Information Notice 1992-35, Higher than Predicted Erosion/Corrosion in Unisolable Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Inside Containment at a Boiling Water Reactor: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
(One intermediate revision by the same user not shown)
Line 3: Line 3:
| issue date = 05/06/1992
| issue date = 05/06/1992
| title = Higher than Predicted Erosion/Corrosion in Unisolable Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Inside Containment at a Boiling Water Reactor
| title = Higher than Predicted Erosion/Corrosion in Unisolable Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Inside Containment at a Boiling Water Reactor
| author name = Rossi C E
| author name = Rossi C
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 5
| page count = 5
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 6, 1992 NRC INFORMATION


NOTICE 92-35: HIGHER THAN PREDICTED
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 6, 1992 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-35:   HIGHER THAN PREDICTED EROSION/CORROSION IN


EROSION/CORROSION
UNISOLABLE REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY


IN UNISOLABLE
PIPING INSIDE CONTAINMENT AT A BOILING


REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY PIPING INSIDE CONTAINMENT
WATER REACTOR
 
AT A BOILING WATER REACTOR


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All holders of operating
power


licenses or construction
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear


permits for nuclear power reactors.
reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
notice


Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information     than


notice to alert addressees
to alert addressees to erosion/corrosion rates that could      be  higher


to erosion/corrosion
piping inside


rates that could be higher than predicted
predicted in certain unisolable reactor coolant pressure boundary that recip- the containment drywell at boiling water reactors.      It is  expected


in certain unisolable
and


reactor coolant pressure boundary piping inside the containment
ients will review the information for applicability to their facilities sugges- consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar    problems.    However, therefore, tions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;
no specific action or written response is  required.


drywell at boiling water reactors.
==Description of Circumstances==
performed


It is expected that recip-ients will review the information
The Pennsylvania Power and Light Company (the licensee) recently Station,          Unit


for applicability
erosion/corrosion inspections at  the Susquehanna  Steam  Electric


to their facilities
unexpectedly  high  rate  of  erosion/corrosion      in


and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
1, and may have identified an                                            1). Erosion


However, sugges-tions contained
certain main feedwater (FW) piping inside containment (Attachment portion


in this information
of this portion of FW  piping is  of particular  concern  since  this


notice are not NRC requirements;
cannot be isolated from the reactor vessel, and erosion/corrosion inspection
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description


of Circumstances
strategies may not direct attention to that part of the FW system.


The Pennsylvania
the


Power and Light Company (the licensee)
When the licensee began operating the unit commercially in June 1982, current
recently performed erosion/corrosion


inspections
nominal wall thickness for the pipe was about 0.688 inch. During        the


at the Susquehanna
refueling outage, wall thinning was found in one of the 20 inch by 12 inch 12 reducing tee risers approximately 10 inches downstream from the tee During  in the


Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, and may have identified
pipe  weld.              the


an unexpectedly
inch pipe section, immediately above a circumferential


high rate of erosion/corrosion
had  measured    the  pipe


in certain main feedwater (FW) piping inside containment (Attachment
previous refueling outage (18 months ago) the licensee


1). Erosion of this portion of FW piping is of particular
wall as 0.619 inch thick at that location. During the current refueling


concern since this portion cannot be isolated from the reactor vessel, and erosion/corrosion
outage, the licensee measured a thickness of 0.521 inch at the same location.  of that


inspection
The licensee measured a thickness of 0.482 inch within about 2 inches of 0.440
  location. The licensee calculated a minimum allowable wall      thickness


strategies
indicated


may not direct attention
inch for that portion of FW pipe. Previous experience and models had the most


to that part of the FW system.When the licensee began operating
an erosion wear rate of no more than 0.085 inch each cycle.        However,
  9205010009              Ar& EC                  9                        /            /JA J20'o


the unit commercially
/i'-'-


in June 1982, the nominal wall thickness
IN 92-35 May 6, 1992 recent measurement indicates a higher wear rate that may be greater than 0.100
inch each cycle.


for the pipe was about 0.688 inch. During the current refueling
The licensee evaluated the data for the FW system and determined that continued


outage, wall thinning was found in one of the 20 inch by 12 inch reducing tee risers approximately
operation could not be justified for another fuel cycle. Therefore, the


10 inches downstream
licensee repaired, rather than replaced, the FW pipe in accordance with Section


from the tee in the 12 inch pipe section, immediately
XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure


above a circumferential
Vessel Code.


pipe weld. During the previous refueling
Discussion


outage (18 months ago) the licensee had measured the pipe wall as 0.619 inch thick at that location.
The licensee determined that although it had expected to find erosion/corrosion


During the current refueling outage, the licensee measured a thickness
at this location, the magnitude of wall thinning exceeded expectations. The


of 0.521 inch at the same location.The licensee measured a thickness
licensee is continuing its investigation to determine the root cause of the


of 0.482 inch within about 2 inches of that location.
unexpected erosion/corrosion rate.


