Text

Ile Proposed Exam Scenarios
	ML22116A059
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	02/24/2022
From:	Chuck Zoia; NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
To:	; Energy Harbor Corp, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
	Zoia C
Shared Package
ML20120A253	List: ML22116A059;
References
	L-21-267
	Download: ML22116A059 (60)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 1 of 22 Facility:

Davis-Besse Scenario No.

1 Op Test No.:

DB1LOT22 Examiners:

Operators:

SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: 100% Power Turnover: Maintain 100% Power Planned: Shift Routines Critical tasks:

1. Close the Pressurizer Spray Valve and PORV Block Valve

2. Restore RCP Seal Return Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

(N) ATC Place Purification Demin 3 I/S per Chemistry request 2

(I) ATC Leaking Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) (TS) 3 (C) BOP Trip TPCW Pump 1 Hi Bearing Temp / Start STBY pump 4

Inverter YV1 DC input failure (TS) 5 (R) ATC/(C) BOP TPCW Pump 2 trips / Lower power to capacity of 1 pump 6

Major Steam Leak in CTMT / Trip Reactor 7

(C) BOP AFP 1 Trips - Start the MDFP (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 2 of 22 DAVIS-BESSE 2022 SCENARIO 1 Event 1 Place Purification Demin 3 I/S per Chemistry request The Crew will take the watch with power at 100%. They will then brief placing Purification Demin 3 in service for 20 minutes per Chemistry request. The ATC will swap purification demineralizers IAW DB-OP-06006, Makeup and Purification System, Section 3.14 Switching Purification Demineralizers. When #3 Purification Demin is in service then the Lead Evaluator will cue Event 2, PORV Leakage Event 2 Leakage Past the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) (TS) (CT)

Leakage past the PORV is indicated by additional Pressurizer Heaters energizing and several RCS low pressure annunciators. If no operator action is taken, a reactor Trip could occur in less than 60 seconds with a subsequent Loss of Subcooling Margin. The expected operator action is to close the PORV Block Valve.

Event 3 Trip Turbine Plant Cooling Water (TPCW) Pump due to Hi Bearing Temp / Start STBY pump TPCW Pump 1 Hi Bearing Temp. The BOP will stop TPCW Pump 1 and start the TPCW Pump

3. The system procedure may be used to swap pumps or the abnormal may be used after stopping #1 TPCW Pump.

Event 4 Inverter YV1 DC input failure (TS)

At the Lead Evaluators cue, INV YV1-YV3 TRBL Annunciator alarm will be received, and an Equipment Operator will report a Low DC Voltage light on YV1 and breaker D1P03 found in the tripped position. Inverter YV1 will be declared Inoperable. Tech Spec 3.8.7, Condition A, for Inverters-Operating will be entered.

Event 5 TPCW Pump 2 trips / Lower power to capacity of 1 pump At the Lead Evaluators cue, TPCW Pump 2 will trip due to a ground fault. The crew will enter Rapid Shutdown and lower power to within the capacity of 1 TPCW Pump, ~65% Power.

Event 6 Steam Leak in CTMT From Main Steam Line 2 / Trip reactor (CT)

The Lead Evaluator will cue the Main Steam Line break in Containment. DB-OP-02525, Steam Leaks, will be implemented. The crew will lower power to low level limits (~30% power) then trip the reactor and Initiate and Isolate the Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS).

When the reactor is tripped the steam leak will get bigger causing Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Level 3 to actuate due to high Containment pressure. MU38, RCP Seal Return will Auto Close, starting a 30-minute clock to either restore seal return flow to all RCPs or stop any pump not having its seal return flow path restored.

Event 7 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (AFP) 1 Trips - Start the Motor Driver Feedwater Pump (MDFP)

The crew will route to DB-OP-02000 Section 7 for the overcooling event. The BOP will Close AF599 and blowdown SG #2 to terminate the overcooling. Event 7 will trip AFP 1. The BOP is expected to recognize this failure and either place the MDFP in service for AFP 1 or align AFP 2 to feed SG 1.

When Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal Return is restored, or the RCPs are stopped the scenario can be terminated.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

1 Page 1

of 1

Event

Description:

Place Purification Demin 3 I/S per Chemistry request Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 3 of 22 Indications Available:

MU10B HISMU10B MU1903 HIS1903 RCS Letdown Pressure P719 ATC Notify Radiation Protection the Purification Demineralizers are being switched.

ATC Switch Purification Demineralizers:

Open MU1903, PURIFICATION DEMIN 3 LETDOWN FLOW INLET, using HIS1903.

Close MU10B, MIXED BED 2 LETDOWN INLET, using HISMU10B.

The crew should set a 20 minute timer, but switching Purification demineralizers back to #2 in service during this scenario is not required.

ATC Switch Purification Demineralizers:

Open MU10B, MIXED BED 2 LETDOWN INLET, using HISMU10B.

Close MU1903, PURIFICATION DEMIN 3 LETDOWN FLOW INLET, using HIS1903.

Continue with Event 2 at the direction of the Lead Evaluator

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 1

of 2

Event

Description:

PORV Leakage (TS) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 4 of 22 Indications Available:

Annunciator 4-1-D PZR RLF VLV OPEN Annunciator 4-4-C HOT LEG PRESS LO PORV Acoustic Indication Red Lights Lit Team Recognize indications of leakage past the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV)

Critical Task ATC

Perform the Supplementary Actions of DB-OP-02513: (CT)

Close RC11 PORV Block using HIS RC11 SRO REFER TO Tech Specs 3.4.11, Pressurizer Pilot Operated Relief Valve (PORV), and comply with requirements.

LCO 3.4.11 The PORV and associated block valve shall be operable in MODES 1, 2 and 3 CONDITION A: PORV Inoperable A.1 Close block valve.

AND A.2 Remove power from block valve.

The remaining steps of Event 2 are not required to be observed before proceeding to Event 3 SRO Determine the RCS leak rate (may be estimated using 1 inch in MU Tank equals 30 gallons), REFER TO DB-SP-03357, RCS Water Inventory Balance.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 2

of 2

Event

Description:

PORV Leakage (TS) (CT)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 5 of 22 SRO /

TEAM REFER TO Tech Specs 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, and comply with requirements.

Determine Closing the PORV Block Valve has stopped all PORV leakage TEAM Verify proper Quench Tank operation. Refer to DB-OP-06004, Quench Tank.

Consult with Plant Management (Shift manager) as necessary to confirm that normal operation may continue. Request the Shift manager to Refer to the following:

Change in nuclear safety risk Pressurizer boron concentration buildup.

Technical Requirements Manual for Reactor Coolant System Vents Technical Requirements Manual for PAM Instrumentation 8.3.7, Table 8.3.7-1, Function 3, RC11 Position Indicator.

NOP-OP-1015, Event Notifications.

DB-OP-01200, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Management. NOP-OP-1010, Operational Decision Making DB-OP-06003, Pressurizer System Operations (operation with PORV Block closed)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

3 Page 1

of 1

Event

Description:

TPCW Pump 1 High Temperature Upper Motor Bearing Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 6 of 22 Indications Available:

T159 TPCW Pump 1 Upper Motor Bearing Oil Temperature CREW Recognize computer alarm T159 indicating high temperature Turbine Plant Cooling Water (TPCW) Pump 1 Upper Motor Bearing Oil Temperature BOP Dispatch Equipment Operator to evaluate TPCW Pump 1 Booth Cue Equipment Operator reports:

There is no oil level indicated in TPCW Pump 1 upper motor bearing sight glass and (if still running) there is a loud sound coming from the bearing SRO Direct stopping TPCW Pump 1 Annunciator 11-1-F TPCW HI-LVL-TK LVL is expected

BOP/SRO Stop TPCW Pump 1 using HIS627 SRO Enter DB-OP-02514, TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTIONS SRO Direct placing TPCW Pump 3 in service per DB-OP-02514, TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTIONS

BOP/SRO Start TPCW Pump 3 using HIS629 CREW Monitor TPCW Tank Levels and System flow rate Proceed to Event 4, Inverter YV1 DC input failure (TS)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

4 Page 1

of 1

Event

Description:

Inverter YV1 DC input failure (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 7 of 22 Indications Available:

1-6-A INV YV1-YV3 TRBL D1P03 Red Light is Off Computer Point Q424 YV1 TRBL CREW Respond to DB-OP-02001, Electrical Distribution Alarm Panel 1 Annunciators, 1-6-A CREW Recognize Inverter YV1 DC input failure D1P03 red light is off Computer Point Q424, YV1 TRBL SRO Refer to DB-OP-06319, Instrument AC System Procedure, Sect.

