Information Notice 1986-44, Failure to Follow Procedures When Working in High Radiation Areas: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
(3 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown)
Line 3: Line 3:
| issue date = 06/10/1986
| issue date = 06/10/1986
| title = Failure to Follow Procedures When Working in High Radiation Areas
| title = Failure to Follow Procedures When Working in High Radiation Areas
| author name = Jordan E L
| author name = Jordan E
| author affiliation = NRC/IE
| author affiliation = NRC/IE
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 5
| page count = 5
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:LIS ORIGINAL SSINS No.: 6835IN 86-44UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENTWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555June 10, 1986IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-44: FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURES WHEN WORKINGIN HIGH RADIATION AREAS
{{#Wiki_filter:LIS ORIGINAL                             SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-44 UNITED STATES
 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 June 10, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-44:   FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURES WHEN WORKING
 
IN HIGH RADIATION AREAS


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or aconstruction permit (CP) and research and test reactors.
:
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a
 
construction permit (CP) and research and test reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
:This information notice is provided to alert licensees of the problem ofrecurring, unauthorized entries by maintenance workers into high radiationareas. A recent event is discussed below, and a related event is summarized inAttachment 1. Since the workers ignored and bypassed maintenance proceduresthat include radiological controls established to limit exposures in highradiation areas, it is fortuitous that during these entries no personnelexposure limits were exceeded.It is expected that recipients will review this notice for applicability totheir facilities' work controls programs and consider actions, if appropriate,to preclude the occurrence of a similar problem at their facilities. Sugges-tions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirementsand, therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Past Related Correspondence:INPO Significant Event Report (SER) 50-85, "Uncontrolled Personnel RadiationExposure," November 4, 1985 (discusses two events).INPO Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) 85-3, "Excessive PersonnelRadiation Exposures," April 30, 1985 (discusses seven events).IE Information Notice No. 84-19, "Two Events Involving Unauthorized EntriesInto PWR Reactor Cavities," March 21, 1984.IE Information Notice No. 84-59, "Deliberate Circumventing of Station HealthPhysics Procedures," August 6, 1984 (discusses six events).8606040010 IN 86-44June 10, 1986  
:
This information notice is provided to alert licensees of the problem of
 
recurring, unauthorized entries by maintenance workers into high radiation
 
areas. A recent event is discussed below, and a related event is summarized in
 
Attachment 1. Since the workers ignored and bypassed maintenance procedures
 
that include radiological controls established to limit exposures in high
 
radiation areas, it is fortuitous that during these entries no personnel
 
exposure limits were exceeded.
 
It is expected that recipients will review this notice for applicability to
 
their facilities' work controls programs and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude the occurrence of a similar problem at their facilities. Sugges- tions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements
 
and, therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
 
Past Related Correspondence:
INPO Significant Event Report (SER) 50-85, "Uncontrolled Personnel Radiation
 
Exposure," November 4, 1985 (discusses two events).
 
INPO Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) 85-3, "Excessive Personnel
 
Radiation Exposures," April 30, 1985 (discusses seven events).
 
IE Information Notice No. 84-19, "Two Events Involving Unauthorized Entries
 
Into PWR Reactor Cavities," March 21, 1984.
 
IE Information Notice No. 84-59, "Deliberate Circumventing of Station Health
 
Physics Procedures," August 6, 1984 (discusses six events).
 
8606040010
 
IN 86-44 June 10, 1986  


==Description of Circumstances==
==Description of Circumstances==
:On January 8, 1986, at Turkey Point, an instrument and controls (IC) technicianmade an unaccompanied, unauthorized entry into a high radiation area to com-plete repairs on the traversing incore probe (TIP) drive unit with an irradi-ated TIP withdrawn into the work area. Earlier that same day, with a healthphysics (HP) technician providing job coverage, the IC technician had madeadjustments to the TIP drive unit (dose rates only 5 to 25 mR/hr), which laterenabled the technician to successfully withdraw the TIP into the accessible TIPdrive work area.During the unauthorized entry, the IC technician received 500 millirem wholebody exposure during an approximately 5-minute stay time in a work area, whichwas later calculated to be 6 R/hr in the general area. The radiation level 1foot away from the work area was 65-70 R/hr on contact with the tubing contain-ing the irradiated TIP. The low-range Geiger-Mueller (GM) portable surveyinstrument (scale of 0-1 R/hr) used by the IC technician upon entering the highradiation area initially moved up the scale to 800 mR/hr and then reportedlywent rapidly down the scale to zero, when moved closer the the radiationsource. The IC technician failed to recognize the malfunctioning surveyinstrument and stayed in the area to complete his maintenance task. At thesedose rates, it was fortuitous that the technician did not remain in the TIParea for any longer period.Subsequent licensee and NRC regional review of the event revealed several keyfactors that contributed to the incident.1. Failure To Follow ProceduresNumerous procedural violations occurred before and during the unauthorizedentry. These violations included failure to notify HP personnel beforeoperating the TIP, performing craft work outside the scope of the author-ized plant work order (PWO), and making entry and working alone on the TIPsystem.2. Personnel ShortcomingsThe IC technician's foreman failed to clearly define the TIP system problemand provide adequate instructions on the PWO. The IC technician failed toobey the local radiological area warning, a posting that read "highradiation area -keep out." Inadequate training caused the IC technicianto fail to recognize a malfunctioning survey instrument (downscale readingcaused by GM detector tube continuous discharge response to intenseradiation levels), which he was using to help control his exposure.The NRC noted subsequent to the event that, although not contributory to thisincident, governing maintenance procedures for the TIP system did not requiretagging out of other operable TIPs (to prevent inadvertent withdrawal into anoccupied work area) with work in progress on a malfunctioning TIP unit. Forfuture TIP work, the licensee agreed to control movement of the irradiated TIPswith equipment tag out control IN 86-44June 10, 1986 Discussion:The NRC continues to note repeated occurrences of unauthorized entries intohigh radiation areas (see Past Related Correspondence). In most of the indi-vidual events discussed in these documents and the two events in this notice,failure of personnel to adhere to existing work/control procedures or radiationwork permits (RWP), or both, is a central cause of the exposure incidents.Adherence to work/surveillance procedures forms a basic framework for providingeffective, consistent radiological controls for work in high radiation areas.Short of providing direct, continuous health physics coverage for each andevery task, these procedures serve as the formal mechanism for initiatingnecessary communications between various plant worker crafts groups and thehealth physics support group. This communication results in appropriateradiological support (e.g., RWP issuance) for the maintenance/surveillanceactivities. Bypassing these procedures and thus failing to comply with theradiological precautions in them seriously weakens the health physics controlprogram established to protect the workers. It is the licensee's responsibil-ity to ensure that these procedures are adhered to.To emphasize the importance of workers properly performing work activities inhigh radiation areas, appropriate enforcement action has been proposed for theTurkey Point event (proposed $50,000 civil penalty).No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the RegionalAdministrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.dwari o Jor , D irectorDivision of Emergency Preparednessand Engineering ResponseOffice of Inspection and EnforcementTechnical Contacts: James E. Wigginton, IE(301) 492-4967Roger L. Pedersen, IE(301) 492-9425
:
On January 8, 1986, at Turkey Point, an instrument and controls (IC)technician
 
made an unaccompanied, unauthorized entry into a high radiation area to com- plete repairs on the traversing incore probe (TIP) drive unit with an irradi- ated TIP withdrawn into the work area. Earlier that same day, with a health
 
physics (HP) technician providing job coverage, the IC technician had made
 
adjustments to the TIP drive unit (dose rates only 5 to 25 mR/hr), which later
 
enabled the technician to successfully withdraw the TIP into the accessible TIP
 
drive work area.
 
During the unauthorized entry, the IC technician received 500 millirem whole
 
body exposure during an approximately 5-minute stay time in a work area, which
 
was later calculated to be 6 R/hr in the general area. The radiation level 1 foot away from the work area was 65-70 R/hr on contact with the tubing contain- ing the irradiated TIP. The low-range Geiger-Mueller (GM) portable survey
 
instrument (scale of 0-1 R/hr) used by the IC technician upon entering the high
 
radiation area initially moved up the scale to 800 mR/hr and then reportedly
 
went rapidly down the scale to zero, when moved closer the the radiation
 
source. The IC technician failed to recognize the malfunctioning survey
 
instrument and stayed in the area to complete his maintenance task. At these
 
dose rates, it was fortuitous that the technician did not remain in the TIP
 
area for any longer period.
 