The licensee calculated
Related Generic Communications


a minimum allowable
Following a pipe rupture at the Surry Power Station in 1986, the NRC issued


wall thickness
Bulletin 87-01, "Thinning of Pipe Walls in Nuclear Power Plants," July 9, 1987.


of 0.440 inch for that portion of FW pipe. Previous experience
In this bulletin, the staff requested licensees and applicants to inform the


and models had indicated an erosion wear rate of no more than 0.085 inch each cycle. However, the most 9205010009 r& / A EC /i'-'- 9 /JA J20'o
NRC about their programs for monitoring the wall thickness of carbon steel


IN 92-35 May 6, 1992 recent measurement
piping in both safety-related and nonsafety-related high energy fluid


indicates
systems.


a higher wear rate that may be greater than 0.100 inch each cycle.The licensee evaluated
In 1989, following an audit of the erosion/corrosion programs at 10 plants, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 89-08, "Erosion/Corrosion-Induced Pipe Wall


the data for the FW system and determined
Thinning," May 2, 1989. In this generic letter, the staff requested licensees


that continued operation
and applicants to implement long term erosion/corrosion monitoring programs.


could not be justified
The staff made this request to obtain assurances that the addressees had imple- mented procedures or administrative controls to maintain the structural integrity


for another fuel cycle. Therefore, the licensee repaired, rather than replaced, the FW pipe in accordance
of all carbon steel systems carrying high energy fluids.


with Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical
The NRC also issued several information notices on the subject of erosion/
corrosion.


Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.Discussion
IN 92-35 May 6, 1992 This information notice requires  no specific action or written response. If


The licensee determined
you have any questions about the  information in this notice, please contact one


that although it had expected to find erosion/corrosion
of the technical contacts listed  below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear


at this location, the magnitude
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project  manager.


of wall thinning exceeded expectations.
Charles E. Rossi, Director


The licensee is continuing
Division of Operational Events Assessment


its investigation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
to determine
 
the root cause of the unexpected
 
erosion/corrosion
 
rate.Related Generic Communications
 
Following


a pipe rupture at the Surry Power Station in 1986, the NRC issued Bulletin 87-01, "Thinning
Technical contacts:  K. I. Parczewski, NRR      S. Barber, Region I


of Pipe Walls in Nuclear Power Plants," July 9, 1987.In this bulletin, the staff requested
(301) 504-2705              (717) 542-2134 David Gamberoni, NRR        John White, Region I


licensees
(301) 504-1171              (215) 337-5114 Attachments:
1. Feedwater System Erosion/Corrosion Location


and applicants
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


to inform the NRC about their programs for monitoring
II*
                      REACTOR                              REACTOR


the wall thickness
REACTOR


of carbon steel piping in both safety-related
VESSEL                VESSEL                              VESSEL


and nonsafety-related
24' X 12- FLOW


high energy fluid systems.In 1989, following
l                      -
                                  20 X 12'
                                  REDUCING


an audit of the erosion/corrosion
REDUCING


programs at 10 plants, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 89-08, "Erosion/Corrosion-Induced
TEE


Pipe Wall Thinning," May 2, 1989. In this generic letter, the staff requested
o-            I A -
                                                                                    r--,
                      1, I                    I--O      l  lI                  7
                                      20-      24 X 20-                24-
        12- 20- X 12'
            REDUCER                            REDUCER


licensees and applicants
"BP


to implement
FEEDWATER


long term erosion/corrosion
LINE


monitoring
EROSION/
                          CORROSI ON


programs.The staff made this request to obtain assurances
ZONE


that the addressees
1    I    FLOW


had imple-mented procedures
20" X 12"
                                            REDUCING


or administrative
TEE


controls to maintain the structural
FLOW                                            (D      'OOb


integrity of all carbon steel systems carrying high energy fluids.The NRC also issued several information
co        rr


notices on the subject of erosion/corrosion.
'0      r-%.


IN 92-35 May 6, 1992 This information
FEEDWATER SYSTEM EROSION/CORROSION LOCATION                                            "-I"
 
notice requires you have any questions
 
about the of the technical
 
contacts listed Reactor Regulation (NRR) project no specific action or written response.
 
