Information Notice 1993-40, Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermal Ceramics FP-60 Fire Barrier Material

Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermal Ceramics FP-60 Fire Barrier Material

ML031080040
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	05/26/1993
From:	Grimes B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-93-040, NUDOCS 9305260385
Download: ML031080040 (14)

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 26, 1993 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE 93-40: FIRE ENDURANCE

TEST RESULTS FOR THERMAL CERAMICS FP-60 FIRE BARRIER MATERIAL

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees

to results of fire endurance

and ampacity derating test reports submitted

by Thermal Ceramics on the FireMaster

FP-60 fire barrier system and the results of NRC staff reviews. It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Descriotion

of Circumstances

In Generic Letter (GL) 92-08, wThermo-Lag

330-1 Fire Barriers," the staff stated it would evaluate other known fire barrier materials

and systems that are used by licensees

to fulfill NRC fire protection

requirements.

The staff is now evaluating

fire barriers manufactured

by other vendors to verify the ability of the barriers to adequately

perform their 1-hour or 3-hour fire resistive

functions

and to meet stated ampacity derating values. Thermal Ceramics, Inc., formerly the Insulating

Products Division of Babcock and Wilcox, Inc., of Augusta, Georgia, manufactures

the FP-60 fire barrier system and submitted

reports on two fire endurance

tests and one ampacity derating test to the NRC in a letter of February 23, 1993.Discussion

In its review of the Thermal Ceramics reports, the staff identified

the following

information.

In its product literature, Thermal Ceramics states that the FP-60 product is manufactured

for use on cable trays, conduits, junction boxes, and other cable raceways.

The primary component, the FireMaster

FP-60 blanket, is a ceramic fiber blanket with thicknesses

varying from 2.5 cm [1 inch] to 7.6 cm[3 inches]. Optional aluminum or stainless

steel foil, Kao-Tex (woven cloth), or other cloth facings are provided for physical protection

of the blanket.The vendor claims that the material, when installed

according

to the instructions, is qualified

for up to a 13/4-hour fire rating using the American 9305260385

' P I)oktce. 93-o POR %'K P~ktcL93sI4 IN 93-40 May 26, 1993 Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard E-119, "Standard

Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction

and Materials." FIRE ENDURANCE

TESTS According

to one report submitted

by Thermal Ceramics, a. 1-hour fire endurance test of the FP-60 fire barrier in various configurations

was performed

at Underwriters

Laboratories, Inc. (UL File R11044-1, Project 84NK8356, March 22, 1985). The test followed UL Subject 1724, "Outline of Investigation, Fire Tests for Electrical

Circuit Protective

Systems," May 1984. According

to the report, the furnace temperatures

followed the ASTM E-119 standard time-temperature

curve for fire exposure, and the barriers were subjected

to a solid hose stream test. The report also states that circuit integrity

was monitored.

Documented

test configurations

included 91.4 cm [36 inch] wide open-ladder

and solid-back

steel cable trays, an air drop assembly, 12.7 cm [5 inch] diameter steel conduits, and a 30.5x15.2 cm (12x6 inch] steel Junction box. All configurations

contained

cables. Two hundred fifty thermocouples

were reportedly

used to measure temperatures

of cables, cable trays, Junction* boxes, conduits and electrical

circuit protective

systdms on the unexposed 1 side of the assembly.x According

to the report, within 30 seconds of the start of the test, the j filament tape around the blanket wrap ignited. At 5 minutes, flames# reportedly

issued from seams and butt joints. The report also states that at 20 minutes, some of the wrap slipped out of position resulting

in an opening^ in the barrier, and at 60 minutes, there was a 8.9 cm [3X inch] opening in the barrier. Some thermocouple

measurements

reportedly

ranged from 204 'C[400 OF] to 260 eC [500 OF] at the end of the fire test.After the test, some cables were documented

to be fused together, and cable jackets were melted and blistered.

The hose stream eroded the bottom surface of the cable tray barrier so that the tray was exposed.The UL report concluded

that the tested fire barrier had a 1-hour fire rating because circuit integrity

was maintained

during the fire exposure and hose stream test. However, it appears that the UL approval is limited to minimum 91.4 cm [36 inch] wide cable trays and 12.7 cm [5 inch] or larger-diameter

conduits with minimum No. 16 AWG jacketed multi-conductor

cables or minimum No. 300 MCM jacketed copper single conductor

power cables with polyvinyl chloride jackets.The second fire endurance

test report submitted

by Thermal Ceramics documented

a Southwest

Research Institute

small-scale

test, "One Hour Fire Qualification

Test of a Protective

Envelope for Class 1E Electrical

Conduit Circuits," (SwRI Project 01-8305-053, February 1986). According

to this report, the test employed the ASTM E-119 standard time-temperature

curve for fire exposure and a subsequent

solid hose stream test. The report also states that circuit integrity

was monitored.

