Text

March 05000400-08-301 Exam Final Simulator Scenarios
	ML082200264
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	08/07/2008
From:	; - No Known Affiliation
To:	; NRC/RGN-II
References
	50-400/08-301, ES-D-1 50-400/08-301
	Download: ML082200264 (103)
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Final Submittal (Blue Paper)

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FINAL SIMULATOR SCENARIOS

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I Facility: HARRIS Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 2008 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: IC-20: 100% power, EOL

TDAFW Pump cleared and tagged to replace tappet nut on trip valve. 54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months remaining on TS 3.7.1 .2 Action a.

4 GPD tube leakage in SG "C" for past 30 days. Chemistry has CRC-804 in effect.

Radiation Monitor RM-01 MS-3593SB, MSL "C" Monitor, was declared inoperable last shift. TS 3.3.3.6 Action c in effect.

Turnover:

Maintain 100% power.

Critical Tasks:

Establish feedwater flow to at least one SG before RCS feed and bleed is required.

Isolate AFW to SG "B" prior to terminating HHSI.

Event Malt. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N/A N -SRO, Load Dispatcher directs rapid power reduction due to a fire at a BOP major switching station R-RO 2 CNS015 TS-SRO Loss of Control Power to Containment Spray Pump "A" during power reduction 3 CCW08A C-RO, Component Cooling Water Leak in the running pump suction SRO header TS-SRO 4 GEN01 C-BOP, Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure SRO 5 NIS08C I-RO, PRNIS Channel N-43 fails HI SRO 6 FT:497 I-BOP, Controlling FF Channel fails LO SRO 7 RCS03 M-ALL RCP "C" Locked rotor 8 CFW01A C-BOP MDAFW Pump "A" breaker trips ZR211158 MDAFW Pump "B" AUTO start fails ZDSQ2:13b 9 MSS11 M-ALL MSLB Outside ContainmenVNo MSIV can be closed from the Control Room 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 1 at 36 REVISION 2

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I 10 MSS058 C-BOP MSIV "B" stuck OPEN ZRPK616A Failure of AUTO AFW Block on SG "B" ZRPK6168

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 1

SUMMARY

The crew will assume the watch at 100% power, with directions to maintain current conditions. The Turbine-driven AFW Pump is cleared and tagged for repair of the tappet nut on the trip valve. TS 3.7.1.2.a is in effect. There is a 4 GPO tube leak in Steam Generator'(SG) "C" that has been stable for 30 days. Chemistry is monitoring in accordance with their procedures. The radiation monitor on Main Steam Line "C" failed last shift. TS3.3.3.6.c is in effect.

Shortly after the crew assumes the watch the Load Dispatcher will call with directions to reduce power to s 50% within the next hour due to a fire in a major switching station.

The SRO should direct the power reduction in accordance with AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER. After a 100 MW reduction or at evaluation team discretion, the Load Dispatcher will call and tell them to hold at the current level.

The Lead Evaluator will cue the loss of control power to Containment Spray Pump "A" when ready. The crew should respond in accordance with the alarm response procedure and the SRO should enter TS 3.6.2.1 ..

After the Containment Spray Pump TS declaration, the Lead Evaluator can cue the leak in the CCW Suction Header. The leak will be less than makeup capability. The crew should respond to the CCW Surge Tank level change and/or alarm and enter AOP-014, LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER. A field operator will report the leak location shortly after being dispatched. The location of the leak will require shifting the operating pumps and locally closing isolation valves. The SRO should enter TS 3.7.3.

After the CCW leak has been isolated and the TS declaration is complete, the Lead Evaluator can cue failure of the Automatic Voltage Regulator on the Main Generator.

The crew should respond in accordance with alarm response procedures, place the voltage regulator in MANUAL, and restore parameters to the normal band.

After Main Generator voltage is under control, the Lead Evaluator can cue failure of the Power Range NIS channel. The crew should respond to the uncontrolled rod motion in accordance with AOP-001, MALFUNCTION OF ROD CONTROL AND INDICATION SYSTEM. The crew should restore Tavg with Rod Control in MANUAL. It is not required that the channel be removed from service to continue the scenario and the TS declaration is not required to meet the minimum scenario requirements.

When the plant is in a stable condition, the Lead Evaluator can cue the SG "C" FF channel failure. The crew should respond in accordance with the alarm response procedure, controlling SG "C" level with the FRV in MANUAL and may switch controlling FF channels to restore control to AUTO. It is not required that the channel be removed 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO t Page 2 of 36 REVISION 2

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I from service to continue the scenario and the TS declaration is not required to meet the minimum scenario requirements.

When SG "C" level is under control or in AUTO, the Lead Evaluator can cue the RCP locked rotor. This will result in an automatic reactor trip on RCS flow. The crew will perform the PATH-1 immediate actions and transition to EPP-004, REACTOR TRIP. In EPP-004 the crew should manually start MDAFW Pump "B" or initiate MFW flow using the FRV Bypass Valves. In EPP-004 a large steam leak will develop outside of containment. All MSIV's will fail to close when the crew attempts to stop the cooldown.

After diagnosis the crew should initiate a MANUAL SI, return to PATH-1, transition to EPP-014, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, and then to EPP-015, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS. Shortly after a field operator is dispatched MSIV's "A" and "C" will close. The crew then will transition back to EPP-014, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, and isolate SG "B". At some point 81 Termination criteria will be met. The scenario can be terminated when normal charging is established.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 3 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 SETUP SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Clip a copy of GUIDE-1 Attachment 1 (SI Alignment) and Attachment 6 (Safeguards Actuation Verification) to each scenario guide for use by the evaluators.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

IC-20: 100°10 power, EOL

Tag TDAFW Pump on the MC8

Reactivity Plan

Turnover Sheet

Ensure rod step counters reset to the correct value PRE-LOAD:

imf cfw01C: TDAFW Pump under clearance

irf rms171: Steamline "C" Rad Monitor failed HIGH

imf cfw01A - MDAFWPump "A" breaker trip coincident with AUTO or MANUAL start

imf zr211158 FAIL_ASIS - MDAFW Pump "8" fails to AUTO start from SG Level or Load Sequencer

imf zdsq2:13b FAIL_ASIS - MDAFW Pump "8" fails to AUTO start from SG Level or Load Sequencer

imf zrpk616a FAIL_ASIS - AUTO AFW Isolation for SG "8" fails

imf zrpk616a FAIL_ASIS - AUTO AFW Isolation for SG "8" fails TRIGGERS:

Event 2: irf cns015 CP_OFF - Loss of control power to CT Spray Pump "8"

Event 3: imf ccw08A CCW suction header leak on A train (50 GPM)

Event 4: imf gen01 Main Generator AUTO Voltage Regulator failure - 130°/0 over 5 minutes

Event 5: imf nis08C - PRNIS N-43 fails HIGH (200°/0)

Event 6: imf FT:497 SG "C" Controlling Feed Flow Channel fails LO (0°/0) over 15 seconds

Event 7: imf rcs03 PUMP 3 - Locked rotor on C RCP

Event 9: Main Steam break outside CNMT (size to prevent RED or ORANGE on Integrity)

imf mss11 (Initial: 40.0 E04, ramp to 4.0 E06 over one minute)

imf mss05a - MSIV "A" fails to close

imf mss05a - MSIV "8" fails to close

imf mss05a - MSIV "C" fails to close

Allow closure of MSIV "A" and "C"

TRG= 10 dmf mss05a

TRG= 10 dmf mss05a

Field actions for GUIDE 1, Attachment 6 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 4 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE Booth Operator Instructions:

Call the MCR as the Load Dispatcher. There is a problem on the grid due to a transformer fire at a major switching station not directly associated with the HARRIS plant. Reduce load to 50% within one hour at a rate of 25 MW/minute. Report back when complete.

When load has been reduced by 100 MWe or on cue from the Lead Evaluator, call as the Load Dispatcher and tell them to HOLD at the current level until further notice.

Indications Available: Call from Load Dispatcher.

SRO Enters AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

This procedure contains no immediate actions.

Steps may be performed simultaneously or out of sequence at the discretion of the Superintendent

- Shift Operations.

EVALUATOR/BOOTH OPERATOR NOTE: The crew may make calls to notify plant management before or during the power reduction. Acknowledge anc;l request a report when more information becomes available.

REFER TO PEP-110, Emergency Classification And Protective SRO Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry point X.

SRO NOTIFY Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load. (N/A)

PROCEDURE NOTE: Boration of the RCS commences at Step 10.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The crew may use OP-107, Section 8.21 - RAPID ADDITION OF BORIC ACID TO RCS, to estimate the boration and perform the steps.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 5 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE DETERMINE required boric acid addition for desired power RO/SRO reduction, as follows:

CHECK BOTH of the following conditions exist:

Reactor power is 100%.

Target power level is provided in OPT-1525, Reactivity Plan Generation Weekly Interval MODE 1 at Full Power (50%, 30% or 5%).

OBTAIN values from Attachment 2, Gallons of Boric RO AcidlTarget Rod Height Required for Power Reduction.

Desired Boration gal

Target Rod height (D Bank) _

PROCEDURE NOTE:

If load reduction rates in excess of 45 MW/min are required, the Unit should be tripped.

If OSI-PI is available, the following path in PLANTSTATUS.PIW will assess VIDAR functionality:

Plant Process Computer: DEH (menu), DEH Trends, DEH_MEGAWATTS. If DEH_MEGAWATTS is flat-lining, VIDAR is NOT functioning properly.

If OSI-PI is NOT available, accessing the ANALOG INPUTS screen on the Graphics Display Computer (located in the Termination Cabinet Room near the ATWS Panel) will show several points, most of which should be updating if the VIDAR Unit is functioning properly.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: Failure of the DEH computer VIDAR Unit while in OPER AUTO has resulted in a plant trip.

BOP CHECK BOTH of the following:

DEH System in AUTO (YES)

VIDAR functioning properly (YES)

BOP PERFORM the following at the DEH panel:

DEPRESS the Loao Rate MW/MIN pushbutton.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 6 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE

ENTER desired rate (NOT to exceed 45 MW/MIN) in DEMAND display.

