ML033160324
| ML033160324 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch, Kewaunee, Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/2003 |
| From: | Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML033160324 (7) | |
Text
NMC Participants
- Jerry Riste - Kewaunee -
Regulatory Affairs
- Steve Thomas - Prairie Island -
Engineering (by telephone)
- Dale Vincent - Prairie Island -
' Regulatory Affairs t _ ~~~NMD)
Prairie Island Meeting Purpose
- Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
- Fuel Handling Accident LAR
- Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant
- Equipment Hatch LAR I. -D N~~~~~
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PINGP Presentation Goal of LAR I* Selective implementation of AST
- Fuel Handling Accident
- Unit 1 Steam Generator Replacement
- Allow equipment hatch open during fuel
- Associated TS changes handling
- September 2004
- Short term goal
- Technical Specification Relief
- Long term goal
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.4, FHA Dose Analysis -,.',FHA Dose Analysis Selective Implementation of AST per
- Current Licensing Basis - FHA in SFP
- Proposed Licensing Basis . -[ i*off-site dose cdlculated
- FHA Inputs and Assumptions FHA in Containment with Airlock Doors Source Term Open
- Atmospheric Dispersion Factors
- Off-Site dose calculated
- Control Room Habitability
- Control Room dose calculated
- Results & Conclusions NMi~)
F
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.; FHA Dose Analysis FHA Dose Analysis
-aRG1.183 - SourceTerm
- - FHA in SFP or Containment bounded by a - Atmospheric Dispersion Factors single analysis Control Room Habitability
- Off-Site and Control Room Dose calculated
^:.,-,Source Term *;Gap Activity
- Fuel Assembly Activity ; Prairie Island Fuel Management program
- ORIGEN2 used to determine core inventory at can result in some fuel assemblies greater 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> following shutdown to bound than 6.3 kw/ft above 54 GWD/MTU.
^Yi. maximum fuel assembly burnup of 62 Site specific analysis using the GWD/MTU
! *Radial Peaking Factor of 1.65 Applied to methodology in ANS-5.4-1982 Determine Fuel Assembly Inventory Temperature and power distribution nputs from Westinghouse j . , ' " iF: . NMD . NM
, 'a s W.-
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FHA Dose Analysis FHA Dose Analysis
- Gap Activity (Continued)
- Gap Activity (Continued)
- Results - Conclusions Fraction *RG 1.183, Table 3, Gap Fractions are bounding Group Pi Result RG 1.183. Table 3 *RG 1.183, Table 3, Gap Fractions are used in the FHA Dose Analysis 1-131 0.036 0.08 Kr-A5 0.056 0.10 Other Noble Gases 0.024 0.05 -
Other Halogens 0.013 0.05 Alkali Metals 0.072 0.12 NM I. . NM I I,.,
- Release from Damaged Assembly
- Atmospheric Dispersion (x/Q)
- Minimum Pool Depth of 23 feet per Technical - Control Room Specifications ARCON96 used to determine X/Q for Control
- Pool Scrubbing - Overall DF of 200 for lodines Room receptor
- No credit for mixing or dilution in Containment or - Source/Receptor Pair selected to bound FHA in SFP Building Containnent or SF1'
- No credit for filtration in Containment or SFP Source Release Location - Aux Bldg Building a Receptor Location -Control Room Fresh Air Intake
- All Activity Released in Two Hours Five Yearsof Meteorological Data
- sMI u_,~~~NMC 1,
FHA Dose Analysis FHA Dose Analysis Atmospheric Dispersion (x/Q)
- Control Room (continued)
- Atmospheric Dispersion (x/Q)
ARCON96 used to determine x/Q for Control Room
- receptor (continued) -Control Room (continued)
- PI Meteorological Tower a Bounding X/Q is to 121 CR Vent Intake Redundant Instrumentation at both I0m and *X/Q for 0 - 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> time period is used for 60m elevations a nstrument Accuracies satisfy RG l.23. duration of the analysis a Monthly Functional Checks *X/Q -1.03E-02 sec/im3 a Annual Calibrations -a ,-
a Data reviewed by Plant Staff for Consistency a Independent (Annual) Review by Meteorological Consultant XNMC NM) 3
FHA Dose Analysis FHA Dose Analysis Atmospheric Dispersion (x/Q) Control Room Habitability
.t - Off-Site - Licensing Basis X/Qs for EAB and LPZ are from Current
- Analyzed to show that the limits in NUREG
- X/Q for 0 -8 hour time period is used for 0737, Item III.D.3.4, were satisfied duration of the analysis
- EAB x/Q - 6.49E-04 sec/m3
- System Description ,-.Control Room Habitability
- olation and Filtration - Unfiltered Inleakage
- Redundant Trains . ., *Tracer Gas Testing in 1998 4i . 9 - Automatic Isolation and Aligned for Filtration by SI or High Radiation Signal S 145*: cftn
- High Radiation Signal used for FHA - Redundant High Rad 1604- cfin Radiation Monitors Dose Analysis uses 510 cfm unfiltered
- Delay due to High Radiation9 Stpoint Included inleakage
- Filtration Flow Rate - Minimum Value per Technical Specifications
- Filter Fficiencies -Consistent with RG 1.5Z Rev. Z 7,bt
