPONENTS COALITION FOR LATE INTERVENTION PURSUANT TO 10 CFR, PART 2, SECTION 2.714 SHOULD ,

BE GRANTED.................................. 11 III. THE COMMISSION SHOULD SUSPEND Tile CON-STRUCTION PERMIT FOR Tile SliOREllAM

• NUCLEAR POWER STATION OR INSTITUTE SUCH PROCEEDINGS AS MAY LEAD TO TIIE ,

SUSPENSION OF TilAT CONSTRUCTION PERMIT. . . . . . 29 AV. PARTICULARIZED CONTENTIONS OF Tile SilOREllAM OPPONENTS COALITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 9

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~ ~V3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.

AND THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

__ __________________x ,

In the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGIITING COMPANY DOCKET NO.50-322 (Shoreham Nuclear Power' Station, Unit 1)

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' PETITION OF THE SIIOREllAM OPPONENTS COALITION. (SOC)

TO SUSPEND CONSTRUCTION PERMIT FOR TIIE LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY'S SIIOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION (UNIT 1) AND TO RENOTICE-HEARINGS IN DOCKET NO. 50-322, OR IN Tile ALTERNATIVE, TO PERMIT LATE INTERVENT. ION OF SOC PURSUANT TO 10 CFR Part 2, SECTION 2.714.

1. The petition of the Shoreham Opponents Coalition (SOC) seeks the following relief:

a. That the Commission or the Atomic Sa fety Licensing Board (Board), as appropriate, issue a new Order and Notice of Ilearing for the Shoreham Operating Licensing Pro-ceeding s (Docket No. 50-322) to permit-intervention by interested and_ qualified partie s in those proceedings;

b. That the Board grant, in the alternative, the petition of SOC for late intervention pursuant to.10-CFR Part 2.714;

c. That, pursuant to its authority as contained in 42 USCS2233 (d) , 2236 (a) , 2237 and_10:CFR

2.206 (c) (1) ; 50,100 and 50.109, the Com- ,

mission suspend the construction permit granted to the Long Island Lighting i

'd Company (LILCO) for the-Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (Unit 1);

d. That, pursuant to the same authority , the Commission direct the Director of Nuclear ,

Reactor Regulation or the Director, Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement, as appropriate,.

to institute such proceedings as nay be necessary to suspend or revoke,the construc-tion permit for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (Unit 1).

2. This Petition is submitted to both the Com-mir.sion itself and to the Atomic Safety Licensing Board (Boa rd) for Docket No. 50-322. In view of the alternative relief requested, intervenors believe that 3 the submission of a single petition is the most officient and expeditious method of presenting its interest in this proceeding . Service of this petition has been ,

made on both the Commission and the Board and all r parties - of record in Docket No. 50-322. j t

Jurisdiction

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3. This petiticn is brought before the Commission  ;

pursuant to its authority as contained in . 4 2 USCSS2233 (d) , c 2236 (a) , and 2237; 10 CFR S3'2.204, 2. 206 (c) (1) , . 50.100 and 50.109. Intervenors further. petition the Commission:

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t to ' invoke its -inherent- supervisory .and oversight responsibility for all aspects of the regulatory process and its " overriding responsibility for. assuring public health and safety in the operation of nuclear power facilities." In the Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. (Indian Point Units 1, 2 and 3);

CLI-75-8, NRCI 7518, 173 (1975).

Background of the Proceeding

4. The construction permit application for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (Unit 1) was filed by LILCO on May 15, 1968. Construction -permit no. CPPR-95 was issued on April 14, 1973. As stated at page 1-1 of the Final Environmental Statement (FES) for Shoreham (NUREG 0285) , the Shoreham reactor was apparently 65%

complete as of September 1, 1977, with a scheduled fuel loading of March, 1980. LILCO's Application for an operating license was submitted in September, 1975 together with LILCO's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). These documents were docketed, and the safety and environmental reviews commenced on January 26, 1976.

5. The Notice of IIcaring was published by the ,

Commission on March 18, 1976 with April 19, 1976. set as the date for filing of petitions to intervene.

Subsequent to publishing'of Notice, several' schedules

' for the issuance of NRC Staf f 's Final Safety Evaluation 4

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Report (SER), discovery and hearings, were set.

On September 20, 1976, the Director of the NRC's Office of Nuclear' Reactor' Regulation projected a date of March, 1977 for the issuance of the Shoreham SER, with discovery, particularization of contentions and  :

hearings to follow. By March'8, 1978, a discovery schedule covering approximately two and one-half 4

l months following the, issuance of the Shoreham SER was established by Elizabeth Bowers Chairman of the ASLB (Board) for Shoreham. At daa t time , the SER had still' not been issued (ASLB Order dated March 8, 1978, l

Docket No. 50-322).

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6. As of the date of this petition, the SER for Shoreham has still not been submitted by Staf f. i l It is now projected to be issued in the spring of 1980.

l Should the Chairman

• c discovery schedule still be ,

feasible in light of regulatory changes prompted by TMI-2 and related matters, hearings- on the Shorehann 4

Operating License might begin some time in the summer of 1980. While inforral discovery has been ongoing-among existing parties to this proceeding, further-discovery on all existing contentions ~ and those --still to be admitted will be provided after the issuance of the SER.

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Description of the Petitioner

7. The shoreham Opponents Coalition is an unin-corporated association consisting of twenty civic and environmental organizations. Each organization sponsors a range of community activities and educational programs on the questions of energy alternatives and nuclear power, including : energy conferences and workshops; public forums to feature experts on energy issues and alternative technologies;. distribution on various publi-cations to the community; participation in local legislative matters involving energy ma tters; and others.

The energy-related projects represent the overwhelming ma jority of activities of the coalition members.

8. The combined membership of SOC exceeds 10,000 individuals, virtually all of whom reside within sixty miles of the Shoreham nuclear plant. This membership figurc does not include the membership of Friends of the Earth, Inc. (FOE), an international organization with local of fices in New York City.

More than 500 members of FOE reside within sixty miles of the Shoreham nuclear plant.

9. Italf of the member groups of SOC were created in response to the D1I accident and related developments. . While the individual member organiza-tions of SOC are capable of maintaining their respective

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. local activities, they have recognized that a meaningful

' involvement in the Shoreham -licensing hearings can only be accomplished through the added organizational ~ and '

financial resources of a coalition such as SOC.

Accordingly, SOC was established in the fall of 1979 to review the status of. the NRC's safety review of the Shoreham nuclear plant and the Shoreham licensing hearings, and to submit this petition to the Commission and the Board. SOC believes that this proceeding represents the last availabic forum in which it may present its concerns regarding nuclear reactor safety and related environmental issues, b

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THE COMMISSION OR :THE BOARD SilOULD'ISSUEL A NEW :

'W ORDER'AND-NOTICEOF HEARING TO. PERMIT INTERVENTION BY.ALL; INTERESTED.AND QUALIFIED' PARTIES IN TIIE'SHOREHAM OPERATING-LICENSE'lIEARINGS'

1. Petitioners' assert that'the Commissi~on.is

justified in issuing -a jnew' Order and- Notice of

Hearing in Docket No. 50-322 to permit 1 timely intervention- by:

all interested and qualified persons. This action.is justified by the significant . changes inf safety design '

criteria, operational procedures and the introduction of issues which the. Commission now acknowledges are appropriate for litigation in individual licensing proceedings. It can be fairly said that the regulatory requirements which must now be met by the Applicant, when contrasted to those which existed in March of 1976, are suf ficient to constitute a new application.