SwRI documented

the use of a small-scale

furnace (maximum test specimen of 425.8 square cm (66 square inches]) to test a 2.5 cm [1 inch] diameter conduit with a pull box, a 5.1 cm [2 inch] diameter conduit with a junction box, and an air drop. According

to the report,. these

IN 93-40 May 26, 1993 test assemblies

each contained

a single-conductor

power cable and two control cables, all with PVC jackets.Recorded cable temperatures (measured

at the cable jackets) at the end of the fire exposure ranged from 146.5 'C (296 *F] to 164 C (327 OF]. According

to the report, circuit integrity

was maintained

during the fire exposure and hose stream tests.The barrier and cable conditions

after the fire exposure were not reported.The test report suggests that the hose stream test caused some barrier damage, although the test report did not clearly report the extent of damage. SwRI did not report a conclusion

as to the acceptability

of the fire barrier system.In a letter of April 27, 1993 to Thermal Ceramics, Inc., the staff expressed concerns regarding

the ability of the FP-60 system to meet existing NRC fire barrier acceptance

criteria.AMPACITY DERATING TEST The ampacity derating test report submitted

by Thermal Ceramics was SwRI Project 01-8818-210, "Ampacity

Derating of Fire-Protected

Cables in Conduit and Cable Trays Using Babcock & Wilcox, Incorporated's

Passive Fire Protection

System," issued by SwRI on July 8, 1986. According

to the report, a 1-hour fire barrier was used in the test. Three-conductor

XLPE-insulated

6 AWG cables with Hypalon protective

wraps were reportedly

installed

in a 61 cm (24 inch] wide by 10.2 cm [4 inch] deep cable tray, and 3-conductor

XLPE-insulated

3 AWG cables with Hypalon protective

wraps were installed

in a 10.2 cm [4 inch] diameter conduit. Both assemblies

were reported to be 3.7 m [12 feet] long and completely

filled. The report stated that thermocouples

were installed

in slits' in the cable insulation.

According

to the report, a steady-state

temperature

of 90 eC (194 *F) at the hottest single thermocouple

was monitored.

Equilibrium

temperature

was reportedly

established

when a steady-state

condition

(+/-1 eC per hour (+/-1.8 OF per hour]) was achieved for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> without any perturbation

to the system.The ampacity derating for the cable tray and conduit was estimated

to be 62.4 and 41.4 percent, respectively, based on the test results.Some licensees

use the FP-60 fire barrier system to achieve physical independence

of electrical

systems in accordance

with Regulatory

Guide 1.75, Physical Independence

of Electrical

Systems." Ampacity derating in fire barrier systems installed

to achieve physical independence

of electric systems is a consideration

in the design of such systems as well as in those installed to protect safe shutdown capability

from a fire.Cables enclosed in electrical

raceways protected

with fire barrier materials are derated to ensure that systems have sufficient

capacity and capability

to perform their intended safety functions.

These cables are derated because of the insulating

effect of the fire barrier material.

Other factors that affect ampacity derating include cable fill, cable loading, cable type, raceway construction, and ambient temperature.

IN 93-40 May 26, 1993 Cable derating calculations

that are based on inaccurate

or nonconservative

derating factors could result in installation

of undersized

cables or raceway overfilling.

This could cause operating

temperatures

to exceed design limits within the raceways thereby reducing the expected design life of the cables.In the letter to Thermal Ceramics, Inc., of April 27, 1993, the staff requested

additional

information

on ampacity derating.The National Electrical

Code, Insulated

Cable Engineers

Association (ICEA)publications, and other industry standards

provide general ampacity derating factors for open-air installations

but do not include derating factors for fire barrier systems. The Insulated

Conductors

Committee

of the IEEE Power Engineering

Society, Task Force 12-45, has been developing

IEEE Standard Procedure

P848, "Procedure

for the Determination

of the Ampacity Derating of Fire Protected

Cables," for use as an industry standard.

The industry consensus

standard development

process may formulate

an appropriate

technical approach to the determination

of ampacity derating factors for cables enclosed by fire barrier systems.The staff is continuing

to review this product for its ability to perform its fire resistive

function and will evaluate whether further generic communications

are needed to address the issues discussed

above.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Isabel M. Miller, NRR (301) 504-2852 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued Information

Notices

• 2 IN 93-40 May 26, 1993 Cable derating calculations

that are based on inaccurate

or nonconservative

derating factors could result in installation

of undersized

cables or raceway overfilling.

