ML033160324
| ML033160324 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch, Kewaunee, Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/2003 |
| From: | Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML033160324 (7) | |
Text
NMC Participants
- Jerry Riste - Kewaunee -
Regulatory Affairs
- Steve Thomas - Prairie Island -
Engineering (by telephone)
- Dale Vincent - Prairie Island -
Regulatory Affairs t
~~~NMD)
Prairie Island Meeting Purpose
- Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
- Fuel Handling Accident LAR
- Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant
- Equipment Hatch LAR NM)
'3~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~
^
I.
I.
N~~~~~
-D PINGP Presentation I*
Selective implementation of AST
- Fuel Handling Accident
- Associated TS changes NM) 5~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Goal of LAR
- Unit 1 Steam Generator Replacement
- Allow equipment hatch open during fuel handling
- September 2004
- Short term goal
- Technical Specification Relief
- Long term goal 1
.4, FHA Dose Analysis Selective Implementation of AST per RG 1.183
- Current Licensing Basis
- Proposed Licensing Basis
- FHA Inputs and Assumptions Source Term
- Atmospheric Dispersion Factors
- Results & Conclusions NMi~)
-,.',FHA Dose Analysis
- FHA - Current Licensing Basis
- RG 1.25
. -[ i *off-site dose cdlculated FHA in Containment with Airlock Doors Open
- Off-Site dose calculated
- Control Room dose calculated F
NM )
.; FHA Dose Analysis
- FHA - Proposed Licensing Basis
-aRG1.183
- FHA in SFP or Containment bounded by a single analysis
- Off-Site and Control Room Dose calculated I~~~~~~~~NI FHA Dose Analysis FHA Inputs and Assumptions
- SourceTerm
- Atmospheric Dispersion Factors Control Room Habitability s
~~NMiD FHA Dose Analysis
^:.,-,Source Term
- Fuel Assembly Activity
- ORIGEN2 used to determine core inventory at 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> following shutdown to bound
^ Y i.
maximum fuel assembly burnup of 62 GWD/MTU
- Radial Peaking Factor of 1.65 Applied to Determine Fuel Assembly Inventory j., ' " iF:
NMD
, 'a s W.-
FHA Dose Analysis
- Gap Activity Prairie Island Fuel Management program can result in some fuel assemblies greater than 6.3 kw/ft above 54 GWD/MTU.
Site specific analysis using the methodology in ANS-5.4-1982 Temperature and power distribution nputs from Westinghouse NM 2
FHA Dose Analysis
- Gap Activity (Continued)
- Results Fraction Group Pi Result RG 1.183. Table 3 1-131 0.036 0.08 Kr-A5 0.056 0.10 Other Noble Gases 0.024 0.05 Other Halogens 0.013 0.05 Alkali Metals 0.072 0.12 NM FHA Dose Analysis
- Gap Activity (Continued)
- Conclusions
- RG 1.183, Table 3, Gap Fractions are bounding
NM I
I,.,
FHA Dose Analysis
- Release from Damaged Assembly
- Minimum Pool Depth of 23 feet per Technical Specifications
- Pool Scrubbing - Overall DF of 200 for lodines
- No credit for mixing or dilution in Containment or SFP Building
- No credit for filtration in Containment or SFP Building
- All Activity Released in Two Hours
- sMI FHA Dose Analysis
- Atmospheric Dispersion (x/Q)
- Control Room ARCON96 used to determine X/Q for Control Room receptor
- Source/Receptor Pair selected to bound FHA in Containnent or SF1' Source Release Location - Aux Bldg a Receptor Location -Control Room Fresh Air Intake Five Yearsof Meteorological Data u_,~~~NMC 1,
FHA Dose Analysis Atmospheric Dispersion (x/Q)
- Control Room (continued)
ARCON96 used to determine x/Q for Control Room receptor (continued)
- PI Meteorological Tower Redundant Instrumentation at both I0m and 60m elevations a nstrument Accuracies satisfy RG l.23.
a Monthly Functional Checks a Annual Calibrations
-a,-
a Data reviewed by Plant Staff for Consistency a Independent (Annual) Review by Meteorological Consultant XNMC FHA Dose Analysis
- Atmospheric Dispersion (x/Q)
-Control Room (continued) a Bounding X/Q is to 121 CR Vent Intake
- X/Q for 0 - 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> time period is used for duration of the analysis
- X/Q -1.03E-02 sec/im3 NM) 3
FHA Dose Analysis Atmospheric Dispersion (x/Q) t Off-Site X/Qs for EAB and LPZ are from Current Licensing Basis (FSAR)
- X/Q for 0 -8 hour time period is used for duration of the analysis
- EAB x/Q - 6.49E-04 sec/m3
- Licensing Basis
- Analyzed to show that the limits in NUREG 0737, Item III.D.3.4, were satisfied NMC FHA Dose Analysis W* Control Room Habitability
- System Description
- olation and Filtration
- Redundant Trains 4i. 9
- Automatic Isolation and Aligned for Filtration by SI or High Radiation Signal
- High Radiation Signal used for FHA - Redundant Radiation Monitors
- Delay due to High Radiation9 Stpoint Included
- Filtration Flow Rate - Minimum Value per Technical Specifications
- Filter Fficiencies -Consistent with RG 1.5Z Rev. Z and CAeneric Letter 99-0 NM FHA Dose Analysis
- Unfiltered Inleakage
- Tracer Gas Testing in 1998 S
145*: cftn High Rad 1604-cfin Dose Analysis uses 510 cfm unfiltered inleakage i ;.
j:
~NM 7,bt FHA Dose Analysis Control Room Habitability Unfiltered Inleakage (Continued)
- Enhancements to CRE and Vent System
- -* t
- Replaced Intake and Exhaust (LIouvered Style) Air 7 i,
>,4,r r r Dampers with Nubble Tight Style Dampers
- Replaced Door Seals
- Annual PM
- Future Activities - Response to Generic Letter 2003-01
- LI l~~~r}
NMD FHA Dose Analysis Results Location Analysis Result Acceptance (TEDE)
Criteria (TEDE)
Control Room 4.0 5.0 EAB 1.95 6.3 LPZ 0.53 6.3 NMCi
' 14 s 4
FHA Dose Analysis
- Conclusions
- Analysis Performed Consistent with RG 1.183
- Bounding Dose Analysis Results are Less than the Acceptance Criteria in RG 1.183
- 50 Hours after Shutdown
- No credit for Containment or Fuel Building Isolation
- No credit for Containment or Fuel Buildiig Filtration Current PINGP TS Model FHA - Containment or SFP:
~CRSVS 100 Hrs +
eContainment
< Dose Limits I I SFVS (CR, EAB)
I
,~~~~~~~~~-2 NM a:
Current PINGP TS Model
- TS for:
- Containment Purge/Inservice Purge Isolation Instrumentation (3.3.5)
- CR Ventilation Actuation (3.3.6)
- SFP Ventilation Actuation Instrumentation (3.3.7)
- CR Ventilation (3.7.10)
- SFP Ventilation (3.7.13)
- Refueling Containment Integrity (3.9A)
I I
I Proposed AST FHA TS Model FHA - Containment or SFP:
50 Hrs + LCRVS ]
Dose Limits (CR, EAB)
X NM 10 CFR 50.36 Criterion 1
- Installed instrumentation that is used to detect... a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
- No - all HA mitigating TS MNM) 1~~~~~~~~~A-10 CFR 50.36 Criterion 2
- A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a DBA or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
- No - all FHA mitigating TS NM) 5
10 CFR 50.36 Criterion 3
- A structur system or component that is part of the primarv success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a DBA or transient that either assumes the failure of or present a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
- Yes - CR Ventilation and Actuation No - all other FHA mitigating TS
~~~~NMiz 10 CFR 50.36 Criterion 4
- -A structure, system or component
-c which operatin g experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and
-' safety.
- Containment Purge/Inservice Purge Isolation Instrumentation (3.3.5)
- Delete Applicability during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies if::-
Delete associated Conditions and Required Actions
- Revise dssWciated Bases CR Ventilation Actuation (3.3.6)
- No(hanges 1
_NM
,;Proposed AST TS Model -pg 2
-. SFP Ventilation Actuation Instrumentation (3.3. 7)
- Delete TS and associated Bases
'*, CR Ventilation (3.7.10)
No c danes SFP Ventilation (3.7.13)
Dclete T and associated Bases
-'* Refueling Containment Integrity (3.9.4)
D lete T anddassociated Bases NMC~
Proposed AST TS Model -pg 3
[ Also have miscellaneous cleanup in other TS and Bases:
- 5.5.9 VFTP - delete reference to SFP Special and Inservice Purge Ventilation System
- Bases reference removal/changes in 3.6.1, Containment; 3.6.2, Containment Air Locks; and 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves raw
~NM
.TSTF-51 considerations
- l -. TSTF added "recently", e.g.
- 'During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies'
- ,_ Cannot physically handle fuel in less time PINGP proposes to delete TS
' Minimize TS Applicability confusion
- SFP, Containment TS never apply
-CRectricPowerfSalwaysapply
- Commit to NUMARC 93-01 X..,l ~
~
~
~
NM 6
Commitment to Defense in Depth
- The NMC LARs will commit to the guidelines of NUMARC 93-01, Revision 3, Section 11.3.6, "Assessment Methods of Shutdown Conditions,"
Subsection 11.3.6.5 NM)
NUMARC 93-01 During hue handlingicore alterations ventilation system and radiation monitor availability (as defined in NUMARC 91.06) should be assessed. with respect to filtration and monitoring of releases from the fuel. Following shutdown. radioactivity In the FtCS decays away fairly rapidly. The basis of ithe Technical Specification operabilty amendment Is he reduction In doses due to such decay. The goal of maintaining venblation system and radiation monitor availability Is to reduce doses even fUrther below that provided by the natural decay and to avoid unmonkiored releases A single normal or contingency method to promptly dose primary or secondary containment penetrations shouid be developed. Such prompt methods need not completey block the penetration or be capabe of resung pressure. The purpose is to enable ventilation sytems to dr;aw the release from a postulated fuel handling accident In the proper direction such that it can be treated and monitored.
NMiCj1
,ia~~~~~~~~~~~
Schedule
- Submit LAR
- LAR Approval September 1, 2004
- Unit 1 Outage September 10, 2004
. ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1
,.c--
' Conclusion I,i:
r.
Comments?
- Questions?
NM wg ".
.~~~~~~~~~~--'
7