If information
 
in this notice, please contact one below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Attachment 2 IN 92-35 May 6, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


contacts: K. I. Parczewski, NRR (301) 504-2705 S. Barber, Region I (717) 542-2134 David (301)Gamberoni, NRR 504-1171 John White, Region I (215) 337-5114 Attachments:
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
1. Feedwater


System 2. List of Recently Erosion/Corrosion
Information                                      Date of


Location Issued NRC Information
Notice No.            Subject                    Issuance  Issued to


Notices
92-34          New Exposure Limits for          05/06/92  All licensees whose opera- Airborne Uranium and                      tions can cause airborne


II*REACTOR VESSEL l 12- 20- X 12'REDUCER REACTOR VESSEL 20 X 12'-REDUCING 1, I I--O REACTOR VESSEL 24' X 12-REDUCING TEE o- I FLOW I l l 7 r--, A -20-24 X 20-REDUCER 24-"BP FEEDWATER LINE EROSION/CORROSI ON ZONE 1 I FLOW 20" X 12" REDUCING TEE FLOW FEEDWATER
Thorium                                    concentrations of uranium


SYSTEM EROSION/CORROSION
and thorium.


LOCATION (D 'OOb co rr'0 r-%."-I"
92-33          Increased Instrument            04/30/92  All holders of OLs or CPs
Attachment


2 IN 92-35 May 6, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
Response Time When                          for nuclear power reactors.


NOTICES Information
Pressure Dampening


Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 92-34 92-33 92-32 New Exposure Limits for Airborne Uranium and Thorium Increased
Devices are Installed


Instrument
92-32          Problems Identified with        04/29/92  All holders of OLs or CPs


Response Time When Pressure Dampening Devices are Installed Problems Identified
Emergency Ventilation                      for nuclear power reactors.


with Emergency
Systems for Near-Site


Ventilation
(Within 10 Miles) Emer- gency Operations Facili- ties and Technical Support


Systems for Near-Site (Within 10 Miles) Emer-gency Operations
Centers


Facili-ties and Technical
92-31          Electrical Connection            04/27/92  All holders of OLs or CPs


Support Centers Electrical
Problem in Johnson                          for nuclear power reactors.


Connection
Yokogawa Corporation


===Problem in Johnson Yokogawa Corporation===
YS-80 Programmable Indi- cating Controllers
YS-80 Programmable


Indi-cating Controllers
92-30          Falsification of Plant          04/23/92  All holders of OLs or CPs


Falsification
Records                                    for nuclear power reactors


of Plant Records Spent Fuel Pool Re-activity Calculations
and all licensed operators


Potential
and senior operators.


Breaker Mis-coordination
92-21,          Spent Fuel Pool Re-              04/22/92  All holders of OLs or CPs


Caused by Instantaneous
Supp. 1        activity Calculations                      for nuclear power reactors.


Trip Circuitry 05/06/92 04/30/92 04/29/92 04/27/92 04/23/92 04/22/92 04/17/92 All licensees
92-29           Potential Breaker Mis-          04/17/92 All holders of OLs or CPs


whose opera-tions can cause airborne concentrations
coordination Caused by                    for nuclear power reactors.


of uranium and thorium.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.92-31 92-30 92-21, Supp. 1 92-29 All for and and holders of OLs or CPs nuclear power reactors all licensed operators senior operators.
Instantaneous Trip


All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.OL = Operating
Circuitry


License CP = Construction
OL = Operating License


Permit}}
CP = Construction Permit}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 03:22, 24 November 2019

Higher than Predicted Erosion/Corrosion in Unisolable Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Inside Containment at a Boiling Water Reactor
ML031200365
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, 05000370  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/06/1992
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-92-035, NUDOCS 9205010009
Download: ML031200365 (5)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 6, 1992 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-35: HIGHER THAN PREDICTED EROSION/CORROSION IN

UNISOLABLE REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY

PIPING INSIDE CONTAINMENT AT A BOILING

WATER REACTOR

Addressees

power

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear

reactors.

Purpose

notice

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information than

to alert addressees to erosion/corrosion rates that could be higher

piping inside

predicted in certain unisolable reactor coolant pressure boundary that recip- the containment drywell at boiling water reactors. It is expected

and

ients will review the information for applicability to their facilities sugges- consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, therefore, tions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;

no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

performed

The Pennsylvania Power and Light Company (the licensee) recently Station, Unit

erosion/corrosion inspections at the Susquehanna Steam Electric

unexpectedly high rate of erosion/corrosion in

1, and may have identified an 1). Erosion

certain main feedwater (FW) piping inside containment (Attachment portion

of this portion of FW piping is of particular concern since this

cannot be isolated from the reactor vessel, and erosion/corrosion inspection

strategies may not direct attention to that part of the FW system.

