ML18139B333

Proposed Changes to Tech Specs,Sections 3.3,3.4,3.8,4.1, 4.5 & 4.11 to Reflect Mods for Alleviating NRC Concerns Re Containment Spray,Low Head Safety Injection & Recirculation Spray Sys

ML18139B333
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	05/19/1981
From:	VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18139B332	List: ML18139B331 ML18139B333
References
NUDOCS 8105280261
Download: ML18139B333 (75)

Text

e I

ATTACHMENT 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SURRY UNITS 1 AND 2

• e 810.5 2*8 0 ~(pl

e PART A EXISTING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TO BE DELETED e

r e TS 3.3-1 S 9 79 (Unit 1) 3.3 SAFITY INJECTION SYSTEM Ap'Dlicability Applies che operating status of the Safety Injection System. /

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Objective I

bea7' To define ccmditions for operation that are n~essary to p*rovide

,/./

• ufficient borated rmoove decay the core 1n emergency situations.

Specifications /

A. A reactor shall not met:

l. 'Ihe refueling water tank itical unle s che follcwi:lg conditions are water with a boron concentra ion at least 2000 ppm.

gal. of borated

2. Each accumulator system to at least 600 psia a.od con-

---

**--- tams a mi%um1.1m of 9 ft3 and a mazillzum f 989 ft 3 of borated water tration of at least 1950 pm.

• 3. The boron cti.ou :ank and isolated portion of che inlet and outlet piping a boron equivalent to at least 11.5% to 13% waig t boric at a tempera:ure of at least 14SoP'. Additi nally, circulation between a unit's Boron Injection Tank and the oric assigned to the unit *hall be maintained *

... .Amerdmca-E Ne, 49, lei.t l

e e 'IS 3.~-2 7 26 77 (Yftit 1)

4. Two channels of heat tracing shall be available for the flow paths.

s.

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6. ad safety injection pumps are operable.

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7. All valves, pi ng, and interlocks associated with tlie above com-1 ponents which operate under acci~t conditions 8.

are operable.

The Charging Pump

//

ter Subsyst~ shall be operating as

/

\

follows:

a.

//

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Make-up water from the Co~nent Cooling Water Subsystem shall be available.

b. Two charging pump component cooling water umps and two charging pump service water pumps shall be

c. Two charing pump intermediate seal coolers shall e opera e.

• Unit l Amendmene He. 32

. I ..

i, e

TS 3.3-3

• t 6 n

(:Yrtit 1)

~-

9. During power operation the A.C. power shall be removed from the fol lawing mctor operated valves with the valve in the open. position:*

Unit Ho.

Ur.it No. 2 ; *

...Ji+*

~CV .189oc MOV 289cc * .

10. operatic~ the A.C. power shall be remcved~~om the r operated valves with the valve i~ t.rciosed position:

Unit~. 2 7

MO¥-'. 286SA H¢/ 286ga av 2a9cA HOV 2890B 11 *

• • • the Unit No. 1 the valve fflQtor operator when greater than 1000 psig.

Unit No. 2 MCV 1865A HOV 2865A HOV 1865 HOV 2865S

________________MOV ..JS C--*-----------*--- V. -l865C ****----------***--*--*

12. Power operation wi less than three loops i s p roh i b i ted

• Isolation valves shall have AC r removed and during power operation.

'I.

Unit No. 1 unr t No. 2 MOV 1590 HOV 2590 MCV 1591 HOV 2591 HOV 1592 .HOV 2592 MOV 1593 HOV 2593 l'tOV 1S94 HOV 2594 MCV 1595 HOV 2595

e

---

~.~: *--------------------------. ---

TS 3.3-4 7 22 iS (t::nu 1)

B. of Specification 3.3-A may be 110dified to allow one of //

owing camponencs co be izloperable at any one time. em

I.a not to meet the requirements of Specification 3.3-A wi specified, the reactor shall in the lf the requirements of nae hours the in.

the cold shutdown

l. One accumulator may be* not to exceed 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

2. Two charging pumps per unit t of service, provided illlmediate pairs and one pump is restored to

3. One-law head out of service, attention status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The other low ini~iating repair of the inoperable pump and sha be tested e every eight CB) hours theruf-:er, until both p1=ll)s are operable status or* the reactor is shut dowa..

4. - Any on* valve in the Safety Injection Systa may be inoperable P':ov.ided repairs are initiated illmlediately and are c:omple_ted within

TS 3.3-5 7 26 77t (Ynit 1)

. * * . 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Prior to initiating repairs, all automatic valves in the redun-

.. *  ! *---d~nt system shall be tested to demonstrate operability.

/

5. One channel of heat tracing may be inoperable for a period not to eed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, provided immediate attention is directed to making repair.

6. component cooling water pumps or one char service

/

out of service provided the pump is resiored to operable status within

7. seal cooler or oth r passive component may be out of service system may stil operate at 100 percent capa-city and repairs are com eted within 48 h~'frs.

8. Power may be restored to any alve ref enced in 3.3.A.9 and 3.3.A.10 for the purpose of valve testing enance providing no more than one valve

~,,

• • --= has power restored and provided power removed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> testing and maintenance is completed and

9. Power. may be restored to ny valve referen din J.J.A.ll for the purpose of valve testing or m intenance providing no re than one valve has power restored and provi d that testing or maintenanc is completed and power removed within hours.

10. ltecirculat n between a unit's Boron Injection Tank and he Boric Acid (s) assigned to the unit may be terminated for a p riod not to exceed provided all other parameters (temperatures, boron oncentration, the Boron Injection Tank are within Specifications 3.3.A.3 and immediate attention is directed to making repairs *

• ~ ....\

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. .~

TS 3.3-6 9 11 79 (YB:it 1)

'the procedure for starting the reactor is, first, to heat the reactor I

o near operating te:iperature by running the reactor coolat;,~z" pumps.

' I the:1 ~ade critical by withdrawing control rods an 7or diluting

~ith this mode of startup the Safety I.jection Sys:e:

is required to During low power physics tests there is energy stored in the system; erefore an accide~:

ccmparable in the Design !.sis Accident not possi~le, and :he full capacity of the Safet re~uired.

!he operable status of the variou by periodic tests, det.iled !n TS A large fraction of these tests are *per::or.:ied while the reactor is in the power range. If a com-ponent is found co be ino?erable. e possible in mos: cases to ef:ec: ~

I repairs and restore the system full operab J.j,ty within a relatively sher:

• -------t;C"';;.;,mmee. --A.--5ingle component -b -inoperable-does - ot-.negate the .ability .of the system to perfor: its fu edundar.cy provided 1~ the reactor design and th .eby l.::its the ability to taler te additional equi?ment failures. assurance that the redundan co:?one?it(s) .r-!l Operate if the redundant component(s) are to be tested pr~or repair of. the inoperable componen~ and, in some es are to 'be the repair period. In some cases, 1 *. cr.arg~:;

components are installed to allow a component to be copera~le sy&te!:I redundancy. For those cases which are not sod ig~e~,

if it develops that (a) the ino;,erable component is not repa,ired ~thin th~-~

Afflel'ldffl!l'I t No

• 53 , r:11 it l

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IS 3.3-7

' u 7j

( 11Ait l) peci:ied allowable time period, or (b) a second component in the same or inoperable, the reactor will initially be put to provide for reductiou of the deca heat from couequent reduc:tiou of cooling requiremencs a.fee a postulated accident. After 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> in the hot shutdo condition, i:

s prompt action to effe t repairs of an inoperable ccmponent. and therefore be c:cmpleted in less than the specified repair times do net apply to regularly schedul which times for repair are based ou: e the Safety Injection System, refueling shutdowns. '!he limiti:g the time required to diagnose and correct various s&fe and proper procedures, the availability of

• health physics requirements and the eztent to which l redundancy to the system under :repair *.

Aasuming the been operating.at full rated decay heat production decreases

• hu~down.

Time After Shutdown Decay Heat,% of Rated Power 1 min. 3.7

• ,~..** 30 min. 1.6

TS 3.3-8 6 16 75 *

(Yaie 1)

'Iime After Shutdown Decav Heat.% of Rated Power

/

l hour 1.3

• 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 0.75 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> 0.48

• nius, the requir for core cooling in case of a ced loss-of-coolant accident: while in shutdown condition is reduc orders of magnitude below the r handling a postulaced occuning during power Placing and the reaccor in the potential consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident, allows some of the Safety Injec:ion Syscem components the exposure to thermal cycling.

Failure to complete repairs going to hot shutdwon condition

. -------------1s considered indicative uu:fo-reseen 1>roblems, i..-e. ,--possibly *the need of -- --- -----

major maincenance

• case the reactor is be put into the*cold ahutdown condition.

the accumulat rs are able to accept leakage from the Reac:eo Coolant Sys'tem effect on their availability. .Allowable inlea-k&ge based on the volume of water Chat can be added to the initial amount: vi.tho exceeding the volume given in Specification 3.3.A.2. '!be maximum acceptable inleakage 1s 14 cubic feet per a.nk.

• e 1S 3.3-9

• 1 a, 77 (BnH 1)

Basis Cont *

• • The accumulators (one for each loop) discharge into the cold legs of the reactor coolant piping when Reactor Coolant System pressure decreases below accumulator pressure, thus assuring rapid core cooling for large breaks. The is provided with a motorized valve to isolate the atar,:-up and shutdown to preclude ~ischarge of the contents o accumulator when not required. These valves receive a safety injection 1s initiated.

To assure later valves satisfy the s ngle failure criterion, they will be blacked open y de-energizing the va ve motor operators when the reactor coolant s 1000 psig. Th~ operating pressure of the

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Reactor Coolant System is 2235 and sa;ety injection is initiated when this pressure drops to 650 psig *

/

gizirig the motor operator when the pressure

/ .

exceeds 1000 psig allows sufficient f e during normal startup operation to

/

perform the actions required to d~energ:l: e the valve.* This procedure will

, I assure that there is. an operab~ flow path to the Reactor

. /

Coolant System during power peration and injec.tion can be accom-plished.

'Ihe removal of powe~* from the valves.listed ication.will assure that the systems ,J{ which they are a part satisfy the sin~e failure criterion.

Continuous ~culation between the Boron Inj action Tank ~ Boric Acid Tank(s) ensures that a unit's Boron Injection Tank is full of concentrated boric acid at all. times *

• 'Suit l Amendment No. 32

e e TS 3.3-1 8 1 88 (l:Jnit 2) 3.3 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Applicability Applies to the operating status of the Safety Injection System.

Objective To define those limiting conditions for operation that are necessary to provide sufficient borated cooling water to remove decay heat from the core in emergency situations.