5.1, Response to INV YV1 TRBL Alarms CREW Dispatch an Equipment Operator to YV1 Booth Cue Role Play as Equipment Operator and report:

The LOW DC VOLTAGE red light is ON and Breaker D1P03 for Inverter YV1 is tripped.

SRO Declare Inverter YV1 Inoperable.

LCO 3.8.7, The Train 1 and Train 2 inverters shall be OPERABLE, is not met Enter Condition A: One inverter inoperable REQUIRED ACTION: A1 Restore inverter to OPERABLE status COMPLETION TIME: 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months SRO Contact Electrical Maintenance to investigate When Tech Spec has been declared and at Lead Evaluators direction, proceed to Event 5, TPCW Pump 2 Trip

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

5 Page 1

of 4

Event

Description:

TPCW Pump 2 trips/Lower Power to capacity of 1 Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 8 of 22 Indications Available:

Green trip light ON, Motor current at zero (11-1-F) TPCW HI LVL TK LVL TPCW HLCWT level lowering as indicated at LI 1588A CREW Recognize Turbine Plant Cooling Water (TPCW) Pump 2 Trip BOP Dispatch Equipment Operator to check pump and breaker Booth Cue Role play as Equipment Operator and report:

Theres nothing abnormal at TPCW Pump 2 Theres a 50 GS (ground sensor) flag on Breaker AD206 for TPCW Pump 2 SRO Enter DB-OP-02514, Turbine Plant Cooling Water Malfunctions Section 4.1 Loss of One Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

5 Page 2

of 4

Event

Description:

TPCW Pump 2 trips/Lower Power to capacity of 1 Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 9 of 22 SRO /

ATC REFER TO DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown to reduce Reactor power until system heat load is within the capacity of one TPCW Pump (approximately 4000 gpm)

Direct the ATC Operator to perform Attachment 1, Power Reduction Actions ICS Full Automatic At the LOAD CONTROL Panel, set the rate of change Select the target RTP Monitor power Expected Target Load is 50% with 3-5% per minute rate of change SRO/BOP Notify the System Dispatcher AND verify generator MVARs are between 0 and 50 MVARs OUT.

NOTE: 16-2-B may alarm if the AVR lower limit is reached SRO/BOP Dispatch an EO to locally throttle the running TPCW Pump's discharge valve and maintain discharge pressure greater than 50 psig.

Booth Cue Role play as EO, Discharge pressure on TPCW Pump 3 is ~70 psig, throttling is not required SRO Notify the Shift Manager to:

REFER TO DB-OP-00002, Operations Section Event/Incident Notifications and Actions.

REFER TO NOBP-OP-0011, Fleet Reporting and Updates.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

5 Page 3

of 4

Event

Description:

TPCW Pump 2 trips/Lower Power to capacity of 1 Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 10 of 22 NOTE: It is not required to complete the following steps to continue with the scenario. If desired by the Lead Examiner, Event 6 can be inserted here.

BOP/SRO Perform DB-OP-02514 Attachment 2, TPCW Load Reduction.

o Dispatch an Operator to adjust the setpoint for TIC 2396B, GEN H2 CLRS WTR OUT TEMP IND CTRL to 113°F and monitor Generator Cold Gas temperature START the EIAC o Direct an EO to Open SA6445, INSTRUMENT AIR /

STATION AIR CROSSTIE SOLENOID.

Place the following equipment in LOCKOUT Station Air Compressor 1 (HIS812)

Station Air Compressor 2 (HIS1494)

Mechanical Hogger (HIS1005).

Direct an EO to reduce TPCW flow as follows:

o Close CW470, STATION AIR COMPRESSOR 2 COOLING WATER SUPPLY o Close CW1020, MECHANICAL HOGGER COOLER 1 INLET BOP/SRO Perform Attachment 6, BOP Actions for Rapid Shutdown o At approximately 90% power, notify an EO to remove the AFP Turbine Main Steam Min flow lines from service. Refer to DB-OP-06233, AFW System.

AT ANY TIME condensate flow is less than 7.0 MPPH (FI578), THEN establish two Condensate pumps in operation o At approximately 675 MWe, notify an EO to coordinate control of MSRs RSLLVs. REFER TO, Controlling RSLLV(s) During Rapid Shutdown

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

5 Page 4

of 4

Event

Description:

TPCW Pump 2 trips/Lower Power to capacity of 1 Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 11 of 22 NOTE: May elect not to complete Attachment 2 if TPCW High Level Cooling Water Tank level is rising SRO Notify Equipment Operators to commence Attachment 15, Field Actions for a Rapid Shutdown. (DB-OP-02504)

SRO REFER TO Attachment 7, Plant Stabilization at a Lower Power Level. (DB-OP-02504)

SRO Notify the System Load Dispatcher of current plant conditions SRO WHEN TPCW High Level Cooling Water Tank level is restored to normal, THEN perform the following IF TIC 2396B, GEN H2 CLRS WTR OUT TEMP IND CTRL setpoint was changed to 113°F in, THEN evaluate plant conditions AND restore TIC2396B setpoint to 110°F Return to Normal Operations, REFER TO NOP-OP-1002, Conduct of Operations.

At Lead Evaluators direction, proceed to Event 6, Steam Leak in CTMT/Trip Reactor

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

6 & 7 Page 1

of 8

Event

Description:

Main Steam Line break in CTMT Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 12 of 22 Indications Available:

4-4-A CTMT TO ANNULUS P HI/LO CTMT to annulus P rising Indicated MWE output lowering No change in Containment Radiation levels on Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) Computer screen.

CREW Identify symptoms of a steam leak inside containment Containment (CTMT) to annulus DP rising Stable CTMT Radiation Levels SRO Implement DB-OP-02525, Steam Leaks SRO Verify no one is in CTMT ATC Monitor Reactor power SRO Refer to DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown to continue the plant shutdown ATC/SRO Use Attachment 1, Power Reduction Actions ICS Full Automatic Operation, to shutdown the plant At the LOAD CONTROL Panel, set the rate of change Select the target RTP Monitor power Expected Target Load is Low Level Limits (28%) with 3-5%

per minute rate of change

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

6 & 7 Page 2

of 8

Event

Description:

Main Steam Line break in CTMT Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 13 of 22 CREW Monitor Containment pressure for Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) or Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip setpoints SRO Notify the Shift Manager to refer to DB-RA-01500, Emergency Classification CREW Determine which Steam Generator has the steam leak NOTE: Will not be able to tell at this point in the scenario SRO Direct the Balance of Plant Operator to continue with, Balance of Plant Actions for Rapid Shutdown for new target power level SRO Notify Equipment Operators to continue with Attachment 15, Field Actions for a Rapid Shutdown SRO Notify the SCC Load Dispatcher of plant shutdown SRO Notify Chemistry to Monitor Condensate Polisher Operation and sample the RCS for isotopic iodine. Refer to TS 3.4.16.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

6 & 7 Page 3

of 8

Event

Description:

Main Steam Line break in CTMT Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 14 of 22 ATC Maintain Makeup Tank Level between 55 and 86 inches ATC/SRO NOTE: Could also trip the reactor if Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) OR Reactor Protection System (RPS) trips on High Containment Pressure prior to reaching Low Level Limits WHEN Steam Generators are on Low Level Limit Control, Determine which SG has the steam leak, if possible Trip reactor Verify power decreasing on the Intermediate Range Trip the Turbine VERIFY all Turbine Stop Valves OR Control Valves are closed Initiate AND Isolate SFRCS using MANUAL ACTUATION Switches CREW Recognize an SFAS Level 3 actuation due to high Containment pressure 5-1-B, SFAS CTMT PRESS HI CH TRIP Time SFAS 1-3 Actuation_________

SRO GO TO DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip, or SG Tube Rupture SRO/ATC Verify immediate actions:

Trip the Reactor Verify power decreasing on the Intermediate Range Trip the turbine Verify all Turbine Stop Valves OR Control Valves are closed

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

6 & 7 Page 4

of 8

Event

Description:

Main Steam Line break in CTMT Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 15 of 22 SRO GO TO Section 4, Supplemental Actions.