DEPRESS ENTER pushbutton.

DEPRESS REF pushbutton.

ENTER desired load (120 MW if shutting down) in DEMAND display.

DEPRESS ENTER pushbutton.

CHECK HOLD pushbutton LIT.

RO CHECK Rod Control in AUTO. (YES)

RO ENERGIZE ALL available PRZ Backup heaters.

SRO DISCUSS Attachment 3, Reactivity Brief, with the MCR staff.

PROCEDURE NOTE: With the Megawatt and Impulse Pressure Feedback Loops out of service, the MW indication in the REFERENCE display will not reflect actual MW output.

An accurate indication of Main Generator output can be obtained from ERFIS point JEE15688 (Gross MWe).

BOP COMMENCE turbine load reduction at the DEH panel:

CHECK OPER AUTO Mode AVAILABLE. (YES)

DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

VERI FY the value in the REFERENCE display LOWERS.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

To prevent over-boration, only the amount of boron required to reduce power to the desired power level should be added.

Adjustments should be made to boric acid flow based on actual core/rod responses.

COMMENCE RCS boration as required to maintain Control RO Rods above the Rod Insertion Limit (Curve F-X-1).

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 7 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form.ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE "

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The following boration steps are provided for evaluator use. They are not in AOP-038.

PROCEDURE NOTE: If performing a rapid shutdown of the plant per AOP-038, the following calculation does not have to be completed before boration begins, but should be completed before half of the estimated (or before 500 gallons whichever is less) boron addition has been dispensed.

DETERMINE the volume of boric acid necessary to achieve the RO required RCS boron concentration.

ENTER the amount determined in previous Step on Attachment RO 13.

VERIFY the backup Boric Acid Transfer Pump control switch is RO in STOP.

START the Boric Acid Transfer Pump aligned for Auto Make-up RO (switch in AUTO) by placing the control switch to START.

RO OPEN 1CS-278 SB, EMERGENCY BORIC ACID ADDITION.

RECORD the Boric Acid flowrate from FI-110 on Attachment RO 13.

CALCULATE the amount of time in minutes it will take to RO deliver the required amount of Boric Acid.

WHEN the calculated amount of time has elapsed, THEN RO SHUT 1CS-278 SB. '

RO STOP the Boric Acid Transfer Pump started previously.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 8 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE VERIFY Boric Acid pumps in the following alignment:

RO

one pump is in AUTO.

one pump is in STOP.

RO REQUEST Chemistry to sample the RCS boron concentration.

RO PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The following boration .steps are provided for

evaluator use. They are not in AOP-038. The RO will use either section 8.21 (above) or section 5.6 (below).

SET FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the desired quantity.

SET controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

VERI FY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the STOP position.

VERI FY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR position.

START the makeup system as follows:

TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

CREW VERIFY Generator load AND Reactor power LOWERING.

BOP MAINTAIN Generator reactive load (VARs) within guidelines.

PROCEDURE NOTE: Opening 3A and 38 Feedwater Heater vents helps minimize water hammer in 3A and 38 Feedwater Heaters.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 9 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE WHEN Turbine load is less than 95%, THEN DISPATCH an SRO operator to open 3A and 38 Feedwater Heater vents per OP-136, Shutdown of Feedwater Heaters 3A and 38.

RO CHECK Tavg within 5 of of Tref. (YES)

CREW NOTIFY Chemistry of the following:

Reactor power change will exceed 15% in a one hour period.

The following surveillances specified in the applicable sections require performing:

RST-204, Reactor Coolant System Chemistry and Radiochemistry Surveillance

RST-211, Gaseous Effluent Radiochemistry Surveillance CHECK that a planned load reduction will take the Unit to SRO Turbine shutdown. (NO)

GO TO Step 18.

NOTI FY Radwaste Control Room to be prepared for the CREW increased water processing requirements due to boration.

SRO CHECK Power level at the target value. (YES - when reached)

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 2 (Loss of Control Power to Containment Spray Pump"A") after the load change is terminated and the plant is stabilized.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 10 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 2 - LOSS OF CONTROL POWER FOR CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 'A' Booth Operator Instructions:

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, actuate ET-2 (irf CNS015 - Loss of Control Power to Containment Spray Pump "A")

Indications Available:

ALB-001-2-4, SPRAY PUMP A OIC TRIP OR CLOSE CKT TROUBLE RESPONDS to alarm ALB-001-2-4, SPRAY PUMP A OIC TRIP RO OR CLOSE CKT TROUBLE RO Performs APP-ALB-001-2-4.

REPORTS loss of breaker control power on computer alarm BOP CRT.

DIRECT an operator to check status of breaker 1A2-SA-4C, SRO Containment Spray Pump 1A-SA.

Booth Operator Note: If dispatched, report: Containment Spray Pump"A" breaker is open, all indicating lights are extinguished and there is a.smell of burnt electrical insulation in the general area. The Static Trip unit is blank.

IF control power is lost with the breaker in the shut position, SRO locally trip the breaker. (N/A)

SRO INITIATE an EIR for CAUSES 1,2, and 3.

SRO CONTACT Work Control to initiate corrective actions.

ENTERS TS 3.6.2.1 (restore to operable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be SRO in HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ).

Evaluator's Note: Cue Event 3 (CCW Leak) after the TS declaration.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 11 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 3 - CCW LEAK Booth Operator Instructions:

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, actuate ET 50 GPM CCW Leak (imfccw08a)

Indications Available: ALB-005-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM CCW SYSTEM Evaluator Note:

The crew may enter AOP-014, LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER, when the first alarm is confirmed.

RESPONDS to alarm ALB-005-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM CCW RO SYSTEM.

BOP REPORTS CCW Surge Tank level alarm on alarm screen.

RESPONDS to alarm ALB-005-6-1, CCW SURGE TANK RO HIGH-LOW LEVEL.

RO ENTERS APP-ALP-005-6-1.

Procedure Note: The CCW Surge Tank baffle plate separates Side A and Side B up to the 380/0 level.

RO CONFIRM alarm using:

LI-670A.1, CCW Surge Tank Level (Side A)

LI-676A.1, CCW Surge Tank Level (Side B)

RO VERIFY Automatic Functions:

CCW flow to the GFFD and Primary Sample Panel will isolate on a low CCW Surge Tank level (40%). (Alarm ALB-026-2-1 actuated.)

(next page) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 12 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 3 - CCW LEAK

CCW Holdup Tank Transfer Pump and the CCW Drain Tank Transfer Pump will trip on a higtJ CCW Surge Tank level (750/0). (N/A)

RO PERFORM Corrective Actions:

IF surge tank level is high AND rising. (N/A)

IF radiation activity level is increasing, THEN GO TO AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. (NO)

IF the alarm is due to plant heatup, THEN DRAIN the surge tank to normal level. (NO)

Procedure Note:

This procedure contains no immediate actions.

Loss of CCW may require implementation of the SHNPP Emergency Plan.

REFER to PEP-110, Emergency Classification and Protective SRO Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry point x.

EVALUATE plant conditions AND GO TO the appropriate SRO section:

CONTACTS AO to check RAB for CCW leaks. (action is not SRO procedurally directed but should happen during the course of implementing this AOP.)

Booth Operator Note: If a report is requested: RadWaste reports increased RAB floor drain in-leakage.

Booth Operator Note: Shortly after contacted, report a leak in the suction header between 1CC-27 and*CCW Pump "A". After you are directed to close 1CC-27 and 1CC-36, wait two minutes then delete IMF CCW08A and report the valves closed.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 13 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 "HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 3 - CCW LEAK Evaluator's Note:

eew Pump start/stop actions are provided in the Scenario Guide, near the bottom of the next page.

The path through the procedure may be different for each crew since it depends on when the leak location is known and how certain questions are answered. However, each crew should initiate makeup, swap running pumps, isolate the leak, and address the TS.

Procedure Note: The GFFD and ReS sample panel will isolate on low eew Surge Tank level of less than or equal to 400/0.

MAINTAIN CCW Surge Tank level between 45% and 75%

RO using 1DW-15, CCW Make Up.

Procedure Note: An affected eew Pump is one to which any of the following apply:

Less than 4% level indicated on the eew Surge Tank.

Exhibits abnormal flow.

Aligned to an affected Train pump through the non-essential header.

RO CHECK BOTH of the following conditions exist:

ALL operable CCW Surge Tank level indicators are greater than 40/0 (YES)

CCW Pump flow indication is NORMAL (YES)

PLACE and HOLD the control switch for ALL affected CCW RO Pumps to STOP until CCW header pressure is less than 52 "psig. (N/A)

SRO CHECK EITHER RHR Train in Shutdown Cooling Mode. (NO)

RO/SRO CHECK RCS temperature greater than 200°F. (YES)

CHECK the Non-Essential header affected or previously RO/SRO isolated (insufficient flow, known to be the leak source, or other indication). (YES/NO) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 14 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 3 - CCW LEAK DIRECTS RO to start the standby pump and stop CCW Pump SRO "A" per OP-145.

Booth Operator Note: If requested to remove control power from "A" CCW' Pump: Remote Function CCW075 CP_OFF RO VERIFIES Initial Conditions.

Procedure Note: Starting the second pump could cause L\P fluctuations across REM-01 CC-3501 ASA (BSB) which may shut solenoid valves 1CC-23 and 1CC-40.

Starting the second pump may cause flow oscillations which could shut 1CC-252. Re-opening of 1CC-252 should not be attempted until the second pump is secured.

Procedure Caution: With one CCW pump running and the standby pump capable of an automatic start, 'ensure a minimum flow rate of 7850 gpm exists as indicated on FI-652.1 (FI-653.1). If both CCW pumps are running OR the CCW trains are separated, a minimum of 3850 gpm per pump is required. This lower flowrate should only be allowed for short durations to accomplish pump swapping or system realignment.

RO At the MCB, START CCW Pump Train B-SB.

