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| | issue date = 05/13/1993 | | | issue date = 05/13/1993 |
| | title = LER 93-006-00:on 930415,unexpected Train a SI Sys Signal Occurred Due to Steam Line Differential Pressure.Caused by Operating Characteristics of Error Inhibit Switch.Procedures Re Manipulation of Switches reviewed.W/930514 Ltr | | | title = LER 93-006-00:on 930415,unexpected Train a SI Sys Signal Occurred Due to Steam Line Differential Pressure.Caused by Operating Characteristics of Error Inhibit Switch.Procedures Re Manipulation of Switches reviewed.W/930514 Ltr |
| | author name = PASTVA M J, VONDRA C A | | | author name = Pastva M, Vondra C |
| | author affiliation = PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. OF NEW JERSEY | | | author affiliation = PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. OF NEW JERSEY |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
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| {{#Wiki_filter:e Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 | | {{#Wiki_filter:e PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station May 14, 1993 |
| | : u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 |
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| ==Dear Sir:== | | ==Dear Sir:== |
| SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 93-006-00 May 14, 1993 This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations lOCFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv). This report is required to be issued within thirty (30). days of event discovery. | | |
| MJPJ:pc Distribution 9305210251 930513 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDR l he rower is in your hands. Sincerely yours, c. A. Vondra General Manager -Salem Operations 95-2189 REV 7-92 NRC FORM 366 (6-89) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150*0104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO" THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503 .. FACILITY NAME.(1) I DOCKET NUMBER (2) I PAGE Ill **Salem Genera tin£ Station -Unit 2 | | SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 93-006-00 This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv). This report is required to be issued within thirty (30). days of event discovery. |
| * o 15 Io Io Io I 31 l 11 1 loF 014 TITLE !*l Train 11 A 11 Safetv Iniection System Signal During Response Time Testing. EVENT DATE (5) LER. NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (71 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR ft= | | Sincerely yours, |
| t? | | : c. A. Vondra General Manager - |
| MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S) o I 4 1 Is 9 3 9 I 3 -o Io I 6 o I o o Is 1 I 3 9 I 3 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE OF 10 CFR §: (Chock ono or moro of tho following) | | Salem Operations MJPJ:pc Distribution 9305210251 930513 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDR l he rower is in your hands. |
| (11 I ___ Mo_D_E_1e_1 | | 95-2189 REV 7-92 |
| _
| | |
| 20.402lbl POWER I 20.'°6(*Jl1llil 20 * .0S(c) -K -50.73loll2lliv) 50.73(oll2llvl 50.73loll2llvii) 50.73.loll2llviiillAl 50.731o)(2J(vliil1Bl 50.731*H2llxl | | NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-89) APPROVED OMB NO. 3150*0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO" THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503 .. |
| -73.71lbl 73.71lcl 50.38(c)(1) or o 10 -20 * .asi.11111111
| | FACILITY NAME.(1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) I PAGE Ill |
| -50.38(cll2l
| | **Salem Genera tin£ Station - Unit 2 |
| --OTHER (Spocify in Abstr*ct btJ/ow *nd in Text, NRC Form 366A) ..---1t11ru11111= | | * TITLE !*l Io 15 Io Io Io I 31 l 11 1 loF 014 Train 11 A11 Safetv Iniection System Signal During Response Time Testing. |
| 50.73(*)(2)(i) | | EVENT DATE (5) LER. NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (71 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) |
