ML14022A055

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1, Revision 0, Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 - Supplemental Information.

ML14022A055
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	01/14/2014
From:	Westinghouse
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML14022A052	List: ML14022A054 ML14022A055
References
102-06818-DCM/MAM/PJH WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1, Rev. 0
Download: ML14022A055 (112)

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled M

Westinghouse Non-Proprietary Class 3 WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 January 2014 Revision 0 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 - Supplemental Information Westinghouse

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 - Supplemental Information Rolando Perez

• Risk Applications & Methods II Walter Djordjevic Seismic Walkdown Peer Review Team Leader January 2014 Reviewer: Derek Seaman*

Risk Applications & Methods II Reviewer: Chris Wandell Senior Consulting Engineer, Arizona Public Service Approved: Dan Sadlon

• Manager, Risk Applications & Methods II

• Electronically approved records are authenticated in the electronic document management system.

Westinghouse Electric Company LLC 1000 Westinghouse Drive Cranberry Township, PA 16066, USA

© 2014 Westinghouse Electric Company LLC All Rights Reserved

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled REVISION LOG Rev Date Revision Description Rev. 0 1/2014 Supplement 1 includes the main body of WCAP- 17679-N P, Rev. 0 (Reference 48, "Executive Summary" through "References") and new or revised content in the appendices that address the conduct and results of the follow-on walkdown activities performed during and following refueling outage 1RI 7. Revision bars are used in the main body to easily identify the updates. With the exception of Appendices A and B, revision bars are utilized in the appendices to identify the updates relative to the corresponding appendices of WCAP- 17679-NP, Rev. 0. Note that Appendices A and B consist of the completed checklists resulting from the follow-on walkdowns and one original SWC (IJRMNB04) that required editorial correction. Editorial and formatting corrections relative to WCAP-17679-NP, Rev. 0 are not identified with individual revision bars in this document.

Supplement I corrects an error contained in the second paragraph of Section 6.4 regarding potentially adverse seismic conditions entered into the plant's CAP.

WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-I January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Executive Summary Following the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) established the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) in response to Commission direction. The NTTF made several recommendations, some of which are related to improving the protection of nuclear power plants against natural phenomena. With recommendation 2.3 (Rec 2.3), the NTTF recommended the NRC require licensees to perform seismic and flooding walkdowns to identify and address vulnerabilities and verify the adequacy of hazard protection features. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued a letter, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), that requests information from all power reactor licensees related to NTTF recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3. For the seismic aspect of Rec 2.3, licensees are required to perform Seismic Walkdowns to verify the current plant configuration with the current seismic licensing basis, verify the adequacy of current strategies and maintenance plans, and identify and address degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed conditions. This report contains the Arizona Public Service Company (APS) response for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit I to the request for information related to the seismic aspects of NTTF Rec 2.3, as addressed in enclosure 3 of the NRC letter.

The original version of this WCAP report summarizes the results from the at-power Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys performed from July 30 through August 6, 2012. Supplement I incorporates the results from the additional walkdowns performed during and after refueling outage IR17, from April 6 through April 7, 2013, and on April 30, 2013.

To establish a consistent methodology for performance of the Seismic Walkdowns, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), in conjunction with the industry, developed guidance in EPRI Technical Report TR-1025286. This guidance was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The Seismic Walkdowns conducted at PVNGS Unit I conform to the requirements of the EPRI Technical Report. Consistent with the guidance, the following topics are addressed in this PVNGS Unit I Seismic Walkdown report:

1. Seismic Licensing Basis for Seismic Category I Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs)

2. Personnel Qualifications

3. Process used for selection of SSCs

4. Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys

5. Licensing Basis Evaluations

6. Peer Review

7. IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report The required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were performed for accessible equipment in PVNGS Unit I during the period from July 30 through August 6, 2012, while the plant was operating in Mode 1. Inaccessible equipment (containment building and energized high-voltage equipment) are identified in the PVNGS Unit I Seismic Walkdown Report and walkdowns were conducted during the Unit I refueling outage, IR17, from April 6 through April 7, 2013, and afterward on April 30, 2013. Also during 1R17, supplemental inspections of electrical cabinets were performed in accordance with the NRC response to industry frequently asked question 4.20. In addition, Area Walk-Bys were completed, as required, during these follow-on activities. Documentation of these additional inspections and the related evaluations is provided in this supplemental report.

The following information identifies the requests in the 50.54(f) letter (in italics) followed by a summary of the APS response:

a. Information on the plant-specific hazard licensing bases and a description of the protection and mitigationfeatures considered in the licensing basis evaluation.

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled ii The PVNGS current Seismic Licensing Basis (seismic codes, standards, and methods) is documented in report Section I and was used to inform the Seismic Walkdown licensing basis evaluations.

b. Information related to the implementation qf the walkdown process.

The approach used to implement the Seismic Walkdown process at PVNGS conforms to the guidance of EPRI Technical Report TR-1025286. Report Sections 3 through 5 provide detailed descriptions of how the walkdown process was implemented at PVNGS.

c. A list of plant-specific vulnerabilities (including any seismic anomalies, outliers, or other

,findings) identified by the IPEEEand a descriptionof the actions taken to eliminate or reduce them (including their completion dates).

No plant-specific seismic vulnerabilities were identified at PVNGS Unit I by the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) program. The results of the IPEEE program are described in report Section 7.

d. Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions. Include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned to address these conditions using the guidance in Regulatory Issues Summary 2005-20, Revision, 1, Revision to NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, "Operabilit, Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety," including entering the condition in the corrective action program.

The summary of the key findings of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys is provided in report Section 4. The licensing basis evaluations of potentially adverse seismic conditions and their resolutions are described in detail in Section 5 and Appendix D of this report. A total of 38 licensing basis evaluations have been satisfactorily closed and seven open evaluations have been entered into the PVNGS Corrective Action Program (CAP) for resolution. Items entered into the CAP are annotated in Appendix D. None of these identified conditions prevent the equipment from performing the intended safety functions during or after a design basis seismic event. Results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys are documented on EPRI TR-1025286 checklists in report Appendices A and B, respectively.

e. Any planned or newly installedprotection and mitigationfeatures.

There are no planned or newly installed protection or mitigation features that resulted from the implementation of the Seismic Walkdown guidance at PVNGS. However, two of the potentially adverse seismic conditions that were identified during the Seismic Walkdowns resulted in action being taken to restore seismic design margins. Bookcases installed near the control boards in the Unit I Control Room were removed and maintenance was performed in Unit I on a solenoid valve support plate related to the controls for an atmospheric steam dump valve. Neither of these conditions would have prevented safety-related equipment from performing its intended safety function during or after a design basis seismic event; the changes were implemented to restore seismic design margins.

f Results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review.

The peer review process performed at PVNGS confirmed and informed the selection of SSCs process, provided real-time feedback to the Seismic Walkdown engineers (SWEs) during performance of the walkdowns, and confirmed that the licensing basis evaluations carefully WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled iii compared the actual as-found plant configurations to the current licensing basis documentation. Details of the peer reviewer activities are described in report Section 6.

In summary, PVNGS Unit I equipment that was inspected and evaluated for the Seismic Walkdown process, including initial and supplemental inspections and related licensing basis evaluations, was determined to be capable of performing intended safety functions during and after a design basis seismic event and the site monitoring and maintenance procedures were determined to be adequate. Follow-on activities to complete the remaining aspects of this process were completed as described in this supplemental report. Therefore, the required NTTF 2.3 walkdown activities have been successfully completed for PVNGS Unit 1 in accordance with the EPRI Guidance document and the intent of Enclosure 3 to the NRC 50.54(f) letter has been satisfied.

WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We wish to acknowledge the following contributors to the effort.

Mike Powell -Arizona Public Service (Director Fukushima Response)

Chris Wandell -Arizona Public Service Justin Wood -Arizona Public Service Winston Borrero -Arizona Public Service Randall "Gene" Eimar- Arizona Public Service Jonathon Lucero -Arizona Public Service Nick Reidenbach -Arizona Public Service Derek Morris - Arizona Public Service Mark Meyer - Arizona Public Service Nathan Hardwick- Arizona Public Service Jose "Angel" Delgadillo -Arizona Public Service Michael Cribbins - Westinghouse Electric Company Rolando Perez - Westinghouse Electric Company Derek Seaman - Westinghouse Electric Company Gary Douglas - Westinghouse Electric Company Joe Somsel - Westinghouse Electric Company Paul Karavoussianis - Stevenson & Associates Walter Djordjevic - Stevenson & Associates Hunter Young - Stevenson & Associates Timothy Nealon - Stevenson & Associates Andrew Masiunas - Stevenson & Associates Cory Figliolini - Stevenson & Associates WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-I January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled V

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym Definition AFAS Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal AF Auxiliary Feedwater AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System AHU Air Handling Unit APS Arizona Public Service ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers AUX Auxiliary Building AWC Area Walk-By Checklist CAP Corrective Action Program CE Combustion Engineering CF Containment Function CH Chemical and Volume Control CLB Current Licensing Basis CP Containment Purge CST Condensate Storage Tank CT Condensate Transfer and Storage CTMT Containment CTRL Control Building CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System DBM Design Basis Manual DCM Design Criteria Manual DF Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer DG Diesel Generator DHR Decay Heat Removal EAHU Essential Air Handling Unit EC HVAC Essential Chilled Water EPRI Electric Power Research Institute EQCF Equipment Qualification Control Form EQID Equipment Identification EW Essential Cooling Water FAQ Frequently Asked Question(s)

FCR Field Change Request GA Service Gas GR Gaseous Radwaste HA HVAC Auxiliary Building HC HVAC Containment Building HD HVAC Diesel Generator Building HJ HVAC Control Building HPSI High Pressure Safety Injection HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled vi Acronym Definition IA Instrument and Service Air IC Reactor Coolant Inventory Control IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ISRS In-Structure Response Spectra MCC Motor Control Center MO Motor-Operated MOV Motor-Operated Valve MSSS Main Steam Support Structure NCR Non-Conformance Reports NQR Non-Quality Related NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System NTTF Near-Term Task Force OBE Operating Basis Earthquake P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram PB Class 1E 4.16 kv Power PC Reactor Coolant Pressure Control PE Class I E Standby Generation PG Class I E 480v Power Switchgear PGD Project General Design Criteria PH Class I E 480v Power Motor Control Center PK Class IE 125 VDC PN Class 1E Instrument Power PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment PVAR Palo Verde Action Request (Corrective Action Program)

PVNGS Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station RAS Re-circulation Actuation Signal RAW Risk Achievement Worth RC Reactivity Control or Reactor Coolant RCPB Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary RCS Reactor Coolant System RD Radioactive Waste Drain RLE Review Level Earthquake RM Main Control Board ROB Rule of the Box RWT Refueling Water Tank S&A Stevenson & Associates SA Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SB Reactor Protection SC-I Seismic Category I WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled vii Acronym Definition SDC Shutdown Cooling SDOC Vendor/Supplier Document SFP Spent Fuel Pool SG Main Steam SI Safety Injection SOV Solenoid-Operated Valve SP Essential Spray Ponds SPRA Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment SQUG Seismic Qualification Utility Group SSCs Structures, Systems, and Components SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SSEL Safe Shutdown Equipment List SWC Seismic Walkdown Checklist SWE Seismic Walkdown Engineer SWEL Seismic Walkdown Equipment List SWG Seismic Walkdown Guidance (EPRI TR-1025286)

SWMS Site Work Management System SWT Seismic Walkdown Team UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report UHS Ultimate Heat Sink ZA Auxiliary Building ZG Diesel Generator Building zi Control Building WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled viii TABLE OF CONTENTS I. SEISM IC LICENSING BASIS .......................................................................................................... 1-1 1.1 IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRA ........................................................................... -I 1.2 SEISM IC QUALIFICATION OF SC-1 EQUIPMENT ............................................................ 1-1

2. PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS .................................................................................................... 2-1 2.1 EQUIPM ENT SELECTION PERSONNEL ........................................................................ 2-I 2.2 SEISM IC WALKDOWN ENGINEERS ................................................................................... 2-1 2.3 LICENSING BASIS REVIEW ERS .......................................................................................... 2-3 2.4 IPEEE REVIEW ERS ................................................................................................................ 2-3 2.5 PEER REVIEW TEAM ............................................................................................................ 2-3

3. SELECTION OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEM S, AND COM PONENTS ............................................ 3-1 3.1 SELECTION PROCESS SUM MARY ..................................................................................... 3-1 3.2 SAMPLE OF REQUIRED ITEMS FOR THE FIVE SAFETY FUNCTIONS ........................ 3-4 3 .2 .1 B ase L ist I .................................................................................................................... 3 -9 3 .2 .2 S W E L 1 ........................................................................................................................ 3-9 3.3 SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) RELATED ITEM S ..................................................................... 3-10 3 .3 .1 B ase L ist 2 .................................................................................................................. 3 -12 3.3.2 Rapid Drain-Down ..................................................................................................... 3-12 3 .3 .3 S W E L 2 ...................................................................................................................... 3 -12 3.4 INACCESSIBLE ITEM S ........................................................................................................ 3-13

4. SEISM IC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS ................................................................... 4-1

4.1 BACKGROUND

....................................................................................................................... 4-1 4.2 PREPARATION FOR SEISM IC WALKDOW NS .................................................................... 4-2 4.3 WALKDOW N RESULTS ......................................................................................................... 4-3

5. LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS ......................................................................................... 5-1 6 . P E E R R E V IE W .................................................................................................................................. 6-1

6.1 INTRODUCTION

..................................................................................................................... 6-1 6.2 PEER REVIEW - SELECTION OF SSCs ............................................................................... 6-2 6 .2 .1 P u rp o se ......................................................................................................................... 6 -2 6.2.2 Peer Review Activity - Selection of SSCs ................................................................... 6-2 6.2.3 Peer Review Findings - Selection of SSCs .................................................................. 6-3 6.2.4 Resolution of Peer Review Comments - Selection of SSCs ........................................ 6-5 6.2.5 Conclusion of Peer Review - Selection of SSCs ......................................................... 6-5 6.3 PEER REVIEW OF SAMPLE SEISMIC WALKDOWN AND AREA WALK-BY C HE C KL IS T S ........................................................................................................................... 6-5 6.4 REVIEW OF LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS ............................................................... 6-8 6.5 REVIEW SUBM ITTAL REPORT .......................................................................................... 6-10

7. IPEEE VULNERABILITIES .............................................................................................................. 7-1

8. RE F E R E N C E S .................................................................................................................................... 8-1 WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-I January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled ix APPENDIX A - SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (SWCs) ................................................. A-I APPENDIX B - AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS (AWCs) ............................................................. B-1 APPENDIX C - PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS .............................................................................. C-I APPENDIX D - LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS

SUMMARY

............................................... D-I A PPEN D IX E - Q U A LIFIC AT IO N S ...................................................................................................... E-I APPENDIX F - PVNGS UN IT I SW EL REPORT ................................................................................ F-I APPENDIX G - SWEL DEVELOPMENT TABLES ........................................................................ G-I WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-I January 2014

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LIST OF TABLES Table 3-I: Sort of the Base List I Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "System Type" ................................. 3-6 Table 3-2: Equipment Selected for SWEL Based on the "Major New or Replacement Equipment" Attribute ........ 3-7 Table 3-3: Sort of the Base List I Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Equipment Type Number" ............. 3-8 Table 3-4: Sort of the Base List I Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Environment (Temperature)" ......... 3-9 Table 3-5: PVNGS-1 Equipment Inaccessible During the Scheduled At-Power Walkdowns ................................ 3-13 Table 3-6: PVNGS- I FAQ 4.20 Supplemental Cabinet Inspections ....................................................................... 3-14 Table 3-7: PVNGS-1 Equipment Inspected During Refueling Outage 1R17 ......................................................... 3-15 Table 3-8: PVNGS-l Item Completed During the April 30, 2013, Inspection ........................................................ 3-16 Table 6-1: SWC and AWC Peer Review Samples from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit I ......................... 6-6 Table 6-2: Table of CAP Status from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit I ...................................................... 6-8 Table G- I: P V N G S -l B ase L ist I ............................................................................................................................ G -1 Table G-2: PVN G S -I S W E L I ................................................................................................................................ G -2 Table G-3: PVNGS-1 Base List 2 (SWEL 2 is the same as Base List 2) ............................................................... G-14 WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-I January 2014

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1. SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS This report is applicable to Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 1.

The licensing basis for Seismic Category I (SC-I) equipment at PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 is defined in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR, Reference 32) Section 3.7 and is supported by summary seismic design criteria defined in Design Criteria Manual - Project General Design Criteria (DCM-PGD, Reference 42) Section 1.3.2. Site design ground motion response spectra for the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) are provided in UFSAR Figures 3.7-1 and 3.7-2, as well as UFSAR Sections 3.9.2.2, 3.9.3 and 3.10, and adhere to Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants (Reference 43). Damping values for SC-I equipment are listed in UFSAR Table 3.7-1 and conform to Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants (Reference 44).

As defined in UFSAR Section 2.5, the SSE is based on the postulated occurrence of a magnitude 8.0 earthquake located 72 miles from the site. Through use of attenuation curves, extrapolation of response spectra, and analysis of intensity data, 0.2g is considered a conservative representation of the severity of horizontal and vertical vibratory ground motion for the SSE. For additional conservatism, the seismic analysis of all Category I structures was performed utilizing a 0.25g SSE. Figures 3.7-1 through 3.7-4 of the UFSAR show the horizontal and vertical design response spectra corresponding to the SSE and Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE), respectively.

1.1 IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRA A time-history analysis was used to develop in-structure response spectra (ISRS) for buildings housing SC-I equipment. Modeling techniques such as the selection of the minimum number of mass points, number of dynamic degrees of freedom per mass point, and torsional effects, are described in Bechtel Topical Report BC-TOP-4-A (Reference 51). The seismic input was defined in terms of the free-field acceleration time history and the soil-structure interaction parameters. The structural damping values used were per Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Reference 44). Soil damping characteristics were modified to account for strain levels. Design basis ISRS are plotted in DBM-C5 (Reference 53) Appendix A.

1.2 SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF SC-1 EQUIPMENT SC-I equipment is classified according to Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification (Reference 45), and is discussed in UFSAR Section 3.2 (Reference 32) and in DCM-PGD Section 1.4.3 (Reference 42), which states:

Category I structures, systems, and components are those that are important to safety and designed to remain functional in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). These structures, systems, and components are those necessary to assure:

• The integrity of the reactorcoolantpressure boundary (RCPB).

• The capability to shutdown the reactorand maintain it in a safe condition.

• The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures.

Per UFSAR Section 3.10.2, SC-1 electrical equipment within the Bechtel scope of supply was qualified per Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std 344-75 (Reference 46). This standard is comprehensive and similar to current requirements for nuclear safety-related components. Per UFSAR WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 1-2 Section 3.10.5, SC-1 electrical equipment within the Combustion Engineering scope of supply was qualified per IEEE Std 344-71 (Reference 41) plus the additional requirements listed. With the additional requirements, the qualification criteria and methods are similar to those of IEEE Std 344-75 (Reference 46). For qualification by testing, per application of the preceding criteria, much of the electrical equipment was subject to shake table testing. The required test levels were typically based on the in-structure response spectra discussed above.

Per Section 3.9.2.2 of the UFSAR., analytical methods without testing were employed to qualify Seismic Category I mechanical equipment such as piping, ductwork, tanks and vessels, heat exchangers, filters, and pumps. Qualification for mechanical components with mechanisms that must change position in order to perform the safety-related function was performed by test or a combination of test and analysis as per the IEEE Std 344-1975 requirements and UFSAR Sections 3.9.2, 3.9.3 and 3.10. These components include American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and non-ASME items such as valves with actuators and their appurtenances as well as check valves, relief valves, fans, chillers, air handling units, and various skid-supplied devices.

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

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2. PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 2.1 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PERSONNEL The Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) development was performed by Westinghouse personnel, Messrs. Rolando Perez and Derek Seaman. Resumes are provided in Appendix E. PVNGS Operations (Gene Eimar, Shift Manager and Angel Delgadillo, Senior Auxiliary Operator) provided verification of safety function selections. PVNGS Engineering (Chris Wandell, Winston Borrero) provided technical input to screening and selection of equipment. PVNGS System Engineering input was provided by performing a review of System Health Reports.

Rolando Perez - Mr. Perez is the Technical Leader for the Palo Verde Unit 1 SWEL development activity in the Risk Applications and Methods Group of Westinghouse's Engineering, Equipment and Major Projects Division. Rolando has over 15 years of experience in Westinghouse and over 35 years of experience in the nuclear safety area. Rolando has worked for Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering (CE) as a Training Engineer, Transient Analyst, and Setpoint Analyst. Rolando has conducted lectures on reactor core physics, health physics, fluid systems, protection systems, and plant operational concepts. In 2009 Rolando expanded his expertise to include CE-designed plants that employ digital-based reactor trip and monitoring systems ("CE digital plants").

Derek Seaman - Mr. Seaman is a member of the Palo Verde Unit I SWEL development team in the Risk Applications and Methods Group of Westinghouse's Engineering, Equipment and Major Projects Division. Derek has over 6 years of experience in Westinghouse in the nuclear engineering area. Derek has rotated through various plant outage positions including reload engineering analyses and project management of fuel reload campaigns. Derek has evaluated power increase proposals from a safety analysis perspective and has designed and implemented quality assurance systems in the nuclear engineering area.

Chris J. Wandell, P.E. - Mr. Wandell is a Senior Consulting Civil Engineer in the Palo Verde Nuclear Design Engineering Department. Chris is a Professional Civil Engineer with over 30 years of experience in the design, analysis, and modification of Seismic Category I pipe supports, electrical raceway supports, heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) supports, instrument supports, and steel and concrete structures. His experience also includes Class I E Seismic Equipment Qualification. Mr. Wandell is Palo Verde's structural and seismic subject matter expert. He has attended EPRI's NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course and is a certified Seismic Walkdown Engineer.

Winston G. Borrero - Mr. Borrero is a Senior Consulting Mechanical Engineer in the Palo Verde Nuclear Design Engineering Department. Winston has over 30 years of experience in the design and construction of Nuclear Plants having worked for Bechtel, Stone & Webster and Sargent & Lundy Engineers at various nuclear sites. Areas of expertise include stress analysis, fracture mechanics and fatigue analysis, seismic and environmental qualification of equipment, and bolted joint analysis. Mr. Borrero is Palo Verde's bolted joint and fatigue stress analysis subject matter expert. He has attended EPRI's NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course and is a certified Seismic Walkdown Engineer.

2.2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEERS The Seismic Walkdown team (SWT) consisted of Seismic Walkdown engineers (SWEs) from Stevenson and Associates (S&A). S&A is recognized as a leading seismic consultant to the nuclear industry and as a regular contributor to the advancement of earthquake engineering knowledge through funded research WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-I January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 2-2 projects. The professional staff has expertise and capabilities in earthquake engineering, structural dynamics, and structural design. S&A has performed seismic evaluations of US nuclear power plants, using either Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA) or Seismic Margin Assessments, to address US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Individual Plant Evaluation for External Events (IPEEE) for over 35 US and European plants. S&A conducted seismic PRA analyses for all of the US Army depots that are demilitarizing their stores of nerve gas ordnance.

The SWT for PVNGS Unit 1, consisting of Hunter Young and Timothy Nealon of S&A, conducted initial walkdowns from July 30, 2012, through August 2, 2012. For supplemental walkdowns occurring April 6, 2013, through April 7, 2013, during refueling outage IR17 and April 30, 2013, the SWT consisted of Hunter Young and Cory Figliolini of S&A (Resum6s are provided in Appendix E). Chris Wandell and Winston Borrero led the support from PVNGS for walkdowns as well as the interface with plant operators. Other PVNGS professional staff provided support and guidance and these persons are acknowledged within this report. The Stevenson & Associates Seismic Walkdown Engineers were accompanied by at least one of the following PVNGS qualified Seismic Walkdown Engineers: Chris Wandell, Nicholas Reidenbach, Winston Borrero, Justin Wood, Derek Morris, and Mark Meyer. The PVNGS engineers (along with the Auxiliary Operator team member) provided walkdown oversight relative to expected conduct in the plant (Nuclear, Radiological and Industrial Safety), compliance with NRC-Approved EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (TR-1025286), PVNGS procedural compliance (inclusive of CAP), and insight into Licensing Basis issues.