CREW Implement any necessary Specific Rules Actions.

ACTIONS FOR LOSS OF SUBCOOLING MARGIN STEAM GENERATOR CONTROL POWER FOR C1 AND D1 BUSES OR EDG START Event 7 is embedded in Event 6 BOP Event 7 Recognize AFPT 1 is tripped:

Enable BOTH Motor Driven Feedwater Pump (MDFP) Discharge Valves HIS 6460 HIS 6459.

Close BOTH MDFP Discharge Valves LIC 6460 LIC 6459 Start the MDFP OR Align AFP 2 to feed SG 1 Close AF 3872 Open AF 3871 SRO Implement any necessary Symptom Mitigation Sections Lack of Adequate Subcooling Margin Lack of Heat Transfer Overcooling

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

6 & 7 Page 5

of 8

Event

Description:

Main Steam Line break in CTMT Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 16 of 22 SRO Routes to Section 7, Overcooling ATC Performs Attachment 8 Check both CCW Trains are in service Check both trains of HPI are in service Check all HPI Injection valves are open Verify both trains of LPI are in service Open both piggyback valves.

DH64 DH63 Transfer Makeup Pump suctions to the BWST AND press OFF

MU6405

MU3971 Verify Pressurizer Level Controller is set to 100 inches Start the standby MU Pump Actions if pressurizer level <40 inches Lock MU6405/3971 on the BWST Close MU2B Check all PZR Heaters off Place alternate injection line in service Open MU6421 Throttle MU6419

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

6 & 7 Page 6

of 8

Event

Description:

Main Steam Line break in CTMT Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 17 of 22 BOP Verify proper Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) actuation BOP Close AF 599 to isolate Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) flow to SG 2

BOP Block and open Atmospheric Vent Valve (AVV) 2 to blowdown SG 2 BOP If at any time an SFRCS isolation causes the AVV to close during the blowdown of the affected SG then block and reopen the affected AVV BOP When the SG is blown down (SG pressure approaching 0 psig and SG level less than 16 inches) close the AVV BOP Maintain proper SG level in the non-isolated SG with AFW using Specific Rule 4.

BOP WHEN SG 2 boils dry (terminating the overcooling), THEN control the AVV on SG 1 to maintain RCS temperature constant or slightly decreasing.

SRO/ATC Begin RCS depressurization to minimum subcooling margin using the spray valve (CSRO set band 30°-70°)

ATC/BOP Verify proper SFAS actuation for the trip parameters present.

REFER TO Table 2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

6 & 7 Page 7

of 8

Event

Description:

Main Steam Line break in CTMT Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 18 of 22 ATC Throttle HPI flow as necessary to control Pressurizer level and SCM. REFER TO Specific Rule 3, HPI/LPI/MU Control NOTE: It is preferred to establish a minimum seal injection flow prior to opening the seal return flow path, however Seal Return may be restored first.

ATC Restore Seal Injection Close MU19, FLOW CONTROL Verify a MU Pump Cross Connect Header isolation valve is open to supply seal injection

- MU6408

- MU6409 Block and open the following valves:

MU66A, RCP SEAL INJECTION 2-1 MU66B, RCP SEAL INJECTION 2-2 MU66C, RCP SEAL INJECTION 1-1 MU66D, RCP SEAL INJECTION 1-2 Gradually (over approximately 2 minutes)

Throttle open MU19 to establish Seal Injection Flow of 12-15 gpm (approximately 3 gpm per RCP).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

1 Event #

6 & 7 Page 8

of 8

Event

Description:

Main Steam Line break in CTMT Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 19 of 22 Critical Task*

ATC Restore Seal Return Verify RCP Seal Return Isolations are closed:

MU59A MU59B MU59C MU59D

*Block and Open MU38, RCP SEAL RETURN Block AND Open RCP SEAL RETURN ISO valves:

*MU59A

*MU59B

*MU59C

*MU59D Time MU38, MU59A, MU59B, MU59C and MU59D are opened OR RCPs are stopped __

When RCP Seal Return has been restored, the scenario can be terminated

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 20 of 22 Justification for Critical Tasks The term Critical Task, is defined in NUREG-1021, OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINER STANDARDS FOR POWER REACTORS. The listed critical tasks were compiled based on a review of Areva Technical Document 47-1229003-06, EOP Technical Bases Document, and additional CTs were added based on established DB Operations expectations and standards for previously identified Critical Task.

Close the PORV Block Valve

1. Safety Significance:

Prevent a Reactor Trip on Low RCS Pressure followed by a Loss of Subcooling Margin.

2. Cues:

Lowering RCS pressure Annunciators 4-1-D, 5-1-G, 5-2-G

3. Measured by:

Required Action: Close the PORV Block Valve Failure to meet the Critical Task: The PORV Block valve is not closed in time to prevent a Reactor Trip on Low RCS Pressure.

4. Feedback:

RCS Pressure Stabilizes above the RCS Pressure / Temperature Trip setpoint Valve position indication Technical Basis

References:

1. Davis-Besse Tech Spec Bases 3.3.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation

a. RC Low Pressure

b. RC Pressure - Temperature

2. Davis-Besse Tech Spec Bases 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits

3. Areva Technical Document 47-1229003-06 CT-3, ISOLATE POSSIBLE RCS LEAK PATHS

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 21 of 22 Justification for Critical Tasks The term Critical Task, is defined in NUREG-1021, OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINER STANDARDS FOR POWER REACTORS. The listed critical tasks were compiled based on a review of Areva Technical Document 47-1229003-06, EOP Technical Bases Document, and additional CTs were added based on established DB Operations expectations and standards for previously identified Critical Task.

Restore RCP Seal Return flow

1. Safety Significance:

The actuation of SFAS levels 1-3 results in a loss of the seal return flowpath.

Extended operation without an RCP Seal Return flowpath may result in seal failure and unisolable RCS leakage. Loss of the seal return flowpath exposes the last seal to full RCS pressure. RCP seals are designed to withstand full RCS pressure only for a limited time while the pump is running. Davis Besse has established 30 minutes as the maximum time allowed for an operating pump without a seal return flowpath.

2. Cues:

Loss of seal return flow as indicated by MU38 closed and RCPs running

DB-OP-02515, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP AND MOTOR ABNORMAL OPERATION and DB-OP-02000 Attachment 10

3. Measured by:

Required Action - Restore Seal Return or shutdown RCPs

Failure to meet the Critical Task -Seal Return not restored within 30 minutes or RCPs not stopped after 30 minutes of operation with MU38 closed (actuation of SFAS levels 1-3 due to high containment pressure).

4. Feedback:

MU38, MU59A, MU59B, MU59C and MU59D are opened, or RCPs are stopped.

Technical Basis

Reference:

1. DB-OP-02515, Reactor Coolant Pump and Motor Abnormal Operation Procedure, ATTACHMENT 6: Background Information - Loss of RCP Seal Return Flow.

Continued operation of the Reactor Coolant Pump for up to 30 minutes is allowed to attempt to restore the seal return flowpath. Extended operation without an RCP Seal Return flowpath may result in seal failure.

2. M-508-00087-04 Instrument Manual for Byron Jackson N-9000 Seal Cartridge

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 22 of 22 SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

1.

Simulator Setup 100% Power

2.

Procedures DB-OP-02005, Primary Instrumentation Alarm Panel DB-OP-03006, Miscellaneous Instrument Shift Checks DB-OP-06405, SFAS Procedure DB-OP-02514, TPCW Malfunctions Abnormal Procedure DB-OP-06263, Turbine Plant Cooling Water Operating Procedure DB-OP-02001, Electrical Distribution Alarm Panel 1 Annunciators DB-OP-06319, Instrument AC System Procedure DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown DB OP 02525, Steam Leaks DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture

3.