| ,____ -60.731*ll2lliil 1---50.731oll2Hiiil LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 112) NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE M. J. Pastva. Jr. -LER Coordinator COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 113) CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT I I I I I I I I TURER I I I I I I *.:,:.::,[ | | MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR ft= SE~~~~~~AL t? ~~~~~~ MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S) o I 4 1 Is 9 3 I 9 3 - oIo I 6 o I o oIs 1 3 I 9 3 I THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE R~QUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Chock ono or moro of tho following) (11 I OPERATING POWER Lr1~~L I or o Mo_D_E_1e_1_ __.~6--'-----1 20.402lbl 20.'°6(*Jl1llil 20 *.0S(c) 50.38(c)(1) |
| .. ,j_j[:,j:::J:.:!::::*,11::::::::*:::=:l!l* | | K 50.73loll2lliv) 50.73(oll2llvl 73.71lbl 73.71lcl 10 - 20 *.asi.11111111 50.38(cll2l |
| SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 114) j YES (If yos. compl*t* EXPECTED SUBMISSl.ON DA TEI bi NO ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.t1., approximtJttJly fiftesn singlt1-spsct1 typewritten lines) (16) SYSTEM I I COMPONENT MANUFAC* TUR ER I I I I I I I I I I I I EXPECTED SUBMISSIO.N DATE 1151 MONTH DAY YEAR. I I I At 1002 on 4/15/93, an unexpected Train "A" Safety Injection System (SI} signal occurred due to STEAM LINE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE when the Solid State Protection System (SSPS} Train "A" Input Error Inhibit Switch was positioned to "INHIBIT", as required by Step 8.6 of Procedure 2IC-18.4.004, "RESPONSE TIME OF SSPS LOGIC -SAFETY INJECTION, TRAIN B". The Reactor was defueled and the Safety Injection (SI} Pumps were cleared and tagged. Steam pressure transmitters were being replaced and the STEAM LINE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE bistables were tripped. Plant components, not cleared and tagged, functioned properly. | | -- 50.73loll2llvii) OTHER (Spocify in Abstr*ct btJ/ow *nd in Text, NRC Form 1t11ru11111= ::::::::~: |
| Prior to performing 2IC-18.4-004, the status of the tripped bistables was discussed. | | 50.73(*)(2)(i) 366A) |
| This event resulted from the particular operating characteristics of the subject switch. Positioning the switch slowly, which occurred during this event, caused a c;telay between removing the signal block and disabling the inputs, which allowed the logic to initiate the SI signal. The switch is operating within acceptable tolerances. | | ,____ 50.73.loll2llviiillAl 1-- |
| 2IC-18.4.004 will be revised, by 6/18/93, to require the SSPS train Mode Selector switch be positioned to "TEST" prior to positioning the corresponding Input Error Inhibit Switch to "INHIBIT" and will include a caution that under certain conditions a Reactor trip signal may be initiated whenever the Input Error Inhibit.switch is positioned to "INHIBIT". | | 60.731*ll2lliil 50.731oll2Hiiil |
| In addition, other similar SSPS procedures on both units will be revised prior to their next use. Station procedures for manipulating SSPS switches will be reviewed and appropriately revised. NRC Form 366 (6-89) | | - 50.731o)(2J(vliil1Bl 50.731*H2llxl LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 112) |
| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse | | NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE M. J. Pastva. Jr. - LER Coordinator COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPO~NT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 113) |
| -Pressurized Water Reactor LER NUMBER 93-006-00 PAGE 2 of 4 Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx} IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Train "A" Safety Injection System Signal During Response Time Testing* Of Train "B" Safety. Injection Solid State Protection System Logic Event Daie: 4/15/93 Report Date: 5/13/93 This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 93-222 . . CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Unit 2 -Defueled in its seventh refueling outage. DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE | | MANUFAC- MANUFAC* |
| -At 1002 on April 15, 1993, an unexpected Train "A" Safety Injection System (SI) signal occurred due to STEAM LINE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE when the. Solid state :Protection System (SSPS) Train "A" Input Error Inhibit switch was repositioned to "INHIBIT", as required by Step 8.6 of Procedure 2IC-18.4.004, "RESPONSE TIME OF SSPS LOGIC -SAFETY INJECTION, TRAIN B". Plant components, not cleared and tagged out as a result of ongoing maintenance activities, functioned properly.
| | CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER TUR ER I I I I I I I *.:,:.::,[.. ,j_j[:,j:::J:.:!::::*,11::::::::*:::=:l!l* I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 114) MONTH DAY YEAR. |
| | EXPECTED j YES (If yos. compl*t* EXPECTED SUBMISSl.ON DA TEI bi ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.t1., approximtJttJly fiftesn singlt1-spsct1 typewritten lines) (16) |
| | NO SUBMISSIO.N DATE 1151 I I I At 1002 on 4/15/93, an unexpected Train "A" Safety Injection System (SI} signal occurred due to STEAM LINE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE when the Solid State Protection System (SSPS} Train "A" Input Error Inhibit Switch was positioned to "INHIBIT", as required by Step 8.6 of Procedure 2IC-18.4.004, "RESPONSE TIME OF SSPS LOGIC - SAFETY INJECTION, TRAIN B". The Reactor was defueled and the Safety Injection (SI} Pumps were cleared and tagged. Steam pressure transmitters were being replaced and the STEAM LINE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE bistables were tripped. Plant components, not cleared and tagged, functioned properly. Prior to performing 2IC-18.4-004, the status of the tripped bistables was discussed. This event resulted from the particular operating characteristics of the subject switch. |
| | Positioning the switch slowly, which occurred during this event, caused a c;telay between removing the signal block and disabling the inputs, which allowed the logic to initiate the SI signal. The switch is operating within acceptable tolerances. 2IC-18.4.004 will be revised, by 6/18/93, to require the SSPS train Mode Selector switch be positioned to "TEST" prior to positioning the corresponding Input Error Inhibit Switch to "INHIBIT" and will include a caution that under certain conditions a Reactor trip signal may be initiated whenever the Input Error Inhibit.switch is positioned to "INHIBIT". |
| | In addition, other similar SSPS procedures on both units will be revised prior to their next use. Station procedures for manipulating SSPS switches will be reviewed and appropriately revised. |
| | NRC Form 366 (6-89) |
| | |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 2 5000311 93-006-00 2 of 4 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx} |
| | IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Train "A" Safety Injection System Signal During Response Time Testing* |
| | Of Train "B" Safety. Injection Solid State Protection System Logic Event Daie: 4/15/93 Report Date: 5/13/93 This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 93-222 . |
| | . CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Unit 2 - Defueled in its seventh refueling outage. |
| | DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE - |
| | At 1002 on April 15, 1993, an unexpected Train "A" Safety Injection System (SI) signal occurred due to STEAM LINE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE when the. Solid state :Protection System (SSPS) Train "A" Input Error Inhibit switch was repositioned to "INHIBIT", as required by Step 8.6 of Procedure 2IC-18.4.004, "RESPONSE TIME OF SSPS LOGIC - SAFETY INJECTION, TRAIN B". Plant components, not cleared and tagged out as a result of ongoing maintenance activities, functioned properly. |
| Due to actuation of the SI logic {BQ}, the Nuclear Regulatory* | | Due to actuation of the SI logic {BQ}, the Nuclear Regulatory* |
| Commission (NRC) was notified of this occurrence in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations lOCFR50.72(b) (ii). *ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE The Reactor Protection System (RPS) encompasses all instrumentation, and equipment that serve to protect the reactor core. The most vital component of the RPS is the SSPS. The SSPS combines into one system the initiation of reactor trips, safeguards actuation and certain non-protective permissives, interlocks and control functions. | | Commission (NRC) was notified of this occurrence in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.72(b) (ii). |
| It receives inputs from various process parameters such as pressure, temperature, level, and power, and initiates appropriate automatic action when the proper number of channels in the monitored parameter exceed a preset value. The SSPS consists of two identical, independent trains to provide complete redundancy. | | *ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE The Reactor Protection System (RPS) encompasses all instrumentation, c~mponents, and equipment that serve to protect the reactor core. The most vital component of the RPS is the SSPS. The SSPS combines into one system the initiation of reactor trips, safeguards actuation and certain non-protective permissives, interlocks and control functions. |
| Both trains receive identical inputs and either train is capable of generating all required outputs (Reactor Trip and/or Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation) | | It receives inputs from various process parameters such as pressure, temperature, level, and power, and initiates appropriate automatic action when the proper number of channels in the monitored parameter exceed a preset value. The SSPS consists of two identical, independent trains to provide complete redundancy. Both trains receive identical inputs and either train is capable of generating all required outputs (Reactor Trip and/or Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation) * |
| * | | * e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PA~E Unit 2 5000311 *93-006-00 3 of 4 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd) |
| * e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd) LER NUMBER *93-006-00 3 of 4 On April 15, 1993, response time testing of the Unit SSPS Train "B" logic was in progress in accordance with Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) Procedure 2IC-18.4.004. | | On April 15, 1993, response time testing of the Unit SSPS Train "B" logic was in progress in accordance with Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) Procedure 2IC-18.4.004. Due to ongoing outage-related activities, the following safety-related equipment was cleared and tagged: "B" Emergency Diesel Generator (DG), Chemical Volume Control System, SI Pumps, Residual Heat Removal System, Component Cooling Water System, and the Emergency Air Compressors. In addition, steam pressure transmitters were being replaced. To support this, the STEAM LINE DIF-FERENTIAL PRESSURE bistables were tripped; however I - an automatic SI* signal was blocked since the Unit Reactor Trip Breakers |
