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| | issue date = 01/26/1988 | | | issue date = 01/26/1988 |
| | title = LER 87-017-02:on 871113,six Leakage Pathways from Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Compartment 13 & One Pathway from Unit 2 Identified.Caused by Control of Design Requirements. Leakage Paths Sealed & Field Directive Will Be Issued | | | title = LER 87-017-02:on 871113,six Leakage Pathways from Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Compartment 13 & One Pathway from Unit 2 Identified.Caused by Control of Design Requirements. Leakage Paths Sealed & Field Directive Will Be Issued |
| | author name = POLLACK M J | | | author name = Pollack M |
| | author affiliation = PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. OF NEW JERSEY | | | author affiliation = PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. OF NEW JERSEY |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
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| {{#Wiki_filter:.. iillC forMJll IM:IJ LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEA) ' U.1, NUCLIAll llEOULATOllY c:a..i*ION -OVID OMI NO. 3110-41CM EX,.llES: | | {{#Wiki_filter:.. |
| 1131
| | iillC forMJll U.1, NUCLIAll llEOULATOllY c:a..i*ION IM:IJ |
| * PACILITY NAMI 111 Salem Generating Station -Unit 1 I DOCKIT Maalll 121 I | | -OVID OMI NO. 3110-41CM EX,.llES: 1131 |
| ,.., o 15 IO IO Io I 21 71 211 loF 0 14 TITLI 1'1 Disc. Leak Paths From 13(23)AFW Pump Compartments
| | * LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEA) ' |
| -Control of Design Reqt IVINT CATI 1111 lllPOllT CATI 171 OTHlll PACIUTlll INVOLVID Ill MONTH QAY YEAR YEAR lt tt MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMU DOCltET NUMIERISI Salem Unit 2 o 1 s Io I o I o t3 11 11 l I 1 ll 3 s 1 s 11--o I 1 I 1 -o I 2 o I 12 16 | | DOCKIT Maalll 121 I r-~* ,.., |
| * s 1 s THll llll'OllT 11 IUIMITTID l'UlllUANT TO THI lllQUllllMINTI OP 10 CPll §: (o-lt -°',,,,.,.of IN followlnf) 1111 Ol'lllATINO MODI Ill 6 20.40211tl 20.4Gl(ol I0.'7311112111*1 71.7111tl t----...---.._+--i i----10.al1IC11 | | I PACILITY NAMI 111 Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 o 15 IO IO Io I 21 71 211 loF 0 14 TITLI 1'1 Disc. Leak Paths From 13(23)AFW Pump Compartments - Control of Design Reqt IVINT CATI 1111 L!llN~llllll lllPOllT CATI 171 OTHlll PACIUTlll INVOLVID Ill MONTH QAY YEAR YEAR lt u:;:;~~~~AL tt :~"1~ MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMU DOCltET NUMIERISI Salem Unit 2 o 1s Io I o I o t3 11 11 l I 1 ll 3 s 1s 11- - o I 1 I1 - oI 2 oI 12 16 |
| *.nc.11211*1 7:1.71111 i--eo.:.101121 | | * s 1s THll llll'OllT 11 IUIMITTID l'UlllUANT TO THI lllQUllllMINTI OP 10 CPll §: (o-lt - °',,,,.,.of IN followlnf) 1111 Ol'lllATINO MODI Ill I |
| ...... l'OWlll I 20 ...... 111,111 01 01 Q-20.4Glloll111MI 6'1.731eli.illll | | t----...---.._+--i l'OWlll L~1L 6 20.40211tl 20......111,111 i-- |
| -110.n1e11211w111
| | i-- |
| -1111.n1e11211w1111w
| | 20.4Gl(ol 10.al1IC11 I0.'7311112111*1 |
| ::R OTHlll (Spclfy In Ab_,
| | *.nc.11211*1 -::R 71.7111tl 7:1.71111 01 01 Q - 20.4Glloll111MI |
| Te:r, NflC f'r;;m --90.731elf2JUll IG.711811211111111111 | | ...... eo.:.101121 110.n1e11211w111 OTHlll (Spclfy In Ab_, |
| --Info Only I0.731ell2111111 ll0.7Jlell21f*I LICENIH CONTACT FOii THll LEll lt:lll NAME TELEPHONE NUMll!ll AREA COD! M. J. Pollack -LER Coordinator 61 0 I 9 31 31 9r 14 10 12 12 COMl'LITI ONE LINI FOii EACH COMPONENT PAILUlll DEIClllllD IN THll llll'OllT 11'1 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. TUR ER SYSTEM COMl'ONENT MANUFAC. TUR ER I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I IUl'PLEMENTAL llEl'OllT l!XPECTID 11'1 EXPECTED MONTH DAY SUllMISSIDN DATE 11111 I YES,,, I'll. --EXl'ECTED
| | ~-er.!!'" Te:r, NflC f'r;;m |
| :SVIMISSION DATE} I I AalTllACT (Limit ID 1400 -* I.&, _.,.1mno1y | | -- 6'1.731eli.illll 90.731elf2JUll -- 1111.n1e11211w1111w IG.711811211111111111 |
| ,,_ r1,.,,, . .,,... ry,.,..,,mn llnmJ 1111 On 11/13/87 an NRC inspector identified leakage paths from the No. 13 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Turbine .Driven Pump compartment | | ~ |