Subsequent licensee and NRC regional review of the event revealed several key
 
factors that contributed to the incident.
 
1.   Failure To Follow Procedures
 
Numerous procedural violations occurred before and during the unauthorized
 
entry. These violations included failure to notify HP personnel before
 
operating the TIP, performing craft work outside the scope of the author- ized plant work order (PWO), and making entry and working alone on the TIP
 
system.
 
2.   Personnel Shortcomings
 
The IC technician's foreman failed to clearly define the TIP system problem
 
and provide adequate instructions on the PWO. The IC technician failed to
 
obey the local radiological area warning, a posting that read "high
 
radiation area - keep out." Inadequate training caused the IC technician
 
to fail to recognize a malfunctioning survey instrument (downscale reading
 
caused by GM detector tube continuous discharge response to intense
 
radiation levels), which he was using to help control his exposure.
 
The NRC noted subsequent to the event that, although not contributory to this
 
incident, governing maintenance procedures for the TIP system did not require
 
tagging out of other operable TIPs (to prevent inadvertent withdrawal into an
 
occupied work area) with work in progress on a malfunctioning TIP unit. For
 
future TIP work, the licensee agreed to control movement of the irradiated TIPs
 
with equipment tag out controls.
 
IN 86-44 June 10, 1986 Discussion:
The NRC continues to note repeated occurrences of unauthorized entries into
 
high radiation areas (see Past Related Correspondence). In most of the indi- vidual events discussed in these documents and the two events in this notice, failure of personnel to adhere to existing work/control procedures or radiation
 
work permits (RWP), or both, is a central cause of the exposure incidents.
 
Adherence to work/surveillance procedures forms a basic framework for providing
 
effective, consistent radiological controls for work in high radiation areas.
 
Short of providing direct, continuous health physics coverage for each and
 
every task, these procedures serve as the formal mechanism for initiating
 
necessary communications between various plant worker crafts groups and the
 
health physics support group. This communication results in appropriate
 
radiological support (e.g., RWP issuance) for the maintenance/surveillance
 
activities. Bypassing these procedures and thus failing to comply with the
 
radiological precautions in them seriously weakens the health physics control
 
program established to protect the workers. It is the licensee's responsibil- ity to ensure that these procedures are adhered to.
 
To emphasize the importance of workers properly performing work activities in
 
high radiation areas, appropriate enforcement action has been proposed for the
 
Turkey Point event (proposed $50,000 civil penalty).
 
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
 
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional
 
Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.
 
dwario Jor D    , irector
 
Division of Emergency Preparedness
 
and Engineering Response
 
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
 
Technical Contacts: James E. Wigginton, IE
 
(301) 492-4967 Roger L. Pedersen, IE
 
(301) 492-9425 Attachments:
1. Related Exposure Event
 
2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
 
Attachment 1 IN 86-44 June 10, 1986 RELATED EVENT SUMMARY
 
At the Cooper Nuclear Station on August 28, 1985, two IC technicians performed
 
maintenance (TIP alignment) as required by a craft work procedure. Contrary to
 
the work procedure's radiological-cautions warnings, these workers failed to
 
obtain a special RWP and entered the TIP drive enclosure housing, ignoring the
 
access posting, "Notify Health Physics Prior to Opening." The TIP maintenance
 
procedure further warned that the drive unit's Gleason reel is spring loaded
 
and the incore detector could be withdrawn by the spring tension. It further
 
warned that the withdrawn incore detector probe could be highly radioactive.
 
Upon opening the unsurveyed enclosure, they found the TIP had withdrawn into
 
the enclosure and the detector had broken off. The technicians immediately
 
exited the high radiation and high airborne radioactivity area. The indivi- duals each received approximately 200 mrem whole body exposure and airborne
 
intakes of 44 and 90 MPC-hrs.
 