2. As previously stated, the SER for the-Shoreham plant was expected to be issued in the spring of 1977.

Three years later, we are no closer to the issuance ' of the SER. In addition, the Commission has ma'n dated newJ safety modifications for the Shoreham plant, perhaps further delaying'the SER. The Commission must agree that TMI-2 and related c',ents have greatly heightened public awareness about reactor safety and-an interest in presenting these concerns in licensinc oevedings.

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a In view of the new areas of contention available to.

existing parties and the fact that-final contentions and discovery will not be completed until af ter the issuance of the SER, there can be little prejudice 'to existing parties if new intervenors are permitted to join in new areas of contention on an equal footing.

i To prohibit such new intervention would be to perpetuate 4

the same restrictive and insulated licensing process for which the NRC was so strongly criticized by the Kemony Commission.

3. By reference to Petitioners' proposed con-1 tention 20. (new FES), the Commission may identify 4

at laast 10 issues which call for the issuance of a I ~

new final environmental report by the App 1icant and a j factors i new FES. These and their applicability to_ reactor safety issues have not previously been available for litigation in this proceeding. This would deny new intervenors their right to an adequate environmental review as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA 42 USC 4221 et. seq.). The Appeal Board itself has established that a new FES may be necessary when current circumstances dif fer markedly f rom those which are reflected in the FES (Allied General Nuclear Services; Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant 'Soparations i

Facility; ALAB-296, 2 NRC. 671 - (1975) ) .

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4. ' A 'new Order and Notice ^ of Hearing ~ 1s warranted -

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on the basis of: individual determinations or regulatory-changes.made by the Commission' itself.:- Thus', the-solutions proposed by the Applicant List response to

-Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendations; the new requirements for emergency planning; the NRC Staff's-obligation to present testimony on unresolved generic safety issues in individual licensing proceedings ' ,

(Virginia Electric and Power Co.,' North Anna Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2, ALAB-491; 8'NRC 245 (1978) ) ;

and the environmental and safety design ramifications of NRC Staff's decision that a class 9 accident is credible, all independently require a new Order and Notice of Hearing in Docket No. 50-322.

5. It is useful to review the criteria'under-which a Licensing Board may reopen a proceeding af ter the close of the hearing record. A Board may reopen a proceeding upon the discovery of a "significant unresolved safety issue" or where there are major changes in facts material to the resolution of major environmental issues (see e.g. , Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., ALAB-124 ; 6 - AEC 358 (1973) ; Commonwealth Edison Co. ; LaSalle County Nuclear Station; Units .

1 and 2 ; ALAB-153 ; 6 AEC 8 21 (1973) ) . Where;significant new' safety issues are presented to the Board, and where' hearing's will not commence within .the next few months, a

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f s-the Board cannot fail to include these issues in the proceeding and . permit new intervenors to litigate these issues when they are first available for. review.

Petitioners assert that the contentions submitted with this Petition consist of new ' issues and that their interventio' must be granted for purposeslaf litigating these issues.

6. In direct response to the accient at TMI-2, the Commission has ordered new' hearings _ prior to the start up of TMI-1. These hearings will cover not only the direct relationship and dependency between TMI Units 1 and 2, but also the owner's implementation of the Lessons Learned Task Force recommendations--which are also applicable to the Shoreham reactor (sco Order and Notice of Hearing, Docket No. 50-289, dated August 9,.

1979). Petitioner requests the Commission to order similar hearings for the Shoreham reactor.

7. On the basis of the foregoing, Petitioners l assert that the Commission is justified in issuing. a L

new Order and Notice of IIearing in Docket No. 50-322, upon such terms and conditions as it deems necessary to avoid undue prejudice to existing parties. Such new hearings will serve the public interest, health l and safety and will inspire confidence thatLthe I

I Commission intends a serious' review of'all reactor f safety and environmental issues in this proceeding.

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THE PETITION OF THE SHOREHAM OPPONENTS-COALITION FOR LATE INTERVENTION-PURSUANT TC 10 CFR, PART 2, SECTION 2.714 SilOULD BE GRANTED -

1. Petitioners reassert each and every paragraph contained in Section I., supra, as if fully set- forth he rein .

2. The Order and Notice of Hearing in Docket No.

50-322 was published by the Commissioner . on March 18~,

1976. This notice set April 19, 1976 as the date.for timely filing of Petitioners to Intervene.

3. Part 2.714 of the Commission 's Rules of Practice (10 CFR, Part 2, generally) authorizes late intervention subject to a finding by the Commission that the petition should be granted in view of certain con-ditions specified in 2. 714 (a ) and (d). Petitioner sub--

mits that an examination of its petition in the context-of those criteria must lead to a decision to grant this pe tition for late intervention.

4. Half of the Coalition's member groups have come into existence during the :last twelve- months. In 1

particular, the accident at Three Mile' Island has-stimulated public. concern about reactor safety.- The Three Mile Island accident has already had an enormous , -

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m p impact on the licensing And ~ construction of' nuclear power plants and has prompted some immediate activities on Long Island:

A. The accident at TMIf2 led to the crea-tion of several. local citizens groups whose purpose was to broaden the-exposure of' Suffolk County--residents to the nuclear power question and to educatefthem about energy alternatives; B. Increasing numbers' cf Long Island residents now recognize that the upcoming Shoreham operating license proceedings would be their last opportunity to review critical safety and environmental issues at the Shoreham Plant; C. Individual local organizations recognize that a successful intervention in the Shoreham operating license proceedings could only be accomplished through the establishment of an association of organi-zations with similar interests; D. In response to the above needs, Soc was formed in the fall of 1979, and shortly thereafter, the decision to intervene in these proceedings was authorized.

5. Petitioners assert that the-Shoreham reactor suffers-from numerous design deficiencies and. defects-in construction and that its completion an$ operation constitutes a threat to the health and safety 'of Coalition members and other Long Island residents.

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-Petitioners believe that .a thorough . review of, Land .

solution to, all-unresolved safety questions affecting-i l

the Shoreham plant must be presented before any star't-up.

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of the Shoreham plant'is. authorized. . Petitioners l further believe that its participation .in these pro- f ccedings will result in a far. safe'r nuclear reactor -

at the Shoreham site than currently exists if a i

decision to operate tho' plant should ultimately be reached. l l

6. The filing of this Petition for late inter-vention is the product of Petitioner 's increasing aware-ness of the inadequacy of the NRC 's regulatory review and the uncertain nature of the intervention by Suffolk County. The inadequacy of the NRC 's regulatory ' review was recently cited by the President's Commission on- .

Three Mile Island (Kemeny Commission) which cited the-NRC for regulatory failure:

"We therefore conclude that there is no well- 1 thought-out, integrated system for'the assurance of nuclear safety within the NRC. We have found evidence of repeated in-depth studies _and criti-cisms both . f rom within the agency and f rom with -

out, but we found very little evidence that these studies have'resulted~in significant improvement."

(Kemeny Commission Report, Executive Summary , pp. 21-22.)

The Kemeny Commission went on to specify ninefserious inadequacies in the NRC's licensing-process covering virtually every aspect of reactor safety (Kemeny Commission Report; Executive Summa ry ,: pp.52-541)

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m g Thus recent events, -both with . regard to the accident at Three Mile Island as well as broader issues in the field of nuclear reactor safety have stimula ted the need for citizens' intervention such as that proposed by the Shoreham Opponents Coalition and have impressed upon Petitioner the fact tha t its interest can only be pro-tected through active intervention at this stage of the proceeding.