| {BAI. Subsequent investigation revealed six (6) unsealed openings from the Unit 1 pump and one unsealed opening from the Unit 2 pump. The compartment encloses the steam feed piping to the AFW Turbine Driven Pump such that a postulated pipe break would not damage adjacent vital electrical equipment located outside the compartment. | | Info Only I0.731ell2111111 ll0.7Jlell21f*I LICENIH CONTACT FOii THll LEll lt:lll NAME TELEPHONE NUMll!ll AREA COD! |
| The root cause of the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment deficiencies has been attributed to control of design requirements. | | M. J. Pollack - LER Coordinator 61 0 I 9 31 31 9r 14 10 12 12 COMl'LITI ONE LINI FOii EACH COMPONENT PAILUlll DEIClllllD IN THll llll'OllT 11'1 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. SYSTEM MANUFAC. |
| | TUR ER COMl'ONENT TUR ER I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l!l li!i!l i!il li ! i! !i! i!i! i!i!i!i i~l!i!i! |
| | IUl'PLEMENTAL llEl'OllT l!XPECTID 11'1 MONTH DAY V~AR EXPECTED |
| | ~NO SUllMISSIDN I YES,,, I'll. - - EXl'ECTED :SVIMISSION DATE} |
| | DATE 11111 I I I AalTllACT (Limit ID 1400 - |
| | * I.&, _.,.1mno1y , , _ r1,.,,,..,,... ry,.,..,,mn llnmJ 1111 On 11/13/87 an NRC inspector identified leakage paths from the No. 13 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Turbine .Driven Pump compartment {BAI. |
| | Subsequent investigation revealed six (6) unsealed openings from the Unit 1 pump and one unsealed opening from the Unit 2 pump. The compartment encloses the steam feed piping to the AFW Turbine Driven Pump such that a postulated pipe break would not damage adjacent vital electrical equipment located outside the compartment. The root cause of the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment deficiencies has been attributed to control of design requirements. The leakage paths identified on the Salem Units 1 & 2 Steam Driven AFW Pump enclosures have been sealed. A review of other protective pipe rupture enclosures, to verify their integrity has been maintained, is continuing. To ensure that adequate attention is given to the maintenance of these structures in the future, the Program Analysis .c Group (PAG) will issue a Field Directive identifying the areas that-: |
| | are designed to accommodate the effects of a pipe rupture. Based on the Field Directive, administrative controls to maintain protective structures in a condition that meets their design requirements will be reviewed and changes made as necessary. |
| | 8802090450 880126 PDR ADOCK 05000272 s PDR |
| | |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem-Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272 87-017-02 2 of 4 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION: |
| | Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as f xxl IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: |
| | Discovered Leakage Paths From 13(23) Aux Feedwater Pump Compartment - |
| | Control of Design Requirements Event Date: 11/13/87 Report Date: 01/26/88 This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 87-449. |
| | CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE: |
| | Mode 6 Reactor Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: |
| | On 11/13/87 an NRC inspector identified leakage paths from the No. 13 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Turbine Driven Pump compartment [BA} . |
| | Subsequent investigation revealed six (6) leakage pathways from the Unit 1 pump compartment . and one pa.thway from the Unit 2 pump compartment. The compartment encloses the steam feed piping to the AFW Turbine Driven Pump such that a postulated pipe break would not damage adjacent vital electrical equipment located outside the compartment. |
| | The Unit 1 pump compartment pathways consist of four (4) pipe penetrations where excessive annulus areas exist between the pipe and the compartment wall, one (1) hole cut to accommodate a protruding bolt~ and one (1) small hole cut through the steel compartment wall for no known reason. The Unit 2 pump compartment pathway is a pipe |
| | *penetration with an excessive annulus area between the pipe*and wall. |
| | -APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: |