Hunter Young, P.E. - Mr. Young is a Senior Engineer in the S&A Phoenix office with specialization in the dynamic analysis and design of structures and equipment for seismic, blast, fluid, and wind loads. He has managed and led Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use in probabilistic risk assessments. Mr. Young has performed the seismic analyses of braced steel frames, concrete foundations, masonry walls, large storage tanks, and electrical and mechanical equipment anchorage. In addition, Mr. Young has executed the walkdown and analysis of tank structures and their associated leak path piping to assess loss of inventory in the event of beyond-design-basis seismic events using manual and finite element methods. Mr. Young has a Master of Engineering in Structural Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Bachelors of Science in Civil Engineering from the University of Notre Dame. He is a licensed P.E. (civil) in California and has completed the 5-day Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Walkdown training course.

Timothy Nealon - Mr. Nealon is an Engineer in the S&A Phoenix office with specialization in the dynamic analysis and design of structures and equipment for seismic, blast, fluid, and wind loads. He has participated in Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use in probabilistic risk assessments. In addition, Mr. Nealon has conducted walkdowns and analysis of tank structures and their associated leakpath piping to assess loss of inventory in the event of beyond-design-basis seismic events using various methods. Furthermore, he has been trained and has conducted NTTF 2.3 Fukushima response Seismic Walkdowns at multiple nuclear stations. Mr. Nealon has a Master of Science in Structural Engineering and a Bachelor of Science in Civil and Environmental Engineering from the University at Buffalo. Mr. Nealon has completed the 5-day SQUG Walkdown training course.

Cory Figliolini - Mr. Figliolini is a Staff Engineer in the S&A Phoenix office. He has planned and performed Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use in probabilistic risk assessments. Mr. Figliolini has conducted seismic analyses of electrical and mechanical equipment anchorage, storage tanks, and civil structures including containment. Mr. Figliolini has a Joint Master of Science, Structural Engineering & Mechanics from the Universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh and a Bachelors of Science in Civil Engineering from Worcester Polytechnic Institute. He is registered as an E.I.T. in Massachusetts. Mr. Figliolini has completed the 5-day SQUG Walkdown training course.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 2-3 2.3 LICENSING BASIS REVIEWERS The Licensing Basis Reviewers for PVNGS Unit 1 consisted of Hunter Young, Timothy Nealon, and Cory Figliolini from the SWT. Their qualifications are provided under Section 2.2. Chris Wandell and Winston Borrero participated in the development of the licensing basis evaluations and provided technical bases for Operability Determinations/Functional Assessments for potentially adverse seismic conditions which were entered into the Corrective Action Program.

2.4 IPEEE REVIEWERS The IPEEE Reviewers consisted of a combination of the Equipment Selection Personnel and the SWT.

Rolando Perez and Derek Seaman of Westinghouse Electric Company LLC (qualifications listed in Appendix E) identified equipment subject to IPEEE enhancements for incorporation in SWEL 1. Hunter Young and Timothy Nealon of S&A (qualifications listed in Section 2.2) performed the identification of actions taken to eliminate or reduce the IPEEE vulnerabilities previously identified. Jonathan Lucero, Engineer Sr. PRA from PVNGS, contributed to the IPEEE review.

Jonathan L. Lucero - Mr. Lucero is a Senior Engineer in the Palo Verde Probabilistic Risk Assessment Department. Jonathan has over 10 years of engineering experience in foundation design, structural dynamics, and uncertainty analysis. His experience also includes multidisciplinary applications, generalized information theory and fuzzy logic. Mr. Lucero is Palo Verde's seismic PRA subject matter expert. He has attended EPRI's Education of Risk Professionals Program and Seismic PRA training course.

2.5 PEER REVIEW TEAM The peer reviewers for PVNGS Unit I are Messrs. Walter Djordjevic of S&A and Gary L Douglas of Westinghouse. Mr. Djordjevic is also designated the peer review Team Leader. Neither was involved in the Seismic Walkdown inspection process as to maintain their independence from the project. Mr.

Djordjevic is an advanced-degree structural engineer with over 30 years of nuclear seismic experience and has been trained as a Seismic Capability Engineer (EPRI SQUG training), EPRI IPEEE Add-on, and Seismic Fragility and Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE). Mr. Douglas is a nuclear engineer with 15 years of nuclear engineering experience and 10 years of aerospace engineering experience. Resum6s are provided in Appendix E. Mr. Djordjevic led the seismic peer review activities and Mr. Douglas led the SWEL selection peer review. All peer review activities were performed by both engineers.

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3. SELECTION OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS 3.1 SELECTION PROCESS

SUMMARY

This section describes the process used by Westinghouse to select the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that were included in the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 (PVNGS-1)

Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL). The process described in Section 3 (Selection of SSCs) of EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3.: Seismic, dated June 2012 (Reference 1), was used as guidance to develop the PVNGS-I SWEL. The following steps from the integrated project schedule outline this process of SWEL selection:

Project Kickoff Meeting Obtain customer inputs Retrieve original Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE - full-scope Seismic Margin Assessment) documentation - basis for Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Base List 1 Review current Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) database Retrieve containment function equipment Retrieve modifications since the IPEEE Retrieve recently modified/upgraded equipment information Retrieve seismic vulnerabilities from Corrective Action Program (CAP)

Retrieve System Health Reports Retrieve spent fuel pool (SFP) SC-I equipment (piping and instrumentation drawings, Design Basis Manuals, and Training Manual) - basis for SSEL Baselist 2 Assemble preliminary Safe Shutdown Equipment List (i.e., Base List 1)

Perform Screen #1, Seismic Category I (non-Seismic Category I SSCs screen out)

Perform Screen #2, Regular Inspections (Structures, Piping, Penetrations screen out)

Perform Screen #3, Safety Function Support Assemble preliminary SSEL (Base List 2)

Perform Screen #1, Seismic Category I (non-Seismic Category I SSCs screen out)

Perform Screen #2, Regular Inspections (Structures, Piping, Penetrations screen out)

Site visit to confirm preliminary SSEL Finalize SSEL Select SWEL I Perform Screen #4 System variety Equipment type variety Environment variety Risk importance considerations Equipment access considerations Major new or replacement equipment Recently modified/upgraded (zone of influence effects)

IPEEE Seismic Vulnerability findings Sample considerations including unit-to-unit variation Select SWEL 2 (spent fuel pool related items)

Perform Screen #3 System variety Equipment type variety Environment variety WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

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Sample considerations including unit-to-unit variation Perform Screen #4 rapid drain-down assessment Confirm SWEL with Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs)

Obtain PVNGS- I Operations approval of SWEL SWEL Peer Review Per the guidance provided in Section 2 of Reference 1, PVNGS Operations and Design Engineering staff members participated in the selection of the SSCs comprising the SWEL and provided input and assistance to the Equipment Selection Personnel collecting the data associated with the equipment considered. The exchange of information between the Equipment Selection Personnel and the PVNGS staff members included:

• Review of the IPEEE and PRA list of components was performed by the Westinghouse and PVNGS team to correct discrepancies in classification, errors in equipment identification (EQID),

omissions, risk categorization, etc.

" Weekly status meetings for review of the SWEL progress.

• A presentation held on July 17, 2012, to discuss Westinghouse's methodology for SWEL selection.

• Verification of equipment information through PVNGS's Site Work Management System (SWMS) (Reference 2).

" Provide risk importance data derived from the PVNGS Internal Events Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model (Reference 33).

" Assist in identifying and categorizing the different operating environment types existing at the plant.

" Discussions with Operations relative to recent upgrades and changes to the plant that have the potential to be relevant to the SWEL.

• Discussions with Design Engineering and Operations to select equipment with operational experience relevant to SWEL selection.

" Equipment Qualification Control Form (EQCF) Database for review of CAP and modifications against seismic equipment.

• Provide System Health Reports and Design Basis Manuals (DBMs) for review by the Equipment Selection Personnel.

" SWEL Peer Review and approval of the SSCs selected for the Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys (see Appendix F).

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The agenda followed during the meetings included:

• Pre-Job Brief of the SWEL selection project

" Discuss high-level approach to SWEL Development

" Review of preliminary Base List I for accuracy and completeness o Populate the Screen #4 Sample Selection attributes o Select the SWEL I items o Identify items for follow-up

• Review of preliminary Base List 2 for accuracy and completeness o Populate the Screen #3 Sample selection attributes o Select the SWEL 2 items o Identify items for follow-up

• Identify any unit-to-unit considerations

• Summarize results

• Summary post-job briefing A second meeting was held on July 17, 2012, to provide a presentation summarizing the Westinghouse/PVNGS team's selection methodology and conduct a second working session with PVNGS staff members to further refine the SWEL.

The following personnel participated in these working sessions:

Attendee Company Position Chris Wandell APS Senior Consulting Engineer (Civil)

Winston Borrero APS Senior Consulting Engineer (Mechanical)

Justin Wood APS Engineer (Modifications)

Jose (Angel) Delgadillo APS Auxiliary Operator Randall (Gene) Eimar APS Operations Shift Manager Rolando Perez Westinghouse SWEL Development Lead (participated remotely via WebExl)

Derek Seaman Westinghouse SWEL Developer Per the guidance provided in Section 3 of Reference 1, SSCs were selected in the following two groups:

" SWEL 1 - A sample of items that safely shutdown the reactor and maintain containment integrity.

• SWEL 2 - A sample of spent fuel pool (SFP) related items, including items that could result in a rapid drain-down of the SFP.

The SWELs from these two groups were combined into a single SWEL for use during the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys.

The following sections discuss how the PVNGS-I SWEL selection process has met the objectives of the guidance of Reference 1, particularly as it relates to incorporating the appropriate variety of classes of WebEx is a trademark or registered trademark of Cisco Systems, Inc.

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3.2 SAMPLE OF REQUIRED ITEMS FOR THE FIVE SAFETY FUNCTIONS The five safety functions include the four safe shutdown functions (reactor reactivity control, reactor coolant pressure control, reactor coolant inventory control, and decay heat removal, which includes the ultimate heat sink), plus the containment functions.

The IPEEE (Reference 3) Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) was used as the starting point for compiling a list (Base List 1) of the SSCs to be considered in the SWEL 1 selection process. A list consisting of 979 SSCs was assembled based on the following tables documented in Appendix 3.A of Reference 3:

" Table 3A-I - Reactor Protection System SSEL (36 items)

" Table 3A Support Systems SSEL (403 items)

• Table 3A Required Instrumentation SSEL (72 items)

• Table 3A Primary Auxiliary Feedwater SSEL (70 items)

• Table 3A Secondary Auxiliary Feedwater SSEL (59 items)

• Table 3A Atmospheric Dump Valves SSEL (72 items)

• Table 3A Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray SSEL (42 items)

• Table 3A Shutdown Cooling System SSEL (84 items)

• Table 3A High Pressure Safety Injection SSEL (89 items)

" Table 3A High Pressure Recirculation SSEL (52 items)

A review of the Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) database (Reference 34) was then performed to expand the equipment list. Seismic Category I (SC-1) equipment that was considered in the SPRA, but not included in the IPEEE tables, was identified and added to the equipment list, resulting in a total equipment count of 1236 items.

Since the IPEEE applies to the three PVNGS Units, general EQIDs were used in the SSEL tables (i.e., the EQIDs presented therein do not show the Unit number, which is normally indicated by the first character of the EQID). In contrast, in the SPRA database, much of the equipment was identified by using the Unit I designation. Therefore, all EQIDs in the list were converted to the Unit I designation.

Per the guidance provided in Section 3 of Reference 1, the process for selecting a sample of the SSCs associated with the safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining containment integrity must include the following four screens:

• Screen #1 - Seismic Category I:

The purpose of Screen #1 is to restrict the scope of SSCs in the SWEL to those that are classified as SC-I. This is intended to comply with the request in the NRC 50.54(0 letter (Reference 50),

under the "Requested Actions" section, to "verify current plant configuration with the current license basis."

Out of 1236 SSCs initially considered, 1119 were retained by Screen #1 and subsequently passed to Screen #2.

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" Screen #2 - Equipment or Systems:

The purpose of Screen #2 is to filter out the SSCs that regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration continues to be consistent with the established plant licensing basis. The types of SSCs that are excluded consist of SC-I Structures, Containment Penetrations, and SC-I Piping Systems.

Manual valves, check valves, flow orifices, fire dampers, and relief valves were also excluded in accordance with the guidance, since they are either considered in-line components or equipment that is regularly inspected.

Out of 1119 items coining in from Screen #1, 775 were retained by Screen #2 and subsequently passed to Screen #3.

• Screen #3 - Support for the 5 Safety Functions:

The purpose of Screen #3 is to filter out the SSCs that do not support at least one of the following safety functions:

o Reactor reactivity control o Reactor coolant pressure control o Reactor coolant inventory control o Decay heat removal, including the ultimate heat sink o Containment function The safety functions supported by each SSC exiting Screen #2 were determined in consultation with PVNGS staff members (Shift Manager/Auxiliary Operator) during the first set of meetings.

Out of 775 items coming in from Screen #2, 412 were retained by Screen #3 and subsequently passed to Screen #4. The list of equipment from Screen #3, entering Screen #4, is defined as Base List 1.

• Screen #4 - Sample Considerations:

The purpose of Screen #4 is to narrow the Base List I candidate items to those of most significance. The PVNGS-1 SWEL 1 contains 1242 representative items from each of the following sample selection attributes:

o A variety of types of systems:

The PVNGS-1 Base List I equipment was categorized based on the third and fourth characters of their EQIDs, which identifies the plant system. There were 31 system categories contained in Base List 1. Table 3-1 shows how these system categories were represented in SWEL 1.

2 The original SWEL I consisted of 125 items. One item was removed (IMCHEEO1) because it was inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area. See discussion in Section 3.4.

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• CP Containment Purge 4 1 CT Condensate Transfer and Storage 3 1 DF Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer 1 0 DG Diesel Generator 14 3 EC HVAC Essential Chilled Water 8 4 EW Essential Cooling Water 8 3 GA Service Gas 1 0 GR Gaseous Radwaste 2 1 HA HVAC Auxiliary Building 4 1 HC HVAC Containment Building 12 6 HD HVAC Diesel Generator Building 4 2 HJ HVAC Control Building 21 11 IA Instrument and Service Air 1 0 PB Class 1E 4.16 kv Power 3 1 PE Class I E Standby Generation 2 1 PG Class IE 480v Power Switchgear 6 3 PH Class I E 480v Power Motor Control Center 8 4 PK Class IE 125 VDC 20 9 PN Class IE Instrument Power 12 6 RC Reactor Coolant 16 9 RD Radioactive Waste Drain 2 1 RM Main Control Board 30 8 SA Engineered Safety Features Actuation System II SB Reactor Protection 14 1 SG Main Steam 40 7 SI Safety Injection 101 19 SP Essential Spray Ponds 4 2 ZA Auxiliary Building 6 0 ZJ Control Building II I

• Refer to Section 3.4 for explanation of change to SWEL I System Type.

Note that the DF (Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer), GA (Service Gas), IA (Instrument and Service Air), and ZA (Auxiliary Building) systems are not represented because the equipment types covered by each system are already well represented.

o Major new and replacement equipment (including recent modifications):

Major new and replacement equipment were identified through a review of either:

1) Section 8 (System Design History) or 2)Section II (Change History), of a selection of the major system DBMs (References 4 through 30). Recent modifications were assessed through consultation with PVNGS Operations and Design Engineering staff members.

Additionally, System Health Reports were reviewed to ensure that recent modifications were captured and examined for potential impact. The participating PVNGS Operations staff members were asked to provide any information they felt the System Health Reports may not have touched upon. This was to address any recent modifications where 1) weight and/or the location of the center of gravity of the replacement are significantly WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- I January 2014

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Based on this sampling consideration, 38 Base List I items were identified as having major new or replacement modifications. Of these, the 15 items shown in Table 3-2 were represented in SWEL 1.

Table 3-2: Equipment Selected for SWEL Based on the "Major New or Replacement Equipment" Attribute Item Walkdown Description Major New or Replacement Equipment Equipment Modifications 115 I EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 Addition of relays. See Reference 6, p. 101 Modified the HPSI throttle valves and miniflow isolating 310 IJSIBUVO616 RC loop 2A isolation valve valves from rising/rotating stem valves and changed the motor operated actuators. See Reference 30, p. 250.

Modified the HPSI throttle valves and miniflow isolating 312 IJSIBUVO626 RC loop 2B isolation valve valves from rising/rotating stem valves and changed the motor operated actuators. See Reference 30, p. 250.

Replaced actuator and yoke assembly on valves. See 11 IJAFBUVO034 SG-EOIA isolation valve Reference 4, p. 104.

12 IJAFBUV0035 SG-E01 B isolation valve Replaced actuator and yoke assembly on valves. See Reference 4, p. 104.

14 IJAFCUV0036 SG-E01A isolation valve Replaced actuator and yoke assembly on valves. See Reference 4, p: 104.

Relocated the motor operated valve from outside the RC loop I long-term recirc/SDC bioshield wall to the inside near the hot leg nozzle to valve eliminate flow induced vibration in the line. See Reference 30, p. 248.

303 IMS1BPOI LPSI pump "B' LPSI pump shaft and mechanical seal retrofit. See Reference 30, p. 246.

Modified the HPSI throttle valves and miniflow isolating 313 IJSIBUVO636 RC loop IA isolation valve valves from rising/rotating stem valves and changed the motor operated actuators. See Reference 30, p. 250.

Modified the HPSI throttle valves and miniflow isolating 314 IJSIBUVO646 RC loop IB isolation valve valves from rising/rotating stem valves and changed the motor operated actuators. See Reference 30, p. 250.

50 I MDGBF03 DG "B" air intake filter Modified hangers. See Reference 6, p. 104.

222 IJSGBUVOI30 SG-EO1A isolation valve Lock nut screw replaced. See Reference 29, p. 154 223 IJSGBUVO035 SG-EOIB isolation valve Lock nut screw replaced. See Reference 29, p. 154 319 IJSIBUV656 RC loop 2 SDC isolation valveRernc30p.28 Added pressure relieving spring check valves. See Reference 30, p. 248.

Modified the HPSI throttle valves and miniflow isolating 321 IJSIBUV667 HPSI pump "B" recirc iso (closes on valves from rising/rotating stem valves and changed the RAS) motor operated actuators. See Reference 30, p. 250.

o A variety of types of equipment:

The Base List 1 items were each assigned to one of the 22 classes of equipment listed in Appendix B of Reference 1. Table 3-3 shows how these classes were represented in SWEL 1. Two classes, compressors and motor generators, were not represented because there are no SC-I equipment in these categories. Additionally, the transformers that are SC-I were considered part of the larger equipment typically represented as switchgear or motor control centers (MCCs). Thus, this classification is not individually represented in SWEL 1.

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• Refer to Section 3.4 for explanation of change to SWEL I Equipment Type Number.

o A variety of environments:

Since the site is located in a dry environment, typical of a desert climate, it was decided to identify the equipment operating environments based on its location either "inside" (i.e., inside an equipment room) or "outside" (i.e., outdoors) and based on the normal maximum design temperature of the corresponding equipment environment. These design temperatures were determined from a review of Appendix A of the Equipment Qualification Program Manual (Reference 31) and Section 9.4 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (Reference 32). Based on this review, seven categories of equipment operating environments were identified. Table 3-4 shows how these equipment operating environments were represented in SWEL 1.

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Temperature Number of Items Number of Items (OF) in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 1 80 142 (All inside) 47 (All inside) 104 150 (All inside) 42 (All inside) 113 8 (2 inside and 6 outside) 3 (All outside) 120 62 (All inside) 17 * (All inside) 122 4 (All outside) 2 (All outside) 124 18 (All inside) 5 (All inside) 140 28 (All inside) 8 (All inside)

• Refer to Section 3.4 for explanation of change to SWEL I Environment list.

o Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program:

Based on a review of the IPEEE report (Reference 3), there were no Unit I seismic vulnerabilities identified. However, the IPEEE report states that a limited number of actions were taken to improve plant seismic capacity; no specific actions other than a Unit 3 example were provided, e.g., the anchorage on the bookcases located behind the control cabinets in Unit 3 was improved to reduce the possibility that the cabinets would be impacted during a seismic event.

The following additional considerations were factored into the SWEL 1 selection process:

o Numerical measures of risk importance:

The Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) derived from the Internal Events PRA model (Reference 33) was compiled for the Base List 1 items to determine potentially risk-significant SSCs. Items with a RAW value greater than 2 were considered of "high" risk importance. There were 70 items of high risk importance in Base List 1; 26 were selected for SWEL 1.

o Protected train restrictions during the walkdown week:

The protected train schedules [PVNGS "Work Week Schedule"] during the PVNGS-1 walkdown dates (from July 30, 2012, through August 3, 2012) were reviewed so that inaccessible items could be identified and deferred from SWEL 1. Of the 124 items selected for SWEL 1, 2 items were expected to be inaccessible due to protected train restrictions (see Appendix G, Table G-2, Items, 33 and 102). Their walkdowns were deferred to PVNGS refueling outage 1RI 7, performed in spring 2013.

3.2.1 Base List 1 The list of equipment retained by Screen #3 (and subsequently entering Screen #4) is defined as Base List I and is summarized in Appendix G, Table G-1.

3.2.2 SWEL 1 The list of equipment retained by Screen #4 is defined as SWEL I and is summarized in Appendix G, Table G-2.

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Eleven additional components were later identified (during the first set of meetings) based on a system review.

Per the guidance established in Section 3 of Reference 1, the process for selecting a sample of the SSCs associated with the SFP includes the following four screens:

" Screen #1 - Seismic Category I:

The process for selecting SFP-related SSCs using Screen #1 is similar to the process described earlier for Screen #1 of SWEL 1. The purpose of Screen #1 is to limit the items to those that have a seismic licensing basis.

All SSCs initially considered for SWEL 2 (26 items) were passed from Screen #1 to Screen #2.

" Screen #2 - Equipment or Systems:

The process for selecting SFP-related SSCs using Screen #2 is similar to the process described earlier for Screen #2 of SWEL 1. Screen #2 considers only those items associated with the SFP that are appropriate for an equipment walkdown process. The purpose of Screen #2 is to filter out the SSCs that regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration continues to be consistent with the established plant licensing basis.

Of the 26 items retained by Screen #1, 6 were retained by Screen #2 and subsequently passed on to Screen #3.

" Screen #3 - Sample Considerations:

The equipment retained by Screen #2 and subsequently entering Screen #3 is defined as Base List 2.

The process for selecting SFP-related SSCs using Screen #3 is similar to the process described earlier for Screen #4 of SWEL 1. The purpose of Screen #3 is to narrow the Base List 2 candidate items to those of most significance, considering the following sample selection attributes:

o A variety of types of systems o Major new and replacement equipment (including recent modifications) o A variety of types of equipment o A variety of environments Since there were only six items associated with the SFP., all items contained in Base List 2 were selected for input to SWEL 2.

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The purpose of Screen #4 is to identify items that could allow the SFP to drain rapidly. Per the guidance established in Section 3 of Reference 1, the SSCs considered are not limited to SC-I items. Any items identified as having the potential for rapidly draining the SFP should be considered.

The Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1) specifies the following on page 3-8:

"Determine whether there are SFPpenetrations below about 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies. If there are no such penetrations, then no rapid drain-down items would be added to SWEL 2."

UFSAR (Reference 32) SeCtion 9.1.3.3.1.1.1, pages 9.1-35 and 9.1-36, states the following:

"If a pipe break were to occur in the Seismic Category I/quality portion of the system, pool cooling could be lost. However, the event would be self-limiting as all pipe penetrations through the pool wall are at or above the minimum required water levels for spent fuel shielding of l Oft as required by Regulatory Guide 1.13. All pipes extending down into the pool have siphon breaker holes at or above the minimum requiredwater level. Under these conditions, sufficient time (longer than 30 minutes) is available to isolate the break and recover the minimum level requiredfor start of the pool cooling system. If the spentfuel pool clean up system is aligned with the refueling pool (drain valves), administrative procedures are in place to identif, locate and isolate a pipe break within the containment in a timely manner."

The first two sentences of this UFSAR excerpt deal with the possibility of losing SFP water inventory following a pipe break. The next two sentences deal with how quickly the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System can be restored following a pipe break and are not pertinent to rapid drain-down.

Based on this documentation, there are no rapid drain-down items for input to SWEL 2.

