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| issue date = 03/30/1994
| issue date = 03/30/1994
| title = LER 94-004-00:on 940303,late Performance of Offsite Power Availability Surveillance Discovered.Caused by Mgt/Quality Assurance Deficiency.Event Reviewed W/Personnel & Expected Action reinforced.W/940330 Ltr
| title = LER 94-004-00:on 940303,late Performance of Offsite Power Availability Surveillance Discovered.Caused by Mgt/Quality Assurance Deficiency.Event Reviewed W/Personnel & Expected Action reinforced.W/940330 Ltr
| author name = HAGAN M J, PASTVA M J
| author name = Hagan M, Pastva M
| author affiliation = PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. OF NEW JERSEY
| author affiliation = PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. OF NEW JERSEY
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:* . e Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555  
{{#Wiki_filter:.                             e OPS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station March 30, 1994
: u. s.     Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC               20555


==Dear Sir:==
==Dear Sir:==
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 94-004-00 March 30, 1994 This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Code of Federal Regulation 10CFR50.73(a)  
 
(2) (i) (B)
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 94-004-00 This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Code of Federal Regulation 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (i) (B)
* Issuance of this report is required within thirty (30) days of event discovery.
* Issuance of this report is required within thirty (30) days of event discovery.
MJPJ:pc D,istr ibution flAfln=:i:
Sincerely yours, General Manager -
9404040102 940330 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDR The power is in your hands. Sincerely yours, General Manager -Salem Operations 95-2189 REV 7*92 NRC FORM 366 (5-92) .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31 /95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEA) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503. FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3) Salem Generating Station -Unit 2 05000 311 1 OF 04 TITLE (4) Late Performance Of Offsite Power Avail. Surv. Due To Untimel Determination Of 2A D/G. EVENT DATE 5 LEA NUMBER 6 REPORT NUMBER 7 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 MONTH DAY 03 03 OPERATING MODE (9) YEAR 94 1 YEAR 94 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 004 REVISION NUMBER 00 MONTH DAY YEAR 03 30 94 FACILITY NAME FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 DOCKET NUMBER 05000 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: Check one or more 11 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71 (b) 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1)  
Salem Operations MJPJ:pc D,istr ibution flAfln=:i:
.50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71 (c) 20.405(a)(1  
9404040102 940330 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S                         PDR The power is in your hands.
)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
95-2189 REV 7*92
OTHER 20.405(a)  
 