VERIFY flow is greater than or equal to 3850 gpm on FI-653.1 RO and FI-652.1.

RO PERFORM one of the following:

SECURE a second CCW Pump using Section 7.1.

RO VERIFIES Initial Conditions.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 15 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 3 - CCW LEAK RO VERIFY OPEN, the following valves:

1CC-99, CCW HEAT EXCHANGER A TO NONESSENTIAL SUP (YES)

1CC-113, CCW HEAT EXCHANGER B TO NONESSENTIAL SUP (YES)

1CC-127, CCW NONESSENTIAL RETURN TO HEADER B (YES)

1CC-128, CCW NONESSENTIAL RETURN TO HEADER A (YES)

VERIFY SHUT, 1CC-167 and 1CC-147, CCW FROM RHR RO HEAT EXCHANGER B-SB AND A-SA (YES)

Procedure Note: If pressure falls below 52 psig, the CCW Pump will restart.

RO At the MCB, STOP CCW Pump Train A-SA.

RO VERIFY the following for Train A:

FLOW stops using FI-653.1 (FI-652.1)

PRESSURE remains greater than 75 psig suing PI-650 (PI-649).

CHECK Train B flow rate between 10,000 and 11,000 gpm on RO MCB indicator FI-663.1.

ENTERS TS 3.7.3 (restore at least two flowpaths to operable SRO within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ).

Evaluator's Note: When the leak is isolated, the CCW Pumps have been swapped, and the TS declaration is complete, cue Event 4 (Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure)..

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 16 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 4 - MAIN GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR FAILURE Booth Operator Instructions: Actuate ET-4 for the Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications Available: The BOP may recognize a problem before any alarms.

ALB-22-4-3, GENERATOR VOLTAGEIFREQ RATIO/HIGH OR UNDER FREQ

ALB-22-9-4 COMPUTER ALARM GEN/EXCITER SYSTEMS BOP RESPONDS to alarms ALB-022-4-3 and 9-4.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: Alarm ALB-022-9-4 is a computer alarm. ALB-022-4-3 will initiate corrective actions.

The crew may refer to AOP-006 but no actions will result.

BOP CONFIRM alarm using:

AT MCB:

EI-525, Generator Frequency.

EI-520, Generator Phase Volts. (YES-Reports voltage regulation problem)

EI-540, Gen Exciter Field Volts.

EI-541, Gen Exciter Field Current.

AT Gen Protective Relay Panel 1B, Gen Over Excitation Prot Backup Protection relay status flag: TRIPPED

AT Gen Protective Relay Panel 1B, Gen Over Excitation Prot Backup Protection relay status flag. *TRIPPED BOP VERIFY Automatic Functions:

VOLTAGE Regulator Limiter decreases Generator excitation.

IF Voltage Limiter is unable to control excitation increase, a Generator Lockout occurs.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 17 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 4 - MAIN GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR FAILURE BOP PERFORM Corrective Actions:

CHECK for the following at MCB:

EI-525, Generator Frequency, stable at 60 Hz. (YES)

EI-520, Generator Phase Volts, stable at 22 KV. (NO)

EI-540, Gen Exciter Field Volts stable. (YES)

EI-541, Gen Exciter Field Current stable. (YES)

Procedure Note: An automatic transfer to manual Generator voltage control is indicated by GENERATOR.VOLTAGE REGULATOR switch ON and the GREEN light LIT.

Both the AMBER light and RED light will be OFF.

BOP

OPERATE GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTER switch to restore Generator voltage to 22 KV and reduce MVARS.

IF GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTER switch is ineffective THEN PERFORM the following to transfer and maintain voltage manually:

OPERATE the GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTER to attempt to zero the REGULATOR OUTPUT BAL VOLT meter.

PLACE GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR switch in the TEST position and observe AMBER light LIT and RED light OFF.

OPERATE GENERATOR BASE ADJUSTER switch to restore Generator voltage to 22 KV.

SRO

REFERENCE AOP-028, Grid Instability. (N/A - the problem is not on the grid)

BOP

VERIFY Main Generator is operating per the Generator Capability Curve.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: When Main Gen Voltage is under control, cue Event 5 (PRNIS Channel N-43 failure) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 18 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 5 - PRNIS CHANNEL FAILURE Booth Operator Instructions: On cue from the Lead Evaluator, Actuate ET-5, PRNIS Channel 43 fails HIGH (NIS08C)

Indications Available: Uncontrolled rod motion and bistable trips.

RO RESPONDS to alarms/uncontrolled rod motion.

RO PERFORMS immediate actions.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: A TS declaration (3.3.1 Action 2) is NOT required for this event and the channel does not have to be removed from service to continue the scenario. The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 6 (SG "C" FF Channel failure) after Tavg is being controlled or when AOP-001 is exited.

BOOTH OPERATOR: If the OWP is implemented: APP-RPS/OWP RP25 TST.

Pause after the first 4 steps.

Immediate CHECK that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped.

Action RO (YES)

Immediate Action RO POSITION Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN.

Immediate Action -RO CHECK Control Bank motion STOPPED. (YES)

SRO PROCEEDS to Section 3.2.

CHECK that instrument channel failure has NOT OCCURRED RO by observing the following:

RCS Tavg (YES)

RCS Tref (YES)

POWER Range NI channels (NO)

TURBINE first stage pressure (YES) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 19 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 5 - PRNIS CHANNEL FAILURE SRO PERFORM the following:

IF a power supply is lost, THEN GO TO AOP-024, Loss of Uninterruptible Power Supply. (N/A)

IF an individual instrument failed, THEN MAINTAIN manual rod control until corrective action is complete.

(YES)

IF a Power Range NI Channel failed, THEN BYPASS the failed channel using OWP-RP. (YES)

EVALUATOR NOTE: A High Power Rod Stop is in effect until defeated at the drawer.

Manually OPERATE affected control bank to restore the RO following:

Equilibrium power and temperature conditions

Rods above the insertion limits of Tech Spec 3.1.3.6 and PLP-106, Technical Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report.

RO VERIFY proper operation of the following: (YES)

CVCS demineralizers

BTRS

Reactor Makeup Control System CHECK that this section was entered due to control banks SRO MOVING OUT. (NO)

GO TO Step 6.

RO CHECK that NEITHER of the following OCCURRED:

Unexplained RCS boration

Unplanned RCS dilution CHECK that an automatic Rod Control malfunction SRO OCCURRED. (NO)

GO TO Step 9.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 20 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 5 - PRNIS CHANNEL FAILURE EVALUATOR NOTE: Though not directed by AOP-001, the SRO should direct implementation of OWP-RP-25 prior to exiting the procedure.

SRO EXIT this procedure.

RO Verify ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch in MANUAL (YES)

BOP Verify FW Reg Byp Valve Controllers in MANUAL (YES)

At Detector Current Comparator Drawer:

RO

UPPER Section Switch to PRN43

LOWER Section Switch to PRN43 At Miscellaneous Control and Indication Panel:

ROD STOP BYPASS Switch to BYPASS PR N43 RO

POWER MISMATCH BYPASS Switch to BYPASS PR N43 At Comparator and Rate Drawer:

RO

COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT Switch to N43 EVALUATOR NOTE: Lead Evaluator can cue next event once plant is stable.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 21 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT 6 - SG 'C' FF CHANNEL FAILS LOW Booth Operator Instructions:

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, actuate ET-6 SG "C" FF Channel fails LO (FT:497)

Note that this Event is a RAPID transient. Wait until the BOP is near to initiate. If a reactor trip occurs then initiate ET-7 and continue on with scenario.

Indications Available: ALB-014-6-1B, SG C STM > FW FLOW MISMATCH BOP RESPONDS to alarm ALB-014-6-1 B.

BOP CONFIRM alarm using:

FI-496, FI-497, SG C Feed Flow

FI-494, FI-495, SG C Steam Flow

Reports FI-497 failed LOW BOP PERFORM Corrective Actions:

IF FCV-498, Feedwater Reg Valve, is NOT controlling SG level, THEN MANUALLY CONTROL FK-498 AND REDUCE feed flow.

DISPATCH an operator to check for indications of feedwater leaks.

Evaluator Note: The SRO may enter AOP-010 based on the flow transient. If so, the outcome will be the same - the associated FRV in MANUAL.

SRO REFERS to OWP-RP-09.

Evaluator's Note:

The crew may swap controlling channels to regain automatic control before the OWP is implemented.

A TS declaration (3.3.1 Action 6) is NOT required for this event and the channel does not have to be removed from service to continue the scenario.

The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 7 when SG level' is being controlled or is in AUTO.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 22 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT Booth Operator Instructions:

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, actuate ET-7 RCP C Locked Rotor (RCS03 PUMP_3)

Indications Available: ALB-011-2-2, REACTOR TRIP LOW FLOW/RCP P8 PERMISSIVE RO RESPONDS to Reactor Trip First Out alarm SRO ENTERS and directs actions of PATH-1.

RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:

AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

CHECK for any of the following:

Trip breakers RTA and BYA OPEN (YES)

Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)

ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES)

NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

BOP VERI FY Turbine Trip:

CHECK for any of the following:

ALL turbine throttle valves - SHUT (YES)

ALL turbine governor valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses

1A-SA and 1B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDG's (YES, off-site power)

RO CHECK SI Actuation:

CHECK for any of the .following - LIT: (NO)

SI Actuated bypass permissive light 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 23 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

ALB-11-2-2

ALB-11-5-1

ALB-11-5-3

ALB-12-1-4 RO SI actuation - REQUIRED (NO)

BOOTH OPERATOR: Actuate MS Break when EPP-004 is entered: (imf mss11 -Initial: 40.0 E04, ramp to 4.0 E06 over one minute; imf mss05a - MSIV "A" fails to close; imf mss05a - M&IV "B" fails to close; imf mss05a - MSIV "C" fails to close).

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The crew will perform EPP-004 until the steam break symptoms are evident. Several EPP-004 steps are included in the scenario guide.

PROCEDURE NOTE: Foldout applies.