| Due to ongoing outage-related activities, the following safety-related equipment was cleared and tagged: "B" Emergency Diesel Generator (DG), Chemical Volume Control System, SI Pumps, Residual Heat Removal System, Component Cooling Water System, and the Emergency Air Compressors. | | -were open. Prior to performing 2IC~18.4-004, the pre-existing condition involving the tripped bistables was discussed between the involved Technicians and Operations. - |
| In addition, steam pressure transmitters were being replaced. | | At 1002 hours, when the SSPSTrain "A" Input Error Inhibit switch was repositioned to "INHIBIT" as required by step 8.6 of the procedure, an unexpected Train "A" Safety Injection (SI) signal occurred. Plant components, not cleared and tagged out as a result of the ongoing outage-related maintenance activities, functioned properly~ including automatic startingof "A" and "C" DGs. |
| To support this, the STEAM LINE DIF-FERENTIAL PRESSURE bistables were tripped; however I -an automatic SI* signal was blocked since the Unit Reactor Trip Breakers -were open. Prior to performing the pre-existing condition involving the tripped bistables was discussed between the involved Technicians and Operations. | |
| -At 1002 hours, when the SSPSTrain "A" Input Error Inhibit switch was repositioned to "INHIBIT" as required by step 8.6 of the procedure, an unexpected Train "A" Safety Injection (SI) signal occurred.
| |
| Plant components, not cleared and tagged out as a result of the ongoing outage-related maintenance activities, functioned including automatic startingof "A" and "C" DGs. | |
| * This event resulted from the particular operating characteristics of the subject switch, Grayhill Incorporated, Part No. 5004-2. When the switch was positioned to "INHIBIT", the SI block was removed before the existing coincident input logic cleared, which allowed the logic to initiate the SI signal. Testing showed that positioning the switch quickly causes the SI logic inputs to be disabled approximately five (5) milli-seconds after the SI block is removed thereby preventing an SI signal. Slower positioning of the switch, which occurred during this event, causes a delay of approximately fifty (50) milli-seconds between removing the block and disabling the inputs, which allows the logic to initiate an SI signal. An assessment determined the switch is operating within acceptable tolerances. | | * This event resulted from the particular operating characteristics of the subject switch, Grayhill Incorporated, Part No. 5004-2. When the switch was positioned to "INHIBIT", the SI block was removed before the existing coincident input logic cleared, which allowed the logic to initiate the SI signal. Testing showed that positioning the switch quickly causes the SI logic inputs to be disabled approximately five (5) milli-seconds after the SI block is removed thereby preventing an SI signal. Slower positioning of the switch, which occurred during this event, causes a delay of approximately fifty (50) milli-seconds between removing the block and disabling the inputs, which allows the logic to initiate an SI signal. An assessment determined the switch is operating within acceptable tolerances. |
| APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: | | APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: |
| Based upon the switch characteristics as described in the above paragraph, the root cause of this event is "Other", -as defined by NUREG-1022, Licensee Event Report System. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES LER 311/92-005-00 reported the unplanned opening of "B" Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) during SSPS testing on March 16, 1992, due to procedural inadequacy. | | Based upon the switch characteristics as described in the above paragraph, the root cause of this event is "Other", -as defined by NUREG-1022, Licensee Event Report System. |
| This event occurred due to failure to recognize that unusual plant conditions (i.e., all high steam flow bistables tripped), concurrent with removal of the SI block during the procedure would cause the RTBs to open. This event occurred-when the SSPS Train "B" Mode Selector Switch was positioned to "TEST", in LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating station Unit 2 PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES (cont'd) DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 LER NUMBER 93-006-00 PAGE 4 of 4 accordance with Operations Procedure "Manual Safety Injection". | | PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES LER 311/92-005-00 reported the unplanned opening of "B" Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) during SSPS testing on March 16, 1992, due to procedural inadequacy. This event occurred due to failure to recognize that unusual plant conditions (i.e., all high steam flow bistables tripped), concurrent with removal of the SI block during the procedure would cause the RTBs to open. This event occurred-when the SSPS Train "B" Mode Selector Switch was positioned to "TEST", in |
| The April 15, 1993 event differs in that it occurred as a result of manipulating the Input Error Inhibit Switch. This switch has a different function from the switch manipulated in the 1992 event. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE This event did not affect the health and safety of the public since plant conditions remained unaffected by the SSPS actuation. | | |
| * Plant equipment not cleared and tagged functioned properly. | | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 2 5000311 93-006-00 4 of 4 PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES (cont'd) accordance with Operations Procedure S2.0P~ST.SSP-OOOl(Q), "Manual Safety Injection". The April 15, 1993 event differs in that it occurred as a result of manipulating the Input Error Inhibit Switch. |
| This included automatic starting of "A" and 11 c 11 DGs. Although the SSPS is not required to be operable while defueled, the Engineered Safety Feature actuation of the system is reportable to the NRC, in accordance with (2) (iv). CORRECTIVE ACTION 1. To help prevent future similar occurrences, 2IC-18.4.004 is undergoing revision by the Procedure Upgrade Project, to require that the SSPS train Mode Selector Switch be positioned to "TEST" prior to positioning the affected train Input Error Inhibit Switch to "INHIBIT". | | This switch has a different function from the switch manipulated in the 1992 event. |
| This revision has an expected completion by June 18, 1993 and will include a caution to notifiy the Operator that a Reactor trip signal may be initiated under abnormal conditions (i.e. tripped bistables during maintenance activities) whenever the. Input Error Inhibit switch is positioned to "INHIBIT". | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE This event did not affect the health and safety of the public since plant conditions remained unaffected by the SSPS actuation. |
