ML061780524

OI Interview Transcript of Witness, Pages 1-76

ML061780524
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	03/10/2004
From:	NRC/OI
To:
References
1-2003-051F, FOIA/PA-2005-0194, NRC-1373
Download: ML061780524 (78)

Text

Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

Interview o

.o9 Docket Number: 1.2003-051 F

.F Location: Salem, New Jersey

! Date:-

Date:

Wednesday, March 10, 2004 Work Order NRC-1 37 3 No.:

Pages 1-76 NEAL R.

GROSS Court Reporters AND CO.,

and 1323 Rhode Transcribers INC.

Island Avenue, Washington, N.W.

D.C.

(202) 234.4433 20005 Information inaccordanceinwith this record Act, exem ptions the Freedomwas deleted

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I1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3

4 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS 5 INTERVIEW 6 ------------------------- x 7 IN THE MATTER OF:

8 INTERVIEW OF Docket No. 1-2003-051F 9

10 (CLOSED) 11 - ------------- x 12 Wednesday, March 10, 2004

........

i T gai nin _C e r .............. ... .. . ...

14 PSEG Nuclear 15 Salem, NJ 16 17 The above-entitled interview was conducted 18 at 9:13 a.m.

19 20 BEFORE:

21 SPECIAL AGENT Eileen Neff 22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT Jeff Teator 23 ALSO PRESENT:

24 Project Engineer Ted Wingfield 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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4 1 APPEARANCES:

2 3 On Behalf of PSEG Nuclear and the Witness, 4

5 JEFFRIE J. KEENAN, ESQ.

DC 6 PSEG Assistant General Solicitor 7 Nuclear Business Unit--N21 8 P.O. Box 236 9 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038.

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1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 9:13 a.m.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Today's date is March 4 10th, 2004. The time is approximately 9:13 a.m.

5 Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, with the NRC 6 Office of Investigations, Region 1. Also present from 7 the same office is Sr. Special Agent Jeff Teator, and 8 from the Division of Reactive Projects, Project 9 Engineer Ted Wingfield.

10 What follows is an interview of 11 12 That's correct.

.........

... ..... ... -..

..1-3 -- H SPECIAL

-..-.-----_AGENT-NEFF.: -......- . scurrently

.whoi 14 employed by PSEG Nuclear as the 15 That's correct.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. PSEG Nuclear 17 Assistant General Solicitor Jeffrie Keenan is also 18 present, and Will describe the purpose of his 19 appearance today, shortly.

20 As agreed, this interview is being tape 21 recorded. The location of this interview is the PSEG 22 Nuclear Training Center at Salem, New Jersey.

23 The subject matter of this interview 24 concerns the safety-conscious work *environment at 25 Salem and Hope Creek. it's been NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 explained to you that you're being approached as a 2 witness in regard to the work environment, and your 3 assessment of it, and that there is no potential 4 violation associated with the safety-conscious work 5 environment. You understand that?

6 1 0Yes, I do.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And you agree 8 to appear here voluntarily today?

9 Yes, I do.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What I'd like 11 to do before we get into any other questions is place 12 you under oath.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If you would, raise 15 your right hand, please.

16 Whereupon, 17 18 having been first duly sworn, was examined and 19 testified as follows:

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Jeff, could you 21 please state the purpose of your appearance here 22 today?

23 MR. KEENAN: Yes. My name is Jeff Keenan.

24 I'm counsel for PSEG Services, assistant general 25 solicitor. Today I'm representing PSEG Nuclear and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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-J 1 (rlin a dual capacity. I don't have any reason to 2 believe there's a conflict of interest.

3 We understand we're here to address issues 4 relative to the safety-conscious work environment, 5 both an assessment of strengths and weaknesses, so we 6 appreciate the opportunity to provide our views.

7 We would like to review the transcript 8 when it's available. We understand it will be done 9 under the purview of the NRC.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you.

11 , do you understand the purpose of the 12 representation as explained to you?

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Does your 15 employer require you to have an attorney present when 16 you are questioned by.-- when you're interviewed by 17 the NRC Office of Investigation?

18 Absolutely not.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Were you in 20 any way threatened with any adverse action if you did 21 not request corporate counsel?

22 No.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Will the presence of 24 Mr. Keenan hinder your testimony in any way?

25 4 None whatsoever. 'f NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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0 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Do you 2 understand you have the right to an interview, a 3 private interview with me, at your convenience?

WI . Yes, I do.

4 5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And with that 6 understanding, do you wish to continue at this time?

~Yes, I do.

7 8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

9 Let's establish just some identifying 10 information for you. Date of birth, Social Security 11 number, please.

• • r- *I was born,

• 12

-- 14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Social 15 Security number.

16 17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Home address.

18 19 20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And home 21 telephone, please.

22 23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right. And a 24 brief summary of your education, please.

25 M I'.,W

, Went to th, i ....

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• o 1

1 graduated in 4.a. ~ -In

-wr .. -. fr-~--- ~

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:

3 What did I say?

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:

5 SI wanted to be ten 6 years your iger. Okay, And in I got a

...................

7 a S . ... -

8 LW-9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And your work 10 history, nuclear.

11 Nuclear work history: after 12 graduating from the I

14 15 -7r-16 '~1 I.

17 MR. KEENAN: What year was that when you 18 left the --

19 20 MR. KEENAN: Okay. You said yDid Is ayr r.ab ro 21 Okay..

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We got it 23 clarified.

24 RIP/ Thank you.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

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1 2

3 4

5 6

7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you 21 licensed on Salem?

.*/) No, I was not.

22 23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right. Are you 25 familiar with the letter that the NRC issued -- I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 *:* (es, Iam.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- last January?

3 Uh-huh.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was your 5 assessment of that letter?

6 -My assessment of the letter 7 was that we have had, over the years, some long-8 standing equipment problems that we have not in a 9 timely manner addressed or fixed, and that we also got 10 the same kind of feedback from some surveys we've done 11 of our employees, a synergy survey we did in December, 12 as well as some other surveys and assessments we've 1 --- done,--that-our__people__donL_tfeel, and rightly so, that 14 we don't -- we don't address some equipment problems 15 in a timely fashion, as well as some industrial 16 safety-type problems that were not addressed in a 17 timely fashion. And to me, that was the main -- when 18 I looked at the letter, that was some of the things 19 that were the main drivers to recount behind the 20 letter, and some of the reasons why you all felt it 21 necessary to ask us to investigate that.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There was a point in 23 the letter that had to do with noted disagreements 24 among operators and senior management in terms of how 25 the plant would be moved and directed.

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1U 1--Uh-huh.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you -- do you 3 remember that part of that?

4 19W_.:: W ---

/ Yes.

4/

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How did that strike 6 you? How did you react to that?

7 There was one instance that 8 came to mind for me that made me -- that I was aware 9 of, that could have been part of the basis for that, 10 and that was in starting up Salem Unit 2 last spring, 11 after a trip from some problems that we had in our 12 circulating water system. And there was some 13 disagreement at the time that we were starting up on 14 what -- what necessary equipment we -- was available 15 for starting the plant up at that time.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're saying that 17 was one issue that you recognize may have been a part 18 of that?

19 Uh-huh.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there anything 21 else?

22 That was the only thing --

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there more than 24 one?

25 - That was the thing that came NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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.L _

. into my mind when I read that.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You were the 3 at that point?

4 .) Yes, I was.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Spring '03?

7 Yes; March.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let' s talk about that 9 and--

10 ' OM Sure.

ii SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- the handling of 12 that. In general, if you can set up, I mean, what you 13 were dealing with at the time --

14 ' We -- last spring was -- we 15 measure the amount of detritus, or just debris that's 16 in the river, so that we can ensure that we're ready 17 to handle that at our circulating and service water 18 systems, and we were monitoring that in the spring.