7. Petitioner asserts that it has a significant stake in the outcome of this pro <eeding. Virtually all of the Coalition members are located within a 60-mile radius of the Shoreham Plant and virtually all of the Coalition's members a re ratepayers of the At >pl ican t ,

the Long Island Lighting Company. Many of the Cea 1ition members reside in the eastern most port. ion of Suffolk County and are thus acutely concerned about the dif-ficulty of evacuating that area in t.he even t of a serious accident at t.Te Shoreham Plant. The NRC has recently commenced rult. making proceedings to impose new requirements f or emergency planning and Petitioners accordingly seek to litaqate the question of emergency planning through the fi l inq of th i. s Petition to Intervene.

B. Petitioners ass.trt that the p6nding licensing hearings regarding the Shoreham plant must .at this date be reevalua ted in the following context : circumstanceu

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4 surrounding the LIba3 Shoreham application, the refuta-tion of major assumptions regarding risk assessment and reactc r safety; new requirements regarding emergency plannirg; reexamination of safety and elvironmental issues in terms of Class 9 accident protability and un-resolved generic sa fety ma tters ; specif ic design and operating changes mandated by the Lessons tearned Task Force; new questions about spent fuel storage, trans-portation and disposal; and so forth. Taken together, these' factors constitute suf ficient new circumstances to warrant a new proceeding and a fortiori, to permit late intervention. These new circumstances should be the basis of evaluating the timeliness of this Petition .

9 Petitioners have no other forum in which to assert their concerns about reactor sa f ety' and environ-mental issues should this petition be denied. Petitioners are acutely aware that no party to this proceeding is actively opposing the proposed operation of the Shoreham reactor. The of ficial posture of Suf folk County is that of a " neutral" intervenor, and the County's continued interven tion is inc rea s ing ly tenuous. Successful lobbying by the Applicant led to the dismissal of the County's experts, MilB Technical Associates, Inc.

These experts are intimately f amilia r with the design of the Shoreham plant. They were r eplaced by exper;

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s recomme'nded byf the Applicant. ~Further,'the County Executive has stated l publicly that~heiwillLdismiss.the

County's Special'CounselDin this proceeding,:even'~though

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the proceeding' is at a critical' stage.

The second intervenor , : North Shore -Committee, s has" not taken the. active role which is envisioned-by Petitioners, and the North- Shore Committee has , in fact, been compelled to drop certain contentions for fail're i

u to diligently pursue them. Thus, Petitioners fear more than inadequate public, representation in the upcoming hearings: They fear that public representation may border on the non-existent.

10. The essential purpose of Petitioners '- inter-vention is to present the testimony of leading experts in the field of reactor safety and related matters.

Petitioners have already retained the firm.of MHB' Technical Associates to work with Petitioners on the development of contentions and the litigation of specific matters through the course of the operating license proceedings. Petitioners will retain further experts to testify on any other technical or environmental contentions for which intervenor status is-granted.

As such, the Shoreham opponents coalition will make a substantial and oositive contribution to this proceeding' and to the safety of the Shoreham Plant.

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11. Petitioners assert that the need to publish a new Order and Notice of Hearing, or in the alternative, to permit late intervention, is further heightened by.recent disclosures of construction defects at the Shoreham Plant. This spring, several hundred pages of construction reports documenting construction defects or modifications, many of them safety related, were found in a town dump some 30 miles from the Shoreham plant. This fall, trial testimony by construction workers and the Assistant Project Manager for the Shoreham plant pro-vided further evidence of construction defects. An investigation has been commenced by the NRC's office of Inspection and Enforcement in King of Prussia, Pa.

Petitioners assert that the issues of construction prac-tices and defects must be litigated in the upcoming operating licensing proceedings and that Petitioners must be granted intervenor status on those issues.

LATE INTERVENTION

12. The applicable section of the Commission's Rules of Practice regarding late intervention is con-tained at 10 CPR 2. 714 (a) , (d). The criteria to be used by the Commission consists, in essence, of a two-part test: (1) an explanation of good cause, if any,

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g far a: late' filing; (2) a review of four additional?

f actors listed in L2.714 (a)-(ii-v) . Specifically,.

the-regulations provide:

"Nontimely filings'will[not be entertained absent a determination-by the Commission, the.

presiding of ficer or the atomic safety and licensing board designated to rule on the petition and/or request, that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon '

a balancing of the following factors- in ad-dition to .those set out in paragraoh'- (d) of this section:

(i) Good cause, if any, for failure to file on time.

(ii) The availability of other means whereby the petitioner's interest will be protected.

(iii) The extent to which the petitioner's-participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record.

(iv) The extent to which the petitioner's interest will be represented by existing: parties.

(V3 The extent to which the petitioner's p'ar-ticipation will broaden the issues or' delay the proceeding . " ,

13. The showing of good cause is not a pre-requisite to the granting of a petition for late intervention:

"A showing of good cause for the tardiness is not a condit' ion precedent to the consideration of the four-factors listed in-10 CPR Section .

2. 714 (a) , but the burden of justifying inter-vention on the basis of these f actors is ' con-siderably greater where.the-non-tigely petitioner has. f ailed :to show such good ~ cause. "

(In the Matter ' of Nuclear Fuel Services , ~Inc . ,

West Valley Reprocessing Plant, _CLI-75-4,

-1 NRC 273. (1975) ) . .

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nf As ~ indicated below, petitioners believe' thatL theyl have .

shown~ good cause for the late fi1irig -_of : this. petition but that _ in any case, ~ 1 ate intervention :s'hould"be granted.on the basis of n consideration >ofLall factors specified Lin 10 CFR Section 2.'714. -

-14. In' addition to the tanalysis of- the instant ~

petition _ pursuant to the criteria: mentioned in para .

graph 11.12. above, the Commission must also_ consider:

1. The nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be- made a party; to the proceeding;

2. The nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial or other interests in the proceeding;

3. The possible ef fect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner 's interest (10 CPR Section

2. 714 (d) ) .

t GOOD CAUSE i

15. As indicated in paragraph 11.4. above, SOC was ~ organized in the fall of 1979 and : shortly thereafter, reached a decision _to submit this petition for late intervention or to renotice the ' proceedings.

The formation of SOC was-in direct, response to a series of developments with in ' and without. the NRC during the past twelve months, which developments:

have drasticall'y changed the circumstances surrounding-

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the safety of?the shoreham NuclearLReac' tor. . Among.

these new developm'ents arefthe:following: .

1. The; accident at Three Mile Island in -late-Nb rch , 1979;

2. The formation of the " Lessons Learned Task Force" and the subsequent mandating by the NRC of various design and operational

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changes to all nuclear plants either ~ in the operating or licensing stage;

3. The admission by NRC Staf f that - the accident at Three Mile Island was a " class 9"_acci-dent and the resulting impact of; this determination. on the environmental impact statement analysis and'related issues;

4. . The significant modification. by tho' NRC and the EPA on the subject of evacuation requirements applicable to nuclear power plants and the commencement of: a rule-making to enforce new evacuation criteria;

5. The issuance of a Report by the Inter-agency-Review Groups on Radioactive Waste flanagement. .-

on the yet unresolved problems with regard to the disposal of radioactive wastes;

6. The issuance of the " Lewis Report," which concluded that the Wash-1400" Reactor Sa fe ty Study" " Fault Tree" analysis should not be a basis for the analysis and resolution of safety considerations in l'icens ing proceedings ;

7. The admission by the NRC that substantial errors are contained in " Table S-3", par-ticularly with regard to radon health effects and the health effects from other radioactive isotopes, and-the' decision-by the NRC to permit the litigation of those ef fects in individual siting ~ proceedings;

8. The policy change being implemented by the NRC according_to which NRC Staff has been-ordered to present testimony in individual l siting proceedings-regarding the impactLof l' unresolved " generic" safety considerations r, as . contained in NUREG-0510 ~(January ,1.979) .