(1)(iii) x 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a) (2)(viii)(A) (Specify in Abstract i-.j._ _ __;_.:...:....:;..:_:
NRC FORM 366                                                   .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                           APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92)                                                                                                                                EXPIRES 5/31 /95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.               FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEA)                                                          COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)                          MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
_____
FACILITY NAME (1)                                                                                               DOCKET NUMBER (2)                                     PAGE (3)
below and in Text, NRC 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
Salem Generating Station - Unit 2                                                                                               05000 311                             1 OF     04 TITLE (4)
Form 366A) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
Late Performance Of Offsite Power Avail. Surv. Due To Untimel                                                               Determination Of 2A D/G.
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA 12 TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) M. J. Pastva, Jr. -LER Coordinator (609) 339--5165 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) x DATE (15) ABSTRACT {Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced tyP.ewritten lines) . At 0500 hours on 3/3/94, required Action "a.' of Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1. should have been performed due to clearing and tagg,ing of A air receiver of 2A Diesel* Generator (DG) . TS 3.8.1.1 .. a requires demonstrating operability of the remaining independent alternating current circuit within one hour by performing TS 4.8.1.1.1.a and at least once per eight hours thereafter.
EVENT DATE 5                             LEA NUMBER 6                           REPORT NUMBER 7                         OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 FACILITY NAME                              DOCKET NUMBER SEQUENTIAL            REVISION MONTH           DAY       YEAR    YEAR                                              MONTH      DAY    YEAR NUMBER            NUMBER                                                                            05000 FACILITY NAME                              DOCKET NUMBER 03             03       94       94                       004           00         03       30       94                                                 05000 OPERATING                      THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: Check one or more 11 MODE (9)                1        20.402(b)                                     20.405(c)                               50.73(a)(2)(iv)                   73.71 (b) 20.405(a)(1)(i)                               50.36(c)(1)                           .50.73(a)(2)(v)                     73.71 (c) 20.405(a)(1 )(ii)                             50.36(c)(2)                             50.73(a)(2)(vii)                   OTHER 20.405(a) (1)(iii) i-.j.__
This event was recognized at 0900 hours (same day) and TS 4.8.1.1.1.a was satisfactorily completed at 0912 hours. This event is attributed to management deficiency due to inadequate communication when Operations personnel incorrectly interpreted that an administrative requirement, to declare a DG inoperable when one of its starting air trains are removed from service, no longer applied. Historically, similar clearing and tagging evolutions were performed without declaring the involved DG inoperable.
x 50.73(a)(2)(i)                         50.73(a) (2)(viii)(A)
The basis for this practice is outlined in PSE&G's response to NRC's Notice of Violation contained in Inspection Report 50-272/93-23; 50-311/93-23, which concluded such practice does not involve a TS violation.
__;_.:...:....:;..:_:_ _ _ _ _-4-=~-...;_;_~.;__------1--1--....;...;...;...,...;,_;..;_;----1 (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC 20.405(a)(1)(iv)                               50.73(a)(2)(ii)                         50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)           Form 366A) 20.405(a)(1)(v)                               50.73(a)(2)(iii)                       50.73(a)(2)(x)
Expectations regarding unavailability of DG starting air train have been reinforced with all Licensed Operations personnel and the station planning department.
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA 12 TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
These expectations will remain in effect pending final disposition of PSE&G's response to the subject NRC Notice Of Violation.
M. J. Pastva, Jr. -                       LER Coordinator                                                                     (609) 339--5165 REPORTABLE                                                                                  REPORTABLE CAUSE       SYSTEM         COMPONENT     MANUFACTURER                                               CAUSE     SYSTEM     COMPONENT         MANUFACTURER TO NPRDS                                                                                      TO NPRDS EXPECTED         MONTH       DAY     YEAR YES                                                                                                                               SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)                                                                                       DATE (15) x ABSTRACT {Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced tyP.ewritten lines)                     ~16)    .
At 0500 hours on 3/3/94, required Action "a.' of Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1. should have been performed due to clearing and tagg,ing of A air receiver of 2A Diesel* Generator (DG) . TS 3.8.1.1 .. a requires demonstrating operability of the remaining independent alternating current circuit within one hour by performing TS 4.8.1.1.1.a and at least once per eight hours thereafter. This event was recognized at 0900 hours (same day) and TS 4.8.1.1.1.a was satisfactorily completed at 0912 hours. This event is attributed to management deficiency due to inadequate communication when Operations personnel incorrectly interpreted that an administrative requirement, to declare a DG inoperable when one of its starting air trains are removed from service, no longer applied. Historically, similar clearing and tagging evolutions were performed without declaring the involved DG inoperable. The basis for this practice is outlined in PSE&G's response to NRC's Notice of Violation contained in Inspection Report 50-272/93-23; 50-311/93-23, which concluded such practice does not involve a TS violation. Expectations regarding unavailability of DG starting air train have been reinforced with all Licensed Operations personnel and the station planning department. These expectations will remain in effect pending final disposition of PSE&G's response to the subject NRC Notice Of Violation.
NRC FORM 366 (5-92)
NRC FORM 366 (5-92)
BLOCK NUMBER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 REQUIRED NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS FOR EACH BLOCK NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS TITLE UP TO 46 FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 DOCKET NUMBER VARIES PAGE NUMBl;:R UP TO 76 TITLE 6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK .EVENT DATE 7TOTAL 2 FOR YEAR 3 FOR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER LEA NUMBER 2 FOR REVISION NUMBER 6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK REPORT DATE UP TO 18 FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL -DOCKET NUMBER OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 1 OPERATING MODE 3 POWER LEVEL 1 CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR UP TO 50 FOR NAME 14 FOR TELEPHONE LICENSEE CONTACT. CAUSE VARIES 2 FOR SYSTEM 4 FOR COMPONENT EACH COMPONENT FAILURE 4 FOR MANUFACTURER
 