Procedures for Simulator Instructor:

None required

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 1 of 20 Facility:

Davis-Besse Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.:

DB NRC 2022 Examiners:

Operators:

SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: 100% Power Turnover: Maintain 100% Power Planned: Shift routines Critical tasks:

1. Shutdown Reactor - ATWS

2. Isolate Overcooling Steam Generators Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

(C) ATC Weekly Run of the Standby Makeup Pump 2 Oil Pumps (TRM) 2 (C) BOP Main Feedwater Pump Turbine 1 High Drain Tank Level 3

(C) BOP Swap SFP Pumps due to high bearing temp/vibration 4

(R) ATC / BOP Dropped Control Rod - Reduce Reactor Power (TS) 5 Major Main Generator Lockout - ATWS 6

(C) BOP Stuck Open Main Steam Safety Valve - Overcooling 7

(C) BOP Steam Feed Rupture Control System fails to automatically align for a low pressure trip on Steam Generator 1 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 2 of 20 DAVIS-BESSE 2022 NRC SCENARIO 2 The crew will take the watch with the plant at 100% power.

EVENT 1: Weekly Run of the STBY MU Pump (2) Oil Pumps (TRM)

The ATC will start Makeup Pump 2 Oil Pumps. The local Equipment Operator reports an oil leak from a broken flow glass on the pump motor end bearing. The control room operator is expected to stop the AC Oil Pump. The Makeup Pump should be declared non-functional. The CSRO should enter TNC 8.1.1 Action A.

EVENT 2: MFPT 1 Drain Level High A sheared shaft on the running drain pump will cause level in the LP drain header to rise. The standby drain pump does not auto start as expected. The BOP will manually start the standby pump. Level will return to normal after the standby pump is started.

EVENT 3: Swap Spent Fuel Pool Pumps (SFP) due to high bearing temp/vibration An equipment operator will contact the CTRM and notify them that the running SFP Pump Bearing is hot and vibrating, no oil is in the sight glass. The BOP will be directed to shut down the pump. The crew will enter DB-OP-02547, Spent Fuel Pool Malfunctions and start the STBY Pump. The Shift Manager will direct swapping pumps only, Heat Exchangers will be aligned later.

EVENT 4: Dropped Control Rod 4 Reduce Power (TS)

Control Rod 4-9 drops into the core. The plant responds with a reduction in both average RCS temperature and Nuclear Instrument power. The crew will respond in accordance with DB-OP-02516, CRD Malfunctions. Power is reduced to 50% using the Unit Load Demand (ULD) Max Load Limit (MLL) at 3% per minute. The BOP will establish two Condensate Pump Operation when directed by DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown.

EVENT 5: Major Transient -The Main Generator will Lockout when directed by the lead examiner - ATWS (CT)

During the power reduction the Main Turbine trips in response to a Main Generator Lockout.

The expected Reactor Trip does not occur and the Immediate Actions of DB-OP-02000 are performed to verify the reactor is tripped. The test trip key does not trip the reactor and E2 and F2 are de-energized to trip the reactor.

EVENT 6: Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) fails open on Steam Generator (SG) 1 (CT)

Overcooling is initiated by the failure of a MSSV. The overcooling section of DB-OP-02000 will be entered in response to this event. The crew will attempt to reseat the failed valve by reducing SG pressure to 700 psig before manually initiating and isolating the Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS). SFRCS will not automatically align the AFW system when pressure lowers to the SFRCS setpoint of 630 psig. Feeding the faulted SG is terminated by closing AF 608 or AF 3870.

EVENT 7: Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) fails to automatically align for a low pressure trip of SG 1 When SG pressure reaches 630 psig, SFRCS fails to align for a low pressure trip. BOP is expected to manually align AFW for a low pressure trip in SG 1 At the direction of the lead evaluator or when the faulted Steam Generator (SG) is isolated and minimum subcooling margin (SCM) is being maintained, the scenario can be terminated

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

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Event

Description:

Weekly Run of Lube Oil Pumps for the Standby Makeup Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 3 of 20 Indications Available:

HIS MU24B1 Makeup Pump 2 AC Oil Pump HIS MU24B2 Makeup Pump 2 DC Oil Pump HIS MU24B3 Makeup Pump 2 Aux Gear Oil Pump SRO Direct the ATC to perform the weekly run of the Makeup Pump 2 oil pumps using DB-OP-06006 Section 3.13 ATC Direct an Equipment Operator to stand by the #2 Makeup pump and monitor the start of the oil pumps ATC Start the AC oil pump for #2 Makeup pump using HIS MU24B1 and check the following occurs as expected:

AC oil pump starts and continues to run DC oil pumps starts, then stops Aux Gear Oil pump starts and continues to run Booth Cue Local Operator reports the following:

Theres an oil leak from the flow glass on the pump motor end bearing. It looks like the glass is cracked.

SRO/ATC Directs ATC to Stop the AC Oil Pump using HIS MU24B1

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Event

Description:

Weekly Run of Lube Oil Pumps for the Standby Makeup Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 4 of 20 SRO Declare One Boron System Flow Path Nonfunctional for Technical Normal Condition (TNC) A SRO REFER to TRM 8.1.1 Boration Systems - Operating:

TNC 8.1.1 The Boration Systems shall be FUNCTIONAL consisting of the following:

a. A flow path from the concentrated FUNCTIONAL boric acid addition system (BAAS) via a FUNCTIONAL boric acid pump and a FUNCTIONAL makeup pump to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS);

AND

b. A flow path from the OPERABLE borated water storage tank via a FUNCTIONAL makeup pump to the RCS System.

Separate Makeup pumps are required to be FUNCTIONAL in MODES 1, 2 and 3, and in MODE 4 when RCS pressure is 150 psig.

Enter TNC 8.1.1 Action A:

A1 Restore the nonfunctional flow path to FUNCTIONAL status within 72 Hours

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Event

Description:

MFPT 1 High Drain Tank Level and Standby Drain Pump fails to automatically start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 5 of 20 Indications Available:

Annunciator 10-6-C Main Feed Pump Turbine (MFPT) 1 DRN LVL HI HIS 1973 MFPT Drain Pump 1-1 HIS 1969 MFPT Drain Pump 1-2 BOP BOP Refers to DB-OP-02010 for Annunciator 10-6-C BOP Start Drain Pump 2 for Main Feedwater Pump Turbine (MFPT) 1 using HIS 1969 BOP Direct an Equipment Operator to locally check the status of both MFPT 1 Drain Pumps If asked to locally check the status of MFPT 1 Drain Pump 1, report the pump is running with a broken shaft. The valve lineup is correct.

If asked, Report the following status of MFPT 1 Drain System:

If Drain pump 2 is running Drain Header LG 1949 is approximately 13 inches above the bottom of the sight glass and lowering Exhaust Casing LG 1322 is just above the bottom of the sight glass and steady BOP Position HIS 1973 to Lockout OR Direct the local Equipment Operator to open BE 3276 on E32B for Drain Pump 1 Booth Cue If directed, report opening BE 3276 On Lead Evaluators direction, insert Event 3 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Vibration

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MFPT 1 High Drain Tank Level and Standby Drain Pump fails to automatically start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 6 of 20 Equipment Operator contacts the Control room: The running Spent Fuel Pool Pump is vibrating so much I could hear it when I got off the elevator. Theres oil under the bearing. We need to swap pumps now.

CSRO Directs stopping the running Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) pump and refers to DB-OP-02547 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Malfunctions.

CSRO IF the Loss of SFP Cooling is due to a loss of the operating SFP or DHR Cooling Train, THEN perform the following:

Restore the previously operating SFP Cooling Train to service.

OR

Alter the existing SFP Cooling System alignment to place at least one SFP Pump AND Heat Exchanger in Service.

REFER TO DB-OP-06021, Spent Fuel Pool Operating Procedure.