| | The root cause of the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment deficiencies is associated with control of design requirements. "Notes" on the AFW Pump enclosure controlled drawings (bot~ Units) state that the compartment structure is designed for an internal pressure of 50 pounds per square foot (psf). Also, the drawing "Notes" indicate that gaps and cracks in the structure should be minimized during erection and plugged as required to ensure a reasonable degree of watertightness. |
| | It cannot be conclusively determined what activities took place that resulted in these leakage paths whether from the original design configuration or as the result of design modifications. |
| | |
| | DOCKET NUMBER LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem*Generating Station LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272 87-017-02 3 of 4* |
| | The Salem Unit 1 AFW Pump compartment was analyzed due to the greater open area than the Unit 2 AFW Pump enclosure. The total unsealed area for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 compartments was approximately 20 square inches and four square inches, respectively. The AFW Pump enclosure is designed to contain the steam release from a postulated steam pipe rupture such that adjacent vital electrical equipment is not damaged. |
| | In the* event of a postulated pump steam supply line rupture (high energy line break} within the compartment, the compartment temperature and pressure would rise. At 0. 33 psi, exhaust dampers will op*en to vent steam into the adjacent Auxiliary Building pipe alley. The total effective free flow area provided by the dampers is 1265 in2 |
| | * The unsealed openings represented an increase in the available exhaust area of 1.6%. The total steam discharge rate from a *postulated break is 11.0 lb.ls of steam at an initial pressure.of 1020 psia, 547°F. |
| | The amount of steam discharged.to the adjacent area of the enclose through the unsealed openings is 1.6% of 11.0 lb.ls which equals 0.17 lb./s. This will be an adiabatic expansion into the area at slightly less than atmosperic pressure. This process will reduce the temperature of t_he exiting steam to 300° F. The specific volume of steam.at these conditions (14.7 psia and 300°F) and a mass flow rate of O.i7 lb.ls will result in 300 cfm of steam exhausted into the area. Steam with a molecular weight of 18 will rise to the. ceiling. |
| | The ceiling area has ventilation exhaust ducts with an exhaust |
| | * capacity of 500 cfm. Therefore, the steam will be exhausted, via the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System, and will* not accumulate in the adjacent area. The operability of equipment adjacent to the enclosure will not be compromised by the steam release. |
| | The adjacent area contains the 11(21) and 12(22) Motor Driven AFW Pumps,. various AFW valves, Main Steam System valves (Unit 2 only), the 1(2)A and 1(2}C West 230 V Vital Motor Control Centers (MCCs); and various electrical panels, including the Alternate Shutdown Panel (Panel 213). This equipment will remain operable during the postulated steam release. |
| | The 230 V MCCs provide power and control to a variety of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) valves, including one Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Minimum Flow Valve (11RH29) (BPI, the Safety Injection Pump Minimum Flow Valves (SJ67 & 68), an RHR Loop Crosstie Valve (11RH19), |
| | one suction valve from the Reactor Water Storage Tank to the Charging Pumps (lSJl),_ a Containment Sump Isolation Valve (11SJ44), and Component Cooling Water discharge valve from the RHR Heat Exchanger (11CC16). |
| | Since an ECCS actuation is not expected to occur as a result of the postulated break, these ECCS valves would not be required to operate. |
| | Also, since a fire is not postulated coincident with a pipe break, the Alternate Shutdown Panel would not be required. However, in the event of a break in the steam supply line to the AFW Turbine Driven Pump, the Motor Driven AFW Pumps and valves would be required to operate |
| | |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE u*n.i t 1 5000272 87-017-02 4 of 4 ANALYS.LS OF OCCURRENCE~ (cont'd) |