19 It was the heaviest, perhaps, loading we had seen, 20 that we had ever seen, actually, since we've been 21 recording it in the early '90s. So we were having 22 some challenges with the circ-water system. Had no 23 challenge with the service water, which is the 24 safety-related cooling system. And I don't remember 25 the exact date. It was in March. It was a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. /

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J_4 1 particularly bad time for the river grass, and we lost 2 several circulating water pumps in succession, and 3 that caused us to manually take Unit 2 off-line, and 4 had to reduce load on Salem Unit 1.

5 As our practice, we have an immediate 6 response team -- at the time, we called it a TARP team 7 -- investigated what happened. They came up with some 8 recommendations.

9 We also -- whenever we trip the plant, we 10 have a Station Operations Review Committee, SORC, 11 meeting that reviews the response to the trip and 12 post-trip response, and also agrees upon what kind of

-1.3 work we have-to-do .and. what.'s-nece s~sary. to. restart the-.

14 plant back up.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What's the 16 difference between the TARP and the SORC at that 17 point?

18 TARP is an immediate 19 response team that looks at -- is the -- have we taken (

20 the appropriate immediate actions, do we have the 21 right people on site to respond to the events ongoing.

22 SORC is more of an after-the-fact 23 oversight. It's a -- it is a safety committee that 24 advises -- at the time, it advises the ops director, 25 and in our current organization advises me on the safe NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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• °

1.3i 1 and efficient and reliable operation of the plant.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So when did 3 this SORC begin looking at this? How far after the 4 fact?

5 0I don't remember exactly, 6 but it would have been a day or two after the fact.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

8 We have the minutes. We 9 could record minutes for those meetings so we can get 10 the exact dates for the -- if you need that.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You have TARP 12 team reports, too, I think --

13 Uh-huh. Yes, we do.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- on each of 15 the issues.

16 Yes.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

18 Okay.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So you were 20 saying that they had made some recommendations.

21 Yes. And we agreed on --

22 and. I believe we -- at that meeting we set some 23 parameters on what equipment we wanted to make sure 24 was in good condition prior to starting the plant up.

25 Specifically dealing with circ-water, we agreed that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 we wanted to have -- I believe it was five circulating 2 water pumps available when we started the plant up.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Out of six?

4 Out of six. That's correct.

5 And that's above and beyond our procedural 6 requirements. Procedurally, we can actually, I 7 believe, start up at three or four. I don't remember 8 if it was three or four, but something less than five.

9 But that's what we had agreed upon.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was in 11 agreement on that? What group of people are you 12 talking about?

13 - 7) That was -- would have been 14 myself, plus the SORC body, and.-- and I provided that 15 to my boss at that time, which asc_-...

16 17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Can 18 you give us the names who were in agreement that you 19 needed five to start up?

20 ) I would only be guessing to 21 say who was on that.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about 23 titles?

24 It would have been -- on the 25 SORC, we have someone from maintenance, someone from NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 operations, someone from engineering, someone from 2 licensing, someone from QA, someone from chemistry, 3 someone from radiation protection. We have to have at 4 least four, the chairman plus four of those.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And those names 6 would be on the SORC meeting minutes?

7 (i *Yes. We would definitely 8 have those.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

10 MR. KEENAN: If that would be helpful, 11 we'd be glad to provide the SORC meeting minutes.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

13 MR. KEENAN: We do not have those today, 14 though.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. All 16 right.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So are you --

19 in your position as' r you the head of 20 the SORC?

21 At the time, I was a 22 And I should remember this, but I don't 23 remember if I was chairing it or -- I was at the SORC.

24 I don't know if was the 25

\

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lb 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

2 Okay.

.3 If I was not the chairman, 4 it would have beerj , .- _,I i.E,,JL__'.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. So the 6 SORC agreed that they wanted five --

7 Right.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- before 9 starting up Unit 1.

. ... Right.

10 11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And you were 12 about to go into SORC presenting that to your senior 13- -management, -right". ?

14 *i Yeah, that was what we 15 agreed upon. And then we -- we were down a few days 16 while we fixed some equipment. And we were in the 17 process of starting the plant up, and we were at the 18 point where it was -- we -- it would have been the 19 time where we needed a fifth circulator to get to the 20 agreed-upon equipment to start the plant up. We had 21 four, and we had said we wanted five. And there was 22 procedurally, we could have -- we could have 23 started the plant up with four, and there was no 24 nuclear safety impact for starting the plant with four 25 circulators. But we had said we were going to start NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS *1~

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1 with five, so. we were waiting for the fifth 2 circulating water pump.

3 And it was the middle of the night. My --

4 my boss at the time wa- .. ._m.

6 AAequested that we have a conference 7 call to discuss starting the plant up, and on that 8 call was myself,--..

10.

1 .'That's who I recall 12 was on the conference call.

13 In the -- and basically, we had a 14 conversation about why -- should we or shouldn't we 15 start the plant up in the current condition, and there 16 was -- there was disagreement on the phone call as far 17 as starting the plant up. Should we start the plant 18 up with our current configuration of four? Our 19 procedures tell us we can. Yet at the same time, we 20 said we needed five to do that. And in the end,-we 21 decided to start the plan up with four.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where is -- who's on 23 what side here? Where's the disagreement?

24 '- 10- 104s basically 25 asking us "Why aren't you starting the plant up? You NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 have what your procedures say you're required to have 2 to start the plant up." And the shift manager, as I 3 would expect him to, said -- was -- wanted to ensure 4 that we had some redundancy. And some agreed -- we 5 agreed upon a certain plant configuration to start the 6 plant up, and so we were talking about that, the pros 7 and cons of doing both. And in the end, we did' start 8 the plant up with four. It was not an unsafe thing to 9 do.

10 However, I think where -- you know, when 11 I reflected on that, that phone call, what -- I think 12 where it could have gone better was, we shouldn't have 13- had__theonfe-re-ncecall with all those people on the 14 phone call. I should have had -- I should have had 15 the conversation myself withme to a 16 consensus on the direction we were going, and then I 17 could separately have a conversation with the 18 operators to -- to get their input, to discuss the 19 pros and cons of starting up with four circulators 20 versus five, and then proceeding that way.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Why? Why would it 22 have gone better if you had separated it out?

23 _,At the time, I was -- when 24 the phone call came together, my -- my mind was still 25 -- we were going to -- we had said we were going to NEAL R. GROSS , (

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.L Z, 1 wait for five circulators: let's wait, let's get the 2 fifth circulator back, and start the plant up. So I 3 think it's always best to -- if I have people that 4 work for me, before I go ask questions of those that 5 work for them about why aren't they doing or not doing 6 something, I would want to make sure I talked to the 7 person that worked directly for me first, to make sure 8 we are on the same page before -- and actually let 9 them have the conversation with those that work for 10 them. It's chain of command, and you don't -- you 11 can't -- you don't under- -- there's a potential to 12 undermine people's leadership if you go around them

--like -tha~t.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You already had 15 an agreement, though, in SORC, which you were a member 16 of, that you wanted --

17 18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That SORC 19 decided we wanted five before startup.

20 Yeah. And it is still our 21 -- we are able to change our decision, based on 22 current plant conditions, where it's -- and the 23 procedures allowed us to do that. So there was no --

24 no, we didn't violate procedures by doing what we did.

25 There was just a -- the interaction could have gone NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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zu 1 much better. They -- and for me personally, I should 2 have stopped the conversation immediately myself, and 3 then -- and had those separate conversations.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If the interaction --

5 at what point would you have stopped it? I mean, what 6 -- was there something objectionable going on, or in 7 what way could it have been better, the interaction?