This could cause operating

temperatures

to exceed design limits within the raceways thereby reducing the expected design life of the cables.In the letter to Thermal Ceramics, Inc., of April 27, 1993, the staff requested

additional

information

on ampacity derating.The National Electrical

Code, Insulated

Cable Engineers

Association (ICEA)publications, and other industry standards

provide general ampacity derating factors for open-air installations

but do not include derating factors for fire barrier systems. The Insulated

Conductors

Committee

of the IEEE Power Engineering

Society, Task Force 12-45, has been developing

IEEE Standard Procedure

P848, "Procedure

for the Determination

of the Ampacity Derating of Fire Protected

Cables,' for use as an industry standard.

The industry consensus

standard development

process may formulate

an appropriate

technical approach to the determination

of ampacity derating factors for cables enclosed by fire barrier systems.The staff is continuing

to review this product for its ability to perform its fire resistive

function and will evaluate whether further generic communications

are needed to address the issues discussed

above.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. Orginal ignd y Brian K. Grimes Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Isabel M. Miller, NRR (301) 504-2852 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued Information

Notices*See previous concurrence

• SPLB:DSSA

• SPLB:DSSA

• TechEd IMiller SWest DGable 05/06/93 , 05/06/93 05/10/93*SPLB:DSSA

• OGC *DE:EELB CMcCracken

JGoldberg

CBerlinger

5/20/93 5/20/93 05/25/93*DD:DSSA *D:DSSA *OGCB:DORS

MVirgilio

AThadani GMarcus Grimes 05/25/93 05/25/93 05/25/93 S g&493 DOCUMENT NAME: 93-40.IN

IN 93-XX May xx, 1993 Cable derating calculations

that are based on inaccurate

or nonconservative

derating factors could result in installation

of undersized

cables or raceway overfilling.

This could cause operating

temperatures

to exceed design limits within the raceways thereby reducing the expected design life of the cables.In the letter to thermal ceramics of April 27, 1993, the staff requested additional

information

on ampacity derating.The National Electrical

Code, Insulated

Cable Engineers

Association (ICEA)publications, and other industry standards

provide general ampacity derating factors for open-air installations

but do not include derating factors for fire barrier systems. The Insulated

Conductors

Committee

of the IEEE Power Engineering

Society, Task Force 12-45, has been developing

IEEE Standard Procedure

P848, "Procedure

for the Determination

of the Ampacity Derating of Fire Protected

Cables," for use as an industry standard.

The industry consensus

standard development

process may formulate

an appropriate

technical approach to the determination

of ampacity derating factors for cables enclosed by fire barrier systems.The staff is continuing

to review this product for its ability to perform its fire resistive

function and will evaluate whether further generic communications

are needed to address the issues discussed

above.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Isabel M. Miller, NRR (301) 504-2852 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued Information

Notices*See previous concurrence

SPLB:DSSA

SPLB:DSSA

TechEd*IMiller *SWest *DGable 05/06/93 05/06/93 05/10/93 SPLB:DSSA

OGC *DE:EELB CMcCracken*

JGoldberg*

CBerlinger

5/20/93 5/20/93 05/25/93*DD:DSSA *D:DSSA *OGCB:DORS

D:DORS MVirgilio

AThadani GMarcus BGrimes 05/25/93 05/25/93 05/25/93 / /93 DOCUMENT NAME: INPSB.1

-- -------------

4 factors for open-air installations

but do not include derating factors for fire barrier systems. The Insulated

Conductors

Committee

of the IEEE Power Engineering

Society, Task Force 12-45, has been developing

IEEE Standard Procedure

P848, Procedure

for the Determination

of the Ampacity Derating of Fire Protected

Cables,' for use as an industry standard.

The staff encourages

licensees

to participate

in the industry consensus

standard development

process to formulate

an appropriate

technical

approach to the determination

of ampacity derating factors for cables enclosed by fire barrier systems.The staff is continuing

to review this product for its ability to perform its fire resistive

function and will take further action if appropriate.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Isabel M. Miller, NRR (301) 504-2852 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued Information

Notices*See previous concurrence

SPLB:DSSA*IMiller 05/06/93 SPLB:DSSA*SWest 05/06/93 TechEd*DGable 05/10/93 SPLB:DSSA CMcCracken*

5/20/93 DD:DSSA MVirgilio*

/ /93 OGC JGoldberg*

5/20/93/D :DSSA M AThadani 5 f1;93 DE:EELB CBerlinger*

/ /93 OGCBD;ORS&M GMar~1-/ (/93 AlS D: DORS BGrimes/ /93[G:\THERMOLA\OTHERVEN\IN

FP60.R3]Originator:

Isabel Miller

_L factors for open-air installations

but do not include derating factors for fire barrier systems. The Insulated

Conductors

Committee

of the IEEE Power Engineering

Society, Task Force 12-45, has been developing

IEEE Standard Procedure

P848, "Procedure

for the Determination

of the Ampacity Derating of Fire Protected

Cables," for use as an industry standard.