Informs Shift Superintendent to evaluate EAL Network Using SRO Entry Point X.

SRO Check RCS Temperature:

Check SG blowdown isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555 OF AND 559 BOP OF using Table 1.

Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize temperature between 555 OF AND 559 OF Evaluator Note: The crew may attempt to close the MSIV's to stabilize temperature.

RO Check RCP Status:

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 24 of 36 REVISION 2

AppendixD Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES)

BOP Check Feed System Status:

RCS Temperature - LESS THAN 564 of

Verify feed reg valves - SHUT

Check feed flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 210 KPPH (NO)

Starts MDAFW Pump "B" or initiates FF using FRV Bypass BOP Valves.

CREW Contacts AO to investigate MDAFW Pump "A" failure.

BOOTH OPERATOR: If dispatched, report MDAFW Pump "A" breaker tripped - cause unknown.

RO Check Control Rod Status:

Check DRPI- AVAILABLE (YES)

Verify all control rods - FULLY INSERTED (YES)

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: At some point the RO will report that PRZ level cannot be maintained and/or the BOP may report indications of a steam break. The SRO should then direct a MANUAL SI and return to PATH-1, Entry Point "A".

SRO Directs a MANUAL SI in accordance with Foldout criteria.

RO Initiates a MANUAL SI.

SRO FOLDOUT A applies.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: Crew should brief on the general foldout criteria.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 25 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The following FOLDOUT A criteria apply in this scenario:

AL TERNATE MINIFLOW OPEN/SHUT CRITERIA IF RCS pressure decreases to less than 1800 PSIG, THEN verify alternate miniflow isolation OR miniflow block valves - SHUT RCP TRIP CRITERIA SI Flow> 200 GPM and RCS Pressure < 1400 PSIG SRO Perform The Following:

Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

Evaluate EAL Network using entry point x.

RO VERIFY ALL CSIPs AND RHR pumps - RUNNING. (YES)

RO CHECK SI Flow:

SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)

RO RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG. (YES)

BOOTH OPERATOR: The SRO should dispatch an operator to locally close the MSIV's. Do NOT close the MSIV's until the cooldown rate is evaluated and AFW is throttled in EPP-15.

BOP CHECK Main Steam Isolation:

MAIN steam isolation - ACTUATED. (NO)

CHECK main steam isolation actuation criteria by observing BOP/RO any of the following:

STEAM line pressure - LESS THAN 601 PSIG. (YES)

CNMT pressure - GREATER THAN 3.0 PSIG. (NO) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 26 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAIN.MENT BOP MAIN Steam isolation - REQUIRED. (YES)

BOP ACTUATE MSLI BOP VERIFY all MSIVs and bypass valves - SHUT. (NO)

CHECK CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 RO PSIG. (YES)

BOP CHECK AFW Status:

AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE. (NO)

Critical Task

Starts AFW Pump "B" before ReS Feed and Bleed BOP criteria is met and controls AFW flow in accordance with SG Level criteria EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 6. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment in accordance with Attachment 6 without SRO approval. The Scenario Guide still identifies tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 6 is not predictable.

SRO ASSIGN operator to perform the following:

VERIFY alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS Signals using Attachment 6, "Safeguards Actuation Verification", while continuing with implementation of EOPs.

RO/BOP CONTROL RCS Temperature:

Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: No Table 1 actions applicable due to uncontrolled cooldown and inoperable MSIV's.

RO/BOP ENERGIZE AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 27 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT RO CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT. (YES)

RO CHECK block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES)

RO PRZ spray valves - SHUT. (YES)

RO/BOP IDENTIFY any faulted SG:

Check for any of the following:

Any SG pressures - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES)

AnY,SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO)

AT least one SG must be maintained available for RCS SRO cooldown.

ANY faulted SG or secondary break should remain isolated SRO during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.

SRO IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: An Orange or Red path may develop on RCS Integrity and/or Heat Sink. RCS Integrity actions are similar to those in epp-015. FRP-H.1 will be exited because procedurally-directed operator actions may have reduced AFW flow.

RO/BOP CHECK MSIVs and Bypass Valves:

VERIFY all MSIVs - SHUT (NO)

SRO DISPATCHES AO to close MSIV's.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 28 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT RO/BOP VERIFY all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT (YES)

RO/BOP CHECK anY,'SG NOT Faulted:

ANY SG pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. (NO)

SRO Foldout applies.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The EPP-015 Foldout criteria that may apply is:

MINIMUM FEED FLOW IF level in any SG is less than 25% [400/0], THEN maintain a minimum of 12.5 KPPH feed flow to that SG.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: After the MSIV's are closed, SG pressures will rise and meet EPP-14 transition criteria.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Close MSIV's "A" and "C" after the cooldown rate is evaluated and AFW is throttled in EPP-015.

BOP CHECK MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:

VERIFY all MSIVs - SHUT (NO)

VERIFY all MSIV Bypass Valves - SHUT (YES)

IF the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, SRO THEN maintain steam supply to the TDAFW pump from one SG. (N/A - under clearance)

IF local actions are required, attempts to isolate all boundaries SRO of one SG should be completed prior to starting those for another SG.

BOP CHECK Secondary Pressure Boundary for ALL SGs:

VERIFY SG PORVs - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY Main FW isolation valves - SHUT (YES) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 29 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'c' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT BOP

SHUT steam supply valves to TDAFW pump:

SG B: 1MS-70 (Tagged)

SG C: 1MS-72 (Tagged)

BOP

VERI FY main steam drain isolations before MSIVs -

SHUT: (YES)

SG A: 1MS-231

SG B: 1MS-266

SG C: 1MS-301

VERIFY SG Blowdown isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY Main Steam Analyzer isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

AS SG pressure and steam flow decrease, RCS hot leg temperatures will eventually stabilize and may increase.

SRO Adjusting feed flow and steam dump will control RCS hot leg temperatures.

RO CONTROL RCS Temperature:

CHECK RCS cooldown rate - LESS THAN 100°F/HR (NO)

BOP Reduce feed flow to 12.5 KPPH to each SG.

Check RCS hot leg temperatures - STABLE OR RO DECREASING (YES/NO)

Evaluator Note: Several more EPP-015 steps are included in the scenario guide but EPP-014 transition criteria should be met shortly after MSIV "A" and MSIV "C" are closed.

Maintain RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM And 13 RO GPM.

RO Check RCP Trip Criteria:

Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES - A and B) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 30 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT RO Check all of the following:

SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

Check RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1400 PSIG (NO)

RO Check PRZ PORV AND Block Valves:

Verify power to PORV block valves - AVAILABLE (YES)

PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

GO TO Step 6f.

Check block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

IF a PRZ PORV opens on high pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint.

PROCEDURE NOTE: A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radlation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.

BOP/SRO Check Secondary Radiation:

Check for all of the following:

Condenser vacuum pump effluent radiation - NORMAL (YES)

SG blowdown radiation - NORMAL (YES)

Main steamline radiation - NORMAL (YES)

SG activity sample - NORMAL (IF AVAILABLE) (N/A)

RO Check RHR Pump Status:

Check any RHR pumps - RUNNING (YES)

RCS Pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)

RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

Check RHR pump suction - ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)

Reset SI.

Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Offsite Power. (Refer to PATH-1 GUIDE, Attachment 2.)

Stop RHR pumps. (YES) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 31 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT SRO IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.

BOP CHECK MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:

VERIFY all MSIVs - SHUT. (NO)

VERIFY all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT. (YES)

BOP CHECK Any SG NOT Faulted:

ANY SG pressure STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)

BOP IDENTIFY Any Faulted SG:

CHECK for any of the following:

ANY SG pressure - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. (YES-"B")

. -. ANY SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED.

(YES - "B")

BOP ISOLATE Faulted SG(s):

VERIFY faulted SG(s) PORV - SHUT. (YES)

VERIFY Main FW isolation valves - SHUT. (YES)

VERIFY MDAFW AND TDAFW pump isolation valves to faulted SG(s) - SHUT. (NO, unless closed earlier)

Critical

Closes 1AF-93, MDAFW Pump "B" to SG "B" before SI Task is terminated.

Shut faulted SG(s) to steam supply valve to TDAFW pump-BOP SHUT.

SG B: .1MS-70

VERIFY main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs-SHUT (YES) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 32 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

VERIFY SG Blowdown isolation valves - SHUT. (YES)

VERIFY main steam analyzer isolation valves - SHUT.

(YES)

BOP CHECK CST Level- GREATER THAN 10%. (YES)

PROCEDURE NOTE: A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.

SRO CHECK Secondary Radiation:

CHECK for all of the following:

SG Blowdown radiation - NORMAL. (YES)

MAIN steamline radiation - NORMAL. (YES)

RO CHECK SG Levels:

ANY level-INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. (NO)

RO CHECK if SI has been terminated:

SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)

RO CHECK SI Termination Criteria:

CHECK Subcooling - GREATER THAN

10°F [40°F] - C (YES)

20°F [50°F] - M

CHECK secondary heat sink by observing any of the following:

LEVEL in at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 25% [40%]. (YES/NO)

TOTAL feed flow to SGs - *GREATER THAN 210 KPPH. (YES)

RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES) 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 33 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO* 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

PRZ level - GREATER THAN 10% [30%] . (YES)

RO RESET SI.

CONTINUOUS ACTION: MANUALLY realign Safeguards SRO Equipment following a loss of offsite power.

RO Reset Phase A and Phase B Isolation Signals.

RO Restore Instrument Air and Nitrogen to Containment:

Open the following valves:

11A-819

1SI-287 RO STOP all but ONE CSIP.

RO CHECK RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)

RO ISOLATE High Head SI Flow:

CHECK CSIP suction - ALIGNED TO RWST. (YES)

OPEN normal miniflow isolation valves:

1CS-182

1CS-196

1CS-210

1CS-214

SHUT BIT outlet valves:

1SI-3

1SI~4

VERIFY cold leg AND hot leg injection valves - SHUT

1SI-52

1SI-86

1SI-107 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 34 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 19 AND GO TO Step 19.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: High head 81 flow should be isolated before continuing.