| In addition, other similar SSPS procedures (on both units) will be revised prior to their next use. 2. Station procedures involving manipulation of SSPS switches on the logic test panel will be reviewed and appropriately revised. MJPJ:pc SORC Mtg. 93-043 General Manager -Salem}} | | * Plant equipment not cleared and tagged functioned properly. This included automatic starting of "A" and 11 c 11 DGs. Although the SSPS is not required to be operable while defueled, the Engineered Safety Feature actuation of the system is reportable to the NRC, in accordance with 10CF~50.73(a) (2) (iv). |
| | CORRECTIVE ACTION |
| | : 1. To help prevent future similar occurrences, 2IC-18.4.004 is undergoing revision by the Procedure Upgrade Project, to require that the SSPS train Mode Selector Switch be positioned to "TEST" prior to positioning the affected train Input Error Inhibit Switch to "INHIBIT". This revision has an expected completion by June 18, 1993 and will include a caution to notifiy the Operator that a Reactor trip signal may be initiated under abnormal conditions (i.e. tripped bistables during maintenance activities) whenever the. Input Error Inhibit switch is positioned to "INHIBIT". In addition, other similar SSPS procedures (on both units) will be revised prior to their next use. |
| | : 2. Station procedures involving manipulation of SSPS switches on the logic test panel will be reviewed and appropriately revised. |
| | General Manager - |
| | Salem ~perations MJPJ:pc SORC Mtg. 93-043}} |
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LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr
ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999
LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr
ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999
LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr
ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998
LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr
ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998
LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr
ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998
LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr
ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998
LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr
ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr
ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr
ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr
ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr
ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr
ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998
LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr
ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr
ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr
ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr
ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr
ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr
ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr
ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr
ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged
ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr
ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr
ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr
ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr
ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr
ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected
ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998
Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences
ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr
ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr
ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr
ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998
Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs
ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr
ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr
1999-08-26
[Table view]
Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr
ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999
LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr
ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr
ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr
ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr
ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr
ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr
ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr
ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr
ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr
ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr
ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr
ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr
ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr
ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999
LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr
ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999
LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr
ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999
LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr
ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998
LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr
ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998
LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr
ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998
LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr
ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998
LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr
ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr
ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr
ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr
ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr
ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr
ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998
LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr
ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr
ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr
ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr
ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr
ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr
ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr
ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr
ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged
ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr
ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr
ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr
ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr
ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr
ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected
ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998
Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences
ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr
ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr
ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr
ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998
Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs
ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr
ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr
1999-08-26
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999
NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data
ML18107A5581999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 991014 Ltr
ML18107A5571999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 991014 Ltr
ML18107A5301999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990913 Ltr
ML18107A5311999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913
ML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr
ML18107A5201999-08-12012 August 1999
Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#9) Second Interval,Second Period, First Outage (96RF).
ML18107A4811999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990813 Ltr
ML18107A4821999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990813 Ltr
ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999
LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr
ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr
ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr
ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr
ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr
ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999
Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF).
ML18107A4351999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990713 Ltr
ML18107A4341999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990713 Ltr
ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999
NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept
ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr
ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr
ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr
ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999
Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716
ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr
ML18107A3681999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990611 Ltr
ML18107A3721999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990611 Ltr
ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr
ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr
ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999
Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1
ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999
Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1
ML18107A2991999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990514 Ltr
ML18107A2971999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990514 Ltr
ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr
ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999
Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11.
ML18107A1821999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990414 Ltr
ML18107A1831999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990414 Ltr
ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr
ML18106B1021999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990315 Ltr
ML18106B1011999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990315 Ltr
ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified
ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999
LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr
ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl
ML18106B0561999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990212 Ltr
ML18106B0571999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990212 Ltr
ML20205P1671999-01-31031 January 1999
a POST-PLUME Phase, Federal Participation Exercise
ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables
ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999
LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr
ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999
LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr
ML18106B0251998-12-31031 December 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Salem Unit 2.With 990115 Ltr
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
e PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station May 14, 1993
- u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 93-006-00 This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv). This report is required to be issued within thirty (30). days of event discovery.
Sincerely yours,
- c. A. Vondra General Manager -
Salem Operations MJPJ:pc Distribution 9305210251 930513 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDR l he rower is in your hands.
95-2189 REV 7-92
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-89) APPROVED OMB NO. 3150*0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO" THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503 ..
FACILITY NAME.(1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) I PAGE Ill
- Salem Genera tin£ Station - Unit 2
- TITLE !*l Io 15 Io Io Io I 31 l 11 1 loF 014 Train 11 A11 Safetv Iniection System Signal During Response Time Testing.
EVENT DATE (5) LER. NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (71 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR ft= SE~~~~~~AL t? ~~~~~~ MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S) o I 4 1 Is 9 3 I 9 3 - oIo I 6 o I o oIs 1 3 I 9 3 I THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE R~QUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Chock ono or moro of tho following) (11 I OPERATING POWER Lr1~~L I or o Mo_D_E_1e_1_ __.~6--'-----1 20.402lbl 20.'°6(*Jl1llil 20 *.0S(c) 50.38(c)(1)
K 50.73loll2lliv) 50.73(oll2llvl 73.71lbl 73.71lcl 10 - 20 *.asi.11111111 50.38(cll2l
-- 50.73loll2llvii) OTHER (Spocify in Abstr*ct btJ/ow *nd in Text, NRC Form 1t11ru11111= ::::::::~:
50.73(*)(2)(i) 366A)
,____ 50.73.loll2llviiillAl 1--
60.731*ll2lliil 50.731oll2Hiiil
- 50.731o)(2J(vliil1Bl 50.731*H2llxl LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 112)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE M. J. Pastva. Jr. - LER Coordinator COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPO~NT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 113)
MANUFAC- MANUFAC*
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER TUR ER I I I I I I I *.:,:.::,[.. ,j_j[:,j:::J:.:!::::*,11::::::::*:::=:l!l* I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 114) MONTH DAY YEAR.