Note: The Shift Manager directs you to switch SFP Pumps only, Heat Exchangers can be switched later when an equipment operator is available BOP Place SFP Pump 1 in service as follows:

Notify the Control Room annunciator alarm (3-5-B),

SFP HX TOTAL FLOW LO, will be LIT.

Start SFP Pump 1 using HIS 1602, SFP PUMP 1.

Insert Event 4 after SFP pumps have been switched

2Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

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Event

Description:

Dropped Control Rod 4-9 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 7 of 20 Indications Available:

Annunciator 5-1-E CRD System Fault Annunciator 5-2-E CRD Asymmetric Rod Control Rod Group 4 indications for Rod 4-9 Loop 2 Average RCS Temperature Lowering Annunciator 14-2-C ICS Rx Demand Hi Limit TEAM Recognize available indications show the expected plant response to a dropped control rod.

SRO Refer to DB-OP-02516 Control Rod Drive (CRD) System Malfunctions ATC Perform the following actions directed by DB-OP-02516 CRD Malfunctions:

Check only one control rod has dropped using the control rod position indication panel Check power has stabilized above 5%

With the Unit Load Demand in Automatic, reduce reactor Power to 50% Rated Thermal Power (RTP) by setting the Max Load Limit to 50% RTP with the rate of change set to 3% per minute SRO Refer to DB-OP-02504 Rapid Shutdown ATC IF annunciator (4-2-E) PZR LEVEL LO alarms due to the dropped rod Tave transient, THEN reduce MU32 setpoint to approximately 180 inches

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Event

Description:

Dropped Control Rod 4-9 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 8 of 20 BOP IF AT ANY TIME condensate flow is less than 7.0 MPPH on FI 578, THEN establish two Condensate pumps in operation ATC Monitor Reactor Power to confirm power is being reduced at approximately the expected rate (NI vs. HBP)

Monitor Regulating Rod Insertion Limits during the Shutdown per Technical Specification 3.2.1 using current Reactor Operator Guidance (ROG) provided by Nuclear Engineering.

BOP At approximately 90 percent power, notify an Equipment Operator to remove the Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Main Steam Minimum flow lines from service. Refer to DB-OP-06233, Auxiliary Feedwater System.

At approximately 675 MWe, notify an Equipment Operator to coordinate control of Moisture separator Reheater (MSR) Reheat Steam Low Load Valves (RSLLVs). REFER TO Attachment 9, Controlling RSLLV(s) During Rapid Shutdown

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Event

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Dropped Control Rod 4-9 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 9 of 20 SRO The following Tech Specs are not met: 3.1.4, 3.1.5, 3.1.7 TS 3.1.4 CONTROL ROD GROUP ALIGNMENT LIMITS Each CONTROL ROD shall be OPERABLE, AND Each CONTROL ROD shall be aligned to within 6.5% of its group average height.

A. One CONTROL ROD not aligned to within 6.5% of its group average height.

Within 1 Hour A.1.1 Verify SDM is within limit.

OR A.1.2 Initiate boration to restore SDM to within limit.

AND Within 2 Hours A.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to 60% of the ALLOWABLE THERMAL POWER.

AND Within 10 Hours A.3 Reduce the High Flux trip setpoint to 70% of the ALLOWABLE THERMAL POWER.

TS 3.1.5 EACH SAFETY ROD SHALL BE FULLY WITHDRAWN.

A. One safety rod not fully withdrawn.

Within 1 Hour A.1.1 Verify SDM is within limit.

OR A.1.2 Initiate boration to restore SDM to within limit.

AND A.2 Declare the rod misaligned.

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Event

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Dropped Control Rod 4-9 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 10 of 20 TS 3.1.7 The Absolute Position Indicator (API) channel and the Relative Position Indicator (RPI) channel for each CONTROL ROD and APSR shall be OPERABLE A.

RPI channel inoperable for one or more rods Within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months A.1 Determine the absolute position indicator channel for the rod is OPERABLE - Repeat once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter.

Insert Event 5 at the direction of the Lead Evaluator

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Event

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Main Generator Lockout / ATWS Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 11 of 20 TEAM Recognize a Main Generator Lockout and Main Turbine Trip above 40% power without a corresponding Reactor Trip

Critical Task ATC Perform Immediate Actions for a Reactor Trip:

At the Rod Control Panel depress both manual Reactor Trip Pushbuttons Recognize the reactor DID NOT trip At the Rod Control Panel, insert the Reactor Trip Test key AND rotate clockwise to depower the CRDMs Recognize the reactor DID NOT trip

1. *Momentarily de-energize E2 and F2 using HIS 6242 and HIS 6246 per DB-OP-02000, step 3.3 Response Not Obtained (RNO)

Recognize the reactor is tripped by verifying power is lowering on the Intermediate Range NI meters SRO/ATC Verify DB-OP-02000 Immediate Actions

Trip the reactor

VERIFY Reactor Power is lowering on the Intermediate range

Trip the turbine

VERIFY all Turbine Stop Valves OR Control Valves are closed

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Event

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Main Generator Lockout / ATWS Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 12 of 20 TEAM Implement Specific Rules ACTIONS FOR LOSS OF SUBCOOLING MARGIN STEAM GENERATOR CONTROL POWER FOR C1 AND D1 BUSES OR EDG START TEAM Check for Symptoms Lack of Adequate Subcooling Margin Lack of Heat Transfer Overcooling Steam Generator Tube Rupture Event 6 Begins on the next page

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

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Event

Description:

SG 1 Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Failure / Overcooling /

SFRCS Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 13 of 20 Indications Available:

SG 1 Pressure on PI SP12B and PI SP12B2 TEAM Recognize an Overcooling on SG 1 based on SG pressure <960 psig due to a secondary side malfunction:

Enter DB-OP-02000 Section 7 If security is asked to check for steam on the aux building roof, report the following:

There is a lot of steam blowing around the aux building roof, but we cant positively identify where its coming from SRO/ATC/

BOP Implement Attachment 8, Place Makeup / High Pressure Injection

/ Low Pressure Injection (MU/HPI/LPI) in Service

Start the STBY CCW Pump

Start both HPI Pumps

Open HP 2A, HP 2B, HP 2C and HP 2D

Start both LPI Pumps

Open DH 64 and DH 63

Transfer MU Pump suctions to the BWST AND press OFF SRO/BOP Implement DB-OP-02000 Attachment 20 to try a reseat the failed MSSV on SG1:

Reduce SG 1 pressure to approximately 700 psig using SG 1 Turbine Bypass Valves o Recognize the Main Steam safety Valve (MSSV) does not reseat Initiate and Isolate the SFRCS system using HIS 6403 and HIS 6404 If security is asked to check for steam on the aux building roof, report the following:

There is a lot of steam blowing around the aux building roof, but we cant positively identify where its coming from, it looks the same as when we checked a few minutes ago.

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Event

Description:

SG 1 Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Failure / Overcooling /

SFRCS Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 14 of 20 Indications Available:

SG 1 Pressure on PI SP12B and PI SP12B2 BOP Verify proper SFRCS for a Manual Initiation and Isolation Note: The CSRO may direct aligning the Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) for a low-pressure trip of SG 1

Critical Task BOP Isolate AFW to the affected SG, *Close AF608 or AF 3870 Time AF 608 or AF 3870 Closed: _________________

BOP Verify proper operation of AFW trains feeding Steam Generator 2 TEAM Check Reactor Coolant System Cooldown Rate lowers to less than 100 degrees per hour BOP Control RCS temperature constant or slightly lowering using the Atmospheric Vent Valve on Steam generator 2, ICS11A

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Event

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SG 1 Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Failure / Overcooling /

SFRCS Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 15 of 20 ATC Begin to depressurize the RCS using the Pressurizer Spray Valve, RC2 AND Heaters to maintain pressure close to the minimum adequate subcooling margin, but above the RCP NPSH limits ATC IF the Safety Features actuation System (SFAS) has NOT actuated AND the RCS pressure drop is being manually controlled, THEN block the SFAS Low RCS Pressure trips when the BLOCK PERMITs come in.

Event 7 begins on the next page

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Event

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SG 1 Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Failure / Overcooling /

SFRCS Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 16 of 20 Indications Available:

SG 1 Pressure on PI SP12B and PI SP12B2

Critical Task BOP Verify proper SFRCS actuation for the trip parameters present.