8 It could have -- I should 9 have stopped it at the point when I knew that --

10 probably from the -- near the beginning, when I knew 11 that I wasn't -- where sking us to do something 12 that we're -- we haven't -- is different than what our

.13 plan was. So I wasn't yet aligned with where his mind 14 was, so I should have stopped it at that point to make 15 sure that myself and my boss and ere on the same 16 page before -- and then allowed me to have the 17 conversation with the people that worked for me.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It sounds -- based on 19 what we've heard about it, it sounds like it got 20 pretty contentious and pretty frustrating --

21 Uh-huh.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- for some of the 23 individuals present.

24 Yes.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The -- what were you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 hearing? What caused them to get to that level of 2 frustration? I mean, in what way were they being 3 directed or interacted with that caused that angst 4 over it?

I think the -- well, part of 5

6 the angst was that we're changing the plan without, 7 you know, making -- we were basically having a 8 conference call to get the different inputs on 9 changing the plan. It's just an unusual -- it was an 10 unusual phone call, the VP ops through the shift 11 manager all on that same conference call discussing 12 how to change the plan and how we're going to maneuver 13 the plan. .And fro point of view, his position 14 was that if there's no nuclear safety impact or we're 15 within our procedural guidance, if we want additional 16 equipment to maximize reliability of that plant, that 17 becomes -- that decision to either wait or not wait 18 becomes his decision, as opposed to the SRO's 19 decision. The SRO's decision is, you know, if the 20 plant's operating and we have all the required 21 equipment, if we were to lose some -- one of the 22 required pieces of equipment, or tech specs direct 23 shutting the plant down, or in their opinion, based on 24 plant conditions, they needed to take -- to remove the 25 plant from service for nuclear safety reasons, that's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 absolutely the SRO's responsibility, and he's required 2 to take that action. If it was from an additional 3 equipment -- from a reliability point of view,',

4 position was that that was his, his decision to make, 5 and there was contention about that.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Between who?

7 I think between all of us.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So he's -- he's the 9 one person arguing, and he's engaged you and 10 and the shift 11 manager. And all of you, at least four people, are 12 arguing for a comfort level on the safety margin that 13 you're looking for, is what you'retalking about here.

14 You're saying, "Yeah, we meet the minimums, but we 15 would like more."

16 And it wasn't safety margin 17 at all. It was more -- it was plant reliability. We 18 had -- there was no impact to safety margin 19 whatsoever.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Oka y. So it's a 21 comfort level --

• Sure.

22 23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- i s what's being 24 expressed to him?

25 Uh-huh.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's "I would rather 2 have this, as agreed upon, as we all agreed upon" --

3 Right.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- "through a TARP 5 and SORC process" --

• .Right.

6 7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- "that we want 8 that." And yet, in that -- in the face of that, he's 9 saying, "No, you need to start up with four, and this 10 is my-decision; it's a management decision."

11 1,1100MEWYRight.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NESS: It's not a safety 13 decision, sohe'.s__going to..make 14 Right.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He wants it to go 16 that way. Was he listening to the concerns at all?

17 Was he at all responsive to what he was hearing from 18 you?

19 ..... Yeah, he was listening to 20 the -- he was -- and point of view has always 21 been, he -- and I think this was his thought process 22 that night. He always challenges us to think through 23 all aspects of a decision that we're making, in that 24 if -- if it looks like we are coming from the point of 25 view that we wanted to get the plant on-line to -- for (202) 234-4433 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 production reasons, he'll ask us to -- lots of 2 questions about the safety aspect of the decision. If 3 we are -- he wants to make sure we're looking at the 4 decision from all points of view.

5 And I think that's what -- that was what 6 he was doing that night, but I think it came across --

7 the way it came across was, I understood -- I 8 understand that that's what he does, but I don't think 9 that those that worked for me always understood that, 10 and I don't think they understood that that night, 11 that he always is coming from making sure that we're 12 looking at all angles.

13 . . SR. SPECIAL AGENT.TEATOR: Well, how did 14 they view it? I mean, I -- you're not being clear.

• ' 15 ) Okay. How did they v~ew it?

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yeah. How do 17 you think they viewed it? I mean, you said that they 18 may have viewed it a different way.

19 I think they --

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What way?

... I think they viewed it as a 21

22. -- that he was making the decision. There was no --

23 there was not a safety impact, so he was making the 24 decision.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's what he 1/

-

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1 said?

2 Uh-huh.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Isn't that what 4 he said, "This is my call"?

5 I mean, he did say it.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did he?

7 C AYeah.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But I mean, 9 SORC had met a couple days before, correct?

10 Uh-huh.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And you're on 12 SORC. SORC decides, "We're not going to start up

.. ... .. .. .. .. ... . . 1 3 - .- _until-we-ha ve-five,"

14 Uh-huh.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: SORC meeting 16 minutes issued?

17 A

• Yes.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or SORC 19 decision -- it must have been -- was that SORC 20 decision shared with management to 21 22 SUh-huh.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: They had to 24 know?

25 Yes.

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zo 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So I'm thinking 2 this isn't -- this should not be a surprise to 3 that SORC had decided, "We need 4 five to start up." Right?

5 %wo. AM..... ) Yes, that's true.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

7 After SORC made that decision, did you get any 8 push-back fro t or e this phone 9 call? -

/

10 No.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why not? Do 12 you know?

-Why-didI-not.get-push-_back2 ...

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, I'm just 15 -- you know, I'm wondering what precipitates the call 16 then. The SORC decision is known at that level, two 17 days before, two -- a couple days before, according to 18 you. Right?

19 I don't -- I don't know if 20 it was one or two days, but, yeah.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

22 We made it known.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, they had 24 other equipment they had to fix before they could go 25 to startup?

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nUh-huh.

1 2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So the SORC 3 decision is out there. Is this the first time you had 4 push-back from on this issue during this 5

6 phone call?

aes.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you know why 8 he made the call, what precipitated him calling this 9 group of people together to discuss this?

10 No. I don'It know what 11 caused him to do it, no.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I mean, you 13 made -- you made a point that it was a plant 14 reliability issue, not a safety issue.

" ' i *Uh-huh-.

15 16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But isn't plant 17 reliability really a safety issue? I mean, if 18 something happens with plant reliability, that could 19 challenge the operators in the control room, correct?

• That's true.

20 21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. So 22 in the end, really, could it not be a safety issue, 23 plant reliability? Or isn't it a safety issue? I'll 24 ask it that way, so it's more clear.

25 Is plant reliability a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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S .U 1 safety issue?

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yeah.

3 Yes, plant reliability -- if 4 the plant's not reliable, and there's lots of 5 transients, then that is a safety issue, yes.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is that where 7 SORC was coming from in making their decision to want 8 to have five before beginning startup?

9 1 SORC was coming from the 10 point of view that we wanted to minimize the 11 challenges to the operators.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Okay.

13 And during this conference call was that position 14 explained to 15 I don't remember if it was 16 explained explicitly, but that was understood.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was the --

18 okay, I want to get back to who the disagreement was 19 between during this phone call. Who was--

20 *talking on one side, correct?

21 Uh-huh.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: He is 23 challenging the group.

24 h-huh.

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1 for the group? Is it you? Is it 2 I think it was the -- I 3 don't know. Like I said, I don't remember if it was 4 *that was the on the phone, 5 but it was the ,,-[ Jr iand M#m the shift 6 manager.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you all in 8 the same room together, and 1was someplace 9 else?

10 I was on the phone.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Withl" 12 resent with you?

13 .)Not with me, no. I was on 14 the phone at my house.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh, okay. All 16 right. You did say it was in the middle of the night.

17 I -huh.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Sometime at 19 night. Okay. So who's putting forward the group's 20 position to 21 9 Again, I don't remember if 22 it was . It was the on the 23 call that I had two. It might have( I'm not 24 sure. I believe it was that person, though.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 9

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1 mentioned(( was on the call. You didn't mention 2 another I don't think.

3 1b _ I believe I said that there 4 was the shift manager 5 I don't know for sure if it was 6 I think that's what I said.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But you're 8 clear that it was the )talking?

