ML082200264

March 05000400-08-301 Exam Final Simulator Scenarios

ML082200264
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	08/07/2008
From:	- No Known Affiliation
To:	NRC/RGN-II
References
50-400/08-301, ES-D-1 50-400/08-301
Download: ML082200264 (103)

See also: IR 05000400/2008301

Text

Final Submittal(BluePaper)

JlAil2l S;Za98--30 f O(eQJ-}c" lI1 5{e&J

5/10-sjsFINAL SIMULATOR SCENARIOS

I Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1

I Facility: HARRISScenarioNo.:1OpTestNo.:2008NRC Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:IC-20:100%power,EOL*TDAFWPumpclearedandtaggedtoreplacetappetnutontripvalve.54hoursremainingonTS3.7.1.2Actiona.

• 4GPDtubeleakageinSG"C"forpast30days.

ChemistryhasCRC-804ineffect.

• RadiationMonitorRM-01MS-3593SB,MSL"C"Monitor,wasdeclaredinoperablelastshift.TS3.3.3.6Actioncineffect.

Turnover:*Maintain100

%power.CriticalTasks:

• Establish feedwaterflowtoatleastoneSGbeforeRCSfeedandbleedisrequired.

• IsolateAFWtoSG"B"priorto

terminating

HHSI.EventMalt.Event

Event No.No.Type*Description

1 N/A N-SRO, Load DispatcherdirectsrapidpowerreductionduetoafireataBOPmajorswitchingstation

R-RO 2 CNS015 TS-SROLossofControlPowerto

ContainmentSprayPump"A"duringpowerreduction

3 CCW08A C-RO, Component Cooling WaterLeakintherunningpumpsuction

SRO header TS-SRO 4 GEN01 C-BOP, Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure SRO 5 NIS08C I-RO,PRNISChannelN-43failsHI

SRO 6 FT:497 I-BOP,ControllingFFChannelfailsLO

SRO 7 RCS03 M-ALLRCP"C"Lockedrotor

8 CFW01A C-BOPMDAFWPump"A" breaker trips ZR211158MDAFWPump"B"AUTOstartfails

ZDSQ2:13b 9 MSS11 M-ALLMSLBOutside

ContainmenVNoMSIVcanbeclosedfromtheControlRoom2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page1 at 36 REVISION 2

I Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1

I 10 MSS058 C-BOPMSIV"B"stuckOPEN

ZRPK616AFailureofAUTOAFWBlockonSG"B" ZRPK6168*(N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajorHARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO 1 SUMMARYThecrewwillassumethewatchat100

%power,with

directionstomaintaincurrent

conditions.

The Turbine-drivenAFWPumpisclearedandtaggedforrepairofthetappetnutonthetripvalve.TS 3.7.1.2.aisineffect.Thereisa4GPOtubeleakinSteam

Generator'(SG)"C"thathasbeenstablefor30days.Chemistryismonitoringin

accordancewiththeirprocedures.TheradiationmonitoronMainSteamLine"C"failedlastshift.

TS3.3.3.6.cisineffect.

ShortlyafterthecrewassumesthewatchtheLoad

Dispatcherwillcallwith

directions

toreducepowertos

50%withinthenexthourduetoafireinamajorswitchingstation.TheSROshoulddirectthepowerreductionin

accordancewithAOP-038,RAPID

DOWNPOWER.Aftera100MWreductionoratevaluationteamdiscretion,theLoad

Dispatcherwillcallandtellthemtoholdatthecurrentlevel.TheLeadEvaluatorwillcuethelossofcontrolpowerto

ContainmentSprayPump"A"whenready.Thecrewshouldrespondin

accordancewiththealarmresponse

procedureandtheSROshouldenterTS3.6.2.1..Afterthe ContainmentSprayPumpTSdeclaration,theLeadEvaluatorcancuetheleakintheCCWSuctionHeader.Theleakwillbelessthanmakeupcapability.ThecrewshouldrespondtotheCCWSurgeTanklevelchangeand/oralarmandenterAOP-014,LOSSOF COMPONENTCOOLINGWATER.Afield

operatorwillreporttheleaklocationshortlyafterbeingdispatched.Thelocationoftheleakwillrequireshiftingthe

operatingpumpsandlocallyclosingisolationvalves.TheSROshouldenterTS3.7.3.AftertheCCWleakhasbeenisolatedandtheTS

declarationiscomplete,theLead

Evaluatorcancuefailureofthe

AutomaticVoltageRegulatorontheMainGenerator.Thecrewshouldrespondin

accordancewithalarmresponseprocedures,placethevoltageregulatorinMANUAL,andrestore

parameterstothenormalband.AfterMain Generatorvoltageisundercontrol,theLead

EvaluatorcancuefailureofthePowerRangeNISchannel.Thecrewshouldrespondtotheuncontrolledrodmotionin

accordancewithAOP-001, MALFUNCTIONOFROD CONTROL AND INDICATIONSYSTEM.ThecrewshouldrestoreTavgwithRodControlinMANUAL.ItisnotrequiredthatthechannelberemovedfromservicetocontinuethescenarioandtheTS

declarationisnotrequiredtomeettheminimumscenariorequirements.Whentheplantisinastablecondition,theLeadEvaluatorcancuetheSG"C"FFchannelfailure.Thecrewshouldrespondin

accordancewiththealarmresponse

procedure,controllingSG"C"levelwiththeFRVinMANUALandmayswitchcontrollingFFchannelstorestorecontroltoAUTO.Itisnotrequiredthatthechannelberemoved2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIOtPage2of36REVISION2

I Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1

Ifromserviceto

continue the scenarioandtheTS declarationisnotrequiredtomeetthe

minimum scenario requirements.WhenSG"C"levelisundercontrolorinAUTO,theLead

EvaluatorcancuetheRCPlockedrotor.Thiswillresultinan

automaticreactortriponRCSflow.ThecrewwillperformthePATH-1

immediateactionsand

transitiontoEPP-004,REACTORTRIP.InEPP-004thecrewshould

manuallystartMDAFWPump"B"orinitiateMFWflowusingtheFRVBypassValves.InEPP-004alargesteamleakwilldevelopoutsideof

containment.

All MSIV'swillfailtoclosewhen

the crew attemptstostopthecooldown.

After diagnosisthecrewshouldinitiatea

MANUALSI,returntoPATH-1, transition

toEPP-014,FAULTEDSTEAM

GENERATOR ISOLATION,andthentoEPP-015, UNCONTROLLED

DEPRESSURIZATIONOFALLSTEAM

GENERATORS.

Shortlyafterafield

operator is dispatchedMSIV's"A"and"C"willclose.Thecrewthenwill

transitionbacktoEPP-014,FAULTEDSTEAM

GENERATOR ISOLATION,andisolateSG"B".Atsomepoint

81 Terminationcriteriawillbemet.The

scenariocanbe terminatedwhennormal

charging is established.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1Page3of36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1SETUPFormES-D-1

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:*ClipacopyofGUIDE-1

Attachment1(SI Alignment)

and Attachment

6 (Safeguards

Actuation Verification)toeachscenarioguideforusebythe

evaluators.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:*IC-20: 100°10power,EOL*Tag TDAFWPumponthe MC8*Reactivity

Plan*Turnover Sheet*Ensurerodstep

countersresettothe

correct value PRE-LOAD:*imfcfw01C:

TDAFWPumpunder clearance*irfrms171:

Steamline"C"Rad MonitorfailedHIGH*imf cfw01A-MDAFWPump"A" breaker trip coincidentwithAUTOorMANUAL

start*imf zr211158 FAIL_ASIS-MDAFWPump"8"failstoAUTOstartfromSGLevelorLoad Sequencer*imf zdsq2:13b FAIL_ASIS-MDAFWPump"8"failstoAUTOstartfromSGLevelorLoad

Sequencer*imf zrpk616a FAIL_ASIS-AUTOAFWIsolationforSG

"8" fails*imf zrpk616a FAIL_ASIS-AUTOAFWIsolationforSG"8"fails

TRIGGERS:*Event2:irfcns015CP

_OFF-LossofcontrolpowertoCTSprayPump"8"*Event3:imf

ccw08ACCWsuction

headerleakonAtrain(50GPM)*Event4:imfgen01Main

GeneratorAUTOVoltage

Regulatorfailure-130°/0 over5minutes*Event5:imfnis08C-PRNISN-43failsHIGH

(200°/0)*Event6:imfFT:497SG"C" ControllingFeedFlowChannelfailsLO

(0°/0)over15 seconds*Event7:imfrcs03PUMP3-LockedrotoronCRCP*Event9:MainSteambreak

outside CNMT(sizeto preventREDor ORANGE on Integrity)*imfmss11(Initial:40.0E04,rampto4.0E06overoneminute)*imf mss05a-MSIV"A"failstoclose*imf mss05a-MSIV"8"failstoclose*imf mss05a-MSIV"C"failstoclose*Allow closureofMSIV"A"and"C"*TRG=10dmf mss05a*TRG=10dmf mss05a*Field actions for GUIDE 1, Attachment

62008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO 1Page4of36REVISION2

AppendixDScenarioOutline

Form ES-D-12008HARRISNRCSCENARIO1EVENT1-POWERCHANGE

Booth Operator Instructions:*Call theMCRas the Load Dispatcher.Thereisa problem on the griddueto a transformer

fireata major switching station not directly associated

with the HARRIS plant.Reduce load to 50%within one houratarate of 25 MW/minute.

Report back when complete.*When loadhasbeen reducedby100MWe oroncue from the Lead Evaluator,callas the Load Dispatcher

and tell themtoHOLDat the current level until further notice.Indications

Available:

Call from Load Dispatcher.SROEntersAOP-038,RAPIDDOWNPOWER.PROCEDURENOTE:

• • This procedure contains no immediate actions.Steps may be performed simultaneously

or out of sequence at the discretion

of the Superintendent

-Shift Operations.

EVALUATOR/BOOTHOPERATORNOTE:The

crew may make calls to notify plant management

before or during the power reduction.

Acknowledge

anc;l request a report when more information

becomes available.REFERTOPEP-110,EmergencyClassificationAndProtectiveSROActionRecommendations,ANDENTERtheEALNetworkatentrypointX.SRONOTIFYLoadDispatcherthattheUnitisreducingload.(N/A)PROCEDURENOTE:

Boration of the RCS commences at Step 10.EVALUATOR'SNOTE:The crew mayuseOP-107, Section 8.21-RAPIDADDITIONOFBORICACIDTORCS,to

estimate the boration and perform the steps.2008HARRISNRCSCENARIO1Page5of36REVISION2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1EVENT1-POWERCHANGE

RO/SRO RO DETERMINErequiredboricacidadditionfordesiredpowerreduction,asfollows:

CHECKBOTHofthefollowing

conditions

exist:*Reactorpoweris100%.

• TargetpowerlevelisprovidedinOPT-1525,ReactivityPlanGenerationWeeklyIntervalMODE1atFullPower

(50%, 30%or5%).OBTAINvaluesfrom

Attachment2,GallonsofBoric

AcidlTargetRodHeightRequiredforPowerReduction.*DesiredBorationgal

• TargetRodheight(DBank)_PROCEDURENOTE:

• • • If load reduction rates in excess of 45 MW/min are required, the Unit should be tripped.IfOSI-PIis

available, the followingpathin PLANTSTATUS.PIW

will assess VIDAR functionality:

• Plant Process Computer: DEH (menu), DEH Trends,DEH_MEGAWATTS.IfDEH_MEGAWATTSis

flat-lining,VIDARis NOT functioning

properly.IfOSI-PIisNOT

available, accessing theANALOGINPUTS

screen on the Graphics Display Computer (located in the Termination

CabinetRoomnear theATWSPanel)

will show several points, most of which should be updatingifthe VIDAR Unit is functioning

properly.PROCEDURECAUTION:

Failure of the DEH computer VIDAR Unit whileinOPERAUTOhas resultedina plant trip.BOP CHECKBOTHofthefollowing:*DEHSysteminAUTO(YES)*VIDARfunctioningproperly(YES)BOPPERFORMthefollowingattheDEHpanel:

• DEPRESS the LoaoRateMW/MINpushbutton.2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page6of36REVISION2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO 1 EVENT1-POWER CHANGE*ENTERdesiredrate(NOTtoexceed45

MW/MIN)inDEMANDdisplay.

• DEPRESS ENTER pushbutton.

• DEPRESS REF pushbutton.

• ENTERdesiredload(120MWifshuttingdown)inDEMANDdisplay.

• DEPRESS ENTER pushbutton.

• CHECK HOLD pushbutton

LIT.RO CHECKRodControlinAUTO.(YES)

RO ENERGIZE ALL availablePRZBackupheaters.

SRO DISCUSS Attachment3,ReactivityBrief,withtheMCRstaff.PROCEDURENOTE:

With the Megawatt and Impulse Pressure Feedback Loops out of service, the MW indication

in the REFERENCE display will not reflect actual MW output.An accurate indication

of Main Generator output can be obtained from ERFIS point JEE15688 (Gross MWe).BOP COMMENCE turbineloadreductionattheDEHpanel:

• CHECKOPERAUTOMode

AVAILABLE.(YES)*DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

• VERIFYthevalueinthe

REFERENCE display LOWERS.PROCEDURENOTE:

• To prevent over-boration, only the amount of boron required to reduce power to the desired power level should be added.*Adjustments

shouldbemadeto boric acid flow based on actual core/rod responses.

RO COMMENCE RCS borationasrequiredtomaintainControlRodsabovetheRodInsertionLimit(CurveF-X-1).

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO1Page7of36

REVISION 2

AppendixDScenarioOutlineForm.ES-D-12008HARRISNRCSCENARIO1EVENT1-POWERCHANGE

" EVALUATOR'SNOTE:The following boration steps are provided for evaluator use.They are notinAOP-038.PROCEDURENOTE:

RO RO RO RO RO RO RO RO RO If performing

a rapid shutdown of the plantper 038, the following calculation

does not havetobe completed before boration begins, but should be completed before half of the estimated (or before 500 gallons whichever is less)boron additionhasbeen dispensed.

DETERMINEthevolumeofboricacid

necessarytoachievetherequiredRCSboron

concentration.ENTERtheamount

determinedinpreviousSteponAttachment

13.VERIFYthebackupBoricAcid

TransferPumpcontrolswitchisinSTOP.STARTtheBoricAcid

TransferPumpalignedforAutoMake-up(switchinAUTO)byplacingthecontrolswitchtoSTART.OPEN1CS-278SB, EMERGENCYBORICACIDADDITION.RECORDtheBoricAcidflowratefromFI-110on

Attachment

13.CALCULATEtheamountoftimeinminutesitwilltaketo

delivertherequiredamountofBoricAcid.WHENthecalculated

amountoftimehaselapsed,THENSHUT1CS-278SB.

'STOPtheBoricAcid

TransferPumpstartedpreviously.2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO 1Page8of36REVISION2

Appendix 0ScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1EVENT1-POWER

CHANGE VERIFYBoricAcidpumpsinthefollowingalignment:

RO*onepumpisinAUTO.

• onepumpisinSTOP.

RO REQUEST ChemistrytosampletheRCSboronconcentration.ROPLACE ReactorMakeupinAutoperSection5.1.

EVALUATOR'SNOTE:The following boration.stepsare provided for*evaluatoruse.Theyare

notinAOP-038.TheRO

will use either section 8.21 (above)or section 5.6 (below).*SETFIS-113,BORICACIDBATCHCOUNTER,toobtain

the desired quantity.*SET controller1CS-283,FK-113BORICACIDFLOW,for

the desiredflowrate.*VERIFYtheRMW

CONTROLswitchhasbeenplacedintheSTOPposition.*VERIFYtheRMW

CONTROLswitchgreenlightislit.*PLACEcontrolswitchRMWMODE

SELECTORtotheBORposition.*STARTthemakeupsystemasfollows:*TURNcontrolswitchRMW

CONTROLtoSTART momentarily.

• VERIFYtheREDindicatorlightisLIT.CREWVERIFY

GeneratorloadANDReactorpowerLOWERING.

BOP MAINTAIN Generatorreactiveload(VARs)withinguidelines.PROCEDURENOTE:

Opening3Aand 38 Feedwater Heater vents helps minimize water hammerin3Aand 38 Feedwater Heaters.2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO 1Page9of36REVISION2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO 1 EVENT1-POWER CHANGEWHENTurbineloadislessthan95%,THENDISPATCHan

SRO operatortoopen3Aand

38 FeedwaterHeaterventsperOP-136,Shutdownof

FeedwaterHeaters3Aand38.

RO CHECKTavgwithin5

ofofTref.(YES)

CREW NOTIFY Chemistryofthe following:

• Reactorpowerchangewillexceed

15%inaonehour

period.Thefollowing

surveillances

specifiedinthe applicable

sectionsrequireperforming:

• RST-204,Reactor

Coolant System Chemistry and Radiochemistry

Surveillance

• RST-211, Gaseous Effluent Radiochemistry

Surveillance

SRO CHECKthataplannedloadreductionwilltaketheUnitto

Turbine shutdown.(NO)*GOTOStep18.

CREWNOTIFYRadwasteControlRoomtobepreparedforthe

increased water processing

requirementsduetoboration.

SRO CHECKPowerlevelatthe

targetvalue.(YES-whenreached)

EVALUATOR'S

NOTE:TheLead Evaluatorcancue Event 2 (Loss of Control Power to Containment

Spray Pump" A")after the load change is terminated

and the plant is stabilized.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO1Page10of36

REVISION 2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1EVENT2-LOSSOF

CONTROLPOWERFOR CONTAINMENT

SPRAYPUMP'A'Booth Operator Instructions:*Oncue from the Lead Evaluator, actuate ET-2 (irfCNS015-Loss of Control Power to Containment

Spray Pump"A")Indications

Available:*ALB-001-2-4,SPRAYPUMPA

OICTRIPORCLOSECKTTROUBLE

RO RO RESPONDStoalarm ALB-001-2-4, SPRAYPUMPA OIC TRIP OR CLOSE CKT TROUBLE Performs APP-ALB-001-2-4.