REFER TO Table 1 of DB-OP-02000.

Recognize SG 1 pressure is less than 630 psig and perform the following:

*Verify closed AF 3870 Verify open AF 3869 Close MS 106 Close MS 107A Time SG 1 Pressure < 630 psig: _________

Time AF 3870 Closed: _________________

Closing AF 3870 is only Critical if AF 608 was NOT Closed earlier.

SRO Check for entry into Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) criteria.

REFER TO Specific Rule 5.

ATC Check for Adequate Subcooling Margin (SCM).

TEAM Check a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) does NOT exist:

Verify the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors are in GROSS Mode (SCA light is off)

Check MS Line 1 RE Check MS Line 2 RE Check Pressurizer Level

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SG 1 Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Failure / Overcooling/

SFRCS Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 17 of 20 Determining SG Tube to Shell Delta Temperature is not required to terminate the scenario TEAM Determine SG Tube and Average SG Shell temperatures for the isolated SG TEAM IF RCS Tave is less than the average SG Shell temperature, THEN maintain RCS temperature as follows:

Block SFRCS to the AVV on the non-overcooling SG AND use the AVV to maintain RCS temperature constant.

Maintain RCS pressure close to the minimum adequate subcooling margin curve.

Allow losses to ambient to cool the shell of the SG.

Termination Criteria:

Lead Evaluator Direction OR Subcooling Margin is being maintained as directed by the CSRO AND SFRCS has been aligned for a low-pressure trip of Steam Generator 1

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 18 of 20 Justification for Critical Tasks The term Critical Task, is defined in NUREG-1021, OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINER STANDARDS FOR POWER REACTORS. The listed critical tasks were compiled based on a review of Areva Technical Document 47-1229003-06, EOP Technical Bases Document, and additional CTs were added based on established DB Operations expectations and standards for previously identified Critical Task.

1: Shutdown Reactor-ATWS

1. Safety Significance:

When the Main Turbine Trips, the Reactor should trip due to exceeding the RPS high pressure trip setpoint. RPS, the Reactor Trip pushbuttons and the Reactor Test Trip Key all fail to cause a reactor trip. The priority action at this point is the shutdown of the reactor. This should be achieved prior to taking additional mitigating actions because post-trip transient mitigation, from this point forward, assumes the reactor is shutdown (subcritical).

2. Cues:

Reactor power not lowering on the Intermediate Range DB-OP-02000, Perform RNO IAs for ATWS

3. Measured by:

Required Action - Momentarily de-energize Busses E2 and F2

Failure to meet the Critical Task - Continuing the mitigation strategy of the EOP prior to the reactor being tripped

4. Feedback:

E2 and F2 deenergized Reactor Power is lowering on the Intermediate Range Technical Basis

References:

1. Davis-Besse Tech Spec Bases 3.3.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation

a. RC High pressure

2. Areva Technical Document 47-1229003-06 CT-24, SHUTDOWN REACTOR -

ATWS

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 19 of 20 2: Isolate Overcooling Steam Generators

1. Safety Significance:

Mitigate excessive heat flow from the core to available heat sinks and its effect on RCS inventory

2. Cues:

SG Pressure <960 psig caused by a secondary side malfunction DB-OP-02000, Symptom Checks

3. Measured by:

Required Action - Close AF 608 or AF 3870 to Isolate AFW to SG 1 Failure to meet the Critical Task - AFW flow continues to feed SG 1 for greater than 10 minutes after SG 1 reaches 630 psig

4. Feedback:

Green (Closed) indicating lights on valves AFW Flow lowering SG level lowering Technical Basis

References:

1. Areva Technical Document 47-1229003-06 CT-17, ISOLATE OVERCOOLING SG(s)

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 20 of 20 SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

1. Simulator Setup 100% Power ATWS (Requires de-energizing E2 and F2 Busses)

SFRCS Fails to automatically actuate.

Makeup Pump 1 and CCW Pump 2 in service

2. Procedures DB-OP-06006, Makeup and Purification System Operating Procedure DB-OP-02010, Feedwater Panel 10 Annunciators DB-OP-02547, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Malfunctions DB-OP-06021, Spent Fuel Pool Operating Procedure DB-OP-02516, Control Rod Drive System Malfunctions DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture

3. For Simulator Instructor None

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 1 of 18 Facility:

Davis-Besse Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.:

DB NRC 2022 Examiners:

Operators:

SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: 50% Power Turnover: Shutdown Main Feedwater Pump1 to 1000 RPM Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1 Out of Service Planned: Complete the Shutdown of Main Feedwater Pump 1 Critical tasks:

1. Trip all 4 RCPs

2. Initiate High Pressure Injection Cooling Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

(N) BOP Remove Main Feedwater Pump 1 from service 2

(C) ATC / BOP Component Cooling Water Pump 2 Trips (TS) 3 Bus F7 Failure / Motor Driven Feedwater Pump Inop (TS) 4 (C) BOP Station Air Compressor 2 setpoint failure - Low air header pressure 5

(R) ATC (C) BOP Rising Main Condenser Pressure - Reduce Reactor Power Trip the Main Generator 6

Major Trip the Reactor - Initiate / Isolate Steam Feedwater Rupture Control system 7

(C) ATC/BOP Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2 Trips - Emergency Feedwater Pump does not start - Loss of All Feedwater Standby Makeup Pumps fails to start - Makeup / High Pressure Injection / PORV Cooling (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Summary NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 2 of 18 DAVIS-BESSE 2022 NRC SCENARIO 3 The crew will take the watch with the plant at 50% power. Preparations for Condenser Waterbox cleaning are scheduled to begin on the following shift.

EVENT 1: Remove Main Feed Pump (MFP) 1 from service The BOP will perform actions to shutdown MFPT 1 to 1000 RPM. This will include placing the associated ARTS toggle switches for MFP 1 in the trip position.

EVENT 2: Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump 2 Trips (TS)

The standby CCW pump will start due to low flow in the opposite train. The time required for flow to degrade to the point of starting the standby pump and aligning the associated CCW non-essential isolation valves results in the loss of RCS letdown from high temperature and the start of the standby Control Rod Drive (CRD) booster pump. The crew will restore letdown flow and stop the standby CRD booster pump. Loss of Train 2 CCW pump makes that train of CCW inoperable (TS) and the associated Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) inoperable (TS).

EVENT 3: Bus F7 Failure / Motor Driven Feedwater Pump (MDFP) Inop (TS)

The failure of Bus F7 results in the MDFP being inoperable (TS) and the Emergency Instrument Air Compressor (EIAC) being unavailable.

EVENT 4: Station Air Compressor (SAC) 2 setpoint failure - Low air header pressure SAC 2 will start controlling Instrument Air (IA) header pressure below the annunciator setpoint.

SAC 1 will not automatically start when its setpoint is reached, requiring the BOP to manually start the compressor. Instrument Air header pressure will be restored once SAC 1 is started.

EVENT 5: Rising Main Condenser Pressure-Reduce Reactor Power CSRO will enter DB-OP-02518. The crew will reduce power to maintain condenser pressure less than 5 inHgA.

EVENT 6: Trip the Reactor - Initiate / Isolate Steam Feedwater Rupture Control system Condenser pressure will continue to rise, and the crew will trip the reactor and initiate and isolate the SFRCS system due to the loss of both Main feedwater Pumps (Trip at 12.5 inHgA).

EVENT 7: AFP 2 Trips / EFW Pump does not start - Loss of All Feedwater - Makeup Pump 2 Fails to start AFP 2 will overspeed trip. With AFP 1 and the MDFP unavailable, the BOP will start the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump IAW Specific Rule 4. The EFW pump will not start. With no feedwater available, the crew is directed to start the standby makeup pump.

Makeup pump 2 fails to start, making it necessary to immediately perform Attachment 4 of DB-OP-02000, Makeup / High Pressure Injection / PORV Cooling (CT). When Minimum Sub Cooling Margin is lost, Specific Rule 2 actions will be performed, and all RCPs tripped (CT).