ESTABLISH Charging Lineup:

SHUT charging flow control valve:

FK-122.1

OPEN charging line isolation valves:

1CS-235

1CS-238 Lead Evaluator: Terminate the scenario when normal charging has been established.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 35 of 36 REVISION 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 EVENT RCP 'C' LOCKED ROTOR/STEAM BREAK, OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT REVISION

SUMMARY

1. Modified scenario to have MSL "C" Rad monitor inop vice "B"

2. Revised summary page to reflect MSL "c" inop

3. Modified Scenario Setup page to reflect "C" inop

4. Changed RO designation to BOP for "Commence turbine load reduction ... "

5. Added steps from OP-107, sect. 8.21 for Rapid Boration if the crew elects to do that.

6. Added gray boxes to help designate what procedure specific actions in the guide are coming from.

7. Added Alarm name for ALB-005-8-5 in body of scenario guide not just in intro.

8. Added clarification that directing AOs in the field is not a procedurally directed action.

9. Clarified what procedure is directing actions for start of CCW pump

10. Added expected status of Relay flags as TRIPPED

11. Included steps from OWP-RP-25 for failure of PRNI-43

12. Added note to remind all that the Feed flow transient will be rapid at this power and should not be initiated until BOP is near. Also added clarification on how to respond if the plant does trip on the transient

13. Modified position designators to RO/BOP for the time when Attachments are expected to be in progress. Evaluators can then just circle which position actually performed the action.

2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 1 Page 36 of 36 REVISION 2

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I Facility: HARRIS Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 2008 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: IC-5: 51% Power, BOL

TDAFW Pump cleared and tagged to replace tappet nut on trip valve. 54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months remaining on TS 3.7.1.2 Action a

4 GPD tube leakage in SG "C" for past 30 days. Chemistry has CRC-804 in effect.

Radiation Monitor RM-01MS-3592SB, MSL "B" Monitor, was declared inoperable last shift. TS 3.3.3.6 Action c in effect.

Turnover:

The previous shift started MFW Pump "A" following replacement of a bearing and has completed GP-005, Step 134. Resume raising power at 4 DEH units/minute Critical Tasks:

. Energize Bus 1B-SB before RCS Feed and Bleed criteria is met

Terminate the release via SG "C" PORV before exiting EPP-014

Minimize primary to secondary leakage to prevent SG "C" from exceeding 95%

Event Malt. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N/A N - BOP, Raise power SRO R-RO 2 LT:115 I-RO, VCT Level Channel 115 fails LOW SRO 3 XD11121 C-BOP, MCC 1A34 Feeder Breaker trips (both fans on AH-3)

SRO TS-SRO 4 SWS07A C-RO, Normal Service Water Pump "A" sheared shaft SRO 5 PT:495 I-BOP, SG "C" Controlling Steam Pressure Channel fails HI SRO TS-SRO 6 SGN05C C-RO, SG "C" progressive SG Tube Leak CVC17 SRO FCV-122, Charging Flow Control Valve, fails to respond in AUTO TS-SRO 7 EPS01 M-ALL Loss of Off-Site Power DSG01A EDG "A" fails to start Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 1 at 39

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I 8 DSG06B C-BOP, EDG "B" breaker fails to close SRO 9 SGN05C M-ALL SG "C" SGTR after EPP-1 exit 10 PT:308C C-BOP SG "C" PORV fails to 1000/0 in AUTO

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 2

SUMMARY

The crew assumes the watch having pre-briefed on the procedure to raise power. The Turbine-driven AFW Pump is cleared and tagged for repair of the tappet nut on the trip valve. TS 3.7.1.2.a is in effect. There is a 4 GPD tube leak in Steam Generator (SG)

"C" that has been stable for 30 days. Chemistry is monitoring in accordance with their procedures. The radiation monitor on Main Steam Line "B" failed last shift. TS 3.3.3.6.c is in effect.

When the evaluation team is satisfied that the power change is under control, the Lead Evaluator can cue the VCT level channel failure. Auto makeup will initiate when the channel fails. The crew should respond to alarms/indications in accordance with alarm response procedure and enter AOP-003, .MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR ~AKEUP.

After the VCT is properly aligned, the Lead Evaluator can cue the trip of the feeder breaker for both fans on Containment Fan Cooler AH-3. The crew should initially respond in accordance with alarm response procedure and then shift to the Train "B" units in accordance with the system operating procedure but may start a standby unit for the near-term. The SRO should enter TS 3.6.2.3.a.

When Containment Fan Cooler actions are complete, the Lead Evaluator can cue the shaft shear on Normal Service Water (NSW) Pump 1A. System pressure will degrade as the standby pump will not start because the interlock is off of the running pump breaker. The crew should respond in accordance with NSW header pressure alarms on ALB-002 and enter AOP-022, LOSS OF SERVICE WATER. This will direct start of the standby pump. There are no TS's associated with the NSW Pumps.

When NSW is properly aligned, the Lead Evaluator can cue the failure of the controlling Steam Pressure Channel on SG "C". The BOP should respond to multiple SG "C" alarms on ALB-14 and take manual control of the affected FRV in accordance with the alarm response procedures and management guidance for controlling malfunctioning automatic equipment. The SRO should enter the TS for Reactor Trip Instrumentation (3.3.1), ESF Jnstrurnentatlon (3.3.2), and Accident Monitoring Instrumentation (3.3.3.6).

The crew may elect to shift to another channel to restore the FRV to AUTO. The channel does not have to be removed from service to continue the scenario.

When SG level is under control, the Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of increasing SG tube leakage in SG "C". The RO should recognize an RCS leak trend or may respond to a Pressurizer level deviation alarm since FCV-122, Charging Flow Control Valve, will not be responding properly in automatic. The SRO should enter AOP-016, EXCESSIVE Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 2 of 39

I Appendix D . Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE. The crew should maintain pressurizer level by manually controlling charging flow and minimizing or securing letdown. The crew should estimate the leakage to determine the requisite Steam Generator Tube Leakage (SGTL) Action Level and the SRO should enter TS 3.4.6.2 for RCS leakage.

When the SGTL Action Level has been determined and the TS entry is complete, the Lead evaluator can cue the loss of off-site power and resultant automatic reactor trip.

EDG "A" fails to start and EDG "B" starts but the breaker does not close automatically.

The crew will enter PATH-1 and transition to EPP-001, LOSS OF AC POWER TO 1A-SA AND 1B-SB BUSES. EPP-001 will provide direction to energize 1B-SB after which the crew will transition back to PATH-1. After the transition back to PATH-1, the SGTL will become a SGTR on SG "C". The crew may initiate a MANUAL SI or it will occur automatically. SG "C" PORV will fail to close at the automatic setpoint. If operators fail to close it in PATH-1 then the crew will transition to EPP-014, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, and isolate SG "C". The crew will transition to PATH-2, isolate SG "C", then cooldown and equalize RCS and SG "C" pressure. The scenario can be terminated when the BIT flowpath is isolated.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 3 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 SETUP SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Clip a copy of GUIDE-1 Attachment 1 (SI Alignment) and Attachment 6 (Safeguards Actuation Verification) to each scenario guide for use by the evaluators.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

IC-5: 51% power, BOL - then start MFW Pump "B" and both HD Pumps and allow approximately 4 minutes for SG levels to stabilize before bringing in the crew

Tag TDAFW Pump on the MCB

Tag and DE-ENERGIZE MS-70 and MS-72

GP-005 completed through Step 133.d

Reactivity Plan for intended evolution (Raise power at 4 DEH Units/minute)

Set DEH Computer for a 4 DEH/min load rate in progress

Turnover Sheet

Ensure rod step counters reset to the correct value PRE-LOAD:

imf cfw01 C: TDAFW Pump under clearance

irf rms170: Steamline "B" Rad Monitor failed HI

imf dsg01: EDG "A" fails to start

imf dsg06b: EDG "B" Breaker fails to close automatically but can be closed from the MCB with the proper interlock satisfied TRIGGERS:

Event 2: imf LT: 115 (VCT level fails low - 0%)

Event 3: xd1i121 (MCC 1A34 Feeder Breaker trips - both fans on AH-3)

Event 4: imf sws07a (NSW Pump "A" shaft shear)

Event 5: imf PT:495 (SG "C" Channel 3 Steam Pressure fails HIGH - 1300)

Event 6: sgn05c/cvc17 (SGTL-60 GPM/FCV-122 fails to track)

Prior to actuating this trigger the Booth Operator must read FCV-122 position off of the summary page and type that value into the FINAL VALUE box.

Event 7/10: imt eps01 (LOOP)/imf PT:308c (SG PORV Setpoint drifts up to 100%)

Event 9: TRG= 9 mmf sgn05c (SGTR-420 GPM)

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 4 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 SETUP

Field actions for GUIDE 1, Attachment 6

irf mss027 to local ops (SG "A" PORV local operation)

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 5 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE Indications Available: N/A EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 2 (VCT Level Channel failure) when the evaluators have completed their evaluation of the power change.

BOP Informs RO/SRO that turbine load increase is being initiated.

BOP Depresses GO pushbutton.

R,O At 55 to 60% Reactor power, CHECK the following:

ALB-13/5-3, POWER RANGE UPPER DETECTOR HIGH FLUX DEV OR AUTO DEFEAT, not illuminated.

ALB-13/5-4, POWER RANGE LOWER DETECTOR HIGH FLUX DEV OR AUTO DEFEAT, not illuminated.

IF either alarm is illuminated, THEN REFER to the APP for a ro riate action.

VERIFY Main Feed Pump Recirculation Valves 1FW-8 and BOP 1FW-39 are shut when total Main Feed Pump flow is greater than 8600 KPPH.

BOP Monitors turbine and feedwater system response.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The crew may elect to start a dilution before the power change is initiated. OP-107 is a "Reference Use" procedure. The dilution steps are provided for evaluator use.

