ML11090A091: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:Plant Hatch Plant Hatch -
{{#Wiki_filter:Plant Hatch -Fire Risk Monitoring Tabletop Pilot Process Primary   objectives Identify Equipment Create Communications Plan Determination of Risk Impacts Provide  Insights Process Lessons Learned
-Fire Risk Monitoring Fire Risk Monitoring Tabletop Pilot Process Tabletop Pilot Process Primary objectives


Primary objectives Identify Equipment
E.I. Hatch Fire Risk Equipment Identification Process
 
* Qualitative Evaluation of Fire Risk with regards to daily work planning was not considered
Identify Equipment Create Communications Plan
* Lack recently updated Fire PRA
 
* Only the equipment associated with the three H t h safe Hatch      f shutdown h td       paths th was considered id d forf Fire Risk monitoring
Create Communications Plan DeterminationofRiskImpacts DeterminationofRiskImpacts Determination of Risk Impacts Determination of Risk Impacts Provide Insights Provide Insights Process ProcessLessons Learned
* Selected approach provides a qualitative look at the status of the equipment used to safely shut the plant down during and after a fire
 
* Does not explicitly address core damage or large early release
Lessons Learned E.I. Hatch Fire Risk Equipment E.I. Hatch Fire Risk Equipment Identification Process Identification Process
*
*Qualitative Evaluation of Fire Risk with regards Qualitative Evaluation of Fire Risk with regards to daily work planning was not consideredto daily work planning was not considered
*
*Lack recently updated Fire PRA Lack recently updated Fire PRA
*
*Only the equipment associated with the three Only the equipment associated with the three Hthfhtdthiddf Hthfhtdthiddf H a t c h sa f e s h u td own pa th s was cons id ere d f or H a t c h sa f e s h u td own pa th s was cons id ere d f or Fire Risk monitoringFire Risk monitoring
*
*Selected approach provides a qualitative look Selected approach provides a qualitative look at the status of the equipment used to safely at the status of the equipment used to safely shut the plant down during and after a fireshut the plant down during and after a fire
*
*Does not explicitly address core damage or large Does not explicitly address core damage or large early release early release E.I. Hatch Fire Risk Equipment E.I. Hatch Fire Risk Equipment Identification Process Identification Process Questions to address in process Questions to address in process Will the selection of equipment be
 
Will the selection of equipment be adequate to cover the requirements of adequate to cover the requirements of (a)(4)?
(a)(4)?(a)(4)?
(a)(4)?
Is the concept of only evaluating fire Is the concept of only evaluating fire shutdown path equipmentshutdown path equipment-
-not core not core damage damage------acceptable?
acceptable?How should we focus safe shutdown


E.I. Hatch Fire Risk Equipment Identification Process Questions    to address in process Will the selection of equipment be adequate to cover the requirements of (a)(4)?
Is the concept of only evaluating fire shutdown path equipment equipmentnot core damage---
damage  ---acceptable?
acceptable?
How should we focus safe shutdown equipment list?
How should we focus safe shutdown equipment list?
equipment list?
E.I. Hatch Fire Risk Equipment E.I. Hatch Fire Risk Equipment Identification Process (Component List)Identification Process (Component List)
A and B RHR pumps A and B RHR pumps RCIC RCIC HPCI HPCI A and B RHR Service Water p um p s A and B RHR Service Water p um p s pp pp A and B Plant Service Water pumps A and B Plant Service Water pumps SRVs A, C, G, and H SRVs A, C, G, and H Core Spray
Core Spray Diesel Generators
Diesel Generators Room Ventilation for RHR Service Water pumps Room Ventilation for RHR Service Water pumps and Plant Service Water Pumps and Diesel and Plant Service Water Pumps and Diesel Generators.
Generators.
Fire Risk Evaluation and RMA Fire Risk Evaluation and RMA Basis Basis Current process includes quantitative risk Current process includes quantitative risk assessment plus defense assessment plus defense--in in--depth status paneldepth status panel Monitoring of these components would be via the Monitoring of these components would be via the EOOSsystem(colorcodedqualitativeapproach)
EOOSsystem(colorcodedqualitativeapproach)
EOOS system (color coded qualitative approach) EOOS system (color coded qualitative approach) used at the site for work planning. used at the site for work planning.
Preliminary plans are a logic model evaluating the Preliminary plans are a logic model evaluating the availability of equipment and its effect on the 3 availability of equipment and its effect on the 3 paths.paths.
Risk Management Actions (RMA) based on a RMA Risk Management Actions (RMA) based on a RMA decision tree would be implemented decision tree would be implemented Identification of Fire ScenariosIdentification of Fire Scenarios A qualitative tree implemented within