- and CAeneric Letter 99-0 NM i ;. j: ~NM FHA Dose Analysis FHA Dose Analysis Control Room Habitability Results
.,- Unfiltered Inleakage (Continued) Location Analysis Result Acceptance (TEDE) Criteria (TEDE)
- Enhancements to CRE and Vent System
- -* t - Replaced Intake and Exhaust (LIouvered Style) Air 7 r i, r >,4,r Dampers with Nubble Tight Style Dampers Control Room 4.0 5.0
- Replaced Door Seals
- Annual PM ' EAB 1.95 6.3
- Future Activities - Response to Generic Letter LPZ 0.53 6.3 2003-01
- LI l~~~r} . NMD NMCi
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FHA Dose Analysis Current PINGP TS Model
- Conclusions FHA - Containment or SFP:
- Analysis Performed Consistent with RG 1.183
- Bounding Dose Analysis Results are Less . ~CRSVS than the Acceptance Criteria in RG 1.183 ' 100 Hrs + eContainment
< Dose Limits
- 50 Hours after Shutdown
- No credit for Containment or Fuel Building I I SFVS (CR, EAB)
Isolation
- No credit for Containment or Fuel Buildiig Filtration I ,~~~~~~~~~-2
- NM a
I Current PINGP TS Model Proposed AST FHA TS Model
- TS for: I FHA - Containment or SFP:
- Containment Purge/Inservice Purge Isolation Instrumentation (3.3.5)
- CR Ventilation Actuation (3.3.6)
- SFP Ventilation Actuation Instrumentation (3.3.7)
- CR Ventilation (3.7.10)
I 50 Hrs + LCRVS ] Dose Limits (CR, EAB)
- SFP Ventilation (3.7.13)
- Refueling Containment Integrity (3.9A)
X NM 10 CFR 50.36 Criterion 1 10 CFR 50.36 Criterion 2
- Installed instrumentation that is used to
- A process variable, design feature, or detect ... a significant abnormal operating restriction that is an initial degradation of the reactor coolant condition of a DBA or transient analysis pressure boundary. that either assumes the failure of or
- No - all HA mitigating TS presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
- No - all FHA mitigating TS MNM) NM) 1~~~~~~~~~A-5
10 CFR 50.36 Criterion 3 10 CFR 50.36 Criterion 4
- A structur system or component that ;-A structure, system or component is part of the primarv success path and -c which operatin g experience or which functions or actuates to mitigate probabilistic risk assessment has shown a DBA or transient that either assumes to be significant to public health and the failure of or present a challenge to
-' safety.
the integrity of a fission product barrier.
- Yes - CR Ventilation and Actuation
.;, . ~~~~NMiz NM) roposed AST TS Model -pg 1 ,;Proposed AST TS Model -pg 2
- Containment Purge/Inservice Purge Isolation -. SFP Ventilation Actuation Instrumentation
, Instrumentation (3.3.5) (3.3.7)
- Delete Applicability during movement of - Delete TS and associated Bases irradiated fuel assemblies '*, CR Ventilation (3.7.10) if::- Delete associated Conditions and Required No cdanes Actions SFP Ventilation (3.7.13)
- Revise dssWciated Bases DcleteT and associated Bases CR Ventilation Actuation (3.3.6) -'* Refueling Containment Integrity (3.9.4)
- No(hanges D lete T anddassociated Bases
, -& -!, 1 _NM NMC~
Proposed AST TS Model -pg 3 .TSTF-51 considerations
[ Also have miscellaneous cleanup in ;l -. TSTF added "recently", e.g.
- 'During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies' other TS and Bases:
- 5.5.9 VFTP - delete reference to SFP Special
- PINGP AST assumes 50 hr decay time and Inservice Purge Ventilation System * ,_Cannot physically handle fuel in less time PINGP proposes to delete TS
- Bases reference removal/changes in 3.6.1, Containment; 3.6.2, Containment Air ' Minimize TS Applicability confusion
- SFP, Containment TS never apply Locks; and 3.6.3, Containment Isolation -CRectricPowerfSalwaysapply Valves
- Commit to NUMARC 93-01
- ',' ' raw ~NM X..,l ~ ~ ~ ~ NM 6
Commitment to Defense in NUMARC 93-01 Depth During huehandlingicore alterations ventilation system and radiation
- The NMC LARs will commit to the monitor availability (as defined in NUMARC 91.06) should be assessed.with respect to filtration and monitoring of releases from the guidelines of NUMARC 93-01, Revision fuel. Following shutdown. radioactivity In the FtCSdecays away fairly rapidly. The basis ofithe Technical Specification operabilty 3, Section 11.3.6, "Assessment amendment Is he reduction In doses due to such decay. The goal of maintaining venblation system and radiation monitor availability Is to Methods of Shutdown Conditions," reduce doses even fUrther below that provided by the natural decay and to avoid unmonkiored releases Subsection 11.3.6.5 A single normal or contingency method to promptly dose primary or secondary containment penetrations shouid be developed. Such prompt methods need not completey block the penetration or be capabe of resung pressure. The purpose is to enableventilation sytems to dr;awthe release from a postulated fuel handling accident In NM) the proper direction such that it can be treated and monitored. NMiCj1
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Schedule ' Conclusion I,i:
- Submit LAR r. Comments?
- LAR Approval September 1, 2004
- Questions?
- Unit 1 Outage September 10, 2004
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