Specifications A. A reactor shall not be made critical unless the following conditions are met:

1. The refueling water storage tank contains not less than~i§,2QQ gal (Yait 1) er]387,100 gal (Yai~ 2) of borated water. {ier Uait 1 ealy, tae ae~ea*eeaeeatratiea saall ee at least 2988 ~pmJ* For I

Unit 2 only, the boron concentration shall be at least 2000 ppm and not greater than 2200 ppm.

2. Each accumulator system is pressurized to at least 600 psia and cont~ins a ~inimum of 975 ft 3 and a maximum of 989 ft 3 of borated water with a boron concentration of at least 1950 ppm.

3. The boron injection tank and isolated portion of the inlet and outlet piping contains no less than 900 gallons of water with a boron concentration equivalent to at least 11.5% to 13% weight boric acid solution at a temperature of at least 145°F. Addi-tionally, recirculation between a unit's Boron Injection Tank and the Boric Acid Tank(s) assigned to the unit shall be main-

' tained.

Amendment No. 59, Bnit 2

• Tae YBit Ne l number; 1nd1Qated a.e aQ~ iR etfeet,

e

• e e

T.S. 3.3-2 a 1 ae tl:Jni.t 2)

4. Two channels of heat tracing shall be available for the flow paths.

s. Two charging pumps are operable.

6. Two low head safety injection pumps are operable.

7. All valves, piping, and interlocks associated with the above components which are required to operate under accident condi-tions are operable.

8. The Charging Pump Cooling Water Subsystem shall be operating as follows:

a. Make-up water from the Component Cooling Water Subsystem shall be available.

b. Two charging pump component cooling water pumps and two charging pump service water pumps shall be operable.

c. Two charging pump intermediate seal coolers shall be operable.

9. During power operation the A.C. power shall be removed from the following motor operated valves with the valve in the open I

position:

Unit No. 1 Unit No. 2 MOV l~C MOV 2890C

10. During powe.r operation the A.C. power shall be removed from the following motor operated valves with the valve in the closed position:

Unit No. 1 Unit No. 2 MOV 1869A MOV 2869A HOV 1869B HOV 2869B HOV 1890A HOV 2890A

'. HOV 1890B MOV 2890B

e e e

T.S. 3.3-3 8 1 89

• e

(

11.

(B'!!:H: 2)

The accumulator discharge valves listed below in non-isolated loops shall be blocked open by de-energizing the valve motor operator when the reactor coolant system pressure is greater than 1000 psig.

Unit No. 1 Unit No. 2 MOV 1865A MOV 2865A MOV 1865B MOV 2865B MOV 1865C MOV 2865C

12. Power operation with less than three loops in service is pro-hibited. The following loop isolation valves shall have AC power removed and be locked in open position during power operation.

Unit No. 1 Unit No. 2 HOV 1590 MOV 2590 MOV 1591 MOV 2591

, MOV 1592 MOV 2592 MOV 1593 MOV 2593 MOV 1594 MOV 2594 MOV 1595 HOV 2595

13. The total system uncollec~ed leakage from valves, flanges, and

..... pumps located outside containment shall not exceed the limit shown in Table 4.11-1 as verified by inspection during system testing. Individual component leakage may exceed the design value given in Table 4.11-1 provided that the total allowable system uncollected leakage is not exceeded.

.\ineB:emeB:t Ne. 59, Yttit 2

e* e e

TS 3.3-4 8 1 88 lYftH aJ B The requirements of Specification 3.3-A may be modified to allow one

-~

• - of the following components to be inoperable at any one time. If the system is not restored to meet the requirements of Specification 3.3-A within the time period specified, the*reactor shall initially be placed in the hot shutdown condition. If the requirements of Specification 3.3-A are not satisfied within an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition.

1. One accumulator may be isolated for a period not to exceed 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

2. Two charging pumps per unit may be out of service, provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs and one pump is restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3. One low head safety injection pump per unit may be out of service, provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs and the pump is restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The other low head safety inject.ion pump shall be tested to demonstrate operability prior to initiating repair of the inoperable pump and shall be tested once every eight (8) hours thereafter, until both pumps are in an operable status or the reactor is shutdown.

4. Any one valve in the Safety Injection System may be inoperable provided repairs are initiated immediately and are compl~ted within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Prior to initiating repairs, all automatic valves in the redundant system shall be tested to demonstrate operability.

5. On channel of heat tracing may be inoperable for a period not to exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs .

Allleaeme:at. Ne. 59 ,* Ynit 2

e e e

T.S. 3.3-5 8 1 89 (l:Jnh i!)

6. One charging pump component cooling water pumps or one charging pump service water pump may be out of service provided the pump is restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

7. One charging pump intermediate seal cooler or other passive component may be out of service provided the system may still operate at 100 percent capacity and repairs are completed within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.

8. Power may be restored to ~ny valve referenced in 3.3.A.9 and 3.3.A.10 for the purpose of valve testing or maintenance pro-viding no more than one valve has power restored and provided that testing and maintenance is completed and power removed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

9. Power may be restored to any valve referenced in 3.3.A.ll for e*

t the purpose of valve testing or maintenance providing no more than one valve has power restored and provided that testing or maintenance is completed and power removed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

10. Recirculation between a unit's Boron Injection Tank and the Boric Acid Tank(s) assigned to_the unit may be terminated for a period not to exceed two hours, provided all other parameters (temperatu~es, boron concentration, volume) of the Boron Injec-tion Tank are within Specification 3.3.A.3 and immediate attention is directed to making repairs.

11. The total uncollected system leakage for v~lves, flanges, and pumps located outside containment can exceed the limit shown in Table 4.11-1 provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs and system leakage is returned to within limits within L

7 days .

• • Ameaemeat Ne. §9, Yait a.

e e

T.S. 3.3-6 8 1 SQ

('Be.it 2)

Basis The normal procedure for starting the reactor is, first, to heat the reactor coolant to near operating temperature by running the reactor coolant pumps. The reactor is then made critical by withdrawing control rods and/or diluting boron in the coolant. With this mode of startup the Safety Injection System is required to be operable as specified. During low power physics tests there is a negligible amount of energy stored in the system; therefore an accident comparable in severity to the Design Basis Accident is not possible, and the full capacity of the Safety Injection System is not required.

The operable status of the various systems and components is to be

-* demonstrated by periodic tests, detailed in TS Section 4.1. A large fraction of these tests are performed while the reactor is operating in the power range. If a component is found to be inoperable, it will be possible in most cases to effect repairs and restore the system to full operability within a relatively short time. A single component being inoperable does not negate the ability of the system to perform its function, but is red~ces the redundancy provided in the reactor design and thereby limits the ability to tolerate additional equipment failures.

To provide maximum assurance that the redundant component(s) will operate if required to do so, the redundant component(s) are to be tested prior to initiating repair of the inoperable component and, in some cases are to be retested at intervals during the repair period. In some cases, i.e.

charging pumps, additional components are installed to allow a component to be inoperable without affecting system redundancy. For *those cases Ameaemeat Ne. 59, Ucit 2

e -

. e

., T.S. 3.3-7 8 1 89 f0uit 2) which are not so designed, if it develops that (a) the inoperable component

. is not repaired within the specified allowable time period, or (b) a second component in* the same or related system is found to be inoperable, the reactor will initially be put in the hot shutdown condition to provide for reduction of the decay heat from the fuel; and consequent reduction of cooling requirements after a postulated loss-of-coolant accident. After 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> in the hot shutdown condition, if the malfunction(s) are not corrected the reactor will be placed in the cold shutdown condition, following normal shutdown and cooldown procedures.

The Specification requires prompt action to effect repairs of an inoperable component, and therefore in most cases repairs will be completed in less than the specified allowable repair times. Furthermore, the specified repair times do not apply to regularly scheduled maintenance of the Safety Injection System, which is normally to be performed during refueling shut-downs. The limiting times for repair are based on: estimates of the time I

required to diagnose and correct various postulated malfunctions using safe and proper procedures, the availability of tools, materials and equipment; health physics requirements and the extent to which other systems provide funct~onal redundancy to the system under repair.

Assuming the reactor has been operating at full rated power for at least 100 days, the magnitude of the decay heat production decreases as follows after initiating hot shutdown.

Time After Shutdown Decay Heat,% of Rated Power 1 min . 3.7

• • 30 min. 1.6

.'\me:aeme:at Ne . 5 9 , Yfti.t 2

• e .,

• • T.S. 3.3-8 8 1 88 (BftH 2)

Time After Shutdown Decay Heat,% of Rated Power 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1.3 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 0.75 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> 0.48 Thus, the requirement for core cooling in case of a postulated loss-of-coolant accident while in the hot shutdown condition is reduced by orders of magnitude below the requirements for handling a postulated loss-of-coolant accident occurring during power operation. Placing and mainta.in-ing the reactor in the hot shutdown condition significantly reduces the potential consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident, allows access to some of the Safety Injection System components in order to effect repairs, and minimizes the exposure to thermal cycling .

• • Failure to complete repairs within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of going to hot shutdown condition is considered indicative of unforeseen problems, i.e., possibly the need of major maintenance*. In such a case the reactor is to be put into the cold shutdown condition.

The accumulators are able to accept leakage from the Reactor Coolant System without any effect on their availability. Allowable inleakage is based on the volume of water that can be added to the initial amount. without exceed-ing the volume given in Specification 3.3.A.2. The maximum acceptable inleakage is 14 cubic feet per tank.

.\meaemeat Ne .. S9, Yftit 2

e **

T. S. 3.3-9 8 1 89 (lt!!.H 2)

The accumulators (one for each loop) discharge into the cold leg of the reactor coolant piping when Reactor Coolant System pressure decreases below accumulator pressure, thus assuring rapid core cooling for large breaks. The line from each accumulator is provided with a motorized valve to isolate the accumulator during reactor start-up and shutdown to preclude the discharge of the contents of the accumulator when not required. These valves receive a signal to open when safety injection is initiated.

To assure that the accumulator valves satisfy the single failure criterion, they will be blocked open by de-energizing the valve motor operators when the reactor coolant pressure exceeds 1000 psig. The operating pressure of the Reactor Coolant System is 2235 psig and safety e injection is initiated when this pressure drops to 650 psig. De-energiz-ing the motor operator when the pressure exceeds 1000 psig allows sufficient time dur}ng normal ~tartup operation to perform the actions required to de-energize the valve. This procedure will assure that there is an operable_ flow path from each accumulator to the Reactor Coolant System during power operation and that safety injection can be accom-plished.

The removal of power from the valves listed in the specification will assure that the systems of which they.are a part satisfy the single failure criterion.