| | -~~~~~ |
| | during normai plant cooldown to remove heat from the core until the RHR System could be placed in operation. |
| | In summary, the equipment adjacent to the Steam Driven AFW Pump are necessary to normal plant operation as well as mitigation of design base accidents. They are required to be protected against the dynamic effects of a postulated pipe rupture. As discussed above, the operability of equipment adjacent to the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment would not have been effected by a postulated steam supply line break. |
| | _CORREC'IIVE _ACTION: |
| The leakage paths identified on the Salem Units 1 & 2 Steam Driven AFW Pump enclosures have been sealed. A review of other protective pipe rupture enclosures, to verify their integrity has been maintained, is continuing. | | The leakage paths identified on the Salem Units 1 & 2 Steam Driven AFW Pump enclosures have been sealed. A review of other protective pipe rupture enclosures, to verify their integrity has been maintained, is continuing. |
| To ensure that adequate attention is given to the maintenance of these structures in the future, the Program Analysis .c Group (PAG) will issue a Field Directive identifying the areas that-: are designed to accommodate the effects of a pipe rupture. Based on the Field Directive, administrative controls to maintain protective structures in a condition that meets their design requirements will be reviewed and changes made as necessary.
| |
| 8802090450 880126 PDR ADOCK 05000272 s PDR I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem-Generating Station Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:
| |
| Westinghouse
| |
| -Pressurized Water Reactor LER NUMBER 87-017-02 PAGE 2 of 4 Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as f xxl IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
| |
| Discovered Leakage Paths From 13(23) Aux Feedwater Pump Compartment
| |
| -Control of Design Requirements Event Date: 11/13/87 Report Date: 01/26/88 This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 87-449. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
| |
| Mode 6 Reactor Power 0% -Unit Load 0 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
| |
| On 11/13/87 an NRC inspector identified leakage paths from the No. 13 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Turbine Driven Pump compartment
| |
| [BA} . Subsequent investigation revealed six (6) leakage pathways from the Unit 1 pump compartment . and one pa.thway from the Unit 2 pump compartment.
| |
| The compartment encloses the steam feed piping to the AFW Turbine Driven Pump such that a postulated pipe break would not damage adjacent vital electrical equipment located outside the compartment.
| |
| The Unit 1 pump compartment pathways consist of four (4) pipe penetrations where excessive annulus areas exist between the pipe and the compartment wall, one (1) hole cut to accommodate a protruding and one (1) small hole cut through the steel compartment wall for no known reason. The Unit 2 pump compartment pathway is a pipe *penetration with an excessive annulus area between the pipe*and wall. -APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
| |
| The root cause of the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment deficiencies is associated with control of design requirements. "Notes" on the AFW Pump enclosure controlled drawings Units) state that the compartment structure is designed for an internal pressure of 50 pounds per square foot (psf). Also, the drawing "Notes" indicate that gaps and cracks in the structure should be minimized during erection and plugged as required to ensure a reasonable degree of watertightness.
| |
| It cannot be conclusively determined what activities took place that resulted in these leakage paths whether from the original design configuration or as the result of design modifications.
| |
| * LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem*Generating Station Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 LER NUMBER 87-017-02 PAGE 3 of 4* The Salem Unit 1 AFW Pump compartment was analyzed due to the greater open area than the Unit 2 AFW Pump enclosure.