A review of the SFP and its relationship to the adjacent fuel transfer canal and cask load pit was conducted to ensure that a*rapid drain-down could not occur via a loss of gate seal integrity. A system review showed that the bottom of the fuel transfer canal gate and cask load pit gate invert are 3-1/2 inches below the top of the spent fuel racks. Although a loss of these gate seals would result in flooding of the cask load pit and the fuel transfer canal, it would not result in a water level less than 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies. This is due to the relatively small volume of the fuel transfer canal and cask load pit. The fuel transfer tube within the fuel transfer canal was also considered since it provides an isolation path to the reactor cavity. The fuel transfer tube seal, canal isolation valve PPCNV1 18, and quick-operating closure device MPCEMOIA are SC-I items considered part of the SFP structure assessed by analysis and periodic inspections and were therefore excluded from SWEL 2. Drainage from the cask load pit to the decontamination pit would be limited because the bottom of the decontamination gate invert is 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies. Although a rapid drain-down threat associated with the gate seal system was not found, the instrument air supply system to the SFP gate was included in the Area Walk-By.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-12 3.3.1 Base List 2 The equipment retained by Screen #2 and subsequently entering Screen #3 is defined as Base List 2 and is summarized in Appendix G, Table G-3.

3.3.2 Rapid Drain-Down SWEL 2 is augmented by the equipment that could potentially cause the SFP to drain rapidly (the equipment retained by Screen #4). As discussed earlier, there are no rapid drain-down items for input to the PVNGS-1 SWEL 2.

3.3.3 SWEL 2 SWEL 2 is defined as the list of equipment retained by Screen #3 plus the equipment retained by Screen

1. 4. As discussed earlier, Screen #3 was not utilized because all 6 items contained in Base List 2 were selected for input into SWEL 2. In addition, there was no equipment associated with rapid drain-down.

Therefore, SWEL 2 is the same as Base List 2 (summarized in Appendix G, Table G-3).

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-13 3.4 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS The equipment items that were inaccessible during the scheduled PVNGS-1 at-power walkdown dates (from July 30, 2012, through August 3, 2012) are identified in Table 3-5. The guidance allows for items to be deferred to a later date if inspection poses a safety concern. Items with electrical safety challenges or items within containment were deferred to ensure safety when inspecting. The items in Table 3-5 were subsequently walked down during and following PVNGS refueling outage 1R17.

Table 3-5: PVNGS-I Equipment Inaccessible During the Scheduled At-Power Walkdowns SWEL I Walkdown Equipment Item Equipment Description Location Number 14 1MCHEEO1 Regenerative heat exchanger CTMT 15 IJCHEHV0239 Charging line to reactor coolant loop 2A isolation globe valve CTMT 20 IJCPBUVO005A Containment power access purge supply isolation butterfly damper CTMT 36 IJHCBUVO044 Discharge sampling from RU-I containment isolation valve CTMT 37 IJHCBUVO047 Inlet sampling to RU-I containment isolation valve CTMT 53 1EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 CTRL 55 1EPGBL32 480 V LC32 bus CTRL 56 1EPGBL34 480 V LC34 bus CTRL 77 IJRCBHVO105 Pressurizer and reactor vessel head vent to reactor drain tank globe valve CTMT 78 IJRCBHVO108 Pressurizer vent to reactor drain tank globe valve CTMT 79 I JRCBHV0109 Pressurizer vent to reactor drain tank globe valve CTMT 80 1JRCBPT0102B Przr pressure (required for RPS/SIAS) CTMT 81 IJRCBPTI04 SDC RCS pressure interlock CTMT 84 1JRCDPT106 SDC RCS pressure interlock CTMT 85 IJRCNTE1OI Pressurizer temperature CTMT 101 IJSGCLT1 I 13C SG-EOIA WR level (required for AFAS) CTMT 102 IJSIAUVO651 RC loop 1 long-term recirc/SDC valve CTMT 108 1JSIBPSV189 RC loop 2 LTOP relief to sump CTMT 109 IJSIBUVO614 Safety injection tank 2A discharge isolation globe valve CTMT 111 1JSIBUVO624 Safety injection tank 2B discharge isolation globe valve CTMT 120 IJSINPT391 HPSI long-term recirc loop Ipressure xmtr CTMT Item 1MCHEEO1 was inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area. For radiological safety considerations, it was decided to remove this component from SWEL 1. A new item was not selected to replace this item for the following reasons:

• This item belongs to system type CH. The removal of this item reduced the number of CH items in SWEL 1 from II to 10 (see Table 3-1), which is still a good representation of this system type.

• This item was not identified as having major new or replacement modifications (see Table 3-2).

Therefore, the removal of this item from SWEL 1 had no effect on the representation of equipment having major new or replacement modifications.

• IMCHEEOI belongs to equipment type 21. The removal of this item from SWEL I reduced the number of type 21 items from 9 to 8 (see Table 3-3), which is still a good representations of the equipment type.

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• IMCHEE01 is assigned a maximum environment temperature of 120 0 F. The removal of this item reduced the number of "120 0 F items" in SWEL 1 from 18 to 17 (see Table 3-4), which is still a good representation of the environment temperature type.

0 IMCHEEOI is not a risk-significant SSC. Therefore, the removal of this item from SWEL I had no effect on the representation of high-risk-importance items in SWEL 1.

Following the completion of the Unit I at-power walkdowns, the industry was made aware that the NRC staff had clarified a position on opening electrical cabinets to inspect for other adverse seismic conditions.

Supplemental inspections of 15 electrical cabinets per FAQ 4.20 were conducted during the follow-on walkdowns. The list of electrical cabinets that require supplemental inspection is included in Table 3-6.

Table 3-6: PVNGS-I FAQ 4.20 Supplemental Cabinet Inspections SWEL 1 Walkdown Description Equipment Item Equipment Location Number 58 IEPHBM32 480 V MCC M32 CTRL 59 IEPHBM34 480 V MCC M34 AUX 60 I EPHBM36 480 V MCC M36 AUX 61 IEPHBM38 480 V MCC M38 AUX 65 1EPKBM42 DC power to TCB I control circuit CTRL 68 1EPKCM43 3 DC power to TCB I control circuit CTRL 57 IEPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus CTRL 94 IJSBBC03 Reactor trip breaker "B" AUX I EPKBD22 (ROB to 62 I EPKBM42) LC 34 control power CTRL IEPKCD23 4(ROB to 66 1EPKCM4 3 ) DC distribution panel D23 CTRL 124 IJSABCOI B Train ESFAS relay cabinets CTRL 64 1EPKBH 12 Battery charger "B" CTRL 69 1EPKCN43 Inverter for shutdown cooling isolation valve CTRL 69____ IEPKCN43_______ IJSICUV653 C__ICTRL 1EPKCM43 was inaccessible during 1RI 7 and was therefore replaced with 1EPKDM44, which was inspected to satisfy FAQ 4.20.

S1EPKCD23 was inaccessible during IRI 7 and was therefore replaced with I EPKDD24, which was inspected to satisfy FAQ 4.20.

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SWEL I Walkdown Description Equipment Item Equipment Location Number 70 I EPKDN44 Inverter for I JSIDUV654 shutdown cooling B return inside CTRL containment isolation valve 75 1EPNCN 13 5 DC/AC inverter "C" CTRL The inaccessible equipment walkdowns performed during refueling outage IR 17 are summarized in Table 3-7. Since Train C was protected during refueling outage I R17, Train C electrical components were substituted with their counterpart from Train D. Table 3-7 indicates equipment substitutions.

Table 3-7: PVNGS-1 Equipment Inspected During Refueling Outage IR17 SWEL I Walkdown Equipment Item Equipment Description Location Number 15 1JCHEHV0239 Charging reactor coolant loop 2A line tovalve CTMT isolation globe 20 IJCPBUVO005A Containment power access purge supply CTMT isolation butterfly damper 36 IJHCBUVO044 Discharge sampling from RU-I CTMT containment isolation valve 37 Inlet sampling to RU-I containment CTMT 37JHCBUV0047 isolation valve 53 I EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 CTRL 55 1EPGBL32 480 V LC32 bus CTRL 56 I EPGBL34 480 V LC34 bus CTRL 77 IJRCBHV0105 Pressurizer and reactor vessel head vent to CTMT reactor drain tank globe valve 78 IJRCBHV0108 Pressurizer vent to reactor drain tank globe CTMT valve 79 IJRCBHV0109 Pressurizer vent to reactor drain tank globe CTMT valve 80 IJRCBPT0102B Przr pressure (required for RPS/SIAS) CTMT 57 I EPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus CTRL 58 1EPHBM32 480 V MCC M32 CTRL 59 1EPHBM34 480 V MCC M34 AUX 60 I EPHBM36 480 V MCC M36 AUX 61 1EPHBM38 480 V MCC M38 AUX 62 I EPKBD22 LC 34 control power CTRL 64 1EPKBH 12 Battery charger "B" CTRL 5 I EPNCN13 was inaccessible during IRI 7 and was therefore replaced with 1EPNDNI4, which was inspected to satisfy FAQ 4.20.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-16 Table 3-7: PVNGS-I Equipment Inspected During Refueling Outage I R17 (Continued)

SWEL I Walkdown Equipment Item Number Equipment Description Lcto Location 65 1EPKBM42 DC power to TCB1 control circuit CTRL IEPKCD23 was inaccessible during IR17 and 66 was therefore replaced with 1EPKDD24, which DC distribution panel D24 CTRL was inspected to satisfy FAQ 4.20.

1EPKCM43 was inaccessible during 1R 17 and 68 was therefore replaced with 1EPKDM44, DC power to TCB I control circuit CTRL which was inspected to satisfy FAQ 4.20.

Inverter for 1JSIDUV654 shutdown 70 I EPKDN44 cooling B return inside containment CTRL isolation valve IEPNCNI3 was inaccessible during 1R17 and DC/AC inverter "D" 75 was therefore replaced with IEPNDN 14, which CTRL was inspected to satisfy FAQ 4.20.

81 IJRCBPTI04 SDC RCS pressure interlock CTMT 84 IJRCDPT106 SDC RCS pressure interlock CTMT 85 IJRCNTEIOI Pressurizer temperature CTMT 94 IJSBBC03 Reactor trip breaker "B" AUX 101 1JSGCLT1 I 13C SG-EOIA WR level (required for AFAS) CTMT 102 IJSIAUV0651 RC loop I long-term recirc/SDC valve CTMT 108 1JSIBPSVI89 RC loop 2 LTOP relief to sump CTMT 109 IJSIBUVO614 Safety injection tank 2A discharge CTMT isolation globe valve III IJSIBUVO624 Safety injection tank 2B discharge isolation CTMT 111____ 1JSIBUV0624___globe valve CTMT 120 IJSINPT391 HPSI long-term recirc loop 1 pressure xmtr CTMT 124 IJSABC0I B train ESFAS relay cabinets CTRL The equipment that could not be inspected during refueling outage lR17 is identified in Table 3-8. The walkdown of this equipment was completed on April 30, 2013.

Table 3-8: PVNGS-1 Item Completed During the April 30, 2013, Inspection All required and supplemental inspections are complete. Inspection results are documented on the corresponding Seismic Walkdown checklist in Appendix A.

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4. SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS

4.1 BACKGROUND

Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were performed in accordance with the requirements of Section 4 of EPRI TR- 1025286 (Reference 1). The walkdowns were conducted by the SWT, consisting of the two SWEs mentioned in Section 2.2. Members of PVNGS Operations and Engineering provided support during all walkdowns. The SWEs utilized engineering judgment based upon experience and training indicated in Section 2.2, supplemented by existing current licensing basis (CLB) plant documentation and analyses, where applicable, to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions. For items on the SWEL, these potential seismic conditions- included any adverse anchorage conditions, adverse seismic spatial interactions, or other adverse seismic conditions. The results of the walkdown and any pertinent observations were documented for each item on the SWEL using the Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs) included in Appendix A. In addition to potentially adverse seismic conditions, observations described in the SWCs include those that, after discussion between the SWEs, were determined to be adequate.

Area Walk-Bys were conducted by the SWT in each area of the plant that contained an item on the SWEL. The Area Walk-Bys identified potentially adverse seismic conditions associated with other SSCs located in the vicinity of the SWEL item (up to a maximum radius of 35 ft from the component). The area examinations identified: 1) adverse anchorage conditions, 2) degraded equipment in the area,

3) potential seismic spatial interactions, 4) adverse cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting,

5) potential flooding/spray or fire hazards, and 6) other adverse housekeeping conditions. The results of the walk-bys and any pertinent observations were documented for each inspected area using Area Walk-By Checklists (AWCs), which are included in Appendix B. Observations described on the AWCs include potentially adverse seismic conditions as well as conditions that were discussed and determined to be adequate at that time.

The SWT was assisted by other individuals present on the walkdown, including PVNGS Operations and Engineering personnel. The SWT for PVNGS Unit I initial walkdowns consisted of Hunter Young and Timothy Nealon of S&A. For supplemental walkdowns during refueling outage IR17, the SWT consisted of Hunter Young and Cory Figliolini. Chris Wandell and Winston Borrero led the support from PVNGS for walkdowns as well as the interface with plant operators. Additional PVNGS staff facilitated access to equipment and provided additional information regarding plant procedures and functions of SWEL items. In addition, these individuals assisted in identifying nearby equipment and systems that could cause adverse seismic interaction. Any issue that could not be resolved by consensus of the SWEs during the walkdowns was identified as a potentially adverse seismic condition on the SWC or AWC (as applicable). The conditions identified were evaluated with respect to the CLB. These Licensing Basis Evaluations are listed and described in Appendix D.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-2 4.2 PREPARATION FOR SEISMIC WALKDOWNS In preparation for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys, the SWT obtained the SWEL and selected 50% of the items (excluding line-mounted equipment) for anchorage configuration verification. A total of 76 components were identified as potential anchorage verification candidates and 40 were randomly chosen to fulfill the 50% anchorage configuration verification requirement. The selection was adjusted to consider equipment of interest identified by PVNGS, including items that had recent modifications or anchorage changes. PVNGS design drawings, seismic qualification calculations, and vendor/supplier documents (SDOCs) were reviewed and later taken to the field to verify as-installed configurations were consistent with the CLB established by these documents. The SWT also obtained PVNGS equipment layout drawings to establish a detailed walkdown schedule.

To prepare for observations involving potential interaction with masonry block walls, the SWT reviewed the equipment layout drawings associated with the SWEL and located masonry walls in proximity. The Control Building 74 ft, 100 ft, and 140 ft elevations, in addition to the Auxiliary Building sub-100 ft elevations, were found to have block walls adjacent to SWEL items and Area Walk-By items. The SWT obtained and reviewed calculation 13-CC-ZJ-0120 (Reference 60) for Control Building masonry walls and 13-CC-ZA-0140 (Reference 61) for Auxiliary Building masonry walls. The calculations indicate that all in-scope walls were designed and analyzed to not collapse under SSE accelerations, which enabled the SWT to conclude that the SWEL items were free of seismic spatial interaction due to a postulated masonry block wall collapse. The SWT assessed SWEL and Area Walk-By equipment for seismic spatial interaction due to differential movement between the equipment and the masonry block walls.

In anticipation of potential flooding/spray interaction hazards due to threaded fire piping, the SWT obtained fire suppression diagrams provided within the IPEEE Report (Reference 3). These diagrams were later used in the field for Area Walk-Bys to determine whether threaded fire piping, where present, was normally wet or pre-actuated and dry. Preliminary review of the fire suppression diagrams indicated that areas with threaded fire piping are generally pre-activated sprinkler systems and therefore are normally dry, thus precluding potential flooding/spray interaction hazards. However, the SWT was cognizant of exceptions where threaded piping could be normally wet. For these cases, the SWT would look for long spans with flexible supports, which may lead to excessive threaded joint rotation and potential spray.

Additional current licensing basis documentation obtained and reviewed to support the walkdowns included: the in-structure floor response spectra for the SSE (DBM-C5, Reference 53), structural damping criteria per UFSAR Table 3.7-1 (Reference 32), the PVNGS scaffolding procedure and installation specifications (30DP-9WPll and 13-CN-0380, References 54 and 55), the PVNGS housekeeping procedure (30DP-OWM12, Reference 56), the PVNGS transient material details and analyses (13-A-ZYD-0034 and 13-CC-ZZ-0309, References 57 and 58), the PVNGS lighting details (13-E-ZAL-001 1, Reference 59), and the control room ceiling qualification (Log No. 13-10407-A216-12, Reference 65).

The PVNGS IPEEE Report (Reference 3) was also obtained and reviewed. This document is discussed in further detail in Section 7.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-3 4.3 WALKDOWN RESULTS The SWT conducted the initial Seismic Walkdowns for Unit I at PVNGS July 30, 2012, through August 2, 2012. For components not originally inspected due to having either inaccessible internal anchorages, being located inside containment, or requiring additional interior inspection related to FAQ 4.20.

additional walkdowns were conducted during refueling outage 1R17 on April 6, 2013, through April 7, 2013, and during follow-on inspections performed on April 30, 2013. Detailed walkdown results are provided on the SWCs and AWCs in Appendices A and B, respectively. When walkdown activities identified potentially adverse seismic conditions, licensing basis evaluations were performed and are discussed in Section 5 and Appendix D. Appendix D provides additional information on the resolution and Operability Determinations/Functional Assessments of each of these conditions. A summary of initial walkdown statistics follows:

" A total of 133 components were walked down and 59 Area Walk-Bys were performed. Six items listed on the SWEL (IEPKBD22, 1EPKDD24, 1EPKCD23, IJRMBB02, IJRMBB04` and 1JRMCB05) were child components contained within parent SWEL components. These child components are referred *to as "Rule of the Box" (ROB) items, for which the walkdown observations are identical to those of the parent item.

• Fifteen (15) SWEL components were electrical cabinets whose interiors were not completely examined during the initial walkdowns. Following the completion of the at-power Seismic Walkdowns, the industry was made aware that the NRC staff had clarified under FAQ 4.20 a position on opening electrical cabinets to inspect for other adverse seismic conditions.

Supplemental inspections of 15 electrical cabinets occurred on April 6, April 7, and April 30, 2013. The list of electrical cabinets requiring supplemental inspection per FAQ 4.20 is included in Section 3.4. Three (3) SWEL electrical cabinets originally inspected during at-power walkdowns were inaccessible during the supplemental inspections due to the plant protected train (refer to Table 3-7, Items 66, 68, and 75). To fulfill the recommendations of FAQ 4.20, sister components for these cabinets on the opposite train were fully inspected-including the cabinet interiors-and documented on SWCs.

" One-hundred-one (101) components and forty-nine (49) Area Walk-Bys were resolved in the field as having no potentially adverse seismic concerns. Two Area Walk-Bys were confirmed in the field to have potentially adverse seismic concerns involving seismic housekeeping. In addition, the door to distribution panel IEPNBD26 was found unlatched and confirmed in the field as a potentially adverse seismic concern.

• Forty-five (45) observation's for thirty-one (31) SWEL components and nine (9) Area Walk-Bys could not be readily resolved by the consensus of the SWEs and were considered potentially adverse seismic conditions requiring further evaluation. It is important to note that some SWEL components or Area Walk-Bys may have multiple potentially adverse conditions that involve anchorage, spatial interaction, or other adverse concerns. Twenty-four (24) of the 45 observations requiring further review involved potential anchorage concerns; 17 involved potential seismic spatial interaction concerns; and four involved spray/flooding hazards. Thirty-eight (38) of the 45 potentially adverse conditions were determined to meet the current seismic licensing basis. Seven (7) conditions could not be readily resolved per the Licensing Basis Evaluation process and were entered into the CAP. All 45 Licensing Basis Evaluation items are discussed in Section 5 and Appendix D, which includes additional information on the current status of potentially non-conforming conditions.

Summaries of Seismic Walkdown observations follow:

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-4 Potentially Adverse Anchorage Conditions While inspecting anchorages for SWEL equipment and in-scope Area Walk-By equipment, the SWT noted 24 cases where as-installed configurations could not be verified by the PVNGS documentation brought in the field (drawings, SDOCs, and calculations). Discrepancies included: exceeded bolt projection lengths, varying equipment pad thicknesses for mechanical components, varying weld patterns for electrical equipment, and varying anchorage spacing. Detailed descriptions of these discrepancies are also indicated in Appendix D. To a limited extent, Field Change Requests (FCRs) and Non-Conformance Reports (NCRs) associated with the anchorage documentation that could verify the as-installed configurations were reviewed as part of Licensing Basis Evaluations.

Three potentially degraded anchorage conditions were observed in the field that required further evaluation. Both the EW "B" Heat Exchanger (IMEWBE01) and the Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchanger 2 (IMPCBEOI) were noted to have loose anchor bolt nuts which may potentially reduce the bolts' uplift capacities. The SWT noted the observations as potentially adverse and sought documentation allowing for backed off nuts as part of Licensing Basis Evaluations. The SWT also observed hairline temperature and shrinkage cracking on the equipment pad for the ESF Switchgear Room "B" Emergency Air Handling Unit (AHU) (IMHJBZ03). The concern is that the anchorage may have reduced capacity if the equipment pad is not properly reinforced. The SWT noted the observation as potentially adverse and sought documentation indicating proper pad reinforcement as part of Licensing Basis Evaluations.

The SWT observed no indications of reinforcement yielding and no signs of excessive corrosion for in-scope safety-related equipment. All cracks observed were noted to be hairline or small cracks (less than 0.03 inch) as defined in EPRI NP-6041-SL (Reference 47).

Potentially Adverse Seismic Spatial Interactions The SWT noted seventeen (17) SWEL components or areas where equipment had potential adverse seismic spatial interactions that required further evaluation. Ten (10) involved potential equipment spatial interaction with nearby permanent equipment due to potentially insufficient clearances. For valves 1JSGBHVI78 and IJSGBHV185, the SWT observed 1/16 inch clearances between potentially sensitive valve body components and separately structurally mounted components that could potentially interact due to differential motion during an SSE event. In the Area Walk-By for MSSS Room C-302, the SWT noted a flexible conduit pinched between 1JSGEUVOI70 (MSIV) and building steel. Valves IJGRBUVO02 and l JWCAUV0062 (refer to AWC AUX A-A09) in addition to dampers 1MHJBM02 and 1MHJBM03 were also observed to have small clearances to permanent equipment. Electrical components with potentially insufficient clearances to permanent equipment included MCC 1EPKBM42, auxiliary relay cabinets 1JZABCOI/C02/C03/C04/C05 (refer to AWC AUX A-127), and 1JSABC06 /

IJSABC04 / IJZJBC02A / IJESACO1 / 1JSHCC02 (refer to AWC CTRL Outer Horseshoe). All ten (10) interaction concerns due to potentially insufficient clearances were documented for further review under Licensing Basis Evaluations.

Two (2) SWEL components or areas involved potential adverse seismic spatial interactions due to overhead items. IMPCAPOI and other safety-related components in the area (refer to AWC DG G-104) are within the zone of influence of large, flat panel lighting mounted overhead should they fail in a seismic event. Documentation detailing the anchorage of these lights was sought as part of Licensing Basis Evaluations.

The SWT inspected overhead piping and distribution systems including cable trays and found them well-anchored and ruggedly supported throughout the unit. Large fire extinguishers on small hooks that could WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-5 possibly uplift and fall were found throughout the unit, but no safety-related equipment items were within fire extinguisher zone of influence. Overhead lighting was also noted to be rugged in all areas with sensitive equipment, particularly the Control Building. Where equipment is less sensitive to impact, several instances of lighting fixtures supported by S-hooks with disengaged or missing setscrews were observed. The SWT judged all cases not to be hazardous to safety-related equipment, but the conditions were noted and documented in the CAP.

All attached lines and piping to SWEL equipment were inspected and readily concluded to have adequate flexibility in the field. One exception was noted on the EW "B" Heat Exchanger (IMEWBE01) where the relief line on top may be subjected to overstress due to differential motion between floors. This observation was noted for further review under Licensing Basis Evaluations.

As noted in Section 4.2, all SWEL components and Area Walk-By equipment within the zone of influence of masonry block walls were evaluated prior to walkdowns not to be impact hazards due to collapse per existing calculations. No seismic spatial interaction hazards due to differential movement between the equipment and the masonry block walls were observed during the walkdowns.

All scaffolding encountered by the SWT was found to be adequately braced and anchored in addition to having sufficient clearances to safety-related equipment in accordance with station procedures.