Continuous recirculation between the Boron Injection Tank and the Boric Acid Tank(s) ensures that a unit's Boron Injection Tank is full of con-

~-

centrated boric acid a-t all times.

.,,.eaElmeaE Ne . S9 , Yait 2

• e **

TS 3.4-l 8 18 7!

(Y!'lie 1) 3.4 SPRAY SYS'IEMS Applicabilit:v operacicD&l *~tua of th.e Spray .Systems.

Objective To define 1:h.ose coudi of the Spray Systems operad.au.

Specifica tiou A. A unit's Reactor Coolant erature or pressure shall not be net be m&de c:rid.cal unless System conditions~ th.at unit

---

- --- -- --- ---*--.re -met: ** ---

1.* e:t.Spray Subsystems, i:aiping, and valves s

2. Eur l.ec~culati.ou Spray Subsystems, iDcluding piping, Th& refueling water atarage tank shall 350,000 1al of borated water at a 1ll&%1lzn.ml temperature as sbDwu in 'rS Fig. 3.S-1.

e* - **

IS 3.4-2

• • • t 3 lj 72 (Unit 1)

If du.s velum.a of water e&m10t be maintai.ned by *makeup, or the temperature 111ai%1.tail1ed belcn, that specifi.ed in IS Fi.g. 3.8-l, 1:he reactor ah.all be shutdcwu imtil repai.rs can be made.

shall be borated to a boron concentratiot:. not less 0 ppm which will assure that the reactor is in the r condi.tiau when all control rod assemblies ar 4.

can-s.

e are required tc operate wide ac dent conditions shall be operable.

• B. During powu operation the r qui.rem specificat1.ou 3.4-A may be

/

modified tc allow tha fa *owil:l.g componen s to be inoperable. If the com-

............ --------------ponents -are -aot ~uta ent of Specification 3.4-A shall be placed in If the requi.remencs Specific:ation 3.4-A ahall be e cold shutdaw. condition us~g aarmal procedures.

One Containment Spray Subsystem may be out of service,

• rovided immediate attention is directed to making repa:i.rs and the ubsystem can be restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. ?he other Con-ta1mnent Spray Subsystem shall be tested as specifi.ed. in Specification 4.5-A to demonstrate operabili.ty prior to initiating repair of the inoperabla-ayatem.

e e TS 3;4-3 8 1S 72 *

(l:Juit: 1)

2. One ou1:S.ide Recirculation Spray Subsystl!!ll may be out of serv.i.ce provided immediate &1:Untiou is directed to making repairs an4/

/

+

the. subsystem can be restored c:c operable sutus w:i.c:hin 2\)iours.

I The er J.ecirculatiou Spray subsystems shall be test~s in Specification* 4.5-A to demonstrate aper.

repair of the incperable system.

3.

provided immediate a atiou Spray Subsystem*ma~ be out of service entiou is directed o making repai.rs aud

+

the subsystem can be The other* Recirculation spec:!.f:L.ad in Specification 4.

to initiating repair of C. Sb.ould the. refuel.ing waters c:ure fail to be main:ained a: or below 45*y, the main:ained in accord with IS Fig. 3. 8-1 to main in the ca:pability of th& Spray System wi the bigher refueling water tempe -cure. If the ature and pressure c:m:mot be maintained th* ruct:or shall be. placed in the cold Buis

'Ihe Spray Systems in each reactor unit consist of two separate parallel Contain-

• .' . ment Spray Subsystems, each of 100 percent capacity, and four separate parallel Recirculation Spray Subsystems, each of*SO percent capacity.

• • -**-* - ----. e f' -

'IS 3.4-4 4 .U 78*

(T:1ttiL 1)

• Each Coa.ca1nmmc Spray Saibayscem draws wacer il1deptm4ucly from :he 350,0QO p l capac:.lty nfu*Ung "ACU s:orage tank. '?he va:er il1 the tank 1a cooled co 45 F or below by circ:ul.&ti:g the cank vaur u&l.mg *cu starage ca:k coolers tl:lraugh the use of rafue] 1n3'_ *Cc recuc:ul.&til:m pumps. '?he wa.cer cemperacure raf:1.gend:lg tm:J.:s aa required.

flawa

• from :ha ca:k ch.--ough an ele, c motor drive:

t ac:osphere through two Npuate :he Spny Systems co ~-

depresaw:ua the cm:u:a1mwrn a fmc:c1o11 of the prusu:e he caa.:a.immmc a.t=ospb.ere,

\

il1 the refueli:g wacu water from the CCIIIIIICU coni:a:u:::mt sump. ough a recirc:ul.a.cion spray pump

- - - - - - - - - - - - - a d .:ac!rc:ulaeiml. -8llr&Y ;,olar, ~ 1a. spray, into -:he -coata1mne:t ac:cs'Phere-C!:lrough & Hll&r&C& secfaf spray rio:les. 'l:wo .e recirculation spray P'IJIIZPS ue locacad C:Ollta1nmeat aid two oucside coatainmenc il1 the CC1l'.Ca1mnea.: auz, ,,a

~

-~ h:i~ 1 :Amm..:drmut . . . ~

e e TS 3.4-5 3 17 72 *

(l:Tftit 1)

With oue Co:taiz:iment Spray Sub&Y.Stem and two Recirculation Spray Subsys-eems operating together, the Spray Systems are-capable. of coaling and depre_.ssurizing the cout maent ta subatmaspheric pres.sure in less than 40 minutes ,f~llowing

. ,/

the The 'R.ecirculatiou Spray Subsystems are

/

capable of

/

maintaining s in the contaimllent indefinitely. following in conjunction with Coutainment Vacuum System to remove term air inleakage.

In addition to supplying w er to the Contaimnen Spray System, the refueling water storage tank is also a r safe~ injection following an accident. centration which assures reactor

• shutdown by approzimately 10 percen when all control rod assemblies are inserted refueling.

References FSAB. Section 4 Coal.ant Systl!!II FSAlt Sectiou 6.3.l ta1"!""'nt Spray Subsystem FSAll Section 6.3. l.ecirculation Spray Pumps and Coolers *.

FSAlt Section 6.3.1 hfueU:ng Water Chemical Addition Tank FSAlt Section 6.3.l l.efueling llater Storage Tank FSAlt Section 14.S.2 Design Basi.s Accident FSil. Section 14.5. 5 Contaimllent Transient Analysis

.)

e e T.S. 3.4.2-1 8 1 88

~ SPRAY SYSTEMS (UNI'f 2)

..... tYait 2J Applicability Applies to the operational status of the Spray Systems.

Objective To define those conditions of the Spray Systems necessary to assure safe unit operation.

Specification A. A unit's Reactor Coolant System temperature or pressure shall not be made to exceed 3S0°F or 450 psig, respectively, or the reactor shall not be made critical unless the following Spray System conditions in the unit are met:

1. Two Containment Spray Subsystems, including containment spray pumps and motor drives, piping, and valves shall be operable.

2. Four Recirculation Spray Subsystems, including recirculation spray pumps, coolers, piping, and valves shall be operable.

3. The refueling wate.r storage tank shall contain not less than 387,100 gal and not greater than 398,000 gal of borated water at a maximum temperature as shown in Fig. 3.8~-1.

If this volume of water cannot be maintained by makeup, or the t-erature maintained below th.at specified in TS Fig. 3.s;-1, t&e-the reactor shall be shutdown until repairs can be made. The water shall be borated to a boron concentration not less than

• .\meeemeat Ne . 59 , l:Jni t 2

e e T.S. 3.4.-,l-2 8 1 80 Ti.

(YeH il)

• • -**-------* -- **-* 2,'000 ppm and n~t *greater than 2200 ppm which will assure tha.t 1~

the reactor.is in the refueling shutdown condition when all control rod assemblies are inserted.

4. The refueling water chemical addition tank shall contain not less than 4,200 gal of solution with a sodium hydroxide concen-tration of not less than 17 percent by weight and not greater than 18 percent by weight.

5. All valves, piping, and interlocks associated with the above components which are required to operate under accident conditions shall be operable.

6. The total uncollected system leakage from valves, flanges, and pumps located outside containment shall not exceed the limit shown in Table 4.5-1 as verified by inspection during system testing. Individual component leakage may exceed the design value given in Table 4.5-1 provided that the total allowed system uncolle.cted leakage is not exceeded.

-B.-- -During power operation the requirements -of-specification 3.~-A may i ---

be modified to allow the following components to be inoperable. If the components axe not restored to meet the requirements of Specifi-cation 3.t-A within the time period specified below, the reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition. If the requirements

'-6!r---

of Specification 3.4~-A are not satisfied within an additional 48 1~

hours the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition using normal operating procedures.

~-:

.:\mendmeBt Ne . 5 9 , lhlit 2 -*

• e e T.S. 3.4,;'f.-3 8 1 88 'l (Bfti£ 2)

1. One Containment Spray Subsystem may be out of service, provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs and the sub-system can be restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The other Containment Spray Subsystem shall be tested as specified in Specification 4.5-A to demonstrate operability prior to initiating repair of the inoperable system.

2. One outside Recirculation Spray Subsystem may be out of service provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs and the subsystem can be restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The other Recirculation Spray subsystems shall be tested as specified in Specification 4.5-A to demonstrate operability prior to initiating repair of the inoperable system.

3. One inside Recirculation Spray Subsystem may be out service provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs and the subsystem can be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

The other Recirculation Spray subsystems shall be tested as specified in Specification 4.5-A to demonstrate operability

---

- prior "to 1.nitiating repair of *the *inoperable subsystems. *

4. The total uncollected system leakage from valves, flanges, and pumps loca~ed outside containment can exceed the limit shown in Table 4.5-1 provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs and system leakage is returned to within limits within 7 days.

C. Should the refueling water storage tank temperature fail to be main-tained at or below 45°F, the containment pressure and .temperature shall be maintained in accordance with TS Fig. 3.8.2-1 to maintain the cap-ability of the Spray System with the higher refueling water temperature.

If the containment temperature and pressure cannot be maintained within the limits of TS Fig 3. 8. 2-1, the rea'ctor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition.

fime:aeme11:t Ne

• a9 , Ye.i. l 2

e e T.S. 3.4eJ.-4

(_

Basis -

8 1 88 ~

lYait 2J The Spray Systems in each reactor unit consist of two separate parallel Containment Spray Subsystems, each of 100 percent capacity, and four separate parallel Recirculation Spray Subsystems, each of 50 percent capacity.