the

When the licensee began operating the unit commercially in June 1982, current

nominal wall thickness for the pipe was about 0.688 inch. During the

refueling outage, wall thinning was found in one of the 20 inch by 12 inch 12 reducing tee risers approximately 10 inches downstream from the tee During in the

pipe weld. the

inch pipe section, immediately above a circumferential

had measured the pipe

previous refueling outage (18 months ago) the licensee

wall as 0.619 inch thick at that location. During the current refueling

outage, the licensee measured a thickness of 0.521 inch at the same location. of that

The licensee measured a thickness of 0.482 inch within about 2 inches of 0.440

location. The licensee calculated a minimum allowable wall thickness

indicated

inch for that portion of FW pipe. Previous experience and models had the most

an erosion wear rate of no more than 0.085 inch each cycle. However,

9205010009 Ar& EC 9 / /JA J20'o

/i'-'-

IN 92-35 May 6, 1992 recent measurement indicates a higher wear rate that may be greater than 0.100

inch each cycle.

The licensee evaluated the data for the FW system and determined that continued

operation could not be justified for another fuel cycle. Therefore, the

licensee repaired, rather than replaced, the FW pipe in accordance with Section

XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure

Vessel Code.

Discussion

The licensee determined that although it had expected to find erosion/corrosion

at this location, the magnitude of wall thinning exceeded expectations. The

licensee is continuing its investigation to determine the root cause of the

unexpected erosion/corrosion rate.

Related Generic Communications

Following a pipe rupture at the Surry Power Station in 1986, the NRC issued

Bulletin 87-01, "Thinning of Pipe Walls in Nuclear Power Plants," July 9, 1987.

In this bulletin, the staff requested licensees and applicants to inform the

NRC about their programs for monitoring the wall thickness of carbon steel

piping in both safety-related and nonsafety-related high energy fluid

systems.

In 1989, following an audit of the erosion/corrosion programs at 10 plants, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 89-08, "Erosion/Corrosion-Induced Pipe Wall

Thinning," May 2, 1989. In this generic letter, the staff requested licensees

and applicants to implement long term erosion/corrosion monitoring programs.

The staff made this request to obtain assurances that the addressees had imple- mented procedures or administrative controls to maintain the structural integrity

of all carbon steel systems carrying high energy fluids.

The NRC also issued several information notices on the subject of erosion/

corrosion.

IN 92-35 May 6, 1992 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: K. I. Parczewski, NRR S. Barber, Region I

(301) 504-2705 (717) 542-2134 David Gamberoni, NRR John White, Region I

(301) 504-1171 (215) 337-5114 Attachments:

1. Feedwater System Erosion/Corrosion Location

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

II*

REACTOR REACTOR

REACTOR

VESSEL VESSEL VESSEL

24' X 12- FLOW

l -

20 X 12'

REDUCING

REDUCING

TEE

o- I A -

r--,

1, I I--O l lI 7

20- 24 X 20- 24-

12- 20- X 12'

REDUCER REDUCER

"BP

FEEDWATER

LINE

EROSION/

CORROSI ON

ZONE

1 I FLOW

20" X 12"

REDUCING

TEE

FLOW (D 'OOb

co rr

'0 r-%.

FEEDWATER SYSTEM EROSION/CORROSION LOCATION "-I"

Attachment 2 IN 92-35 May 6, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

92-34 New Exposure Limits for 05/06/92 All licensees whose opera- Airborne Uranium and tions can cause airborne

Thorium concentrations of uranium

and thorium.

92-33 Increased Instrument 04/30/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Response Time When for nuclear power reactors.

Pressure Dampening

Devices are Installed

92-32 Problems Identified with 04/29/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Emergency Ventilation for nuclear power reactors.

Systems for Near-Site

(Within 10 Miles) Emer- gency Operations Facili- ties and Technical Support

Centers

92-31 Electrical Connection 04/27/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Problem in Johnson for nuclear power reactors.

Yokogawa Corporation

YS-80 Programmable Indi- cating Controllers

92-30 Falsification of Plant 04/23/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Records for nuclear power reactors

and all licensed operators

and senior operators.

92-21, Spent Fuel Pool Re- 04/22/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Supp. 1 activity Calculations for nuclear power reactors.

92-29 Potential Breaker Mis- 04/17/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

coordination Caused by for nuclear power reactors.

Instantaneous Trip

Circuitry

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit


Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=Information_Notice_1992-35,_Higher_than_Predicted_Erosion/Corrosion_in_Unisolable_Reactor_Coolant_Pressure_Boundary_Piping_Inside_Containment_at_a_Boiling_Water_Reactor&oldid=2200258"