| |
| The total unsealed area for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 compartments was approximately 20 square inches and four square inches, respectively.
| |
| The AFW Pump enclosure is designed to contain the steam release from a postulated steam pipe rupture such that adjacent vital electrical equipment is not damaged. In the* event of a postulated pump steam supply line rupture (high energy line break} within the compartment, the compartment temperature and pressure would rise. At 0. 33 psi, exhaust dampers will op*en to vent steam into the adjacent Auxiliary Building pipe alley. The total effective free flow area provided by the dampers is 1265 in 2
| |
| * The unsealed openings represented an increase in the available exhaust area of 1.6%. The total steam discharge rate from a *postulated break is 11.0 lb.ls of steam at an initial pressure.of 1020 psia, 547°F. The amount of steam discharged.to the adjacent area of the enclose through the unsealed openings is 1.6% of 11.0 lb.ls which equals 0.17 lb./s. This will be an adiabatic expansion into the area at slightly less than atmosperic pressure.
| |
| This process will reduce the temperature of t_he exiting steam to 300° F. The specific volume of steam.at these conditions (14.7 psia and 300°F) and a mass flow rate of O.i7 lb.ls will result in 300 cfm of steam exhausted into the area. Steam with a molecular weight of 18 will rise to the. ceiling. The ceiling area has ventilation exhaust ducts with an exhaust
| |
| * capacity of 500 cfm. Therefore, the steam will be exhausted, via the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System, and will* not accumulate in the adjacent area. The operability of equipment adjacent to the enclosure will not be compromised by the steam release. The adjacent area contains the 11(21) and 12(22) Motor Driven AFW Pumps,. various AFW valves, Main Steam System valves (Unit 2 only), the 1(2)A and 1(2}C West 230 V Vital Motor Control Centers (MCCs); and various electrical panels, including the Alternate Shutdown Panel (Panel 213). This equipment will remain operable during the postulated steam release. The 230 V MCCs provide power and control to a variety of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) valves, including one Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Minimum Flow Valve (11RH29) (BPI, the Safety Injection Pump Minimum Flow Valves (SJ67 & 68), an RHR Loop Crosstie Valve (11RH19), one suction valve from the Reactor Water Storage Tank to the Charging Pumps (lSJl),_ a Containment Sump Isolation Valve (11SJ44), and Component Cooling Water discharge valve from the RHR Heat Exchanger (11CC16).
| |
| Since an ECCS actuation is not expected to occur as a result of the postulated break, these ECCS valves would not be required to operate. Also, since a fire is not postulated coincident with a pipe break, the Alternate Shutdown Panel would not be required.
| |
| However, in the event of a break in the steam supply line to the AFW Turbine Driven Pump, the Motor Driven AFW Pumps and valves would be required to operate LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station u*n.i t 1 DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 ANALYS.LS OF (cont'd)
| |
| LER NUMBER 87-017-02 PAGE 4 of 4 during normai plant cooldown to remove heat from the core until the RHR System could be placed in operation.
| |
| In summary, the equipment adjacent to the Steam Driven AFW Pump are necessary to normal plant operation as well as mitigation of design base accidents.
| |
| They are required to be protected against the dynamic effects of a postulated pipe rupture. As discussed above, the operability of equipment adjacent to the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment would not have been effected by a postulated steam supply line break. _CORREC'IIVE
| |
| _ACTION: The leakage paths identified on the Salem Units 1 & 2 Steam Driven AFW Pump enclosures have been sealed. A review of other protective pipe rupture enclosures, to verify their integrity has been maintained, is continuing.