Each Containment Spray Subsystem draws water independently from the 398,000 gal; capacity refueling water storage tank. The water in the ~

tank is cooled to 45°F or below by circulating the tank water through one of the two refueling water storage tank coolers through the use of one of the two refueling water recirculating pumps. The water temperature is maintained by two mechanical refrigerating units required. In each Containment Spray Subsystem, the water flows from the tank through an electric motor driven containment spray pump and is sprayed into the containment atmosphere through two separate sets of spray nozzles. The capacity of the Spray Systems to depressurize the containment in the event of a Design Basis Accident is a function of the pressure and temperature

---

~ _________ .of the __containment atmosphere, .the .1;ervice water _.temperature, . .and the_ __ _____ _

temperature in the refueling wafe*r storage* tanks as discussed in Specifi-cation 3.Sr-B. ~-

Each Recirculation Spray Subsystem draws water from the common containment pump; In each subsystem the water flows through a recirculation spray pump and recirculation spray cooler, and is sprayed into the containment atmos-phere through a separate set of spray nozzles. Two of the recirculation spray pumps are located inside the containment and two outside the contain-ment in the containment auxiliary structure.

Ameadmeat ie, 59, Yait a

e e T.s. 3.40 f-5 8 1 88 *~

(Yftit 2) f

-- - . : --- - - -- ---- With one Containment Spray Subsystem and two Recirculation Spray Sub-

- systems operating. together, the Spray Systems are capable of cooling and depressurizing the containment to subatmospheric pressure in less than 60 minutes following the Design Basis Accident. The Recirculation Spray I'*

Subsystems are capable of maintaining subatmospheric pressure in the con-tainment indefinitely following the Design Basis Accident whe.n used in conjunction with the Containment Vacuum System to remove any long term air in leakage.

In addition to supplying water to the Containment Spray System, the.refuel-ing water storage tank is also a source of water for safety injection follo.wing an accident. This water is borated to a concentration which assures reactor shutdown by approxi.mately 10 percent 6k/k when all control rod assemblies are inserted and when the reactor.is cooled down for refueling.

I References

---

**SAR -Section ./+---------Reactor Coolant System :*------***- * **-** *- * - *****

I:

FSAR Section 6.3.1 Containment Spray Subsystem FSAR Section 6.l.1 Recirculation Spray Pumps and Coolers FSAR Section 6.3.1 Refueling Water Chemical Addition Tank FSAR Section 6.3.1 Refueling Water Storage Tank FSAR Section 14.5.2 Design Basis Accident FSAR Section 14.5.5 Containment Transient Analysis

.\mendment No. 59, Yttit 2

e TS 3.S-l 3 17 72

{YRie 1)

3. 8

• CONU.INME?rr Ap1'licab ili tv Applies to the uiteRrity and operating pressure of the reactor ,.c'ontai:cment.

/'

Objective To def uie the contai:cment for unit operatiOtl.

~.

Specification

• A. Containment

l. The coutaimnent inte icy, as defined i%f TS Section 1.0. shall not

• unless the reactor condition.

2. Tha rue r containment*hall not be purged while t!i g, acept u stated in Specification A.3.

uring the plant *urtup, the remote 'lll&nual valve ou the *team jet air ejector suction line lll&Y be open, if under admiuistrative control, while contairmlent vacmm is being established. The Reactor Coolant System temt,erature and pressure must not cceed Jso*r and 450 psig, respectively, until the air partial pressure in the contaiment has been reduced to a value equal to, or below, that S'Pecified in TS Figure 3.S-l.

e TS 3. 8-2 9 ll i9 (l:fnH 1)

4. !he containment integrity shall not be violatec ~hen _the reactor vessel head is unbolted unless a shu:down margin sreater than 10 percent A k/k is maintained.

/

s. reactivity ehan~es shall not be made by rod drive otion lution unless the contai:=ent integrity is i ac:.

!. Internal ?ressu=e

l. If the 1nte=:ial air p ;si

-above the preset value o pressure (TS Figure 3.8-l),

the reactor shall be brough shutdovn condition.

2. I£ the leaka.Je condition contai:iment integrity or partial pressure ccnt!nues to ri5e, the reactor sha condi:io::

__________________ i_itilizing ncr.:al Qper procedures.--**-- ____ ------*-------- ________________________________

J. ress.u::e falls 'below S. 25 re.actor shall be placed in the cold shutcevu condition

• Basis The Reactor Coolant System temperature an~ pressure being beloY 35o*r ar.~

450 psig, res~ectively, ensures that no significant c:ount of flashing scea:::

\1111 be fo~ed and hence that there would be no signi!icant pressure build~?

in the contaim.ent if there is a loss-of-coolant accident.

AirleREBRel'lt Pie. ;,; , YA it 1

e

.*\r.....

TS 3.S-3 3 17 72 (Yeic 1)

The shutdown margins ai::e selected based ou the type of activities that are being carried out. The 10 percent 4k/k shutdowa margin during refueling precludes criticality under any circumstance, r.,:en though fuel and control rod assemblies are being moved.

The aubatmospher air partial pressure used fer normal oper. tion is maintained The set value of on the temperature e service water which the recirculation spray coolers, the and the heat sink C&l)ability of The allowable air partial pressure is given in TS Figure of service water temperature, the reiueling water storage tank and the ambient containment air e.

~

temperature.. set value, action shall be taken i=me.diately the condition. If the condition cannot* be corrected, the reactor ly shutdowu and cooldcwn initiated.

pressure of 45 psig

.*------** --*--will not- be exceeded and depressurization accomplished in the unlikely event of a £-coolant accident. The system 1s nat activated by the containment high pressure is reached.

Figure* 3.S-l bas been established to provide the operator with information con-cerning where the air partial pressure must be maintained as a function of RWST

e TS 3.8-4 3-=17 72

• tYRH: 1) and service water temperature to insure depressurizatiou within 40 minutes

. following a loss-of-coolant accident, In the event of a loss-_of-coolan~/

the contaimllent is brought back to.subac:os,:,heric conditio by is frcm the refueli~ water tank (RWST) is cooled by service water, LOCA depends on the ittiti air partial pressu e. Thus, for a given combination bel~ a certain level to assure that the

~-- _c within 40 minutes following a LOCA.

'Ihe lowest set value the contaimnent is 9.0 psia.

an air of capable of withstanding as liner is capable 8 psi&.

References FSAll Section 4.3.2 Reactor Coolant P,mip l'SAll Section S.2 Containment Isolation l'SAll Section s.2.1 Design Bases.

FSAlt Section s.2.2 Iaolation Design

--*- - - - - - - --- . e e

• e 1--* *.

\.... ~ TS FiG. 3 8 -1 3 l7 7i .

/ / (I~:i.t l)

/

• w I

1 **1--

1I .. I a::

in V,

w a::

--+ j_

I I .I REFUELING W tR S'l'CRAGE TANK

~ T PfoRATURE

~

10.4 llC .t5* F 1

a::

~

c:,

~

z 10 2

,o.o

~~.___l--*:--;.--.:.....----~

--~-5~0F I Cl:

a::

0 i:r..

9.8 I w

=

..I

..,I *. a-Q

~

I

.,I

..I 9.4' I

2

~

x Cl:

~-Z 2

9.0 3!5

_.. ____ --** *---- 4!5---* es 10!5 SE~VICE NOTES OWASl.E ,,PERAflPJG AIR ~ARTIAL PRE$SURE

• IN ~

CONTAINM T AS A FUNCTION OF SERVICE WATER TEMP!!U7'l1RE

&NC A!F £LING WATER STORAGE TANK TEMPERATURE.

• sET INT VALUE IN CONTAINMENT VACUUM SYSTEM 1111SiRUMENTATION*\

MUM INE SERVICE TAINMENT WATER

• PERATURE TEMPERATURE 9!50 F f!50 F .

9!5 7' \

15 5!5 7!5 3!5 ~

MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE OPERATING AIR PARTIAL PRESSURE SURRY POWER. STATION

- - - - * * - .- - - - c -

T.S. 3.8~-1 8 1 88 ~

H1aH aJ

.*~ CONTAINMENT (WIT 2)

Applicability Applies to the integrity and operating pressure of the reactor containment.

Objective To define the limiting operating status of the reactor containment for unit operation.

., Specification A. Containment Integrity and Operating Pressure

t. The containment integrity, as defined in TS Section 1. 0, shall .

not be violated; except as specified in A2, below, unless the reactor is in the cold shutdown conditiGn.

~-*

2. The reactor containment shall not be purged while the reactor is operating, except as stated in Specification A.3.

3. During the plant startup, the remote manual valve on the steam jet

. __ _air ejector ...suction line .may be open, :if .under ..administrative control, while* containment vacuum is being established. The Reactor Co~lant System temperature and pressure must not exceed 350°F and 450 psig, respectively, until the air partial pressure in the containment has been reduced to a value equal to, or below, that specified in TS Figure 3.8~-1.

4. The containment integrity shall not be violated when the reactor vessel head is unbolted unless a shutdown margin greater than 10 percent llk/k is maintained.

s. Positive reactivity changes shall not be made by rod drive motion 4':. or boron dilution unless the containment integrity is intact .

• \meatimeat Ne. 59, Uait 2

• e T.S. 3.8.2-2 s 1 se

• • ( B. Internal Pressure (YRit :Z)

1. If the internal air partial pressure rises to a point 0.25 psi above the maHim1a1111 allowable se& peiat value of the air partial pressure (TS Figure 3.8~-1), the reactor shall be brought to the hot shutdown condition.

2. If the leakage condition cannot be corrected without violating the containment integrity or if the internal partial pressure continues to rise, the reactor shall be brought to the cold shutdown condition utilizing normal operating procedures.

3. If the internal pressure falls below 8.25 psia the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition.

I

4. The 11iaH1Y1B allatilahls Ht poi:at :t'.o_r tb.e air partial pressure is 9.1 psia. If the.air partial pressure cannot be maintained greater than or equal to 9.0 psia, the reactor shall be brought to the hot shutdown condition *

.. *-*-***-*-*---***--**-*--.Basis**---------*----*--*--*--**-***--**--***-***--**-*-**----*-*-* ... --*.**-***-** * ***-** **-*-* *- --*********- *- ****-**--*-*-*----

The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure being below 3S0°F and 450 psig, respective~y, ensures that*no significant amount of flashing steam will be formed and hence that there would be no significant pressure build-up in the containment if there is a loss-of-coolant accident.

The shutdown margins are selected based on the type of activities that are being carried out. The 10 percent llk/k shutdown margin during refueling precludes criticality under any circumstance, even though fuel and control rod assemblies are being moved.

~ *_:,,._.

Amendment Ne . 59 , Yait 2

• e- e T.S. 3.Si-3 a i se f,

(t:Tnit: 2)

VQ.\u.<;?.