9 aYes.

1i0 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Discussing it 11 wi th nlr, N; 12 Yes.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did it get 14 heated between those two individuals, this discussion?

15 "Heated" is my word.

16 Heated? I would say yes.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. In 18 what way? What was said?

19 I don't remember the exact 20 words that would cause me to say it was heated, other 21 than there was disagreement.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Did it 23 become personal betweenA 24 No, I don't believe it 25 became personal.

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_;J_

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was it insulting to 2 anybody?

3 MI -- nothing sticks out in 4 my head that would cause me to say it was insulting.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall 6 anybody's manhood being challenged, in terms of making 7 this decision to run with four or five circulators?

8 In that way, insulting?

9 I don't recall that.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall 11 anything close to that?

~No, I don It.

12 13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were any names used, 14 any kind of name-calling, any profanity?

15 ) I don't remember 16 specifically if there was profanity.v method --

17 or ften used profane words in his conversation, 18 so that not occurring here, not sticking out in my 19 mind, doesn't -- it could or couldn't have happened.

20 Probably there were some profane words used, but it 21 doesn't stick out in my mind, because that was part of 22 his normal way of talking.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you recall 24 if the 4.got up and left the phone call?

25 I believe he did, for part NEAL R. GROSS C' COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 of the phone call.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Excuse me?

3 P I believe he did, by -- as 4 part of the phone call.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Believe he did 6 what?

7 Left, left the phone call, 8 for part of the phone call.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you know 10 what caused that person to leave the phone call? Was 11 there something said?

12 I don't remember 13 specifically what caused them to leave, no.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How would you 15 be in a vantage point to know if somebody left the 16 call or not, I mean, if you were participating 17 by--

18 I don't know if he said it 19 or -- they were in the shift manager's office, I know, 20 and I -- I do remember knowing that he left for a 21 while and came back, but I don't -- I don't know how 22 I knew that, if he said he's leaving or -- I don't 23 know.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you have some 25 follow-up with the 9 on this, do you recall, NEALR.GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 regarding that meeting?

2 *_We talked about it, yeah.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And what was 4 talked about?

5 We talked about the -- just 6 how the conversation -- I was -- the main follow-up I 7 had was that I -- I think it was my responsibility to 8 end the call much sooner than -- right at the 9 beginning of the conversation, so, as I said, I can 10 get in line with my bosses and then have a separate 11 conversation with the people what work for me. We 12 shouldn't have that debate in that -- in that -- on a 13 conference call like that. And that's what I talked 14 about with him. I said -- in the end, we talked 15 about, you know, was it -- from a plant safety point 16 of view, was it safe to start the plant up? And we 17 all agreed after the fact that it was. Before, we did 18 agree that it was safe to do, but we should have had 19 that -- it shouldn't have been a decision that we make 20 in a conference call with that -- with that number of 21 people in the call.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did the 23 ,A....1V4"Ntand after -- I guess the next day, did 24 theli-in your presence to talk about 25 the phone call the night before?

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1 That's possible. I don't 2 remember that. That's possible, but I don't remember 3 that.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you direct 5 the - j~and apologize?

6 No.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You're positive 8 of that?

• Yes.

9 10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you talk to --

11 I think I asked him ;- I 12 said -- I think I said that they should talk about the 13 interaction. They should talk, you know, make -- talk 14 through how the conversation went. I think I told him 15 to do that, but I didn't tell him to apologize, no.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now, why did you do 17 that? Was that a concern that you had, or was that 18 coming to you from 19 That was me,. I believe. I 20 wasn't directed fronp to have him talk to him, no.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was the 22 23 Im thinking -itm was t u 24 Again, I'm -- I'm sure it was )9La&

Well, not sure.

25 I think'- I'm pretty sure it wa 9&fon NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS L 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 SR. SPECIAL-AGENT TEATOR:6 2

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're thinking --

4 your recollection is, you weren't prompted by

• 5 call him with an 6 apology?

7 No.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But you thought it 9 might have been a good idea for those two to talk --

'~Yes.

10 11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- about the 12 interaction from the night before.

13 Uh-huh.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you give him any 15 direction on specifically what they needed to -- you

.16 know, to hash out there?

17 &I don't recall that I did.

18 Just that -- just from a -- how can we improve and how 19 can we do it better next time?

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was his reaction 21 to that, to your suggestion?

22 I don't remember the 23 specific reaction.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's go back 25 to the phone call, if we could, for a few minutes,

/

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30 1 okay?

2 Sure.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can we just do one 4 thing on that phone call? What time of day is this?

5 You're saying middle of the night?

6 That's my recollection.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Not earlier, like 8 dinnertime, 6:00, 7:00 o'clock at night? Middle of 9 the night? Did you get woken up with a phone call for 10 this?

i! . I don't think I was woken 12 up. It was at night. If it was around dinner, that's 13 possible. I know I was at home. I'm sure we can 14 figure out the time, 'cause it was a AT&T conference 15 call. I'm sure we could get the records for that, if 16 that's necessary.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Sorry to have 18 interrupted you on that.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'll talk about 20 the call, too. How long do you think the call lasted?

21 Around --

22 I would say probably forty-23 five minutes or so.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. At what 25 point during the call did the decision change to allow NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

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1 the plant to start up with four circulators instead of 2 five, which is what SORC had decided previously?

3 The decision was -- the 4 ultimate decision was toward the end of the phone 5 call.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And how 7 did -- how was that decision reached? On what basis 8 was that decision reached?

9 ) The basis was that the shift 10 manager agreed that it was within 'our procedural 11 guidance, and from a nuclear safety point of view, 12 there was not a challenge to nuclear safety by not 13 having that fifth circulator.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Hadn't SORC 15 already weighed all of that, those possibilities, and 16 come to a conclusion that they wanted to start with 17 five, though? Hadn't that already been weighed and a 18 decision reached?

19 SORC's role was to advise.

20 At the time, it would have been( 1')

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That the --

22 what?

23 9 SORC's role is to advise.

24 SORC doesn't make the decisions.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

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1 SORC advises the operations 2 director.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

4 Which-- that's what SORC 5 advised. It is still -- we still -- as a management 6 team, we're able to change, change the decision.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. I 8 understand that.

9 Had something changed physically in the 10 plant which made it more wise or -- to start with four 11 instead of five? Had something changed physically in 12 the plant?

I don't -

13 14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or in the 15 grassing, or anything?

16 No.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So as part of the 18 SORC, it -was considered that this -- what you 19 described as a particularly bad part of the season, in 20 this part of March, was that documented? That was 21 known? That was -- that was part of the SORC's 22 decision, what you were dealing with at that 23 particular time?

24

• I believe so.

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1 by your senior management?

2 uh-huh, yes.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Had that 4 condition changed up to this phone call?

5 It was -- that time period 6 was a particularly bad time period for grassing. It 7 was -- the peak had come down before we started up.

8 It was -- the grassing was better, yes.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How much?

10 I--we have the data. I 11 don't know exactly, myself, right now, but we do have 12 the data.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. I'm 14 trying to get to what caused the decision to be 15 changed during this phone call to allow startup with 16 four. Can you get us to that, and tell us how that 17 happened, why it happened?

18 (( asked that --

19 challenged us to look at what was re- -- what was 20 required to start the plant up, and we reevaluated 21 what we needed, and we agreed that that was -- that 22 four circulators was okay. We reassessed the plant 23 conditions and reassessed the equipment necessary.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were you comfortable 25 with that?