Several housekeeping issues were discovered within the unit. Two housekeeping issues were confirmed as found in the field by the SWT to be potentially adverse seismic conditions. A large waste bin located approximately 12" from a safety-related J-box (IEZFI AAKJO1) was observed during the Area Walk-By of the 100' Elevation of the Fuel Building near the Fuel Building AHUs. The condition was immediately corrected by PVNGS Operations and documented under Palo Verde Action Request (PVAR) 4221593.

The SWT also noted laydown equipment stored in proximity to safety-related HVAC duct on the 140' elevation of the Fuel Building (refer to AWC FB 140). The condition was also documented under PVAR 4221593. Housekeeping issues that were found in violation of the housekeeping procedure (Reference

56) were entered into the CAP.

Detailed descriptions of all potentially adverse seismic spatial interaction concerns are provided in Appendix D.

Other Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions The SWT observed an unlatched door on distribution panel IEPNBD26, which contained an undervoltage relay and ground relay inside although not on the door. The condition was corrected immediately and documented under PVAR 4219492. The SWT did not note any other degraded conditions, missing equipment fasteners, or irregular mountings on equipment.

Potential Flooding/Spray Hazards The SWT was cognizant of potential spray and flooding hazards particularly from threaded fire piping.

Overhead fire piping was generally found to be welded and ruggedly supported (no rod hung piping) at short and regular intervals. Areas that had threaded piping were either confirmed to be pre-activated and therefore normally dry or have adequate rigid support spacing so as to preclude excessive joint rotation.

One SWEL item and three Area Walk-Bys were observed by the SWT to have potential spray hazards that required additional review as part of Licensing Basis Evaluations. ESF Switchgear Room "B" Emergency AHU (1MHJBZ03, also refer to AWC CTRL J-A05) was observed to be in proximity of a leaking solder joint on the domestic service (DS) water piping north of the AHU. The Area Walk-By for the "B" Diesel Generator Room (refer to AWC DG G-104) was observed to have DS piping within the zone of influence of heavy heaters and lights overhead should they fall during a seismic event. The Area WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-6 Walk-By associated with Reactor Trip Breaker "B" (refer to AWC AUX A-227) was observed to have large air handlers on vibration mounts. The concern is that the AHUs could fall off their mounts, allowing their pipe connections to break, flood the area, and open the reactor trip breakers.

Potential Seismically Induced Fire Interactions No potential seismically induced fire interactions were noted for Unit I by the SWT. This included no observations of hazardous/flammable material stored in inadequately anchored drums, inadequately anchored shelves, or unlocked cabinets; and no adverse natural gas or hydrogen lines.

Non-NTTF 2.3 Related Observations The SWT (including PVNGS Operator and Engineering SWEs) were also cognizant of issues not necessarily pertaining to the seismic qualification of safety-related equipment. The SWT noted conditions such as:

" Broken/missing floor grating clips

• Missing or partially-engaged set-screws on pendant lighting S-hooks

• Support showing wear from seal water tubing to charging pump

" NQR junction box with panel nut not installed

• General housekeeping issues such as:

o Squeegee stored near AHU o Step ladder near surge tank Non-NTTF 2.3 observations were recorded on the SWCs/AWCs and entered into the PVNGS CAP.

Many of these conditions were also corrected on-the-spot by the operations member of the SWT. None of these observations (by definition) represented potentially adverse seismic conditions - fasteners were located on non-seismic components; lighting and loose or unsecured items were not within the zone of influence of any soft targets.

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5. LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS The 45 potentially adverse seismic conditions requiring further evaluation identified in either the equipment Seismic Walkdowns or the Area Walk-Bys as discussed in Section 4 were evaluated with respect to their seismic licensing basis. As indicated in Section 4.3, 24 of the 45 items requiring further review involved potential anchorage concerns; 17 involved potential seismic spatial interaction concerns; and four involved spray/flooding hazards. These potentially adverse conditions are included in Appendix D, along with their dispositions. Thirty-eight (38) of the 45 potentially adverse conditions were determined to meet their seismic licensing basis. The seven (7) NTTF status "N" potentially adverse seismic conditions that could not readily be shown to meet the current seismic licensing basis were entered into the site's CAP. For each of the items that fell into this category, the PVAR number is included in the disposition text, which is shown in Appendix D. Additional information pertaining to the current resolution and Operability Determinations/Functional Assessments of these items is included in Appendix D.

General methodologies adopted by the Licensing Basis Reviewers listed in Section 2.3 for addressing the observations noted in Section 4 are summarized in the following subsections.

Evaluations of Potentially Adverse Anchorage Conditions For the anchorage observations noted in Section 4 that involved discrepancies between the as-installed configurations and the anchorage documentation (drawings, SDOCs, and calculations) taken into the field, the Licensing Basis Reviewers collected and reviewed FCRs and NCRs for updates to the field documents that represent the Current Licensing Basis (CLB). Eighteen (18) as-installed anchorage configurations were determined to meet their seismic licensing basis. Five (5) as-installed anchorage configurations for SWEL components IMHFAJOI, IMHFBJ01, IMPCAE01, IMECBE01, and IMPCBE01 could not be readily shown to reflect CLB documentation, and therefore were entered into the CAP and indicated as potentially non-conforming conditions by the listing of "No" under Question 5 of the SWCs. The two potentially degraded conditions involving backed off nuts for IMEWBE01 and 1MPCBE01 were confirmed not to have documentation allowing for gaps. Therefore, these items were entered into the CAP and indicated as non-conforming conditions by the listing of "No" under Question 2 of the SWCs.

Evaluations of Potentially Adverse Seismic Spatial Interactions Observations involving the possibility of insufficient clearances between safety-related components were generally resolved by estimating relative displacement from the in-structure response spectra of Reference

53. Given equipment anchorage and spatial configuration, the Licensing Basis Reviewers determined lower-bound estimates of component frequencies. These frequency estimates along with the appropriate damping values from UFSAR Table 3.7-1 (Reference 32) were used to obtain spectral accelerations.

Component displacement was then estimated by the following formula (Reference 63):

in S,

• 386. 4 n S 2 d=SF* o

• 2)

Where SF = modal shape factor (1.6 for cantilever)

S, = spectral acceleration (g) from response spectra

6) = fundamental frequency (Hz)

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 5-2 If the combinations of component displacements under SSE loadings did not exceed the gap noted in the walkdown, the gap was noted as sufficient to preclude impact.

In some instances, licensing basis evaluations of potential spatial interactions were resolved by inspection of installation details and existing analyses. This disposition method was applied for the auxiliary relay cabinets located 1/8-inch from concrete walls. The Licensing Basis Reviewers located EQCF D95-0038 (Reference 65), which documents that the auxiliary relay cabinets were analyzed by finite element methodology and determined to be rigid. Therefore, the 1/8-inch as-built gap was noted as sufficient.

All but one of the potential spatial interaction concerns were determined to meet their seismic licensing basis. Storage of material near a SC-I duct in Area FUEL 140 ft. which could potentially impact the duct was immediately corrected. The condition was entered into the CAP and indicated as a non-conforming condition by the listing of"No" under Question 7 of the AWC.

Evaluations of Other Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions There were no Licensing Basis Evaluations pertaining to other adverse seismic conditions (loose/missing fasteners, heavy additions to cabinets, unlatched cabinet doors) for Unit 1.

Evaluations of Potential FloodinL/Snrav Hazards Potential flooding/spray hazards noted during the walkdown were evaluated by a combination of further documentation review and reassessment of photographs and walkdown information. Of particular note, the vibration-mounted AHUs in proximity to the reactor trip breakers on the 120' elevation of the Auxiliary Building were determined to pose no spray or flood hazard to the reactor trip breakers. Per PVNGS, potential impacts of flooding/spray hazards are mitigated by the enclosed protective cabinets (designed as drip-proof per SDOC NOOI-1303-00057 (Reference 65)), which house the reactor trip breakers and the distance from the AHUs. All potential flooding/spray hazards were resolved.

Evaluations of Potential Seismically Induced Fire Interactions No potential seismically induced fire interactions were noted for Unit I by the SWT; therefore, there are no Licensing Basis Evaluations.

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6. PEER REVIEW

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This section documents the independent peer review for the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF)

Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns performed by Stevenson & Associates (S&A) for Unit I of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS). The peer review addresses the following activities:

• Review of the selection of the structures, systems, and components, (SSCs) that are included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL)

• Review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys

• Review of the licensing basis evaluations

" Review of the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions in to the plant's Corrective Action Program (CAP)

• Review of the final and supplement submittal reports The peer reviewers for Palo Verde Unit 1 are Messrs. Walter Djordjevic of S&A and Gary L Douglas of Westinghouse. Mr. Djordjevic is designated the peer review Team Leader and participated in all peer review activities as the seismic subject matter expert. Mr. Douglas participated in all peer review activities and led the SWEL selection peer review as the SWEL selection subject matter expert. Neither peer reviewer was involved in the Seismic Walkdown inspection process. Mr. Djordjevic is an advanced degree structural engineer with over 30 years of nuclear seismic experience. He has received Seismic Capability Engineer (EPRI SQUG training), EPRI IPEEE Add-on, Seismic Fragility and Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE) training. Mr. Douglas is a nuclear engineer with 15 years of nuclear engineering experience and 10 years of aerospace engineering experience. Resumds are provided in Appendix E.

The peer review of the SWEL development began on July 25, 2012, and was completed on July 28, 2012.

All findings noted on the SWEL Peer Review Checklist were resolved. The completed SWEL Peer Review Checklist is found in Appendix C. The results of the SWEL development peer review are discussed in Section 6.2.

The peer review of the Seismic Walkdown inspection started on July 25, 2012, with a peer check of the actual walkdowns for Unit 2. Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas joined the walkdown team for a portion of the day's planned walkdowns to observe the conduct of walkdowns and adherence to the Seismic Walkdown Guidance (SWG) (Reference 1). No additional peer review site visits were made for the Unit 1 walkdown as the same procedures were implemented and a similar suite of SWEL equipment was inspected as selected for PVNGS Unit 2. The required interviews were conducted by Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas with the SWE inspection team on August 23, 2012, after review of a sample of the Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWC) and Area Walk-By Checklists (AWC) to ascertain the quality and procedural compliance with the SWG. An additional interview was conducted by Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas with Mr. Hunter A. Young on August 19, 2013, to review the SWCs and AWCs completed during the follow-on walkdowns. The discussion of the results of these sample SWC and AWC reviews are provided in Section 6.3.

The results of the peer review of licensing basis evaluations are provided in Section 6.4. These assessments and their outcomes were also discussed with the SWE inspection team on August 23, 2012, and August 19, 2013. The peer reviewers reviewed the 45 licensing basis evaluations and found the final WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- I January 2014

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6.2 PEER REVIEW - SELECTION OF SSCs 6.2.1 Purpose The purpose of this section is to describe the process used to perform the peer review of the selected SSCs that were included in the SWEL.

6.2.2 Peer Review Activity - Selection of SSCs The guidance in EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3.: Seismic, dated June 2012 (Reference 1), Section 3: Selection of SSCs was used as the basis for this review.

This peer review was also based on reviews of the spreadsheets utilized by the SWEL developers to generate the Base Lists and Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists.

Peer review was also based on interviews with the following individuals who were directly responsible for development of the SWEL:

o Rolando Perez (Westinghouse) o Derek Seaman (Westinghouse) o Chris Wandell (Palo Verde Engineering) o Winston Borrero (Palo Verde Engineering)

This peer review utilized the Seismic Walkdown Guidance checklist shown in Reference I Appendix F:

Checklist for Peer Review of SSC Selection.

For SWEL 1 development, the following actions were completed in the peer review process:

Verification that the SSCs selected represented a diverse sample of the equipment required to perform the following five safety functions:

o Reactivity Control (RC) o Reactor Coolant Pressure Control (PC) o Reactor Coolant Inventory Control (IC) o Decay Heat Removal (DHR); Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) o Containment Function (CF)

Verification that the SSCs selected include an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:

o Various types of systems o Major new and replacement equipment o Various types of equipment WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- I January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-3 o Various environments o Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE program o Risk insight consideration For SWEL 2 development, the following actions were completed in the peer review process:

Verification that spent fuel pool related items were considered and appropriately added to SWEL 2.

Verification that appropriate justification was documented for spent fuel pool related items that were not included in SWEL 2.

6.2.3 Peer Review Findings - Selection of SSCs This peer review found that the process for selecting SSCs that were added to the SWEL complied with the process outlined in Reference 1, Section 3: Selection of SSCs. SWEL I selections totaled 124 items and SWEL 2 selections totaled six items.

The peer reviewers verified that the SSCs selected represented a diverse sample of the equipment required to perform the five safety functions. The bases for items selected to SWEL I were the IPEEE Report, Appendix 3.A (Reference 3), which listed safe shutdown equipment from each redundant train of the systems supporting the five safety functions, and Seismic Category I items from the Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) database. A breakdown of the safety functions represented by the SWEL I selections follows:

Reactivity control - 39 SWEL selections support this function Pressure control - 80 SWEL selections support this function Inventory control - 53 SWEL selections support this function Decay heat removal/ultimate heat sink - 89 SWEL selections support this function Containment function - 19 SWEL selections support this function The peer reviewers verified that the SSCs selected to SWEL 1 include an appropriate representation of items having the required sample selection attributes. A breakdown of the sample selection attributes represented by the SWEL 1 selections follows:

Twenty-seven (27) of 31 Base List systems were represented in the SWEL I list. The peer reviewers recommended that equipment from two unrepresented systems be added to the SWEL list. Components from the remaining unrepresented systems were component types that were adequately represented by other system selections. Since all five safety functions are also adequately represented by the SWEL, the peer review team concluded that the "various types of systems" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

Fifteen (15) of 38 major new or replacement items were represented in the SWEL I list. The sources for these items were Design Basis Manuals for the systems supporting the five safety functions. Several of the new or replacement items involved a change to a group of similar items, and at least one item was selected from each group to represent the change. The peer review team concluded that the "major new and replacement equipment" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented. During review of the submittal report, a revision to the SWEL was needed to correct an error to this sample consideration attribute in the spreadsheet that was used to track and implement the SWEL selection process. This error did not result in a change to the WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-4 Base List or SWEL selections; it increased the number of major new or replacement items represented in the SWEL I list. The peer reviewers verified that the Seismic Walkdown Guidance requirements for this sample consideration attribute were maintained.

Twenty (20) of 22 types of equipment were represented in the SWEL I list. The equipment types not represented were "compressors" and "motor-generator sets." The site does not have safety-related equipment in these equipment types. Equipment type "transformer" is a subcomponent to equipment type "switchgear." The peer review team concluded that the "various types of equipment" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

All environments were represented in the SWEL I list. The Palo Verde Units are located in a dry environment; therefore environment classification was based on the maximum design temperature of the equipment rooms. Since at least one item was selected from each environment classification the peer review team concluded that the "various environments" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

No items were added to the SWEL I list based on findings of the IPEEE program because no equipment enhancements were required in Unit 1.

Twenty-six (26) of 70 risk-significant items were represented in the SWEL list. Risk insights were applied from the Seismic PRA and Internal Events models to the selection of items to the SWEL. The peer review team concluded that the "risk insights" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

The peer reviewers verified that spent fuel pool related items were considered and appropriately added to SWEL 2.

Spent fuel pool related items considered were based on a review of design basis manual descriptions, piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, and a system review using the Site Work Management System (SWMS). All items that screened into Base List 2 were selected to SWEL 2.

The peer reviewers verified that appropriate justification was documented for spent fuel pool related items that were not included in SWEL 2.

The justification for screening out spent fuel pool related items was reviewed and found to be supported by the Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1). Components in-line with Seismic Category I piping were screened out. No rapid drain-down items were included in SWEL 2. This conclusion was supported by a review of the UFSAR (Reference 32) which determined that all pipe penetrations through the pool wall are at or above the minimum required water level of 10 ft above top of fuel assemblies. All pipes extending down into the pool have siphon breaker holes that are at or above the minimum required water level of 10 ft above top of fuel assemblies. All items that screened in to Base List 2 were selected to SWEL 2; therefore the peer review team concluded that appropriate justification was documented.

The completed peer review checklist in Appendix C documents the peer review results.

The SWEL was revised during the follow-on walkdowns to remove component 1MCHEE01, and to replace three (3) protected Train C components with corresponding Train D components which were readily accessible. This change reduced the number of SWEL I items from 125 to 124. The component was removed because it was located in a locked high-radiation area. It was not necessary to replace 1MCHEE01 with a similar equipment type since the sampling selection attributes remained adequately represented by multiple items on the SWEL. The replacement of Train C components with corresponding Train D components is acceptable per the guidance requirements. The Peer Review Team reviewed these WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-5 SWEL changes and verified that all sampling selection attributes remained adequately represented on the SWEL.

6.2.4 Resolution of Peer Review Comments - Selection of SSCs The peer review comments documented in the peer review checklist in Appendix C were resolved in a timely manner and improved the Seismic Walkdown process as summarized in the following:

• Additional SWEL selections from systems SA and ZJ were recommended; this enhanced the system variety represented on the SWEL.

• Adding an Area Walk-By of the SFP to evaluate interactions of equipment with the SFP transfer gates and inflatable seal equipment was recommended; this enhanced the walkdown effort.

• The enhancements and editorial corrections made to the Unit 2 SWEL report were incorporated into the Unit 1 SWEL report prior to this peer review; this improved report clarity.

• Provided clarification that DF system items will be adequately evaluated by the DG system SWEL Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys; this provided for clarity in the report.

6.2.5 Conclusion of Peer Review - Selection of SSCs This peer review concluded that the process for selecting SSCs to be included in the Seismic Walkdown equipment list complied with the process outlined in Reference 1, Section 3: Selection of SSCs. It is further concluded that the SWEL sufficiently represents a variety of the required sampling of plant Seismic Category I safe shutdown equipment to meet the objectives of the NRC 50.54(f) letter (Reference 50).

6.3 PEER REVIEW OF SAMPLE SEISMIC WALKDOWN AND AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS A site visit was made on July 25, 2012, by Messrs. Walter Djordjevic and Mr. Gary L. Douglas to perform the peer review of the Seismic Walkdown team's inspection of Unit 2 equipment. This allowed constructive feedback to be provided to the walkdown team in the field for subsequent application in the Unit I and Unit 3 walkdowns. A final review of the SWCs and AWCs was performed on August 22 and 23, 2012, after which an interview was conducted by Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas with the SWE inspection team in accordance with the SWG requirements. The SWE trained walkdown engineers were Messrs. Hunter A. Young and Timothy S. Nealon. An additional interview was conducted by Messrs.

Djordjevic and Douglas with Mr. Hunter A. Young in accordance with the SWG requirements on August 19, 2013.

Table 6-1 lists the SWC and AWC samples which represent 25% of the SWC and 24% of the AWC populations, respectively. The sample includes equipment from various equipment classes to introduce diversity to the sampling procedure.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-6 Table 6-1: SWC and AWC Peer Review Samples from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit I Equipment Equipment Walkdown Item Observations Identification (GIP) Class Gap is properly assessed given that MCC is rigid in 1EPHBM32 1 Motor Control Center the longitudinal direction, so evaluation is acceptable Inverter for Shutdown 1EPKDN44 16 No comment Cooling B Return Power to PPS "C" 1EPNCD27 14 No comment Instrumentation 1JAFBFT0041B 18 AFW Instrument Rack No comment 1JAFBUVO035 8 SG-EO1B Isolation No comment Valve Regenerative Heat 1JCHBUV0924 8 Exchanger Outlet No comment Isolation Globe Valve 1JHCBPT0351B 18 Containment Pressure Verified spring nuts on drawing 13-J-ZZS-0143 and -

Instrument rack 0147 Containment Pressure Verified spring nuts on drawing 13-J-ZZS-0143 and -

Instrument rack 0147 Performed licensing basis evaluation. PVAR 1JRMNB02 20 RWT Level Panel 4220252 generated to correct sheet 53 of calculation 13-CC-ZQ-J01 to reflect installed configuration depicted on sheet 49.

1JRMCB05 20 Control Room Board No comment 1JSBBC2A 18 I/V Converter 1JSBBC2A 18 Instrument Rack Adjacent masonry wall is seismically designed Verified existing gap of approximately 1/16" is insufficient to prevent contact between SOy 1SGB-HY185B and tube steel; however, it is also 1JSGBHV0185 7 Atmospheric dump determined that SOV functionality will not be valve HV-185 impaired. Recommendation is to cut HSS member or move mounting channel to provide additional clearance. PVAR 4250333 was entered into the CAP system to document the observation and resolution.

SG-EO1B Isolation 1JSGBUN0135 7 No comment Valve 1JSIBPSV409 7 HPSI Train B Injection No comment to EDT Relief Containment Spray 1JSIBUV0665 8 Pump Recirc to RWT No comment Train B Globe Valve 1JSIBUV676 8 Sump Isolation Valve No comment 1MCHBP01 5 Charging Pump 2 No comment 1MCTET01 21 CST No comment Excessive bolt projections cannot be reconciled.

1MECBE01 11 Essential Chiller B PVAR 4275110 generated to reconcile the configuration discrepancy.

1MEWBP01 5 EW Pump B No comment DG "B" Room Essential 1MHDBJ01 9 No comment Exhaust Fan WCAP-17679-NP, 1 Supplement Revision 0 PVNGS- I January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-7 Table 6-1: SWC and AWC Peer Review Samples from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit I 1MHJBF04 10 Control Room EAHU No comment 1MHJBM03 8 MO Damper Clearance to duct (1/4") determined to be adequate Verified anchorage with Sheet 95 of calculation 13-1EPKDM44 1 Motor Control Center CCQO CC-ZQ-E01 1EPNDN14 16 Inverter Verified anchorage with calculation 13-CC-ZQ-EO1 Przr pressure Verified anchorage with Detail 1 on SDOC N001-1JRCBPT0102B 18 (required for 1301-00698 RPS/SIAS)

SDC RCS pressure Verified anchorage with Detail 1 on SDOC NOO1-interlock 1301-00698 SDC RCS pressure Verified anchorage with Detail 1 on SDOC N001-interlock 1301-00698 SG-E01A WR level Verified anchorage with Detail 1 on SDOC NO01-(required for AFAS) 1301-00698 HPSI long-term recirc Verified anchorage with Detail 2 on Drawing 13-J-loop 1 pressure xmtr 01D-0119 Clearance to cable tray (1/16") determined to be adequate; evaluation acceptable 1EPGBL36 2 480 V LC36 bus No comment Environmental enclosure clearance to building steel (1-1/2") and cable tray (3/8"), and to the MCC 1EPHBM34 1 480 V MCC M34 internally (1/2") determined to be adequate; potential S-hook interaction determined to have no impact; evaluations acceptable Area Walkdown Description Observations C02, C03, C04 all within close proximity to J wall. C01 is within 1/8" at top to wall.

Area: Aux, 100', A-127 Licensing Basis Evaluation: Per EQCF D95-0038 (Ref. 65), all ZAA and ZAB cabinets were analyzed with finite element methodology and determined to be rigid. Therefore, the as-built gap is sufficient.

Area: Aux, 40', A-D15 No comment Light fixtures (3 with open s-hooks) could fall on 1" piping but cannot Area: AUX, 70', A-B21dagepin damage piping Area: Control,100', J-109 No comment Area: Control,140', Inner Horseshoe No comment - suspended ceiling is Category I, no seismic interactions No comment - good housekeeping and heater meets seismic Area: DG, 100', G-104 rqieet requirements Numerous housekeeping issues along south and west walls. One potential impact with Category I duct on west wall Area: MSSS, 140', C-302 Flexible conduit between MSIV and building steel.

Licensing Basis Evaluation: Review of photographs from walkdowns indicated that flexible conduit could withstand MSIV movement due to SSE since valve is well-supported within very close proximity.

Accordingly, differential movement between the MSIV and the building steel will be negligible. Therefore, there is no adverse seismic concern.

Area: SP, 140', Y-124 No comment Area: Yard, 93', CST proximity Light near DMWT judged to not be a hazard Area : CTMT, 100, 1JCHEHV239 No comment Proximity WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS- I January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-8 Table 6-1: SWC and AWC Peer Review Samples from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit I Area : CTMT, 120, 1JRCDPT106 Photographs labeled "U1 Outage NTTF 2" are inconsistent with the Proximity labeling used elsewhere in the report; corrected in Appendix B.

Area : CTMT, 80, 1JSINPT391 No comment Proximity Area : CTMT, 140, Pressurizer Cube No comment 6.4 REVIEW OF LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS Appendix D provides a list of the potentially adverse seismic conditions identified during the Unit 1 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys and how they were addressed. If a PVAR was generated, it is referenced in Appendix D. Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas conducted an interview with the SWE inspection team on August 23, 2012, to discuss the issues identified to determine if, in the opinion of the peer reviewers, any of them potentially challenged the current licensing basis of the plant.