As corrective actions, the licensee (1) stressed to all station personnel the
 
importance of properly following radiological controls and (2) revised the
 
governing maintenance procedure to require written documentation (signoff)
notifying HP before working on the TIP system.
 
Attachment 2 IN 86-44 June 10, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
 
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
 
Information                                  Date of
 
Notice No.    Subject                        Issue    Issued to
 
86-43          Problems With Silver Zeolite  6/10/86  All power reactor
 
Sampling Of Airborne Radio-              facilities holding
 
iodine                                  an OL or CP
 
86-42          Improper Maintenance Of        6/9/86    All power rector
 
Radiation Monitoring Systems            facilities holding
 
an OL or CP
 
86-41          Evaluation Of Questionable    6/9/86    All byproduct
 
Exposure Readings Of Licensee            material licensees
 
Personnel Dosimeters
 
86-32          Request For Collection Of      6/6/86    All power reactor
 
Sup. 1        Licensee Radioactivity                  facilities holding
 
Measurements Attributed to              an OL or CP
 
The Chernobyl Nuclear Plant
 
Accident
 
86-40          Degraded Ability To Isolate    6/5/86  All power reactor
 
The Reactor Coolant System                facilities holding
 
From Low-Pressure Coolant              an OL or CP
 
Systems in BWRS
 
86-39          Failures Of RHR Pump Motors    5/20/86  All power reactor
 
And Pump Internals                      facilities holding
 
an OL or CP
 
86-38          Deficient Operator Actions    5/20/86  All power reactor
 
Following Dual Function Valve            facilities holding
 
Failures                                an OL or CP
 
86-37          Degradation Of Station        5/16/86  All power reactor
 
Batteries                                facilities holding
 
an OL or CP
 
86-36          Change In NRC Practice        5/16/86-  All power reactor
 
Regarding Issuance Of                    facilities holding
 
Confirming Letters To                    an OL or CP
 
Principal Contractors
 
OL = Operating License


===Attachments:===
CP = Construction Permit}}
1. Related Exposure Event2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices Attachment 1IN 86-44June 10, 1986 RELATED EVENT SUMMARYAt the Cooper Nuclear Station on August 28, 1985, two IC technicians performedmaintenance (TIP alignment) as required by a craft work procedure. Contrary tothe work procedure's radiological-cautions warnings, these workers failed toobtain a special RWP and entered the TIP drive enclosure housing, ignoring theaccess posting, "Notify Health Physics Prior to Opening." The TIP maintenanceprocedure further warned that the drive unit's Gleason reel is spring loadedand the incore detector could be withdrawn by the spring tension. It furtherwarned that the withdrawn incore detector probe could be highly radioactive.Upon opening the unsurveyed enclosure, they found the TIP had withdrawn intothe enclosure and the detector had broken off. The technicians immediatelyexited the high radiation and high airborne radioactivity area. The indivi-duals each received approximately 200 mrem whole body exposure and airborneintakes of 44 and 90 MPC-hrs.As corrective actions, the licensee (1) stressed to all station personnel theimportance of properly following radiological controls and (2) revised thegoverning maintenance procedure to require written documentation (signoff)notifying HP before working on the TIP syste Attachment 2IN 86-44June 10, 1986LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDIE INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issue Issued to86-43ProblemsSamplingiodineWith Silver ZeoliteOf Airborne Radio-86-42Improper MaintenanceRadiation MonitoringOfSystems86-4186-32Sup. 186-4086-3986-38Evaluation Of QuestionableExposure Readings Of LicenseePersonnel DosimetersRequest For Collection OfLicensee RadioactivityMeasurements Attributed toThe Chernobyl Nuclear PlantAccidentDegraded Ability To IsolateThe Reactor Coolant SystemFrom Low-Pressure CoolantSystems in BWRSFailures Of RHR Pump MotorsAnd Pump InternalsDeficient Operator ActionsFollowing Dual Function ValveFailuresDegradation Of StationBatteriesChange In NRC PracticeRegarding Issuance OfConfirming Letters ToPrincipal Contractors6/10/866/9/866/9/866/6/866/5/865/20/865/20/865/16/865/16/86-All power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power rectorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll byproductmaterial licenseesAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CP86-3786-36OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 03:02, 24 November 2019