* NPRDS VARIES 1 CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Station DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:
REQUIRED NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS FOR EACH BLOCK BLOCK          NUMBER OF TITLE NUMBER    DIGITS/CHARACTERS 1              UP TO 46                 FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL 2                                      DOCKET NUMBER 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 3              VARIES                 PAGE NUMBl;:R 4              UP TO 76               TITLE 6 TOTAL 5                                      .EVENT DATE 2 PER BLOCK 7TOTAL 2 FOR YEAR 6                                      LEA NUMBER 3 FOR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 2 FOR REVISION NUMBER 6 TOTAL 7                                      REPORT DATE 2 PER BLOCK UP TO 18     FACILITY NAME 8                                      OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 TOTAL - DOCKET NUMBER 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 9                  1                   OPERATING MODE 10                  3                   POWER LEVEL 1
Westinghouse  
11                                      REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES UP TO 50 FOR NAME 12                                      LICENSEE CONTACT.
-Pressurized Water Reactor LER NUMBER 94-004-00 PAGE 2 of 4 Energy Industry Identification System (EI!S) codes are identified in the text as {xx} IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
14 FOR TELEPHONE CAUSE VARIES 2 FOR SYSTEM 13        4 FOR COMPONENT               EACH COMPONENT FAILURE 4 FOR MANUFACTURER
Late Performance Of Offsite Power Availability Surveillance Due To Untimely Determination Of 2A Diesel Generator Inoperability Event Date: 3/3/94 Report Date: 3/30/94 This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 94-076. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
* NPRDS VARIES 1
Mode 1 Reactor Power 100 % -Unit Load 1110 MWe RIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
14                                      SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES 6 TOTAL 15                                      EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE 2 PER BLOCK
At 0500 hours on March 3, 1994, Action "a." of Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1. should have been performed due to clearing and tagging of the A air receiver of 2A Diesel Generator (DG) {VJ} which, by administrative control, requires declaring the DG inoperable.
 
TS 3.8.1.1.a requires demonstrating operability of the remaining independent alternating current (A.C.) circuit within one hour by performing TS Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a and at least once per eight hours thereafter.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Station     DOCKET NUMBER     LER NUMBER      PAGE 5000311         94-004-00      2 of 4 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:
This event was not recognized until 0900 (same day) and TS Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a was satisfactorily completed at 0912 hours. ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
Westinghouse   - Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EI!S) codes are identified in the text as {xx}
Each Salem Unit has three DGs available to supply emergency electrical power to the safety related equipment.
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
DG operability requires certain minimum auxiliary equipment be available.
Late Performance Of Offsite Power Availability Surveillance Due To Untimely Determination Of 2A Diesel Generator Inoperability Event Date:   3/3/94 Report Date:   3/30/94 This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 94-076.
TS 4.8.1.1.1.a imposes restrictions upon continued facility operation to ensure the initial condition assumptions of the accident analyses are met. These assumptions are based upon maintaining at least two independent sets of onsite A.C. and direct current (D.C.) power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and a single failure of one onsite A.C source.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION em Generating Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) LER NUMBER 94-004-00 PAGE 3 of 4 The starting air system of each DG consists of two independent trains with each train having a starting air receiving tank and two starting air motors. The DG is designed and qualified to start and attain rated speed on any pair of air start motors within 10 seconds of a demand signal. Operability of the trains (two of the four air start motors per DG) is currently demonstrated monthly on alternating months in accordance with surveillances S2.0P-ST.DG-0001, 0002, and 0003. At 0500 hours on March 3, 1994, the A starting air receiver of 2A DG was cleared and tagged to perform maintenance on the air receiver check valve 21DA6A. Prior to this evolution, the redundant starting air train (B) starting air receiver and compressor were verified to be functioning satisfactorily.
Mode 1   Reactor Power 100 % - Unit Load 1110 MWe RIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
No tagging was applied to the DG, which would have prevented it from performing its intended safety function.
At 0500 hours on March 3, 1994, Action "a." of Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1. should have been performed due to clearing and tagging of the A air receiver of 2A Diesel Generator (DG) {VJ} which, by administrative control, requires declaring the DG inoperable. TS 3.8.1.1.a requires demonstrating operability of the remaining independent alternating current (A.C.) circuit within one hour by performing TS Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a and at least once per eight hours thereafter. This event was not recognized until 0900 ho~rs (same day) and TS Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a was satisfactorily completed at 0912 hours.
Subsequently, at 0900 hours (same day) it was determined that the DG should have been declared inoperable because of existing administrative controls when the A starting air receiver was removed from service. As such, the required surveillance was not completed  
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
*until 0912 hours (same day). A Night Order Book (NOB) entry, dated November 5, 1993, requires declaring a DG inoperable whenever a starting air train is removed from service (rendered unavailable).
Each Salem Unit has three DGs available to supply emergency electrical power to the safety related equipment. DG operability requires certain minimum auxiliary equipment be available. TS 4.8.1.1.1.a imposes restrictions upon continued facility operation to ensure the initial condition assumptions of the accident analyses are met. These assumptions are based upon maintaining at least two independent sets of onsite A.C. and direct current (D.C.) power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and a single failure of one onsite A.C source.
 