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1 I was comfortable with the 2 equipment lineup and starting the plant up, yes. I 3 was not comfortable in that whole conversation. As I 4 stated, I should have -- I should have personally 5 handled it completely differently.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What made you 7 change your comfort level, though? You were a member 8 of the SORC --

9 *Uh-huh.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- that came to 11 a conclusion, or an advisement that we need -- we 12 think we should start with only -- with five. What 13 made you change your position? I mean, you're theo 14 15 . Right. When I looked at it 16 from the point of view tha fwas presenting, which 17 was, you know, it was my responsibility and SRO's 18 responsibility to operate *the plants in accordance 19 with the procedures safely, and to protect the health 20 and safety of the public from operating a nuclear 21 plant, and if there is economic or reliability

22. decision on top of that, to make that -- it's his 23 decision. So when I looked at it from that point of 24 view, I looked at what was necessary to safely operate 25 the plant, and I looked at it from a different point NEALR. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 of view.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did() as 3 part of his argument, argue that it was an economic 4 decision?

5 Yes.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What did he 7 say?

8 I don't remember the exact 9 words, but it was something along the lines of, it's 10 a -- again, the procedures say you can do it. It's --

11 from a nuclear safety point of view, it's okay to do 12 it. Additional equipment above and beyond that for 13 reliability is -- it's his decision to make, because 14 it's a reliability and economic impact, or decision.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But it really 16 wasn't his decision to make, becauseJ 'had 17 to make the decision. Is that correct?

18 ( *I -had to make the 19 decision because he was directing the operators, yes.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. So 21 whose call was in 22 the end?

23 In the end, if A"did not 24 believe that it was the right thing to do, it was --

25 it's his decision, to operate the plant.

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• 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Then, in your 2 opinion, did put any undue pressure upon him 3 or others to -- during this conference call, to start 4 up with four instead of five?

5 "Undue pressure" in the 6 sense that that was the wrong forum for that decision 7 to be made, the conversation to be had. That should 8 have -- again, I should have stopped that conversation 9 right at the beginning, got in line with my bosses, 10 had a separate conversation with 9 and the 11 operators to get their input, and approach it 12 differently. So, was there undue pressure? It was

--1-3 . --.-undue-pressure-in_-that it was _- týh conversation was 14 -- it was just the wrong forum for that, for that 15 conversation and decision.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The wrong 17 forum, or the wrong things being said? Which was it?

18 9 I. think I said the wrong 19 forum. That's what I believe.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh, I know.

21 Well, I'm asking you the question: were there wrong 22 things also said during that call that shouldn't have 23 been said in front of these people? And if so, what 24 were they?

25 M, afl You may -- you asked NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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• o 234-4433

1 questions about some things that I don't recall, so --

2 I don't remember a wrong thing being said like that, 3 so I don't recall that.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If you had had a 5 separate conversation witi 6 and then gone to your shift management, 7 would anything have come out differently?

8 W I think it would have -- I 9 think we would have, in the end, made the same 10 decision. I think that there wouldn't have been the 11 perception that, you know aking this decision, 12 and I think the relationships between everyone would

_13- -not have -- there was some -- there was some damage to 14 some of the relationships between people in that 15 conversation. And I think that would not have 16 happened, had we handled the whole decision-making 17 differently.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where was the damage?

19 Between who?

20 tip I think -- I think all 21 people involved in the conversation. Me, personally, 22 I think I grew from it, and that I learned that I 23 needed to interject and intervene sooner to -- if that 24 were to happen to again, to stop it. I just think, as 25 you said and as I said, it was a contentious NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 discussion, that I think everyone recognized after the 2 fact that we shouldn't have had that -- made that 3 decision on a conference call like that.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you have 5 conference -- conversations wit 6 afterward on how he felt about it?

7 I remember talking to -

8 about the -- about his assessment of, was it safe to 9 do, and all that. And he agreed that it was.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Moving forward with 11 the four?

12 Yeah.

__ -13 .. -SPECIAL AGENT-. NEFF: .What. about in terms 14 of how he felt as being part of that conference call, 15 any pressure felt by him on the decision-making? Did 16 he weigh in with any concerns there?

17 I don't remember him saying 18 that to me. I remember telling him that I should have 19 ended the call sooner, and we should have had a 20 separate conversation. But I don't remember that.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That he felt any 22 pressure because he was a part of ..

23 conversation, and what he was pushing for?

24 I don't remember him saying 25 that. I don't remember.

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1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You don't remember.

2 Ie could have, but I don't H

3 remember him saying that.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let me ask a 5 question here.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Uh-huh.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Can you think 8 of any other occasions where -

• disagreed 9 pith a SORC decision on what equipment was needed 10 before restart?

11 No.

12 MR. WINGFIELD: Can I ask a technical

--13 question about the grassing and the number of 14 circ-pumps? What -- so you went ahead and started up 15 with four, right?

16 Uh-huh.

17 MR. WINGFIELD: If you lost one, what 18 would the impact be? Was it a procedural requirement, 19 or is like the effect on vacuum that would, you know, 20 drive you to taking the units off, or --

21 At the time, our procedures, 22 if we were at 100 percent power and we'd either take 23 one out or lose one, then it's not zero impact, and we 24 lose a couple megawatts. If we were to lose -- the 25 procedural requirement is, if we were to lose two on NEAL R. GROSS K COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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11U 1 the same condenser, at the time, it said we had to 2 reduce power immediately to 850 megawatts. After 3 that, it's based on -- it was based on condenser 4 parameters that -- and then it's a operator decision 5 to make, whether to take the unit off-line or not.

6 MR. WINGFIELD: Okay. I was just curious 7 about the mechanics of it.

8 Okay.

9 MR. WINGFIELD: And the -- and like you 10 were saying, the -- where SORC was, and the potential 11 to lose one of the four, and that's why they went with 12 five, but procedurally it was allowed for four. And 13 I just wanted to get an understanding of how far apart 14 was that thought process.

15 Okay.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Of the four 17 that you had that night available --

18 Uh-huh.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay? Were, of 20 those -- do you remember if any of those were in 21 danger of losing one of those? Was there a question 22 about one of them?

23 I don't recall any. I don't 24 recall any.

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.= I 1 said something about if you had two in the same 2 condenser.

3 .p Yeah.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was that -- was 5 that an issue during this conference call? Were there 6 two in the same condenser that were not operating?

7 / I don't recall that. That's 8 possible, but I don't recall that.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

10 MR. WINGFIELD: Do you remember where --

11 which unit was this? Was this 2 or 1?

12 MR. This is 2.

13 MR. WINGFIELD: Do you remember where Unit 14 1 1.7= = ')

15 Unit 1 was at -- I don't 16 know at that -- at the conference call time, what --

17 where Unit 1 was. But in the same time period we had 18 to reduce load on Unit 1 because of some challenges 19 with circ-water. Unit 1, now, that season -- and 20 traditionally, Unit 1 is more impacted from grass just 21 because of the nature of where the intake structure 22 is, and we had had to do some down-powers on Unit 1 23 because of grass. Unit 2 was -- actually was 24 performing very well up until the point where we --

25 that night, where we had to take it off-line.

..- ~ -~

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1 MR. WINGFIELD: Okay.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How many 3 circulators wa* Unit 1 operating with at that point?

4 Do you remember?

5 IWO; No, I don't remember.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Complete on that 7 issue, then? Okay.

8 One of the things that you mentioned was 9 that I'll call it style -- was that 10 he would challenge you to think through all aspects of 11 your decision, and that --

12 ) Uh-huh. He would take the 13 opposing view, basically, to make sure you' re thinking 14 from all points of view.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So if you're 16 -- in this instance, this particular instance, which 17 is the only one that you're saying came to mind when 18 you saw the letter in terms of potential damage, that 19 was done for operator disagreements with senior 20 management --

21 22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The NRC letter, I'.m 23 referring to. This is the only instance that comes to 24 mind. What about in terms of, here you're taking the 25 conservative position and he's coming at you with a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 less conservative --

2 Uh-huh.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- position. What 4 are instance where he took the more conservative 5 position?

6 - On that same -- in the same 7 time period, like I said, I mentioned on Unit 1 that 8 we had to do some down-powers because of circulators 9 and -- let me think through the specifics.