EXPECTED j YES (If yos. compl*t* EXPECTED SUBMISSl.ON DA TEI bi ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.t1., approximtJttJly fiftesn singlt1-spsct1 typewritten lines) (16)
NO SUBMISSIO.N DATE 1151 I I I At 1002 on 4/15/93, an unexpected Train "A" Safety Injection System (SI} signal occurred due to STEAM LINE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE when the Solid State Protection System (SSPS} Train "A" Input Error Inhibit Switch was positioned to "INHIBIT", as required by Step 8.6 of Procedure 2IC-18.4.004, "RESPONSE TIME OF SSPS LOGIC - SAFETY INJECTION, TRAIN B". The Reactor was defueled and the Safety Injection (SI} Pumps were cleared and tagged. Steam pressure transmitters were being replaced and the STEAM LINE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE bistables were tripped. Plant components, not cleared and tagged, functioned properly. Prior to performing 2IC-18.4-004, the status of the tripped bistables was discussed. This event resulted from the particular operating characteristics of the subject switch.
Positioning the switch slowly, which occurred during this event, caused a c;telay between removing the signal block and disabling the inputs, which allowed the logic to initiate the SI signal. The switch is operating within acceptable tolerances. 2IC-18.4.004 will be revised, by 6/18/93, to require the SSPS train Mode Selector switch be positioned to "TEST" prior to positioning the corresponding Input Error Inhibit Switch to "INHIBIT" and will include a caution that under certain conditions a Reactor trip signal may be initiated whenever the Input Error Inhibit.switch is positioned to "INHIBIT".
In addition, other similar SSPS procedures on both units will be revised prior to their next use. Station procedures for manipulating SSPS switches will be reviewed and appropriately revised.
NRC Form 366 (6-89)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 2 5000311 93-006-00 2 of 4 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx}
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Train "A" Safety Injection System Signal During Response Time Testing*
Of Train "B" Safety. Injection Solid State Protection System Logic Event Daie: 4/15/93 Report Date: 5/13/93 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.93-222 .
. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Unit 2 - Defueled in its seventh refueling outage.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE -
At 1002 on April 15, 1993, an unexpected Train "A" Safety Injection System (SI) signal occurred due to STEAM LINE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE when the. Solid state :Protection System (SSPS) Train "A" Input Error Inhibit switch was repositioned to "INHIBIT", as required by Step 8.6 of Procedure 2IC-18.4.004, "RESPONSE TIME OF SSPS LOGIC - SAFETY INJECTION, TRAIN B". Plant components, not cleared and tagged out as a result of ongoing maintenance activities, functioned properly.
Due to actuation of the SI logic {BQ}, the Nuclear Regulatory*
Commission (NRC) was notified of this occurrence in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.72(b) (ii).
- ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE The Reactor Protection System (RPS) encompasses all instrumentation, c~mponents, and equipment that serve to protect the reactor core. The most vital component of the RPS is the SSPS. The SSPS combines into one system the initiation of reactor trips, safeguards actuation and certain non-protective permissives, interlocks and control functions.