BOP SRO Booth Operator Note: SRO SRO SRO SRO REPORTSlossof breakercontrolpoweron

computer alarm CRT.DIRECTan operatortocheckstatusof

breaker1A2-SA-4C, ContainmentSprayPump1A-SA.

If dispatched, report: Containment

Spray Pump" A" breaker is open, all indicating

lights are extinguished

and there is a.smell of burnt electrical

insulation

in the generalarea.The Static Trip unit is blank.IFcontrolpowerislostwiththe

breakerintheshutposition, locallytripthebreaker.(N/A)INITIATEanEIRfor CAUSES 1,2,and3.CONTACT WorkControltoinitiate

corrective

actions.ENTERSTS3.6.2.1(restoreto

operablewithin72hoursorbeinHSBwithinthenext6hours).

Evaluator's

Note: Cue Event3(CCWLeak)

after the TS declaration.2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page11of36REVISION2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1EVENT3-CCWLEAK

Booth Operator Instructions:*On cue from the Lead Evaluator, actuateET-3-50GPMCCW

Leak (imfccw08a)

Indications

Available:

ALB-005-8-5, COMPUTER ALARMCCWSYSTEM Evaluator Note:*The crew may enter AOP-014,LOSSOF COMPONENT COOLING WATER, when the first alarm is confirmed.

RO BOP RO RORESPONDStoalarmALB-005-8-5, COMPUTERALARMCCW SYSTEM.REPORTSCCWSurgeTanklevelalarmonalarmscreen.RESPONDStoalarmALB-005-6-1,CCWSURGE

TANK HIGH-LOW LEVEL.ENTERS APP-ALP-005-6-1.

Procedure Note: RO ROTheCCW Surge Tank baffle plate separates Side A and Side B up to the 380/0 level.CONFIRMalarmusing:*LI-670A.1,CCWSurgeTankLevel(SideA)*LI-676A.1,CCWSurgeTankLevel(SideB)

VERIFY Automatic Functions:*CCWflowtotheGFFDandPrimarySamplePanelwillisolateonalowCCWSurgeTanklevel(40%).(AlarmALB-026-2-1actuated.)(nextpage)2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page12of36REVISION2

AppendixDScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRCSCENARIO1EVENT3-CCWLEAK

• CCWHoldupTank

TransferPumpandtheCCWDrain

Tank TransferPumpwilltripona

higtJCCWSurgeTank

level (750/0).(N/A)ROPERFORMCorrectiveActions:

• IFsurgetanklevelishighANDrising.(N/A)

• IFradiationactivitylevelisincreasing,THENGOTOAOP-016,ExcessivePrimaryPlantLeakage.(NO)

• IFthealarmisduetoplantheatup,THENDRAINthesurgetanktonormallevel.(NO)

Procedure Note: SRO SRO SRO*This procedure contains no immediate actions.*Loss ofCCWmay require implementationoftheSHNPP

Emergency Plan.REFERtoPEP-110, Emergency ClassificationandProtective

Action Recommendations,ANDENTERtheEALNetworkatentrypoint

x.EVALUATEplantconditionsANDGOTOtheappropriate

section: CONTACTSAOtocheckRABforCCWleaks.(actionisnot

procedurallydirectedbutshouldhappenduringthecourseof

implementingthisAOP.)Booth Operator Note: Booth Operator Note:Ifa report is requested:

RadWaste reports increased RAB floor drain in-leakage.

Shortly after contacted, report a leak in the suction header between 1CC-27 and*CCW Pump"A".Afteryouare directed to close1CC-27and1CC-36, wait two minutes then delete IMF CCW08A and report the valves closed.2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page13of36REVISION2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1

2008"HARRIS NRC SCENARIO1EVENT3-CCWLEAK

Evaluator's

Note:*eew Pump start/stop

actions are providedinthe ScenarioGuide,nearthe

bottom of the next page.*Thepath through the proceduremaybe different foreachcrew since it dependsonwhen the leak location is known and how certain questions are answered.However, each crew should initiate makeup, swap running pumps, isolatetheleak,and

addresstheTS.Procedure Note: RO Procedure Note:TheGFFDandReS

sample panel will isolate on low eew Surge Tanklevelofless

than orequalto 400/0.MAINTAINCCWSurgeTanklevelbetween

45%and 75%using1DW-15,CCWMakeUp.

An affected eew Pumpisoneto which any of the following apply:*Less than 4%level indicated on the eew Surge Tank.*Exhibits abnormal flow.*Alignedtoan affected Train pump through theessential header.RO CHECKBOTHofthefollowingconditionsexist:*ALLoperableCCWSurgeTanklevelindicatorsaregreater

than 40/0 (YES)*CCWPumpflowindicationis

NORMAL (YES)PLACEandHOLDthecontrolswitchforALLaffectedCCWROPumpstoSTOPuntilCCWheaderpressureislessthan52"psig.(N/A)SRO CHECKEITHERRHRTraininShutdownCoolingMode.(NO)

RO/SRO CHECK RCS temperature

greaterthan200°F.(YES)

CHECK the Non-Essentialheaderaffectedor

previouslyRO/SROisolated (insufficientflow,knowntobetheleaksource,orother

indication).(YES/NO)2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page14of36REVISION2

AppendixDScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1EVENT3-CCWLEAK

SRO Booth Operator Note:DIRECTSROtostartthe

standbypumpandstopCCWPump"A"perOP-145.

If requested to remove control power from"A" CCW'Pump:Remote

FunctionCCW075CP_OFF

RO Procedure Note:VERIFIESInitial

Conditions.

Starting the second pump could cause L\P fluctuations

across REM-01 CC-3501ASA(BSB)which may shut solenoid valves1CC-23and1CC-40.

Starting the second pump may cause flow oscillations

which could shut1CC-252.Re-opening

of1CC-252 should not be attempted until the second pump is secured.Procedure Caution: WithoneCCW pump runningandthe standby pump capableofan automatic start,'ensure a minimum flowrateof7850

gpm exists as indicated on FI-652.1(FI-653.1).If

both CCW pumps are running OR the CCW trains are separated, a minimumof3850gpmper

pump is required.This lower flowrate should only be allowed for short durations to accomplish

pump swapping or system realignment.

RO RO ROAttheMCB,START

CCWPumpTrainB-SB.VERIFYflowisgreaterthanorequalto3850gpmonFI-653.1andFI-652.1.PERFORMoneofthefollowing:

• SECUREasecondCCWPumpusingSection7.1.

RO VERIFIES Initial Conditions.2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page15of36REVISION2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1EVENT3-CCWLEAK

RO VERIFYOPEN,thefollowingvalves:

• 1CC-99,CCWHEAT

EXCHANGERATO NONESSENTIALSUP(YES)*1CC-113,CCWHEAT

EXCHANGERBTO NONESSENTIALSUP(YES)*1CC-127,CCW

NONESSENTIALRETURNTOHEADERB(YES)*1CC-128, CCW NONESSENTIALRETURNTOHEADERA(YES)RO VERIFY SHUT, 1CC-167and1CC-147,CCWFROMRHR

HEAT EXCHANGERB-SBANDA-SA(YES)

Procedure Note: Ifpressurefalls

below 52 psig,theCCW Pump will restart.ROAttheMCB,STOPCCWPumpTrainA-SA.

RO VERIFYthefollowingforTrainA:

• FLOWstopsusingFI-653.1 (FI-652.1)

• PRESSURE remains greaterthan75psigsuingPI-650 (PI-649).RO CHECKTrainBflowratebetween

10,000and11,000gpmon

MCB indicator FI-663.1.SRO ENTERSTS3.7.3(restoreatleasttwo

flowpathstooperablewithin72hoursorbeinHSBwithinthenext6hours).

Evaluator's

Note:Whentheleakis

isolated,theCCW Pumpshavebeen swapped,andtheTS declaration

is complete, cue Event 4 (Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure)..2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page16of36REVISION2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRCSCENARIO1EVENT4-MAIN

GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR FAILURE Booth Operator Instructions:

Actuate ET-4 for the Main Generator Voltage Regulator failureoncue from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications

Available:TheBOP may recognize a problem before any alarms.*ALB-22-4-3,GENERATORVOLTAGEIFREQRATIO/HIGHORUNDERFREQ

• ALB-22-9-4COMPUTERALARMGEN/EXCITERSYSTEMSBOPRESPONDStoalarms

ALB-022-4-3and9-4.EVALUATOR'S

NOTE: Alarm ALB-022-9-4isa computer alarm.ALB-022-4-3

will initiate corrective

actions.The crew may refertoAOP-006 but no actions will result.BOPCONFIRMalarmusing:*ATMCB:*EI-525, Generator Frequency.*EI-520, GeneratorPhaseVolts.(YES-Reports

voltageregulationproblem)*EI-540,GenExciterFieldVolts.*EI-541,GenExciterFieldCurrent.*ATGenProtectiveRelayPanel1B,GenOverExcitation

ProtBackupProtectionrelaystatusflag:TRIPPED*ATGenProtectiveRelayPanel1B,GenOverExcitationProtBackupProtectionrelaystatusflag.*TRIPPEDBOPVERIFY Automatic Functions:

• VOLTAGERegulatorLimiter

decreases Generator excitation.*IFVoltageLimiterisunabletocontrolexcitationincrease,a

GeneratorLockoutoccurs.2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page17of36REVISION2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO1EVENT4-MAIN

GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR FAILURE BOP PERFORM Corrective

Actions:*CHECKforthefollowingatMCB:

• EI-525, Generator Frequency,stableat60Hz.(YES)*EI-520, GeneratorPhaseVolts,stableat22KV.(NO)

• EI-540,GenExciterFieldVoltsstable.(YES)

• EI-541,GenExciterField

Currentstable.(YES)

Procedure Note: An automatic transfer to manual Generator voltage control is indicated by GENERATOR.VOLTAGE

REGULATOR switchONand the GREEN light LIT.Both the AMBER lightandRED light willbeOFF.BOP*OPERATE GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTERswitchto restore Generator voltageto22KVandreduceMVARS.

• IF GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTERswitchis ineffective

THEN PERFORMthefollowingto

transfer andmaintainvoltagemanually:

• OPERATE the GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTER to attempttozerothe REGULATOR OUTPUT BALVOLTmeter.

• PLACE GENERATORVOLTAGE REGULATOR switchintheTESTpositionand

observeAMBERlightLITandREDlightOFF.

• OPERATE GENERATOR BASE ADJUSTERswitchto restore Generator voltageto22KV.SRO*REFERENCE AOP-028,GridInstability.(N/A-theproblemisnotonthegrid)

BOP*VERIFY Main Generator is operatingperthe Generator Capability

Curve.EVALUATOR'S

NOTE: When Main Gen Voltage is under control, cue Event 5 (PRNIS Channel N-43 failure)2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO1Page18of36REVISION2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT5-PRNIS CHANNEL FAILURE Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications

Available:Oncue from the Lead Evaluator, Actuate ET-5, PRNIS Channel 43 failsHIGH(NIS08C)

Uncontrolled

rod motion and bistable trips.RO RESPONDS to alarms/uncontrolledrodmotion.

RO PERFORMS immediate actions.EVALUATOR'SNOTE:ATS declaration

(3.3.1 Action2)isNOT required for this event and the channel does nothavetobe removed from service to continue the scenario.The Lead Evaluatorcancue Event6(SG"C" FF Channel failure)afterTavgis being controlled

or when AOP-001 is exited.BOOTHOPERATOR:If

theOWPis implemented:APP-RPS/OWPRP25TST.

Pause after the first 4 steps.Immediate Action Immediate Action Immediate Action RO RO-RO SRO RO CHECKthatLESSTHAN

TWOcontrolrodsare

dropped.(YES)POSITIONRodBank SelectorSwitchtoMAN.

CHECK ControlBankmotion

STOPPED.(YES)PROCEEDStoSection3.2.

CHECK that instrument

channelfailurehasNOT

OCCURRED by observing the following:*RCSTavg(YES)*RCSTref(YES)

• POWERRangeNI channels (NO)*TURBINE first stage pressure (YES)2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO1Page19of36

REVISION 2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRCSCENARIO1EVENT5-PRNIS

CHANNEL FAILURE SROPERFORMthefollowing:

• IFapowersupplyislost,THENGOTOAOP-024,Lossof

UninterruptiblePowerSupply.(N/A)

• IFanindividual

instrumentfailed,THENMAINTAINmanualrodcontroluntilcorrectiveactioniscomplete.(YES)*IFaPowerRangeNIChannelfailed,THENBYPASSthefailedchannelusingOWP-RP.(YES)

EVALUATORNOTE:A High Power Rod Stopisin effect until defeated at the drawer.RO Manually OPERATEaffectedcontrolbanktorestorethe

following:

• Equilibriumpowerand

temperature

conditions

• RodsabovetheinsertionlimitsofTechSpec3.1.3.6and

PLP-106, Technical SpecificationEquipmentListProgramandCoreOperatingLimitsReport.ROVERIFYproperoperationofthefollowing:(YES)

• CVCS demineralizers

• BTRS*ReactorMakeupControlSystem

SRO CHECKthatthissectionwasenteredduetocontrolbanksMOVINGOUT.(NO)

• GOTOStep6.

RO CHECK that NEITHERofthefollowing

OCCURRED:*UnexplainedRCSboration

• UnplannedRCSdilution

SRO CHECKthatan automaticRodControlmalfunction

OCCURRED.(NO)*GOTOStep9.2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page20of36REVISION2

AppendixDScenarioOutline

Form ES-D-12008HARRISNRCSCENARIO1EVENT5-PRNISCHANNELFAILURE

EVALUATOR NOTE: Though not directedbyAOP-001, the SRO should direct implementation

of OWP-RP-25 prior to exiting the procedure.SROEXITthisprocedure.

RO Verify ROD BANK SELECTORSwitchin MANUAL (YES)BOPVerifyFWRegBypValve

Controllers

in MANUAL (YES)At Detector Current Comparator

Drawer:RO*UPPERSectionSwitchtoPRN43*LOWERSectionSwitchtoPRN43

RO RO At MiscellaneousControland

Indication

Panel:*RODSTOPBYPASSSwitchtoBYPASSPRN43*POWER MISMATCH BYPASSSwitchtoBYPASSPRN43 At ComparatorandRateDrawer:

• COMPARATORCHANNEL

DEFEATSwitchto N43 EVALUATORNOTE:Lead Evaluatorcancue next event once plant is stable.2008HARRISNRCSCENARIO1Page21of36REVISION2

AppendixDScenarioOutline

Form ES-D-12008HARRISNRCSCENARIO1EVENT6-SG'C'FFCHANNELFAILSLOW

Booth Operator Instructions:

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, actuateET-6SG"C" FF Channel failsLO(FT:497)

Note that this EventisaRAPID transient.

Wait until theBOPis near to initiate.If a reactor trip occurstheninitiateET-7and continue on with scenario.Indications

Available:

ALB-014-6-1B,SGCSTM>FWFLOWMISMATCHBOPRESPONDStoalarmALB-014-6-1B.BOPCONFIRMalarmusing:*FI-496,FI-497,SGCFeedFlow*FI-494,FI-495,SGCSteamFlow*ReportsFI-497failedLOWBOPPERFORMCorrectiveActions:*IFFCV-498,FeedwaterRegValve,isNOTcontrollingSGlevel,THENMANUALLYCONTROLFK-498ANDREDUCEfeedflow.*DISPATCHanoperatortocheckforindicationsoffeedwaterleaks.

Evaluator Note:TheSRO may enter AOP-010 based on the flow transient.Ifso, the outcome will be the same-the associatedFRVin MANUAL.SROREFERStoOWP-RP-09.

Evaluator's

Note:*The crew may swap controlling

channels to regain automatic control before theOWPis implemented.*ATS declaration

(3.3.1 Action6)isNOT required for this event and the channel does not have to be removed from service to continue the scenario.*TheLead Evaluator can cue Event 7 when SG level'is being controlled

or isinAUTO.2008HARRISNRCSCENARIO1Page22of36REVISION2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1EVENTRCP'C'LOCKEDROTOR/STEAMBREAK

OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

Booth Operator Instructions:*On cue from the Lead Evaluator, actuateET-7RCPC Locked Rotor (RCS03 PUMP_3)Indications

Available:

ALB-011-2-2,REACTORTRIPLOWFLOW/RCPP8

PERMISSIVERORESPONDStoReactorTripFirstOutalarmSROENTERSanddirectsactionsofPATH-1.

RO VERIFYReactorTrip:*AUTOorMANUAL

ReactorTripsuccessful:

• CHECKforanyofthefollowing:*TripbreakersRTAandBYAOPEN(YES)*TripbreakersRTBandBYBOPEN(YES)*RODBottomlightsLIT(YES)*NEUTRONflux

decreasing (YES)BOPVERIFYTurbineTrip:

• CHECKforanyofthefollowing:*ALLturbinethrottlevalves-SHUT(YES)*ALLturbine

governorvalves-SHUT(YES)BOPVERIFYpowertoAC

Emergency Buses*1A-SAand1B-SBBusesenergizedbyoff-sitepowerorEDG's(YES,off-sitepower)

RO CHECKSIActuation:

• CHECKforanyofthe.following-LIT:(NO)*SIActuatedbypass

permissive

light2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page23of36REVISION2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO 1 EVENTRCP'C'LOCKED

ROTOR/STEAM

BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

• ALB-11-2-2*ALB-11-5-1

• ALB-11-5-3

• ALB-12-1-4ROSI actuation-REQUIRED (NO)BOOTHOPERATOR:

EVALUATOR'S

NOTE:PROCEDURENOTE:

SRO SRO BOP Actuate MS Break whenEPP-004is entered: (imf mss11-Initial:40.0E04, rampto4.0E06 over one minute;imf mss05a-MSIV"A" fails to close;imf mss05a-M&IV"B" fails to close;imf mss05a-MSIV"C" fails to close).The crew will perform EPP-004 until the steam break symptoms are evident.Several EPP-004 steps are included in the scenario guide.Foldout applies.Informs Shift SuperintendenttoevaluateEAL

Network UsingEntryPointX.