......... The 11.aHi:alwm allowable set Je:i.at for the containment air partial pressure is presented in Figure 3.~,j-1 for service water temperature from 25 to 90°F.

va..\u.e. t;'

The allowable set peiat varies as shown in Figure 3.8~-1 for a given containment average temperature. The RWST water shall have a maximum temperature of 45°F.

The horizontal limit lines in Figure 3.8g1--1 are based on LOCA peak calcu-lated pressure criteria, and the sloped line is based on LOCA subatmospheric peak pressure criteria.

The curve shall be interpreted as follows:

a.\ \cwo..'c\e.

The horizontal limit line designates the maxi.mwm air*partial vo...\u.e pressure set peiat for the given average containment temperature.

The horizontal limit line applies for service water temperatures from 25°F to the sloped line intersection value (maximum service water temperature).

From Figure 3.Sr.ii-1, if the containment average temperature is 112°F and el a.\\owa.k>\e.

the service water telllperature is less than or equal to 83°F, thel\air

.,... partial pressure set peiat value shall be less than or equal to 9.65 psia .

If the average containment temperature is 116°F and the service water o..\ \cwo.'o\e.

temperature is less than or equal to 88°F, the.l\air partial pressure~

peiat value shall be less than or equal to 9.35 psia. These horizontal limit lines are a result of the higher allowable initial containment average temperatures and the analysis of the pump suction break.

Ameaemeat Ne. 59, Yait 2

e T.S. 3.W-4 S=l=i~ r; (l:JRi.t 2)

If the containment air partial pres~ure rises to a point 0.25 psi above the a..l \o,,*,om.lo\ e.

maximwa &et peiat value, the reactor shall be brought to the hot shutdown condition. If a LOCA occurs at the time the containment air partial pres-o.\ \owc..b \ e.

sure is 0.25 psi above the set pei:at value, the maximum containment pressure will be less than 45 psig, the containment will depressurize*in less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, and the maximum subatmosp~eric peak pressure will be less than 0.0 psig.

Tae miaiml:Hll allewaale set peiat fer tae eeataiemeat air partial press~re is Q,1 p&ia, If the containment air partial pressure cannot be maintained greater than or equal to 9.0 psia, the reactor shall be br:u~ht to the hot shutdown condition. The shell and dome plate liner.,.e{the containment are capable of withstanding an internal pressure as low as 3 psia, and the bottom mat liner is capable of withstanding an internal pressure as low as 8 psia.

References

__ FSAR Section 4. 3. 2 .Reactor Coolant Pump FSAR Section 5.2 Containment Isolation FSAR Section s.z.1 Design Bases FSAR Section 5.5.2 Isolation Design

-~

.\me:aemeat Ne. 59, Yait 2

e T. S. Figure 3.Bo;-1

\...'

B 1 89

("U:ai,,g; 2)

E

.tt.9 3EIW'M ALLOWABLE AIR PARTIAL PRESSURE SURRY POWER STATION - l:IPHT NO. 2

Y'*

=- ---

0*£7,.{:=--**--- :_

---

~ \* ' _:_

-- . *- -------=

-~ -+-:.::.

• I--- - -:-=.=.... --

.:..'\.If l~.-r.-. _._

--\:-:-=t::-- :.

~--* n,n F-

- --- - *- -- + ::. *::__

1..::i- :.

Amendment No. 59, ijnH 2

. -*~*-"'-~- -----~ -*-**-*

8 1 89

)

(}

FIGURE J.Sttt-1 (Continued)

FIGURE NOTATION TC - Containment average temperature.

FIGURE NOTES

1. Ke!dmYlll k1owable operating air partial pressure in the containment as a function of service water temperature.

2. Refueling Water Storage Tank temperature.!. 45°F.

o..\ \cwo..'o\ e.

3. Horizontal lines designate lliiiiiiliilWia air partial pressure setpoint per given containment average temperature.

4. Each containment temperature line is a maximum for the given air partial pressure.

s. Hot shutdown is required for containment air partial pressure sacpei.a, increase greater than 0.25 psi'/ or less

• than *9.-0 'psia *...... ---* ***-*- ..... o.b~ve. tY1~ o..\\~~~:&ie** ~o..\lAe.

6. Cold shutdown is required for containment air partial pressure less than 8.25 psia.

,'\meeement: No. 59, tfoit 2

..._ i I

TABI.E 4.1-1 ( C a r ~ "-:-.A

.J I -

1..11annel Deacrl(!tion Calibrate Teat Remarka 10~ Rod Position Bank Counters 9 (1 ,

1

2) N.A. . . N.A. *

1) Each six inches of rod aotlon when data logger is out of service

2) With analog rod position

11. Stea* Generator Level s R H

12. Chargtns Plov N.A. R N.A.

ll. Residual Heat Removal N.A.I R N.A.

14.

15.

Dor.le Acid Tank Level Refueling Water

• D R R

N.A.

N.A.

e

16. Boron Injection Tank Level I N.A.

17. Volume Control Tank Level* N.A.I!

18. Reactor Containment Presoure-CLS *D 1) Isolation Valve signal and spray I

signal l

19. Process and Area Radiation Ho~itor-I 20.

21.

inl\ Systen1s Boric Acid Control Contat11111ent Slllllp Level

J i

.A *.I R

R N.A.

22. Accumulator s R N.A. e

23. Containment System s R N.A.

tf~

24. Stea~'Line Preasur~ s R H

~*

I I

1

• "9 TABLE 4.1-1. , mtinued)

Channel Description I Check Calibrate Test Remarks

10. Rod Position Bank Counters 1 s u.2) N.A. N.A. 1) Each six inches of rod ~tion I when data logger is our of I

service

! 2) With analog rod position I

11. Steam Generator Level R M 12.

13.

Charging Flow Residual Heat Removal Pump Flow N.A.

N.A.

R R

N.A.

N.A.

e 14: Boric Acid Tank Level I *D I

R N.A.

I 15A, lJait l, Refueliag llate£ Ste'E'age I Tank Level ~

I I

15#. Ynit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank Level ;s R M i

16. Boron Injection Tank Level iW N.A. N.A.

I

17. Volume Control Tank Level IN.A. R N.A.

I

18. Reactor Containment Pressure-CLS R M (1) 1) Isolation Valve signal and I *D spray signal l

19. Process and Area Radiation Monitoring Systems *D R M I 20. Boric Acid Control  : N.A. R N.A.

I

21. Containment Pump Level . 'H.A. R N.A.

22. Accumulator Level and Pressure iS R N.A.

23. Containment Pressure-Vacuum Pump System :s R N.A.

24. Steam Line Pressure *s R M

-*- I I

.~

TABLE 4.5-1 RECIRCULATION SUBSYSTEM LEAKAGE*

-~

t Design Leakage to No. I Uncollected Vent and of Type of Leakage Control and Unit Leakage, Drain System, Item Units Leakage Rate cc per hr** cc per hr Recirculation spray 2 . No leak of spray water due to tandem 0 0 pumps Flanges:

a.

b.

pump Valves -

4 4

seal arrangement 40 drops per min per flange 480 460 0

0 bonnet to body (larger than 2 in.)

Valves - Stem 4 Backseated,- double packing with 0 16 leakoffs leakoff - 4 cc per hr per in. stem diameter Miscellaneous 2 Flariges body, packed stem - 4 drop 24 0 small valves per min Total 964 16

• Based on two subsystems in operation under DBA conditions.

Total Allowed System Uncollected Leakage is 964.cc/hr.

• • Individual component uncollected leakage may exceed the design value provided that the total allowable system uncollected leakage is not exceeded.

e TABLE 4.11-1 EXTERNAL RECIRCULATION LOOP LEAKAGE (Safety Injection System Only)

Design Design Leakage to Leakage to No. of Type of Leakage Control and Unit Atmosphere Waste Disposal Items Units Leakage Rate cc :eer hr** Tank 2 cc :eer hr Low Head Safety Injection 2 Mechanical Seal with leakoff - 0 24 Pumps 4 drop per min Safety Injection Charging 3 Mechanical Seal with leakoff -

4 drop per min 0 36 e

Flanges:

a. Pump 10 Gasket~ adjusted to zero leakage 1,200 0 following any test - 40 drops per min, per flange

b. Valves Bonnet to Body 54 2,240 0 (larger than 2 in~)

Valves - Stem Leakoffs 27 Backseated, double packing with 0 108 leakoff - 4 cc per hr per in stem diameter Hise. Valves 33 Flanges body packed stems - 4 drop per min 396 0 Totals 3,836 168 Total Allowed System Uncollected Leakage is 3,836 cc/hr

• • Individual component uncollected leakage may exceed the design value provided that the total allowable system uncoll~cted leakage is not exceeded.

e **

• e PART B PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TO BE ADDED

e

e e

TS 3.3-1

-- 3.3 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Applicability Applies to the operating status of the Safety Injection System.

Objective To define those limiting conditions for operation that are necessary to provide sufficient borated cooling water to remove decay heat from the core in emergency situations.

Specifications A. A reactor shall not be made critical unless the following conditions are met:

1. The refueling water storage tank contains not less than 387,100 gal of borated water. The boron c9ncentration shall be at least 2000 ppm and not greater than 2200 ppm *.

2. Each accumulator system is pressurized to at least .600 psia and contains a minimum of 975 £t 3 and a maximum of 989 ft 3 of borated water with a boron concentration of at least 1950 ppm.

3. The boron injection tank and isolated portion of the inlet and outlet piping contains no less than 900 gallons of water with a boron concentration equ:i.valent to at least 11.5%-*to 13% weight boric acid solution at a temperature of at least 145°F. Addi-tionally, recirculation between a unit's Boron Injection Tank and the Boric Acid Tank(s) assigned to the unit shall be main-tained.

e ** TS 3.3-2

-- 4. Two channels of heat tracing shall be available for the flow paths.

5. Two charging pumps are operable.

6. Two low head safety injection pumps are operable.

7. All valves, pip_ing, and interlocks associated with the above components which are required to operate under accident condi-tions are operable.

8. The Charging Pump Cooling Water Subsystem shall be operating as follows:

a. Make-up water from the Component Cooling Water Subsystem shall be available.

b. Two charging pump component cooling water pumps and two charging pump service water pumps shall be operable.

c. Two charging pump intermediate seal coolers shall be operable.

9. During power ~peration the A.C. power shall be removed from the following motor operated valves with the valve in the open position:

Unit No. 1 Unit No. 2 MOV 1890C MOV 2890C

10. During power operation the A.C. power shall be removed from the following motor operated valves with the valve in the closed position:

Unit ,No. 1 Unit No. 2 MOV 1869A MOV 2869A MOV 1869B MOV 2869B MOV 1890A MOV 2890A MOV 1890B MOV 2890B

--*e TS 3.3-3

11. The accumulator discharge valves listed below in non-isolated loops shall be blocked open by de-energizing the valve motor operator when the reactor coolant system pressure is greater than 1000 psig.