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION em Generating Station       DOCKET NUMBER    LER NUMBER        PAGE Unit 2                           5000311       94-004-00        3 of 4 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)
The starting air system of each DG consists of two independent trains with each train having a starting air receiving tank and two starting air motors. The DG is designed and qualified to start and attain rated speed on any pair of air start motors within 10 seconds of a demand signal. Operability of the independe~t trains (two of the four air start motors per DG) is currently demonstrated monthly on alternating months in accordance with surveillances S2.0P-ST.DG-0001, 0002, and 0003.
At 0500 hours on March 3, 1994, the A starting air receiver of 2A DG was cleared and tagged to perform maintenance on the air receiver check valve 21DA6A. Prior to this evolution, the redundant starting air train (B) starting air receiver and compressor were verified to be functioning satisfactorily. No tagging was applied to the DG, which would have prevented it from performing its intended safety function. Subsequently, at 0900 hours (same day) it was determined that the DG should have been declared inoperable because of existing administrative controls when the A starting air receiver was removed from service. As such, the required surveillance was not completed until 0912 hours (same day). A Night Order Book (NOB) entry, dated November 5, 1993, requires declaring a DG inoperable whenever a
* starting air train is removed from service (rendered unavailable).
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
The cause of this occurrence is "Management/Quality Assurance Deficiency", as classified in Appendix B of NUREG-1022, and resulted from inadequate communication.
The cause of this occurrence is "Management/Quality Assurance Deficiency", as classified in Appendix B of NUREG-1022, and resulted from inadequate communication. Following the submittal of PSE&G's response to NRC's Notice of Violation contained in Inspection Report 50-272/93-23; 50-311/93-23, Operations personnel incorrectly interpreted that the NOB entry of November 5, 1993 no longer applied.
Following the submittal of PSE&G's response to NRC's Notice of Violation contained in Inspection Report 50-272/93-23; 50-311/93-23, Operations personnel incorrectly interpreted that the NOB entry of November 5, 1993 no longer applied. Historically, PSE&G has performed similar clearing and tagging of single DG starting air receivers without declaring the involved DG inoperable.
Historically, PSE&G has performed similar clearing and tagging of single DG starting air receivers without declaring the involved DG inoperable. The basis for this practice is outlined in PSE&G's response to the violation, which concluded such practice does not involve a TS violation.
The basis for this practice is outlined in PSE&G's response to the violation, which concluded such practice does not involve a TS violation.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:
As outlined in the aforementioned notice of violation, prior similar occurrences involving removing DG starting air trains without administratively declaring the DG inoperable have occurred.
As outlined in the aforementioned notice of violation, prior similar occurrences involving removing DG starting air trains without administratively declaring the DG inoperable have occurred. PSE&G's response in regard to these occurrences is provided within its response to the notice of violation.
PSE&G's response in regard to these occurrences is provided within its response to the notice of violation.  
 