Check RCS Temperature:

• CheckSGblowdownisolationvalves-SHUT(YES)

StabilizeANDmaintain

temperaturebetween555

OFAND559 OFusingTable1.*Controlfeedflowandsteamdumpto

stabilize temperaturebetween555

OFAND559 OF EvaluatorNote:The crew may attempt to close the MSIV's to stabilize temperature.

RO CheckRCPStatus:2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page24of36REVISION2

AppendixDScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO1EVENTRCP'C'LOCKEDROTOR/STEAMBREAK

OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT*CheckRCPs-ATLEASTONERUNNING(YES)

BOP BOP CREWBOOTHOPERATOR:

ROCheckFeedSystemStatus:*RCS Temperature-LESSTHAN564

of*Verifyfeedregvalves-SHUT*CheckfeedflowtoSGs-

GREATERTHAN210KPPH (NO)StartsMDAFWPump"B"orinitiatesFFusingFRVBypass

Valves.ContactsAOto

investigateMDAFWPump"A"failure.

If dispatched, report MDAFW Pump"A" breaker tripped-cause unknown.CheckControlRodStatus:*Check DRPI-AVAILABLE (YES)*Verifyallcontrolrods-FULLYINSERTED(YES)

EVALUATOR'SNOTE:At some point the RO will report thatPRZlevel cannot be maintained

and/or theBOPmay report indications

of a steam break.TheSRO should then direct a MANUALSIand returntoPATH-1, Entry Point"A".SRODirectsaMANUALSIin

accordancewithFoldoutcriteria.ROInitiatesaMANUALSI.

SRO FOLDOUTAapplies.EVALUATOR'SNOTE:Crew should brief on the general foldout criteria.2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page25of36REVISION2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1EVENTRCP'C'LOCKED

ROTOR/STEAM

BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

EVALUATOR'S

NOTE: The following FOLDOUT A criteria apply in this scenario: AL TERNATE MINIFLOW OPEN/SHUT CRITERIAIFRCS pressure decreases to less than1800PSIG, THEN verify alternate miniflow isolation OR miniflow block valves-SHUTRCPTRIP CRITERIA SI Flow>200GPM and RCS Pressure<1400PSIGSROPerformTheFollowing:

• InitiatemonitoringtheCriticalSafetyFunctionStatus

Trees.*EvaluateEALNetworkusingentrypoint

x.RO VERIFYALLCSIPsANDRHRpumps-RUNNING.(YES)

RO CHECKSIFlow:*SIflow-GREATERTHAN200GPM.(YES)

RO RCS pressure-GREATERTHAN230PSIG.(YES)

BOOTH OPERATOR:TheSRO should dispatch an operator to locally close the MSIV's.DoNOT close the MSIV's until the cooldown rate is evaluated andAFWis throttled in EPP-15.BOP CHECKMainSteamIsolation:

• MAINsteamisolation-

ACTUATED.(NO)BOP/RO CHECKmainsteamisolationactuationcriteriabyobservinganyofthefollowing:

• STEAMlinepressure-LESSTHAN601PSIG.(YES)

• CNMTpressure-

GREATERTHAN3.0PSIG.(NO)2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page26of36REVISION2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO 1 EVENTRCP'C'LOCKED

ROTOR/STEAM

BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAIN.MENTBOPMAINSteamisolation-REQUIRED.(YES)

BOP ACTUATE MSLI BOP VERIFYallMSIVsandbypassvalves-SHUT.(NO)

RO CHECK CNMTPressure-HASREMAINEDLESSTHAN10PSIG.(YES)

BOP CHECKAFWStatus:

• AFWflow-ATLEAST210KPPH

AVAILABLE.(NO)Critical*Starts AFW Pump"B" beforeReSFeedand

Bleed Task BOP criteriaismetand controls AFW flow in accordance

withSGLevel criteria EVALUATOR'SNOTE:TheRO

will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment6.TheBOPis

permitted to properly align plant equipment in accordance

with Attachment

6 without SRO approval.The Scenario Guide still identifies

tasks by board position because the time frame for completion

of Attachment6is not predictable.

SRO ASSIGN operatortoperformthefollowing:

• VERIFY alignment of components

from actuation ofESFASSignalsusing

Attachment

6,"Safeguards

Actuation Verification", while continuing

with implementation

of EOPs.RO/BOP CONTROL RCS Temperature:

• StabilizeANDmaintain

temperature

between 555°F AND 559°FusingTable1.

EVALUATOR'S

NOTE: No Table 1 actions applicable

due to uncontrolled

cooldown and inoperable

MSIV's.RO/BOP ENERGIZEACbuses1A1AND1B1.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO1Page27of36

REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1EVENTRCP'C'LOCKED

ROTOR/STEAM

BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

RO RO RO RO/BOP CHECKPRZPORVs-SHUT.(YES)

CHECKblockvalves-ATLEASTONEOPEN.(YES)PRZsprayvalves-SHUT.(YES)

IDENTIFYanyfaultedSG:

• Checkforanyofthefollowing:*AnySG pressures-DECREASINGINAN UNCONTROLLED

MANNER (YES)*AnY,SG-COMPLETELY

DEPRESSURIZED.(NO)SRO SRO SRO EVALUATOR'S

NOTE: RO/BOP SROATleastoneSGmustbe

maintained

availableforRCS cooldown.ANYfaultedSGor

secondarybreakshouldremainisolated

during subsequent

recoveryactionsunlessneededforRCS

cooldown.IMPLEMENT Function Restoration

Proceduresasrequired.AnOrangeorRedpathmay

developonRCSIntegrity

and/orHeatSink.RCS

Integrityactionsaresimilartothosein epp-015.FRP-H.1willbeexitedbecause

procedurally-directed

operatoractionsmayhavereducedAFWflow.

CHECKMSIVsandBypassValves:

• VERIFYallMSIVs-SHUT(NO)

DISPATCHESAOtocloseMSIV's.2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page28of36REVISION2

AppendixDScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRCSCENARIO1EVENTRCP'C'LOCKEDROTOR/STEAMBREAK

OUTSIDE CONTAINMENTRO/BOPVERIFYallMSIVbypassvalves-SHUT(YES)RO/BOPCHECK

anY,'SGNOTFaulted:*ANYSGpressure-STABLEORINCREASING.(NO)SROFoldoutapplies.

EVALUATOR'SNOTE:TheEPP-015

Foldout criteria that may apply is:MINIMUMFEEDFLOW

IF level in anySGis less than 25%[400/0], THEN maintain a minimum of12.5KPPHfeed

flow to that SG.EVALUATOR'S

NOTE: After the MSIV's are closed, SG pressures will rise and meet EPP-14 transition

criteria.BOOTHOPERATOR:

Close MSIV's"A" and"C" after the cooldownrateis evaluatedandAFWis throttledinEPP-015.BOPCHECKMSIVsANDBypassValves:*VERIFYallMSIVs-SHUT(NO)*VERIFYallMSIVBypassValves-SHUT(YES)IFtheTDAFWpumpistheonlyavailablesourceoffeedflow,SROTHENmaintainsteamsupplytotheTDAFWpumpfromoneSG.(N/A-underclearance)IFlocalactionsarerequired,attemptstoisolateallboundariesSROofoneSGshouldbecompletedpriortostartingthoseforanotherSG.BOPCHECK SecondaryPressureBoundaryforALLSGs:*VERIFYSGPORVs-SHUT(YES)*VERIFYMainFWisolationvalves-SHUT(YES)2008HARRISNRCSCENARIO1Page29of36REVISION2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO1EVENTRCP'c'LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM

BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

BOP*SHUTsteam supplyvalvesto TDAFW pump:*SGB:1MS-70 (Tagged)*SGC:1MS-72(Tagged)

BOP*VERIFYmainsteamdrain

isolationsbeforeMSIVs-SHUT:(YES)

• SGA:1MS-231

• SGB:1MS-266

• SGC:1MS-301

• VERIFYSGBlowdownisolationvalves-SHUT(YES)

• VERIFY Main Steam Analyzerisolationvalves-SHUT (YES)ASSGpressureandsteamflowdecrease,RCShotleg

SRO temperatures

will eventually

stabilizeandmayincrease.

Adjustingfeedflowandsteam

dumpwillcontrolRCShotleg

temperatures.

RO CONTROL RCS Temperature:

• CHECK RCS cooldownrate-LESSTHAN

100°F/HR (NO)BOPReducefeedflowto12.5KPPHtoeachSG.

RO CheckRCShotleg temperatures-STABLEOR DECREASING (YES/NO)Evaluator Note: Several more EPP-015 steps are included in the scenario guide but EPP-014 transition

criteria shouldbemet shortly after MSIV"A"andMSIV"C" are closed.ROMaintainRCPSealInjectionFlowBetween8GPMAnd13

GPM.ROCheckRCPTripCriteria:

• CheckRCPs-ATLEASTONERUNNING(YES-AandB)2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO1Page30of36

REVISION 2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1EVENTRCP'C'LOCKED

ROTOR/STEAM

BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

RO Checkallofthefollowing:

• SIflow-GREATERTHAN200GPM(YES)

• CheckRCSpressure-LESSTHAN1400PSIG(NO)

RO CheckPRZPORVANDBlockValves:

• VerifypowertoPORVblockvalves-

AVAILABLE (YES)*PRZPORVs-SHUT(YES)

• GOTOStep6f.

• Checkblockvalves-ATLEASTONEOPEN(YES)

• IFaPRZPORVopensonhighpressure,THENverifyitshutsafterpressure

decreasestolessthanopening

setpoint.PROCEDURENOTE:ASG

may be suspectedtobe rupturedifit fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow.Local checks for radlationcanbe used to confirm primary-to-secondary

leakage.BOP/SRO Check Secondary Radiation:

Checkforallofthefollowing:

• Condenservacuumpump

effluentradiation-

NORMAL (YES)*SGblowdownradiation-

NORMAL (YES)*Main steamlineradiation-

NORMAL (YES)*SG activitysample-NORMAL (IF AVAILABLE)(N/A)RO CheckRHRPumpStatus:

• CheckanyRHRpumps-RUNNING(YES)

• RCSPressure-

GREATERTHAN230PSIG(YES)

• RCS pressure-STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)*CheckRHRpumpsuction-

ALIGNEDTORWST(YES)

• ResetSI.*Manually Realign Safeguards

EquipmentFollowingALossOfOffsitePower.(RefertoPATH-1GUIDE, Attachment

2.)*StopRHRpumps.(YES)2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page31of36

REVISION 2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1EVENTRCP'C'LOCKED

ROTOR/STEAM

BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

SRO IMPLEMENTFunctionRestorationProceduresasrequired.

BOP CHECKMSIVsANDBypassValves:*VERIFYallMSIVs

-SHUT.(NO)*VERIFYallMSIVbypassvalves

-SHUT.(YES)

BOP CHECKAnySGNOTFaulted:*ANYSGpressureSTABLEOR

INCREASING.(YES)BOP IDENTIFYAnyFaultedSG:

• CHECKforanyofthefollowing:*ANYSGpressure

-DECREASINGINAN

UNCONTROLLEDMANNER.(YES-"B")

..-.ANYSG-COMPLETELY

DEPRESSURIZED.(YES-"B")Critical Task BOP BOP ISOLATEFaultedSG(s):*VERIFYfaultedSG(s)PORV

-SHUT.(YES)*VERIFYMainFWisolationvalves

-SHUT.(YES)*VERIFYMDAFWANDTDAFWpumpisolationvalvestofaultedSG(s)

-SHUT.(NO,unlessclosedearlier)

• Closes1AF-93,MDAFW

Pump"B"toSG"B" before SI is terminated.ShutfaultedSG(s)tosteamsupplyvalveto

TDAFWSHUT.*SGB:.1MS-70*VERIFYmainsteamdrainisolation(s)beforeSHUT(YES)2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page32of36REVISION2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENTRCP'C'LOCKED

ROTOR/STEAM

BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

• VERIFYSGBlowdownisolationvalves-SHUT.(YES)

• VERIFYmainsteam analyzerisolationvalves-SHUT.(YES)BOP CHECK CST Level-GREATERTHAN10%.(YES)PROCEDURE NOTE:ASGmaybe suspectedtobe rupturedifit fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow.Local checks for radiationcanbeusedto

confirm primary-to-secondary

leakage.SRO CHECK Secondary Radiation:

• CHECKforallofthefollowing:

• SGBlowdownradiation-

NORMAL.(YES)*MAIN steamlineradiation-

NORMAL.(YES)RO CHECKSGLevels:*ANY level-INCREASINGINAN UNCONTROLLEDMANNER.(NO)

RO CHECKifSIhasbeen

terminated:

• SIflow-GREATERTHAN200GPM.(YES)RO CHECK SI Termination

Criteria: CHECK Subcooling

-GREATER THAN*10°F[40°F]-C(YES)

• 20°F[50°F]-M

• CHECK secondaryheatsinkby

observinganyofthe following:

• LEVELinatleastoneintactSG-

GREATER THAN 25%[40%].(YES/NO)*TOTALfeedflowtoSGs-*GREATERTHAN210KPPH.(YES)

• RCS pressure-STABLEOR INCREASING.(YES)2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page33of36REVISION2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRISNRCSCENARIO*1

EVENTRCP'C'LOCKED

ROTOR/STEAM

BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

• PRZlevel-GREATERTHAN10%[30%].(YES)RORESETSI.SRO CONTINUOUS

ACTION: MANUALLY realign Safeguards

Equipmentfollowingalossofoffsitepower.

ROResetPhaseAandPhaseBIsolationSignals.

RO Restore InstrumentAirandNitrogento

Containment:Openthefollowingvalves:

• 11A-819*1 SI-287 ROSTOPallbutONECSIP.

RO CHECK RCS pressure-STABLE OR INCREASING.(YES)RO ISOLATEHighHeadSIFlow:

• CHECKCSIPsuction-

ALIGNEDTORWST.(YES)

• OPENnormal

miniflowisolationvalves:

• 1CS-182*1CS-196*1CS-210*1CS-214*SHUTBIToutletvalves:

• 1SI-3*

• VERIFYcoldlegANDhotleginjectionvalves-SHUT

• 1SI-52*1SI-86*1SI-107 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO1Page34of36

REVISION 2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1EVENTRCP'C'LOCKED

ROTOR/STEAM

BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

• OBSERVECAUTIONpriortoStep19ANDGOTOStep19.PROCEDURE CAUTION:Highhead 81flowshouldbeisolatedbefore

continuing.ESTABLISHChargingLineup:

• SHUTchargingflowcontrolvalve:

• FK-122.1*OPENcharginglineisolationvalves:

• 1CS-235*1CS-238 Lead Evaluator:

Terminate the scenariowhennormal

charginghasbeen established.2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page35of36REVISION2

AppendixDScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1EVENTRCP'C'LOCKED

ROTOR/STEAM

BREAK, OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

REVISION SUMMARY1.ModifiedscenariotohaveMSL"C"Radmonitorinopvice"B"2.Revised summarypagetoreflectMSL"c" inop3.ModifiedScenarioSetuppagetoreflect"C"inop4.ChangedRO

designationtoBOPfor"Commenceturbineloadreduction..."5.AddedstepsfromOP-107,sect.8.21forRapidBorationifthecrewelectstodo

that.6.Addedgrayboxestohelp

designatewhatprocedurespecificactionsintheguidearecomingfrom.7.AddedAlarmnamefor

ALB-005-8-5inbodyofscenarioguidenotjustinintro.8.Added clarificationthatdirectingAOsinthefieldisnota

procedurally

directed action.9.Clarifiedwhat

procedureisdirectingactionsforstartofCCWpump10.AddedexpectedstatusofRelayflagsasTRIPPED11.Includedstepsfrom

OWP-RP-25forfailureofPRNI-4312.AddednotetoremindallthattheFeedflow

transient willberapidatthispowerandshould notbeinitiateduntilBOPisnear.Alsoaddedclarificationonhowtorespondiftheplantdoestriponthe

transient13.Modifiedposition

designatorstoRO/BOPforthetimewhen

Attachments

areexpectedtobeinprogress.Evaluatorscanthenjustcirclewhichposition

actually performedtheaction.2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO1Page36of36REVISION2

I Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

I Facility: Examiners:

HARRIS Scenario No.: Operators:2OpTestNo.:2008NRC Initial Conditions:IC-5:51%Power,BOL

• TDAFWPumpclearedandtaggedtoreplacetappetnutontripvalve.54hoursremainingonTS3.7.1.2Actiona*4GPDtubeleakageinSG"C"forpast30days.

Chemistry has CRC-804ineffect.*RadiationMonitorRM-01

MS-3592SB,MSL"B"Monitor,wasdeclaredinoperablelastshift.TS3.3.3.6Actioncineffect.

Turnover:*ThepreviousshiftstartedMFWPump"A"following

replacementofabearingandhascompletedGP-005,Step134.Resumeraisingpowerat4DEH

units/minuteCriticalTasks:

• .EnergizeBus1B-SBbeforeRCSFeedandBleedcriteriaismet

• TerminatethereleaseviaSG"C"PORVbeforeexitingEPP-014

• Minimize primary to secondaryleakagetopreventSG"C"fromexceeding

95%EventMalt.Event

Event No.No.Type*Description

1 N/AN-BOP,Raisepower

SRO R-RO 2 LT:115 I-RO,VCTLevelChannel115failsLOW

SRO 3 XD11121 C-BOP,MCC1A34FeederBreakertrips(bothfansonAH-3)

SRO TS-SRO 4 SWS07A C-RO,NormalService

WaterPump"A"shearedshaft

SRO 5 PT:495 I-BOP,SG"C" ControllingSteamPressureChannelfailsHI

SRO TS-SRO 6 SGN05C C-RO,SG"C" progressiveSGTubeLeak

CVC17 SROFCV-122,ChargingFlowControlValve,failstorespondinAUTO

TS-SRO 7 EPS01 M-ALLLossof Off-Site Power DSG01AEDG"A"failstostart

Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRC

Scenario2Revision2Page1 at 39

I Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1

I 8 DSG06B C-BOP,EDG"B"breakerfailstoclose

SRO 9 SGN05C M-ALLSG"C"SGTRafterEPP-1exit

10 PT:308C C-BOPSG"C"PORVfailsto

1000/0inAUTO*(N)ormal,(R)eactivity,(I)nstrument,(C)omponent,(M)ajorHARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO 2 SUMMARYThecrew assumesthewatchhavingpre-briefedonthe

proceduretoraisepower.The

Turbine-drivenAFWPumpisclearedandtaggedforrepairofthetappetnutonthetripvalve.TS 3.7.1.2.aisineffect.Thereisa4GPDtubeleakinSteamGenerator(SG)"C"thathasbeenstablefor30days.