It receives inputs from various process parameters such as pressure, temperature, level, and power, and initiates appropriate automatic action when the proper number of channels in the monitored parameter exceed a preset value. The SSPS consists of two identical, independent trains to provide complete redundancy. Both trains receive identical inputs and either train is capable of generating all required outputs (Reactor Trip and/or Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation) *
- e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PA~E Unit 2 5000311 *93-006-00 3 of 4 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd)
On April 15, 1993, response time testing of the Unit SSPS Train "B" logic was in progress in accordance with Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) Procedure 2IC-18.4.004. Due to ongoing outage-related activities, the following safety-related equipment was cleared and tagged: "B" Emergency Diesel Generator (DG), Chemical Volume Control System, SI Pumps, Residual Heat Removal System, Component Cooling Water System, and the Emergency Air Compressors. In addition, steam pressure transmitters were being replaced. To support this, the STEAM LINE DIF-FERENTIAL PRESSURE bistables were tripped; however I - an automatic SI* signal was blocked since the Unit Reactor Trip Breakers
-were open. Prior to performing 2IC~18.4-004, the pre-existing condition involving the tripped bistables was discussed between the involved Technicians and Operations. -
At 1002 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00166 weeks <br />3.81261e-4 months <br />, when the SSPSTrain "A" Input Error Inhibit switch was repositioned to "INHIBIT" as required by step 8.6 of the procedure, an unexpected Train "A" Safety Injection (SI) signal occurred. Plant components, not cleared and tagged out as a result of the ongoing outage-related maintenance activities, functioned properly~ including automatic startingof "A" and "C" DGs.
- This event resulted from the particular operating characteristics of the subject switch, Grayhill Incorporated, Part No. 5004-2. When the switch was positioned to "INHIBIT", the SI block was removed before the existing coincident input logic cleared, which allowed the logic to initiate the SI signal. Testing showed that positioning the switch quickly causes the SI logic inputs to be disabled approximately five (5) milli-seconds after the SI block is removed thereby preventing an SI signal. Slower positioning of the switch, which occurred during this event, causes a delay of approximately fifty (50) milli-seconds between removing the block and disabling the inputs, which allows the logic to initiate an SI signal. An assessment determined the switch is operating within acceptable tolerances.
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
Based upon the switch characteristics as described in the above paragraph, the root cause of this event is "Other", -as defined by NUREG-1022, Licensee Event Report System.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES LER 311/92-005-00 reported the unplanned opening of "B" Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) during SSPS testing on March 16, 1992, due to procedural inadequacy. This event occurred due to failure to recognize that unusual plant conditions (i.e., all high steam flow bistables tripped), concurrent with removal of the SI block during the procedure would cause the RTBs to open. This event occurred-when the SSPS Train "B" Mode Selector Switch was positioned to "TEST", in
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 2 5000311 93-006-00 4 of 4 PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES (cont'd) accordance with Operations Procedure S2.0P~ST.SSP-OOOl(Q), "Manual Safety Injection". The April 15, 1993 event differs in that it occurred as a result of manipulating the Input Error Inhibit Switch.
This switch has a different function from the switch manipulated in the 1992 event.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE This event did not affect the health and safety of the public since plant conditions remained unaffected by the SSPS actuation.
- Plant equipment not cleared and tagged functioned properly. This included automatic starting of "A" and 11 c 11 DGs. Although the SSPS is not required to be operable while defueled, the Engineered Safety Feature actuation of the system is reportable to the NRC, in accordance with 10CF~50.73(a) (2) (iv).
CORRECTIVE ACTION
- 1. To help prevent future similar occurrences, 2IC-18.4.004 is undergoing revision by the Procedure Upgrade Project, to require that the SSPS train Mode Selector Switch be positioned to "TEST" prior to positioning the affected train Input Error Inhibit Switch to "INHIBIT". This revision has an expected completion by June 18, 1993 and will include a caution to notifiy the Operator that a Reactor trip signal may be initiated under abnormal conditions (i.e. tripped bistables during maintenance activities) whenever the. Input Error Inhibit switch is positioned to "INHIBIT". In addition, other similar SSPS procedures (on both units) will be revised prior to their next use.
- 2. Station procedures involving manipulation of SSPS switches on the logic test panel will be reviewed and appropriately revised.
General Manager -
Salem ~perations MJPJ:pc SORC Mtg.93-043