A qualitative tree implemented within EOOS EOOS Used to Identify removal of critical SSCs Used to Identify removal of critical SSCs neededforSafeShutdown(SSD) neededforSafeShutdown(SSD) needed for Safe Shutdown (SSD)needed for Safe Shutdown (SSD)
E.I. Hatch Fire Risk Equipment Identification Process (Component List)
Determine number of paths available (A  
A and B RHR pumps RCIC HPCI A and B RHR Service Water ppumps p
A and B Plant Service Water pumps SRVs A, C, G, and H Core Spray Diesel Generators Room Ventilation for RHR Service Water pumps and Plant Service Water Pumps and Diesel Generators.


Determine number of paths available (A train versus B train)train versus B train)
Fire Risk Evaluation and RMA Basis Current  process includes quantitative risk assessment plus defense defense--in in--depth status panel Monitoring of these components would be via the EOOS system (color coded qualitative approach) used at the site for work planning.
Communication of RMAsCommunication of RMAs The Plan of the Day will communicate The Plan of the Day will communicate areas with high fire risk impact.
Preliminary plans are a logic model evaluating the availability of equipment and its effect on the 3 paths.
areas with high fire risk impact.
Risk Management Actions (RMA) based on a RMA decision tree would be implemented
In place of the "roving fire watch" In place of the "roving fire watch" Work directly related to shutdown Work directly related to shutdown paths will be acknowledged via a paths will be acknowledged via a checklist.
checklist.
Communication of RMAsCommunication of RMAs Implement a list of actions based on  


Implement a list of actions based on possible safe shutdown degradationpossible safe shutdown degradationWork Planning should notify Fire Work Planning should notify Fire Protection Engineering for any Protection Engineering for any unanticipated casesunanticipated cases Fire Protection Engineering evaluates if
Identification of Fire Scenarios A qualitative tree implemented within EOOS Used to Identify removal of critical SSCs needed for Safe Shutdown (SSD)
Determine number of paths available (A train versus B train)


Fire Protection Engineering evaluates if additional fire protection is additional fire protection is merited/justified merited/justified Fire Protection Engineering Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation Evaluation Fire Protection Engineering is best equipped
Communication of RMAs The  Plan of the Day will communicate areas with high fire risk impact.
In place of the roving fire watch Work    directly related to shutdown paths will be acknowledged via a checklist.


Fire Protection Engineering is best equipped to determine whether additional fire to determine whether additional fire protection actions should be taken for any protection actions should be taken for any unanticipatedcases unanticipatedcases unanticipated cases unanticipated cases Assessing Safe Shutdown paths at Work
Communication of RMAs Implement a list of actions based on possible safe shutdown degradation Work Planning should notify Fire Protection Engineering for any unanticipated cases Fire Protection Engineering evaluates if additional fire protection is merited/justified