10 We had lost two. It's around that time 11 frame, but it was before then, I know, but as to the 12 specific dates, I don't recall. We had lost two 13 circulators, forced us to do a down-power to 850 14 megawatts. We did some maintenance, got one of the 15 circulators back, was in the process of still doing 16 the maintenance on the -- the sixth one, and we made 17 the decision to raise power back up. And he 18 challenged us at that point: "Well, why did you make 19 that decision when you didn't have a full complement 20 of circulators available to support 100 percent 21 operation?" And so he challenged us from that point 22 of view.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You had five?

24 Yeah, that's --

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Maintenance on the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 sixth?

2 Maintenance on the sixth.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Ongoing?

4 Right.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you would need 6 how many for 100 percent? Do you have to have the 7 sixth?

8 . Have to have five.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You have to have 10 five?

11 .- Right.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you had 13 lo Well, I mean, it could 14 actually be at four, if the two circulators that are 15 out are not on the same condenser.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: While at 100 percent?

17 ' Correct.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. But you 19 started back up, so you're not at full power when you 20 have -- you're starting --

21 We had -- we lost two in the 22 same condenser, forcing us to reduce load to 850 23 megawatts. We got one of them back, and we raised 24 power, which we're allowed to do, while we were still 25 doing the repairs on the sixth one.

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J).

1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And who was in 2 that discussion?

3 IW AM wwj and myself.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who?

5 and 6 myself.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:

8 right?

9 Yeah.

3.0 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And this was before 11 the other incident that we just talked about?

12 ) Yes, it was. Yes. I don't 13 recall what it would have been sometime between 14 January and March of last year.

15 And other things that are similar to that 16 would be -- I'm trying to think what outage -- coming 17 out of a refueling outage. I don't recall the 18 specific equipment, but we had to -- we always make 19 decisions, okay, what -- we did all the work we had 20 xlanned to do. There was a couple of outstanding 21 items that we were not able to get completed, still 22 meeting all our procedural requirements and tech 23 specs. We have to decide, is it the right thing to do 24 to continue starting the plant up or not, without this 25 equipment. And he challenged us, are we making the NEAL R. GROSS (202)

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1 right decision by starting the plant up with this 2 equipment still out.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Going back to that --

4 And he'd come at it at both 5 ends.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That -- the other 7 challenge, with the circulators?

8 Uh-huh.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At the point that 10 you're talking to him, has the startup occurred with 11 the circulators, with the five circulators?

12 . Raising it back up to 100 13 percent?

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

15 It wasn't a startup. It was 16 just raising power.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you were raising 18 power?

19 PYes. We had already done 20 it.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You had already done 22 it.

23 MN Uh-huh.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then he asked 25 about why you would, with the number available?

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1Right.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then in this 3 other -- in this instance, I guess what I'm looking at 4 is -- I'm looking at this a little differently. The 5 decision's already made, the movement's already taken 6 place, right, and then he's questioning it?

7 Uh-huh.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In this other 9 instance that we're looking at, the challenges that 10 you were getting was before you made the decision.

11 You were holding up, right? You were holding up --

12 Uh-huh.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- the movement of 14 the plant?

15 Uh-huh.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the challenge was 17 to go and to move it --

18Yes.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- with the less 20 number. But in this case, you had already done it, so 21 after the fact, he's asking you --

22 Yes.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: was it a wise 24 thing to do, with the number that you had. He asked 25 about that?

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1 ~Yeah.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So, in the 3 refuel outage with the outstanding items, is he 4 questioning after the fact, or before the decision's 5 being made is he raising these challenges? What's the 6 timing there?

7 OI think -- I think that was 8 before, before we actually maneuvered the plant.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What was the 10 particular item then? What was outstanding?

ii -I don't recall the 12 particular items.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the outage, which 14 one was that?

15 - That would have been, I 16 think, the one in the fall of 2002, I believe, as I --

17 SPECIALAGENT NEFF: Fall of 2002?

18 That would be the 1 outage.

19 Yeah, Unit 1, fall 2002.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Any others?

21 *9Those are the -- what come 22 -- that's what come to mind.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I've got a 24 follow-up for you, on the -- on the one where\

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1 all the circulators operating --

2 ) Uh-huh.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you come 4 back down in power based on his challenge and 5 questioning of that?

6 No, because it was -- there 7 was -- that was in the past.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, how long 9 into the startup did he raise the question?

10 I don't recall the exact 11 timing.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: A couple of 13 hours? A day? Two days?

14 - It was about, I think, the 15 next day.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The next day.

17 All right.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have anything 19 else on that, Jeff?

20 I want to go into something that I read.

21 We had the opportunity to review your interview with 22 Winston and Strahn (phonetic), which was April of 23 2003.

24 Okay.

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1 come out in that interview.

2 Uh-huh.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And it looks as 4 though -- I'm just showing you that. You had a chance 5 to review it?

6

• Yeah.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And there were some 8 minor penciled-in corrections on here.

9 Okay.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But there was 11 something toward the end that we wanted to ask you 12 about. You talk about "This recent trip that we 13 manually did on the Salem" -- and I'm reading directly 14 from page 48 of this particular transcript -- "recent 15 trip that we manually did on the Salem Unit 2 on the 16 29th." And I believe that's the 29th of March, 2003.

17 Wo" Okay.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: "And the full support 19 of all levels and management with the decision to trip 20 Salem Unit 2 is a testament that we do take nuclear 21 safety very seriously, and nuclear safety comes first.

22 There was no question with. regard to the shift 23 manager's decision to take the unit off-line. In 24 fact, after the fact, I personally congratulated the 25 individual, as well as the senior vice-president of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 operations. sent him a letter expressing 2 his thanks and congratulations. They fully met all 3 our expectations with regard to nuclear safety." And 4 then you state, "That's in stark contrast to the 5 history of Salem in the early '90s."

6 Who is the SMAM-G__N here that we're 7 talking about?

8 9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. The fact that 10 the shift manager's decision to take the unit off-11 line, and that he fully met your expectations with 12 regard to nuclear safety, is that so unusual that it 13 requires a special recognition from the VP of ops and 14 from you at that particular time? It seems like it's 15 an unusual event that you're pointing out to them that 16 "He did this, he did what he's supposed to do" --

17 hhh 18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- "but I and the VP 19 recognized it," at that time frame.

20 I think why it's pertinent 21 for Salem is because of the Salem history, in that --

22 April 7th, 1994, before I was here, Salem was famous 23 for doing the exact opposite: the shift manager 24 actually doing things himself in the field to keep the 25 unit on the line. And this, it's noteworthy, in that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 we've come a long way from that, and the -- the 2 culture has completely changed, and the full support 3 that he made the right decisions, that's why it was 4 noteworthy.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's about ten 6 years after the early to mid-'90s issue which you 7 mentioned, though, right?

8 Uh-huh.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It just strikes 10 us as a little unusual, reading that a guy does what 11 he's supposed to do, and he's recognized for just 12 doing his job. It just strikes us the opposite, kind 13 of.

14 Okay.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was it so --

16 was that in '03?

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yeah.

18 Yeah.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was that type 20 of behavior by a shift manager so unusual in '03 that 21 you felt it needed to be recognized the way it was?

22 I mean, it's way -- well-removed from the --

23 Yeah, I can see -- I'm 24 thinking --

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- April '94.

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1 '7- Thinking from your point of 2 view, I can see how you're -- why you're asking that 3 question. Every time, as the -- I wasn't 4 the for about a year, so there was some-,

5 time, again -- I think I'd been for about:.c.

6 six months. I'm always looking for opportunities to-7 7 reinforce when people are meeting my expectations, and 8 that was one of them.