Chemistryismonitoringinaccordancewiththeirprocedures.Theradiation

monitoronMainSteamLine"B"failedlastshift.TS3.3.3.6.cisineffect.Whentheevaluationteamissatisfiedthatthepowerchangeisundercontrol,theLeadEvaluatorcancuetheVCTlevelchannelfailure.Automakeupwillinitiatewhenthechannelfails.Thecrewshouldrespondto

alarms/indicationsinaccordancewithalarm

response procedureandenterAOP-003,.MALFUNCTIONOFREACTORAftertheVCTisproperlyaligned,theLeadEvaluatorcancuethetripofthefeeder

breakerforbothfanson

ContainmentFanCoolerAH-3.Thecrewshouldinitiallyrespondin accordancewithalarmresponseprocedureandthenshifttotheTrain"B"unitsin accordancewiththesystemoperating

procedurebutmaystartastandbyunitforthenear-term.TheSROshouldenterTS3.6.2.3.a.

When Containment

Fan Cooleractionsarecomplete,theLeadEvaluatorcancuetheshaftshearonNormalService

Water(NSW)Pump1A.Systempressurewilldegradeasthe standbypumpwillnotstartbecausethe

interlockisoffoftherunningpumpbreaker.Thecrewshouldrespondin

accordancewithNSWheaderpressurealarmsonALB-002andenterAOP-022,LOSSOFSERVICEWATER.Thiswilldirectstartofthe

standbypump.TherearenoTS'sassociatedwiththeNSWPumps.WhenNSWis properlyaligned,theLeadEvaluatorcancuethefailureofthecontrollingSteamPressureChannelonSG"C".TheBOPshouldrespondtomultipleSG"C"alarmsonALB-14andtakemanualcontroloftheaffectedFRVinaccordancewiththealarmresponse

procedures

and managementguidanceforcontrolling

malfunctioning

automaticequipment.TheSROshouldentertheTSforReactorTrip

Instrumentation(3.3.1),ESFJnstrurnentatlon(3.3.2),andAccidentMonitoring

Instrumentation

(3.3.3.6).Thecrewmayelecttoshiftto

anotherchanneltorestoretheFRVtoAUTO.Thechanneldoesnothavetoberemovedfromservicetocontinuethescenario.WhenSGlevelisundercontrol,theLeadEvaluatorcancueinitiationofincreasingSGtubeleakageinSG"C".TheROshouldrecognizeanRCSleaktrendormayrespondto

a Pressurizer

level deviationalarmsinceFCV-122,ChargingFlowControlValve,willnotberespondingproperlyinautomatic.TheSROshouldenterAOP-016, EXCESSIVEAppendixDNUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page2of39

I AppendixD.Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

I PRIMARYPLANTLEAKAGE.Thecrewshouldmaintain

pressurizerlevelby manually controlling

chargingflowand minimizingorsecuringletdown.Thecrewshouldestimatetheleakageto

determinetherequisiteSteam

GeneratorTubeLeakage(SGTL)ActionLevelandtheSROshouldenterTS3.4.6.2forRCSleakage.WhentheSGTLActionLevelhasbeen

determinedandtheTSentryis

complete, the Lead evaluatorcancuethelossofoff-sitepowerandresultant

automaticreactortrip.EDG"A"failstostartandEDG"B"startsbutthe

breakerdoesnotclose

automatically.

The crew will enterPATH-1and transitiontoEPP-001,LOSSOFAC

POWERTOSAAND1B-SBBUSES.EPP-001willprovide

directiontoenergize1B-SBafterwhichthecrewwill

transitionbacktoPATH-1.Afterthe

transitionbacktoPATH-1,theSGTLwillbecomeaSGTRonSG"C".Thecrewmayinitiatea

MANUALSIoritwilloccur

automatically.SG"C"PORVwillfailtocloseatthe

automaticsetpoint.If

operators failtocloseitinPATH-1thenthecrewwill

transitiontoEPP-014,FAULTEDSTEAM

GENERATOR ISOLATION,andisolateSG"C".Thecrewwill

transitiontoPATH-2,isolateSG"C",thencooldownandequalizeRCSandSG"C"pressure.The

scenariocanbe terminatedwhentheBIT

flowpathisisolated.

Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS 2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page3of39

Appendix D Scenario Outline2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO2SETUPFormES-D-1

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:*ClipacopyofGUIDE-1

Attachment1(SI Alignment)

and Attachment

6 (Safeguards

Actuation Verification)toeach scenarioguideforusebythe

evaluators.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:*IC-5: 51%power,BOL-thenstartMFWPump"B"andbothHDPumpsand

allow approximately4minutesforSGlevelstostabilizebeforebringinginthe

crew*Tag TDAFWPumpontheMCB*Tagand DE-ENERGIZEMS-70andMS-72

• GP-005 completedthroughStep133.d

• ReactivityPlanforintendedevolution(Raisepowerat4DEH

Units/minute)*SetDEH Computerfora4DEH/minloadratein

progress*Turnover Sheet*Ensurerodstep

countersresettothe

correct value PRE-LOAD:*imfcfw01C:

TDAFWPumpunder clearance*irfrms170:

Steamline"B"Rad MonitorfailedHI*imfdsg01:EDG"A"failstostart*imf dsg06b:EDG"B" Breakerfailstoclose

automaticallybutcanbeclosedfromtheMCBwiththe

proper interlock satisfied TRIGGERS:*Event2:imfLT:115(VCTlevelfailslow-0%)*Event3:xd1i121(MCC1A34Feeder

Breakertrips-bothfansonAH-3)*Event4:imf

sws07a(NSWPump"A"shaftshear)*Event5:imfPT:495(SG"C"Channel3SteamPressurefailsHIGH-1300)

• Event6: sgn05c/cvc17 (SGTL-60 GPM/FCV-122failstotrack)*Priorto actuating this triggertheBooth Operatormustread FCV-122positionoffofthe

summarypageandtypethatvalueintotheFINAL

VALUE box.*Event7/10:imteps01 (LOOP)/imf

PT:308c(SGPORV Setpointdriftsupto

100%)*Event9: TRG=9mmfsgn05c (SGTR-420 GPM)Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario2Revision2Page4of39

Appendix D Scenario Outline 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO2SETUPFormES-D-1*Field actionsforGUIDE1, Attachment

6*irf mss027tolocalops(SG"A"PORVlocal

operation)

Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario2Revision2Page5of39

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO2EVENT1-POWER

CHANGE Indications

Available:

N/A EVALUATOR'S

NOTE:TheLead Evaluatorcancue Event2(VCTLevel

Channel failure)when the evaluators

have completed their evaluationofthe power change.BOP BOP R,O BOP BOP EVALUATOR'S

NOTE: RO RO InformsRO/SROthatturbineloadincreaseisbeinginitiated.

Depresses GO pushbutton.At55to 60%Reactorpower, CHECKthefollowing:

• ALB-13/5-3,POWERRANGEUPPER

DETECTORHIGHFLUXDEVORAUTODEFEAT,not

illuminated.

• ALB-13/5-4,POWERRANGELOWER

DETECTORHIGHFLUXDEVORAUTODEFEAT,not

illuminated.*IFeitheralarmis

illuminated,THENREFERtotheAPPforaroriateaction.

VERIFYMainFeedPump

RecirculationValves1FW-8and1FW-39areshutwhentotalMainFeedPumpflowis

greaterthan8600KPPH.

Monitors turbine and feedwatersystemresponse.

The crew may elect to start a dilution before the power change is initiated.OP-107isa"Reference

Use" procedure.

The dilution steps are provided for evaluator use.DETERMINEthevolumeof

makeupwatertobeadded.Thismaybedoneby

experienceorviathereactivityplan

associatedwiththe Simulator IC.SETSFIS-114, TOTAL MAKEUPWTRBATCH COUNTER, toobtainthedesiredquantity.

Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRC

Scenario2Revision2Page6of39

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO2EVENT1-POWER CHANGEROSETtotalmakeupflowasfollows:

• IF performingDILinStep8,THENSET

controller1CS-151,FK-114RWMUFLOW,forlessthanorequalto90gpm.*IF performingALTDILinStep8,THENSET

controller1CS-151,FK-114RWMUFLOW,forthedesiredflowrate.

RO VERIFYtheRMW CONTROLswitchhasbeenplacedintheSTOPposition.

RO VERIFYtheRMW CONTROLswitchgreenlightislit.

ROPLACEthecontrolswitchRMWMODE

SELECTORtotheDILORtheALTDILposition.PROCEDURENOTE:WhenPRZ backup heaters are energized in manual,PK-444A1,PRZ

Master Pressure Controller(aPI controller)

will integrateuptoa greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint.The resultisas follows:*PORVPCV-444B

will openata lower than expected pressure.*ALB-009-3-2,PRESSURIZERHIGHPRESSDEVIATIONCONTROL, will activateata lower than expected pressure.*Increased probability

for exceedingTechSpec DNS limit for RCS pressure.EVALUATORNOTE:The crew may elect to manually crackopenaPRZ SprayValveto establish PRZ Surge line flow and thereby maintain PRz/RCS boron concentrations

within limits.OPERATE the pressurizer

backupheatersasrequiredtolimit

RO the differencebetweenthe

pressurizerandtheRCSboron

concentrationtolessthan10ppm.

EVALUATOR NOTE: SRO concurrence

should be obtained prior to energizing

theBUHin MANUAL.Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario2Revision2Page7of39

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO2EVENT1-POWER

CHANGE ROSTARTthe makeupsystemasfollows:

• TURNcontrolswitchRMW

CONTROL to START momentarily.

• VERIFYthered indicatorlightislit.

RO VERIFYTavgandrodmotionrespondsasdesired.

RO VERIFY dilution automatically

terminateswhenthe desired quantityhasbeenadded.

RO PLACE Reactor MakeupinAutoperSection5.1.

RO VERIFYtheRMW CONTROL switch:*IsintheSTOPposition.

• Thegreenlightislit.

ROPLACEtheRMWMODE

SELECTORtoAUTO.ROSTARTthe makeupsystemasfollows:

• TURNcontrolswitchRMW

CONTROL to START momentarily.

• VERIFYthered indicatorlightislit.

Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario2Revision2Page8of39

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO2EVENT2-VCTLEVEL

CHANNELLT-115FAILS

LOW Booth Operator Instructions:*On cue from the Lead Evaluator, initiate Event 2...VCTLevel Channel failure (imfLT:115,0 0/0).Indications

Available:

ALB-007-4-3,VCTHIGH-LOWLEVEL

RO RESPONDStoalarm ALB-007-4-3.*The crew may place the power changeonHOLD.Appendix D RO RO RO CONFIRMalarmusingLI-115-1,VolControlTankLevel (MCB-1A2).

DETERMINESLT-115failedLOW.

VERIFY Automatic Functions:*AT 5%VCTlevel,the

followingoccurs:(N/A)*1CS-291,SuctionfromRWST (LCV-115B)

opens.*1CS-292,SuctionfromRWST (LCV-115D)

opens*1CS-165,VCT

Outlet/Dilution (LCV-115C)

shuts*1CS-166,VCT

Outlet/Dilution (LCV-115E)

shuts*AT 20%VCTlevel,auto

makeupfromtheReactorMakeupSystemstarts.(YES)*AT 40%VCTlevel,auto

makeupfromtheReactorMakeupSystemstops.(N/A)*AT 80%VCTlevel, 1CS-120,VCTLevelControlVlv,fullydivertsletdownflowtotheRHT.(N/A)NUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario2Revision2Page9of39

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO2EVENT2-VCTLEVEL

CHANNELLT-115FAILS

LOWROPERFORMCorrectiveActions:

Procedure Caution: LowVCTlevelisa precursortogas bindingtheCSIPs.*MATCHchargingandletdownflows.

• IFchargingflowislost,(NO)THENGOTOAOP-018,ReactorCoolantPumpAbnormalConditions.

ProcedureNote:If eitherLT-112orLT-115

falls high, the automatic CSIP suction swapover fromtheVCTtotheRWST

will not function'if required.SROIFEITHERofthefollowingoccurs:*VCTlevelislessthan

20%AND automaticmakeupisNOTinprogress*VCTlevelisgreaterthan

40%AND automaticmakeupisstillinprogressTHENGOTOAOP-003,MalfunctionofReactorMakeupControl.

CREW CHECK instrumentairavailable.(YES)

RO CHECKBOTHLT-112andLT-115functioningproperly.(NO)SROGOTOSection3.1,LT-112orLT-115Malfunction.REFERTO Attachment1,VCTLevelControlChannelsSROOperation,as

necessarytoassesstheeffectsofanLT-112orLT-115malfunction.

Evaluator'sNote:Crewmay

brief on Attachment

1.Procedure Note: An instrument

malfunction

may manifest itselfasa slow drift rather than a"full high" or"full low" failure.Until the instrument

has failed fUlly high or fullylow,all steps should be reviewed for applicability

periodically,evenif not continuously

applicable.

Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page10of39

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO2EVENT2-VCTLEVEL

CHANNELLT-115FAILS

LOW RO CHECK thatisFAILING.(YES)

RO MONITORVCTlevelusing

eitherofthefollowing:

• ERFISpoint

LCS0112*LI-112(local)

RO CHECKLT-115FAILINGLOW.(YES)

ROPLACERMW CONTROLSwitchinSTOP.

Procedure Note: Normally,VCTlevelis

maintained

between 20 and 400/0 by auto makeup.RO CONTROLVCTlevelasfollows:

• MAlNTAINlevel

BELOW 70%.*MAINTAIN level ABOVE 20%ORDESI'REDMINIMUM.

RO MAINTAINVCTlevel GREATERTHAN5%.Procedure Note: Lifting leadsinthe following step will simulate a low-low level signal from the failed instrument.

Thisisto allow a valid low-low level signal one instrument

to initiate emergency makeup.RO CHECK the malfunctioning

instrumentFAILINGLOW.(YES)

SRO DIRECT Maintenance

to investigateandrepairthe

instrument

malfunction.

SRO CHECKthatthe instrument

malfunctionhasbeenrepaired.

SRO WAITuntilrepairsare

complete before proceeding.

Evaluator's

Note:TheLead Evaluatorcancue Event 3(MCC1 A34 Feeder Breaker failur.e)when the crew is waiting for the instrument

repair.Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario2Revision2Page11of39

AppendixDScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1.2008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO2EVENT3-MCC1A34FEEDERBREAKERTRIP(LOSSOFFANCOOLER

AH-3)-Booth Operator Instructions:*On cue from the Lead Evaluator, actuate Event3-MCC1A34 Feeder Breaker trip (XD11121)Indications

Available:

• ALB-001-6-5, ENGINEERING

SAFEGUARDFEATURESSYSTEMTRAINA

BYPASSED OR INOPERABLE

• ALB-027-8-2, CONTAINMENTFANCOOLERSAH-3FLOWLOW

OIL RO BOPRespondstoalarmALB-001-6-5.RespondstoalarmALB-027-8-2.

RO RO RO/BOP BOP SROReportsalarm

condition(s)onEngineeredSafeguardFeatureBypassPanelA.RefertoAPP-ESF-A-4-1forthewindowindicatedinalarmonESFBypassPanelA.

Reports ContainmentFanCoolerAH-3tripped.Reportsnopowerto1A34.

DispatchesAOtoinvestigate.

Booth Operator Note: Report1A34 feeder breaker is open-cause unknown.Evaluator Note:TheSRO should direct the BOP to shift to the Train"B" coolers(AH-1andAH-4).The

following steps should be completed forAH-1and repeated forAH-4(in either order)then AH-2 should be stopped.SRODirectsBOPtoshifttoTrain"B"FanCoolers.AppendixDNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page12of39

AppendixDScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRCSCENARIO2EVENT3-MCC1A34FEEDERBREAKERTRIP(LOSSOFFANCOOLERAH-3)BOPVerifiesInitialConditions.BOPPlacescontrolswitchforbothfansinAH-1/AH-4toLO-SPD.

Evaluator's

Note: Procedure Note indicates the next two steps must be completed without delay to avoid coastdown.BOPPlacecontrolswitchesforAH-1/AH-4toSTOP.BOPPlacecontrolswitchesforAH-1/AH-4toHI-SPD.BOPPlacescontrolswitchesforAH-2fansinSTOP.BOPRestoresnormalcontainmentpurge:*Opensnormalinlet/dischargeCP9/CP5*Opensnormalinlet/dischargeCP6/CP3PlacesswitchforNormalPurgeSupplyFantoSTART.

Procedure Note: Controls are now aligned for thefanto auto start if/when CNMT pressure reaches the negative value setpoint.SROContactsWorkControlforassistance.EntersTS3.6.2.3Actiona.(RestorebothtrainstooperableSROwithin7daysorbeinHSBinthefollowing6hours)ReferenceTS3.6.1.5(NAuntil>120°F)

Lead EvaluatorNote:Cue Event4(NSW Pump" A"'sheared shaft)after the fan coolers are aligned in accordance

with SRO directions

and the Fan CoolerTShasbeen entered.AppendixDNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page13of39

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT4-NSWPUMP"A" SHAFT SHEAR" Booth Operator Instructions:

Actuate" Event4-NSW Pump"A" sheared shaft(NSW07A)oncue

from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications

Available:

• ALB-02-6-1,SERVWTRSUPPLYHDRALOWPRESS;

• .ALB-02-7-1,SERVWTRSUPPLYHDRBLOWPRESS;

• ALB-02-7-2,SERVWTRPUMPSDISCHARGELOWPRESS

RO Responds to ALB-02 alarms-reportslowNSW

header pressurewithpumprunning

indication.

