ML18095A783

Special Rept 91-1:on 910211,Elevation 64 & 84 Ft Switchgear Rooms & Elevation 78 Ft Electrical Penetration Area CO2 Fire Protection Sys Inoperable for More than 14 Days.Caused by Required Design Work.Continuous Fire Watch Established

ML18095A783
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/07/1991
From:	Labruna S Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
91-1, NUDOCS 9103150023
Download: ML18095A783 (3)

Text

r-/r;~j,.

.e

.

.\: ..;,,;.,.: PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station March 7, 1991 1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 SPECIAL REPORT 91-1 This Special Report addresses inoperability of C02 Fire Protection Systems for greater than fourteen (14) days. This ieport has been prepared in accordance with the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.3.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.

Sincerely yours,

//;r~-C~-7~

s. LaBruna General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution

,/

J*

9103150023 910307 PDR ADOCK 05000311 F'DF~

95-2189 I 1OM) 12-89

.UNIT 2*SPECIA:L REPORT 91 PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Sa~em Generating Station Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

64' and 84' Elevation Switchgear Rooms and 78' Elevation Electrical Penetration Area C02 Fire Prot~ction Systems Inoperable For Greater Than Fourteen Days Event riate(s): 2/11/91 Report Date: 3/7/91 The original event is identified by Incident Report No.91-010 *.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:.

Mode 1: .Rx Power 100% Unit Load 1155 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

T~is special report describes the inoperabiiity of the actuation capability of the 64' and 84' Elevation Switchgear Rooms and the 78' Electrical Penetration Area C02 Fire Protection Systems for greater than fourteen (14) days. This report is submitted for informational purposes in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10.3 Action Statement "a" which states:

"With one.or more of the abo.ve required C02 systems inope~able, within one hour establish a continuous fir~ watch with backup fire suppression equipment for those areas in which redundant systems or components could be damaged; for other areas, establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification*

6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status".

On January 28, 1991, Technical Specificatiori Action Statement 3.7.10.3c.a was entered when the C02 Fire Protection System was made inoperable in support of design change work (i.e., DCP 2SC-2160 and 2SC-2161). This design change is modifying the C02 System, for the 84' Elevation Switchgear Ro6m and the 78' Elevation Electric~l Penetration Area, by incorporation of an automatic actuation feature.

• for* these areas. This system modification is in response to conditions* contained in the NRC approval of exemptions from the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R. This is identified in NRC letter dated July 26, 1989.

Consistent with the design change implementation plans, the 64' and the 84' Elevation Switchgear Room and the 78' Elevation Electrical Penetration Area C02 Fire Protection Systems remain inoperable as of the issue of this report. The required fire watch remains in affect as per the Technical Specification Action Statement.

.UNIT 2 SP.ECIAL REPORT 9. ~2-

• ~,--=------,--

.

\i APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The 9ause of the C02 systems' inoperability, for greater than fourteen (_14) days, is to support required design change work.

A directive to applicabie Fire Protection and Operations Department personnel w~~ issued identifting the plans for the C02 system. *

.*outage and the coordination required t*o ensure al3= fire pi;-otection

. measures are met.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The 64' and 84' Elevatl.on Switchgear Rooms and the.78' Elevation-Electrical Penetration Area C02- Fire Protection Systems are designed to mitigate the consequences of a fire in their respective*

areas. They are currently manually initiated.systems. Upon making the systems inoperable, a continuous fire.watchwas implemented per Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.Jc~a. The assigned fire watch provides early fire warning such that compensatory actions can be implemented; therefore, this situation does not affect the heal th or safety of the public.

• This event is reportable to the

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission in accordance with the requirements of*.

Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.3c.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.

In support of the design change work, the.Diesel Generator Areas and the Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Area C02. Fire Protection Systems* were .

also made inoper~ble on ~a~uary 28, 1991. A continuous fire watch was put in place foi these areas at that time. The~e areas' C02 Fire Protection Systems were returned to o~erable on February 6, 1~91*

(i.e., within fourteen days).

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The 64' and 84' Elevation Switchgear Rooms and the 78' Elevation Eleqtrical.Penetr~tion Area Fire Protection C02 System design

• change work has been completed~ The systems were returned to operable and the Technical Specification Action Statement was exited on March 7, 1991.

• No corrective action is required as the system in.operability is necessary to support design change work. Adequate* precautions were taken to ensure that design basis capability was not compromised relative to fire protection capability during the interval of the

• change.

General Manager ~

Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg.91-022