--------------------
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION em Generating Station     DOCKET NUMBER     LER NUMBER         PAGE Unit 2                          5000311        94-004-00         4 of 4 SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:
--------
This event did not affect the health and safety of the public. It is reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (i) (B) as a condition prohibited by TS.
* LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION em Generating Station Unit 2 SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:
Operability of the independent trains (two o~ the four air start motors per DG) is demonstrated monthly on alternating months in accordance with surveillances S2.0P-ST.DG-0001, 0002, and 0003. This demonstrates the ability of each DG to start within design parameters and carry out their safety function with an unavailable starting air train. Throughout this event, 2A DG was fully capable of automatic starting and was considered inoperable due to administrative controls.
DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 LER NUMBER 94-004-00 PAGE 4 of 4 This event did not affect the health and safety of the public. It is reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)  
(2) (i) (B) as a condition prohibited by TS. Operability of the independent trains (two the four air start motors per DG) is demonstrated monthly on alternating months in accordance with surveillances S2.0P-ST.DG-0001, 0002, and 0003. This demonstrates the ability of each DG to start within design parameters and carry out their safety function with an unavailable starting air train. Throughout this event, 2A DG was fully capable of automatic starting and was considered inoperable due to administrative controls.
The satisfactory performance of TS 4.8.1.1.1.a verified proper alignment of the independent A.C. trains. In addition, two independent sources of offsite power were available at all times. As such, minimal consequence existed due to the late performance of the TS surveillance, since the DG was capable of automatic starting.
The satisfactory performance of TS 4.8.1.1.1.a verified proper alignment of the independent A.C. trains. In addition, two independent sources of offsite power were available at all times. As such, minimal consequence existed due to the late performance of the TS surveillance, since the DG was capable of automatic starting.
ECTIVE ACTION: The expected action, to declare a DG inoperable in accordance with TS 3.8.1.1 whenever a starting air train is removed from service (rendered unavailable), has been reinforced with all Licensed Operations personnel.
ECTIVE ACTION:
The expected action, to declare a DG inoperable in accordance with TS 3.8.1.1 whenever a starting air train is removed from service (rendered unavailable), has been reinforced with all Licensed Operations personnel.
The station planning department has also been advised that unavailability of a DG starting air train invokes entering the TS Limiting Condition of Operation and the required surveillance must be performed.
The station planning department has also been advised that unavailability of a DG starting air train invokes entering the TS Limiting Condition of Operation and the required surveillance must be performed.
The above described actions will remain in effect until final disposition of PSE&G's response to the subject NRC Notice Of Violation at which time they will either become a permanent requirement or will be revised accordingly.
The above described actions will remain in effect until final disposition of PSE&G's response to the subject NRC Notice Of Violation at which time they will either become a permanent requirement or will be revised accordingly.
MJPJ:pc Mtg. 94-026}}
MJPJ:pc Mtg. 94-026}}

Latest revision as of 06:01, 3 February 2020

LER 94-004-00:on 940303,late Performance of Offsite Power Availability Surveillance Discovered.Caused by Mgt/Quality Assurance Deficiency.Event Reviewed W/Personnel & Expected Action reinforced.W/940330 Ltr
ML18100A975
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 03/30/1994
From: Hagan M, Pastva M
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-94-004-01, LER-94-4-1, NUDOCS 9404040102
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. e OPS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station March 30, 1994

u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 94-004-00 This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Code of Federal Regulation 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (i) (B)

  • Issuance of this report is required within thirty (30) days of event discovery.

Sincerely yours, General Manager -

Salem Operations MJPJ:pc D,istr ibution flAfln=:i:

9404040102 940330 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDR The power is in your hands.