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16 . ; The cumulative impact'ofithese developments t and' their inevitable and' admitted ' impact on the :lic'ensing iprocess, constitutes'the. motivating-forc'e behind the formation of the L Shoreham Opponents Coalition. The' Coalition has been formed for.the. express. purpose of carrying ~ forth a credible -intervention -in .the Shoreham operating licensing proceedings,Lincluding_the:represen-tation by counsel and thesretaining-of.expertsLto testify on behalf of SOC ' on -nuclear sa'fety-related issues Lin -

the form of contentions in this proceeding. The safety-of the Shoreham nuclear plant is of. critical concern to the member organizations and individua1 members of SOC in that the overwhelming majority of these members reside within a sixty-mile radius of the plant.

17. The Board cannot underestimate the impact of-the above eight-factors on local community; aware--

ness of the issue of nuclear reactor sa fety and the impetus which these developments have provided for 'an -

ef fort such as the proposed intervtation . The. creation

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of new local organizations, such as many of"the member organizations of SOC; the willingness'and desire of thousands of local Long' Island residents-to seek representation in_these hearings through the Coalition;-

and the drastic revisions ' to reactor sa fety l requirements' , -

licensing regulations ~ and assessments ofL fueli cycle s _

P C considerations such as waste disposa l , strongly suggest that the Shoreham operating licensing hearings will be ' virtually a new proceeding.

18. There is a range of issues regarding reactor safety and environmental impact generally which are now ripe for review in these proceedings and which were not available at the time the notice for hearing was filed.

Safety issues such as those designated by the Lessons Learned Task Force or raised by new emergency planning requirements are just now becoming available for litiga-tion. These factors require that an organization such as SOC be permitted to join the proceeding at this stage on these new issues to assist the Board in es-tablishing a thorough record on the saiety of the Shoreham plant.

19. Simila rly , the NRC's acknowledgement that a Class 9 accident is credible, ' necessita tes signif icant revisions to the Shoreham PES and ultimately to reactor design. The impact of a Class 9 accident has not been considered in this proceeding and has only become ripe for litigation in the wake of TMI 2.

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PETITIONER 'S ' INTEREST ' MAY BIF PROTECTED

-20. Thei Shoreham operating license: proceeding

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is the lastiforum available?to'petitionersLfor the-considerationiof safety 1 issues rotating to .the . opera- , ,

tion of the'Shoreham nuclear plant. Thore; exists no state proceeding ini which these ~ issues. may f be -

reviewed as was the case for LILCO's Jamesport Nuclear Units 1 and 2.

21. There are, at present, only two inter-venors to the Shoreham proceeding: Suf f olk County; and the North Shore Committee Against Nucl. car and Thermal Pollution. As previously mentioned, Suffolk' County's.

participation in the Shoreham licensing proceedings has been extensive,although as a " neutral" intervenor.

However, Suf folk County is a municipal party and its continued participation is subject-~to the whims of the Suffolk County Legislature. Within-the last year,'the-County Legislature discharged the enginerring con-sulting firm of MHB Technical Associates, thereby -

seriously hampering thhe County 's ability to pursue j with vigor contentions availabic to it. Private:

f_ intervenors such as those represented by SOC, cannot' i

s be. asked to rely on the representation 7 of fered by .a l

-neutral intervenor whose status' in ' the proceedings r

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may be suddenly altered by a vote of the County Legislature. As f urther evidence of Suf folk County 's tenuous Intervention, the new County Executive has announced he will dismiss the County 's special ' counsel, Irving Like. The other remaining intervenor is the.

" North Shore Committee" which has two contentions still alive in this proceeding. The North Shore Committee is a private intervenor, but it has been unable to aggressively pursue a variety of prior contentions available to it. The North Sboro Committee, in fact, was required to drop several areas of contentions for just this reason. Petitioners intend to pursue specific new contentions aggressively in this pro-ceeding if they are granted Intervenor s ta tu s , a nd there appears to be no other intervenor with the resources or inclination to advocate those contentions .

CONTRIBUTION OF PETITIONERS TOWARDS DEVELOPING A SOUND RECORD

22. The pa rticipation of SOC in the Shoreham operating license proceedings will be of great assis-tance to the Board in deve lop inq a sound record. As previously stated, SOC has retained the firm of MilB Technical Associates to litigate specific contentions in this proceeding and other experts wilI be reta ined by Petitioners depending upon the na tur e of the contentions which we are parmitted to litigate.

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23. Petitioners willcsubmit> testimony offin'dividuals!

with ^ construction ' experience at Jthe1Shoreham . plant ein order--to1 bring to'the Board'sfdirect attention the existence of: safety defe' cts and: poor construction prac tic es . The active participat' ion? by Petitioners on the numerous issues referred to in-paragraph II. 15 . .

above will be' invaluable:for!the purpose oficonvincing the public at large that critic'al safetyyconsiderations .

at the Shoreham plant will be thoroughly . reviewed: before -

the plant goes on line. At present, the- Coalition members and the public at la rgo do not 'have- confidence that this result will be obtained without the aggressive:

participation of a private intervenor such as SOC.

TIIE EXTENT'TO WilICH PETITIONER'S PARTICIPATION WILL BROADEN Ti!E ISSUES OR DELAY Tile PROCEEDING

24. As mentioned in paragraph II.15. above, the NRC itself has substantially broadened the issues available for litigation in this harticular proceeding '

through its mandated design and operation changes;and its reevaluation of generic issues andiemergency ,

- planning. ~Many of these issues are available--for

' ~

litigation for the-first~ time'and thus participation -

by Petitioner.will result in no broadening?of the issues.

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Petitioner seeks'to:intervenefon; precisely'these new- 't safety and environmental' issues which.the NRC itself.

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admits umst be reexamined. The principalLconcernLof i

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l both the NRC and' Petitioner; is - to evaluate: the safety. >

2

[ of the Shoreham nuclear plant' in- the context of. these 4

new considerations and to ensure that all safety related deficiencies in that plant are resolved prior to-its i going operational.

25. The involvement of Petitioner in'this pro-ceeding will not lead to a delay.in theDcommencement' of the proceeding . NRC Staf f has ' suggested that the f

4 ,

final Safety Evaluation . Report will not be -issued .until' j early spring of 1980, at the earliest, and-hearings l will not commence until some number of monUts af ter- l the issuance of the final SER. Petitioner-will.not i 4

delay the proceeding if it adheres to the discovery

schedule established after the issuance of the SER.

26. Petitioner has submitted with this Petition [

a list of particularized contentions which it intends '

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to pursue during the course of these proceedings.

f Petitioner will submit -its full range-of contentions to the Board according to the scheduleiestablished af ter.

the issuance of = the SER.

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27. Petitioner is prepared to commence dis-covery immediately upon the Boa rd 's gran t of this petition to intervene. Petitioner recogni zes tha t discovery may be limited in those areas of contention which have been already submitted in this proceeding.