As noted in Section 5, there were 45 potentially adverse seismic conditions identified in either the equipment Seismic Walkdowns or the Area Walk-Bys requiring evaluation with respect to their seismic licensing basis. Not all potentially adverse conditions were resolved. The peer reviewers performed a review of all completed licensing basis evaluations and the walkdown team's decisions for entering these potentially adverse seismic conditions into the plant's CAP. Thirty-eight (38) of the licensing basis evaluations determined that the potentially adverse conditions were ultimately found to be in compliance with the current licensing basis. Of the remaining seven (7) potentially adverse seismic conditions that were entered into the plant's CAP, six (6) involved follow-up verification of the as-built anchorage configuration with plant documentation and one (1) involved potential interaction between storage material and Seismic Category I ducting in the spent fuel pool area. The peer reviews of Sections 4.3 and 5, and Appendix D led the peer reviewers to conclude that the licensing basis evaluations carefully compared the actual as-found plant configurations to the current licensing basis documentation in order to assess configuration compliance with the Palo Verde design basis, and the decisions for entering conditions into the plant's CAP complied with the expectations of the SWG.

CAP Status Review The peer reviewers performed a review of the status of items that were entered into the plant's CAP as a result of the Seismic Walkdowns (see Table 6-2). This supplement submittal report was found to appropriately reflect these updates.

Table 6-2: Table of CAP Status from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit 1 CAP Item CAP Status PVAR 4221593 Area: FUEL 100' large waste bin located Action completed. Housekeeping issue approximately 12" from a safety-related J-box corrected.

(1EZF1AAKJ01)

PVAR 4219492 1EPNBD26 unlatched door Action completed. Condition corrected.

PVAR 4250333 1JSGBHV0185 gap of approximately 1/16" between Action completed. Evaluated using SOV 1SGB-HY185B and tube steel existing calculation 13-MC-SG-0515.

Condition corrected.

PVAR 4214832 Bookcases in the zone of influence of the main Action completed. Bookcases removed control boards in all three units.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-9 Table 6-2: Table of CAP Status from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit 1 CAP Item CAP Status PVAR 4221758 1MEWBE01 slightly loose nut on E saddle anchor Action completed. Evaluated as no bolt impact on seismic capability and no operability impact. Condition corrected.

PVAR 4221593 Area: FUEL 140' Seismic Category I duct Action completed. All improperly along W wall with storage material that could restrained items were corrected.

potentially impact the duct PVAR 4220252 1JRMNB02 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition meets CLB as readily verified against CLB documentation evaluated against Sheet 49 of existing calculation 13-CC-ZQ-J01. EDC 2013-00470 will update Calculation 13-CC-ZQ-J01 to enhance documentation.

PVAR 4220252 1JRMNB04 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition meets CLB as readily verified against CLB documentation evaluated against Sheet 50 of existing calculation 13-CC-ZQ-JO1. EDC 2013-00470 will update Calculation 13-CC-ZQ-J01 to enhance documentation.

PVAR 4275110 1MHFAJO1 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition meets CLB as readily verified against CLB documentation evaluated within existing NCR CF-01260.

PVAR 4293568 1MHJBZ03 leaking solder joint on the DS piping Joint evaluated as no potential for spray north of the AHU . hazard to safety related equipment; Working action plan to correct the leaking joint.

PVAR 4275110 1MPCAE01 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition meets CLB as readily verified against CLB documentation evaluated in existing calculation 13-CC-ZQ-M001.

PVAR 4275110 1MECBE01 anchorage configuration could not be Evaluated using calculation 13-CC-ZJ-readily verified against CLB documentation 0085. No impact on seismic capability and no operability impact. As-found configuration will be documented on EDC 2013-00470.

PVAR 4275110 1MHFBJ01 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition meets CLB as readily verified against CLB documentation evaluated within existing NCR CF-01260.

PVAR 4275110 1MPCBE01 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition (no torque on sliding readily verified against CLB documentation support nuts and 2 middle bolts not installed) meets CLB as evaluated in existing calculation 13-CC-ZQ-MOO1.

PVAR 4220895 1MPCBEO1 E saddle SW bolt nut is loose with gap Action completed. As-found condition (gap and missing washer) has been corrected to meet CLB.

PVAR 4293568 Area: CTRL J-A05 spray hazard concern from HJB- Joint evaluated as no potential for spray Z03 hazard to safety related equipment; Working action plan to correct the leaking joint.

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7. IPEEE VULNERABILITIES A summary of IPEEE vulnerabilities is available in Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Individual Plant Examination of External Events report (Reference 3). Per Reference 3, no seismic vulnerabilities were determined to exist at PVNGS-1 and no significant changes to plant design were required in order to demonstrate the ability to mitigate .the Review Level Earthquake (RLE). All observations identified from the IPEEE walkdowns were resolved prior to issuing of the IPEEE report on June 1, 1995.

Table 4-1 of PVNGS CORR 94-001-506 (Reference 62) had documented items to review for the Seismic IPEEE prescreening and walkdown of all three units; and Table 3-4 of Reference 3 summarized the resolution of these original walkdown concerns. The IPEEE report (Reference 3) concluded that all components have capacities exceeding the 0.3g peak ground acceleration of the RLE. However, action was taken to improve the seismic capacity of the bookcases located behind the control cabinets in the Unit 3 Control Room. The existing anchorage was determined to be marginal, and additional anchorage was provided prior to issuing of the IPEEE report to resolve the concern. While the condition was also noted for the same bookcases in Unit I per Reference 62, the IPEEE report did not specify action to provide additional anchorage for these bookcases.

As noted in Section 4.2, the SWT reviewed the IPEEE report prior to conducting walkdowns. Similar observations noted in the IPEEE report regarding the Control Room bookcases were also noted for review during these walkdowns. The SWT reviewed Detail 35 of 13-A-ZYD-0034 (Reference 57), which specifies 23 metal screws fastening the bookcases in all three units to the metal stud wall. The SWT and licensing basis reviewers determined that, although the as-installed anchorage for the Unit 1 bookcase did not comply with this detail, the demand forces were adequately low to preclude failure; therefore, no adverse spatial interaction was identified. As a result of this observation, PVAR 4214832 was generated and PVNGS removed these bookcases from the zone of influence of the main control boards in all three units.

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8. REFERENCES

1. EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012

2. Drawing 13-I-ZZI-0001.R011, "Site Work Management System (SWMS) Equipment Database."

3. CORR 102-03407, "Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - IPEEE."

4. Design Basis Manual DBM AF, "Auxiliary Feedwater System," Revision 22.

5. Design Basis Manual DBM CH, "Chemical and Volume Control System," Revision 21.

6. Design Basis Manual DBM DF/DG/PE, "Diesel Generator, Class I E Standby Generation, Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System," Revision 23.

7. Design Basis Manual DBM EC, "Essential Chilled Water System," Revision 13.

8. Design Basis Manual DBM EW, "Essential Cooling Water System," Revision 23.

9. Design Basis Manual DBM FW, "Feedwater System," Revision 13.

10. Design Basis Manual DBM HA, "Auxiliary Building HVAC System," Revision 17.

11. Design Basis Manual DBM HC, "Containment Building HVAC System," Revision 9.

12. Design Basis Manual DBM HD, "HVAC - Diesel Generator Building," Revision 12.

13. Design Basis Manual DBM HP, "Containment Hydrogen Control System," Revision 13.

14. Design Basis Manual DBM MA, "Main Generation System," Revision 8.

15. Design Basis Manual DBM NA, "13.8 kV AC Non-Class IE Power System," Revision 10.

16. Design Basis Manual DBM NC, "Nuclear Cooling Water System," Revision 19.

17. Design Basis Manual DBM NE, "Station Blackout Topical," Revision 18.

18. Design Basis Manual DBM PB, "Class IE 4.16 kV Power System," Revision 13.

19. Design Basis Manual DBM PG, "Class IE 480 VAC Power Switchgear System," Revision 11.

20. Design Basis Manual DBM PH, "Class IE 480V Power - MCC," Revision 11.

21. Design Basis Manual DBM PK, "Class 1E 125 VDC Power System," Revision 17.

22. Design Basis Manual DBM PN, "Class I E Instrument AC Power System," Revision 10.

23. Design Basis Manual DBM QD, "Emergency Lighting System," Revision 10.

24. Design Basis Manual DBM RC, "Reactor Coolant System," Revision 29.

25. Design Basis Manual DBM SA, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation System," Revision 16.

26. Design Basis Manual DBM SB, "Reactor Protection System," Revision 18.

27. Design Basis Manual DBM SF-FWCS, "Feedwater Control System," Revision 6.

28. Design Basis Manual DBM SF-SBCS, "Steam Bypass Control System," Revision 6.

29. Design Basis Manual DBM SG, "Main Steam," Revision 31.

30. Design Basis Manual DBM SI, "Safety Injection System," Revision 33.

31. Equipment Qualification (EQ) Files EQDF EQ-PM, Equipment Qualification Program Manual, Revision 21.

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32. Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 17, June 2013.

33. Westinghouse Calculation CN-RAM-1 1-019, "Validation of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model Conversion for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station," September 2012 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2).

34. Interim Version of the Westinghouse Seismic PRA Database (Microsoft Access& database file "APS-SPRA.mdb," dated August 22, 2012).

35. Design Basis Manual DBM PC "Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System," Revision 18.

36. Drawing Number 01-M-PCP-0001, "P & I Diagram, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System,"

Revision 27.

37. Drawing Number 01-P-PCF-0501, "Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Isometric," Revision 4.

38. Drawing Number 01-P-PCF-0502, "Fuel Building Isometric Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System," Revision 2.

39. Drawing Number 01-P-PCF-0503, "Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Isometric," Revision 0.

40. Drawing Number 01-P-PCF-0504, "Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Isometric," Revision 0.

41. Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers Standard IEEE 344-71, "Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

42. Design Criteria Manual DCM-PGD, "Project General Design Criteria," Revision 24.

43. Regulatory Guide 1.60, "Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants,"

Revision 1, December 1973.

44. Regulatory Guide 1.61, "Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants,"

Revision 0, October 1973.

45. Regulatory Guide 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification," Revision 1, August 1973.

46. Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers Standard IEEE 344-75, "Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

47. EPRI Report NP-6041-SL, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin (Revision I)," Revision 1.

48. WCAP-17679-NP, "Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1," Revision 0, November 2012.

49. Not used.

50. NRC Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident," Enclosure 3, "Recommendation 2.3: Seismic."

51. Bechtel Topical Report BC-TOP-4-A, Rev. 3, "Seismic Analysis of Structures and Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants," November 1974.

52. Not used.

53. Design Basis Manual DBM-C5, "Seismic Topical," Revision 4.

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54. Procedure 30DP-9WPI 1, "Scaffolding Instructions," Revision 24.

55. Specification 13-CN-0380, "Installation Specification for Seismic Cat IX and Non-Seismic Scaffolding," Revision 20.

56. Procedure 30DP-0WM12, "Housekeeping," Revision 20.

57. Drawing 13-A-ZYD-0034, "Transient Material Restraint Details," Revision 20.

58. Calculation 13-CC-ZZ-0309, "Transient Material Analysis," Revision 5.

59. Drawing 13-E-ZAL-00 11, "Lighting Fixture Mounting," Revision 31.

60. Calculation 13-CC-ZJ-0 120, "Concrete Block Walls," Revision 5.

61. Calculation 13-CC-ZA-0140, "Hatches and Penetrations," Revision 7.

62. Correspondence 94-001-506, "Transmittal of Report Prescreening and Walkdown of PVNGS for Seismic IPEEE."

63. "Dynamics of Structures, Theory and Application to Earthquake Engineering," Anil K. Chopra, University of California at Berkeley.

64. Not used.

65. PVNGS Documents used for Anchorage Configuration Verification and Licensing Basis Evaluations

a. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZQ-EOO1, "Seismic Qualification Evaluation - Electrical Equipment," Revision 5.

b. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZQ-JOO1, "Seismic Qualification Evaluation - Control Equipment," Revision 6.

c. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZQ-MOO, "Seismic Qualification Evaluation -

Mechanical Equipment," Revision 8.

d. Drawing Number 13-C-OOA-0001, "Civil-Structural Generator Notes," Revision 24.

e. Drawing Number 13-C-OOA-001 1, "Anchor Bolt Schedule and Details," Revision 9.

f. Drawing Number 13-C-SPS-0376, "Nuclear Service Spray Ponds Sections and Details Sht 1," Revision 11.

g. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0240, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation Details Sht 1," Revision 10.

h. Not used.

i. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0241, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation Details Sht 2," Revision 9.

j. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0242, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation Details Sht 3," Revision 11.

k. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0243, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation Details Sht 4," Revision 13.

i. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0245, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation Details Sht 5," Revision 8.

m. Drawing Number 13-C-ZCS-0703, "MSSS Concrete Sections and Details," Revision 8.

n. Drawing Number 13-C-ZCS-0705, "MSSS Floor Inserts and Penetrations," Revision 20.

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o. Drawing Number 13-C-ZFS-0187, "Fuel Building Concrete Sections & Details,"

Revision 11.

p. Drawing Number 13-C-ZGS-01 10, "Diesel Generator Building Diesel Generator Foundation Plan Sections and Details," Revision 5.

q. Drawing Number 13-C-ZGS-01 16, "Diesel Generator Building Concrete Section and Details Sht 2," Revision 7.

r. Drawing Number 13-C-ZJS-0580, "Control Building Misc Steel Platforms and Details Sht 1," Revision 6.

s. Drawing Number 13-J-OID-0103, "Auxiliary Building Isometric HCA-PT-351A and HCA-PT-352A Sensing Lines," Revision 4.

t. Drawing Number 13-J-O1D-0104, "Sensing Lines for HCC-PT-351C and 352-C Auxiliary Building," Revision 3.

u. Drawing Number 13-J-01 D-01 73, "MSSS Building Iso Sensing Line SGA-PT308, 315; SBG-PT301, 321," Revision 6.

v. Drawing Number 13-J-04D-0118, "MSSS ISO AFA-FT-40A and AFB-FT-41A Sensing Lines," Revision 2.

w. Drawing Number 13-J-ZZS-0157, "Seismic Category I Instrument Mtg. Support for 12"W x 24"H Plate with Unistrut," Revision 6.

x. Log Number 13-10407-A216-12, "Wyle Job No. 44815 - Seismic Test of Compact Ceiling Light Module and an Incandescent Light Module," Revision A.

y. SDOC Number E051-00047, "Qualification Report for Class I E Battery Charger,"

Revision 10.

z. SDOC Number E054-0070, "Class 1E Inverter IEEE 323 and 324 Qualification Report," Revision 7.

aa. SDOC Number E105-0001 1, "Outline Line Voltage Regulator 25KVA," Revision 17.

bb. SDOC Number EN050B-AOOO15, "General Arrangement 28-Cell Battery Rack Sht. 3,"

Revision 5.

cc. SDOC Number J601 A-00274, "Nuclear Qualification Test Report for Modulating Atmospheric Dump Valve," Revision 0.

dd. SDOC Number M598-01433, "Mounting and Wiring Detail for Q Class HVAC Instruments," Revision 21.

ee. Calculation Number 13-MC-SG-0515, "MSSS Main Steam Bypass And Atmospheric Dump Lines," Revision 14.

ff. EPRI Report 1014608, "Seismic Evaluation Guidelines for HVAC Duct and Damper Systems, Revision to 1007896," December 2006.

gg. Drawing Number 13-E-ZAL-001 1, "Lighting Fixture Mounting Detail Sheet 1,"

Revision 32.

hh. Drawing Number 13-E-ZFL-0001, "Fuel Handling Building Lighting &

Communications El. 100 ft, & El. 120 ft, Level 1&2," Revision 14.

ii. Equipment Qualification Control Form (EQCF) D95-0038, "Restraints for Aux. Relay Cabinets."

jj. Calculation Number 13-MC-WC-0502, "Normal Chilled Water Supply System,"

Revision 4.

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II. SDOC Number N00 1-0502-00322, "Bridge Assembly SFHM V-CE- 14439, 3-22-81,"

Revision 4.

mm. SDOC Number NOW-0502-00326, "Trolly Hoist Assy SFHM V-CE-14439, 3-22-81,"

Revision 6.

nn. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZG-0070, "Diesel Generator Building Equipment Supports," Revision 6.

oo. Drawing Number 01-E-ZGL-0001, "Diesel Generator Bldg. Lighting &

Communications Plans at El. 100'-0"& 115'-0"," Revision 8.

pp. Drawing Number 13-J-ZZS-0143, "Seismic Category I Instrument Mtg. Support for 12"w xl8"h Plate with Unistrut," Revision 7.

qq. Drawing Number 13-J-ZZS-0147, "Seismic I Instrument Mounting Support 5,"

Revision 3.

rr. Drawing Number 13-C-ZJS-0102, "Control Building Area JID Concrete and Steel Plans for El. 74' and 100'," Revision 10.

ss. Field Change Request Number 66708C, "Cont Bldg AR JIA&B PL @ E-100."

tt. Westinghouse Calculation CN-RAM-12-015, "Palo Verde Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment- Model Development," November 2012 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2).

uu. Westinghouse Calculation CN-RAM-12-022, "Palo Verde Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment - Quantification," December 2012 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2).

vv. SDOC Number NOO1-1303-00057, "Std Spec Reac Brkr Swtgr System Com Ltr Log 66,72," Revision 3.

ww. Drawing Number 13-J-01 D- 119, "Containment Bldg Isometric SIB-PT-391 Sensing Line," Revision 3.

xx. Nonconformance Report CF-01260, "Anchor Bolt Out of Tolerance."

yy. SDOC Number NOOI-1301-00698, "Wall Rack Assembly V-CE-17414, 23NO82,"

Revision 13."

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This appendix provides only the SWCs from the at-power Seismic Walkdowns performed from July 30 through August 6, 2012, that were revised related to FAQ 4.20, plus the SWCs resulting from the 1R17 refueling outage Seismic Walkdowns performed from April 6 through April 7, 2013, and subsequently on April 30, 2013. The SWCs from the at-power Seismic Walkdowns that are not contained herein can be found in Appendix A of Reference 48 ("Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit I ").

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SUMMARY

Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTTF 7 Resolution (if issued) 6 Status i*tmospneric aump Pdo0et approximateiy 110 Cleardi'dLt 11/d T Lbill*sII D811: -VOlIUCIllUll. rCI Lr lU1 JUJ33DnlVUVL0Jj valve HV-178 between soft air tubing instrument on maximum pipe displacement of.0.085" is considered for lower part of valve and rigid conduit parent pipe of valve HV0178 by similarity. This is greater mounted separately. Verify whether gap is than the approximately 1/16" (0.0625 ")gap as found in the acceptable. field. However, upon reinspection of the component photographs, it is noted that the receptacle receiving the air tubing is cantilevered off the valve body, and therefore has inherent flexibility. Given the flexibility of the air tubing receiving receptacle, it is concluded that the as-found gap of 1/16" is acceptable and not an adverse seismic condition.

SSC meets CLB.

6 PVAR denotes Palo Verde Action Request which is the entry document for the PVNGS corrective action program.

7 NTTF Status denotes conclusions of LBE for the condition. Y- Condition was found to conform to the Current License Basis. N- Condition is either a Non-Conforming Condition or a Potential Non-Conforming Condition WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

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1MHJBM02 motor-operated Noted an approximately 1/2" clearance n/a

• V Licensing Basis Evaluation: Review of Section 3.4.1 of EPRI damper between damper enclosure and fire piping Report 1014608 (Ref. 65) indicates that braced duct runs support steel. Support duct is braced in N/S may have an estimated lower-bound frequency of 10 Hz.

direction about 12-15' W of damper. Verify This falls well out of the flexible range of the PVNGS whether clearance is adequate or damper response spectra; accordingly, a 1/2" gap is judged to be box is not a soft target. sufficient; not an adverse seismic condition. SSC meets CLB. I WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-3 Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NITF Resolution 6 7 IN isrupri Status I

lt'pK5M4Z uL power to IL51 uoservea i-il* ciearance aetween bw n/a Licensing oasis tvaiuation: i ne rrequency OT mne MLL in its control circuit corner and rigidly connected light in the N-S weak direction can conservatively be taken as 5 Hz and the direction. Verify whether clearance is rigidly connected light at 33 Hz. From the SSE response adequate or whether equipment is sensitive spectra using 4% damping in accordance with the UFSAR for to impact. welded structures, the corresponding MCC acceleration at 5 Hz for 4% damping on the 100' CTRL elevation is 1.51 g ( =

1.35

• sqrt(5%/4% damping)) whereas the ZPA at 120' for the light is 0.54g. The estimated maximum relative displacement is 0.95 in (= 1.6*1.51g

• 386.4 / (2*pi*5 Hz)A2

+ 1.6*0.54g *386.4 / (2*pi*33 Hz)A2)), which is less than the gap provided. Therefore, there is no interaction WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-4 Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTrF Resolution (if issued) 6 Status7 1MEWBE01 EW "B" heat 1) Noted sliRhtlv loose nut on E saddle 4221758 N 1) Licensing Basis Evaluation: Per APS, Unit 1 EW HX does exchanger anchor bolt. Verify whether this is an not have documentation allowing for gap; therefore nut acceptable condition per CLB was discovered in a degraded condition and PVAR 4221758 documentation. was generated. APS reports that PVAR (related work) indicates - The nine effective bolts on the sliding end support maintain the ability to resist tensile loads. No adverse seismic condition exists.

APS reports this is a non-conforming condition. Operability Determination concluded that the EW HX remained Operable.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that SSC as-

2) Also noted a relief line on the top of the found condition (loose nut) has been corrected to meet HX that may be subjected to overstress due CLB.

to differential motion between floors. The 10" run on 1" dia. pipe may be subject to 2) Licensing Basis Evaluation: With regards to the relief differential motion due to separate rigid valve piping supports, re-inspection of photos shows a supports mounted to different building threaded connection at the relief valve. This is judged to be levels. Verify whether either there is no the weak point and would fail prior to the valve-to-heat-functionality concern from losing the relief exchanger welded connection. Therefore, differential line or the pipe stress is not excessive due support movement between the building floors poses no to differential motion. adverse seismic concern. SSC meets CLB.

APS rmoorts this is not a non-conforming condition.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-5 Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTTF Resolution (if issued) 6 Status7 Area: AUX A- AREA WALK BY Noted a safety-related MOV n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation: Calculation 13-MC-WCF-0502 A09 (iJWCAUVO062) and SOY (HCAUV46) w/ (Ref. 65) indicates that the 10" pipe running to approximately 1/4" clearance. The SOV is 1JWCAUVO062 is fixed at Containment Penetration 61.

rigidly supported off of Containment steel. From Drawing 01-P-WCF-0201 (Ref. 65), 1JWCAUV0062 is The flexibility of the MOV relative to the located approximately 4 ft from the penetration. Given the SOV could not be verified in the field. small span and large diameter pipe, the displacement of Action shall be taken to determine whether 1JWCAUV0062 is judged to be reasonably less than 1/4".

gap is adequate. Regarding relative displacement to HCAUV46, this SOV is immediately supported rigidly by steel braced off of Containment and is accordingly negligible. Therefore, the 1/4" gap is judged to be acceptable; not an adverse seismic WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-6 Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTTF Resolution (if issued) Status7 Area: FUEL 140' AREA WALK BY 1) Verify whether the Spent Fuel Pool 4221593 N 1) Licensing.Basis Evaluation: Spent Fuel Handling Machine Handling Machine (1MZFNM03) has 1MZFNM03 SDOCs N001-0502-00322 and N001-0502- I support designed to prevent uplift off of 00326 (Ref. 65) indicates that uplift is resisted by members tracks. on the handling machine that engage grooves on the inside of the rail. Therefore, there is no overturning hazard; SSC meets CLB.

2) Also noted Seismic Category I duct along W wall with storage material that could 2) Licensing Basis Evaluation: The NTTF Status is designated potentially impact the duct. Alerted PVNGS "N" for PVAR 4221593 which was issued for storage Engineering and Operations of condition. material that could potentially impact SC-1 duct along W-PVAR 4221593 generated to reconcile the wall.

equipment adjacent to the duct. APS reports that PVAR (related work) indicates - All improperly restrained items were corrected. No adverse seismic condition exists.