Unit No. 1 Unit No. 2 MOV 1865A MOV 2865A MOV 1865B MOV 2865B MOV 1865C MOV.2865C

12. Power operation with less than three loops in servic~ is pro-hibited. The following loop isolation valves shall have AC power removed and be locked in open position during power operation.

Unit No. 1 Unit No. 2 MOV 1590 MOV 2590 MOV 1591 MOV 2591 MOV 1592 MOV 2592 MOV 1593 MOV 2593 MOV 1594 MOV 2594 MOV 1595 MOV 2595

13. The total system uncollected leakage from valves, flanges, and pumps located outside containment shall not exceed the limit shown in Table 4.11-1 as verified by inspection during system testing. Individual component leakage may exceed the design value given in Table 4.11-1 provided that the total allowable system uncollected leakage is not exceeded.

• • TS 3.3-4

-- B. The requirements of Specification 3.3-A may be modified to allow one of the following components to be inoperable at any one time. If the system is not restored to meet the requirements of Specification 3.3 ..A within the time period speci£ied, the reactor shall initially be placed in the shutdown condition. If the requirements of Specification 3.3-A are not satisfied within an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> the reactor shall be placed in cold shutdown condition.

1. One accumulator may be isolated for a period not to exceed 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

2. Two charging pumps per unit may be out service, provided immediate attention is directed.to making repairs and one pump is restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3. One low head safety injection pump per unit may be out of service, provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs and the pump is restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The other low head safety injection pump shall be tested to demonstrate operability prior to initiating repair of the inoperable pump and shall be tested once every eight (8) hours thereafter, until both pumps are in an operable status or the reactor is shutdown.

4. Any one valve in the Safety Injection System may be inoperable provided repairs are initiated immediately and are completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Prior to initiating repairs, all automatic valves in the redundant system shall be tested to demonstrate operability.

5. One channel of heat tracing may be inoperable for a period not to exceed-24 hours,. provided immediate attention is diTected to making repairs.

TS 3.3-5

6. One charging pump component*cooling water pump or one charging pump service water pump may be out of service provided_the pump is restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

=

7. One charging pump intermediate seal cooler or other passive component may be out of service provided the system may still operate at 100 percent capacity and repairs are completed within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.

8. Power may be restored to any valve referenced in Specifications 3.3.A.9 and 3.3.A.10 for the purpose of valve testing or maintenance providing no more than one valve has power restored and provided that testing and maintenance is completed and power removed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

9. Power may be restored to any valve referenced in Specification 3.3.A.11 for the purpose of valve testing or maintenance providing no more than one valve has power restored and provided that testing or maintenance is completed and power removed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

10. Recirculation between a unit's Boron Injection Tank and the Boric Acid Tank(s) assigned to the unit may be terminated for a period not to exceed two hours, provided all other parameters (temperatures, boron concentration, volume) of the Boron Injec-tion Tank are within Specification 3.3.A.3 and immediate attention is directed to making repairs.

11. The total uncollected system leakage for valves, flanges, and pumps located outside containment can exceed the limit shown in Table 4.11-1 provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs and system leakage is returned to within limits within e 7 days.

• • TS 3.3-6 Basis The normal procedure for starting the reactor is, first, to heat the reactor coolant to near operati~g temperature by running the reactor coolant pumps. The reactor is then make critical by withdrawing control rods and/or diluting boron in the coolant. With this mode of startup the Safety Injection System is required to be operable as spe*cified. During low power physics tests there is a negligible amount of energy stored in the system; therefore an accident comparable in severity to ehe Design Basis Accident is not possible, and the full capacity of the Safety Injection System is not required.

The operable status of the various systems and components is to be demonstrated by periodic tests, detailed in TS Section 4.1. A large fraction of these tests are perform.ed while the reactor is operating in the power range. If a component is found to be inoperable, it will be possible in most cases to effect repairs and restore the system to full operability within a relatively short time. A single component being inoperable does not negate the ability of the system to perform its function, but it reduces the redundancy provided in the reactor design and thereby limits the ability to tolerate additional equipment failures.

To provide maximum assurance that the redundant component(s) will operate if required to do so, the redundant component(s) are to be tested prior to initiating repair of the inoperable component and, in some cases are to be retested at intervals during the repair period. In some cases, i.e.

charging pumps, additional components are installed to allow a component e to be inoperable. wi thou~. affe.~~ing system redu~da,ncy. For those cases

• • TS 3.3-7 e which are not so designed, if it develops that (a) the inoperable component is not repaired within the specified allowable time period, or (b) a second component in the same or related system is found to be inoperable, the reactor w~ll initially be put in the hot shutdown condition to provide for reduction of the decay heat from the fuel, and consequent reduction of cooling requirements after a postulated loss-of-coolant accident. After 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> in the hot shutdown condition, if the malfunction(s) are not corrected the reactor will be placed in cold shutdown condition, following normal shutdown and cooldown procedures.

The Specification requires prompt action to effect repairs of an inoperable component, and therefore in most cases repairs will be completed in less than the specified allowable repair times. Furthermore, the specified repair times do not apply to regularly scheduled maintenance of the Safety Injection System, which is normally to be performed during refueling shut-

- .. *- . *-~--.--

downs. The limiting times for repair are based on: estimates of the time required to diagnose and correct various postulated malfunctions using safe and proper procedures, the availability of tools, materials and equipment; health physics requirements and the extent to which other systems provide functional redundancy to the system under repair.

Assuming the reactor has been operating at full rated..-power for at least 100 days, the magnitude of the decay heat production decreases as follows after initiating hot shutdown.

Time After Shutdown Decay Heat,% of Rated Power e 1 min. 3.7 30 min. 1.6

• • TS 3.3-8 Time After Shutdown Decay Heat,% of Rated Power 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1.3 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 0.75 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> 0.48 Thus, the requirement for core cooling in case of a postulated loss-of-coolant accident while in the hot shutdown condition is reduced by orders of magnitude below the requirements for handling a postulated loss-of-coolant accident*occurring during power operation. Placing and maintain-ing the reactor in the hot shutdown condition significantly reduces the potential consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident, allows access to some of the Safety Injection Sytem components in order to effect repairs, and minimizes the exposure to thermal cycling.

Failure to complete repairs within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of going to hot shutdown condition is considered indicative of unforeseen problems, i.e., possibly the need of major maintenance. In such a case the reactor is to be put into the cold shutdown condition ...

The accumulators are able to accept leakage from the Reactor Coolant System without any effect on their availability. Allowable inleakage is based on the volume of water that can be added to the initial amount without exceed-ing the volume given in Specification 3.3.A.2. The maximum*acceptable inleakage is 14 cubic feet per tank.

1.

TS 3.3-9 The accumulators (one for each loop) discharge*into the cold leg of the reactor coolant piping when Reactor Coolant System pressure decreases below accumulator pressure, thus assuring rapid core cooling for large breaks. The line from each accumulator is provided with a motorized valve to isolate the accumulator during reactor start-up and shutdown to preclude the discharge of the contents of the accumulator when not requi~ed. These valves receive a signal to open when safety injection is initiated.

To assure that the accumulator valves satisfy the single failure criterion, they will be blocked open by de-energizing the valve motor operators when the reactor coolant pressure exceeds 1000 psig. The operating pressure of the Reactor Coolant System is 2235 psig and safety injection is initiated when this pressure drops to 650 psig. De-energiz-ing the motor operator when the pressure exceeds 1000 psig allows sufficient time during normal startup operation to perform the actions required to de-energize the valve. This procedure will assure that there is an operable flow path from each accumulator to the Reactor Coolant System during power operation and that safety injection can be accom-plished.

The removal o*f power from the valves listed in the specification will assure that the systems of which they* are a part satisfy the single failure criterion.

Continuous recirculation between the Boron Injection Tank and the Boric Acid Tank(s) ensures tha~ a unit's Boron Injection Tank is full of con-centrated boric acid at all times.

TS 3.4-1 3.4 SPRAY SYSTEMS Applicability Applies to the operational status of. the Spray Systems.

Objective To define those conditions of the Spray Systems necessary to assure safe unit operation.

Specification A. A unit's Reactor Coolant System temperature or pressure shall not be made to exceed 350°F or 450 psig, respectively, or the reactor shall not be made critical unless the following Spray System conditions in the uilit are met:

1. Two Containment Spray Subsystems, including containment spray pumps and motor drives, piping, and valves shall be operable.

2. Four Recirculation Spray Subsystems, including recirculation spray pumps, coolers, piping, and valves shall be operable.

3. The refueling water storage tank shall contain not less than 387,100 gal and not greater than 398,000 gal of borated water at a maximum temperature as shown in TS Fig. 3.8-1 If this volume of water cannot be maintained by makeup, or the temperature maintained below that specified in TS Fig. 3.8-1, the reactor shall be shutdown until repairs can be made. The water shall be borated to a boron concentration not less than

e. e TS 3.4-2 2,000 ppm and not greater than 2,200 ppm which will assure that the reactor is in the refueling shutdown condition when all control rod assemblies are inserted.

4. The refueling water chemical addition tank shall contain not less than 4,200 gal of solution with a sodium hydroxide concen-tration of not less than 17 percent by weight and not greater than 18 perc~nt by weight.

S. All valves, piping, and interlocks associated with the above components which are required_ to operate under accident conditions shall be operable.

6. The total uncollected system leakage from valves, flanges, and*

pumps located outside containment shall not exceed the limit shown in Table 4.5-1 as verified by inspection during system testing. Individual component leakage may exceed the design

• value given in Table 4.5-1 provided that the total allowed system uncollected leakage is not exceeded.

B. During power operation the requirements of Specification 3.4-A may be modified to allow the following components to be inoperable. If the components are not restored to meet the requirements of Specifi-cation 3.4-A within the time period specified below, the reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition. If the requirements of Specification 3.4-A are . not satisfied within an additional. 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition using normal operating procedures.

1. e e TS 3.4-3

- 1. One Containment Spray Subsystem may be out of service, provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs and the sub-system can be restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The other Containment Spray Subsystem shall be tested as specified in Specification 4.5-A to demonstrate operability prior to initiating repair of the inoperable system.

2. One outside Recirculation Spray Subsystem may be out of service provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs and the subsystem can be restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The other Recirculation Spray subsystem shall be tested as specified in Specification 4.5-A to demonstrate operability prior to initiating repair of the inoperable system .