However, since Petitioner intends to pursue discovery primarily in areas that have not previously been the subject of contentions in this proceeding, _ Petitioner does not anticipate any delay in the proceedings if its Petition to Intervene is granted. _ Petitioner will have the assistance of experts and counsel during the discovery phase so that dis covery requests will be specific and responsive to the issues ava ilab te_ tor conten tion . Since existing parties will be entitled to further discovery af ter the issuance of the SER, discovery on existing issues by Petitioner can proceed in step with that of other parties without replowing old ground.

28. In its consideration of this Petition, the Board must take into account the factors l is ted in 10 CFR Section 2. 714 (d) . With regard to each of these factors, the case to admit Petitioner to this -

proceeding is strong.

(a) Virtually all of .the member organizations

-and individual members of SOC 1resid'e witflin 60 miles 1 of the Shoreham Nuclear Plant; many of. the Coalition members reside within a mile or two of that plant.

(b) Many of the' Coalition members are property owners within that same 60 mile radius and virtually all of the Coalition members are ratepayers to the Long Island Lighting Company. As such, these Coalition members collectively ~ have a significant financial and property stake in the costs and safety of the Shoreham nuclear plant and the outcome of this proceeding.

(c) Consequently, any determination rendered by the Commission on the LILCO Shoreham operating license application will be deter mina t ive of Petitioner's interests and concerno r egarding the 3

Shoreham nuclear plant. Absent a determination by the Commission to grant late intervenor status to Petitioner, there may well be a prejudice to Petitioner 's standing to challenge a determina tion issued by the Commission in f a vor of the L il,CO I

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ap pl ic a tion .

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29. For al1 of the toregoinq zvasona, and Ior any other reasons which are deemed rel.ivant by the

' Board, Petitioner believes it has made a substantial l

showing of good cause f or the . la te filing of this l

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y, petition and that a review of the other factors to be balanced by the board pursuant to 10 CLR Part 2.714 require that this Petition be granted.

Ill.

TllE COMMISSION SilOULD SUSPEND TIIE CONSTRUCTION PERMIT FOR TIIE S!!OREllAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION OR INSTITUTE SUCil PROCEEDINGS AS MAY LEAD TO TIIE SUSPENSION OF TilAT CONSTRUCTION PERMIT

1. Recent actions by the Commission and recent events in commercial nuclear reactor operation.have clearly established that al1 nuclear reactors under construction are likely to undergo substantial modi-fication or retrofit prior to the issuance of an operating license. Pursuant to 10 CPR Part 50.100 and 50.109, the Commission has broad authority to revoke, suspend or modify in whole or in parta construction permit:

"...for failure to construct or operate a facility in accordance with the terms of the construction permit or license...

or for violation of, or failure to observe, any of the terms and provisions of the act,  ;

regula tions , license, permit, or order of the Commission."

2. Petit.ioners assert that there are several reasons why construction should cease at the Shorham Plant:

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a) Testimony by construction workers from .

the plant have revealed shoddy construc- .

tion practices, defects in reactor safety systems and the possibility that these defects are being concealed prior to NRC inspection; b) The NRC's office of Inspection and Enforcement is investigating these charges and has promised to investigate every allegation of improper construction.

By failing to halt construction in the face of these allegations, the NRC is running a risk that defects will be concealed or that construction expenditures made at this time may have to be redone at a future date; c) The New York State Public Service Commission (PSC) has commenced a formal investigation into the 500% cost overruns at the Shoreham plant. The purpose of this investigation is to' avoid unnecessary ex-penditures that might be incurred if modi-fications or retrofits are required pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.109. The PSC is without authority to suspend construction to avoid such cost' overruns. A suspension of the construction permit by the Commission will enable the PSC to keep future construction costs to a minimum, which is in the direct interest of the Applicant's ratepayers.

3. .The Commission's failure to suspend the 4

Shoreham construction permit will severely prejudice the cost / benefit analysis that will be required as part of any new EIS ordered by the Commission. Con-tinued construction expenditures will' create greater incentive to complete the Shoreham plant, even in the face j of acknowledged inadequacies in plant construction-l or design.

4. For all of the foregoing,-the Commission must suspend the Shoreham construction permit or take such action to institute proceedings that may lead to the suspension of the Shoreham construction permit.

IV.

PARTICULARIZED CONTENTIONS OF THE SHOREHAM OPPONENTS COALITION I

Introduction ,

i Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 2. 714 (a) 2, -the Shoreham Opponents Coalition (SOC) has formulated twenty con--

tentions for submission in Docket No. 50-322 (In the Matter of Long Island Lighting Company: Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1).

The public notice in this proceeding was issued in March 18, 1976. Since that time the regulatory and design criteria applicable to commercial nuclear reactors have undergone significant revision. No single event has had .as great an impact on the regu-lation and design of nuclear reactors as the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 in Harrisburg, Pa. (TMI).

The contentions which follow signify the most significant areas of public concern regarding reactor licensing, operation and safety. Without exception, the impact of each of these issues on the public health and safety has been dramatized during the past several months. In many areas, the Nuclea r Regulatory Commission has determined a need to make wholesale revisions in its requirements of potenti.1 licensees. ,

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Some changes,'such as those mandated by'the ,

Commission's " Lessons Learned Task ~ Force",~have already been instituted (NUREG-0 578) . With regard to the Shoreham nuclear plant, the applicant must propose solutions to the problems identified by the NRC. The integrity of these solutions must be subject to public scrutiny.

In other areas, such as Emergency Planning, the NRC has instituted rulemaking proceedings in. order to impose new standards on licensees. The Shoreham nuclear plant must demonstrate compliance with these standards.-

In yet another area, the NRC has decided that major safety and environmental problems previously ignored, must now be confronted. Thus, the NRC has ordered the NRC Staff to demonstrate a solution to dozens of unresolved generic safety issues as they apply in individual licensing proceedings and to assess, in each proceeding, its " confidence" in dealing with the storage, transportation and disposal of spent reactor fuel.

Without question, the attitude of'the NRC, and now I

the public, towards reactor safety, has undergone a j fundamental change. The issues stated above, and those represented by the numerous documents listed ,

below, constitute entirely new standards against which the safety of future nuclear plants, and hopefully, operating plants, will be judged.

m y In. numerous new areas, the NRC no longer specu-lates whether or not certain changes will be made.

The problems identified by the " Lessons Learned Task Force" must be solved before Shoreham will be permitted to operate. Evacuation plans of significant scope must be developed prior to reactor _ operation. The NRC and' the public must be satisfied that generic safety ques- ,

tions, or problems associated with spent reactor fuel, have been resolved. The overall environmental impacts-of the nuclear option must be reevaluated in the light of Class 9 accidents and numerous other issues.

The Shoreham nuclear reactor was planned, designed and a construction permit was issued more than 10 years before these recent developments. Shoreham, and other plants nearing completion, must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis against the experience of Three Mile Island and new attitudes about reactor safety.

We have listed below more than two dozen recent NRC studies and decisions which provide the basis for the contentions which follow. The listing of documents is o,i not intended to be complete', as the issues presented have /

been repeated in many additional documents. Years af ter the filing of the Notice for this proceeding, it is still not-possible to accurately identify many of the safety _

issues that will be reviewed _ in that proceeding.

7 The Shoreham Opponents- Coalition believes that each of the contentions which follows is~ critically relevant - to the Shoreham nuclear plant and that these contentions reflect the new issues to be examined in licensing proceedings. SOC reserves its right to amend and expand these contentions as the applicant provides further information on designated safety issues. We urge that the Coalition and its experts be admitted to this proceeding and that these contentions be accepted for regulatory and, public review.