EVALUATORNOTE:TheESW

Pumps will auto start on low header pressure.Immediate Action RO CHECKESWflowlosttoANY

RUNNINGCSIP-MORETHAN

1-minute: (NO)SROGOTOStep2.

Immediate Action SRO CHECKESWflowlosttoANY

RUNNINGEDG-MORETHAN

1-minute: (NO)BOOTHOPERATOR:

There are several points in the AOP whereanAO may be dispatched

to check for leaks and proper operation of equipment.

Report no leaks, no breaker problems but when dispatched

to the pump, report that the coupling appears to have failed and request maintenance" assistance.

Appendix D SRO RO/SRO SROGOTOStep3.GOTOthe appropriatestepas indicatedbythe parameter LOST:*NSWPump failure (YES)*NSWPumplossof

flow ProceedstoStep6NUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario2Revision2Page14of39

AppendixD.Scenario Outline Form

12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO2EVENT4-NSWPUMP"A"SHAFTSHEAR

RO CHECKlossofNSW HeaderduetoNSWPumpFAILEDorLOSSOFFLOW.

START standbyNSWPumpasfollows:

• VERIFY dischargevalvefor affectedpumpisCLOSINGbyplacingaffectedpumpcontrolswitchtoSTOP.

• START standbyNSWPumpinprimingmodeby

momentarily

placing standbyNSWPumpcontrolswitchtoSTART.*WHEN dischargevalveforaffectedpumpisfullySHUT,THENPLACEandHOLDcontrolswitchforrunningpumptoSTARTtofullyOPENpump

discharge valve.RO CHECKANYNSWPump-RUNNING.(YES)SROGOTOSection3.2(page30).

SRO CHECK TurbinetriprequiredbyANYofthe

following conditions-EXIST:(NO)

• NoNSW Pumpcanbe operated*Non-isolableleakexistsintheNSWsystem

• Majorisolableleakexistsonthe

TurbineBuildingNSW

HeaderANDtimedoesnot

permit a controlled

plant shutdown SRO OBSERVENotepriortoStep13ANDGOTOStep13.PROCEDURENOTE:

Steps 13 through 19 address leaksonNSW turbine building header.Leaks on individual

components

supplied by the Turbine Building header are addressed by Steps20and21.CREW CHECKforminorisolableleakon

Turbine Building header-ANY EXISTING.(NO)SROGOTOStep20.

CREW CHECKforleakinanindividual

component-ANYEXISTING.(NO)Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9.HARRIS2008NRC

Scenario2Revision2Page15of39

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT4-NSWPUMP"A" SHAFT SHEAR SROGOTOStep22.

CREW CHECKforleakon WPB header-ANY EXISTING.(NO)GOTOStep24.

RO CHECKthatNSWPump(s)-

MALFUNCTIONED.(YES)CREWPERFORMthe

following for affectedNSWPump(s):

CHECKNSWPump breaker(s)

-MALFUNCTIONED.(NO)SROGOTOStep25.b.

RO/BOP CHECK adequatepumpsuction

inventory EXISTS:*LI-9300.1, Service WaterPMPA CHMBR LVL, GREATER THAN 51%(ERFIS LSW9300)*LI-9302,Service

WaterPMPBCHMBRLVL, GREATER THAN 51%(ERFIS LSW9302)*LI-1931,Cooling

TowerBasinLevel, GREATER THAN31inches Locally VERIFY the followingforthe affectedNSWPumpperOP-139,Service

Water System: CREWPropercoolingandsealwater

supplytoNSWPumps.

• • Proper operationofNSW strainer b.ackwash.

CREW Locally CHECKNSWPump(s)forsignsof

damage (shaftshearorother

obvious problems).

SRO INITIATE appropriate

correctiveactionforthelossofNSW.

SRO Completes an Equipment Failure Checklist and contacts WCC for assistance.TheLead Evaluatorcancue Event5(SG"C" Pressure Channel failure)after assistance

is requested or whenAOP-022is exited.Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRC

Scenario2Revision2Page16of39

AppendixDScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO2EVENT5-SG"C"STEAMPRESSURECHANNELFAILSHIGH Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications

Available:

Actuate Event5-SG"C" Controlling

Steam Pressure Channel Fails HI (imfPT:495)oncue

from the Lead Evaluator.

ALB-014-1-2and2-2(LOOPAandLOOPBHISTEAMLINEBOP EVALUATOR'S

NOTE:RESPONDStoalarms

ALB-014-1-2and2-2(LOOPHISTEAM

LINETHEBOPmay take MANUAL control of the associated

FRV prior to entering the APP.BOPPLACESFRVforSG"C"inMANUALandcontrolsflow.BOOTHOPERATORNOTE:If

directed to investigate

locallyonRAB261 rack, report"PT-495is not leaking".EVALUATOR'SNOTE:TheSRO

may direct a swap to Channel4to regain auto control.TheOWP also accomplishes

this action.BOPSelectsChannel4(PT-496)forcontrol.BOPRestoresFRV"C"toAUTO.

SRO CONTACTSworkcontrolforassistance.AppendixDNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page17of39

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO2EVENT5-SG"C"STEAM

PRESSURE CHANNELFAILSHIGHENTERSTS:*3.3.1.aReactorTrip

Instrumentation,Action6*3.3.2.aESFInstrumentation,Action19

SROBothrequiretrippingtheinoperablechannelwithin6hours.

and*3.3.3.6.a.AccidentMonitoring

Instrumentation-restore the inoperablechannelwithin7days.(Not

applicablebutmayinitiateatrackingEIRrelatedto

thisTS)EVALUATOR'S

NOTE: After theFRVisinAUTOand

theTShasbeen entered, the Lead Evaluator can cue Event6(SGTL).Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page18of39

Appendix 0ScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRCSCENARIO2EVENT6-SG"C"TUBELEAK/FCV-122FAILSAS-IS

Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications

Available:

Prior to actuating this trigger the Booth Operator must read FCV-122 position off of the summarypageand type that value into theFINALVALUE

box.Actuate Event6(SG"C" Tube LeaklFCV-122

fails to trackinAUTO)ALB-009-2-2,PRESSURIZERCONTROLLOWLEVELDEVIATION

ALB-10-4-5,RADMONITORSYSTEMTROUBLERORespondstoalarmsand/orindicationsofRCSleakage.

• EVALUATOR'S

NOTE: Multiple alarms associated

with RCS leakage will direct implementation

ofAOP-016,EXCESSIVE

PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE.The leakrateis approximately60GPM.Letdown will have to be reduced or isolated to stabilize charging flow on scale.*TheRO may take MANUAL control of FCV-122, Charging Flow ControlValve,at any point after the failure is recognized.PROCEDURENOTE:

• • • This procedure contains no immediate actions.Throughout

this procedure, as wellasallAOPs, actions are based on valid alarms and instrumentation.

Actionsbasedon invalid indication

are not applicable.

When possible (except in the cases of rapidly propagating

leaks and leaks approaching

ActionLevel3), leakage should be qualitatively

confirmed prior to declaration

of an action level.Leakage is qualitatively

confirmed when two different indications (such as grab samples or radiation monitors)trend in the same direction with the same approximate

order of magnitude.RO/SROCHECKRHRinoperation.(NO)GOTOStep3.

Appendix 0NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page19of39

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO2EVENT6-SG"C"TUBE

LEAK/FCV-122FAILSAS-IS

SROREFERTOPEP-110, Emergency ClassificationAndProtective

Action Recommendations,ANDENTERtheEAL

Networkatentry point x.PROCEDURENOTE:

This stepisa qualitative

check for leakage obviously in excess ofMakeUp capability.

Isolation of letdown may be necessary.

A formal calculation

to determine the leakrate is performed in Step 16.RO CHECK RCS leakagewithinVCT makeupcapability.(YES)PROCEDURENOTE:IfCSIP suction is re-aligned

to the RWST, negative reactivity

addition should be anticipated.

RO MAINTAINVCTlevel GREATERTHAN5%.SROGOTOstep10.PROCEDURENOTE:Ifa

Containment

Ventilation

Isolation signal has occurred,TechSpec3.0.3is

applicable, since both trains of Containment

Vacuum Relief are inoperable.

SRO CHECK valid CNMT Ventilation

Isolation monitors (REM-3561A,B,CandD)ALARMCLEAR.(YES)

SRO CHECKRM3502A,RCSLeakDetectionRadiationMonitor,ALARMCLEAR.(YES)

SRO CHECKALLvalidAreaRadiation

MonitorsALARMCLEAR.(YES)SRO CHECKvalidStack

MonitorsALARMCLEAR.(YES)

Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page20of39

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT6-SG"c" TUBE LEAK/FCV-122FAILSAS-IS

SRO DETERMINE if unnecessarypersonnelshouldbe

evacuatedfromaffected'areas,asfollows:

• CHECKthatanRCSleakoutside

Containment

hascausedavalidRMSalarm.(NO)

SROGOTOStep14.d.

SRO CHECKthatavalidRMS

SecondaryMonitorHIGHALARMindicatesaSGtubeleakmayexist.(YES)

ROSOUNDlocal

evacuation

alarm.ANNOUNCEonthePA:"Attentionall

personnel.HighradiationlevelsmayexistinportionsofthepowerblockduetoSGtubeleakage.

UnnecessarypersonnelevacuatetheRABand Turbine Building, includingtheSteamTunnel.Further

announcementswillbemadeassurveysare

performed." CREW NOTIFY Chemistrytostopany primary sampling activities.

EVALUATOR'S

NOTE:*If not already done,inthe following step the RO should take MANUAL control of FCV-122.*TheSRO may direct a reduction in letdown flow in the following step.RO PERFORManRCSflowbalance

calculationasfollows:

CONTROL chargingflowusingFK-122.1,tostabilizePRZ

level.OPERATE the followingletdownorificevalvesas

necessary to maintain chargingflowonscale:

• 1CS-7,45gpmLetdownOrificeA

• 1CS-8,60gpmLetdownOrificeB

• 1CS-9,60gpmLetdownOrificeC

Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRC

Scenario2Revision2Page21of39

Appendix 0 Scenario OutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO2EVENT6-SG"c" TUBE LEAK/FCV-122FAILSAS-IS

Evaluator Note: Entering Primary-to-Secondary

Leak ActionLevel3is more restrictive

than the TS Action Statement and therefore meets the TS action requirement.Whentheleakrateis

estimated(approx.60GPM)theSRO

SROshouldenterTS3.4.6.2.b (Reducetowithinlimitswithin4hoursorbeinHSBwithinthenext6hours).

CREW DETERMINEleaklocation(SGs)

SRONOTIFYHealthPhysicsofleaklocationandradiationlevelsSROGOTO Attachment1for Primary-to-Secondary

Leak SRO NOTIFY Chemistry to implement CRC-804PROCEDURENOTE:Fora known leak rate greater than 150 gpd(PSAL3 threshold), the UnitSCQmay direct performance

of Attachments9,10and11 while the remaining steps of Attachment1are being completed.

RO CHECKknownleakrateis

<150gpd(0.1gpm)(NO)

SRO'GOTOStep4 SRO DETERMINEleakingSteam

Generator(Mayhaveenough

information

to determineleakingSGis"C")

SRO CHECK SecondarySystemRadiation

monitoralarmsCLEAR (YES/NO dependingonpace through procedure)

SRO CHECKSGTubeleakageiswithinTSLimits(NO)

,SROStart CVPETS AppendixDNUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page22of39

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO2EVENT6-SG"C"TUBE

LEAK/FCV-122FAILSAS-IS

SRO CHECKvalidAuxSteam

CondensateradiationmonitorsALARMCLEAR:(YES)

SRO NOTIFY ChemistrytosampletheAuxiliarySteamSystemfor

activity.UsingTablein

Attachment

1, determinetherequiredAction

SROLevel:(ACTIONLEVEL3,Perform

Attachment11,Reducepowerto 50%within1hour,BeinMode3withinthenext2hours,(3hourstotaltime)

Evaluator Note:TheLead Evaluatorcancue Event7(LOOP)after the crew has calculated

the roughSGTLrate, evaluated theTS,and declared the appropriate

Action Level.Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page23of39

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT-LOOP/SG"C" TUB,E RUPTURE BOOTH OPERATOR:*Actuate Events7and10[imf eps01 (LOOP)/imfPT:308c(SGPORV

failsOPENinAUTO)]oncue

from the Lead Evaluator.

• Actuate the SG"C" SGTR (imf sgn05c)when the crew entersEPP-004.INDICATIONS:

Multiple alarms/lighting

transfers CREWPerformsPATH-1

immediate actions.ROVERIFYReactorTrip:

• AUTOor MANUAL ReactorTripsuccessful:

• CHECKforanyofthe

following:

• TRIP breakersRTAandBYAOPEN(YES)

• TRIP breakersRTBandBYBOPEN(YES)

• RODBottomlightsLIT(No

Indication)

• NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)BOP VERIFYTurbineTrip:

• CHECKforanyofthe

following:

• ALL turbine throttlevalves-SHUT(YES)

• ALLturbine

governorvalves-SHUT(NoIndication)

BOP VERIFYpowertoAC Emergency Buses:*1A-SAand1B-SBBuses

energizedbyoff-sitepowerorEDG's(NO)BOP Check AC emergencybus1A-SAOR1B-SB-

ENERGIZED (NO)Evaluator Note: The crew may analyze the condition of EDG's"A" and"B", noting that EDG"B" is running with the breaker OPEN but no trip alarms.Such being the case, the SRO may direct theBOPto close EDG"B" breaker before entry intoEPP-001.The

breaker SYNCH Switch mustbeONtodoso.

I Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRC

Scenario2Revision2Page24of39

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO2EVENT7-10-

LOOP/SG"C"TUBERUPTUREROVERIFY ReactorTrip(YES)ROVERIFY TurbineTrip(YES)ROCHECKifRCSisolated:

• CHECKPRZPORVs-SHUT.(YES)

• CheckletdownisolationvalvesSHUT.(NO)*Closes1CS-7,1CS-8,1CS-9*1CS-2,1CS-1

• VERIFYexcessletdownvalves-SHUT.(YES)

• 1CS-460*1CS-461 BOP VERIFYAFWFlowandControlSGLevels:

• VERIFYAFWFlow-GREATERTHAN210KPPH.(NO)*ANYlevel-

GREATER THAN 250/0[40%].(YES/NO dependingonpace)*Maintain210KPPHuntil

>25%in SG.Appendix D SRO BOP EVALUATE EAL NetworkusingEntryPointX.

Verify AC Emergency Bus Cross-Ties

to Non-Emergency

ACBuses-OPENVerifyanycrosstietoBus1A-SA-OPEN(YES)

• Breaker 104*Breaker105 VerifyAnycrosstietoBus1B-SB-OPEN(YES)

• Breaker 124*Breaker 125NUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS 2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page25of39

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO2EVENT7-10-LOOP/SG"C"TUBE

RUPTURE BOP ENERGIZE AC EmergencyBusesusingEDGs:

• CHECKEDG1Aand1

B-AVAlLABLE*EDG emergencytripsCLEAR(NOT

PRESENT).(1A-NO,1B-YES)

• EDGoutput breakers-NORMAL (NOT TRIPPED).(YES)BOP*CHECKanyEDG-RUNNING.(YES-B)

SRO*GOTOStep7e.

BOP*CHECKanyAC emergencybus-ENERGIZED:

• 1A-SAbusvoltage(NO)

• 1B-SBbusvoltage(NO)

BOP PERFORMthefollowing:

CRITICAL*Energize1B-SBby closing Breaker 126 before RCS TASKFeedandBleed

criteriaismet EVALUATOR'S

NOTE: The Synch.Switch must be turnedONto satisfy the interlock for closing the breaker from the MCB.SROGOTOStep7h.

BOP CHECKanyAC emergencybus-ENERGIZED:

• 1A-SAbusvoltage(NO)

• 1B-SBbusvoltage(YES)

SRO IMPLEMENT Function Restoration

Proceduresasrequired.

SRO TransitionstoPATH-1,Step4.BOOTHOPERATOR:

Actuate the event trigger for SGTR when the crew returns to performing

actionsinPATH-1.EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew will likely transitiontoEPP-004 before SGTR symptoms are evident.Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRC

Scenario2Revision2Page26of39

AppendixDScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO2EVENT7-10-LOOP/SG"C"TUBERUPTURE

RO CHECKSIActuation(NO)SIRequired (NO)" SRO RO SRO SRO EVALUATOR'S

NOTE: RO RODirectsaMANUALSIin

accordancewithFoldoutcriteria.InitiatesaMANUALSI.

Transitions(orcontinues)toPATH-1,EntryPoint"A".

FOLDOUTAapplies.The following actions should be taken in accordance

withFOLDOUTA criteria during the scenario:*Verify Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves or Miniflow Block.ValvesCLOSE

when RCS Pressure lowers to less than 1800 PSIG.VERIFYALLCSIPsANDRHRpumps-RUNNING.(NO-only"B"Train)CHECKSIFlow:*SIflow-GREATERTHAN200GPM.(YES)RORCSpressure-GREATERTHAN230PSIG.(YES)

BOP CHECKMainSteamIsolation:*MAINsteamisolation-

ACTUATED.(NO)BOPMAINsteamisolation-REQUIRED.(YES/NO)*Steamlinepressure-LESSTHAN601PSIG.*CNMTpressure-

GREATERTHAN3.0PSIG.AppendixDNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page27of39

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT7-10-LOOP/SG"C"TUBERUPTURE

• MANUAL closureofallMSIVsANDbypassvalvesis

desired.RO CHECK CNMTPressure-HASREMAINEDLESSTHAN10PSIG.(YES)

BOP CHECKAFWStatus:

• AFWflow-ATLEAST210KPPH

AVAILABLE.(YES)EVALUATOR'SNOTE:The crew may identify SG"C" as ruptured at this time and isolate AFW.BOP CHECKanySG level-GREATER THAN 250/0[40%].(YES)

VERIFY Alignment of Components

From ActuationofESFAS BOPSignalsUsing

Attachment

6,"Safeguards

Actuation Verification", While ContinuingwiththisProcedure.