Assessing Safe Shutdown paths at Work Planning Stage provides additional Planning Stage provides additional assurance of maintenance of safe shutdown assurance of maintenance of safe shutdown capability capability Insights/Lessons LearnedInsights/Lessons Learned Need thoughtful approach to combine Need thoughtful approach to combine qualitative approach with internal events qualitative approach with internal events model model Fire Protection Pro gram needs to be Fire Protection Pro gram needs to be g
Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation Fire Protection Engineering is best equipped to determine whether additional fire protection actions should be taken for any unanticipated cases Assessing Safe Shutdown paths at Work Planning Stage provides additional assurance of maintenance of safe shutdown capability
g credited when evaluating fire risk as part of


credited when evaluating fire risk as part of (a)(4) program (a)(4) program Need to develop method for addressing Need to develop method for addressing large number of critical fire areas when a large number of critical fire areas when a safe shutdown path safe shutdown path is impacted is impacted}}
Insights/Lessons Learned Need  thoughtful approach to combine qualitative approach with internal events model Fire Protection Program g      needs to be credited when evaluating fire risk as part of (a)(4) program Need to develop method for addressing large number of critical fire areas when a safe shutdown path is impacted}}

Latest revision as of 02:23, 13 November 2019

Plant Hatch Fire Risk Monitoring
ML11090A091
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 04/05/2011
From:
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Bowen, Jeremy
Shared Package
ML11090A079 List:
References
NUMARC 93-01, Rev 4
Download: ML11090A091 (11)
v • d • e


Text

Plant Hatch -Fire Risk Monitoring Tabletop Pilot Process Primary objectives Identify Equipment Create Communications Plan Determination of Risk Impacts Provide Insights Process Lessons Learned

E.I. Hatch Fire Risk Equipment Identification Process

  • Qualitative Evaluation of Fire Risk with regards to daily work planning was not considered
  • Lack recently updated Fire PRA
  • Only the equipment associated with the three H t h safe Hatch f shutdown h td paths th was considered id d forf Fire Risk monitoring
  • Selected approach provides a qualitative look at the status of the equipment used to safely shut the plant down during and after a fire
  • Does not explicitly address core damage or large early release

E.I. Hatch Fire Risk Equipment Identification Process Questions to address in process Will the selection of equipment be adequate to cover the requirements of (a)(4)?

Is the concept of only evaluating fire shutdown path equipment equipmentnot core damage---

damage ---acceptable?

acceptable?

How should we focus safe shutdown equipment list?

E.I. Hatch Fire Risk Equipment Identification Process (Component List)

A and B RHR pumps RCIC HPCI A and B RHR Service Water ppumps p

A and B Plant Service Water pumps SRVs A, C, G, and H Core Spray Diesel Generators Room Ventilation for RHR Service Water pumps and Plant Service Water Pumps and Diesel Generators.

Fire Risk Evaluation and RMA Basis Current process includes quantitative risk assessment plus defense defense--in in--depth status panel Monitoring of these components would be via the EOOS system (color coded qualitative approach) used at the site for work planning.

Preliminary plans are a logic model evaluating the availability of equipment and its effect on the 3 paths.

Risk Management Actions (RMA) based on a RMA decision tree would be implemented

Identification of Fire Scenarios A qualitative tree implemented within EOOS Used to Identify removal of critical SSCs needed for Safe Shutdown (SSD)

Determine number of paths available (A train versus B train)

Communication of RMAs The Plan of the Day will communicate areas with high fire risk impact.

In place of the roving fire watch Work directly related to shutdown paths will be acknowledged via a checklist.

Communication of RMAs Implement a list of actions based on possible safe shutdown degradation Work Planning should notify Fire Protection Engineering for any unanticipated cases Fire Protection Engineering evaluates if additional fire protection is merited/justified

Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation Fire Protection Engineering is best equipped to determine whether additional fire protection actions should be taken for any unanticipated cases Assessing Safe Shutdown paths at Work Planning Stage provides additional assurance of maintenance of safe shutdown capability

Insights/Lessons Learned Need thoughtful approach to combine qualitative approach with internal events model Fire Protection Program g needs to be credited when evaluating fire risk as part of (a)(4) program Need to develop method for addressing large number of critical fire areas when a safe shutdown path is impacted

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