Recent NRC Documents and Studies Af fecting the Shoreham Nuclear Plant

1. "NRC Staff Response to Board Question No. 4 Regarding the Occurrence of a Class 9 Accident at Three Mile Island," Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1) Docket No. 50-272.

2. Investigation Into the March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island Accident by Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement; NUREG-0600.

3. "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report";

NUREG-0585.

4. " Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure-Boundary Piping"; NUREG-0313; Rev. 1 (for Comment).

5. " Cladding Swelling and Rupture Models for LOCA Analysis"; NUREG-0630,

6. " Preliminary Analysis and Views' of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the Recommendations of the President's commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island," Nov. 9, 1979, and letter f rom Joseph- Hendrie to Dr. Frank Press, ' Nov. 9, 1979.

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7. Memorandum-from Jerry Wilson, Project' Manager, to all. Parties in Docket No. 50-322 (Shoreham Nuclear Unit No. 1) re; Status of NRC Review of Shoreham Operating License Application and Status of Remaining Open Issues '(Encl. 2) .

8. " Anticipated Transients Without Scram for Light Water Reactors," NUREG-0460.

9. "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Project and Short Term Recommendations," NUREG-0578.

10. NRC Investigation Into Allegations of Construction Defects Revealed During Trial of Shoreham Defendant (and Trial Transcript)

11. NRC Generic Proceeding to Reassess Confidence in Safe Disposal of Nuclear Waste (in Response to Court of Appeals decision in Northern States

12. " Identification of Unresolved Safety Issues Relating to Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0510.

13. "NRC Program for the Resolution of Generic Issues Related to Nuclear Power Plants,"

NUREG-0410.

14. Decision by the Appeal Board in Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclea r Power Station, Units 1 & 2) , ALAB-4 91, 8 NRC 245 (1978).

15. Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, The Need for Change: The Legacy of Three Mile Island, October, 1979 ("Kemony Report") .

16. NUREG/CR-04 00, Risk Assessment Review Group Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC., September, 1978, p. vii.

17. NRC Siting Task Force, NUREG-0625.

18. NUREG 0396/ EPA 520/1-78-016 - Planning Basis For Development of State and Local ' Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of LWN Power Plants, USNRC, Wash ing ton , D .C. ,

December, 1978.

19. NRC/ EPA proposed Rulemaking on Emergency Response Plans, 10 CPR Part 50 (December , - 19 79) .

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20. Sandia Labs test results'onLIEEE-279,' Cable

Separation.

21. Underwriter's Lab Fire Tests, 9/15/78

22. I & E Bulletin 79-26, Nov. 20, 1979 (Controli Rod Failure and Loss of Boron)

23. NRC Pipe Crack Study Group, NUREG 0531.

24. EMD-78-110, Areas Around Nuclear Plants Should Be Better Prepared For Radiological Emergencies, USGAO, Washington, D.C., March 30, 1979.

25. Draft Action Plans - NUREG/0660.

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1. Sito Suitability Intorv nors contend that the Shoreham plant site

, does not adequately fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 1., and 10 CFR, Part 100.10.

Deficiencies are evidenced by the facts that:

-The NRC Staff is now recommendi.ig tha t more stringent population density standards be applied (NRC Siting Policy Committee Report, NUREG-0625).

-Concern is now being expressed regarding serious contamination of the Long Island water table in the post-acciden t era .

-The NRC Seismic Qualification Review has not yet been completed.

-The NRC has proposed new evacuation criteria as evidenced by the recent rulemaking on Emergency Planning (10 CFR Part 50) commenced by the NRC.

2. Emergency Planning (a) Intervenors contend tha t the applicant has not adequately described the Shoreham emergency plans, pro-cedures, and equipment as required by 10 CFR, Pa r t 50, Appendix E, including an evalua tion of the lessons derived from the events associated with the Three Mile Island accident. Specific issues of concern include the following:

(i) Capability of the operators and react ef fectively at all times.

(ii) Adequacy of existing emergency r esponse plans for the shoreha n Plant.

U

_38_ t (iii) Capability of the applicant and its desig-nated personnel to take effective emergency.

action if required.

(iv) Adequacy of instrumentation to monitor the Shoreham plant during and following an ac-cident-including post-accident monitoring ins trumenta tion .

(v) Capability of the applicant's personnel and the off-site of ficials charged with ensuring I

public. safety during an emergency to work

• efficiently and offectively in pursuant of evacuation or other protective actions.

(vi) Adequacy of agreements between the applicant, State of New York, County of Suffolk, and other local authorities to enable responsible

) of ficials to respond decisively and construc-tively to an emergency in all ways that affect the public safety .

(vii) Adequacy of emergency planning zones including the area encompassed by (theoretical) class 9 accidents.

(viii) Adequacy of health treatment facilities for treating irradiated members of the public.

(ix) Adequacy of public training programs.

(x) Capability of Shoreham plant instruments to i

initiate the emergency plan including an auto-matic alarming and initiating system for

notifying responsible local governmental officials.

(xi) Adequacy of local medical supplies and

, equipment including the availability of potassium iodide tablets, a mild laxative, and a filter mask to diminish doses from l internal emitters.

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. 3. Accident Monitoring The Intervenors contend that the applicant has not adequately demonstrated that the Shoreham design meets the requirements of 10 CFR, Pa r t 50, Appendix A, criteria 19 because of inadequate instrumentation to be sure the plant is being maintained in a safe condition during and following an accident, based on:

-The experience at the TMI-2 accident which showed accident and post-accident monitoring instruments were inadequate.

-The recent revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Pollowing an Accident" details the needed devices and qualifications of instruments, many of which are not presently a pa rt of the Shoreham design.

4. Human Factors The applicant has not demonstrated and the NRC has not confirned that the control room design at Shoreham and the training program for the operators (including simulator training) is adequate to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, Criterion 13 and Criterion 19, and to provide the timely control necessary to protect the health and safety of the public.

-The Shoreham Plant does not have a training simulator available which duplicates the specific features of the Shoreham control room.

-The human factor 'riteria and details of the control room design a re not described in the FSAR.

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-The NRC has not made a. detailed evaluation of ,

the human' factors involved in the control. room design, the simulator. training program and the combined ef fect of these areas .on safety.

-The ef fects of human error have not been specifically f actored into the evaluation of control room design, operator training ef fec-tiveness and person-nachine interface adequacy.

5. ALARA Intervenors contend that the Shoreham plant design does not comply with the standards for protection against radiation exposure to workers regarding achievement of as-low-asreasonably-achievable exposure objectives required by 10 CPR Part 20.1. Lack of compliance is evidenced by new information regarding: -

-NRC response to the Kemeny Commission Report recommendation concerning the need for "better" understanding of the health ef fects of ionizing radiation.

-demonstration of lack of adequate design at TMI (and by implication, Shoreham) to ensure operability of the non-safety portions of a plant in the post-accident condition.

-inadequate attention to control room post-accident habitability design demonstra'ted at TMI-2.

-Lack of attention given in-the design to ensure recovery .f rom accidents, including-measuring,. assessment, clean up, and waste disposal as demonstrated at.TMI-2.

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6. Quality Assurance /Ouality Centrol (a) Intervenors contend that the Applicant has not adequately developed and implemented a quality assurance program for the design, procurement, construction, and installa tion of structures , systems, and components for the Shoreham nuclear station as required by 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria 1 through 18, and 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 1 with regard to the following:

(i) Adequacy of disposition of specific construc-tion deficiencies identified and described by Shoreham construction workers.