EVALUATOR'S

NOTE:*TheRO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment6.TheBOPis

permitted to properly align plant equipment in accordance

with Attachment

6 without SRO approval.The Scenario Guide still identifies

both board positions because the time frame for completion

of Attachment6is not predictable.

Attachment6is clipped to the back of this guide.*The crew may recognize that SG"C"PORVis 100 0 k open during attempts to control RCS temperature.

In that case, he/she may take MANUAL control and closeitat any time after the malfunction

is determined.

If that occurs then a transitiontoEPP-014is

not required.BOPControlRCS

Temperature:StabilizeAND

maintain temperature

between 555°F AND 559°FusingTable1.

• Controlfeed

flowandsteamdumptostabilize

temperaturebetween555

OFAND559 OF BOP VERIFYACbuses1A1(NO)AND1B1-

ENERGIZED.(YES)Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario2Revision2Page28of39

AppendixDScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO2EVENT7-10-LOOP/SG"C"TUBERUPTURE

RO RO RO CHECKPRZPORVs-SHUT.(YES)

CHECKblockvalves-ATLEASTONEOPEN.(YES-All

OPEN)PRZsprayvalves-SHUT

..(YES)EVALUATORNOTE:If the crew has not identified

SG"C" PORVas OPEN then a transitiontoEPP-014 should occur.IfSG"C"PORVhas been closed in MANUAL then the crew will continuein1to the PATH-2 transition.(Page31 of this guide.)BOP IDENTIFYanyfaultedSG:

• CHECKforanyofthefollowing:*ANYSGpressures-

DECREASINGINAN UNCONTROLLEDMANNER(YES-"C")*ANYSG-COMPLETELY

DEPRESSURIZED.(NO)BOOTHOPERATOR:If

directed to walk down the system to check for leaks: Wait 3 minutes and then report SG"C" PORV tailpipe blowing steam.PROCEDURENOTE:

• At leastoneSG must be maintained

available for RCS cooldown.*Any faultedSGOR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent

recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.SRO IMPLEMENTFunctionRestorationProceduresasrequired.

BOP CHECKMSIVsandBYPASSValves:*VERIFYallMSIVs-SHUT.AppendixDNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page29of39

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO2EVENT7-10-

LOOP/SG"c"TUBERUPTURE

BOP VERIFYallMSIVbypassvalves-SHUT.(YES)

BOP CHECK anySGNOTFaulted:

-*ANYSG pressure-STABLEOR INCREASING.(YES,"A"and"B").

BOP IDENTIFYanyFaultedSG:

• CHECKforanyofthefollowing:

• ANYSGpressure-

DECREASINGINAN UNCONTROLLED

MANNER(YES-"C")BOP ISOLATEFaultedSG(s):

• VERIFYfaultedSG(s)PORV-SHUT(NO)

Critical*Places SG"C"PORVin MANUAL and closes to Task terminate the release before exiting EPP-014.*VERIFYMainFWisolationvalves-SHUT(YES)

• VERIFYMDAFWand TDAFWpumpisolationvalvestofaultedSG(s)-SHUT

• SHUTfaultedSG(s)steam

supplyvalveto TDAFWpump-SHUT*ClosesisolationfromSG"C":1MS-72

• VERIFYmainsteamdrain

isolation(s)

before MSIVs-SHUT:*SGA:1MS-231(YES)

• SGB:1MS-266(YES)

• SGC:1MS-301(CLOSES)

• VERIFYSGBlowdownisolationvalves-SHUT(YES)

• VERIFYmainsteam analyzerisolationvalves-SHUT (YES)BOP CHECK CST Level-GREATER THAN 10%(YES).Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page30of39

AppendixDScenarioOutline

Form ES-D-12008HARRISNRCSCENARIO2EVENT7-10-LOOP/SG"c"TUBERUPTUREPROCEDURENOTE:A5Gmaybe suspectedtobe rupturedifit fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow.Local checks for radiationcanbe used to confirm primary-to-secondary

leakage.'EVALUATORNOTE:The"Check secondary radiation" could be answered YES or NO, depending on the condition of the alarm before 51 was initiated.SROCHECKSecondaryRadiation:

• SGBlowdownradiation-NORMAL(YES/NO)

• MAINsteamlineradiation-NORMAL(YES/NO)BOPCHECKSGLevels:

• ANY level-INCREASINGINANUNCONTROLLEDMANNER(YES,"C")SROFOLDOUTCapplies.

EVALUATOR'SNOTE:No actions should result from FOLDOUT"C" during the remainder of the scenario.SROEVALUATEEALNetworkusingEntryPointU.SROIMPLEMENTFunctionRestorationProceduresasrequired.PROCEDURENOTE:TheRCP

Trip Criteriaisin effect untilanRCS cooldown is initiated.ROCHECKRCPTripCriteria:

• ANYRCP-RUNNING(NO)BOPIDENTIFYanyrupturedSG:

• CHECKforanyofthefollowing:AppendixDNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page31of39

AppendixDScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO 2 EVENT.7-10-LOOP/SG"c"TUBERUPTURE

• SG level-INCREASINGINAN UNCONTROLLEDMANNER(YES-"C")PROCEDURECAUTION:

• At leastoneSG must be maintained

available for RCS cooldown.*If the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, one steam supply valve from an intact SG must be maintained

open.BOPISOLATEFlowFromRupturedSG:

ADJUSTrupturedSGPORV

controller

setpoint to 88%(1145PSIG)ANDplaceinauto.

• PlacesSG"C"PORVin

MANUALandcloses.ItshouldNOTbeplaced.inAUTO.IfitisplacedinAUTOthenthe

operator should determinethatithasopened,placeitinMANUAL,closeit,andleaveitinMANUAL.

• CHECKrupturedSGPORV-SHUT.(YES/NO)

• SHUTrupturedSGsteamsupplyvalvetoTDAFWpump:

• MS-70and72aretaggedSHUT

• VERIFY blowdownisolationvalvesfromruptured

SG-SHUT(YES)*SHUTrupturedSGmainsteamdrainisolationbefore

MSIV:*SGA:1MS-231

• SGB:1MS-266

• SGC:1MS-301

• SHUTrupturedSGMSIVandBYPASSvalve.(SG"C")BOPRupturedSGMSIVandbypassedvalvesSHUT(YES)

SRO ObserveCAUTIONpriortoStep8ANDGOTOStep8.PROCEDURECAUTION:If

rupturedSGis faultedANDisNOT needed for RCS cooldown,THENfeed flow to that SG should remain isolated.AppendixDNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page32of39

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO2EVENT7-10-LOOP/SG"C"TUBERUPTURE

BOP MONITORRupturedSGLevel:

• RUPTUREDSG-FAULTED(NO)

• Level-GREATER THAN 25%*Stopfeedflowbyshuttingthe

MDAFW and TDAFWisolationvalvestotherupturedSG.PROCEDURECAUTION:The

steam supply valve from the rupturedSGtothe TDAFW pump should be shut OR isolated before continuing.

BOP CHECKRupturedSG(s)Pressure-

GREATERTHAN260PSIG[350PSIG](YES)ROBlockLowSteamPressureSI:

• Pressure-LESSTHAN2000PSIG(YES)

• BlocklowsteampressureSI.PROCEDURENOTE:

After the low steam pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occurifthe high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.SROPrepareForRCSCooldown:

• AtleastoneintactSG-

AVAILABLEFORRCS COOLDOWN (YES)*GOTOStep11e.

• Determinerequiredcoreexit

temperaturebasedonlowestrupturedSGpressure:PROCEDURECAUTION:IFRCPsareNOT

running, an invalidREDorORANGE

condition forRCSINTEGRITYCSF-4may

occur during the following steps.Disregard ruptured SG wide range cold leg temperature

untilStep39 completed.BOPInitiateRCSCooldown:

Checkallofthe following to determineifsteamcanbedumped

to condenser:

Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRC'

Scenario2Revision2Page33of39

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO2EVENT7-10-

LOOP/SG"C"TUBE RUPTURE EVALUATORNOTE:Thereisno

power to the SG"A" PORV controller.TheSRO should direct local operation.BOOTHOPERATORNOTE:If

directed to control SG"A" PORV locally:*irf mss027 TO LOCAL OPSDumpsteamfromintactSGsatmaximumrateusinganyofthe

following(listedinorderof

preference):*SGPORV's*InitiatescooldownusingonlySGPORV's"A"and"B"("A"PORVcanonlybe

operatedlocallyatthispoint)*GOTOStep13.

Evaluator Note: The crew will continue with the procedure while the cooldown is in progress.When the CET temperature

is less than the target then the crew should terminate the cooldown and continue with the procedure.

RO RO MonitorCoreExitTCsWhile

ContinuingWithThisProcedure:*CoreexitTCs-LESSTHAN

REQUIRED TEMPERATURE (NO)*WHENcoreexitTCsless

REQUIRED TEMPERATURETHENdoSteps13bANDc.13.bStopRCScooldown.13.cMaintaincoreexitTCslessthanrequired

temperature.MaintainRCPSealInjectionFlowBetween8GPMAnd13

GPM.PROCEDURECAUTION:*IfanAFW isolation to an intact SG occurs, the signalmaybe reset to allow restoration

ofAFW.(AnAFW

isolation will occurifa main steam line isolation signal is presentANDoneSG pressure decreases100PSIG below the other two SGs.)*If the steam supply valve from the rupturedSGtoTDAFW pump reopens due to decreasing

SG level, it must be restored to the shut position.(Two out of three SG levels decreasing

below 25°k will open both steam supply vales to the TDAFW pump.)Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page34of39

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO2EVENT7-10-LOOP/SG"C"TUBE

RUPTURE BOP CheckIntactSGLevels:

• AnyintactSGlevel-

GREATER THAN 25%[40%](YES)*AFWflow-AT

LEAST210KPPH AVAILABLE (YES)*ControlfeedflowtomaintainintactSGlevelsbetween

25%and 50%[40%and50%]*AnyintactSGlevel-

INCREASINGINAN UNCONTROLLED

MANNER (NO)SROGOTOStep16.

RO CheckPRZPORVANDBlockValves:

• VerifypowertoPORVblockvalves-

AVAILABLE (YES-one)*CheckPRZPORVs-SHUT(YES)

• GOTOStep16f.

• Checkblockvalves-ATLEASTONEOPEN(YES)

• IFaPRZPORVopensonhighpressure,THENverifyitshutsafter

pressure decreasestolessthanopening

setpoint.ROResetSI.SRO Manually Realign Safeguards

EquipmentFollowingALossOf

Offsite Power.ROResetPhaseAANDPhaseBIsolationSignals.(PhaseAonly

is actuated)RO Establish InstrumentAirANDNitrogenToCNMT:Openthefollowingvalves:

• 11A-819..1SI-287 RO CheckRHRPumpStatus:

Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario2Revision2Page35of39

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO2EVENT7-10-LOOP/SG"C"TUBERUPTURE

• RCSpressure-

GREATERTHAN230PSIG(YES)

• StopRHRpumps.("B")ROCheckIfRCScooldownShouldBeStopped:

• CoreexitTCs-LESSTHANREQUIRED

TEMPERATURE (YES/NO)BOP*StopRCScooldown.

• MaintaincoreexitTCslessthanrequiredtemperature.

BOPCheckRupturedSGPressure

• CheckrupturedSGpressure-STABLEOR

INCREASING (YES)*GOTOStep24.

ROCheckRCS Subcooling

-GREATERTHAN30of-C(YES)RO DepressurizeRCSToMinimizeBreakFlowANDRefillPRZ:

• NormalPRZspray-AVAILABLE(NO)

SRO*ObserveCAUTIONpriortoStep26ANDGOTOStep

26.PROCEDURECAUTION

• ThePRTmay ruptureifaPRZPORVis

used to depressurizetheRCS.This may result in abnormal containment

conditions.

• Cycling ofthePRZPORV

should be minimized to avoid the possibility

of the valve sticking.PROCEDURENOTE:The

upper head region may void during RCS depressurizationifRCPsare not running.This will result in a rapidly increasingPRZlevel.RO DepressurizeRCSUsingPRZPORVToMinimizeBreakFlowANDRefillPRZ:PRZPORV-ATLEASTONE

AVAILABLEAppendixDNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRC

Scenario2Revision2Page36of39

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO2EVENT7-10-LOOP/SG"C"TUBERUPTUREOpenonePRZPORVuntilanyofthefollowing

conditions

satisfied:

• PRZ level-GREATER THAN 75%[60%]*RCS subcooling-LESSTHAN10

of[40DF]-CBothofthefollowing:

• RCS pressure-LESSTHAN RUPTURED SG(s)PRESSURE*PRZlevel-GREATER THAN 10%[30%]RO CheckRCSPressure:

• Pressure-INCREASING (YES)*Observe CAUTIONpriortoStep28ANDGOTOStep

28.PROCEDURE CAUTION: To prevent overfillingtheruptured 51 termination

shouldNOTbe delayed.RO Check SI Termination

Criteria:*RCS subcooling

-GREATERTHAN10of-C(YES)BOP Check secondaryheatsinkusinganyofthefollowing:

• TotalfeedflowtoSGs-AT

LEAST210KPPH AVAILABLE*LevelinatleastoneintactSG-

GREATER THAN 25%[40%]RORCS pressure-STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)ROPRZlevel-GREATER THAN 10%[300/0](YES)ROStopAllButOneCSIP.

'ROIsolateHighHeadSIFlow:

CheckCSIPsuction-

ALIGNEDTORWST Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario2Revision2Page37of39

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-12008HARRISNRC

SCENARIO2EVENT7-10-LOOP/SG"C"TUBERUPTUREOpennormal

miniflowisolationvalves:

• 1CS-182*1CS-196*1CS-210*1CS-214 Critical Task Shut BIT outlet valves:*151-3*1SI-4(Nopower)

Shuts 151-3 before SG"O" level indication

reaches 95%.TheLead Evaluator can terminate thescenariowhen151-3isSHUT.

Appendix DNUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario2Revision2Page38of39

Appendix 0 Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO2EVENT7-10-

LOOP/SG"C" TUBE RUPTURE RevlslonSurnmary

1.CorrectedinitialICtobeIC-5,notIC-9

2.Clarifiedoverfillas"exceeding

95%" 3.CorrectederrorsinSimSetup4.Added MS-70&MS-72 tagged and de-energizedtoSimSetup

5.Clarified order and priorityofalarmsforEvent36.AddedTS 3.6.1.5asaTSthatwillbe

referenced

though not applicable

duringEvent3 7.Clarified where procedure direction is comingfrominEvent3'8.Addedmore

informationonTS 3.3.3.6.a.

applicabilityduringEvent5

9.Extended the guide to allowEvent6torununtil

completion

of Attachment1in AOP-01610.Moved1CS-1*inguidetoreflectorder

operator is expected to operate valve 11.Changed answerforSG Level>25%[40%]to YES/NO dependingonpace12.Addednotethat

Attachmentisclippedtobackof

Guide13.Added clarificationonwhatstepswouldbe

skipped if crew identifiesandshuts open PORVearlyonin scenario.14.'Addeda

secondlineinguidefor

evaluatorstorecordbothrequiredCoreExit

Temperature

and Lowest Ruptured SG Pressure duringsteptoPrepareforRCS

Cooldown 15.Clarified that"A"SGPORVwillonlybe

availabletocontrol locally Appendix 0NUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario2Revision2Page39of39

I Appendix D Scenario Outline______Fo_r_m_ES-D-IJ

Facility: HARRIS Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.:2008NRC Examiners:

Operators:

r:..Initial Conditions:FromIC-27:

• 4.20/0power,MOL,Boron1570PPM.

• Plant startuptofull power in progress.PerformGP-005toStep95.

• No equipment out-of-service.

Turnover:)*The previous shift continuedaplant startup followingashort maintenanceoutage.GP-005, POWER OPERATION,isin progresswithStep94

completed.

Continue the startupbutmaintain

steadystatepowerat

7-9%whileI&C Technicians

complete testingoftheP-7 permissive.CriticalTasks:

• StartCSIP"B"nolaterthanthePATH-1SIflow

verification

step*CloseatleastonePhase"A"IsolationValveineachopenlinenolaterthanthe

completion

of GUIDE1, Attachment

6EventMalt.EventType*

EventNo.No.Description

1 N/AN-BOP,ShifttotheMFW

Regulating

Valves SRO Raise power and stabilize<P-7 2 Z1974TDI C-BOP, Spuriousstartofthe

TDAFW pump Z1975TDI SRO 3 TI:144 C-RO,SRO Letdown Temperature

Controller

fails LO/DiversionValvefailsto

JTB1438 bypass demineralizers

4 RCS098 C-RO, SRORCP"B"rising

vibration TS-SRO 5 CFW16A C-BOP,RunningMFWPumptrips

XB1.1155 SRO StandbyMFWPumpfailstostart

ZR211158 Both MDAFWPumpAUTOstartfailure

ZR211113 6 RCS01AA M-ALL Small Break LOCA CVC05ACSIP"A" breaker trips 7 DSG04A C-RO,SRO Sequencer"B"skipsCSIPload

block 8 ZRPK630A C-BOPSameslaverelayineachtrainfailsto

actuate respective

Phase ZRPK630B"A" Isolation Valves*(N)ormal, (Rjeactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix DPage1ot27NUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario3Revision2

I Appendix DScenarioOutlineHARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO 3 SUMMARYFormES-D-1

IThecrewwillassumethewatchpre-briefedontheinitial

conditionsandtheprocedureineffect(GP-005,POWER

OPERATION).