| |
| To ensure that adequate attention is given to the maintenance of these structures in the future, the Program Analysis Group (PAG) will issue a Field Directive (by February 16, 1988) identifying the areas that are.designed to accommodate the effects of a pipe rupture. Based on the Field Directive, administrative controls to maintain protective structures in a condition that meets their design requirements will be reviewed and changes made as necessary. | | To ensure that adequate attention is given to the maintenance of these structures in the future, the Program Analysis Group (PAG) will issue a Field Directive (by February 16, 1988) identifying the areas that are.designed to accommodate the effects of a pipe rupture. Based on the Field Directive, administrative controls to maintain protective structures in a condition that meets their design requirements will be reviewed and changes made as necessary. |
| i1Jl-':pc SORC Mtg. 88-009 (]AA 9 Salerr, Operation!':}} | | G~~~~er ~ |
| | (]AA 9 Salerr, Operation!': |
| | i1Jl-':pc SORC Mtg. 88-009}} |
LER 87-017-02:on 871113,six Leakage Pathways from Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Compartment 13 & One Pathway from Unit 2 Identified.Caused by Control of Design Requirements. Leakage Paths Sealed & Field Directive Will Be Issued| ML18093A625 |
| Person / Time |
|---|
| Site: |
Salem  |
|---|
| Issue date: |
01/26/1988 |
|---|
| From: |
Pollack M
Public Service Enterprise Group |
|---|
| To: |
|
|---|
| Shared Package |
|---|
| ML18093A627 |
List: |
|---|
| References |
|---|
| LER-87-017, LER-87-17, NUDOCS 8802090450 |
| Download: ML18093A625 (4) |
|
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ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998
LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr
ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998
LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr
ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr
ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr
ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr
ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr
ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr
ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998
LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr
ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr
ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr
ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr
ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr
ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr
ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr
ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr
ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged
ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr
ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr
ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr
ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr
ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr
ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected
ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998
Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences
ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr
ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr
ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr
ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998
Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs
ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr
ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr
1999-08-26
[Table view]
Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr
ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999
LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr
ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr
ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr
ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr
ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr
ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr
ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr
ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr
ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr
ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr
ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr
ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr
ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr
ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999
LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr
ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999
LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr
ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999
LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr
ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998
LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr
ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998
LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr
ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998
LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr
ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998
LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr
ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr
ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr
ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr
ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr
ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr
ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998
LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr
ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr
ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr
ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr
ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr
ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr
ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr
ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr
ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged
ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr
ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr
ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr
ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr
ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr
ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected
ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998
Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences
ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr
ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr
ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr
ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998
Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs
ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr
ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr
1999-08-26
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999
NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data
ML18107A5581999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 991014 Ltr
ML18107A5571999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 991014 Ltr
ML18107A5301999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990913 Ltr
ML18107A5311999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913
ML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr
ML18107A5201999-08-12012 August 1999
Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#9) Second Interval,Second Period, First Outage (96RF).
ML18107A4811999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990813 Ltr
ML18107A4821999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990813 Ltr
ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999
LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr
ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr
ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr
ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr
ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr
ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999
Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF).
ML18107A4351999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990713 Ltr
ML18107A4341999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990713 Ltr
ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999
NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept
ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr
ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr
ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr
ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999
Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716
ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr
ML18107A3681999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990611 Ltr
ML18107A3721999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990611 Ltr
ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr
ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr
ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999
Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1
ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999
Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1
ML18107A2991999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990514 Ltr
ML18107A2971999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990514 Ltr
ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr
ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999
Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11.
ML18107A1821999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990414 Ltr
ML18107A1831999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990414 Ltr
ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr
ML18106B1021999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990315 Ltr
ML18106B1011999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990315 Ltr
ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified
ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999
LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr
ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl
ML18106B0561999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990212 Ltr
ML18106B0571999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990212 Ltr
ML20205P1671999-01-31031 January 1999
a POST-PLUME Phase, Federal Participation Exercise
ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables
ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999
LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr
ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999
LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr
ML18106B0251998-12-31031 December 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Salem Unit 2.With 990115 Ltr
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
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iillC forMJll U.1, NUCLIAll llEOULATOllY c:a..i*ION IM:IJ
-OVID OMI NO. 3110-41CM EX,.llES: 1131
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEA) '
DOCKIT Maalll 121 I r-~* ,..,
I PACILITY NAMI 111 Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 o 15 IO IO Io I 21 71 211 loF 0 14 TITLI 1'1 Disc. Leak Paths From 13(23)AFW Pump Compartments - Control of Design Reqt IVINT CATI 1111 L!llN~llllll lllPOllT CATI 171 OTHlll PACIUTlll INVOLVID Ill MONTH QAY YEAR YEAR lt u:;:;~~~~AL tt :~"1~ MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMU DOCltET NUMIERISI Salem Unit 2 o 1s Io I o I o t3 11 11 l I 1 ll 3 s 1s 11- - o I 1 I1 - oI 2 oI 12 16
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M. J. Pollack - LER Coordinator 61 0 I 9 31 31 9r 14 10 12 12 COMl'LITI ONE LINI FOii EACH COMPONENT PAILUlll DEIClllllD IN THll llll'OllT 11'1 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. SYSTEM MANUFAC.