95-2189 REV 7*92

NRC FORM 366 .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31 /95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEA) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 05000 311 1 OF 04 TITLE (4)

Late Performance Of Offsite Power Avail. Surv. Due To Untimel Determination Of 2A D/G.

EVENT DATE 5 LEA NUMBER 6 REPORT NUMBER 7 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 03 03 94 94 004 00 03 30 94 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: Check one or more 11 MODE (9) 1 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71 (b) 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) .50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71 (c) 20.405(a)(1 )(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER 20.405(a) (1)(iii) i-.j.__

x 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a) (2)(viii)(A)

__;_.:...:....:;..:_:_ _ _ _ _-4-=~-...;_;_~.;__------1--1--....;...;...;...,...;,_;..;_;----1 (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) Form 366A) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA 12 TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

M. J. Pastva, Jr. - LER Coordinator (609) 339--5165 REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPRDS TO NPRDS EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) DATE (15) x ABSTRACT {Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced tyP.ewritten lines) ~16) .

At 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> on 3/3/94, required Action "a.' of Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1. should have been performed due to clearing and tagg,ing of A air receiver of 2A Diesel* Generator (DG) . TS 3.8.1.1 .. a requires demonstrating operability of the remaining independent alternating current circuit within one hour by performing TS 4.8.1.1.1.a and at least once per eight hours thereafter. This event was recognized at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> (same day) and TS 4.8.1.1.1.a was satisfactorily completed at 0912 hours0.0106 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.47016e-4 months <br />. This event is attributed to management deficiency due to inadequate communication when Operations personnel incorrectly interpreted that an administrative requirement, to declare a DG inoperable when one of its starting air trains are removed from service, no longer applied. Historically, similar clearing and tagging evolutions were performed without declaring the involved DG inoperable. The basis for this practice is outlined in PSE&G's response to NRC's Notice of Violation contained in Inspection Report 50-272/93-23; 50-311/93-23, which concluded such practice does not involve a TS violation. Expectations regarding unavailability of DG starting air train have been reinforced with all Licensed Operations personnel and the station planning department. These expectations will remain in effect pending final disposition of PSE&G's response to the subject NRC Notice Of Violation.

NRC FORM 366 (5-92)

REQUIRED NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS FOR EACH BLOCK BLOCK NUMBER OF TITLE NUMBER DIGITS/CHARACTERS 1 UP TO 46 FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL 2 DOCKET NUMBER 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 3 VARIES PAGE NUMBl;:R 4 UP TO 76 TITLE 6 TOTAL 5 .EVENT DATE 2 PER BLOCK 7TOTAL 2 FOR YEAR 6 LEA NUMBER 3 FOR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 2 FOR REVISION NUMBER 6 TOTAL 7 REPORT DATE 2 PER BLOCK UP TO 18 FACILITY NAME 8 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 TOTAL - DOCKET NUMBER 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 9 1 OPERATING MODE 10 3 POWER LEVEL 1

11 REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES UP TO 50 FOR NAME 12 LICENSEE CONTACT.

14 FOR TELEPHONE CAUSE VARIES 2 FOR SYSTEM 13 4 FOR COMPONENT EACH COMPONENT FAILURE 4 FOR MANUFACTURER

14 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES 6 TOTAL 15 EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE 2 PER BLOCK

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE 5000311 94-004-00 2 of 4 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EI!S) codes are identified in the text as {xx}