APS reports this was a non-conforming condition that was corrected on the spot, therefore no Operability Determination was necessary.

Area: MSSS C- AREA WALK BY Observed flexible conduit pinched between n/a V Licensing Basis Evaluation: Review of photographs from 302 SGE-UV170 (MSIV) and building steel. Flex walkdowns indicates that flexible conduit could withstand conduit runs to junction box SGBJ16. Verify MSIV movement due to SSE since valve is well-supported whether enough flexibility is present in within very close proximity. Accordingly, differential conduit to accommodate differential movement between the MSIV and the building steel will be motion. negligible. Therefore, there is no adverse seismic condition.

SSC meets CLB. I WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

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SDHX A outlet 13-CC-ZQ-JO1 (Ret. 65) calls tor 8" welds at n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation: Further review ot 13-CC-ZQ-JO1 temperature 4' o.c, which varies from the as-installed Sheet 49 (Ref. 65) shows that the as-installed configuration configuration observed in the field. Verify observed during the walkdown matches the "as-required" as-installed anchorage configuration meets configuration indicated in the CLB documentation. SSC CLB documentation. meets CLB. PVAR 4220252 generated by PVNGS to update the "as-installed" configuration indicated on Sheet 53 to reflect the field configuration.

APS reports this is not a non-conforming condition, but does identify a minor documentation deficiency.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that EDC 2013-00470 will update Calculation 13-CC-ZQ-JO1 to correct I

I J.JnL~rus)Lu Lontainmemn veriy .Lz oonts witn spring nuts Tor piaie n/a T Licensing nasis tvaiuaton: As-instaniea conringuration pressure connection to Unistrut per CLB verified per Note 1 on DWG 13-J-ZZS-0143 and 13-J-ZZS-documentation. 0147 (Refs. 65) ; SSC meets CLB.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-8 Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTTF Resolution 6 u7 (if Issued) 6 Status J.10JLUs It:- swltcngear 1.) Notea cracKs in paa near ancnorage on n/a T 1.) Licensing oasis tvaiuatuon: bection u or ii---zJ:--uiuz room "B" EAHU north side. Verify whether pad has (Ref. 65) confirms that #6 ties @ 12" e.w. are doweled from reinforcing that develops in the floor slab. the pad into the base slab; therefore anchorage is 2.) Additionally noted a leaking solder joint adequate; not an adverse seismic condition. SSC meets CLB. I on the DS piping north of the AHU. Verify 2.) Licensing Basis Evaluation: Regarding the leaking solder whether spray hazard is plausible for AHU. joint, combination of support near the joint, relatively low pressure in the line, and distance of safety-related equipment from the piping leads to judgment that leaking joint poses no spray hazard to the equipment; PVAR 4293568 issued to address leaking joint. SSC meets CLB.

Revision 0 17679-NP, Supplement I WCAP- 17679-NP, 2 0 Revision PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-9 Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTTF 7 Resolution 6

(if issued) Status 1EPEBG02 Emergency diesel Dowels per Detail G of 13-C-ZGS-110 (Ref. n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation: Regarding dowels, inspection ot generator "B" 65) were not installed and anchor bolts on 13-C-ZGS-0110 (Ref. 65) and walkdown photos reveals that main engine exceeded max projection (5- the dowels are 2" in diameter with an air-gap at center.

7/8" versus 5-1/4" required). Verify This reflects the as-found configuration. Therefore, there is whether CLB documentation exists allowing no adverse anchorage concern; SSC meets CLB. Regarding for deviation. projection, inspection of Section 4 on DWG 13-C-ZGS-0110 (Ref. 65) reveals that the as-found projection allows for full thread engagement into anchor bolt sleeves. Therefore, there is no adverse anchorage concern as bolt meets Inverter for As-installed configuration did not meet field n/a Y Licensing Bsasts Evaluation: Per sneet lbw on 1j-LL-ZLQ-U1 shutdown cooling documentation. Verify whether anchorage and FCR 66708C (Ref. 65), 1/4" channel-to-embed fillet isolation valve meets CLB documentation. welds are documented, which was verified in the field; SSC IJSICUV653 meets CLB.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D- 10 Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NT"F 7 Resolution 6

(if issued) Status IJHCBPTO351B Containment Verify 1/2" bolts with spring nuts for plate n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation: As-installed configuration pressure connection to Unistrut per CLB verified per Note 1 onOWG 13-J-ZZS-0143 (Ref. 65) and 13-documentation. J-ZZS-0147 (Ref. 65); SSC meets CLB.

ivieasureu 4-i/Q oomi projections oUt naa n/a Y Licensing 1Iasis tvaluation: F-urther review ot 13-L-LA5-0241 no documentation in field on drawings to Detail 1 (Ref. 65) indicates an anchor bolt T.O.S. of 101'-0" verify this dimension as conforming with with a pad T.O.C. of 100'-8". Therefore, the maximum CLB documentation. Action required to projection is 4" from top of pad. 1/4" discrepancy is judged verify projection as adequate. acceptable given typical 1/8" tolerance on both the concrete slab finish and bolt placement in additional to 1/8" measurement error; condition meets CLB.

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D- 1I Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTTF Resolution (if issued) 6 Status7 1MHFBJ01 Fuel Building AHU Bolts were noted surpassing the document- 4275110 N Licensing Basis Evaluation: As-installed configuration could indicated max projection. Verify whether not readily be verified against CLB documentation. PVAR this condition is documented as being 4275110 generated to reconcile the configuration evaluated. discrepancy.

APS reports that PVAR (related work) indicates - This condition was analyzed within NCR CF-01260 (Ref. 65) which concluded the equipment will not be adversely affected by anchor bolts out of elevation tolerance; No adverse seismic condition exists.

APS reports this is a potential non-conforming condition.

An Operability Determination concluded that the SSC remained Operable.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that SSC meets CLB (NCR CF-01260, Ref. 65) therefore this is not a non-conforming condition; no corrective action recuired.

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-12 Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTrF Resolution (if issued)6 Status 7 Area: AUX A- AREA WALK BY Verify whether vibration mounts on HAN- n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation: Per APS, potential impacts of 227 Z02A/ZO2B have adequate seismic stops so flooding/spray hazards are mitigated by the enclosed as to preclude anchor failure and possible protective cabinets (designed as drip-proof per SDOC N001-water line rupture. 1303-00057 (Ref. 65)), which house the reactor trip breakers and the distance from the AHUs. All potential flooding /spray hazards were resolved. The configurations meet CUB.

1EPKDM44 DC power to TCB1 Anchorage consists of channels inverted n/a V Licensing Basis Evaluation: As-installed configuration is control circuit and welded to MCC base. consistent with Sheet 95 of 13-CC-ZQ-E01 (Ref. 65). SSC Inverted channels anchored with 5/8" meets CLB.

Concrete Expansion Anchors. Verify as-installed configuration is consistent with plant documentation.

rressurizer mountea to common rack tnat is weiaea to n/a y Licensing tBasis lvaluation: As-installed contiguration is pressure steel embeds. Verify as-built weld-to- consistent with Detail 1 on SDOC NOO1-1301-00698 (Ref.

transmitter embed pattern. 65). SSC meets CLB.

(required for DOC IdACI UIRCDPT106 SDC RCS pressure Pressure transmitter is mounted to steel n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation: As-installed configuration is interlock rack welded to embed plates. Verify as- consistent with Detail 1 on SDOC NOO1-1301-00698 (Ref.

built meets anchorage configuration 65). SSC meets CLB.

documentation.

WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-13 Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTrF Resolution (if issued) 6 Status7 1JSINPT391 HPSI Long-term Typical column-mounted transmitter plate n/a V Licensing Basis Evaluation: As-installed configuration is recirc loop 1 bolted to two horizontal P1000 Unistrut consistent with Detail 2 on Drawing 13-J-01D-0119 (Ref.

pressure members that are in turn welded at top and 65). SSC meets CLB.

transmitter bottom at four locations to column flanges.

Verify as-built configurations meets plant documentation.

Revision 0 WCAP- 17679-NP, WCAP- Supplement 1 17679-NP, Supplement 2 0 Revision PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page E- 1 APPENDIX E - QUALIFICATIONS This appendix contains only the qualifications of new personnel involved with the 1R17 refueling outage Seismic Walkdowns performed from April 6 through April 7, 2013, and the subsequent walkdowns performed on April 30, 2013. The qualifications of personnel involved with the at-power Seismic Walkdowns performed from July 30 through August 6, 2012, can be found in Appendix E of Reference 48 ("Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1").

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page E-2 CORY T. FIGLIOLINI, E.I.T.

EDUCATION 2009 - 2010 University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, United Kingdom University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, United Kingdom Joint Master of Science, Structural Engineering& Mechanics (M Sc.)

2004 - 2009 Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, Massachusetts Bachelor of Science, Civil and EnvironmentalEngineering(BSCE)

REGISTRATION AND AFFILIATIONS Engineer in Training, Massachusetts, Certificate No. 22279 PROFESSIONAL CAPABILITIES Structural analysis and design of steel, concrete, and masonry structures using IBC and UBC Dynamic analysis of structures for seismic, vibration, blast, fluid, and wind loads Competed 5-day SQUG training course for walkdown and fragility analysis of nuclear facilities and their components Completed 5-day ASME Power Piping Design and Fabrication training course Risk and hazard analysis Construction support and inspection PROFESSIONAL HISTORY 2010 - Present Stevenson and Associates, Goodyear, Arizona Engineer PROJECT EXPERIENCE

SUMMARY

Seismic FragilityProjects Mr. Figliolini has planned and performed Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use in probabilistic risk assessments. On these projects, he has walked down both Safety Related and non-Safety Related structures, systems and components in all areas of the power block. Mr.

Figliolini has conducted seismic analyses of electrical and mechanical equipment anchorages, storage tanks, and civil structures including containment.

Security Projects Mr. Figliolini has performed structural modifications to existing structures for hardened alarm stations and security related equipment supports. He has performed blast analyses to determine the vulnerability of security structures.

PipingProjects Mr. Figliolini has worked on Safety Related piping analyses and modifications which include assessment and conversion of piping analysis models, screening and review of piping supports, and modifications to piping supports.

WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F- I APPENDIX F - PVNGS UNIT 1 SWEL REPORT This appendix is attached to reflect the changes made in Revision 2 and Revision 3 of the SWEL transmittal associated with the IRi7 refueling outage Seismic Walkdowns performed from April 6 through April 7, 2013, and afterward on April 30, 2013. Please see the "Revision History" on page F-3 for a complete explanation. The Revision 0 and Revision 1 SWEL transmittals for the at-power Seismic Walkdowns performed from July 30 through August 6, 2012, can be found in Appendix F of Reference 48 ("Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1").

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-2

• Westinghouse Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Revision 3 In Response to NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Palo Verde Nuclear Station Unit 1 Rolando Perez C.W~/'~ AJ r-/

Equipment Selection Pe'rs&nnel Lead Date 011

-/

Z Derek Seaman .....

.-....- 7/i .3 Equipment Selection Personnel Eim ar, Randall oigitallysigned byEimar, Randall Date G(Z34606)

DN: cn=Eimar, Randall G(Z34606)

Randall Eimar G(Z34606) Date: 2013.06.07 12:10:41 -0700' Station Operations Date PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May24,2013 I WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-3 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List; Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Revision History Revision 0 of this document provides the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) developed prior to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) At-Power Seismic Walkdowns performed between Monday, July 30th, 2012 and Friday, August 3rd, 2012. The SWEL contained a total of 131 components (125 SWEL 1 & 6 SWEL 2).

Revision 1 of this document updates the "Major New or Replacement Equipment" column of the SWEL 1 table included in Attachment 1 and Table 3-2 of Attachment 3.

The information related to "Major New or Replacement Equipment" was revised as a result of an error found in the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet that was used track and implement the SWEL selection process. This error did not result in a change to the Base List or SWEL data.

Revision 2 of this document revises the SWEL 1 table provided in Attachment 1 to document changes required for the refueling outage 1R17 walkdown activities performed from April 6 through April 9, 2013. Train C was inaccessible during refueling outage 1R17. Therefore, the following Train C electrical components were substituted with their counterpart from Train D, which were selected from Base List 1:

• 1 EPKCD23 was substituted with sister component 1EPKDD24.

• 1 EPKCM43 was substituted with sister component 1EPKDM44

• 1EPNCN13 was substituted with sister component 1EPNDN14.

These components were inspected to fulfill Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) 4.20 regarding the supplemental inspection of electrical cabinets.

These substitutions did not affect the number of SWEL items and since the replacements were performed with equipment of the same type, the revised SWEL 1 still satisfied the Reference 1 guidance. That is, component type, along with other attributes, remain adequately represented on the SWEL.

Revision 3 of this document removes SWEL 1 item 14 (1MCHEE01). This item was removed for radiological safety considerations. It was identified as inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area. A new item was not selected to replace 1MCHEE01 since the resulting equipment list still satisfied the Reference 1 guidance. That is, all attributes remain adequately represented on the SWEL.

Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL)

A listing of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that will be inspected during the walkdown, the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL), has been prepared in advance of the walkdown effort.

PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 2 I WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-4 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 The selection of SSCs process described in EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012 {Reference 1}, was utilized to develop the SWEL for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1.

The SWEL is comprised of two groups of items:

o:* SWEL 1 (Attachment 1) is a sample of items to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity

• . SWEL 2 (Attachment 2) is a list of spent fuel pool related items APS Operations and Design Engineering Staff Members participated in the selection of the SSCs comprising the SWEL and provided inputs and assistance to the Equipment Selection Personnel to find the data associated with the equipment considered. The interchange of information between the Equipment Selection Personnel and the APS Staff Members included:

" Weekly status meetings for review of the SWEL progress.

" Verification of equipment information through APS's SWMS Database system.

" Discussions with Operations relative to recent upgrades and changes to the plant that might be relevant to the SWELs.

• Discussions with Design Engineering and Operations to select equipment with operational experience relevant to SWEL selection.

" Provided System Health Reports and Design Basis Manuals for review by the Equipment Selection Personnel.

Details describing the process for Selection of SSCs to produce the SWEL have been provided to APS in the form of a formal presentation, given on July 18, 2012.

Additionally, details describing the process for Selection of SSCs to produce the SWEL are provided in the "Selection of SSCs" section of the Submittal Report.

References

1) EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012.

PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 3 WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-5 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Attachments

1) Seismic Walkdown Equipment List 1

2) Seismic Walkdown Equipment List 2

3) SWEL Sort Tables PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 4 WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-6 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1 - SWEL 1 Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen #3 Environment SWEL Walkdown #1 Screen #2 (Safety Major new (Temp, °F) IPEEE Walkdown Item EquipmentNubrLcnigIsetos)Function Description Building (SC - 1 (Regular ty Eqimn Equipment ytm System o or (IIfrfor vlerability vu Deferred to Comments qp e Numb Licensing Inspections?) Suppor) Class Type replacement "Inside or en a t? Outage?

Basis?) equipment? O for enhancement?

"Outside")

Operations noted engineering Inst. Rack scaffolding was recently added to the MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Int AF No 140 (I) No No scaff This s be esamied by are 1 1JAFBFT0041A Auxiliary feedwater flow (18) MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineering 1JAFBFT0041B Auxiliary feedwater flow MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Inst. Rack AFscaffolding was recently added to the (18) MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineering 3 1scaffolding was recently added to the 1JAFBHV0030 SG-E01A reg valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MDV (B) AF No 104 (I) No No MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineering 1JAFBHV0031 4 SG-EO1B reg valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF No 104 (I) No No scaffolding was recently added to the MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineering S 1MAFBP01 AF pump "B" MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Horz. Pump AF scaffolding was recently added to the (5) No 104 (I) No No MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineering IJAFBUV0034 6 SG-E01A isolation valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF Yes 104 (l) No No scaffolding was recently added to the MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineering 1JAFBUV0035 7 SG-E01B isolation valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF Yes 104 (l) No No scaffolding was recently added to the MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineering 8 IJAFCUVO036 SG-E01A isolation valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF Yes 104 (I) No No scaffolding was recently added to the MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Yes Yes RC IC DHR MOV (8) CH No 104(l) No No 9 1JCHBHV0530 RWT outlet to SI train "B" AUX 10 1MCHBP01 Charging pump 2 AUX Yes Yes RC PC IC Horz. Pump CH No 104(l) No No (5)

Train B For Charging Inst Rack 11 1JCHBPSLO218 Pump 1MCHEP01 Suction AUX Yes Yes RC IC (18) CH No 104(l) No No Line Pressure Switch Regenerative Heat 12 1JCHBUV0924 Exchanger Outlet To Pass AUX Yes Yes RC IC SOV (8) CH No 104(l) No No Line Isolation Globe Valve RWT level (required for Inst. Rack 13 1JCHCLT0203C YARD Yes Yes DHR CH No 113 (0) No No RAS) (1.8)

Rege4a4%eet4 e 2Q (') me This item was removed from e4-4) SWEL 1.

I PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 5 1 WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-7 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1 - SWEL 1 Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen #3 Environment SWEL Walkdown SWEL Waldow Buiding(SC- #1Desripion 1 (Reglar Screen #2 (Safety (SaetyIPEEE Major new (Temp, °F) Walkdown Item Equipment Description Building (SC- 1 (Regular Function Equipment System or (I for blity Deferred to Comments Numbe r q Licensing Inspections?) C"Inside"r Outage?

Support) Class Type replacement 0nfor enhancement?

Basis?) equipment? 0 for "Outside")

Charging Line To Reactor 15 1JCHEHV0239 Coolant Loop 2A Isolation CTMT Yes Yes RC IC POV (7) CH No 120 (I) No Yes Globe Valve 16 1JCHEHV0532 RWT suction iso (fails AUX Yes Yes RC PC POV (7) CH No 104 (I) No No open on loss of air) 17 11CHEHV0536 RWT suction isolation AUX Yes Yes RC PC MOV (8) CH No 1041() No No 18 1MCHEP01 Charging pump 3 AUX Yes Yes RC PC IC Horz.(5)Pump H CH N No 10 104) I Noo No No 19 1MCHET01 RWI" (refueling water Yard Yes Yes RC PCIC Tank (21) CH No 113(0) No No tank) DHR Containment Power 20 1JCPBUVO005A Access Purge Supply CTMT Yes Yes CF MOV (8) CP No 120 (I) No Yes Isolation Butterfly Damper 21 1MCTETO1 CST (condensate storage Yard Yes Yes PC DHR Tank (21) CT No 113(0) No No tank) 22 lMDGBF03 DG "B" air intake DG Yes Yes RCPCIC Other (0) DG Yes 140 (I) No No structure DHR RC PC IC 23 1MDGBXO1A Starting air accumulator DG Yes Yes DHR Tank (21) DG No 140 (l) No No RCPC IC 24 1MDGBXO1B Starting air accumulator DG Yes Yes DHR Tank (21) DG No 140 (I) No No RCPC IC 25 1MECBEO1 Essential chiller "B" CTRL Yes Yes Chiller (11) EC No B0(l) No No DHR 26 1MECBPO1 Circulating water pump CTRL Yes Yes RCPC IC Horz Pump EC No 80ll) No No "B" DHR (5)

RC PC IC 27 1MECBT01 EC expansion tank "B" CTRL Yes Yes DHR Tank (21) EC No 80ll) No No Control room "B" EAHU 28 1JECBTV0030 flow regvalve CTRL Yes Yes PC ICDHR POV (7) EC No 80(l) No No flow reg valve Heat 29 IMEWBE01 EW "B" heat exchanger AUX Yes Yes PC ICDHR Exchanger EW No 104(l) No No 1 (21) 30 1MEWBP01 EW pump "B" AUX Yes Yes PC ICDHR Horz(S) W EW No N 104(l) 10(I No Noo No 31 1MEWBT01 EW "B" surge tank AUX Yes Yes PC ICDHR Tank (21) EW No 104 (I) No No (LLRT)RDT/GAS Surge 32 1JGRBUVO002 Header Isolation Valve AUX Yes Yes CF SOV (8) GR No 104(l) No No (Outside Containment)

Although Train "A", the AHU's are of greater importance due to cascading 33 1MHAAZ04 EAHU AUX Yes Yes PC ICDHR AHU (10) HA No 104(l) No No Tech Specs. HAAZ04 was selected as a representitive piece of equipment for the new interpretation of Tech Specs.

Inst. Rack 34 1JHCBPT03S1B Containment pressure AUX Yes Yes CF (n8) HC No 104(l) No No I__________ I___1 ___1 (18) _____ _____

PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 6 WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-8 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1 - SWEL 1 Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations ScreenScreen #3 Environment SWEL Walkdown #1 Screen #2 (Safety Major new (Temp, °F) IPEEE Walkdown Item Description Building (SC- 1 (Regular Equipment System or (I for vnerability Deferred to Comments Number Licensing Inspections?) Class Type replacement "Inside"or vu Outage?

Basis?) Support) equipment? O for enhancement?

"Outside")

Inst. Rack 35 IJHCBPTO352B Containment pressure AUX Yes Yes CF 1181 HC No 104 (I) No No Discharge Sampling From 36 1JHCBUVO044 RU-1 Containment CTMT Yes Yes CF SOV (8) HC No 120 (I) No Yes Isolation Valve Inlet Sampling To RU-1 37 1JHCBUVO047 Containment Isolation CTMT Yes Yes CF SOV (8) HC No 120 (I) No Yes Valve Inst. Rack 38 1JHCDPT0351D Containment pressure AUX Yes Yes CF HC No 104(l) No No (18) 39 IJHCDPT0352D Containment pressure Inst. Rack AUX Yes Yes CF (18) HC No 104(l) No No 40 1MHDBA01 DG "B" room EAHU fan DG Yes Yes PC IC DHR Fan (9) HD No 140 (I) No No DG "B" room essential 41 1MHDBJ01 eshaust fan DG Yes Yes PC IC DHR Fan (9) HD No 140 (I) No No Conautro oo A HUfn 42 1MHJBF04 Control room EAHU (fan, CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR AHU (10) HJ No 80(1) No No

______ ~~filters and HX( _____

43DC room "D"essential CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Fan (9) HJ No 80(I) No No 1MHJBJO1Aeshaust fan 44 1MHJBJ01B DCroom "B" essential CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Fan (9) HJ No 80(1) No No

_____exhaust fan1 45 1MHJBM02 motor-operated damper CTRL Yes Yes PC ICDHR MOV (8) HJ No 80(I) No No 46 1MHJBM03 motor-operated damper CTRL Yes Yes PC ICDHR MOV (8) HJ No 80(I) No No 47 1MHJBM31 Air-operated damper CTRL Yes Yes PC ICDHR POV (7) HJ No 80(I) No No 48 48 1MJBMS8 MHJBM isolation Air-operated DC room "B" CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR POV (7) HJ No 80(I) No No Air-operated computer CTRL Yes Yes PC ICDHR POV (7) HJ No 80(I) No No room DP 5 1JHJBTICO124 Control room temp Temp 50 indicating controller CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Sensor (19) Hi No 80(l) No No 5 1MHJBZ03 ESF EAHU switchgear room "B" CTRL Yes Yes PC ICDHR AHU (10) HJ No 80(I) No No 52 1MHJBZ04 DC room "B" EAHU CTRL Yes Yes PC ICDHR AHU (10) HJ No 80(I) No No RC PC IC Med. Volt 53 1EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus 504 CTRL Yes Yes DHR CF SWGR (3) PB Yes 80(I) No No 54 1EPEBG02 Emergency diesel DG Yes Yes RCPC IC Eng. Gen. No generator "B" DHR (17) PE No 140 (I) No 55 1EPGBL32 480 V LC32 bus CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR Low Volt. PG No 80(I) No No SWGR (2) 56 1EPGBL34 480 V LC34 bus CTRL Yes Yes RCPC DHR Low Volt. PG No 80(I) No No SWGR (2)

Low Volt.

57 1EPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus CTRL Yes Yes RCPC DHR PG No 80(I) No No SWGR (2) 55 1EPHBM32 480 V MCC M32 CTRL Yes Yes RCPC DHR MCC (1) PH No 80(I) No No 59 1EPHBM34 480 V MCC M34 AUX Yes Yes RCPC DHR MCC (1) PH No 104(I) No No 60 1EPHBM36 480 V MCC M36 AUX Yes Yes RCPC DHR MCC (1) PH No 104(I) No No I

PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 7 I WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-9 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1 - SWEL 1 Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen #3 Environment SWEL Walkdown #1 Screen #2 (Safety Major new (Temp, °F) Walkdown Item Description Building (SC - 1 (Regular Function Equipment ype vunerability Deferred to Comments NumbrLicensing Inspections?) S t Class Type replacement "Inside"or vu Outage?