When directed by the lead evaluator or Subcooling Margin has been restored with lowering incore temperatures, the scenario may be terminated.

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Shutdown MFPT 1 to 1000 RPM Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 3 of 18 Indications Available:

MFPT 1 Speed SI 2707B MFP 1 Discharge Pressure PI 473 MFP 1 Booster Feed pump Flow FI 428 SRO Direct the BOP to Shutdown Main Feedwater Pump Turbine (MFPT) 1 to 1000 RPM in accordance with DB-OP-06224 Section 3.8 BOP Verify FW423, DEAERATING STORAGE TANKS DISCHARGE CROSSOVER, is open BOP Place the following test toggle switches to the TRIP position in all four Anticipatory Reactor Trip System (ARTS) cabinets:

CH 1, C5784A MAIN FEED PUMP INPUT TEST, for MFP-1

CH 2, C5784B MAIN FEED PUMP INPUT TEST, for MFP-1

CH 3, C5784C MAIN FEED PUMP INPUT TEST, for MFP-1

CH 4, C5784D MAIN FEED PUMP INPUT TEST, for MFP-1.

Door annunciator 5-5-F is expected when opening the ARTS cabinets BOP Assign an Equipment Operator to Close FW488, FW488 Air Supply and vent air from the FW488 actuator When directed report you are standing by to Close FW488 air supply and vent air

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Event

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Shutdown MFPT 1 to 1000 RPM Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 4 of 18 BOP Place HIC ICS36B Hand/Auto Station for Main Feed Pump 1 Speed, in Hand AND Begin reducing MFPT1 speed to its lowest setting BOP Transfer Speed control to MDT20 AND Reduce MFPT Speed to 1000 RPM BOP When discharge pressure is less than 150 psig, place the MFP 1 warmup valve in service Insert Event 2 after MFPT 1 speed has been reduced to 1000 RPM

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Event

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Operating Component Cooling Water Pump Trip (2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 5 of 18 Indications Available:

ANNUNCIATOR 6-5-B SEAL CCW FLOW LO ANNUNCIATOR 5-6-D CRD BOOSTER PMP P HI/FLOW LO CTRM PANEL C5721 HIS1418 FOR CCW PUMP 2 TEAM Recognize Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump 2 is Tripped ATC Verify Component Cooling Water pump 1 starts due to low flow ATC may start CCW pump 1 before CCW pump 1 starts on a low flow signal from Train 2 CSRO Enter DB-OP-02523 CCW System Malfunctions TEAM Direct an Equipment Operator to locally inspect CCW Pump 2 and Breaker AD113 for CCW Pump 2 IF directed to locally check CCW Pump 2 and its associated Breaker, Report the following:

There are no abnormal indications locally at CCW Pump 2 AD113 has a 50/51 C Overcurrent trip relay actuated

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Event

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Operating Component Cooling Water Pump Trip (2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 6 of 18

SRO (TS)

LCO 3.7.7 Two CCW loops shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1,2,3 and 4 Enter Action A.1

1. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by CCW.

Restore CCW Loop to Operable Status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months LCO 3.8.1.b Two emergency diesel generators (EDGs) each capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System; Enter Actions B.1, B.2, B.3 and B.4 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE offsite circuit(s) Within 1 Hour AND B.2 Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable EDG inoperable when its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from discovery of Condition B concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s)

AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE EDG is not inoperable due to common cause failure.

OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE EDG with 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months AND B.4 Restore EDG to OPERABLE status within 7 days

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

3 Event #

2 Page 3

of 3

Event

Description:

Operating Component Cooling Water Pump Trip (2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 7 of 18 TEAM Recognize the loss of RCS Letdown flow due to high letdown temperature Annunciator 2-3-A Letdown Temperature High Alarm MU2B is Closed CSRO /

TEAM Direct an equipment operator to disable EDG 2 by closing DA 31 and DA 45 Turn on the blue lights for CCW and EDG ATC Restore RCS Letdown Flow:

Direct an Operator to Open MU104 Close MU10B Hold Open MU2B, MU1A and MU1B until 2-3-A, Letdown Temperature High, clears Open MU10B Direct an Operator to Close MU104 BOP Refer to annunciator 5-6-D CRD BOOSTER PMP P HI/FLOW LO Stop the standby Control Rod Drive Booster Pump Insert Event 3 after RCS Letdown is restored or when directed by the Lead Evaluator

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

3 Event #

3 Page 1

of 1

Event

Description:

Bus F7 Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 8 of 18 Indications Available:

Annunciator 1-5-J BUS F7 TRBL Zero Volts indicated on EI 6465 BDF7 Indicates Open TEAM Annunciator 1-5-J BUS F7 TRBL TEAM Direct an Equipment Operator to inspect Bus F7 If directed to inspect Bus F7, report the following: The supply breaker for F7 is tripped open with a faint electrical smell in the area. No indications of smoke or fire.

Well need electricians to inspect the breaker.

TEAM Refer to E1040A to determine loads lost by the failure of F7.

Recognize the loss of F7 makes the Motor Driven Feedwater Pump Inoperable due to the loss of the electric lube oil pump SRO (TS)

LCO 3.7.5 Three EFW trains shall be OPERABLE, consisting of:

a. Two Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) trains; and

b. The Motor Driven Feedwater Pump (MDFP) train.

Enter LCO 3.7.5 Action D for Two EFW trains inoperable for reasons other than Condition C in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

D.1 Be in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months AND D.2 Be in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SRO Enter DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown for an LCO required shutdown and REFER to Attachment 17 Insert Event 4 after the SRO announces entry into the Rapid Shutdown Procedure

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

3 Event #

4 Page 1

of 1

Event

Description:

Station Air Compressor 2 Setpoint Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 9 of 18 Indications Available:

Lowering Air Pressure on PI810 Instrument Air Header Lowering Air Pressure on PI 811 Station Air Header TEAM 9-1-F INSTR AIR HDR PRESS LO 9-3-E STA AIR HDR PRESS LO BOP Check status of the operating Station Air Compressor (SAC 2) and report current Station Air Pressure If asked to investigate the status of SAC 2 locally, report the following:

SAC 2 looks like its working fine, except its cycling at a much lower than normal pressure and the control panel is locked up, not allowing me to check the setpoints.

SRO Enter DB-OP-02528, INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Section 4.4 for Stable Low Instrument Air Header Pressure The crew may enter Section 4.1 for Severe Loss of Instrument Air if they do not recognize air pressure is stable at a lower than normal setpoint. Starting SAC 1 is the expected action regardless of which section is entered.

BOP Start Station Air Compressor 1 Insert Event 5 after Station Air Compressor 1 is started

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

3 Event #

5 Page 1

of 1

Event

Description:

Rising Main Condenser Pressure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 10 of 18 Indications Available:

Yokogawa PR530 and PR541 Annunciator 15-1-F HP CNDSR PRESS HI Annunciator 15-2-F LP CNDSR PRESS HI TEAM Recognize Rising Main Condenser Pressure SRO Enter DB-OP-02518 High Condenser Pressure ATC IF AT ANY TIME Reactor Power exceeds the maximum allowed power (normally 100% RTP) THEN reduce Reactor Power to less than or equal to the maximum allowed power BOP Announce over the GAI-Tronics, Attention all station personnel the station is experiencing a loss of condenser vacuum all available operators investigate and report any vacuum leaks to the Control Room immediately."

SRO Reduce power as necessary in accordance with DB-OP-02504, Rapid Shutdown ATC Using the Unit Load Demand (ULD) in Automatic, reduce power as necessary to maintain condenser pressure below 5 inHg Absolute. The target load and rate of change will be set by the SRO as plant conditions change.

Expected rate of change is 3-5% per minute

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

3 Event #

6 and 7 Page 1

of 5

Event

Description:

Reactor Trip, Total Loss of Feedwater, PORV Cooling Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 11 of 18 BOP Trip the Main Turbine:

Condenser pressure exceeds 7.5 in Hg Absolute Condenser pressure exceeds 5 in Hg Absolute with less than 280 MWE Event 7 Begins when the Reactor is tripped ATC Initiate and isolate the Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) when Main Condenser Pressure exceeds 10 in Hg Absolute:

Trip the Reactor Initiate and Isolate SFRCS SRO Enter DB-OP-02000 RPS, SFAS, SFRCS TRIP, OR SG TUBE RUPTURE:

Trip the Reactor.