. 3. One inside Recirculation Spray Subsystem may be out of service provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs and the subsystem can be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

The other Recirculation Spray subsystems shall be tested as specified in Specification 4.5-A to demonstrate operability prior to initiating repair of the inoperable subsystems.

4. The total uncollected system leakage from valves, flanges, and pumps located outside containment can exceed the limit shown in Table 4.5-1 provided immediate attention is directed to making repairs and system leakage is returned to within limits within 7 days.

TS 3.4-4 e C. Should the refueling water storage tank temperature fail to be main-tained at or below 45°F, the containment pressure and temperature shall be maintained in accordance with TS Fig. 3.8-1 to maintain the cap-ability of the Spray System with the higher refueling water temperature ..

If the containment temperature and pressure cannot be maintained within the limits of TS Fig. 3.8-1, the reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition.

Basis The Spray Systems in each reactor unit consist of two separate parallel Containment Spray Subsystems, each of 100 percent capacity, and four separate parallel Recirculation Spray Subsystems, each of 50 percent capacity.

Each Containment Spray Subsystem draws water independently from the 398,000 gal. capacity refueling water storage tank. The water in the tank is cooled to 45°F or below by circulating the tank water through one of the two refueling water storage tank coolers through the use of one of the two refueling water recirculating pumps. The water temperature is maintained by two mechanical refrigerating units required. In each Containment Spray Subsystem, the water flows from the tank through an electric motor driven containment spray pump.and is a.pr~yed into the containment atmosphere through two separate sets of spray nozzles. The capacity of the Spray Systems to depressurize the containment in the event of a Design Basis Accident is a function of the pressure and temperature of the containment atmosphere, the service water temperature, and the temp.~.i;at:u;~ in. tile r~fuel~11g, water storage tanks as discussed in Specifi-cation 3.8-B.

Each Recirculation Spray Subsystem draws water from the common containment pump.. In each subsystem the water flows through a recirculation spray pump and recirculation spray cooler, and is sprayed into the containment atmos-phere through a separate set of spray nozzles. Two of the recirculation spray pumps are located inside the containment and two outside the contain-ment in the containment auxiliary structure.

With one Containment Spray Subsystem and two Recirculation Spray Sub-systems operating together, the Spray Systems are capable of cooling and depressurizing the containment to subatmospheric pressure in less than 60 minutes following the Design Basis Accident. The Recirculation Spray Subsystems are capable of maintaining subatmospheric pressure in the.con-tainment indefinitely following the Design Basis A~cident when used in conjunction with the Containment Vacuum System to remove any long term air in leakage.

In addition to supplying water to the Containment Spray System,. the refuel-ing water storage tank is also a.source of *water for safety injection following an accident. This water is borated to a concentration which assures reactor shutdown by approximately 10 percent Llk/k when all control rod assemblies are inserted and when the reactor is cooled down for refueling.

e

• TS 3.4-6 References FSAR Section 4 Re.actor Coolant System FSAR Section 6.3.1 Containment Spray Subsystem FSAR Section 6.3.1 Recirculation Spray Pumps and Coolers FSAR Section 6.3.1 Refueling Water Chemical Addition Tank FSAR Section 6.3.1 Refueling Water Storage Tank FSAR Section 14.5.2 Design Basis Accident FSAR Section 14.5.5 Containment Transient Analysis

e TS 3.8-1 3.8 CONTAINMENT Applicability Applies to the integrity and operating pressure of the reactor containment.

Objective To define the limiting operating status of the reactor containment for unit operation.

Specification A. Containment Integrity and Operating Pressure

1. The containment integrity, as defined in TS Section 1.0, shall not be violated, except as specified in A2, below, unless the reactor is in the cold shutdown condition.

2. The reactor containment shall not be purged while the reactor is operating, except as stated in Specification 3.8.A.3.

3. During the plant startup, the remote manual valve on the steam jet*

air ejector suction line may be open, if under administrative control, while containment vacuum is being established. The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure must not exceed 350°F and 450 psig, respectively, until the air partial pressure in the containment has been reduced to a value equal to, or below, that specified in TS Fig. 3.8-1. I

4. The containment integrity shall not be violated when the reactor

- vessel head is unbolted unless a shutdown margin greater than 10 per.cen:t Mc/k is maintained.

TS 3.8-2

- s. Positive reactivity changes shall not be made by rod drive motion or boron dilution unless the containment integrity is intact.

B. Internal Pressure

1. If the internal air partial pressure rises to a point 0.25 psi above the allowable value of the air partial pressure (TS Fig. 3.8-1),

the reactor shall be brought to the hot shutdown condition.

2. If the leakage condition cannot be corrected without violating the containment integrity or if the internal partial pressure continues to rise, the reactor shall be brought to the cold shutdown condition utilizing normal operating procedures.

3. If the internal pressure falls below 8.25 psia the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition.

4. If the air partial pressure cannot be maintained greater than or equal to 9.0 psia, the reactor shall be brought to the hot shutdown condition.

Basis The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure being below 3S0°F and 450 psig, respectively, ensures that no significant amount of flashing steam will be formed-and hence that there would be no significant pressure build-up in the containment if there is a loss-of-coolant accident.

The shutdown margins are selected based on the type of activities that are being carried out. The 10 percent ak/k shutdown margin during refueling precludes criticality under any circumstance, even though fuel and control rod assemblies are being moved.

e e TS 3.8-3

- The allowable value for the containment air partial pressure is presented in TS Fig. 3.8-1° for service water temperatures from 25 to 90°F. The allowable value varies as shown in TS Fig. 3.8-1 for a given containment average temperature. The RWST water shall have a maximum temperature of 45°F.

The horizontal limit lines in TS Fig. 3.8-1 are based on LOCA peak calcu-

. lated pressure criteria, and the sloped line is based on LOCA subatmospheric peak pressure criteria.

The curve shall be interpreted as follows:

The horizontal limit line designates the allowable air partial pressure value for the given average containment temperature.

The horizontal limit line applies for service water temperatures from 25°F to the sloped line intersection value (maximum service water temperature).

From TS Fig. 3.8-1, if the containment average temperature is 112°F and the service water temperature is less than or equal to 83°F, the allow-able air partial pressure value shall be less than or equal to 9.65 psia.

If the average containment tempe~ature is 116°F and the service water temperature is less than or equal to 88°F, the allowable air partial pressure value shall be less than or equal to 9.35 psia. These horizontal limit lines are a result of the higher allowable initial containment average temperatures and the analysis of the pump suction break.

e ,**,*"":*

TS 3.8-4 e If the containment air partial pressure rises to a point 0.25 psi above the allowable value, the reactor shall be brought to the hot shutdown condition.

If a LOCA occurs at the time the containment air partial pressure is 0.25 psi above the allowable value, the maximum containment pressure will be less than 45 psig, the containment will depressurize in less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, and the maximum subatmospheric peak pressure will be less than 0.0 psig.

If the containment air partial pressure cannot be maintained greater than or equal to 9.0 psia, the reactor shall be brought to the hot shutdown condition. The shell and dome plate liner of the containment are capable of withstanding an internal pressure as low as 3 psia, and the bottom mat liner is capable of withstanding an internal pressure as low as 8 psia.

References FSAR Section 4.3.2 Reactor Coolant Pump .

FSAR Section 5.2 Containment Isolation FSAR Section 5.2.1 Design Bases FSAR Section 5.5.2 Isolation Design

1.

T.S. Figure 3.8-1 e

ALLOWABLE AIR PARTIAL PRESSURE SURRY POWER STATION 10.0 1,1,1 a:

=

~

I.I.I a:

a.

~

--~- *. 9-.

a:

._ ... 1-*-:.

--**-* I

---.'-i.* _, __ , ___ :_

• I

~

~-~: \:~~-:~5 .c.0-_.L ~-~-~-~~~-;: ~~~~;4:_~::~:~5-:, .*. _65 . : . 75 . .i . , 8~ 95

--~---'----l--;-!- *, :!-'.:'. *J>f.:s~VICE WATERTEMPERAl"URE (Of);*:-**---:*-- ----i-

: ; . t : . : : __ :_:.T"-'i:_,4~:.,.,:,y--*--:- -j--- . , ' -...

TS Figure 3.8-1 I FIGURE 3.8-1 (Continued)

FIGURE NOTATION TC - Containment average temperature.

FIGURE NOTES

1. Allowable operating air partial pressure in the containment as a function of service water temperature.

2. Refueling Water Storage Tank temperature~ 45°F.

3. Horizontal lines designate allowable air partial pressure setpoint ,per given containment average temperature.

4. Each containment temperature line is a maximum for the given air partial pressure.

S. Hot shutdown is required for containment air partial pressure increase greater than 0.25 psi above the allowable value or less than 9.0 psia.

6; Cold shutdown is required for containment air partial pressure less than 8.25 psia.

e TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued)

Channel Description Check Calibrate Test Remarks

10. Rod Position Bank Counters S (1,2) N.A. N.A. 1) Each six inches of rod motion when data- logger is out of service

2) With analog rod position s

11., Steam Generator Level

12. *Charging Flow N.A.

R R

M N.A.

e 13 .. Residual Heal Removal Pump Flow N.A. R N.A.

14., Boric Acid Tank Level *D R N.A.

15. Refueling Water Storage Tank Level s R M

16. Boron Injection Tank Level w N.A. N.A.

17. Volume Control Tank Level N.A. R N.A.

18.* Reactor Containment Pressure-CLS *D R M (1) 1) Isolation Valve signal and spray signal 19.. Process and Area Radiation Monitoring System *D R M

~

20. Boric Acid Control \ N.A. R N.A.

21. Containment Pump Level N.A. R N.A.

22. Accumulator Level and Pressure S, R N.A.

I-'

23. Containment Pressure-Vacuum Pump .....

I System s R N.A.

24. Steam Line Pressure s R M

e TABLE 4.5-1 RECIRCULATION SUBSYSTEM LEAKAGE*

D~sign Leakage to No. Uncollected Vent and I of Type of Leakage Control and Unit Leakage Drain System, Item Units Leakage Rate cc per hr** cc per hr Recirculation spray 2 No leak of spray water due to tandem 0 0 pumps seal arrangement

'Flanges: 40 drops per min per flange

a. pump 4 480 0

b. Valves 4 460 0 bonnet to body (larger than 2 in.)

Valves - Stem 4 Backseated, double packing with 0 16 leakoffs leakoff - 4 cc per hr per in. stem diameter Miscellaneous 2 Flanges body, packed stem - 4 drop 24 0 small valves per min Total 964 16

• Based on two subsystems in operation under DBA conditions.

Total Allowed System Uncollected Leakage is 964.cc/hr.