TUR ER COMl'ONENT TUR ER I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l!l li!i!l i!il li ! i! !i! i!i! i!i!i!i i~l!i!i!
IUl'PLEMENTAL llEl'OllT l!XPECTID 11'1 MONTH DAY V~AR EXPECTED
~NO SUllMISSIDN I YES,,, I'll. - - EXl'ECTED :SVIMISSION DATE}
DATE 11111 I I I AalTllACT (Limit ID 1400 -
- I.&, _.,.1mno1y , , _ r1,.,,,..,,... ry,.,..,,mn llnmJ 1111 On 11/13/87 an NRC inspector identified leakage paths from the No. 13 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Turbine .Driven Pump compartment {BAI.
Subsequent investigation revealed six (6) unsealed openings from the Unit 1 pump and one unsealed opening from the Unit 2 pump. The compartment encloses the steam feed piping to the AFW Turbine Driven Pump such that a postulated pipe break would not damage adjacent vital electrical equipment located outside the compartment. The root cause of the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment deficiencies has been attributed to control of design requirements. The leakage paths identified on the Salem Units 1 & 2 Steam Driven AFW Pump enclosures have been sealed. A review of other protective pipe rupture enclosures, to verify their integrity has been maintained, is continuing. To ensure that adequate attention is given to the maintenance of these structures in the future, the Program Analysis .c Group (PAG) will issue a Field Directive identifying the areas that-:
are designed to accommodate the effects of a pipe rupture. Based on the Field Directive, administrative controls to maintain protective structures in a condition that meets their design requirements will be reviewed and changes made as necessary.
8802090450 880126 PDR ADOCK 05000272 s PDR
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem-Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272 87-017-02 2 of 4 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:
Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as f xxl IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Discovered Leakage Paths From 13(23) Aux Feedwater Pump Compartment -
Control of Design Requirements Event Date: 11/13/87 Report Date: 01/26/88 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.87-449.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
Mode 6 Reactor Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
On 11/13/87 an NRC inspector identified leakage paths from the No. 13 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Turbine Driven Pump compartment [BA} .
Subsequent investigation revealed six (6) leakage pathways from the Unit 1 pump compartment . and one pa.thway from the Unit 2 pump compartment. The compartment encloses the steam feed piping to the AFW Turbine Driven Pump such that a postulated pipe break would not damage adjacent vital electrical equipment located outside the compartment.
The Unit 1 pump compartment pathways consist of four (4) pipe penetrations where excessive annulus areas exist between the pipe and the compartment wall, one (1) hole cut to accommodate a protruding bolt~ and one (1) small hole cut through the steel compartment wall for no known reason. The Unit 2 pump compartment pathway is a pipe
- penetration with an excessive annulus area between the pipe*and wall.
-APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
The root cause of the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment deficiencies is associated with control of design requirements. "Notes" on the AFW Pump enclosure controlled drawings (bot~ Units) state that the compartment structure is designed for an internal pressure of 50 pounds per square foot (psf). Also, the drawing "Notes" indicate that gaps and cracks in the structure should be minimized during erection and plugged as required to ensure a reasonable degree of watertightness.
It cannot be conclusively determined what activities took place that resulted in these leakage paths whether from the original design configuration or as the result of design modifications.