(ii) Adequacy of quality requirements for non-safety rela ted structures, systems, and comL-ponents, with particular emphasis on those non-safety items which may be subject to system interactions between safety and non-sa f ety rela ted items.

(iii) Adequacy of design verif ication by vendors including General Electric, of safety related equipment such as pumps, valves, instruments, motors and switch year with emphasis on special processes, environmental qua l i f ica-tion, qualification for aging, and seismic qualification.

(iv) Adequacy of a review of NDE and NDT records.

(v) Pailure to provide an adequate corrective action program to define and resolve de-ficiencies discovered during construction.

(vi) Adequacy of applicant 's disposition of non-conformances for safety-rela ted items.

(vii) Adequacy of vendors, including General Electric, for reporting and dispositioning of non-conformances identified dur ing the manuf acture of sa f ety-rela ted items.

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-N (viii) - Adequacy of safety classification ofs safety - ,

and non-safety structures,. systems, and components.

(ix) ' Adequacy of in-service inspection prograni including compliance with the requirement of.

Section XI of the ASME Code..

(x) . Adequacy of design verification program' for potential system interactions betwoon safety and non-safety rela ted equipment.

7. Generic Technical Issues

a. Intervonors contend that the Regulatory Staf f' has not adequately assessed the generic unresolved technical issuca, both singularly and cumulatively, applicable to a BWR of the Shoreham design, in reviewing 'the '

Shoreham operating license application, and, as a result the Regulatory Staf f has not required the Shoreham l structures, systems, and components to be backfitted j to current regulatory practices as required by 10 CPR,.

l 50, 55 (a ) and 10 CFR, Part 50, 109, with regard to:

i (i) The list of category A, B, C, and'D technicals issues defined in NUREG-0510, 1 NUREG-0 371, and N'UREG-04 71.

(ii) Additional generic issues' identified in 1979 including those identified as .a result of the TMI-2 accident.

b. Intervenors contend that : the applicant has not addressed the generic unresolved technical issues, as:

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identified in (a) (i) and -(a) (ii) above in- the Shoreham FSAR.to enable Regulatory Staff-to_ review the plant-as to-all current- regulatory practices including' regulation's, f

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. - regulatory . guides , standard review plans and Branch technical positions as required by 10 CFR,-Part-50, 109, and as further defined inL10 CFR, Part 50,: Appendix A (General- Design Criteria) .

c. Intervenors contend that the applicant is deficient in that the Shoreham' FSAR ,does not include an adequate plan, schedule and acceptance criteria for resolving each of the generic technical issues applicable to Shoreham, as listed in (a) (i) and -(a) (ii) of this con-tention, as required by 10 CFR Part 34 (b) .

d. Intervenors contend that the Shoreham SER prepared by the Regulatory Staf f is inadequate in that the SER does not identify and describe the' plan and schedule for resolving each of the generie technical issues identified in Section (a) (i) and (a) (ii) of this con- '

tention and applicable to the Shoreham BWR as required by 10 CFR, Part 50.57;

8. Instrumentation Intervenors. contend that Shoreham Nuclear Unit No. 1 does not hn'.*n the capability to directly measure the temperatut3 of f uel rods within the reactor--

. core. General design criteria Number 13 requires-instrumentation to monitor- variables where appropriate to insure adequate safety and further provides _ that the-

' instrumentation shall directly -measure the desired variable. IEEE 279,.Section 4.8, .as-incorporated in

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10 CPR 50. 55 (h) , states that:

To the extent feasible and t>t acticil pr otec t ion system inputn ahalI he derived t:om t i < p.a 1 :>

wh ich a re direct me a s u r e., of the desired variables.

The absence of such ins L t umen t a t ion and the rallure of applicant and staf f to requite eqa i va 1 :n t Iuvels of protection poses a thtt.tt to ! ubl a h alth and safety.

9 Operator 1rulicator :

As evidenced by the aci ideor .it the. Mi1 Accident Unit 2, accident a .n d i t t < >u , , en in: + 1 it ,it'a t e d by the operation ut the plant while one or mo s e aately uystems are inope ra b l e At Three Mil. Islami, two aux i lia ry fe<dvater s/ stem valves were closed when they should have been oper. Intuiveno a euntend that the Shoreham Plant does not corit a in an adeqaate m/ stem to inform the reactor operator When a sately system has been delibera tel y d isabled . Appl ican t must provide a sy s tem which meets the specificatu'n: of regulatory galot 1.47 or i t. : iquivalent in order t1 a d. .;ua t . l y protect. the public hea l th .inu a: ,>t ' i< . , i. i n e r . i:,' u With 10 CPR Part 30 , M' .: t- A, ' i i , .i '

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? > >, i 10 . : Qualification of Non-Safety Equipment Intervenors contend that applicant has failed to qualify. numerous systems which are important to, safety according to the requirements of General Design Criterion

4. As evidenced by the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, the accident ~ environment in which equipment important to safety must ' f unction ' has been severely-underestimated, leading to the failure of equipment previously thought to be environmentally qualified.

Intervenors contend that the criteria for_ determining the adequacy of environmental qualification should be that contained in Regulatory Guide 1.89 or its equiva-lent. A failure to meet such criteria constitutes unreasonable danger to the public health and safety,

11. Qualification of Non-Safety Systems As indicated by the accident at Three Mile-Island 2, reactor systems and components which are currently-classified as "non-safety related" may in f act have a significant ef fect on the integrity of the reactor ,

core and on reactor safety in general. This is true since those systems might a f fect, directly or. indirectly ~,

temperature, pressure,. flow and/or reactivity. At

-Section.3.2 of NUREG-0578 (TMI-2 Lessons Learned. Task.

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Force . Report-Short- Term Recon mendations) , the Lessons

' Learned Task Force: indicates that it will further study.

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s the problem of qualifying non asafetyf according to safety standards. Intervenors contend that this short -

term recommendation by staff is inadequate to protect ~the public health and safety . Intervencrs contend that -all systems and components which can either cause-or ag-gravate an accident or which might. be used to mitigate an accident, must:

1. be identified and classified as components-important1to safety;

2. must be required to meet all safety grade designed criteria.

12. Mark II Containment Intervenors contend that the Shoreham' primary' con-tainment system does not adequately fulfill the require-ments of 10 CPR, Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 4, 16, 50' and 51. This contention is supported by the fact of new information regarding :

-recently obtained evidence presented alleging-shoddy Quality Control practices during the containment construction regarding lack of proper.

control of welding rod, cracks and honeycomb in the containment walls and basement, seawater intervision into uncurved concrete,. improper curing of concrete by reason of early stripping of forms and inadequate f reeze -protection.

-the recent decision to install substantial-

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additional downcomen bracing:at another Mark;II plant due to test- discrepancies at one of ~tlue full scale Mark-II confirmation tests and the-associated implication that similar. deficiencies exist at Shoreham.

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-the unresolved issue ot LOCA' hydrogen genera-tion quantities demonstrated at TMI-2 and the possible need' for containment -inerting, . venting, or strengthening ,it Shoreham.

13. Anticipated Trans.ent-Without Scram (ATWS)~

The ?.pplicant and the staf f have not1 resolved the ATWS issue in a manner which permits the.Shoreham Nuclear Plant to comply with 10 CPR 50, Appendix A, Criterion 20, 21 and 29 for the following reasons:

-The SER OPEN ITEMS LIST (resulting from October 17, 1979 meeting) shows the interim ATWS position for Shoreham is merely an RPT plus procedural / training requirements.