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Late Performance Of Offsite Power Availability Surveillance Due To Untimely Determination Of 2A Diesel Generator Inoperability Event Date: 3/3/94 Report Date: 3/30/94 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.94-076.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 Reactor Power 100 % - Unit Load 1110 MWe RIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> on March 3, 1994, Action "a." of Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1. should have been performed due to clearing and tagging of the A air receiver of 2A Diesel Generator (DG) {VJ} which, by administrative control, requires declaring the DG inoperable. TS 3.8.1.1.a requires demonstrating operability of the remaining independent alternating current (A.C.) circuit within one hour by performing TS Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a and at least once per eight hours thereafter. This event was not recognized until 0900 ho~rs (same day) and TS Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a was satisfactorily completed at 0912 hours0.0106 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.47016e-4 months <br />.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Each Salem Unit has three DGs available to supply emergency electrical power to the safety related equipment. DG operability requires certain minimum auxiliary equipment be available. TS 4.8.1.1.1.a imposes restrictions upon continued facility operation to ensure the initial condition assumptions of the accident analyses are met. These assumptions are based upon maintaining at least two independent sets of onsite A.C. and direct current (D.C.) power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and a single failure of one onsite A.C source.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION em Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 2 5000311 94-004-00 3 of 4 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

The starting air system of each DG consists of two independent trains with each train having a starting air receiving tank and two starting air motors. The DG is designed and qualified to start and attain rated speed on any pair of air start motors within 10 seconds of a demand signal. Operability of the independe~t trains (two of the four air start motors per DG) is currently demonstrated monthly on alternating months in accordance with surveillances S2.0P-ST.DG-0001, 0002, and 0003.

At 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> on March 3, 1994, the A starting air receiver of 2A DG was cleared and tagged to perform maintenance on the air receiver check valve 21DA6A. Prior to this evolution, the redundant starting air train (B) starting air receiver and compressor were verified to be functioning satisfactorily. No tagging was applied to the DG, which would have prevented it from performing its intended safety function. Subsequently, at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> (same day) it was determined that the DG should have been declared inoperable because of existing administrative controls when the A starting air receiver was removed from service. As such, the required surveillance was not completed until 0912 hours0.0106 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.47016e-4 months <br /> (same day). A Night Order Book (NOB) entry, dated November 5, 1993, requires declaring a DG inoperable whenever a

  • starting air train is removed from service (rendered unavailable).

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of this occurrence is "Management/Quality Assurance Deficiency", as classified in Appendix B of NUREG-1022, and resulted from inadequate communication. Following the submittal of PSE&G's response to NRC's Notice of Violation contained in Inspection Report 50-272/93-23; 50-311/93-23, Operations personnel incorrectly interpreted that the NOB entry of November 5, 1993 no longer applied.

Historically, PSE&G has performed similar clearing and tagging of single DG starting air receivers without declaring the involved DG inoperable. The basis for this practice is outlined in PSE&G's response to the violation, which concluded such practice does not involve a TS violation.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

As outlined in the aforementioned notice of violation, prior similar occurrences involving removing DG starting air trains without administratively declaring the DG inoperable have occurred. PSE&G's response in regard to these occurrences is provided within its response to the notice of violation.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION em Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 2 5000311 94-004-00 4 of 4 SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

This event did not affect the health and safety of the public. It is reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (i) (B) as a condition prohibited by TS.

Operability of the independent trains (two o~ the four air start motors per DG) is demonstrated monthly on alternating months in accordance with surveillances S2.0P-ST.DG-0001, 0002, and 0003. This demonstrates the ability of each DG to start within design parameters and carry out their safety function with an unavailable starting air train. Throughout this event, 2A DG was fully capable of automatic starting and was considered inoperable due to administrative controls.

The satisfactory performance of TS 4.8.1.1.1.a verified proper alignment of the independent A.C. trains. In addition, two independent sources of offsite power were available at all times. As such, minimal consequence existed due to the late performance of the TS surveillance, since the DG was capable of automatic starting.

ECTIVE ACTION:

The expected action, to declare a DG inoperable in accordance with TS 3.8.1.1 whenever a starting air train is removed from service (rendered unavailable), has been reinforced with all Licensed Operations personnel.

The station planning department has also been advised that unavailability of a DG starting air train invokes entering the TS Limiting Condition of Operation and the required surveillance must be performed.

The above described actions will remain in effect until final disposition of PSE&G's response to the subject NRC Notice Of Violation at which time they will either become a permanent requirement or will be revised accordingly.

MJPJ:pc Mtg.94-026