Information Notice 1986-27, Access Control at Nuclear Facilities

Access Control at Nuclear Facilities

ML031220665
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date:	04/21/1986
From:	Jordan E NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-86-027, NUDOCS 8604160379
Download: ML031220665 (4)

IG IB L SSINS No.:

IN 86-27

6835 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 April 21, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-27: ACCESS CONTROL AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or

construction permit (CP), research and nonpower reactor facilities, and fuel

fabrication and processing facilities using or possessing formula quantities

of special nuclear material.

Purpose

This information notice is provided to describe examples of significant physical

security problems in the area of access control. It is expected that recipients

will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider

actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar problems from occurring at their

facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not

constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response

is required at this time.

Description of Circumstances

In recent months, the number of incidents related to degraded access control at

nuclear facilities appears to have increased considerably. Breakdowns in positive

access control, especially those that could have allowed access into vital areas

(VAs) and material access areas (MAAs), are among the most significant safeguards

vulnerabilities that can occur at nuclear facilities.

Examples of the most frequent access control problems are:

o Weapons have been found on vehicles by 'security personnel during protected

area exit searches instead of entry searches. Also, individuals already

granted access have discovered that they mistakenly brought weapons on site

via vehicle or package., In some cases,- no entry search-was conducted, while

in others, a search was conducted but the weapon was not detected. Secu- rity personnel have asked drivers of vehicles if they had any weapons on

their persons, but failed to ask if there were any weapons in the vehicles.

o Individuals have gained access to facilities by tailgating or by using

someone else's badge. Also, individuals not authorized access to VAs and

MAAs have tailgated into those areas. In many cases, they were not chal- lenged by the person being tailgated or by personnel working in the area.

Some violators displayed badges that clearly indicated they were not

authorized to be in the area, while others did not even display a badge.

8604160379

FE

IN 86-27,' 2 April 21, 1986 o VA and MAA doors have been found unsecured because they would not close

properly. Also, these doors have been found taped or propped open for

operational convenience. In other instances, the closure time for power- controlled VA and MAA doors has been excessive, inviting tailgating or

unauthorized entries. Poor maintenance programs and inadequate compensa- tory measures have frequently compounded these problems.

o Guards being used as compensatory measures for VA and MAA barriers and/or

security alarm systems, have been found asleep at their posts or have left

their posts before barriers and/or alarm systems have been returned to an

effective state of operation.

° Responses to protected area and VA and MAA alarms have been very untimely

and, in some cases, no responses have been made.

In several of these cases, NRC has taken escalated enforcement action for

failure to properly control access to the site protected area and VAs. Under

the NRC Enforcement Policy, failure to control access such that contraband is

introduced into the site protected area-or individuals are allowed access to

protected areas or VAs without proper authorization may be categorized as

Severity Level III or higher violations. Depending on the particular

circumstances of such incidents, a substantial civil penalty may be imposed.

Discussion:

The above examples of frequent access control problems indicate that many

licensees may share some of the following program management problems:

o Failure to properly train and motivate security personnel and other employees

in discharging their security-related responsibilities.

o Failure to place appropriate priorities on maintenance of security equipment.

o Poor security awareness or attitudes by employees.

° Poor access control procedures, especially concerning searches, issuance of

badges, and use of turnstiles.

Human error, ineffective training, and poor attitudes towards the security

program appear to be the most significant factors in the problem areas identified.

NRC inspectors are directing more inspection effort in these areas, and violations

will be processed in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy.

IN 86-27 April 21, 1986 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, -please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office, or this office.

EJordan, Director

Divisi of Emergency Preparedness

and ngineering Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

N. Ervin, IE

(301) 492-7855 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

Attachment 1 IN 86-27 April 21, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to

86-26 Potential Problems In 4/17/86 All power reactor

Generators Manufactured By facilities holding

Electrical Products an OL or CP

Incorporated

86-25 Traceability And Material 4/11/86 All power reactor

Control Of Material And facilities holding

Equipment, Particularly an OL or CP

Fasteners

86-24 Respirator Users Notice: 4/11/86 All power reactor

Increased Inspection Frequency facilities holding

For Certain Self-Contained an OL or CP; research

Breathing Apparatus Air and test reactor

Cylinders facilities; fuel

cycle licensees and

Priority 1 material

licensees

86-23 Excessive Skin Exposures Due 4/9/86 All power reactor

To Contamination With Hot facilities holding

Particles an OL or CP

86-22 Underresponse Of Radition 3/31/86 All power reactor

Survey Instrument To High facilities holding

Radiation Fields an OL or CP and

research and test

reactors

86-21 Recognition Of American 3/31/86 All power reactor

Society Of Mechanical facilities holding

Engineers Accreditation an OL or CP and all

Program For N Stamp Holders recipients of NUREG-

0040 (white book)

86-20 Low-Level Radioactive Waste 3/28/86 All power reactor

Scaling Factors, 10 CFR facilities holding

Part 61 an OL or CP

86-19 Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft 3/21/86 All power reactor

Failure At Crystal River facilities holding

an OL or CP

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit