ML12023A023

2011 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Initial Examination Operating Test Review Comments

ML12023A023
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	12/27/2011
From:	Operations Branch III
To:
References
Download: ML12023A023 (5)

Text

Operating Test Comments Davis-Besse Exam 2011 Generic:

1. If we are giving an EAL JPM after each scenario, the cue sheet for this JPM should also have the statement, This is a time critical JPM. Have all SROs complete this JPM with first round of scenarios. Change JPM to a classification upgrade. RE: Removed EAL JPM from end of scenario.

This JPM will be done independent of scenario in the schedule.

2. Does Control Room (Simulator) have display for wind speed and wind direction? If so, this should not be given to the individual, but he should know how to obtain this information.

RE: No, control room panels used to have this indication. Now indication is on computer.

Scenario 1:

1. Scenario only has one component failure for BOP. This scenario needs to be run with two other scenarios to ensure the crew gets proper number of beans.

RE: OK as is.

2. Event 2: Need to add steps from DB-OP-06221 for starting CD pump. RE: CD 420/421 may or may not be operated. Step added.

3. Why do you need Event 4 since the SRO already has two TS calls in this scenario? It is not an instrument/component failure, does not involve the rest of the crew, is it necessary?

RE: Minimum is 2 Tech Spec calls, keep 3rd TS call in! Need to reference correct TS, TS 3.4.16!

4. Event 5: Need to add contingent entry into TS 3.4.1 should pzr press drop below DNB limit. RE:

Added. Need to ensure applicant picks up proper keys to open RPS cabinets. RE: Added Keys 32, 33 & 36.

5. Event 6: Why initiate SFRCS on a Circ Water system rupture?

RE: Anticipatory loss of feedwater pumps, taught to initiate SFRCS.

Scenario 2:

1. Event 3, if operators reduced Rx power to the point of taking a MFP off line, how much runback will there be if the MFP is tripped? What consequence would there be if operators did not runback Rx/FW? RE: Must start scenario from 90% power in lieu of 70% to ensure operators detect failure of ICS to runback. Also reduced ramp rate to 1% per minute.

2. Event 5: Is equipment operable or inoperable? RE: Will note that VY1 is operable in scenario.

3. Event 6: Need to add that BOP checks RE 1003A/B (Vacuum RE). RE: Added.

Delete reference to EAL Classification for JPM since JPM is removed from Scenario! RE: EAL Classification removed.

Lump ATC actions and SRO notifications in one box. RE: Done.

4. Events 7, 8, 9: Page 12, 3rd action, verify RC 10 in what position? RE: Verified Open.

Pg 13, add in maximum allowed cooldown rate. RE: 100°F/hr added

5. During this major, will the applicants duplicate JPM #1? RE: JPM is down the road from where the Scenario 2 ends. NO duplication.

Scenario 3:

1. Add additional event for BOP to ensure enough beans for BOP. RE: Added Main Seal Oil Pump Shaft Shear.

2. Event 1: Valve AS1934 is operated by operator in Control Room. RE: Added step for BOP to do from CR. Also added note that GS2385 may indicate closed but valve is actually cracked open.

3. Event 2: Add operators to illuminate blue AFW inop light. RE: Added

4. Event 4: Operators will reduce reactor power to about 25% after CRD equipment problems not 50%. Also, power stabilization will take place prior to MU32 diagnosis RE: Changed from 50%

to 32%, removed ATC stabilizing power from MU32 actions.

5. Events 7 - 9: What level will operators control SGWL? Also, Train 2 equipment needs to be started, not Train 1 equipment. RE: Changes made.

Scenario 4:

1. Event 2/3: Need to reference TS for this item since it is designated TS for SRO on ES-D-1 cover page. RE: Added Tech Specs 3.2.1, 3.4.9 for SRO review.

2. Event 5, 6, 7: There are no BOP actions for starting the motor driven feed water pump in the scenario. RE: Added actions for starting MDFP, pg 12.

3. Event 7, Are the SFAS panels the responsibility of the ATC operator? If the BOP ids the component failure, there may be inadequate instrument/component malfunction opportunities for the ATC operator in this scenario. RE: This should be done by the ATC operators.

Plant JPM #1:

1. Added follow-up action to have applicant show where locked valve keys are kept.

2. Added clarification on criticality of rotating valves off of backseat.

Plant JPM #2:

1. Added cue for charger current indication.

Plant JPM #3:

1. It doesnt appear that Performance Steps 8, 19, 20 and 22, verification steps, are Critical!

RE: Step 8 left as CRITICAL due to importance of alignment. Step 19 and all subsequent steps deleted since they were not critical to the assigned task.

2. Added cue (noise of turbine acceleration and RPM rising) to step where Trip Throttle Valve is cracked open.

Admin JPM #2:

1. Procedure DB-PF-03272, step 4.2.4 is performed if the stroke times exceeded the maximum allowable stroke times. It has you N/A step 4.2.5. This is the step that has you stroke time the valve a second time. Must add something in JPM to compensate for procedure deficiency!

RE: As written, its correct as is, since less than maximum allowable stroke time.

2. This appears to be a system JPM rather than an Admin since system components are manipulated.

a) Time must exceed max allowable for TS call for SRO.

b) RO JPM ends when RO reports discrepant condition to SRO.

c) SRO must make operability call, what TS LCO applicable before JPM ends.

RE1: Leave JPM as is for RO JPM. But for SROs, exceed maximum allowable stroke time and have SROs enter TS LCO for unsat.

RE2: SRO JPM will be rewritten to provide SRO with a completed surveillance procedure that is incorrectly signed off as SATISFACTORY. SRO will have to identify that valve stroke time is exceeded, declare the valve inoperable, and identify the required Tech Spec Actions.

Admin JPM #3:

1. Is it necessary to tag the control switch in the control room? RE: Tagging procedure red tags breaker, and puts a tag on switch in CR. Not critical to JPM.

2. Are NT Vents and Drains critical to JPM? RE: Critical to JPM to open vent and drains.

3. Copy of NOBP-OP-1001 should not be handed to applicant until procedure is located. RE: OK!

4. We need a better description for Tag Types and when each is appropriate.

5. We may be able to do this JPM in a classroom setting with all the ROs at the same time, but well need enough system drawings. RE: Need to evaluate during OV. Determined that can be performed in classroom setting with all ROs Admin JPM #4:

1. Done with in-plant JPMs. RE: Yes!

2. Do we need to tell the applicants that they need to check out a detector or is it sufficient to simply say that RP coverage is not available, and that Onsite Emergency Response facilities are not manned. RE: Initiating Cue revised to eliminate mention of specific meter.

3. JPM revised to allow applicant to choose one of two available meters. Applicable steps have been added for the two different meter types.

4. Performance step 13 should probably be a critical step. RE: Steps to replace shield plug were changed to critical.

5. Have first drawn instrument fail source check. (Critical step) RE: JPM revised to have meter fail the battery check instead.

6. Change initial rad level condition to verify meter required (Need procedure reference to verify).

RE: Rad level change was determined to be unnecessary.

Admin JPM #5:

1. Title for this JPM on ES 301-1 needs to be changed from Comp actions for removing EDG Deluge valve to Comp actions for removing fire suppression for Startup Transformer 01. RE Sprinkler system changed to Aux Boiler to eliminate two possible outcomes.

2. Will closing FP 126 in the yard isolate any other FP component requiring additional compensatory actions for that isolated component? RE: No

3. Copy of DB-FP-00009 should not be handed to applicant until procedure is located.

4. Attachment 4, has an error associated with reference to FHAR 8.2.2 RE: New system identified and Attachment 4 marked up appropriately.

5. Step 5 should not be critical since no comp measure is required. RE: Critical Steps reevaluated and identified appropriately.

Admin JPM #6:

1. Bank JPM drawn to replace classification call in scenarios. No comments.

Sim JPM #1:

1. Must ensure that we do not repeat this JPM in Scenario #2!

RE: Will not get this far in Scenario.

2. What is function of TBV/MSIV interlock in Step 5?

RE: MSIVs closed transfers ICS control to Atm Vent Valves. Remove Fuse to open TBVs. Fuse not simulated. Must tell applicant that condition met.

3. Add cue at step 14 to inform applicant that Attachment 16 will be assigned to another operator.

RE: Added

4. Moves cues into the step where it is applicable. RE: Done (steps 14, 16, 18, and 20)

Sim JPM #2:

1. JPM is does not have an Alternate Path RE: Removed A from ES 301-2 sheets for RO and SRO(I).

2. Recommend terminating JPM after Control Rods returned to Full Out. RE: Subsequent steps deleted.

Sim JPM #3:

1. JPM is does not have an Alternate Path RE: Sat as is since need to operate a key switch to reset RPS in lieu of depressing a toggle switch.

2. Added location information to JPM to aid evaluator.

Sim JPM #4:

1. Are the Auxiliary Building Radioactive Waste Fans instrumented to cause an alarm in the control room should they trip? RE: No alarm generated on fan trip. If so, then have the fans running when starting the JPM, and have them trip during the discharge. The applicant should then diagnose the loss of the fans and take corrective action rather than telling him the fans have tripped. Or, have them get a high radiation alarm condition that has them also stopping the evolution. RE: Added high radiation alarm condition.

Sim JPM #5:

1. Added cue to Step 1 for Nuclear Engineer response.

Sim JPM #6:

1. Split Performance Step 6 into four separate steps.

Sim JPM #7:

1. Title on ES 301-2 does not match up with JPM title. RE: Updated titles to be consistent.

2. Reworded Initiating Cue to ensure that applicant understands that Bus A must be energized from Startup Transformer.

3. Added NOTES to instructor for clarification.

Sim JPM #8:

1. JPM is does not have an Alternate Path RE: Sat as is since operator must trip HD Drain pumps since they did not automatically trip previously.

2. Added cues related to local verification of Heater Drain Pumps status.

Sim JPM #9:

1. Applicant SRO(U), should select the alternate feed path rather than being directed to use HPI.

RE: Applicant makes decision first and asks for which pump to use later. Must check during OV week!

2. Added clarifying information for evaluator use.

3. Moved external cues to appropriate steps.