9 MR. WINGFIELD: Was there a lack of --

10 like a historic lack of -- say, 2000 to 2003, like a 11 lack of recognition, and this --

12 We haven't --

131.. .... MR. WINGFIELD: that was the intent, to --

14 We have done a poor job of 15 recognizing our -- recognizing employees over the 16 years, yes.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And was a 18 vehicle thatyou saw to --

19 Yeah.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: try and 21 change that?

22 k ,Yeah. Absolutely.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you have 24 conversations with Was that coordinated 25 with him, what you did there? .. (

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1 SI -- hmm. I don't recall.

2 I think that he told me he was going to write a 3 letter,. that I had already -- I believe I had already 4 met with the crew and said, you know, I appreciated 5 them doing what they're doing, they did the right 6 thing, met all my expectations. And I think"'j told 7 me he was going to write the man a letter saying the 8 same thing. I don't know that we coordinated or not.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's talk 10 about the event a little bit. Was the decision to 11 shut the plant down agreed upon efore it 12 actually happened?

• No.

13 14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The plant was 15 operating and something came up, and they did an 16 unscheduled shutdown. Is that happened?

17 Yes.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Let's just 20 take a quick break, all right? It's 10:14 a.m.

21 (Whereupon, at 10:14 a.m. off the record 22 until 10:32 a.m.)

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We're back on 24 the record. It's approximately 10:32, after a brief 25 break. I NEAL R. GROSS x~~Th ~

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1 j*an area I'd like to cover now with 2 you, along the'lines of disagreements you may not have 3 been aware of, at any point did you become aware that 4 there were disagreements or there was some level of 5 concern expressed by the senior operators over -- and 6 this would be between them and senior management --

7 regarding the threshold for making operability calls?

~No.

8 9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You don't recall 10 anything that falls into that?

11 The threshold for making 12 operability calls?

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yeah.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Maybe feeling 15 that something had to be proven inoperable before an 16 action could be taken?

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Or the length of the 18 discovery phase that was to be involved?

19 7 I don't remember anything in 20 specific about that.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. The -- how 22 about this term? Had you ever heard this before?

23 It's a quote, but I'm talking to the effect of "Why 24 are you holding the plant hostage?"

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1 before.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And how have you 3 heard it?

4 * " I don't remember a specific 5 incident, but I can remember that term being used when 6 -- if a piece of equipment comes back and it passes 7 all its testing, but maybe the job site doesn't meet 8 all the maintenance standards as far as either 9 cleanliness or preservation of equipment, I mean, we 10 will at times say, "Well, okay, we're not considering 11 it back to operations until it does meet all the 12 standards, and as such, we can't move the plant until 13 it is -- has met that standard." And someone might 14 say, "Well, why are you holding the plant hostage for 15 one group of people, not -- you know, the equipment's 16 operable, it'll meet all its design and safety 17 functions. Why hold the plant hostage while we clean 18 up the area?" Or something.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF- Someone where?

20 Someone might use the term. Who would use the term?

21 I don't remember a specific 1) 22 person using that term.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you --

24 . But that's the context that 25 I have heard it in the past.

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was that when 2 you were in the maintenance arena that you heard that?

3 Because you talked about maintenance type of things.

4 Yeah. I don't remember. I 5 can't tell you I remember a specific piece of 6 equipment and time when I've heard that, but I have 7 heard that, and that was the context of how I heard --

8 I've heard that. Or an inci- --

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Or an incident or a 10 particular --

11iii -_-) Actually, I can talk about 12 an incident that occurred just a couple of days ago, 13 or yesterday. We've had -- as to circ-water, we've 14 had a circ-water pump out of service since before 15 Christmas because of a problem. And we did a lot of 16 work to fix it, and we got it back to operations two 17 days ago. And the shift manager wouldn't release it 18 because the job site didn't meet the standards, and --

19 and we had a big discussion between maintenance and 20 ops, and I was involved, and we kind of -- we met half 21 way, and we got a lot of the area cleaned up, and 22 maintenance agreed to continue cleaning the area up as 23 we started the pump up. So that was kind of a -- the 24 same kind of discussion: are we holding the plant 25 hostage to make a point? Is that the right thing to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 do? That kind of discussion.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was that piece 3 of equipment causing the plant to not be at 100 4 percent power?

5 No, but it did cause us --

6 that part is -- 13 Alpha and Bravo are two circulators 7 in the same condenser, and I talked about if we had 8 two out on the same condenser, we'd have to reduce 9 power. With the 13 Bravo being out since before 10 Christmas, every -- particularly in the spring, every 11 three to four days we have to remove those 12 circulators, partic- -- 13 Alpha and Bravo tend to be 13 the worst, because they're at the end of the intake 14 structure. We have to remove those every few days to 15 clean the tube-sheet of the condenser. So with that 16 being out of service, every time we took 13 Alpha out, 17 we would have to reduce power to 83 percent. But we 18 were not -- we were not in -- you know, within any 19 near-term need to do that.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How about in terms of 21 the specific use? And this would be from senior 22 management, and this is either from._

23 ' ...... .. \ In terms of -- and the 24 way it was applied and defined for us is, "holding the 25 plant hostage" meant operations is making some sort of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 an unreasonable demand, and it was -- the term 2 "holding the plant hostage" was used by senior 3 management, one of those three individuals. Do you 4 recall anything that goes to that?

5 I can't remember a specific, 6 but again, it's -- that wouldn't surprise me if one of 7 them said that.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Another thing 9 that comes out through some of these interviews is in 10 operations, particularly at Salem, there was a concern 11 at the ops management level that when senior 12 management is questioning you, it's not that you're 13 explaining your position to them in terms of what you 14 plan to do, it's that you're defending your position.

15 Do you recall instances that would tend to support 16 something like that, that your senior operators felt 17 to be on the defensive against senior management? I 18 know we discussed the one incident.

19 If it's -- to me, it was, I 20 mean, if you get questions, you're always defending 21 your position, so -- or explaining your position. I

.22 don't -- I mean, I wasE 'mfora year, and 23 whether I'm defending my position or explaining my 24 position, I don't --

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1 between the two?

2 I see a distinction, but --

3 MR. KEENAN: Oh, okay.

4 I mean, if I work for Jeff, 5 and he is asking me to talk about a decision I made, 6 I mean, I'm explaining it and defending it at the same 7 time. I mean, I do see a distinction, but --

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did any of your 9 licensed operators express that distinction to you, 10 that they thought they were having to -- instead of 11 explaining their position, they were having to more 12 defend it? Did your people come to you with "This is 13 how I feel"?

14 kl Not that I recall.

.-

15 MR. KEENAN: Back on the explaining, is it 16 that the same -- you're using the same words, it's 17 just the emotional baggage or background or whatever 18 that's behind it, when you're using the same words?

19 ) Yeah, that's how I would 20 differentiate it.

21 MR. KEENAN: Okay.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Do you have 23 more on the machine there, Jeff?

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No, I just --

25 1 guess a little follow-up to just some of these K..-

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0I 1 things.

2 Can you recall if there were any occasions 3 where you participated in a debate or a potential 4 safety issue or equipment issue for an inordinate 5 amount of time, where the issue was real black and 6 white, yet the debate continued more than it should 7 have, excessive debate?

8 Excessive debate. Well, it 9 -- after the fact, oftentimes we'll look back at 10 things and say, you know, in looking back, we had 11 information that, had we recognized it at the time, we 12 should have made a decision quicker.

13 What comes to mind there is, in this past 14 fall we had a feed reg. Valve 14BF19 was -- ended up 15 being, because of a foreign material -- a piece of 16 foreign material was stuck in position, and it was --

17 had we recognized -- the point at which we recognized 18 that it was immovable, it put us into a certain tech 19 spec, or actually put us outside of tech specs, which 20 put us in Tech Spec 303, which gave us an hour to shut 21 the plant down. And it took us about ten to twelve 22 hours to come to a conclusion. At that -- you know, 23 in the heat of the moment, while we were looking at 24 it, evaluating and troubleshooting it, we had --

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1 it was a control problem, and the valve would still 2 perform its safety function, which is to fail closed 3 on a feed-water isolation. And as soon as we 4 concluded that, no, it's not, it's actually immovable 5 and won't close, that we entered the action statement 6 to shut the plant down. Because that was the time 7 when, after the fact, we looked back and said, yeah, 8 if we would have put these three or four things 9 together, we should have made our conclusion sooner.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did anybody 11 raise that? Do you recall anybody raising that issue 12 during the course of that debate?