DETERMINE the volume of makeup water to be added. This RO may be done by experience or via the reactivity plan associated with the Simulator IC.

SETS FIS-114, TOTAL MAKEUP WTR BATCH COUNTER, to RO obtain the desired quantity.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 6 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE RO SET total makeup flow as follows:

IF performing DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for less than or equal to 90 gpm.

IF performing ALT DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the RO STOP position.

RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

PLACE the control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the DIL RO OR the ALT DIL position.

PROCEDURE NOTE: When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK-444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure.

ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.

Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNS limit for RCS pressure.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew may elect to manually crack open a PRZ Spray Valve to establish PRZ Surge line flow and thereby maintain PRz/RCS boron concentrations within limits.

OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and the RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm.

EVALUATOR NOTE: SRO concurrence should be obtained prior to energizing the BUH in MANUAL.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 7 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE RO START the makeup system as follows:

TU RN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

RO VERIFY Tavg and rod motion responds as desired.

VERIFY dilution automatically terminates when the desired RO quantity has been added.

RO PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

Is in the STOP position.

The green light is lit.

RO PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

RO START the makeup system as follows:

TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 8 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 2 - VCT LEVEL CHANNEL LT-115 FAILS LOW Booth Operator Instructions:

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, initiate Event 2 ... VCT Level Channel failure (imf LT:115, 00/0).

Indications Available: ALB-007-4-3, VCT HIGH-LOW LEVEL RO RESPONDS to alarm ALB-007-4-3.

The crew may place the power change on HOLD.

CONFIRM alarm using LI-115-1, Vol Control Tank Level RO (MCB-1A2).

RO DETERMINES LT-115 failed LOW.

RO VERIFY Automatic Functions:

AT 5% VCT level, the following occurs: (N/A)

1CS-291, Suction from RWST (LCV-115B) opens.

1CS-292, Suction from RWST (LCV-115D) opens

1CS-165, VCT Outlet/Dilution (LCV-115C) shuts

1CS-166, VCT Outlet/Dilution (LCV-115E) shuts

AT 20% VCT level, auto makeup from the Reactor Makeup System starts. (YES)

AT 40% VCT level, auto makeup from the Reactor Makeup System stops. (N/A)

AT 80% VCT level, 1CS-120, VCT Level Control Vlv, fully diverts letdown flow to the RHT. (N/A)

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 9 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 2 - VCT LEVEL CHANNEL LT-115 FAILS LOW RO PERFORM Corrective Actions:

Procedure Caution: LowVCT level is a precursor to gas binding the CSIPs.

MATCH charging and letdown flows.

IF charging flow is lost, (NO) THEN GO TO AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions.

Procedure Note: If either LT-112 or LT-115 falls high, the automatic CSIP suction swapover from the VCT to the RWST will not function

'if required.

SRO IF EITHER of the following occurs:

VCT level is less than 20% AND automatic makeup is NOT in progress

VCT level is greater than 40% AND automatic makeup is still in progress THEN GO TO AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control.

CREW CHECK instrument air available. (YES)

RO CHECK BOTH LT-112 and LT-115 functioning properly. (NO)

SRO GO TO Section 3.1, LT-112 or LT-115 Malfunction.

REFER TO Attachment 1, VCT Level Control Channels SRO Operation, as necessary to assess the effects of an LT-112 or LT-115 malfunction.

Evaluator's Note: Crew may brief on Attachment 1.

Procedure Note: An instrument malfunction may manifest itself as a slow drift rather than a "full high" or "full low" failure. Until the instrument has failed fUlly high or fully low, all steps should be reviewed for applicability periodically, even if not continuously applicable.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 10 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 2 - VCT LEVEL CHANNEL LT-115 FAILS LOW RO CHECK that LT~115 is FAILING. (YES)

RO MONITOR VCT level using either of the following:

ERFIS point LCS0112

LI-112 (local)

RO CHECK LT-115 FAILING LOW. (YES)

RO PLACE RMW CONTROL Switch in STOP.

Procedure Note: Normally, VCT level is maintained between 20 and 400/0 by auto makeup.

RO CONTROL VCT level as follows:

MAl NTAIN level BELOW 70%.

MAINTAIN level ABOVE 20% OR DESI'RED MINIMUM.

RO MAINTAIN VCT level GREATER THAN 5%.

Procedure Note: Lifting leads in the following step will simulate a low-low level signal from the failed instrument. This is to allow a valid low-low level signal one instrument to initiate emergency makeup.

RO CHECK the malfunctioning instrument FAILING LOW. (YES)

DIRECT Maintenance to investigate and repair the instrument SRO malfunction.

SRO CHECK that the instrument malfunction has been repaired.

SRO WAIT until repairs are complete before proceeding.

Evaluator's Note: The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 3 (MCC 1A34 Feeder Breaker failur.e) when the crew is waiting for the instrument repair.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 11 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

. 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 3 - MCC 1A34 FEEDER BREAKER TRIP (LOSS OF FAN COOLER AH-3)-

Booth Operator Instructions:

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, actuate Event 3 - MCC 1A34 Feeder Breaker trip (XD11121)

Indications Available:

ALB-001-6-5, ENGINEERING SAFEGUARD FEATURES SYSTEM TRAIN A BYPASSED OR INOPERABLE

ALB-027-8-2, CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS AH-3 FLOW LOW OIL RO Responds to alarm ALB-001-6-5.

BOP Responds to alarm ALB-027-8-2.

Reports alarm condition(s) on Engineered Safeguard Feature RO Bypass Panel A.

Refer to APP-ESF-A-4-1 for the window indicated in alarm on RO ESF Bypass Panel A.

RO/BOP Reports Containment Fan Cooler AH-3 tripped.

BOP Reports no power to 1A34.

SRO Dispatches AO to investigate.

Booth Operator Note: Report 1A34 feeder breaker is open - cause unknown.

Evaluator Note: The SRO should direct the BOP to shift to the Train "B" coolers (AH-1 and AH-4). The following steps should be completed for AH-1 and repeated for AH-4 (in either order) then AH-2 should be stopped.

SRO Directs BOP to shift to Train "B" Fan Coolers.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 12 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 3 - MCC 1A34 FEEDER BREAKER TRIP (LOSS OF FAN COOLER AH-3)

BOP Verifies Initial Conditions.

BOP Places control switch for both fans in AH-1/AH-4 to LO-SPD.

Evaluator's Note: Procedure Note indicates the next two steps must be completed without delay to avoid coastdown.

BOP Place control switches for AH-1/AH-4 to STOP.

BOP Place control switches for AH-1/AH-4 to HI-SPD.

BOP Places control switches for AH-2 fans in STOP.

BOP Restores normal containment purge:

Opens normal inlet/discharge CP9/CP5

Opens normal inlet/discharge CP6/CP3 Places switch for Normal Purge Supply Fan to START.

Procedure Note: Controls are now aligned for the fan to auto start if/when CNMT pressure reaches the negative value setpoint.

SRO Contacts Work Control for assistance.

Enters TS 3.6.2.3 Action a. (Restore both trains to operable SRO within 7 days or be in HSB in the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months )

Reference TS 3.6.1.5 (NA until >120°F)

Lead Evaluator Note: Cue Event 4 (NSW Pump"A" 'sheared shaft) after the fan coolers are aligned in accordance with SRO directions and the Fan Cooler TS has been entered.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 13 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 4 - NSW PUMP "A" SHAFT SHEAR "

Booth Operator Instructions: Actuate" Event 4 - NSW Pump "A" sheared shaft (NSW07A) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications Available:

ALB-02-6-1, SERV WTR SUPPLY HDR A LOW PRESS;

. ALB-02-7-1, SERV WTR SUPPLY HDR B LOW PRESS;

ALB-02-7-2, SERV WTR PUMPS DISCHARGE LOW PRESS Responds to ALB-02 alarms - reports low NSW header RO pressure with pump running indication.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The ESW Pumps will auto start on low header pressure.

Immediate CHECK ESW flow lost to ANY RUNNING CSIP - MORE THAN Action RO 1-minute: (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 2.

Immediate CHECK ESW flow lost to ANY RUNNING EDG - MORE THAN Action SRO 1-minute: (NO)

BOOTH OPERATOR: There are several points in the AOP where an AO may be dispatched to check for leaks and proper operation of equipment. Report no leaks, no breaker problems but when dispatched to the pump, report that the coupling appears to have failed and request maintenance" assistance.

SRO GO TO Step 3.

GO TO the appropriate step as indicated by the parameter RO/SRO LOST:

NSW Pump failure (YES)

NSW Pump loss of flow SRO Proceeds to Step 6 Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 14 of 39

Appendix D . Scenario Outline Form ES-D~ 1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 4 - NSW PUMP "A" SHAFT SHEAR CHECK loss of NSW Header due to NSW Pump FAILED or RO LOSS OF FLOW.

START standby NSW Pump as follows:

VERIFY discharge valve for affected pump is CLOSING by placing affected pump control switch to STOP.

START standby NSW Pump in priming mode by momentarily placing standby NSW Pump control switch to START.

WHEN discharge valve for affected pump is fully SHUT, THEN PLACE and HOLD control switch for running pump to START to fully OPEN pump discharge valve.

RO CHECK ANY NSW Pump - RUNNING. (YES)

SRO GO TO Section 3.2 (page 30).

CHECK Turbine trip required by ANY of the following SRO conditions - EXIST: (NO)

No NSW Pump can be operated

Non-isolable leak exists in the NSW system

Major isolable leak exists on the Turbine Building NSW Header AND time does not permit a controlled plant shutdown SRO OBSERVE Note prior to Step 13 AND GO TO Step 13.

PROCEDURE NOTE: Steps 13 through 19 address leaks on NSW turbine building header. Leaks on individual components supplied by the Turbine Building header are addressed by Steps 20 and 21.

CHECK for minor isolable leak on Turbine Building header-CREW ANY EXISTING. (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 20.

CHECK for leak in an individual component - ANY EXISTING.

CREW (NO)

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9

.HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 15 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 4 - NSW PUMP "A" SHAFT SHEAR SRO GO TO Step 22.