The staff encourages

licensees

to participate

in the industry consensus

standard development

process to formulate

an appropriate

technical

approach to the determination

of ampacity derating factors for cables enclosed by fire barrier systems.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.The staff is continuing

to review this product for its ability to perform its fire resistive

function and will take further action if appropriate.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Isabel M. Miller, NRR (301) 504-2852 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued Information

Notices*See previous concurrence

SPLB:DSSA*IMiller 05/06/93 SPLB:DSSA CMcCracken*

5/20/93 DD:DSSA,~M9irgil 9 SPLB:DSSA*SWest 05/06/93 OGC JGoldberg*

5/20/93 TechEd*DGable 05/10/93 DE:EE CBerltTrg

r-jstk093 D:DSSA AThadani/ /93 OGCB:DORS GMarcus/ /93 D:DORS BGrimes/ /93[G:\THERMOLA\OTHERVEN\IN

FP60.R3]Originator:

Isabel Miller

.'\1 factors for open-air installations

but do not include derating factors for fire barrier systems. The Insulated

Conductors

Committee

of the IEEE Power Engineering

Society, Task Force 12-45, has been developing

IEEE Standard Procedure

P848, "Procedure

for the Determination

of the Ampacity Derating of Fire Protected

Cables," for use as an industry standard.

The staff encourages

licensees

to participate

in the industry consensus

standard development

process to formulate

an appropriate

technical

approach to the determination

of ampacity derating factors for cables enclosed by fire barrier systems.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

The staff is continuing

to review this product for its ability to perform its fire resistive

function and will take further action if appropriate.

Licensees

are advised to consider this information

when contemplating

any changes to their current fire protection

program. If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Isabel M. Miller, NRR (301) 504-2852 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued Information

Notices*See previous concurrence

SPLB:DSSA*IMiller 05/06/93 SPLB:DSSP( ' L CMcCrackelr

_.5/P/93 DD:DSSA MVirgilio/ /93 SPLB:DSSA*SWest 05/06/v D:DSSA AThadani/ /93 TechEd*DGabl e 05/10/93 DE:EELB CBerlinger

/ /93 OGCB:DORS GMarcus/ /93 D: DORS BGrimes/ /93[G:\THERMOLA\OTHERVEN\IN

FP60.R2]Originator:

Isabel Miller

This information

notice required no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

K. Steven West, NRR (301) 504-1220 Technical

contact: Attachment:

List of Recently Issued Information

Notices SPLB:DSSA IMiller/ /93 OGC JGoldberg/ /93 DD:DSSA GHolahan 04/ /93 SPLB:DSSA SWest/ /93 SPLB:DSSA CMcCracken

/ /93 D:DSSA AThadani 04/ /93 6:7/0/93 DE:EELB CBerlinger

/ /93 OGCB:DORS GMarcus 04/ /93 D: DORS BGrimes/ /93

., --.1; l *consider actions as appropriate.

This information

notice required no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contai Attachment:

List of Recentl2 SPLB:DSSA,.

IMilletgfYL

5f/6 /93 K. Steven West, NRR (301) 504-1220 ssued Information

Notices SIest t576 /93 TechEd RiStnde-e/ /93 OGC JGoldberg/ /93 SPLB:DSSA CMcCracken

/ /93 DE: EELB CBerlinger

/ /93 DD: DSSA GHolahan 04/ /93 D: DSSA AThadani 04/ /93 OGCB:DORS GMarcus 04/ /93 D: DORS BGrimes/ /93[G:\THERMOLA\FP-60

IN.R1]Originator:

IsabeT Miller

I -1 Attachment

IN 93-40 May 26, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 93-39 93-38 Radiation

Beams from Power Reactor Biolog-ical Shields Inadequate

Testing of Engineered

Safety Features Actuation System 05/25/93 05/24/93 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.93-37 Eyebolts with Indeter-minate Properties

In-stalled in Limitorque

Valve Operator Housing Covers 05/19/93 All holders for nuclear of OLs or CPs power reactors.93-36 Notifications, Reports, and Records of Misadmin-istrations

05/07/93 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

medical licensees.

93-35 Insights from Common-Cause Failure Events 05/12/93 All holders for nuclear (NPPs).of OLs or CPs power plants 93-34, Supp. 1 93-34 Potential

for Loss of Emergency

Cooling Function Due to A Combination

of Operational

and Post-Loca Debris in Contain-ment Potential

for Loss of Emergency

Cooling Function Due to A Combination

of Operational

and Post-Loca Debris in Contain-ment 05/06/93 04/26/93 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.OL = Operating

License CP = Construction

Permit