DOCKET NUMBER LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem*Generating Station LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272 87-017-02 3 of 4*
The Salem Unit 1 AFW Pump compartment was analyzed due to the greater open area than the Unit 2 AFW Pump enclosure. The total unsealed area for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 compartments was approximately 20 square inches and four square inches, respectively. The AFW Pump enclosure is designed to contain the steam release from a postulated steam pipe rupture such that adjacent vital electrical equipment is not damaged.
In the* event of a postulated pump steam supply line rupture (high energy line break} within the compartment, the compartment temperature and pressure would rise. At 0. 33 psi, exhaust dampers will op*en to vent steam into the adjacent Auxiliary Building pipe alley. The total effective free flow area provided by the dampers is 1265 in2
- The unsealed openings represented an increase in the available exhaust area of 1.6%. The total steam discharge rate from a *postulated break is 11.0 lb.ls of steam at an initial pressure.of 1020 psia, 547°F.
The amount of steam discharged.to the adjacent area of the enclose through the unsealed openings is 1.6% of 11.0 lb.ls which equals 0.17 lb./s. This will be an adiabatic expansion into the area at slightly less than atmosperic pressure. This process will reduce the temperature of t_he exiting steam to 300° F. The specific volume of steam.at these conditions (14.7 psia and 300°F) and a mass flow rate of O.i7 lb.ls will result in 300 cfm of steam exhausted into the area. Steam with a molecular weight of 18 will rise to the. ceiling.
The ceiling area has ventilation exhaust ducts with an exhaust
- capacity of 500 cfm. Therefore, the steam will be exhausted, via the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System, and will* not accumulate in the adjacent area. The operability of equipment adjacent to the enclosure will not be compromised by the steam release.
The adjacent area contains the 11(21) and 12(22) Motor Driven AFW Pumps,. various AFW valves, Main Steam System valves (Unit 2 only), the 1(2)A and 1(2}C West 230 V Vital Motor Control Centers (MCCs); and various electrical panels, including the Alternate Shutdown Panel (Panel 213). This equipment will remain operable during the postulated steam release.
The 230 V MCCs provide power and control to a variety of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) valves, including one Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Minimum Flow Valve (11RH29) (BPI, the Safety Injection Pump Minimum Flow Valves (SJ67 & 68), an RHR Loop Crosstie Valve (11RH19),
one suction valve from the Reactor Water Storage Tank to the Charging Pumps (lSJl),_ a Containment Sump Isolation Valve (11SJ44), and Component Cooling Water discharge valve from the RHR Heat Exchanger (11CC16).
Since an ECCS actuation is not expected to occur as a result of the postulated break, these ECCS valves would not be required to operate.
Also, since a fire is not postulated coincident with a pipe break, the Alternate Shutdown Panel would not be required. However, in the event of a break in the steam supply line to the AFW Turbine Driven Pump, the Motor Driven AFW Pumps and valves would be required to operate
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE u*n.i t 1 5000272 87-017-02 4 of 4 ANALYS.LS OF OCCURRENCE~ (cont'd)
-~~~~~
during normai plant cooldown to remove heat from the core until the RHR System could be placed in operation.
In summary, the equipment adjacent to the Steam Driven AFW Pump are necessary to normal plant operation as well as mitigation of design base accidents. They are required to be protected against the dynamic effects of a postulated pipe rupture. As discussed above, the operability of equipment adjacent to the Steam Driven AFW Pump compartment would not have been effected by a postulated steam supply line break.
_CORREC'IIVE _ACTION:
The leakage paths identified on the Salem Units 1 & 2 Steam Driven AFW Pump enclosures have been sealed. A review of other protective pipe rupture enclosures, to verify their integrity has been maintained, is continuing.
To ensure that adequate attention is given to the maintenance of these structures in the future, the Program Analysis Group (PAG) will issue a Field Directive (by February 16, 1988) identifying the areas that are.designed to accommodate the effects of a pipe rupture. Based on the Field Directive, administrative controls to maintain protective structures in a condition that meets their design requirements will be reviewed and changes made as necessary.
G~~~~er ~
(]AA 9 Salerr, Operation!':
i1Jl-':pc SORC Mtg.88-009