Basis?) Support) equipment? 0 for enhancement?

"Outside")

61 1EPHBM38 480 V MCC M38 AUX Yes Yes RC PC DHR MCC (1) PH No 104 (I) No No Dint Panel 62 1EPKBD22 LC 34 control power CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR PK No 80(I) No No (14) 63 1EPKBF12 DC battery "B" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR Battery PK No 80(I) No

______ ~~Rack (15)No0))o No 64 1EPKBH12 Battery charger "B" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR Battery Chg PK No 80(I) No No (16) 65 1EPKBM42 DC power to TCB1 control CTRL Yes Yes RC PC MCC (1) PK No 80(l) No No circuit Dist Panel 66 1EPKDD24 DC distribution panel D24 CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR PK No 80(l) No Yes (14) 67 1EPKCF13 DC battery "C" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR Battery PK No 80(I) No Yes Rack (15)

DC power to TCB1 control 68 1EPKDM44 circuit CTRL Yes Yes RC PC MCC (1) PK No 80() No Yes Inverter For Shutdown Inverter 69 1EPKCN43 Cooling Isolation Valve CTRL Yes Yes DHR (16) PK No 80(l) No No 1JSICUV653 Inverter For IJSIDUV654 Shutdown Cooling B Inverter 70 1EPKDN44 Return Inside CTRL Yes Yes CF (16) PK No 80 (I) No No Containment Isolation Valve 71Power to PPS "B" RC PC IC Dist Panel PN No 80(l) No No instrumentation DHR (14)

PC IC DHR inverter 72 1EPNBN12 DC/AC inverter "B" CTRL Yes Yes PN No 80(l) No No CF (16) 73 1EPNBV26 120 V vital ac voltage CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Other (0) PN No 80(l) No No regulator "B" CF 74 1EPNCD27 Power to PPS "C" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC IC Dist Panel No instrumentation DHR (14) PN No 80 (I) No NO 75 ~~~PCIC DHR Inverter PN o 80I)N 75 1EPNDN14 DC/AC inverter "D" CTRL Yes Yes CF In (16) r PIN No 80(I) No Yes 76 1EPNOV28 120 V vital ac voltage CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Other (0) PN No 80(l) No No regulator "D" CF Pressurizer and Reactor 77 1JRCBHV0105 Vessel Head Vent To Reactor Drain Tank Globe CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV (8) RC No 120 (I) No Yes Valve Pressurizer Vent To 78 1JRCBHV0108 Reactor Drain Tank Globe CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV (8) RC No 120 (I) No Yes Valve Pressurizer Vent To 79 1JRCBHV0109 Reactor Drain Tank Globe CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV (8) RC No 120 (I) No Yes Valve PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page8 I WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-10 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1 - SWEL 1 Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen #3 Environment SWEL Walkdown #1 Screen #2 (Safety Major new (Temp, °F) IPEEE Walkdown Item Equipment Description Building (SC - 1 (Regular Function Equipment System or (I for vulnerability Deferred to Comments Number Licensing Inspections?) Class Type replacement "Inside"or Os sutage?

equipment? 0 for Basis?)

"Outside")

80 1JRCBPT01O2B Przr pressure (required CTMT Yes Yes PC Inst. Rack RC No 120 (I) No Yes for RPS/SIAS) (18) 81 1JRCBPT104 SDC RCS pressure CTMT Yes Yes DHR Inst. Rack RC No 120(l) No Yes interlock C18N Inst. Rack 82 1JSBBCO2A I/V converter CTRL Yes Yes DHR RC No 80(l) No No (18)

Inst. Rack 83 1JSBCC02A I/V converter CTRL Yes Yes DHR RC No 80(1) No No 84 1JRCDPT106 SDC RCS pressure CTMT Yes Yes DHR Inst. Rack RC No 120 Il) No Yes interlock (18) 85 1JRCNTE101 Pressurizer temperature CTMT Yes Yes PC Temp 9) RC No 120 (I) No Yes Sensor 119 Isolation Containment When choosing containment isolation Isoltio Conainentvalves that esist for both inside and AUX Yes Yes CF MOV (8) RD No 104(l) No No outs taist otside as 86 1JRDBUVO024 Radwaste Sump Outlet Isolation Gate Valvechsn Isolaion ate alveoutside containment, outside was chosen.

Control 87 1IRMBB02 RWT level CTRL Yes Yes IC Panel (201) RMM No N 800) 811 No N No Control 88 1JRMBB04 RCS temperature CTRL Yes Yes RC Panel (20) RM No 80(1) No No Control 89 1JRMBB0S Containment pressure CTRL Yes Yes CF Panel(20)

Panel RM No 80(1) No No Control 90 1JRMBB06 Auxiliary feedwater flow CTRL Yes Yes PC DHR Panel (20) RM No 80(1) No No Control 91 1JRMCBOS Containment pressure CTRL Yes Yes CF Panel (20) RM No 80(l) No No SDHX A outlet Control 92 1JRMNB02 CTRL Yes Yes DHR RM No 80(I) No No temperature Panel (20)1 Control 93 1JRMNB04 Pressurizer temperature CTRL Yes Yes PC Panel (20) RM No 80(1) No No Breaker 94 1JSBBC03 Reactor____________

trip breaker "B" AUX Yes Yes

__________Panel RC PC 121 SB

__ No 104(l) No No Operations noted engineering 95 JJSGBHV0178 Atmospheric dump valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG No 124(l) No No scaffolding was recently added to the HV-178 MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineering Atmospheric dump valve scaffolding was recently added to the 96 1JSGBHV0185 HV-185 MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV 171 SG No 124(l) No No MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineering 97 1JSGBPT0306 Instrument air line MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Inst. Rack scaffolding was recently added to the pressure transmitter (18) MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

I PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 9 I WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-11 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1 - SWEL 1 Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen #3 Environment SWEL I1 Screen #2 (Safety Major new (Temp, °F) Walkdown e Equipment Description Building (SC- 1 (Regular nction Equipment System or (I for IPEEE Deferred to Comments Number Licensing Inspections?) Class Type replacement "Inside"or enn e Outage?

Support) equipment? 0 for nhancement?

Basis?)

"Outside")

Operations noted engineering 98 Iscaffolding was recently added to the 1JSGBPV036B 98 N2 supply solenoid valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR SOV (8) SG No 124 (I) No No MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineering scaffolding was recently added to the 99 1JSGBUV013D SG-ED1A isolation valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG Yes 124 (I) No No MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

Operations noted engineering scaffolding was recently added to the 100 1JSGBUVD135 SG-EO1B isolation valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG Yes 124 (I) No No MSSS. This should be examined by area walkby.

SG-EO1A WR level Inst. Rack 101 1JSGCLT1113C (reqie for (required fr AFAS)

AFAS) CONT Yes Yes PC DHR Ins.(18) c SG No 120 (I) No No This item is being specifically walked 102 IJSIAUVO651 RC loop 1 long term CTMT Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 120 (I) No Yes down due to its significance in plant recirc/SDC valve history (pipe vibration).

Heat 103 1MSIBE01 SDHX "B" AUX Yes Yes DHR Exchanger SI No 104 (I) No No 1 (21) 104 1MSIBP01 LPSI pump "B" AUX Yes Yes DHR Vert. Pump SI Yes 104(I) No No (6) S e 0Io 105 1MSlBP03 Containment Spray Pump AUX Yes Yes CF Vert. Pump The CS pump was selected for B (6) SI No 104 (INo No walkdown per ops/engineering request.

HPSI Long Term 106 1JSIBPSVO166 Recirculation Train B AUX Yes Yes PC DHR Other (0) SI No 104(l) No No Pressure Relief Valve 107 1JSIBPSVO409 HPSI train "B" injection to AUX Yes Yes IC DHR Other (0) SI No 104(l) No No EDT relief 108 1JSIBPSV189 RC loop 2 LTOP relief to CTMT Yes Yes DHR Other (0) SI No 120 (I) No Yes sump Safety Injection Tank 2A 109 1JSIBUVO614 Discharge Isolation Globe CTMT Yes Yes RC IC MOV (8) SI No 120 (I) No Yes Valve 110 1JSIBUVO616 RC loop 2A isolation valve AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104(l) No No Safety Injection Tank 2B 111 1JSIBUVO624 Discharge Isolation Globe CTMT Yes Yes RC IC MOV (8) SI No 120 (I) No Yes Valve 112 1JSIBUVO626 RC loop 2B isolation valve AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104(l) No No 113 1JSIBUV0636 RC loop 1A isolation valve AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104(l) No No 114 1JSIBUVO646 RC loop 1B isolation valve AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104(I) No No Containment Spray Pump 115 1JSIBUV0665 Recirculation To Refueling AUX Yes Yes CF MDV (8) SI No 104(l) No No Water Tank Train B Globe Valve I

PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 10 WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-12 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1 - SWEL 1 Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Se 3 Environment SWEL Walkdown #1 Screen #2 Major new (Temp, °F) Walkdown Item Equipment Description Building (SC- 1 (Regular Function Equipment System or (I for vulnerability Deferred to Comments Number Licensing Inspections?) Sunct) Class Type replacement "Inside"or Outage?

Basis?) equipment? 0 for "Outside")

116 1-JSIBUV615 RC loop 2A LPSIisolation AUX Yes Yes DHR MOV (8) SI No 104 (I) No No valve 117 IJSIBUV656 RC loop 2 SDC isolation AUX Yes Yes DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104 (I) No No valve 118 IJSIBUV667 HPSIpump "B" AS recirc AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104(I) No No (closes on RAS) 119 IJSIBUV676 SUMP isolation valve AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI No 104(l) No No HPSIlong term recirc loop Inst. Rack Non Class Power however kept in list 120 1JSINPT391 1p res irre loop CTMT Yes Yes IC DHR 18) SI No 120 (I) No Yes because of pressure boundary 1 pressure xmtr (18) considerations.

121 1MSPBP01 Spray pond pump "B" SP Yes Yes PC DHR UHS Vert. Pump SP No 122(0) No No (6) 122 lMHSBJ01 Spray pond pump house Selected per ops/engineering request exhaust fan "B" SP Yes Yes PC DHR UHS AHU (6) SP No 122 ()environmental conditions Main Control Board Control 123 1JRMBB01 Section B01 Electrical CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Panel (20) RM No 80(l) No No Systems P (20)

B Train ESFAS Relay Dist. Panel 124 1JSABC01 Cabinets CTRL Yes Yes RC (14) SA No 80(I) No No 125

• 1JZJBE01 Remote Shutdown Panel CTRL Yes Yes RC PC IC Control ZJ No 80(l) No No

_________________DHR

__________ Panel (20)No Bl)o

• The total number of SWEL 1 items is 124 instead of 125 because items 14 (1MCHEE01) was removed. The item numbers in the first column of this table were not adjusted to make it easier to compare the items listed herein to those in previous revisions of this document.

PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 11 WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F- 13 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 2 - SWEL 2 Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 SWEL Screen 4J2 Associated e Walcldow iption Watow E:uiprrent S-tem Buildng (Seismic Screens wttthulapid Commieiw Number Equipmem clam. Tpe Licensing In?) Draindown?

N__merBasis?]

1 1MPCAPOI Fuel pod cooling pump 1 PP PC Fuel Building Yes Yes I2 2 1MPCAEO1 Fuel pod weolvg heat exdcanger 1 HX PC Fuel Building Yes Yes 147 3 1MPCSP01 Fuel pod cooling pump 2 PP PC Fuel Building Yes Yes w_

4 1MPCOEO1 Fuel pod cooling heat exchanger 2 1-X PC Fuel Building Yes Yes N2 5 IMI-FAJ01 Fuel Building AHU AHU HF Fuel Building Yes Yes Wi 6 1MI-JFBJOI Fuel Building AHU AHU HF Fuel Building Yes Yes N__

I PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 12 1 WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-14 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3 - SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Table 3-1: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "System Type" (Note: The DF (Tank), GA (SOV), IA (SOV) and ZA (Dist. Panels) systems are not represented due to the equipment types covered by each system are already well represented.)

Items Numberfor of Items Number of Items Number of Items StT ysemype in BaseofList Number 1 Selected SWEL 1 System Type in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 1 AF 14 8 PE 2 1 CH 29 10 PG 6 3 CP 4 1 PH 8 4 CT 3 1 PK 20 9 DF 1 0 PN 12 6 DG 14 3 RC 16 9 EC 8 4 RD 2 1 EW 8 3 RM 30 8 GA 1 0 SA 11 1 GR 2 1 SB 14 1 HA 4 1 SG 40 7 HC 12 6 SI 101 19 HD 4 2 SP 4 2 HJ 21 11 ZA 6 0 IA 1 0 zi 11 1 PB 3 1 II PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 13 I WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-15 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3 - SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Table 3-2: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "Major new or replacement equipment" (Of the 412 items comprising Base List 1, 38 items were identified as "Major new or replacement equipment."

The following 15 items were selected for SWEL 1.)

Base Walkdown List 1 Equipment Description Item 115 1EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 11 1JAFBUVO034 SG-EO1A isolation valve 12 1JAFBUVO035 SG-EO1B isolation valve 14 1JAFCUVO036 SG-E01A isolation valve 272 1JSIAUVO651 RC loop 1 long term recirc/SDC valve 303 1MSIBP01 LPSI pump "B" 312 1JSIBUVO626 RC loop 2B isolation valve 313 1JSIBUVO636 RC loop 1A isolation valve 50 1MDGBF03 DG "B" air intake structure 222 1JSGBUVO130 SG-E01A isolation valve 223 1JSGBUV0135 SG-E01B isolation valve 321 1JSIBUV667 HPSI pump "B" recirc iso (closes on RAS) 310 1JSIBUVO616 RC loop 2A isolation valve 314 1JSIBUV0646 RC loop 1B isolation valve 319 1JSIBUV656 RC loop 2 SDC isolation valve I

PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 14 [

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-16 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3 - SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Table 3-3: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "Equipment Type" (Note: Equipment type 4 (transformers) are not mentioned as they are part of larger parent equipment (i.e.

switchgear, load centers). Additionally, EQ type 12 (Air Compressors) and 13 (Motor Generators) are not included as Palo Verde does not have any safety related equipment in this category.)

Equipment Type Description Number of Items Number of Items Number in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 1 0 Miscellaneous 13 6 1 Motor Control Centers 13 6 2 Low Voltage Switchgear 12 4 3 Medium Voltage Switchgear 2 1 4 Transformers 0 0 5 Horizontal Pumps 11 5 6 Vertical Pumps 8 4 7 Fluid Operated Valves 23 10 8 Motor Operated Valves, Solenoid Operated Valves 115 31 9 Fans 8 4 10 Air Handlers 10 4 11 Chillers 2 1 12 Air Compressors 0 0 13 Motor Generators 0 0 14 Distribution Panels 41 5 15 Batteries on Racks 4 2 16 Battery Chargers and Inverters 12 5 17 Engine Generators 2 1 18 Instruments on Racks 74 16 19 Temperature Sensors 3 2 20 Instrumentation and Control Panels and Racks 39 9 21 Tanks and Heat Exchangers (GIP Section 7) 20 8 I

PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 15 1 WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-17 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3 - SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Table 3-4: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "Environment (Temperature)"

(Since the PVNGS Units are located in a dry environment, it was decided to classify the environments based on the maximum design temperature of the equipment rooms. Temperature values were determined from a review of the EQ DBM and the UFSAR.)

Temperature Number of Items Number of Items

(°F) in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 1 80 142 (All inside) 47 (All inside) 104 150 (All inside) 42 (All inside) 113 8 (2 Inside and 6 outside) 3 (All outside) 120 62 (All inside) 17 (All inside) 122 4 (All outside) 2 (All outside) 124 18 (All inside) 5 (All inside) 140 28 (All inside) 8 (All inside)

I PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 16 WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-18 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3 - SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Table 3-5: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) and the Availability of the Associated Train Base Walkdown Is the Train e

List Item Equipment Description RAW Uaalbe 45 1MCTET01 CST (condensate storage tank) 30500 No 40 1MCHET01 RWT (refueling water tank) 56.89 No 138 1EPKBF12 DC battery "B" 9.34 No 115 1EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 9.32 No 10 1MAFBPO1 AF pump "B" 6.44 No 122 1EPGBL34 480 V LC34 bus 4.92 No 129 1EPHBM34 480 V MCC M34 4.92 No 121 1EPGBL32 480 V LC32 bus 4.81 No 131 1EPHBM38 480 V MCC M38 4.74 No 336 1MSPBPO1 Spray pond pump "B" Low Risk No 324 1JSIBUV676 SUMP isolation valve Low Risk No 123 1EPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus Low Risk No 130 1EPHBM36 480 V MCC M36 Low Risk No 89 1MHDBA01 DG "B" room EAHU fan Low Risk No 90 1MHDBJ01 DG "B" room essential exhaust fan Low Risk No 128 1EPHBM32 480 V MCC M32 Low Risk No 37 1JCHEHV0532 RWT suction iso (fails open on loss of air) Low Risk No 307 1JSIBPSVO409 HPSI train "B" injection to EDT relief Low Risk No 67 1MEWBP01 EW pump "B" Low Risk No 68 1MEWBT01 EW "B" surge tank Low Risk No 25 1JCHBHV0530 RWT outlet to SI train "B" Low Risk No 321 1JSIBUV667 HPSI pump "B" recirc iso (closes on RAS) Low Risk No 66 IMEWBE01 EW "B" heat exchanger Low Risk No 283 1MSIBE01 SDHX "B" Low Risk No I I PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 17 1 WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-19 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3 - SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Base Walkdown Is the Train List 1 n Description RAW Unavailable?

Item Equipment Description 117 1EPEBG02 Emergency diesel generator "B" Low Risk No 306 1JSIBPSVO166 HPSI Long Term Recirculation Train B Pressure Relief Valve Low Risk No 60 1JECBTV0030 Control room "B" EAHU flow reg valve Low Risk No 101 1MHJBF04 Control room EAHU (fan, filters and HX) Low Risk No 57 1MECBE01 Essential chiller "B" Low Risk No 58 1MECBP01 Circulating water pump "B" Low Risk No 309 1JSIBUVO614 Safety Injection Tank 2A Discharge Isolation Globe Valve Low Risk No 311 1JSIBUV0624 Safety Injection Tank 2B Discharge Isolation Globe Valve Low Risk No 8 1JAFBHV0030 SG-EO1A reg valve Low Risk No 9 1JAFBHVO031 SG-EO1B reg valve Low Risk No 11 1JAFBUVO034 SG-EO1A isolation valve Low Risk No 12 IJAFBUVO035 SG-EO1B isolation valve Low Risk No 14 1JAFCUVO036 SG-EO1A isolation valve Low Risk No 38 1JCHEHV0536 RWT suction isolation Low Risk No 315 1JSIBUVO665 Containment Spray Pump Recirculation To Refueling Water Tank Train B Globe Valve Low Risk No 143 1EPKCF13 DC battery "C" Low Risk No 27 1MCHBP01 Charging pump 2 Low Risk No 146 1EPKCN43 Inverter For Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valve 1JSICUV653 Low Risk No 151 IEPKDN44 Inverter For 1JSIDUV654 Shutdown Cooling B Return Inside Containment Isolation Valve Low Risk No 213 1JSGBHV0178 Atmospheric dump valve HV-178 Low Risk No 214 IJSGBHV0185 Atmospheric dump valve HV-185 Low Risk No 272 IJSIAUVO651 RC loop 1 long term recirc/SDC valve Low Risk Yes 303 1MSIBPO1 LPSI pump "B" Low Risk No 305 1MSIBP03 Containment Spray Pump B Low Risk No 308 IJSIBPSV189 RC loop 2 LTOP relief to sump Low Risk No 310 1JSIBUVO616 RC loop 2A isolation valve Low Risk No 312 IJSIBUVO626 RC loop 2B isolation valve Low Risk No PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 18 WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-20 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3 - SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Base Walkdown RAW Is the Train List 1 Equipment Description Item Unavailable?

313 1JSIBUV0636 RC loop 1A isolation valve Low Risk No 314 1JSIBUV0646 RC loop 1B isolation valve Low Risk No 316 1JSIBUV615 RC loop 2A LPSI isolation valve Low Risk No 319 1JSIBUV656 RC loop 2 SDC isolation valve Low Risk No 6 1JAFBFT0041A Auxiliary feedwater flow Not Modeled in the PRA No 7 1JAFBFT0041B Auxiliary feedwater flow Not Modeled in the PRA No 29 1JCHBPSL0218 Train B For Charging Pump 1MCHEP01 Suction Line Pressure Switch Not Modeled in the PRA No 31 1JCHBUV0924 Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet To Pass Line Isolation Globe Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No 32 1JCHCLT0203C RWT level (required for RAS) Not Modeled in the PRA No 34 1MCHEEO1 Regenerative heat exchanger Not Modeled in the PRA No 35 1JCHEHV0239 Charging Line To Reactor Coolant Loop 2A Isolation Globe Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No 39 1MCHEPO1 Charging pump 3 Not Modeled in the PRA No 42 1JCPBUVO005A Containment Power Access Purge Supply Isolation Butterfly Damper Not Modeled in the PRA No 50 1MDGBF03 DG "B" air intake structure Not Modeled in the PRA No 51 1MDGBXO1A Starting air accumulator Not Modeled in the PRA No 52 1MDGBXO1B Starting air accumulator Not Modeled in the PRA No 59 1MECBT01 EC expansion tank "B" Not Modeled in the PRA No 70 1JGRBUVO002 (LLRT) RDT/GAS Surge Header Isolation Valve (Outside Containment) Not Modeled in the PRA No 73 1MHAAZ04 AFW pump room "A" EAHU Not Modeled in the PRA Yes 79 1JHCBPT0351B Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No 80 1JHCBPT0352B Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No 81 1JHCBUVO044 Discharge Sampling From RU-1 Containment Isolation Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No 82 1JHCBUVO047 Inlet Sampling To RU-i Containment Isolation Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No 85 1JHCDPT0351D Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No 86 1JHCDPT0352D Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No 102 1MHJBJ01A DC room "D"essential exhaust fan Not Modeled in the PRA No 103 1MHJBJ01B DC room "B" essential exhaust fan Not Modeled in the PRA No PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 19 WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-21 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3 - SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Base Wldw RAW Is the Train List istem Walkdown Equipment Description Description? Uaalbe Item 104 1MHJBM02 motor-operated damper Not Modeled in the PRA No 105 1MHJBM03 motor-operated damper Not Modeled in the PRA No 106 lMHJBM31 Air-operated damper Not Modeled in the PRA No 107 lMHJBM58 Air-operated DC room "B" isolation Not Modeled in the PRA No 108 1MHJBM67 Air-operated computer room DP Not Modeled in the PRA No 109 IJHJBTICO124 Control room temp indicating controller Not Modeled in the PRA No 110 1MHJBZ03 ESF switchgear room "B" EAHU Not Modeled in the PRA No 111 1MHJBZ04 DC room "B" EAHU Not Modeled in the PRA No 137 1EPKBD22 LC 34 control power Not Modeled in the PRA No 139 1EPKBH12 Battery charger "B" Not Modeled in the PRA No 141 1EPKBM42 DC power to TCB1 control circuit Not Modeled in the PRA No 147 1EPKDD24 DC distribution panel D24 Not Modeled in the PRA No 150 1EPKDM44 DC power to TCB1 control circuit Not Modeled in the PRA No 155 1EPNBD26 Power to PPS "B" instrumentation Not Modeled in the PRA No 156 1EPNBN12 DC/AC inverter "B" Not Modeled in the PRA No 157 1EPNBV26 120 V vital ac voltage regulator "B" Not Modeled in the PRA No 158 1EPNCD27 Power to PPS "C" instrumentation Not Modeled in the PRA No 162 1EPNDN14 DC/AC inverter "D" Not Modeled in the PRA No 163 1EPNDV28 120 V vital ac voltage regulator "D" Not Modeled in the PRA No 167 1JRCBHV0105 Pressurizer and Reactor Vessel Head Vent To Reactor Drain Tank Globe Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No 168 1JRCBHV0108 Pressurizer Vent To Reactor Drain Tank Globe Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No 169 1JRCBHV0109 Pressurizer Vent To Reactor Drain Tank Globe Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No 170 1JRCBPT0102B Przr pressure (required for RPS/SIAS) Not Modeled in the PRA No 171 1JRCBPT104 SDC RCS pressure interlock Not Modeled in the PRA No 172 1JSBBC02A I/V converter Not Modeled in the PRA No 175 1JSBCC02A I/V converter Not Modeled in the PRA No 177 1JRCDPT106 SDC RCS pressure interlock Not Modeled in the PRA No I

PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 20 I WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-22 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 3 - SWEL Sort Tables Palo Verde Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Base Walkdown RAW Is the Train e

List Equipment Description Item Unavailable?