VERIFY Reactor Power is lowering on the Intermediate Range Trip the Turbine VERIFY all Turbine Stop Valves OR Control Valves are closed SRO Implement any necessary Specific Rules Actions.

ACTIONS FOR LOSS OF SUBCOOLING MARGIN STEAM GENERATOR CONTROL POWER FOR C1 AND D1 BUSES OR EDG START

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

3 Event #

6 and 7 Page 2

of 5

Event

Description:

Reactor Trip, Total Loss of Feedwater, PORV Cooling Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 12 of 18 BOP Recognize the loss of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (AFP) 2 with AFP 1 and the MDFP unavailable BOP Implement Specific Rule 4 Actions:

IF a loss of all MFW AND AFW is identified, THEN:

Start the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump to supply SG

1.

BOP Recognize the EFW Pump fails to start.

Declare a Total Loss of Feedwater SRO/BOP

/ATC Implement Specific Rule 4 Actions for a Total loss of Feedwater Start the standby Makeup Pump.

Recognize the Standby Makeup Pump fails to start Immediately GO TO Attachment 4, Initiate Makeup / High Pressure Injection (MU/HPI) Cooling (SRO Directed).

ATC Trip all but one RCP. Leaving RCP 2-2 in service is recommended for PZR Spray flow.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

3 Event #

6 and 7 Page 3

of 5

Event

Description:

Reactor Trip, Total Loss of Feedwater, PORV Cooling Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 13 of 18 BOP Verify Attachment 8, Place HPI/LPI/MU in Service:

Start the STBY CCW Pump

Start both High Pressure Injection (HPI) Pumps

Open HP 2A, HP 2B, HP 2C and HP 2D

Start both Low Pressure Injection (LPI) Pumps

Open DH 64 and DH 63

Transfer MU Pump suctions to the BWST AND press OFF ATC Place all Pressurizer (PZR) Heaters in OFF.

Lock BOTH Makeup Pump Suctions on the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) MU6405 and MU3971 Close MU6408 MU PUMP CROSS CONNECT HEADER ISOLATION Verify MU6421, MU ALTERNATE INJECTION LINE CTMT ISOLATION is open.

Open MU6419, MU ALTERNATE INJECTION LINE.

Close MU6407, MU PUMP 1 MINIMUM RECIRC.

Close MU6406, MU PUMP 2 MINIMUM RECIRC.

Verify RC11, PORV BLOCK is open SRO Verify Attachment 8, Place HPI/LPI/MU in Service, is complete.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

3 Event #

6 and 7 Page 4

of 5

Event

Description:

Reactor Trip, Total Loss of Feedwater, PORV Cooling Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 14 of 18

Critical Task ATC

Lock open RC2A, Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV).

Time Thot indication reaches 600 degrees: __________

Time PORV Locked Open: ___________

Time must be within 10 minutes after Thot reaches 600 degrees to successfully complete the Critical Task

Critical Task Time for LSCM:

Time last RCP is stopped:

ATC IF AT ANY TIME Adequate Subcooling Margin is lost, THEN perform the following:

*Trip all Reactor Coolant Pumps.

Transfer Subcooled Margin Inputs to Incore Thermocouples:

Post Accident Monitoring Panel 1 Post Accident Monitoring Panel 2 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS).

RCPs must be stopped within 10 minutes of the loss of subcooling margin to successfully complete the Critical Task ATC Open Loop 1 High Point Vents RC4608B and RC4608A Open Loop 2 High Point Vents RC4610B and RC4610A Open PZR High Point Vents RC200 and RC239A TEAM Check for entry into PTS Criteria. REFER TO Specific Rule 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

2022 Scenario #

3 Event #

6 and 7 Page 5

of 5

Event

Description:

Reactor Trip, Total Loss of Feedwater, PORV Cooling Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 15 of 18 TEAM IF MU Pump room cooling is NOT available AND the area is accessible, THEN prop open the MU Pump room door ATC Close either of the following to isolate Letdown. MU2B, LETDOWN ISO or MU3, LETDOWN CLRS OUTLET Prevent transfer of water from CTMT Normal Sump to the Auxiliary Building as follows Close DR 2012A, CTMT NORMAL SUMP and DR 2012B, CTMT NORMAL SUMP SRO GO TO Section 12, MU/HPI PORV Cooldown.

Termination Criteria: When directed by the lead evaluator OR Subcooling Margin has been restored with lowering incore temperatures

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 16 of 18 Justification for Critical Tasks The term Critical Task, is defined in NUREG-1021, OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINER STANDARDS FOR POWER REACTORS. The listed critical tasks were compiled based on a review of Areva Technical Document 47-1229003-06, EOP Technical Bases Document, and additional CTs were added based on established DB Operations expectations and standards for previously identified Critical Task.

1. Trip all Reactor Coolant Pumps

1. Safety Significance:

Analyses were performed which used both conservative and realistic Appendix K assumptions with the objective of meeting the requirements of 10CFR50.46.

Using conservative Appendix K assumptions, it was shown that RCPs must be tripped within two minutes after losing adequate SCM to prevent the RCS from evolving to a high enough void fraction such that the core would be uncovered if the RCPs were tripped at a later time.

Using realistic Appendix K assumptions with 2 HPI Pumps available, the maximum allowed time for tripping the RCPs was determined to be 10 minutes.

2. Cues:

Subcooling Margin Meters on Post Accident Monitoring Panels C5789 and C5799

Annunciator 4-1-B SUBCOOL MARGIN LO

DB-OP-02000 Specific Rule 2, Actions for a Loss of Subcooling Margin

3. Measured by:

Required Action - Stop all RCPs

Failure to Meet the Critical Task - All 4 RCPs not stopped within 10 minutes after Subcooling Margin drops below 20 Degrees in either RCS Loop.

4. Feedback:

Each RCP ammeter drops to Zero Amps

RCP Green Indicating Lights Technical Basis

Reference:

1. Areva Technical Document 74-1152414-12 Vol. 3

2. Areva Technical Document 47-1229003-06 CT-1, TRIP ALL RCPs

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 17 of 18 Justification for Critical Tasks

2. Initiate High Pressure Injection Cooling

1. Safety Significance:

Immediate initiation of MU/HPI/PORV cooling with one Makeup Pump available prevents the collapsed level of the RCS from dropping below the top of the core and increases the margin to the onset of Inadequate Core Cooling.

2. Cues:

DB-OP-02000 Specific Rule 4, Total Loss of Feedwater

Lack of Primary to Secondary heat Transfer with a single Makeup Pump available

3. Measured by:

Required Action - Refer to DB-OP-02000 Attachment 4, Initiate MU/HPI Cooling.

- 1 Makeup Pump piggybacked from LPI

- All available HPI Pumps piggybacked from LPI

- PORV Locked Open

Failure to Meet the Critical Task: Failure to Initiate Feed and Bleed Cooling with the PORV Open within 10 minutes of Thot reaching 600 degrees

4. Feedback:

Incore Thermocouple Temperatures Lowering

Makeup, HPI, and LPI Pump indications

PORV Valve position Technical Basis

Reference:

1. DB-OP-02515, Bases and Deviation Document for DB-OP02000

2. AREVA Technical Document 74-1152414-12

3. AREVA Technical Document 47-1229003-04 CT-14 INITIATE HPI COOLING FOR DAVIS-BESSE

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Page 18 of 18 SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

1. Simulator Setup 50% Power Both Main Feed Pumps in service

2. Procedures DB-OP-02004, Reactor Coolant Alarm Panel 4 Annunciators DB-OP-02512, Makeup and Purification System Malfunctions DB-OP-02001, Electrical Distribution Alarm Panel 1 Annunciators DB-OP-02521, Loss of AC Bus Power Sources DB-OP-06902, Power Operations DB-OP-02000, RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture

3. For Simulator Instructor None

ML22116A059

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