No equipment is out-of-servicebutI&C Technicians

are performingP-7permissivetesting.Steadystatepowermustbe

maintainedat<10°10poweruntiltheP-7testingiscomplete.Thisdirectionisactuallytoensurepowerislessthan

10°10whenRCPvibrationoccursandtherunningMFWPump

trips.Whenthe evaluatingteamissatisfiedwiththepowerchangeandthe

feedwater controlvalvesareinAUTO(sothattheBOPcanrespond),theLeadEvaluatorcancuethespuriousstartof

the*TDAFWPump.TheBOPshouldrespondtothechangingplant

parametersandrecognizethatthe

TDAFWPumphasstarted.TheLead EvaluatorcancuetheLetdown

Temperature

Controllerfailureoncetheplanthasstabilized.Thecrewshouldrespondin

accordancewiththealarmprocedure.TheROshould manuallybypasstheCVC

Demineralizersandrestoreletdown

temperaturetonormalin

MANUALcontrol.TheCVC

Demineralizerswillremainbypassedpending

an engineering

evaluation.OncuefromtheLeadEvaluator,RCP"B"vibrationwillbegintorise.Thecrewwillrespondtoalarmsand/or

indicationsandenterAOP-018,REACTOR

COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS.VibrationwillcontinuetoriseuntilRCPtripcriteriaismet.Sincepoweris<P-7,theRCPcanbestoppedwithoutareactortrip.TheSROshouldenterTS3.4.1.1.WhentheplantisstableandtheRCP-relatedTSentryiscomplete,theLeadEvaluatorcancuethetripoftherunningMFWPump.TheBOPshouldreportthelossofthepump

and/orrespondtoalarms.TheSROshouldenterandconductAOP-010, FEEDWATER MALFUNCTIONS.ActionswillincludestartingtheAFWSystemandloweringpoweras

necessarytomaintainSGlevels.Whentheplantisstable,theLead

EvaluatorcancuetheSBLOCA.ThiswillresultinaMANUALor automaticSIinitiation.

CoincidentwiththeSI,CSIP"A"breakerwilltripandtheLoad SequencerwillskiptheCSIP"B"loadblock.Thecrewshould

manually startCSIP"8"toestablishHHSIintheearlystepsofPATH-1.TheBOPshouldcloseatleastoneisolationvalveinanyunisolatedPhase"A"lineintheprocessofperforming

1, Attachment6.ThecrewwillcontinueinPATH-1untilthetransitiontoEPP-009, POST-LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION,occurs.Thescenariocanbe

terminatedwhenthefirstRCSpressurereductioniscompleteinEPP-009.AppendixDPage2of27NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS*2008NRCScenario3Revision2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineHARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO 3 SETUPFormES-D-1

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:*ClipacopyofGUIDE-1

Attachment1(SI Alignment)

and Attachment

6 (Safeguards

Actuation Verification)toeach scenarioguideforusebythe

evaluators.*ClipacopyofAOP-018, Attachment1-RCPTripLimits,tothebackofthis

scenario guide.INITIAL CONDITIONS:*IC-27, 4.2%power,MOL,Boron1580

• GP-005 completed throughStep94*ReactivityPlanfor intendedevolution(Raisepowerto

just below 100/0)*Turnover Sheet*Ensurerodstep

countersresettothe

correct value PRE-LOAD:*imfdsg04a:Load

Sequencer"B"skipsCSIPloadblock

• zrpk630a:Phase"A" isolationslaverelayfailure

• zrpk630b:Phase"A" isolationslaverelayfailure*xb1i155: StandbyMFWPumpfailstostart

• zr211158/zr211113:

MDAFWPumpsfailtoAUTOstart

TRIGGERS:Event2: Z1974/Z1975

TDI_ENERGIZED (Spuriousstartof TDAFW)Event3: tt:144 Letdown Temperature

ControllerfailsLO/imf

jtb143b FAIL_RESET,FAIL_ASIS

DemineralizerBypassfailstobypass

automaticallyEvent4:rcs09b30RCP"B" vibrationEvent5:cfw16aMFWPump"A"tripsEvent6:rcs01a

SBLOCA.09 severity (450 GPM)/cvc05a

TRUECSIP"A"trips

Appendix DPage3of27NUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario3Revision2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

HARRIS2008NRC SCENARIO3EVENT1-POWER

CHANGE EVALUATOR'S

NOTE: EVALUATOR'S

NOTE: BOP RO Cue Event 2 after power is stabilizedinbandof7%to 9%andtheBOPis

available to respond to indications

of a spurious TDAFW pump start.OP-107isa"Reference

Use" procedure.

Adjustssteamdump demandsignalasnecessary.

Initiatesdilutionas

necessary RO RO RO RO RO RO Appendix D DETERMINEthevolumeof

makeupwatertobeadded.Thismaybedoneby

experienceorviathereactivityplan

associatedwiththe Simulator IC.SETSFIS-114, TOTALMAKEUPWTRBATCH

COUNTER, toobtainthedesiredquantity.SETtotal makeupflowasfollows:

• IF performingDILinStep8,THENSET

controller1CS-151,FK-114RWMUFLOW,forlessthanorequalto

90 qprn,*IF performingALTDILinStep8,THENSET

controller1CS-151,FK-114RWMUFLOW,forthedesiredflowrate.

VERIFYtheRMW CONTROLswitchhasbeen,placedintheSTOPposition.VERIFYtheRMW

CONTROLswitchgreenlightislit.PLACEthecontrolswitchRMWMODE

SELECTORtotheDILORtheALTDILposition.Page4of27NUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario3Revision2

Appendix D Scenario Outline.FormES-D-1HARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO3EVENT1-POWERCHANGEPROCEDURENOTE:WhenPRZ

backup heaters are energized in manual, PK444A1,PRZ Master Pressure Controller(aPI controller)

will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint.The resultisas follows:*PORVPCV-444B

willopenata lower than expected pressure*ALB-009-3-2,PRESSURIZERHIGHPRESSDEVIATIONCONTROL, will activateata lower than expected pressure*Increased probability

for exceedingTechSpec DNB limit for RCS pressure NOTE: SRO concurrence

should be obtained prior to energizing

theBUHinMANUAL.

OPERATE the pressurizerbackupheatersasrequiredtolimit

RO the differencebetweenthe

pressurizerandRCSboron

concentrationtolessthan10ppm.ROSTARTthemakeupsystemasfollows:

• TURNcontrolswitchRMW

CONTROLtoSTART momentariiy.

• VERIFYtheRED

indicatorlightisLIT.PROCEDURECAUTION:

The operation should be stoppedifan unanticipated

reactivity

effectisseen.Do not resume the operation until the causehasbeen corrected.ROVERIFYTavgrespondsasdesired.IFrodcontrolisinAUTO,THENVERIFYthecontrolrodsareROsteppingouttothedesiredheight.(N/A-rodcontrolisin

MANUAL)ROVERIFYdilution

automatically

terminateswhenthedesired

quantityhasbeenadded.

ROPLACEReactorMakeupinAUTOperSection5.1.AppendixDPage5of27NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario3Revision2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1HARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO3EVENT1-POWER

CHANGEROVERIFYtheRMW

CONTROL switch:*IsintheSTOPposition.

• TheGREENlightisLIT.ROPLACEtheRMWMODE

SELECTORtoAUTO.ROSTARTthemakeupsystemasfollows:

• TURNcontrolswitchRMW

CONTROLtoSTART momentarily.

• VERIFYtheRED indicatorlightisLIT.AppendixD SRO BOP BOPDirectsBOPtoperformStep95,PREPAREtoplacetheMain

FeedwaterRegulatingvalvesinservice.PREPAREtoplacetheMain

FeedwaterRegulatingvalvesinserviceasfollows:VERIFYthefollowingMain

FeedwaterRegulatingvalvesareshutwiththeflowcontrollersinmanualwithzero(0or

minimum)controller

output:*1FW-133,MAINFWA

REGULATOR (FK-478)*1FW-249,MAINFWB

REGULATOR (FK-488)*1FW-191,MAINFWC

REGULATOR (FK-498)VERIFYSHUTthefollowingMainFeedRegulatingBlock

valves:*1FW-130,MAINFWABLOCKVLV

• 1FW-246,MAINFWBBLOCKVLV

• 1FW-188,MAINFWCBLOCKVLVPage6of27NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario3Revision2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D..1 HARRIS2008NRC SCENARIO3EVENT1-POWER

CHANGEBOOTHOPERATORNOTE:

• In the following step, report smooth operation ofeachFCV.When

requested to verify: report1FW-136,1FW-252,1FW-194(MainFeedReg

Valve Outlet IsolationValves)allOPEN.

BOPCYCLEthefollowing

controllerstoopenthenshuttheflowcontrolvalves,while

monitoringlocallyforsmooth

operation:

• 1FW-133,MAINFWA

REGULATOR (FK-478)*1FW-249,MAINFWB

REGULATOR (FK-488)*1FW-191,MAINFWC

REGULATOR (FK-498)BOP VERIFYOPENthefollowingMainFeedRegulatingIsolation

Valves:*1FW-130,MAINFWA

BLOCK VLV'*1FW-246,MAINFWB

BLOCK VLV*1FW-188,MAINFWC

BLOCK VLV*1FW-136,MAINFEEDREGVALVEA

OUTLET ISOL*1FW-252,MAINFEEDREGVALVEB

OUTLET ISOL*1FW-194,MAINFEEDREGVALVEC

OUTLET ISOL EVALUATOR CUE: Cue next event once power increasehasbeen observed but beforetheBOP begins to TransferSGLevel Control to theMFRVs.Next

step is included but crew is not expected to reach this step.SRO Declaresmodechangeoncepoweris>5%.

WHEN FeedwaterRegulatingBypassValveFCV

Controller

BOP demandisbetween 700/0and80%,ORwhenReactorPowerisbetween7and9%,THEN

TRANSFERSGlevelcontroltothe

Main Feedwater Regulatingvalvesasfollows:PLACEthe following Feedwater RegulatingValveBypassFCV

ControllersinMAN:*1FW-140,MNFWAREGBYPFK-479.1

• 1FW-256,MNFWBREGBYPFK-489.1

• 1FW-198,MNFWCREGBYPFK-499.1

Appendix DPage7of27NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRC

Scenario3Revision2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1HARRIS2008

NRC.SCENARIO3EVENT2-TDAFW SPURIOUS START.Booth Operator Instructions:

Actuate Event 2-Spurious startofTDAFW(ET-2)oncue from Lead Evaluator.

Indications

Available:ALB-017-7-1AFWTURBDISCHARGELOWSUCTION/LOW

PRESSURE (flashesinon start), increasing

power, rising SG Levels, open indicationonMS-70 BOP Responds to indications

of spuriousstartof TDAFW BOPReferstoAPP-ALB-7-1

CREW Determines

TDAFWpumpshouldnotberunning.CREW DispatchesanAOto investigate.BOOTHOPERATOR'SCUE:

When contacted,wait

2-3 minutes then report TDAFW Pump is running.No indications

locallyastothe cause.BOPReferstoOP-137, Auxiliary Feedwater,section7.2

BOPVerify1MS-70SASHUT(NO)Shuts1MS-70.BOPVerify1MS-72SBShut(YES)

BOP VerifyAFWFCVand IsolationsindicateOPEN(YES)

BOPSetAFWFCVsOutputDemandto

1000/0for1AF-129,1AF-130,1AF-131.(YES)

BOP Verify TDAFW Speed ControllerinAUTOandsetperCurveF-

X-10.EVALUATORCUE:SROmay also reference OWP-MS-05, but thisOWPhasno actions.Appendix DPage8of27NUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario3Revision2

Appendix 0ScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1HARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO3EVENT2-TDAFW

SPURIOUS START PROCEDURE

The following step makes the TDAFW pump operable, and aligns TDAFW pumptoa standby alignment.

BOP Complete Attachment7,TDAFWRestoration.(Clippedtobackofguide)EvaluatesTechspecsfromAPPandOWPT.S.3.3.2,Action21.(6hours)

SRO T.S.3.6.3,Actiona.(4hours)T.S.3.7.1.2,Action(72hours)T.S.3.9.4.(Not

applicable)

SROIfnot alreadydone,maycompleteand

Equipment Failure ChecklistandcontactWCCforassistance.

EVALUATOR'SNOTE:Cue Event 3 (Letdown Temperature

Controlier/Demin

Bypass valve Failure)whenthe standby chillerisin service and the TS entryhasbeen completed or AOP-026is exited.'Appendix 0Page9of27NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario3Revision2

AppendixDScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1HARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO3EVENT3-LETDOWN

TEMPERATURE

CONTROL FAILURE Booth Operator Instructions:

Actuate Event3-Letdown Temperature

controller

failure (tt:144/jtb143b)oncue fromtheLead Evaluator.

Indications

Available:ALB-007-3-2,DEMINFLOWDIVERSIONHIGH

TEMP.RORespondstoalarmandenters

APP-ALB-007-3-2.

ROCONFIRMalarmusingTI-143,LPLetdownTemperature.

RO VERIFY Automatic Functions:

• Manuallypositions1CS-50,LetdowntoVCT/Demin,todivertflowtotheVCT.

RO PERFORM Corrective

actions:*VERIFYthat1CS-50divertsflowtotheVCT,bypassingtheBTRSandPurification

Demineralizers.

• PERFORMthefollowingasneededtolowerletdown

temperature:

• VERIFYproperchargingflowisestablished.(YES)

• LOWERletdownflow.(N/A-CCWProblem)

• IFCCWflowtotheLetdownHeatExchangerappearslow,THEN:

• TAKEmanualcontrolof

TK-144.*OPEN1CC-337,toraiseCCWflow.

SRO ContactsWorkControland/orSystemEngineerforassistance.BOOTHOPERATOR:

If contactedasWCC or System Engineer: "maintain flow bypassing the demineralizers

untilaresin damage assessment

is completed".

I EVALUATOR'S

NOTE:TheLead Evaluatorcancue Event4(RCP"B" high vibration)

when letdown temperature

is under control.AppendixDPage10of27NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario3Revision2

Appendix D Scen-ario OutlineFormES-D-1HARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO3EVENT4-RCP"B"HIGHVIBRATION

Booth Operator Instructions:

Actuate trigger for Event4(RCS09B)oncue

from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications

Available:ALB-010-2-5,RCP-BTROUBLE

RORespondstoalarmALB-010-2-5.

Evaluator's

Note:Crewmay enter ALB-010-1-5

but will likely go directly to AOP-018 when high vibration is recognized.

SROEntersanddirectsactionsofAOP-018,REACTOR

COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL OPERATIONS.

Immediate ROPerformImmediateAction

Action*VerifiesoneCSIPrunning.(YES)

SROInformSSOtorefertoPEP-110, Emergency Classification

andProtectiveAction

Recommendations.

SROProceedstoSection3.2,RCPHighVibration.EVALUATORNOTE:

• The answer to the following questionmaybeYESat

this time but the limit will be exceeded in short order.Thisisa continuous

action step that should be implemented

when the limit is exceeded.The scenario guide is therefore writtenasifthe limit is exceeded when the stepisread.*Attachment1is attached to the back of this scenario guide for evaluator use.SROCheckallRCP'soperatingwithinlimitsof

Attachment

1.SROCheckreactor

power>P-8.(NO)ROCheckmorethanone

Repaffected.(NO)

Appendix DPage11of27NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario3Revision2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

HARRIS2008NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT4-RCP"B"HIGH

VIBRATIONEVALUATORNOTE:TheSROmay conduct a brief on Attachment

7 before the Rep is stopped.ROPerformthefollowing:

• STOPthe affectedRCP.(RCP"B")

SROREFERTO Attachment

7, OperationWithTwoRCPs.GOTOStep11.

RO CHECKallRCPs RUNNING.(NO)PERFORMthefollowing:

• IFRCPAis SECURED,THENSHUT1RC-107,PRZSprayLoopA.(N/A)

• IFRCPBis SECURED,THENSHUT1RC-103;PRZSprayLoopB.

BOP*VERIFYSGlevelsbeing

maintained

between 52%and 62%.RO*MONITORrodinsertionlimits(RefertoSectionFcurvefromCurveBook).

• INITIATEaplant shutdownusingONEofthefollowing:

SRO*GP-006,NormalPlantShutdownfromPower

OperationtoHot Standby*AOP-038, Rapid Downpower RO CONFIRMthevibrationalarmVALIDbycheckingBOTHofthe

following:a.TheGreenvibration

monitorOKlightisLIT.b.Eitherofthefollowing

conditions

exist:*ShaftANDframe

vibration are proportionally

rising*VerticalAND

Horizontalvibrationare

proportionally

rising RO CHECKthefollowing

parametersnormalfortheaffectedRCP (referenceHNPPOMGroup

TrendsforAOP-018):

• All parameterslistedin Attachment6,ERFISPointsfor

Reactor Coolant Pumps*Seal liP*UpperOil Reservoir level*LowerOil Reservoir level*RCSLoopFlow

Appendix D.Page12of27NUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario3Revision2

AppendixDScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1HARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO3EVENT4-RCP"B"HIGHVIBRATION

SRO CONSULTwiththeResponsible

Engineerforrecommended

follow-up actions.SROREFERTOthefollowingTechSpecs:TS3.4.1.1isthemostlimiting:BeinatleastHSBwithin6hours.TheLead Evaluatorcancue Event5(MFW Pump trip)after the TS declaration.AppendixDPage13of27NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario3Revision2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1HARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO3EVENT5-RUNNINGMFWPUMPTRIP

Booth Operator Instructions:

Ensure power is<100/0 then actuate the trigger for Event 5 (Running MFW Pump trip)oncue fromtheLead Evaluator.

Indications

Available:ALB-016,FWPUMPAlBHIGH

BACK FLOW O'RLOWSUCTIONPRESSORTRIP

Evaluator Note: MFW Pump 2 should not be started due to overfeed concerns.BOPRespondstoindicationofrunningMain

Feedwater (MFW)Pumptrip and/ormultiplealarms.

BOPReportsMFWPump1tripped.SROEntersAOP-010, FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION.

BOP Performs immediateactionsofAOP-01

O.*CHECKANYMainFeedwaterPumpTRIPPED.(YES)

• CHECKinitialReactorpowerlessthan

900/0.(YES)*CHECKinitialReactorpowerlessthan80%.(YES)PROCEDURENOTE:

• Turbine runback will automatically

terminate at approximately

50 0 k power withDEHinAUTO.

