ML19318C407

LER 80-043/03L-0:on 800528,while Testing Safety Features Actuation Sys,Valve DH-11 Closed & Dh Pump 1-1 Was Stopped. Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Responsible Personnel Were Made Aware of Problem

ML19318C407
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	06/26/1980
From:	Isley T TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML19318C399	List: ML19318C398 ML19318C407
References
LER-80-043-03L, LER-80-43-3L, NUDOCS 8007010439
Download: ML19318C407 (3)

Text

r U. S. NUCLEAR RE ULATORY COMMISSION WRC FORF3 363 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFOZMATION) l l l l l lh 6

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REPORT DATE 7 60 61 DOCK ET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PRO 8ABLE CCNSEQUENCES h o 2 l (Np-33-80-53) on 5/28/80, at 1101 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.189305e-4 months <br />. I&C nersonnel were testine the work nn l

[TTT1 I FCR 79-439A when a test connection was made to the Reactor Coolant System pressure l FiTTl I input at the Safety Features Actuation System channel and cabinet. DH 11 went closed. I o s l Dil pump 1-1 was stopped, place the Station in violation of Technical Snecification I o s 13.9.8. There was no danger to the public or Station personnel. The action statement l

[T[Tl lwould have required any core alterations to be stopped, however. none were in pronressl o a i l 80 7 9 9 DE CODE SUSC E COMPONENT CODE SUSCOO'E SU OE 7

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[Njg 42 l Zlg 43 l Zl 9l 9l 9lg 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h i o l The cause of the event was a procedural inadequacy. FCR 79-439A contained a test to l i i l verify the installation, however, the work package did not contain a precaution to l

, , gj umper out a bistable which causes Dil 11 to close. Dil 11 was reopened and the pump l

, 3 l restarted at 1103 hours0.0128 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.196915e-4 months <br />. Responsible personnel were made aware of the problem. l i 1 1 1 7 8 9 80 S1 S  % POWE R OTHER STATUS DISCO RY OlSCOVERY DESCRIPTION i s l 11l@ l Ol dj 0]@l NA l l C l@l FCR 79-439A l A flVITY CO TENT CELE ASED OF RELE ASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELE ASE i G 8 9

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• a 5 39-PREPARER 8'0'0 7 NAME 0' 10[F Thomas Isley (I&C) PHONE: (419) 259-5000 Ext. 230

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAtIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE

' SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-53 DATE OF EVENT: May 28, 1980 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF' OCCURRENCE: Loss of Decay Heat Flow when DH Isolation Valve DHil closed during test preparations.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 6, with Power (MWT) = 0, and Load (Cross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On May 28, 1980, at 1101 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.189305e-4 months <br />, Instruments and Controls (I&C) personnel were making preparations to begin testing following the implementa-tion of Facility Change Request (FCR) 79-439A. This FCR installed a temperature saturation meter which required a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure input. When a, test connection was made to the RCS pressure input at the Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Channel 4 Cabinet, DHil went closed. DH Pump 1-1 was stopped immedi-ately to prevent damage. This placed the Station in violation of Technical Specifi-cation 3.9.8 which requires at least one decay heat removsl loop to be in operation in Mode 6. The action statement would have required any core alterations to be stopped. None were in progress. DHil was reopened at 1103 hours0.0128 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.196915e-4 months <br />, DH Pump 1-1 was restarted, anc flow of 3000 gpm was verified which removed the Station from the action statement.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrency: The cause of the event was a procedural inadequacy. The work package prepared for FCR 79-439A contained a one time procedure to be conducted to verify correct installation. However, the procedure did not contain the precaution to jumper out the bistable which protects the decay heat removal system from overpressurization (causing DH11 to close). This bistable uses the RCS pressure input to the SFAS Channel 4 Cabinet. As the I&C technician connected his test equipment, he caused a spike in the RCS pressure input which tripped SFAS CH 4 which was already in the test position and also tripped the special bistable which closed DH11. This caused a loss of decay heat pump suction and required the pump to be shutdown. .

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to Station personnel. Decay heat removal flow was off for only two minutes and caused no significant increase in RCS temperature. There was no damage to the decay heat pump since the pump was immediately stopped when DHil closed.

Corrective Action: The pump was restarted with a 3000 gpm flow ,erified after DHil was reopened at 1103 hours0.0128 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.196915e-4 months <br /> on May 28, 1980, removing the station from the action statement of Technical Specification 3.9.8. A modification to the FCR work package has been made to prevent recurrence. Personnel responsible for work package prepara-tions were made aware of the problem and were cautioned to assure necessary precautions

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were included in work packages.

LER #80-043

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

• DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-53 PAGE 2 Failure Data: Previous failures were reported in LER NP-32-77-03 (Maintenance Instruction I-1-1701 did not'contain the precaution) and NP-32-77-05 (ST 5031.01 Monthly Calibration Check did not contain the precaution).

LER #80-043 i

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