Failure to Follow Procedures When Working in High Radiation Areas
ML031250056
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date: 06/10/1986
From: Jordan E
NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-86-044, NUDOCS 8606040010
Download: ML031250056 (5)
v • d • e


LIS ORIGINAL SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-44 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 June 10, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-44: FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURES WHEN WORKING

IN HIGH RADIATION AREAS

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a

construction permit (CP) and research and test reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is provided to alert licensees of the problem of

recurring, unauthorized entries by maintenance workers into high radiation

areas. A recent event is discussed below, and a related event is summarized in

Attachment 1. Since the workers ignored and bypassed maintenance procedures

that include radiological controls established to limit exposures in high

radiation areas, it is fortuitous that during these entries no personnel

exposure limits were exceeded.

It is expected that recipients will review this notice for applicability to

their facilities' work controls programs and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude the occurrence of a similar problem at their facilities. Sugges- tions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements

and, therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Past Related Correspondence:

INPO Significant Event Report (SER) 50-85, "Uncontrolled Personnel Radiation

Exposure," November 4, 1985 (discusses two events).

INPO Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) 85-3, "Excessive Personnel

Radiation Exposures," April 30, 1985 (discusses seven events).

IE Information Notice No. 84-19, "Two Events Involving Unauthorized Entries

Into PWR Reactor Cavities," March 21, 1984.

IE Information Notice No. 84-59, "Deliberate Circumventing of Station Health

Physics Procedures," August 6, 1984 (discusses six events).

8606040010

IN 86-44 June 10, 1986

Description of Circumstances

On January 8, 1986, at Turkey Point, an instrument and controls (IC)technician

made an unaccompanied, unauthorized entry into a high radiation area to com- plete repairs on the traversing incore probe (TIP) drive unit with an irradi- ated TIP withdrawn into the work area. Earlier that same day, with a health

physics (HP) technician providing job coverage, the IC technician had made

adjustments to the TIP drive unit (dose rates only 5 to 25 mR/hr), which later

enabled the technician to successfully withdraw the TIP into the accessible TIP

drive work area.

During the unauthorized entry, the IC technician received 500 millirem whole

body exposure during an approximately 5-minute stay time in a work area, which

was later calculated to be 6 R/hr in the general area. The radiation level 1 foot away from the work area was 65-70 R/hr on contact with the tubing contain- ing the irradiated TIP. The low-range Geiger-Mueller (GM) portable survey

instrument (scale of 0-1 R/hr) used by the IC technician upon entering the high

radiation area initially moved up the scale to 800 mR/hr and then reportedly

went rapidly down the scale to zero, when moved closer the the radiation

source. The IC technician failed to recognize the malfunctioning survey

instrument and stayed in the area to complete his maintenance task. At these

dose rates, it was fortuitous that the technician did not remain in the TIP

area for any longer period.

Subsequent licensee and NRC regional review of the event revealed several key

factors that contributed to the incident.

1. Failure To Follow Procedures

Numerous procedural violations occurred before and during the unauthorized

entry. These violations included failure to notify HP personnel before

operating the TIP, performing craft work outside the scope of the author- ized plant work order (PWO), and making entry and working alone on the TIP

system.

2. Personnel Shortcomings

The IC technician's foreman failed to clearly define the TIP system problem

and provide adequate instructions on the PWO. The IC technician failed to

obey the local radiological area warning, a posting that read "high

radiation area - keep out." Inadequate training caused the IC technician

to fail to recognize a malfunctioning survey instrument (downscale reading

caused by GM detector tube continuous discharge response to intense

radiation levels), which he was using to help control his exposure.

The NRC noted subsequent to the event that, although not contributory to this

incident, governing maintenance procedures for the TIP system did not require

tagging out of other operable TIPs (to prevent inadvertent withdrawal into an

occupied work area) with work in progress on a malfunctioning TIP unit. For

future TIP work, the licensee agreed to control movement of the irradiated TIPs

with equipment tag out controls.