13 Not during the debate.

14 After the fact, one of the operators, you know, one of 15 the reactor operators, told me that he thought we 16 should have made the decision a lot sooner.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: After the fact.

18 Q Uh-huh.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did that person 20 offer that up during the debate?

21 Not to me. I don't -- no, 22 I did not hear that during the debate.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about an 24 issue where there has been some type of debate, and 25 people think it's a clear issue where this piece of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 equipment is inoperable, yet the debate continues 2 beyond that, when people have already reached that 3 conclusion? Can you think of an instance where that 4 occurred?

5 Nothing specific comes to my 6 mind. We all -- oftentimes we will have a piece of 7 equipment that's degraded, and they'll -- you know, 8 we'll try to look at all angles and make a decision.

9 So there might be somebody that says, "Hey, I think 10 it's inoperable because of this," and then, you know, 11 we talk about what do we see, and --

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I guess what 13 I'm --

14 It's the licensed operator 15 that makes that decision.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. I guess 17 what I'm thinking about is the group below senior ops 18 management level, Wevel, 19 that the group below that had reached a conclusion 20 that "Hey, you know, this piece of equipment is 21 inoperable, it can't perform its function," and yet 22 the debate continues via that upper level, 23 challenging, continuing to challenge.

24 t For the operability of a 25 tech-spec-required piece of equipment?

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1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yeah.

2 No. I don't recall anything 3 like that.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

5

• O ~It is the licensed 6 operator's responsibility to make that decision.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And whether the -- I 8 don't have any other incidents.

9 Ted, do you have anything further on that?

10 MR. WINGFIELD: Nope.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: , I guess what 12 we'd like to ask you at this point is, you know about 13 the letter. You've read the letter?

14 )uh-huh.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You hear the kind of 16 concerns that we're exploring with you here today. Is 17 there something we haven't talked about, something we 18 just didn't get to, or something that might be 19 relevant that we should talk about in terms of this 20 inquiry, that goes to the kind of issues that we're 21 talking about here, and that the -- the damage in the 22 work environment that has been noted to date? Is 23 there anything that we've not covered?

24 I don't think so. I look at 25 -- I look at the things that we're doing, that we've NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 done since came and realigned the organization, 2 the pers onnel changes we've made, as all -- they're 3 all thin gs that I think are going right at some of the 4 issues t] hat you're investigating, that we're focusing 5 on fixing the equipment, that -- making sure we're 6 resolvin g our long-standing equipment issues. The VP 7 of ops, .low is much more -- is a -- has 8 a comple tely different personality than the previous 9 one had.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In what way?

11 In that he -- it's my job to 12 .. a-and I make the decisions on 13 how we If I make a decision, I'll 14 and he'll give me some definitely talk to him about it 15 input, but he has never said, "Don't do that, do 16 this." He'll ask me questions and ask me to think of 17 things from a.different point of view, but I make the 18 decisions, and I do that with input from my people.

19 It's just a completely different -- different mindset.

20 In the past, before the reorganization, 21 the operators always *had the responsibility, the 22 obligation, and were supported in it if the plant were 23 to -- or if there was to be equipment problems or a 24 need, they were -- it was their authority to remove 25 the unit from service if necessary. If we had a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 scheduled down-power, it was -- we followed the 2 schedule and raised power back up. However, if we 3 were to have an unplanned down-power or unplanned 4 trip, I did not have the authority to bring the plant 5 back. I had to get permission. We had to go all the 6 way up to the vice-president of operations to get 7 permission to bring the plant up. And now it's, you 8 know, I make the decision based on the input from my 9 people, so it's different in that regard.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Empowerment.

11 Empowerment, yeah.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Any other personnel 13 changes? I mean, you're talking about 14 -at that level.

15 M) At that level, and our whole 16 structure.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF-: Okay.

18 NOS Before, we did not have 19 plant managers. We had a site organization such that 20 there was no dedicated maintenance engineering. The 21 only dedicated groups were basically operations and 22 chemistry, because they -- they're basically licensed 23 on the plant, so they couldn't work at both Salem and 24 Hope Creek. All the other organizations worked at 25 both, so that we kind of lost some ownership of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS .

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1 plants. That's, I think, what led to or aided in 2 leading to some of the equipment being degraded.

3 You know, we have dedi- -- I'm responsible 4 for Salem. I have dedicated maintenance engineering, 5 all the support I need to make improvements, so it's 6 -- that structure has helped quite a bit. I think 7 that I've gotten feedback from the people; they see 8 that. We've changed some people at lower levels from 9 superintendent and manager people as well, but I think 10 it's all in the -- it's all helping to alleviate some 11 of the -- some of the reasons why that letter was 12 generated.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Anything else?

14 No.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I have one 16 follow-up.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Go ahead, Jeff.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Go back to 19 before the reorganization, okay?

20 NOW Uh-huh.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Had you ever 22 got a sense of an instance where corporate management 23 out of Newark provided direction or supervision to the 24 plant regarding a startup or shutdown, or a safety 25 issue?

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1 *) No, I've never had that 2 sense at all.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did anyone ever 4 tell you that they had a sense that that was 5 occurring?

6 W xNo.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. I 8 don't have anything further.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Just some 10 closing questions on the issues.

11 Have I or any other NRC representative 12 offered you any promises of reward or threatened you 13 in any manner in exchange for your information today?

14 No.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you appeared 16 here freely and voluntarily?

17 Yes, I have.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you. I thank 19 you for your time.

20 ,_ . I have one question.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I'm sorry. Go ahead.

22 You had asked -- you both 23 have asked some general questions that I didn't have 24 any specific recollection of. If you have specific 25 examples, that might help jar my recollection. It NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 seemed like I didn't -- I didn't have any examples, or 2 couldn't recall any example, but oftentimes if you'd 3 remind me of something that you have a specific 4 question about, it would aid my memory, and I might 5 have some information on it.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right, let's --

7 on that thought, we'll just take a quick break. It's 8 10:50. We'll just review something, and get back on 9 'the record if we need to.

10 Okay.

11 Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m. off the record 12 until 10:54 a.m.)

.13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We're back on 14 the record; it's 10:54.

.15 After going over some incidents, we 16 reviewed with .two, after your offer of, if we 17 could refresh your recollection you might be able to 18 discuss these incidents further. And we were talking 19 about the SJ check valve. You don't have any specific 20 recollection of that --

21 That's correct.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- being an issue.

23 And another one having to do with reactor 24 head vents, the indicators that were in the control 25 room in regard to that and any issues surrounding NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 making on-the-spot changes to get around this damaged 2 indicator, you indicated--

3 (1) I know that we've talked 4 about that before, like what is the real requirement 5 to -- or what is the -- what's the requirement to have 6 indication, but I don't remember anything specific to 7 on-the- spot changes that you had asked about, or you 8 mentioned.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And there's 10 potential that that's just a time fram. issue in terms 11 of when you came on as thA But we 12 wanted to clear that up.

13 Okay.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's -- we'll go off 15 the record. I thank you for your time on this issue.

16 It's 10:55 a.m.

17 (Whereupon, at 10:55 a.m. the interview 18 was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name,-of,Proceeding: Interview of Docket Number: 1-2003-051F Location: Salem, NJ were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings as recorded on tape(s) provided by the NRC.

[ Bill Wagner Official Transcriber Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc.

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