179 1JRCNTE101 Pressurizer temperature Not Modeled in the PRA No 181 1JRDBUVO024 Isolation Containment Radwaste Sump Outlet Isolation Gate Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No 186 1JRMBB02 RWT level Not Modeled in the PRA No 187 1JRMBB04 RCS temperature Not Modeled in the PRA No 188 1JRMBB05 Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No 189 1JRMBB06 Auxiliary feedwater flow Not Modeled in the PRA No 190 1JRMCB05 Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No 192 1JRMNB02 SDHX A outlet temperature Not Modeled in the PRA No 193 1JRMNB04 Pressurizer temperature Not Modeled in the PRA No 195 1JSBBC03 Reactor trip breaker "B" Not Modeled in the PRA No 219 1JSGBPT0306 Instrument air line pressure transmitter Not Modeled in the PRA No 221 1JSGBPVO306B N2 supply solenoid valve Not Modeled in the PRA No 222 1JSGBUV0130 SG-EO1A isolation valve Not Modeled in the PRA No 223 1JSGBUVO135 SG-EO1B isolation valve Not Modeled in the PRA No 228 1JSGCLT1113C SG-EO1A WR level (required for AFAS) Not Modeled in the PRA No 334 1JSINPT391 HPSI long term recirc loop 1 pressure xmtr Not Modeled in the PRA No 338 1MHSBJO1 Spray pond pump house exhaust fan "B" Not Modeled in the PRA No 355 1JRMBB01 Main Control Board Section BO0 Electrical Systems Not Modeled in the PRA No 374 1JSABCO1 B Train ESFAS Relay Cabinets Not Modeled in the PRA No 409 1JZJBE01 Remote Shutdown Panel Not Modeled in the PRA No PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 21 1 WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G- 1 APPENDIX G - SWEL DEVELOPMENT TABLES There were no changes to the equipment selected for Base List 1 (Table G-1). One item was removed from SWEL 1 (Table G-2) because it was inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area and three Train C electrical components were substituted with their counterpart from Train D because they were inaccessible during refueling outage 1R17. These changes are discussed in Section 3.4.

There were no changes to Base List 2 and SWEL 2 (Table G-3).

Table G-1: PVNGS-1 Base List 1 (Refer to Table G- 1 of Reference 48, "Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit I")

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- I January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G-2 Table G-2: PVNGS-1 SWEL 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen SWEL Item Walkdown Bnewin #1 Screen #2 #3 SaftyIPEEE Major new Majorpion Environment Environmentr Walkdown Deferred to Number Equipment Description Building (SC - I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or Temp., OF vulnerability Outage?

Licensing Inspections?) Function Class Type replacement (I for "Inside" or Basis?) Support) equipment? 0 for "Outside") enhancement?

I IJAFBFT0041A Auxiliary MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Inst. Rack AF No 140(I) No No feedwater flow Yes PCIDHRo(N8 (MS8)FYeo 2 IJAFBFT0041B Auxiliary Inst. Rack AF No 140 (l) No No feedwater flow MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR (18) 3OIJAFBHV0030 reg IA MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF No 104(l) No No regulating valve 4IJAFBHV0031 e ivalve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF No 104(I) No No Horz.

5 IMAFBP01 AF pump "B" MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Pump (5) AF No 104 (1) No No 6 IJAFBUVO034 SG-E01A isolation MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF Yes 104 (l) No No valve SG-E01B isolation 7 IJAFBUVO035S IBal MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF Yes 104 (I) No No 8 IJAFCUVO036 SG-vOIA isolation MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF Yes 104 (1) No No

________ ~~~~valve__________ _______

9 IJCHBHV0530 RWT outlet to SI AUX Yes Yes RC IC MOV(8) CR No 104() No No 9_ ICB 03 train "B" AUX DHR RC PC Horz.

10 IMCHBPOI Charging pump 2 AUX Yes Yes IC Pump (5) CH No 104 (I) No No Train B For Charging Pump Inst. Rack 11 IJCHBPSLO218 IMCHEP01 AUX Yes Yes RC IC (18) CH No 104 (l) No No Suction Line Pressure Switch WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G-3 Table G-2: PVNGS-1 SWEL 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen SWEL Walkdown Numer Item Equipment Walkdown Description Building (SCu(Regulr (SC - S (Regular (Satetyor (Safety Equipment System or new Temp.,I °Fvunrbit IPEEE Otae to Deferred Number Licensing Inspections?) Function Class Type replacement (I for "Inside" or vulnerability Outage?

Basis?) Support) equipment? 0 for "Outside") enhancement?

Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet 12 IJCHBUVO924 To Pass Line AUX Yes Yes RC IC SOV (8) CH No 104 (l) No No Isolation Globe Valve RWT level Inst. Rack 13 IJCHCLT0203C revel YARD Yes Yes DHR (18) CH No 113 (0) No No (required for RAS) YAD YsYs DR (18)

(This item was Heat 4-4 removed from RgeaeratiVO-heat

. . Y 4 C NO 444-(oN Yes.

SWEL I in this exehangef (44 report. See Section 3.4.)

Charging Line To 15 IJCHEHV0239 Reactor Coolant CTMT Yes Yes RC IC POV (7) CH No 120(l) No Yes Loop 2A Isolation Globe Valve RWT suction iso 16 IJCHEHV0532 (fails open on loss AUX Yes Yes RC PC POV (7) CH No 104 (1) No No of air) 17 IJCHEHV0536 RWT suction AUX Yes Yes RC PC MOV (8) CH No 104 (1) No No isolation RC PC Horz.

18 IMCHEP01 Charging pump 3 AUX Yes Yes IC Pump (5) CH No 104 (I) No No 19RWT (refueling Yard Yes Yes Tank (21) CH No 113(0) No No water tank) IC DHR Containment power access 20 IJCPBUVO005A purge supply CTMT Yes Yes CF MOV (8) CP No 120 (I) No Yes isolation butterfly damper WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G-4 Table G-2: PVNGS-1 SWEL I Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen Walkdown #1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Environment Walkdown temb Equipment Description Building (SC - I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or Temp., Fto Number Licensing Inspections?) Function Class Type replacement (I for "Inside" or vulnerability Outage?

Basis?) Support) equipment? 0 for "Outside") enhancement?

21 1MCTET0 CST (condensate Yard Yes Yes PC DHR Tank (21) CT No 113(0) No No storage tank)

DG "B" air intake DG Yes Yes RC PCD 22 1MDGBF03 filter IC DHR Other (0) DG Yes 140 (I) No No 23 IMDGBX01A Starting air RC PC accunulatr accumulator DG Yes Yes RCDHR IC DHR Tank (21) DG No 140 (I) No No 24IDB0B Starting air RC PC 24 IMDGBXOIB accumulatr accumulator DG Yes Yes RCDHR IC DHR Tank (21) DG No 140 (1) No No Essential chiller Ys e RTL C DHC 25 IMECBE01 "B" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC Chiller (11) EC No 80(I) No No 26 IMECBPOI Circulating water CTRL Yes Yes RC PC Horz Pump EC No 80(l) No No pump "B" IC DHR (5) 27 IMECBTOI EC expansion tank CTRL Yes Yes RC PC Tank (21) EC No 80(1) No No "B" IC DHR Control room "B" PC IC 28 IJECBTV0030 EAHU flow CTRL Yes Yes DHR POV (7) EC No 80(I) No No regulating valve EW "B" heat PC IC Heat 29 IMEWBE01 exchanger AUX Yes Yes DHR Exchanger EW No 104I() No No (21) 30 IMEWBPOI EW pump "B" AUX Yes Yes PC DHRIC Horz(5)

Pump EW No 104 (l) No No 31LEB0 W "B" surge PC IC 31 IMEWBTOI tank AUX Yes Yes DHR Tank (21) EW No 104 (l) No No WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G-5 Table G-2: PVNGS-1 SWEL 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen SWEL Walkdown #1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Environment Walkdown Item Equipment Description Building (SC - I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or Temp., F IPEEE Deferred to Number Licensing Inspections?) Function Class Type replacement (I for "Inside" or vulnerability Outage?

Basis?) Support) equipment? 0 for "Outside") enhancement?

(LLRT)

RDT/GAS Surge 32 IJGRBUV0002 Header Isolation AUX Yes Yes CF SOV (8) GR No 104 (1) No No Valve (Outside Containment) 33 IMHAAZO4 A EAHpump room AUX Yes Yes PCDHRIC AHU (10) HA No 104 (I) No Yes 34 IJHCBPT0351B AUX Yes Yes CF HC No 104 (I) No No pressure (18) 35 IJHCBPT0352B Inst. Rack HC No 104(l) No No Containm35B resuen AUX Yes Yes CF (18) HCN10 )Noo pressure (8 Discharge 36 IJHCBUV0044 Sampling From CTMT Yes Yes CF SOV (8) HC No 120 (I) No Yes RU-I Containment Isolation Valve Inlet Sampling To 37 IJHCBUV0047 RU-I Containment CTMT Yes Yes CF SOV (8) HC No 120 (l) No Yes Isolation Valve 38Containment AUInst. Rack HC No 104(I) No No Containm35D resuen AUX Yes Yes CF (18) HCN10(1Noo pressure (8 39 IJHCDPT0352D Containment prsueAX AUX Yes Ys Yes YsC CF Inst.1)Rack HC H Noo14()No 104(l) No pressure (18)

DO "B" room PC IC 40 IMHDBA01 EAHU fan DG Yes Yes DHR Fan (9) HD No 140 (I) No No DG "B" room PC IC 41 IMHDBJOI essential exhaust DG Yes Yes DHR Fan (9) HD No 140 (I) No No fan III__II_

Control room PC IC 42 IMHJBF04 EAHU (fan, filters CTRL Yes Yes DHR AHU (10) HJ No 80(I) No No and HX) DHR WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-I January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G-6 Table G-2: PVNGS-1 SWEL 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen SWEL Walkdown S~VELWalkdown #1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Environment IPEEE Deferred to Item Equipment Description Building (SC - I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or Temp., OF vulnerability Outage?

Number Licensing Inspections?) Function Class Type replacement (I for "Inside" or enancmet?

Basis?) Support) equipment? 0 for "Outside") enhancement?

DC room "D" PC IC 43 IMHJBJOIA essential exhaust CTRL Yes Yes DHR Fan (9) HJ No 80(l) No No fan DC room "B" PCtC 44 IMHJBJOIB essential exhaust CTRL Yes Yes DHR Fan (9) HJ No 80(l) No No fan moto-opeatedPC IC 45 IMHJBM02 motor-operated damper CTRL Yes Yes PH DHR MOV (8) HJ No 80(l) No No moto-opeatedPC IC 46 IMHJBM03 motor-operated damper CTRL Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) HJ No 80(I) No No PC 1C 47 IMHJBM31 Pneumatic damper CTRL Yes Yes DHR POV (7) HJ No 80(l) No No 48 1MHJBM58 Pneumatic DC PC IC POV (7) Hi No 80(I) No No room "B" isolation CTRL Yes Yes DHR 49 IMHJBM67 Pnuai Pneumatic TL CTRCYs YsYs es PC DHIC POV (7) Hi No 80(l) No No computer room DP DHR Control room temp PC IC Temp 50 IJHJBTIC0124 indicating CTRL Yes Yes DHR Sensor(19) HJ No 80(I) No No controller ESF switchgear CTPCYs e1CH 51 IMHJBZ03 "B" EAU CTRL Yes Yes PC AHU (10) HJ No 80(I) No No room "B" EAHU H DC room "B" PC IC 52 IMHJBZ04 DAHU CTRL Yes Yes DHR AHU (10) HJ No 80(l) No No RC PC Med. Volt 53 IEPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 CTRL Yes Yes IC DHR SWGR (3) PB Yes 80(I) No No CF Emergency diesel RC PC Eng. Gen. PE No 140(l) No No generator "B" IC DHR (17)

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G-7 Table G-2: PVNGS-1 SWEL I Screen #4 Sample Considerations SWEL Screen Screen Walkdown SWEL Walkdown #1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Environment IPEEE Deferred to Item Description Building (SC - I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or Temp., IF vulnerability Outage?

Number Licensing Inspections?) Function Class Type replacement (I for "Inside" or Basis?) Support) equipment? 0 for "Outside") enhancement?

RC PC Low Volt.

55 IEPGBL32 480 V LC32 bus CTRL Yes Yes R PC DHR SWGR (2) PG No 80(1) No No RC PC Low Volt. P 'o8 1 oN 56 IEPGBL34 480 V LC34 bus CTRýL Yes Yes DHR SWGRPol PG No 80(1) No No 57 IEPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus CTRL Yes Yes RC PC Low Volt. PG No 80(1) No No DHR SWGR (2)

RC PC 58 IEPHBM32 480 V MCC M32 CTRL Yes Yes DHR MCC (1) PH No 800() No No RCPC 59 IEPHBM34 480 V MCC M34 AUX Yes Yes DHR MCC (1) PH No 104(1) No No RC PC 60 IEPHBM36 480 V MCC M36 AUX Yes Yes DHR MCC (1) PH No 104(l) No No 61 IEPHBM38 480 V MCC M38 AUX Yes Yes RCPC MCC (1) PH No 104(l) No No DHR 62 IEPKBD22 CTRL Yes Yes Panel PK No 80(l) No No power DHR (14) 63 IEPKBFI2 DC battery "B" CTRL Yes Yes RCPC Battery PK No 80(1) No No 63 ~~DHR Rack (15) PKN80) 64 IEPKBH12 Battery charger CTRL Yes Yes RC PC Battery PK No 80(l) No No "B" DHR Chg (16)

DC power to 65 IEPKBM42 TCBI control CTRL Yes Yes RC PC MCC (I) PK No 80(1) No No circuit WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G-8 Table G-2: PVNGS-1 SWEL I Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen SWEL Walkdown #1 Screen #2 N3 Major new Environment VDalkdown Item Equipment Description Building (SC - I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or Temp., IF IPEEE Deferred to Number Licensing Inspections?) Function Class Type replacement (I for "Inside" or vulnerability Outage?

Basis?) Support) equipment? 0 for "Outside") enhancement?

1EPKDD24 DC distribution RC PC Dist Panel 66 (substitute for CTRL Yes Yes PK No 80(l) No Yes 1EPKCD23) panel D24 DHR (14) 67 IEPKCFI3 DC battery "C" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC Battery No No DHR Rack (15) PK No 80(1)

IEPKDM44 DC power to 68 (substitute for TCBI control CTRL Yes Yes RC PC MCC (1) PK No 80(1) No Yes IEPKCM43) circuit Inverter for 69 1EPKCN43 shutdown cooling isolation valve Inverter CTRL Yes Yes DHR (16) PK No 80(l) No No IJSICUV653 Inverter For IJSIDUV654 70 IEPKDN44 Shutdown Coolin Inverter PK No 80(l) No No B Return Inside CTRL Yes Yes CF (16)

Containment Isolation Valve Power to PPS "B" RC PC Dist Panel 71 IEPNBD26 instrumentation IC DHR (14)80() No No 72DC/AC inverter PC IC Inverter PN No 80(l) No No DC/ACPiBvre"B" CTRL Yes Yes DHR CF (16) 120 V vital ac PC IC 73 IEPNBV26 voltage regulator CTRL Yes Yes DHR CF Other (0) PN No 80(l) No No "B"

Power to PPS "C" RC PC Dist Panel PN No 80(l) 74 1EPNCD27 instrumentation CTRL Yes Yes IC DHR (14) No No 1EPNDN14 DC/AC inverter PC IC Inverter 75 (substitute for "D"CTRL Yes Yes (16) PN No 80() No Yes IEPNCN 13) "D" DHR CF (16) 120 V vital ac PCIC 76 IEPNDV28 voltage regulator CTRL Yes Yes DHR CF Other (0) PN No 80(l) No No "lD" ---

WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-l January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G-9 Table G-2: PVNGS-1 SWEL 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen SWEL Walkdown Numer Item Equipment Walkdown Description Building (SCu(Regulr (SC - S(Regular (Satetyor (Safety Equipment System or new Temp.,Ir °Fvunrblt IPEEE Otae to Deferred Number Licensing Inspections?) Function Class Type replacement (I for "Inside" or vulnerability Outage?

Basis?) Support) equipment? 0 for "Outside") enhancement?

Pressurizer and Reactor Vessel 77 IJRCBHV0105 Head Vent To CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV (8) RC No 120 (1) No Yes Reactor Drain Tank Globe Valve Pressurizer Vent 78 IJRCBHV0108 To Reactor Drain CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV (8) RC No 120 (I) No Yes Tank Globe Valve Pressurizer Vent 79 IJRCBHV0109 To Reactor Drain CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV (8) RC No 120 (I) No Yes Tank Globe Valve Przr pressure Inst. Rack 80 IJRCBPT0102B (required for CTMT Yes Yes PC t18) RC No 120 (l) No Yes

_18)

RPS/SIAS) 81 IJRCBPTI04 SDC RCS pressure CTMT Yes Yes DHR Inst. Rack RC No 120 (I) No Yes interlock (18)

Inst. Rack 82 IJSBBC02A I/V converter CTRL Yes Yes DHR (18) RC No 80(l) No No Inst. Rack 83 IJSBCC02A I/V converter CTRL Yes Yes DHR (18) RC No 80 (I) No No 84 IJRCDPT106 SDC RCS pressure CTMT Yes Yes DHR Inst. Rack RC No 120 (I) No Yes interlock (18.)

85 IJRCNTEI01 Pressurizer CTMT Yes Yes PC Temp RC No 120 (l) No Yes temperature Sensor (19)

Isolation Containment 86 IJRDBUVO024 Radwaste Sump AUX Yes Yes CF MOV (8) RD No 104 (l) No No Outlet Isolation Gate Valve Control 87 IJRMBB02 RWT level CTRL Yes Yes IC Panel (20) RM No 80 (1) No No WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- I January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G- 10 Table G-2: PVNGS-1 SWEL 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen e#1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Environment Walkdown Item Equipment Description Building (SC-- I (Regular (Safet Equipment System or Temp., IF ulerbi Deferred to Number Licensing Inspections?) Function Class Type replacement (I for "Inside" or vulnerability Outage?

Basis?) Support) equipment? 0 for "Outside") enhancement?

Control 88 1JRMBB04 RCS temperature CTRL Yes Yes RC Panel(20) RM No 80 (l) No No 89Containment Control RM No 80(l) No No ContaMB05 pr nmuen CIRL Yes Yes CF Panel (20) RINo8()Noo pressure Pnl(0 f0Auxiliary CTRL Yes Yes PC DHR Control 90 IJRMBB6 feedwater flow Panel (20) RM No 80(l) No No 91 IJRMCB05 CTRL Yes Yes CF RM No 80(l) No No pressure Panel (20) 92 IJRMNB02 SDHX A outlet GIRL Yes Yes DHR Control (2

temperature CoPanel (20) RM No 80() No No Pressurizer Control 93 IJRMNB04 temperature GIRL Yes Yes PC Panel (20) RM No 80(1) No No Reacor tip

• Breaker 94 IJSBBC03 Reactor trip AUX Yes Yes RC PC' Panel (2) SB No 104 (I) No No breaker "B' ael2 Atmospheric 95 IJSGBHVO078 dump valve HV- MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG No 124 (l) No No 178 Atmospheric 96 IJSGBHV0185 dump valve HV- MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG No 124 (1) No No 185 Instrument air line 97 IJSGBPT0306 pressure MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Inst SG No 104 (l) No No transmitter (18) 98 1JSGBPV0306B N2 supplyve solenoid valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR SOV (8) SG No 124 (l) No No WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- I January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G- I i Table G-2: PVNGS-1 SWEL 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen SWEL Walkdown #1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Environment Walkdown Item Equipment Description Building (SC - I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or Temp., IF IPEEE Deferred to Number Licensing Inspections?) Function Class Type replacement (I for "Inside" or vulnerability Outage?

Basis?) Support) equipment? 0 for "Outside") enhancement?

SG-E01A isolationNoo 99 IJSGBUVOI30 v Alve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG Yes 124(l) No No valve 100 IJSGBUVO135 valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG Yes 124(l) No No SG-EOIA WR Inst. Rack 101 IJSGCLTI 113C level (required for CONT Yes Yes PC DHR (I8) SG No 120 (l) No Yes AFAS) _ _8)

RC loop I long-102 IJSIAUVO651 term recirc/SDC CTMT Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 120 (I) No Yes valve Heat 103 IMSIBE01 SDHX "B" AUX Yes Yes DHR Exchanger SI No 104 (1) No No (21) 104 IMSIBP01 LPSI pump "B" AUX Yes Yes DHR Vert.(6)Pump Yes 104(I) No No 105 IMSIBPO3 Containment AUX Yes Yes CF Vert. Pump Spray Pump B (6) SI No 104 (1)

HPSI Long-Term Recirculation 106 IJSIBPSVOI66 Train B Pressure AUX Yes Yes PC DHR Other (0) SI No 104 (1) No No Relief Valve HPSI train "B" 107 IJSIBPSVO409 injection to EDT AUX Yes Yes IC DHR Other (0) SI No 104 (l) No No relief 108 IJSIBPSVI89 RC loop 2 LTOP CTMT Yes Yes DHR Other (0) SI No 120(l) No Yes relief to sump Safety Injection Tank 2A 109 IJSIBUVO614 Discharge CTMT Yes Yes RC IC MOV (8) SI No 120 (1) No Yes Isolation Globe Valve WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- 1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G- 12 Table G-2: PVNGS-I SWEL 1 Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen SWEL Walkdown #1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Environment Walkdown Item Equipment Description Building (SC - I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or Temp., IF IPEEE Deferred to Number Licensing Inspections?) Function Class Type replacement (I for "Inside" or vulnerability Outage?

Basis?) Support) equipment? 0 for "Outside") enhancement?

110 IJSIBUV0616 RC loop 2A is6lon valve isolation vA AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) S1 Yes 104 (I) No No Safety Injection Tank 2B Ill IJSIBUVO624 Discharge CTMT Yes Yes RC IC MOV (8) SI No 120 (1) No Yes Isolation Globe Valve 112 IJSIBUVO626 isoloop 2vl AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104 (I) No No 11 IJSIBUV66 isolation valve 113 IJSIBUVi636 RC isolation vA loop valve AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104 (1) No No 114 IJSBUV646 RC loopl1B 114 IJSIBUV646 isolation valve AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104 (I) No No Containment Spray Pump 115 IJSBUVO665 Recirculation ToNoo 115 IJSIBUV0665 Refueling Water AUX Yes Yes CF MOV (8) S1 No 104(I) No No Tank Train B Globe Valve 116 IJSIBUV615 RCloop2ALPSI AUX Yes Yes DHR MOV (8) SI No 104(I) No No isolation valve RC loop 2 SDC AUX Yes Yes DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104(1) No No isolation valve HPSI pump "B" 118 1JSIBUV667 recirc iso (closes AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) S1 Yes 104 (I) No No on RAS) 119 IJSIBUV676 Sump isolation AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) S1 No 104(l) No No valve HPSI long-term Inst. Rack 120 IJSINPT391 recirc loop I CTMT Yes Yes IC DHR (18) SI No 120 (l) No Yes pressure xmtr IMSPBPOI Spray pond pump SP Yes Yes PC DHR Vert. Pump SP No 122(0) No No 21_ IMSPBP01 "B" SI Yes Yes UHS (6) SI__o 122_(_) NoNo WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS-1 January 2014

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G- 13 Table G-2: PVNGS-1 SWEL 1 The total number of SWEL I items is 124 instead of 125 because item 14 (1MCHEEO1) was removed (see discussion in Section 3.4). The item numbers in the first column of this table were not adjusted to make it easier to compare the items to those in Table G-2 of Reference 48.

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G-14 Table G-3: PVNGS-1 Base List 2 (SWEL 2 is the same as Base List 2)

(Refer to Table G-3 of Reference 48, "Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit I")

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0 PVNGS- I January 2014