IN 86-44 June 10, 1986 Discussion:

The NRC continues to note repeated occurrences of unauthorized entries into

high radiation areas (see Past Related Correspondence). In most of the indi- vidual events discussed in these documents and the two events in this notice, failure of personnel to adhere to existing work/control procedures or radiation

work permits (RWP), or both, is a central cause of the exposure incidents.

Adherence to work/surveillance procedures forms a basic framework for providing

effective, consistent radiological controls for work in high radiation areas.

Short of providing direct, continuous health physics coverage for each and

every task, these procedures serve as the formal mechanism for initiating

necessary communications between various plant worker crafts groups and the

health physics support group. This communication results in appropriate

radiological support (e.g., RWP issuance) for the maintenance/surveillance

activities. Bypassing these procedures and thus failing to comply with the

radiological precautions in them seriously weakens the health physics control

program established to protect the workers. It is the licensee's responsibil- ity to ensure that these procedures are adhered to.

To emphasize the importance of workers properly performing work activities in

high radiation areas, appropriate enforcement action has been proposed for the

Turkey Point event (proposed $50,000 civil penalty).

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.

dwario Jor D , irector

Division of Emergency Preparedness

and Engineering Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contacts: James E. Wigginton, IE

(301) 492-4967 Roger L. Pedersen, IE

(301) 492-9425 Attachments:

1. Related Exposure Event

2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

Attachment 1 IN 86-44 June 10, 1986 RELATED EVENT SUMMARY

At the Cooper Nuclear Station on August 28, 1985, two IC technicians performed

maintenance (TIP alignment) as required by a craft work procedure. Contrary to

the work procedure's radiological-cautions warnings, these workers failed to

obtain a special RWP and entered the TIP drive enclosure housing, ignoring the

access posting, "Notify Health Physics Prior to Opening." The TIP maintenance

procedure further warned that the drive unit's Gleason reel is spring loaded

and the incore detector could be withdrawn by the spring tension. It further

warned that the withdrawn incore detector probe could be highly radioactive.

Upon opening the unsurveyed enclosure, they found the TIP had withdrawn into

the enclosure and the detector had broken off. The technicians immediately

exited the high radiation and high airborne radioactivity area. The indivi- duals each received approximately 200 mrem whole body exposure and airborne

intakes of 44 and 90 MPC-hrs.

As corrective actions, the licensee (1) stressed to all station personnel the

importance of properly following radiological controls and (2) revised the

governing maintenance procedure to require written documentation (signoff)

notifying HP before working on the TIP system.

Attachment 2 IN 86-44 June 10, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to

86-43 Problems With Silver Zeolite 6/10/86 All power reactor

Sampling Of Airborne Radio- facilities holding

iodine an OL or CP

86-42 Improper Maintenance Of 6/9/86 All power rector

Radiation Monitoring Systems facilities holding

an OL or CP

86-41 Evaluation Of Questionable 6/9/86 All byproduct

Exposure Readings Of Licensee material licensees

Personnel Dosimeters

86-32 Request For Collection Of 6/6/86 All power reactor

Sup. 1 Licensee Radioactivity facilities holding

Measurements Attributed to an OL or CP

The Chernobyl Nuclear Plant

Accident

86-40 Degraded Ability To Isolate 6/5/86 All power reactor

The Reactor Coolant System facilities holding

From Low-Pressure Coolant an OL or CP

Systems in BWRS

86-39 Failures Of RHR Pump Motors 5/20/86 All power reactor

And Pump Internals facilities holding

an OL or CP

86-38 Deficient Operator Actions 5/20/86 All power reactor

Following Dual Function Valve facilities holding

Failures an OL or CP

86-37 Degradation Of Station 5/16/86 All power reactor

Batteries facilities holding

an OL or CP

86-36 Change In NRC Practice 5/16/86- All power reactor

Regarding Issuance Of facilities holding

Confirming Letters To an OL or CP

Principal Contractors

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit


Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=Information_Notice_1986-44,_Failure_to_Follow_Procedures_When_Working_in_High_Radiation_Areas&oldid=2200060"