\J1

• • Individual component uncollected leakage may exceed the design value provided that the total I allowable system uncollected leakage is not exceeded. °'

e e TABLE 4.11-1 EXTERNAL RECIRCULATION LOOP LEAKAGE (Safety Injection System Only)

Design Design Leakage to Leakage to No. of Type of Leakage Control and Unit Atmosphere Waste Disposal Item Units Leakage Rate . cc per hr** Tank, cc per hr Low Head Safety 2 Mechanical Seal with leakoff - 0 24 Injection Pumps 4 drop per min Safety Injection 3 Mechanical Seal with leakoff - 0 36 Chargin~ 4 drop per min Flanges:

a. Pump 10 Gasket - adjusted to zero leakage 1,200 0 following any test - 40 drop per min, per flange

b. Valves Bonnet 54 2,240 0 Body (larger than 2 in.)

Valves - Stem Leakoffs 27 Backseated, double packing with 0 108 leakoff - 4 cc per hr per in stem diameter Misc. Valves 33 Flanges body packed stems - 4 drop per min 396 0 Totals . 3,836 168 0

I-'

Total Allowed System Uncollected Leakage is 3,836 cc/hr VI I

• • Individual component uncollected leakage may exceed the design value provided that the total allowable system uncollected leakage is not exceeded.

- ATTACHMENT 2 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES SURRY POWER STATION INTRODUCTION The changes as discussed herein are a result of modifications made for allevi-

. ating concerns associated with site boundary dosage as related to the per-formance of the Containment Spray System, Low Head Safety Injection System and the Recirculation Spray System.

BACKGROUND Background information. associated with these modifications can be referenced

'in., the following correspondence:

A~ *Information concerning LOCA site boundary dose considerations has been provided to the NRC in the following correspondence:

1. Vepco to NRC, S/N 142/090976, 8-31-76; Response to Request for Addi-tional Information

2. Vepco to NRC, S/N 045/020177, 4-6-77; Response to Request for Addi-e tional Information

3. Vepco to NRC, S/N 045A/020177, 5-9-77; Followup to Provide Complete Response and Proposed Modifications

4. Vepco to NRC, S/N 042, 1-24-80; Update InformatioQ. and Changes to Proposed Modifications

5. Vepco to NRC, S/N 187, 3-20-80; Pretest Report Submittal for Draw-down Test

6. Vepco to NRC, S/N 501, 6-11-80, Documentation of May 22, 1980 Meeting and Presentation of Preliminary Information

7. Vepco to NRC, S/N 535, 6-18-80, submittal of Final Analysis and Test Information --

B. 'l'he associated NRC correspondence for the above concerns are as follows:

1.

• NRC to* Vepco, S/N 142/090976, 7-9-76; Request for Reanalysis of Meteorological Data and LOCA Dose Considerations

2. NRC to Vepco, S/N 045/020177, 2-1-77; Request for Additional Infer-mation /

e

e c. Information concerning Surry Power Station's NPSH and Containment In-tegrity requirements has also been presented to the NRC in the following correspondence:

1. Vepco to NRC, S/N 366,.8-24-77; Results of Analyses for NPSH Problem and the Associated Modifications.

2. Vepco to NRC, S/N 374, 8-29-77; Report of Inadequate NPSH for LHSI pumps and Associated 'Modifications.

3. Vepco to NRC, S/N 374A/082977, 9-1-77; Report of Additional NPSH Modifications for LHSI pumps.

4. Vepco to NRC, S/N 382/082477, 9-12-77; Response to NRC request for Additional Information (8-24-77). This letter provides the NPSH analyses and calculations justifying the interim modifications in-stalled.

5. Vepco to NRC, S/N 382/092477, 11-22-77; Proposal and justifying analyses for permanent solution to NPSH problem.

D. The NRC's review of the NPSH Problem has been documented in the following correspondence:

1. NRC to Vepco, S/N 367/082477, 8-24-77; the NRC approves Interim NPSH Modifications.

2. NRC to Vepco, S/N 382/082477, 8-24-77; the NRC' s "Order for Modifi-cation of License" utilizing Interim NPSH Modifications; it includes NRC's request for additional information.

3. NRC to Vepco, S/N 069/013178, 1-31-78; NRC's further request for additional information based on Final NPSH Modification proposal.

Responses to the NRC's request for additional information were made ~n April 14, 1978 (S/N 069A/013178) and on April 28, 1978 (S/N 069B/013178). The final response to the NRC's request was submitted on November 27, 1978 (S/N 069C/ 013178) with additional information on this response being provided on February 14, 1979 (S/N 085) and June 19, 1980 (S/N 069D/013178).

The above correspondence discussed certain long-term modifications required to ---

alleviate LOCA site boundary dose concerns and certain interim and long-term, modifications required to alleviate NPSH concerns.

The long-term modifications as detailed i~ this correspondence have been com-pleted on Surry Unit No. 2 and are in progress on Surry Unit No. 1 during the current Steam Generator Replacement Outage. These modifications will be com-pleted prior to Unit No. 1 start-up. A synopsis of modifications being made is as fol lows :

,,.. e e A. NPSH Modifications

1. Inside Recirculation Spray System a" Remove and plug all type 1HH30100 nozzles in the spray headers.

b. Install a 2~ in. bleed line from the discharge of the Recircu-lation Spray heat exchangers to the suction of the IRS pumps.

Design flow is 350 gpm.

2. Outside Recirculation Spray System

a. Remove and plug all type 1HH30100 nozzles in the containment recirculation spray headers.

• i

b. Install a restriction orifice on the ORS pump discharge to limit system flow to 3000 gpm.

c. Install a 2~ in. bleed line from each Containment Spray System supply header to the suction of the ORS pump in the containment sump. Design flow is 300 gpm.

3. Low Head Safety Injection System

a. Install cavitating venturis in each of the cold leg injection lines to limit LHSI pump flow to 3250 gpm during the recircula-tion mode of operation.

4. Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)

a. In conjunction with the RWST modifications for the Containment Spray (CS) Modification, elbows were installed.inside the RWST on the CS pump suction lines.*

B. Containment Spray System Modifications

1. Containment Spray Headers a._ Install new containment spray header outside the crane wall.

2.

b* Replace nozzles in existing headers.

Caustic Addition Modifications

a. Resize and reroute Chemical Addition Tank (CAT) outlet line directly to CS pump suction.

3. RWST Modifications

a. Removal of mixing weir inside RWST.

b. Installation of elbows on CS pump suction lines inside RWST.

... e e c. Upgrade of level instrumentation to provide input to control circuitry for automatic switchover of the LSHI system suction from the RWST to the Contairunent sump.

The basis for implementing the above modifications was to 1) ensure adequate iodine removal for the most restrictive LOCA for all Engineered Safety Feature pump combinations 2) provide adequate spray to ensure containment depressuriza-tion for all pump combinations and 3) ensure adequate NPSH available for all

• LOCA transients. This has been accomplished by modifications to 1) provide increased caustic spray coverage, 2) reduce the delay time in caustic solution reaching the spray nozzles, 3) add caustic solution at a rate that will assure spray pH and sump pH is within bounds of the licensing requirements for. all containment depressurization transients, 4) achieve maximum spray thermal effectiveness for the Contairunent and Recirculation Spray (RS) Systems,

5) reduce NPSH required for the LHSI and RS Systems by restricting maximum flow conditions, and 6) increase NPSH available for the RS Systems by providing subcooled water to pump su.ctions.

In our letter of June 30, 1980 (Serial No. 562), we requested and were sub-sequently granted Amendment No. 59 to Surry Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifica-tions which reflected these changes listed above. This amendment created

• separate and distinct Sections 3.3, 3.4, 3.8 and 4.1 for each unit. Upon completion of the long-term modifications in progress on Surry Unit No. 1, certain changes will be required to the Technical Specifications which will essentially make Sections 3.3, 3.4, 3.8 and 4.1 the same for both Units 1 and

• A list of these changes is as follows:

Changes to Surry Unit 1 Technical Specifications

1. Section 3.3 (A-1) - The RWST Level has *been increased from 350,000 gallons to 387,100 gallons in order to ensure that sufficient water is available to operate the C.S. and S.I. systems for the complete duration of a LOCA considering all combinations of SI and CS pumps.

The upper limit of boron concentration has been established,at 2200 PPM in order to maintain a correct pH after mixing with the sodium hydroxide of the CAT for the contairunent spray.

2. Section 3,3 (A-13) - The addition of this section will provide limits on allowable leakages from the various ECCS systems that may contain radioactive fluids following a LOCA. Leakage from these sources will be verified by testing prior to start-up. Acceptance criteria for these tests will be in accordance with leakage valves listed in Tables 4.5.1 and 4.11.1.

3. Section 3.3 (B-11) - 'nle addition of this section will provide limits on a allowable leakages from the various ECCS systems that may contain radioactive fluids following a LOCA. Leakage from these sources will be verified by Periodic Testing on a quarterly basis or as a special refueling test. Acceptance criteria for these tests will be listed in Tables 4.5.1 and 4.11.1.

• e e Safety Evaluation The function of the existing Engineered Safeguards Systems has not been altered as a result of the installed modifications. Accepted analyt icaI methods have been utilized to detennine the consequences following a LOCA based on the most limiting system parameters. The margin of.safety as defined in the basis for technical specifications is not reduced. The modifications optimize the design function of existing systems through hardware changes.

Therefore, the proposed changes to Technical Specification for Surry Unit No. 1 as a result of installed modifications are acceptable and:

a. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety and previously evalu~

ated in the Safety Analysis Report is not increased. The modifica-tions ensure the operation of RS and LHSI pumps throughout all phases of LOCA and ensure proper operation of the CS system for containment iodine removal. Computer analyses have confinned acceptable contain-ment transient performance in that the peak pressure limit of 45 psig is not exceeded and the pressure returns to subatmospheric conditions in less than 60 minutes and remains subatmospheric. Analyses have also shown acceptable performance of systems to mitigate the conse-quences of a Design Basis LOCA.

b. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type e than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report is not created. The level of integrity and the function of the CS, SI and RS systems is not changed.*

• Analyses have shown that LOCA is ade-quately mitigated with the NPSH and Containment Spray Modifications installed. All piping stresses on the SI, CS, and RS systems imposed by this design change are acceptable.

c. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any technical specification, is not reduced. As was shown by analyses, the pro-posed technical specification changes* assure acceptable containment performance for worse case transient pressures and show that subatmospheric cond*itions are reached in less than one hour, remain subatmospheric, and never exceed 45 psig, and also acceptable performance of systems to mitigate Design Basis LOCA consequences.

Therefore, the modifications and associ4ted changes to the Technical Specifica-tions do not create an unreviewed safety question *

....._.'.;>.*