• Turbine runbacks are quickly identified

byALB-020-2-2,TURBINERUNBACKOPERATIVE,in

alarmandRUN BACK OPER lightLITas long as the initiating

signal is presentonDEHPanelA.

BOP/RO CHECKinitialReactorpowerlessthan60%.(YES)

BOP/SRO CHECKDEHcontrollingTurbineValvesPROPERLY.(N/A-turbinenotonline)SROGOTOStep7.

Appendix DPage14of27NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario3Revision2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1HARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO3EVENT5-RUNNINGMFWPUMPTRIP

BOPMAINTAINALLofthefollowing:

• AtleastONEMain

FeedwaterPumpRUNNING(NO)EVALUATORNOTE:

The crew may start both MDAFW Pumpsandthe TDAFW Pump in the next block of steps.BOPPERFORMthefollowing:

• IFANYSGleveldropsto

30%THENTRIPtheReactorANDGOTOEOPPath-1.

• IFAbovePOAHAND

ReactorpowerisLESSTHAN10%, THEN:*INITIATEAFWflowtomaintainSteam

Generator levelsbetween52 and 62%.PROCEDURENOTE:

Mode change occurs at 50/0 Reactor power.ROREDUCEpoweras

necessarytomaintainSGlevel.

SROIFbelowPOAH,THEN:(N/A)

BOPStartsbothMDAFWPumpandadjustsflowusingthe

associatedflowcontrolvalves.

EVALUATOR'S

NOTE:*The crew will continueinAOP-010 but the procedure actions are not intended for this situation.

Allow the crew time to match powertoAFW capability

then cue the next event (LOCA).*Since a shutdown willbein progress for the failedRCP,theSROmay

elect to direct a reactor trip rather than to continue keeping the plant at power.If so, then cuetheBOOTHOPERATOR

to initiate Event6(LOCAICSIP

Trip)coincident

with the reactor trip.BOOTHOPERATOR:

• Be prepared to actuate Event6(LOCAICSIP

Trip)iftheSRO directs a MANUAL reactor trip.ROAdjustpowerusing

MANUALRodControland/orborationas

Appendix DPage15of27NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario3Revision2

AppendixDScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1HARRIS2008NRCSCENARIO3EVENT5-RUNNINGMFWPUMPTRIPdirectedbytheSRO.

Lead Evaluator:

Cue Event6(LOCAICSIP

Trip)when the plantisina stable condition with power matchedtoAFW capability.AppendixDPage16of27NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario3Revision2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO3EVENT6-8-

SBLOCA/CSIP

FAILURE/PHASE"A" SLAVE RELAY.FAILUREBOOTHOPERATOR:

Actuate Event 6 SBLOCAICSIP"A" trip (RCS01 A1CVC05A)oncue fromtheLead Evaluator.

INDICATIONS:RCSLow Pressure alarms/Rapidly

Decreasing

RCS Pressure and Pressurizer

LevelEVALUATORNOTE:

Depending on which indications

the crew notices first theymaytake the Immediate Actions for AOP-018 firstduetothe trip of the running CSIP.However, shortly into that procedure they should recognize the SBLOCA in progress and transitiontoPATH-1.The crew may also initiateaMANUALSI before the AUTO setpoint is reached.RORespondto ALB-06Alarmsfortripof"A"CSIPSROEnterAOP-018,RCP

Abnormal conditions

Immediate RO CheckanyCSIPrunning(NO)

Action.ImmediateIsolateLetdownby

SHUTTING Action*1CS-7(SHUT)

RO*1CS-8(SHUT)

• 1CS-9 (Verify SHUT)EVALUATORNOTE:Bythe time the immediate actions are complete the crew should identify the indications

that a SBLOCA is in progress.SROEntersPATH-1ROVERIFYReactorTrip:

• AUTOor MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

• CHECKforanyofthefollowing:

• Trip breakersRTAandBYAOPEN(YES)

Appendix DPage17of27NUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario3Revision2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1HARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO3EVENT6-8-

SBLOCA/CSIP

FAILURE/PHASE"A"SLAVERELAY

FAILURE*TripbreakersRTBandBYBOPEN(YES)

• RODBottomlightsLIT(YES)

• NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)BOP VERIFYTurbineTrip:

• CHECKforanyofthefollowing:

• ALLturbinethrottlevalves-SHUT(YES)

• ALLturbine

governorvalves-SHUT(YES)

BOPVERIFYpowertoAC

Emergency Buses*1A-SAAND1B-SBBuses

energizedbyoff-sitepowerorEDG's.(YES)

RO CHECKSIActuation:

• CHECKforanyofthe

following-LIT:(YES)

• SI Actuated bypass permissive

light*ALB-11-2-2

• ALB-11-5-1

• ALB-11-5-3

• ALB-12-1-4

SROPerformTheFollowing:

• Initiate monitoringtheCritical

SafetyFunctionStatus

Trees.*EvaluateEAL

NetworkusingentrypointX.(RefertoPEP-

110)SROInformsCrewFoldoutAapplies.

EVALUATOR'S

NOTE: The following actionsshouldbetakenin

accordance

with FOLDOUT A criteria during the scenario: Appendix DPage18of27NUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario3Revision2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1HARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO3EVENT6-8-

SBLOCAICSIP

FAILURE/PHASE"A"SLAVERELAYFAILURE

• Verify Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves or Miniflow BlockValvesCLOSE

when RCS Pressure lowerstoless than1800PSIG.*If the crew is slow to start CSIP"B" then RCP trip criteria couldbemet.ROVerifyALLCSIPsANDRHRpumps-RUNNING.

Critical*Starts CSIP"B" after Load Block 9, butbyno later Task than the completion

ofGUIDE1, Attachment

6.*ReportsRHRPumpsrunning(YES)

ROCheckSIFlow:

SI flow-GREATERTHAN200GPM.(YES)

ROVerifiesCSIP

miniflowvalvesclosed(YES)

RO RCS pressure-GREATERTHAN230PSIG.(YES)

EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew may manually initiateMainSteam Isolation because Containment

Pressure is rising towards the automatic setpoint.RO/BOPCheckMainSteamIsolation:MainSteamIsolation-ACTUATED.(NO)

ROCheckCNMTPressure-HASREMAINEDLESSTHAN10PSIG.(YES)

RO/BOPCheckAFWStatus:AFWflow-ATLEAST210KPPHAVAILABLE.(YES)(MS-70)EVALUATOR'S

NOTE: MS-70 will not automatically

open due to the previous relay failure.EVALUATOR'S

NOTE:TheRO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment6.TheBOPis

permitted to properly align plant equipment in accordance

with Attachment

6 without SRO approval.The Scenario Appendix DPage19of27NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario3Revision2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO3EVENT6-8-

SBLOCA/CSIP

FAILURE/PHASE"A"SLAVERELAY

FAILURE Guide still identifies

tasks by board position because the time frame for completion

of Attachment6is not predictable.

Verify Alignment of ComponentsFromActuationofESFASBOPSignalsUsing

Attachment

6,"Safeguards

ActuationVerification",While

ContinuingwiththisProcedure.

Critical BOP Closes at least one of the valvesineachofthe

following Task combinations

before exiting Attachment

6:*1 SP-948/1SP-949,RCSLOOPSB&CHOTLEGCNMT

ISOL*1 ED-94/1ED-95,CNMTSUMPPUMPDISCHARGE

AND closes at least one set of the following:

• 1SP-16/1SP-939,RCS

LEAKDETSAMPLEISOL

• 1SP-916/1SP-918,RCS

LEAKDETSAMPLEISOL

BOP/ROControlRCS

Temperature:ControlfeedflowandsteamdumptostabilizeRCS

temperature

between 555°FAND559°FTable1.BOP/ROEnergizeACbuses1A1AND1B1.

RO CheckPRZPORVs-SHUT(YES)

RO CheckPZRPORVblockvalves-ATLEASTONEOPEN.(YES)ROPRZsprayvalves-SHUT.(YES)

RO/BOP IdentifyanyfaultedSG:

Checkforanyofthe

following:

• AnySG pressures-DECREASINGINAN UNCONTROLLED

MANNER (NO)*AnySG-COMPLETEL Y DEPRESSURIZED.(NO)Appendix DPage20of27NUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS2008NRC Scenario3Revision2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1HARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO3EVENT6-8-

SBLOCAICSIP

FAILURE/PHASE"A"SLAVERELAYFAILURE

CREW Check Secondary Radiation:Checkforallofthefollowing:

• CondenserVacuumPumpEffluentradiation-NORMAL.(YES)*SGBlowdownradiation-NORMAL.(YES)

• MainSteamlineradiation-NORMAL.(YES)

BOP/ROAnySGwithanuncontrolledlevelincrease(NO)

SROCheckRCSIntact:Checkforallofthefollowing:

• CNMTpressure-NORMAL.(NO)ProceedsTOStep44.(EntryPointC)

SRO CONTINUOUSACTION:ImplementFunctionRestoration

ProceduresAsRequired.(Nonerequired)

SRO CONTINUOUSACTION:FoldoutsAandBApply.

Evaluator Note: The crew may review foldout criteria.Foldout A actions should be complete.No Foldout B actions apply.The crew should use Adverse Values ()when Containment

Pressure exceeds3PSIG.ROMaintainRCPSealInjectionflowbetween8GPMAND13GPM.BOPCheckIntactSGLevels:

• Any level-GREATER THAN 25%[40%].(YES)

BOPControlfeedflowtomaintainallintactlevelsbetween

250/0 AND 50%[40%AND50%].Appendix DPage21of27NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario3Revision2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

HARRIS2008NRC SCENARIO3EVENT6-8-

SBLOCA/CSIP

FAILURE/PHASE"A"SLAVERELAYFAILUREBOPVerifyACbuses1A1AND1B1-

ENERGIZED.(YES)ROCheckPRZPORVs-SHUT.(YES)

ROCheckPZRPORVblockvalves-ATLEASTONEOPEN.(YES)CONTINUOUSACTION:IFaPRZ

PORVopensonhighSROpressure,THENverifyitshutsafterpressure

decreasestolessthanopeningsetpoint.ROCheckSI Termination

Criteria: RCS subcooling

-GREATERTHAN(YES)*10°F[40°F]-C

• 20°F[50°F]-MBOPCheck secondaryheatsinkby

observinganyofthe following:

• LevelinatleastoneintactSG-

GREATER THAN 25%[40%](YES)

• TotalfeedflowtointactSGs-

GREATERTHAN210KPPH(YES)RORCS Pressurestableor increasing (NO)SROWHENtheSI terminationcriteriaaremet,THENGOTOEPP-008,"SI TERMINATION",Ste'p1.RO Check CNMTSprayStatus:CheckanyCNMTSprayPump-RUNNING.(NO)ROCheckSourceRange

Detector Status: Intermediaterangeflux-LESSTHAN5x10-11 AMPS.*Verifysourcerange

detectors-ENERGIZED.*Transfer nuclearrecordertosourcerangescale.

Appendix DPage22of27NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario3Revision2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1HARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO3EVENT6-8-

SBLOCA/CSIP

FAILURE/PHASE"A"SLAVERELAY

FAILURE RO CheckRHRPumpstatus:

• RCSPressure

greater than 230PSIG(YES)Evaluator's

Note: The evaluation/trend

of RCS pressureinthe nextseveral

steps is dependent on how long it took the crewtoreach these steps (Decay Heat/Break

Flow/ECCS flow).*RCS pressure-STABLE OR INCREASING.(NO)RO Checkforbothofthe

following:

• AllSG Pressures-STABLE OR INCREASING.(YES)*RCS pressure-STABLE OR DECREASING.(YES)ROEstablishCCWFlowToTheRHRHeatExchangers:

VerifybothCCWPumpsrunning(YES)Openthefollowingvalves:(CCWReturnFromRHRHXTrains"A"and"B")

• 1CC-147*1CC-167 RO VerifyCCWflowtotheRHRHeat

Exchangers (YES)Performoneofthefollowingtoestablishtwo

independent

CCW systems:ShuttrainACCW

non-essential

supplyANDreturnvalves:

• 1CC-99*1CC-128ShuttrainBCCW

non-essential

supplyANDreturnvalves:

• 1CC-113*1CC-127 BOP/RO CheckEDGstatus:

Check AC emergencybuses1A-SAAND1B-SB-

ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER (YES)*Check Bus voltages (Normal)*Verify breakers105and125closed(YES)

BOP/RO*Shutdown any unloadedEDGsusingOP-155,"Diesel

Generator EmergencyPowerSystem",Section7.0.

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Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1HARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO3EVENT6-8-

SBLOCA/CSIP

FAILURE/PHASE"A"SLAVERELAYFAILURE

SRORHRsystem-

CAPABLEOFCOLDLEG RECIRCULATION.(YES).SROCheckauxiliaryANDradwasteprocessingbuildingradiation-

NORMAL (YES)SROGOTOStep58.ROCheckRCSStatus:Checkforbothofthefollowing:

• RCSpressure-LESSTHAN230PSIG(NO)

• AnyRHRHXheaderflow-GREATERTHAN1000GPM(NO)SROGOTOEPP-009,"POSTLOCACOOLDOWNAND

DEPRESSURIZATION",Step1.SROReviewsEPP-009

FOLDOUTCriteria(Nonewillrequireaction)ROResetSI SROManuallyrealign

safeguardsequipmentifalossofoff-sitepoweroccurs.ROResetPhaseAandPhaseBIsolationsignalsROEstablish

Instrument

Air andNitrogentoCNMTOpenthefollowingvalves:

• 11A-819*1SI-287MonitorACBuses:

BOP/ROCheckAC emergencybuses1A-SAAND1B-SB-

ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER:*Checkbusvoltages

• Checkbreakers105AND125-CLOSED(YES)

Appendix DPage24of27NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario3Revision2

Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO3EVENT6-8-SBLOCA/CSIP

FAILURE/PHASE"A"SLAVERELAY

FAILURE SRO*GOTOStep5e.

BOP/RO Check all non-emergencyACbuses-ENERGIZED (YES)PROCEDURECAUTION:PRZ

heaters shouldNOTbe energized until PRZ water level indicates greater than minimum recommended

by plant operations

staff to ensure heaters are covered.ROSecurePRZHeaters:

• Verifycontrolheaters-OFF

• PlacebackupheatersintheOFFposition.

• Verifycontrolheaters-OFF

.>Consult plant operationsstafffora recommended

minimumindicatedPRZwaterlevelthatwillensureheatersarecovered.(Referto USER1SGUIDE,IIUSERISGUIDE

II, Attachment

2, Evaluating

Pressurizer

Water Level Indication.)ROCheckRHRPumpStatus:

• RCS pressure-GREATERTHAN230PSIG(YES)

• RCS pressure-STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)*CheckRHRpumpsuction-

ALIGNEDTORWST(YES)

• StopRHRPumps

BOP CheckIntactSGLevels:

• Anylevel-GREATER THAN 25%[40%](YES)

• Controlfeedflowtomaintainallintactlevelsbetween

25%and 50%[40%and50%].PROCEDURENOTE:

After thelow steam pressure 81 signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occurifthe high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.RO CheckPRZPressure:

• Pressure-lessthan2000PSIG(YES)

• BlocklowsteampressureSI

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Appendix D Scenario OutlineFormES-D-1

HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT6-8-SBLOCAICSIP

FAILURE/PHASE"A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE SRO Initiate RCS CooldownToCold Shutdown: Maintain cooldownrateinRCScoldlegs-LESS

THAN 100°F/HR RO*Check RHR system-OPERATING IN SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE (NO)SROGOTOStep10f.

Checkallofthe following to determineifsteamcanbe

dumped to condenser:

BOP*Check any intact SG MSIV-OPEN (NO)Dump steam from intactSGsusing anyofthe following (listed in order of preference):

BOP*SG PORVsSROGoto Step 11 SRO.Monitor Shutdown Margin While Continuing

RCS Cooldown: a.Coordinatewithplant operations

staff AND chemistry to perform the following to obtain primary and secondary samples: 1)Operate the primary AND secondary sample panels.2)Open CCW to sampleHXvalves:*1CC-114*1CC-115 3)Open CCW to GFFD valves:*1CC-304*1CC-3054)AlignANDobtain

activityANDboron samplesofthe following:

• RCShotlegs

• AIISGs (RefertoOP-101,"SAMPLING

SYSTEM", Section 5.0.)b.Determine boron required for shutdown margin for anticipated

RCS temperatures.(Refer to OST-1036,"SHUTDOWN MARGIN CALCULATION

II.)c.CheckRCSloopboron-

GREATER THAN BORON REQUIRED FOR SHUTDOWN MARGIN RO Check RCS Subcooling

-GREATER THAN 10 of[40 OF]-C (YES)RO Check SI Status:*SI flow-GREATER THAN200GPM(YES)

Appendix DPage26of27

NUREG1021Revision9

HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix DScenarioOutlineFormES-D-1HARRIS2008NRC

SCENARIO3EVENT6-8-

SBLOCA/CSIP

FAILURE/PHASE"A"SLAVERELAYFAILURE

'.SROObserveCAUTIONpriortoStep14ANDGOTOStep14.PROCEDURECAUTION:

Voiding may occurintheRCS during RCS depressurization.

This will resultina rapidly increasingPRZlevel.PROCEDURENOTE:

RCS depressurization

shouldNOTbe stoppedifRCS subcooling

is lost.SUbcooling

should be restored as the cooldown continues.

RO DepressurizeRCSToRefillPRZ:

• PRZlevel-LESSTHAN

25%[40%](YES)

• Depressurizeusingnormalspray.

EVALUATOR NOTE: If the crew previously

reached RCP Trip Criteria due to slow response in startingaCSIP then the depressurization

will be doneviathePORV.

However,RCPTRIPCRITERIA

does not apply during EPP-009.*PRZ level-GREATER THAN 25%[40%](YES)

• WHENlevelis

greater than 25%[40%],THENstop

ReS depressurization.TheLead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when the depressurization

is secured.Appendix DPage27of27NUREG1021Revision9HARRIS2008NRCScenario3Revision2