-BWR's are more sensitive to ATWS problems than PWR's and NUREG-0460 indicates that RPT wil'1 not prevent major fuel damage for some 'combina-tions of failures and sequences in an ATWS event.

-The experience at TMI-2 shows that procedural-and manual functions may be overlooked or mis-operated during the course of an accident and therefore cannot be relied upon to accomplish safety functions with a high probability of d

suCCOss.

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14. Reactor Coolant Relief and Safety Valves .,

Intervenors contend that the Shoreham Reactor Coolant System Relief and' Safety Valves have'not been subjected to appropriate qualification testing to verify the capability of these valves to function' during transient and accident conditions. These valves form part of the Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundaryi ,

i. In the absence of appropriate testing of these valves and verification of their capability, applicant cannot i demonstrate compliance with General Design Criteria 1, i

14, 15 and 30, thereby endangering the public health j and safety .

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15. Control Rod Life Intervenors contend that the reactor control rod design proposed for use at the Shoreham Plant does-not meet the requirements of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix A, Criteria 4, 21, and 22. This contention is sEpported i'

by the issuance by the NRC's I & E Bulletin 79-26 3 which advises the operators of BWR's of a recently observed control rod failure mode that can go undetected, jeopardizing the shutdown capability of the reactivity control system and endangerby the public health and safety.

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- 16. Emergency Core Cooling System Intervenors contend that .the Emergency . Core Cooling System (ECCS) to be used in the mitigation of loss of coolant accidents does not meet the requirements of

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10 CFR, Part 50.46, 10 CFR, Part.50, Appendix K, and furthermore, that the ECCS design verification program does not comply with 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B,

Criterion III. This contention is supported by the fact of new information regarding

-new test results obtained by the NRC' Staff concerning inadequate modeling of clad swelling and flow blockage (NUREG-0630).

, -incomplete results from the General Electric (GE) core spray test program.

-Jack of resolution of the GE two-loop-test-apparatus discrepancies.

-uncertainty regarding peak clad temperature.

predictions and hydrogen generation non-conser-vatisms evidenced at the TMI-2 accident.

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17. Protection System 'Punctioning i Intervenors contend that the design of.the Shoreham l l

1 Nuclear Unit No.1 violates 10 CPR 50.55a (h) (sec. 4.16 {

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of IEEE 279) which states:

the protection system shall be so designed that; once initiated,'a protection system action shall go to completion. l 1

As evidenced by the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, a reactor operator can shut off the emergency core l

cooling system prior to the-completion of its stated  !

func tion . Such an action by a reactor operator can i l

aggravate a reactor accident and the failure of the i i

Shoreham design to prevent such operator actions  !

cndangers the public health and safety. The Shoreham design must be modified so thhat operator action cannot i

disable a safety system once it has been initiated prior to that system's completion of its safety function.

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18. Fire' Protection Intervenors contend that the applicant has not sub-mitted an acceptable Fire Hazards _ Analysis to demonstrate the adequacy of his plant design to confirm with the fire protection requirements of 90 CFR 50 Appendix A,.

Criterion 3 and considering the following additional inf ormation : ,

-The recommendations for greater cable separa-tion and separate divisional cabic spreading.

rooms per the recommendations of NUREG-0050.

-The requirements of Revision 2 .of . Regulatory Guide 1.75 regarding Physical Independence of electrical systems.

-The results of fire tests conducted- at Sandia in July of 1977 which showed the minimum require-ments for cable construction per IEEE 383-1974 may not provide adequate protection against fires, and the separation of R.G. 1.75 may not be suf-ficient to protect separated safety divisions.

-There is no approved Fire llazards Analysis'for Shoreham which demonstrates that the plant has an in-depth fire protection system.

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19. Applicability of Regulatory Guides d

Current NRC procedure does not require that existing nuclear plants under construction meet the criteria contained in NRC Regulatory Guides. As indi-cated by the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, the accident was aggravated or caused by f actors which were the subject of Regulatory Guides but which were not o incorpora ted into the design of Three Mile Island Unit 2. Similarly, the Shoreham Nuclear Unit 2 design does not incorporate all safety requirements contained in recent regulatory guides. The failure of the appli-cant and staf f to demonstrate that the Shoreham design conforms with each regulatory guide presently applicable to plants of the GEDWR type unduly endangers the public health and safety.

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20. New Final Environmental Statement Intervenors contend that. the FEIS prepared for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1 (N UREG-028 5) fails to adequately assess numerous significant environ-mental issues and fails to meet the requirements of 10 CFR, Part 51, 23, and 51.26. Intervenors contend that the NRC must prepare a new PEIS for Shoreham Nuclear Unit 1. The areas of ina'dequacy in the existing FEIS include, but are not limited to:

(a) Risk Assessment (b) Emergency Planning (c) Waste Disposal and transportation of spent reactor fuel (d) Failure to assess the consequences of a Class 9 accident (c) IIcalth ef fects of low-level rad ia t ion (f) Need for the proposed facility and available alternatives (g) The environmental impacts of plant clean-up in the event of a serious accident.

(h) Overall cost / benefit analysis (i) Environmental and cost / benefit impact resulting f rom f ailure to resolve. generic safety issues as contained in NUREG-0410 and 0510.

(j) New Final Environmental Report by. applicant pursuant to 10 CFR Part 51.21.

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s RESERVATIONS *

1. Petitioners reserve the right to amend their Contentions f rom time to, time, to accommodate further issues which Petitioners believe ought to be raised within a reasonable time a f ter each or any of the

• following :

i. An Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting.

ii. ACRS letter, iii. Issuance of a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FES).

iv. Issuance of the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) .

v. Comments of anyone on the FES.

vi. Regulatory Staff quest, ions, vii. Applicant 's answers to Regulatory Staf f.

questions.

viii. Amendments by the Applicant to any part of the application including the Preliminary-Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) or the Environ--

mental Report (ER) and site addendums.

ix. Information generated by State agencies which have jursidiction over the applica-tion in connection with matters which may affect this proceeding.

x. Information submitted to the United States Environmental Protection Agency or.regula-tions issued by that Agency, including but -

not limited to radiation release standards.

xi. Matters obtained in discovery f rom anyone, and xii. The Regulatory Staf f evaluation.

2. Petitioners reserve the right to participate by of fering evidence and cross-examining and seeking discovery in connection with contentions raised or placed into issue by other parties to the proceeding in accordance with well-established principios of_ law

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and announced by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board in'ALAB-244, RA1-74-11 857 (November 21, _

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s 1974) and ALAB-252, RAI ,75-1_ (Slip Op.

January 6, 1975) .

3. Petitioners reserve the right to serve its contentions with'out prejudice to its right_ to present legal arguments on the basis of r. . full evidentiary record in this proceeding concerning, specif ically , the comingling of promotional-and regulatory responsibilities in the NRC, the constitutionality of the Price Anderson Act, and the constitutionality and validity of the NRC regulations governing this proceeding.

4. Should any of the contentions of Petitioners be deemed to constitute an attack on any rule or regulation of the Commission, they reserve the right to petition pursuant to 10 CFR, S2.758'that the applica-tion of such rule or regulation be waived or an exception i ude for this proceeding on the ground that the special-and unprecedented circumstances with respect to the site of the proposed unit are such that application of the rule.or regulation would not serve the purposes for which it was adopted.

Respectfully submitte ,

BY:

/TWOfiEY, LATIIAM &,SCllMITT Attorneys-for Shoreham opponents Coalition P.O. Box 398.

Riverhead, NY 11901 Dated; . January 24, 1980

.Riverhead, NY N