CHECK for leak on WPB header - ANY EXISTING. (NO)

CREW GO TO Step 24.

RO CHECK that NSW Pump(s) - MALFUNCTIONED. (YES)

CREW PERFORM the following for affected NSW Pump(s):

CHECK NSW Pump breaker(s) - MALFUNCTIONED. (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 25.b.

RO/BOP CHECK adequate pump suction inventory EXISTS:

LI-9300.1, Service Water PMP A CHMBR LVL, GREATER THAN 51% (ERFIS LSW9300)

LI-9302, Service Water PMP B CHMBR LVL, GREATER THAN 51% (ERFIS LSW9302)

LI-1931, Cooling Tower Basin Level, GREATER THAN 31 inches Locally VERIFY the following for the affected NSW Pump per OP-139, Service Water System:

CREW

Proper cooling and seal water supply to NSW Pumps.

Proper operation of NSW strainer b.ackwash.

Locally CHECK NSW Pump(s) for signs of damage (shaft CREW shear or other obvious problems).

SRO INITIATE appropriate corrective action for the loss of NSW.

Completes an Equipment Failure Checklist and contacts WCC SRO for assistance.

The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 5 (SG "C" Pressure Channel failure) after assistance is requested or when AOP-022 is exited.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 16 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 5 - SG "C" STEAM PRESSURE CHANNEL FAILS HIGH Booth Operator Instructions: Actuate Event 5 - SG "C" Controlling Steam Pressure Channel Fails HI (imf PT:495) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications Available: ALB-014-1-2 and 2-2 (LOOP A and LOOP B HI STEAM LINE ~P)

RESPONDS to alarms ALB-014-1-2 and 2-2 (LOOP HI STEAM BOP LINE ~P).

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: THE BOP may take MANUAL control of the associated FRV prior to entering the APP.

BOP PLACES FRV for SG "C" in MANUAL and controls flow.

BOOTH OPERATOR NOTE: If directed to investigate locally on RAB 261 rack, report "PT-495is not leaking".

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The SRO may direct a swap to Channel 4 to regain auto control. The OWP also accomplishes this action.

BOP Selects Channel 4 (PT-496) for control.

BOP Restores FRV "C" to AUTO.

SRO CONTACTS work control for assistance.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 17 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 5 - SG "C" STEAM PRESSURE CHANNEL FAILS HIGH ENTERS TS:

3.3.1.a Reactor Trip Instrumentation, Action 6

3.3.2.a ESF Instrumentation, Action 19 SRO Both require tripping the inoperable channel within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

and

3.3.3.6.a. Accident Monitoring Instrumentation - restore the inoperable channel within 7 days. (Not applicable but may initiate a tracking EIR related to thisTS)

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: After the FRV is in AUTO and the TS has been entered, the Lead Evaluator can cue Event 6 (SGTL).

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 18 of 39

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 6 - SG "C" TUBE LEAK/FCV-122 FAILS AS-IS Booth Operator Instructions: Prior to actuating this trigger the Booth Operator must read FCV-122 position off of the summary page and type that value into the FINAL VALUE box. Actuate Event 6 (SG "C" Tube LeaklFCV-122 fails to track in AUTO)

Indications Available: ALB-009-2-2, PRESSURIZER CONTROL LOW LEVEL DEVIATION ALB-10-4-5, RAD MONITOR SYSTEM TROUBLE RO Responds to alarms and/or indications of RCS leakage.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

Multiple alarms associated with RCS leakage will direct implementation of AOP-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE. The leak rate is approximately 60 GPM. Letdown will have to be reduced or isolated to stabilize charging flow on scale.

The RO may take MANUAL control of FCV-122, Charging Flow Control Valve, at any point after the failure is recognized.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

This procedure contains no immediate actions.

Throughout this procedure, as well as all AOPs, actions are based on valid alarms and instrumentation. Actions based on invalid indication are not applicable.

When possible (except in the cases of rapidly propagating leaks and leaks approaching Action Level 3), leakage should be qualitatively confirmed prior to declaration of an action level.

Leakage is qualitatively confirmed when two different indications (such as grab samples or radiation monitors) trend in the same direction with the same approximate order of magnitude.

RO/SRO CHECK RHR in operation. (NO)

GO TO Step 3.

Appendix 0 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 19 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 6 - SG "C" TUBE LEAK/FCV-122 FAILS AS-IS REFER TO PEP-110, Emergency Classification And Protective SRO Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry point x.

PROCEDURE NOTE: This step is a qualitative check for leakage obviously in excess of Make Up capability. Isolation of letdown may be necessary. A formal calculation to determine the leakrate is performed in Step 16.

RO CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability. (YES)

PROCEDURE NOTE: If CSIP suction is re-aligned to the RWST, negative reactivity addition should be anticipated.

RO MAINTAIN VCT level GREATER THAN 5%.

SRO GO TO step 10.

PROCEDURE NOTE: If a Containment Ventilation Isolation signal has occurred, Tech Spec 3.0.3 is applicable, since both trains of Containment Vacuum Relief are inoperable.

CHECK valid CNMT Ventilation Isolation monitors (REM-SRO 3561A, B, C and D) ALARM CLEAR. (YES)

CHECK RM 3502A, RCS Leak Detection Radiation Monitor, SRO ALARM CLEAR. (YES)

CHECK ALL valid Area Radiation Monitors ALARM CLEAR.

SRO (YES)

SRO CHECK valid Stack Monitors ALARM CLEAR. (YES)

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 20 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 6 - SG "c" TUBE LEAK/FCV-122 FAILS AS-IS DETERMINE if unnecessary personnel should be evacuated SRO from affected' areas, as follows:

CHECK that an RCS leak outside Containment has caused a valid RMS alarm. (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 14.d.

CHECK that a valid RMS Secondary Monitor HIGH ALARM SRO indicates a SG tube leak may exist. (YES)

RO SOUND local evacuation alarm.

ANNOUNCE on the PA:

"Attention all personnel. High radiation levels may exist in portions of the power block due to SG tube leakage.

Unnecessary personnel evacuate the RAB and Turbine Building, including the Steam Tunnel. Further announcements will be made as surveys are performed."

CREW NOTIFY Chemistry to stop any primary sampling activities.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

If not already done, in the following step the RO should take MANUAL control of FCV-122.

The SRO may direct a reduction in letdown flow in the following step.

RO PERFORM an RCS flow balance calculation as follows:

CONTROL charging flow using FK-122.1, to stabilize PRZ level.

OPERATE the following letdown orifice valves as necessary to maintain charging flow on scale:

1CS-7, 45 gpm Letdown Orifice A

1CS-8, 60 gpm Letdown Orifice B

1CS-9, 60 gpm Letdown Orifice C Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 21 of 39

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 6 - SG "c" TUBE LEAK/FCV-122 FAILS AS-IS Evaluator Note: Entering Primary-to-Secondary Leak Action Level 3 is more restrictive than the TS Action Statement and therefore meets the TS action requirement.

When the leak rate is estimated (approx. 60 GPM) the SRO SRO should enter TS 3.4.6.2.b (Reduce to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ).

CREW DETERMINE leak location (SGs)

SRO NOTI FY Health Physics of leak location and radiation levels SRO GO TO Attachment 1 for Primary-to-Secondary Leak SRO NOTIFY Chemistry to implement CRC-804 PROCEDURE NOTE: For a known leak rate greater than 150 gpd (PSAL 3 threshold), the Unit SCQ may direct performance of Attachments 9, 10 and 11 while the remaining steps of Attachment 1 are being completed.

RO CHECK known leak rate is < 150 gpd (0.1 gpm) (NO)

SRO' GO TO Step 4 DETERMINE leaking Steam Generator (May have enough SRO information to determine leaking SG is "C")

CHECK Secondary System Radiation monitor alarms CLEAR SRO (YES/NO depending on pace through procedure)

SRO CHECK SG Tube leakage is within TS Limits (NO)

SRO Start CVPETS AppendixD NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 22 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 6 - SG "C" TUBE LEAK/FCV-122 FAILS AS-IS CHECK valid Aux Steam Condensate radiation monitors SRO ALARM CLEAR: (YES)

NOTIFY Chemistry to sample the Auxiliary Steam System for SRO activity.

Using Table in Attachment 1, determine the required Action Level: (ACTION LEVEL 3, Perform Attachment 11, Reduce SRO power to 50% within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , Be in Mode 3 within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , (3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months total time)

Evaluator Note: The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 7 (LOOP) after the crew has calculated the rough SGTL rate, evaluated the TS, and declared the appropriate Action Level.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 23 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7~10 - LOOP/SG "C" TUB,E RUPTURE BOOTH OPERATOR:

Actuate Events 7 and 10 [imf eps01 (LOOP)/imf PT:308c (SG PORV fails OPEN in AUTO)] on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

Actuate the SG "C" SGTR (imf sgn05c) when the crew enters EPP-004.

INDICATIONS: Multiple alarms/lighting transfers CREW Performs PATH-1 immediate actions.

RO VERI FY Reactor Trip:

AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

CHECK for any of the following:

TRIP breakers RTA and BYA OPEN (YES)

TRIP breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)

ROD Bottom lights LIT (No Indication)

NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:

CHECK for any of the following:

ALL turbine throttle valves - SHUT (YES)

ALL turbine governor valves - SHUT (No Indication)

BOP VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses:

1A-SA and 1B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDG's (NO)

Check AC emergency bus 1A-SA OR 1B-SB - ENERGIZED BOP (NO)

Evaluator Note: The crew may analyze the condition of EDG's "A" and "B", noting that EDG "B" is running with the breaker OPEN but no trip alarms.

Such being the case, the SRO may direct the BOP to close EDG "B" breaker before entry into EPP-001. The breaker SYNCH Switch must be ON to do so.

I Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 24 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE RO VERI FY Reactor Trip (YES)

RO VERI FY Turbine Trip (YES)

RO CHECK if RCS isolated:

CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT. (YES)

Check letdown isolation valves SHUT. (NO)

Closes 1CS-7, 1CS-8, 1CS-9

1CS-2, 1CS-1

VERIFY excess letdown valves - SHUT. (YES)

1CS-460

1CS-461 BOP VERIFY AFW Flow and Control SG Levels:

VERIFY AFW Flow - GREATER THAN 210 KPPH. (NO)

ANY level - GREATER THAN 250/0 [40%]. (YES/NO depending on pace)

Maintain 210 KPPH until >25% in ~1 SG.

SRO EVALUATE EAL Network using Entry Point X.

Verify AC Emergency Bus Cross-Ties to Non-Emergency AC BOP Buses - OPEN Verify any cross tie to Bus 1A-SA - OPEN (YES)

Breaker 104

Breaker 105 Verify Any cross tie to Bus 1B-SB - OPEN (YES)

Breaker 124

Breaker 125 Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 25 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE BOP ENERGIZE AC Emergency Buses using EDGs:

CHECK EDG 1A and 1B- AVAl LABLE

EDG emergency trips CLEAR (NOT PRESENT). (1A-NO,1B-YES)

EDG output breakers - NORMAL (NOT TRIPPED).

(YES)

BOP

CHECK any EDG - RUNNING. (YES-B)

SRO

GO TO Step 7e.

BOP

CHECK any AC emergency bus - ENERGIZED:

1A-SA bus voltage (NO)

1B-SB bus voltage (NO)

BOP PERFORM the following:

CRITICAL TASK

Energize 1B-SB by closing Breaker 126 before RCS Feed and Bleed criteria is met EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The Synch. Switch must be turned ON to satisfy the interlock for closing the breaker from the MCB.

SRO GO TO Step 7h.

BOP CHECK any AC emergency bus - ENERGIZED:

1A-SA bus voltage (NO)

1B-SB bus voltage (YES)

SRO IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.

SRO Transitions to PATH-1, Step 4.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Actuate the event trigger for SGTR when the crew returns to performing actions in PATH-1.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew will likely transition to EPP-004 before SGTR symptoms are evident.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 26 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE RO CHECK SI Actuation (NO)

SI Required (NO)"

SRO Directs a MANUAL SI in accordance with Foldout criteria.

RO Initiates a MANUAL SI.

SRO Transitions (or continues) to PATH-1, Entry Point "A".

SRO FOLDOUT A applies.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The following actions should be taken in accordance with FOLDOUT A criteria during the scenario:

Verify Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves or Miniflow Block .Valves CLOSE when RCS Pressure lowers to less than 1800 PSIG.

VERIFY ALL CSIPs AND RHR pumps - RUNNING. (NO-only RO "B" Train)

RO CHECK SI Flow:

SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)

RO RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG. (YES)

BOP CHECK Main Steam Isolation:

MAIN steam isolation - ACTUATED. (NO)

BOP MAIN steam isolation - REQUIRED. (YES/NO)

Steam line pressure - LESS THAN 601 PSIG.

CNMT pressure - GREATER THAN 3.0 PSIG.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 27 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE

MANUAL closure of all MSIVs AND bypass valves is desired.

CHECK CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 RO PSIG. (YES)

BOP CHECK AFW Status:

AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE. (YES)

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The crew may identify SG "C" as ruptured at this time and isolate AFW.

BOP CHECK any SG level- GREATER THAN 250/0 [40%]. (YES)

VERIFY Alignment of Components From Actuation of ESFAS BOP Signals Using Attachment 6, "Safeguards Actuation Verification", While Continuing with this Procedure.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment

6. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment in accordance with Attachment 6 without SRO approval. The Scenario Guide still identifies both board positions because the time frame for completion of Attachment 6 is not predictable. Attachment 6 is clipped to the back of this guide.

The crew may recognize that SG "C" PORV is 1000k open during attempts to control RCS temperature. In that case, he/she may take MANUAL control and close it at any time after the malfunction is determined. If that occurs then a transition to EPP-014 is not required.

BOP Control RCS Temperature:

Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize temperature between 555 OF AND 559 OF BOP VERIFY AC buses 1A1 (NO) AND 1B1 - ENERGIZED. (YES)

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 28 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE RO CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT. (YES)

CHECK block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES-All RO OPEN)

RO PRZ spray valves - SHUT . (YES)

EVALUATOR NOTE: If the crew has not identified SG "C" PORVas OPEN then a transition to EPP-014 should occur. If SG "C" PORV has been closed in MANUAL then the crew will continue in PATH-1 to the PATH-2 transition. (Page 31 of this guide.)

BOP IDENTIFY any faulted SG:

CHECK for any of the following:

ANY SG pressures - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES - "C")

ANY SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO)

BOOTH OPERATOR: If directed to walk down the system to check for leaks:

Wait 3 minutes and then report SG "C" PORV tailpipe blowing steam.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.

SRO IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.

BOP CHECK MSIVs and BYPASS Valves:

VERIFY all MSIVs - SHUT.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 29 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "c" TUBE RUPTURE BOP VERIFY all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT. (YES)

BOP CHECK anySG NOT Faulted: -

ANY SG pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES, "A" and "B").

BOP IDENTIFY any Faulted SG:

CHECK for any of the following:

ANY SG pressure - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES - "C")

BOP ISOLATE Faulted SG(s):

VERIFY faulted SG(s) PORV - SHUT (NO)

Critical Task

Places SG "C" PORV in MANUAL and closes to terminate the release before exiting EPP-014.

VERIFY Main FW isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY MDAFW and TDAFW pump isolation valves to faulted SG(s) - SHUT

SHUT faulted SG(s) steam supply valve to TDAFWpump

-SHUT

Closes isolation from SG "C": 1MS-72

VERIFY main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs-SHUT:

SG A: 1MS-231 (YES)

SG B: 1MS-266 (YES)

SG C: 1MS-301 (CLOSES)

VERIFY SG Blowdown isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY main steam analyzer isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP CHECK CST Level- GREATER THAN 10% (YES)

. Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 30 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "c" TUBE RUPTURE PROCEDURE NOTE: A 5G may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage. '

EVALUATOR NOTE: The "Check secondary radiation" could be answered YES or NO, depending on the condition of the alarm before 51 was initiated.

SRO CHECK Secondary Radiation:

SG Blowdown radiation - NORMAL (YES/NO)

MAIN steamline radiation - NORMAL (YES/NO)

BOP CHECK SG Levels:

ANY level-INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES, "C")

SRO FOLDOUT C applies.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: No actions should result from FOLDOUT "C" during the remainder of the scenario.

SRO EVALUATE EAL Network using Entry Point U.

SRO IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.

PROCEDURE NOTE: The RCP Trip Criteria is in effect until an RCS cooldown is initiated.

RO CHECK RCP Trip Criteria:

ANY RCP - RUNNING (NO)

BOP IDENTIFY any ruptured SG:

CHECK for any of the following:

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 31 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT.7 LOOP/SG "c" TUBE RUPTURE

SG level-INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES - "C")

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

If the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, one steam supply valve from an intact SG must be maintained open.

BOP ISOLATE Flow From Ruptured SG:

ADJUST ruptured SG PORV controller setpoint to 88% (1145 PSIG) AND place in auto.

Places SG "C" PORV in MANUAL and closes. It should NOT be placed. in AUTO. If it is placed in AUTO then the operator should determine that it has opened, place it in MANUAL, close it, and leave it in MANUAL.

CHECK ruptured SG PORV - SHUT. (YES/NO)

SHUT ruptured SG steam supply valve to TDAFW pump:

MS-70 and 72 are tagged SHUT

VERIFY blowdown isolation valves from ruptured SG-SHUT (YES)

SHUT ruptured SG main steam drain isolation before MSIV:

SG A: 1MS-231

SG B: 1MS-266

SG C: 1MS-301

SHUT ruptured SG MSIV and BYPASS valve. (SG "C")

BOP Ruptured SG MSIV and bypassed valves SHUT (YES)

SRO Observe CAUTION prior to Step 8 AND GO TO Step 8.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: If ruptured SG is faulted AND is NOT needed for RCS cooldown, THEN feed flow to that SG should remain isolated.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 32 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE BOP MONITOR Ruptured SG Level:

RUPTURED SG - FAULTED (NO)

Level - GREATER THAN 25%

Stop feed flow by shutting the MDAFW and TDAFW isolation valves to the ruptured SG.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: The steam supply valve from the ruptured SG to the TDAFW pump should be shut OR isolated before continuing.

CHECK Ruptured SG(s) Pressure - GREATER THAN 260 BOP PSIG [350 PSIG] (YES)

RO Block Low Steam Pressure SI:

Pressure - LESS THAN 2000 PSIG (YES)

Block low steam pressure SI.

PROCEDURE NOTE: After the low steam pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

SRO Prepare For RCS Cooldown:

At least one intact SG - AVAILABLE FOR RCS COOLDOWN (YES)

GO TO Step 11e.

Determine required core exit temperature based on lowest ruptured SG pressure:

PROCEDURE CAUTION: IF RCPs are NOT running, an invalid RED or ORANGE condition for RCS INTEGRITY CSF-4 may occur during the following steps. Disregard ruptured SG wide range cold leg temperature until Step 39 completed.

BOP Initiate RCS Cooldown:

Check all of the following to determine if steam can be dumped to condenser:

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC' Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 33 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE EVALUATOR NOTE: There is no power to the SG "A" PORV controller. The SRO should direct local operation.

BOOTH OPERATOR NOTE: If directed to control SG "A" PORV locally:

irf mss027 TO LOCAL OPS Dump steam from intact SGs at maximum rate using any of the following (listed in order of preference):

SG PORV's

Initiates cooldown using only SG PORV's "A" and "B"

("A" PORV can only be operated locally at this point)

GO TO Step 13.

Evaluator Note: The crew will continue with the procedure while the cooldown is in progress. When the CET temperature is less than the target then the crew should terminate the cooldown and continue with the procedure.

RO Monitor Core Exit TCs While Continuing With This Procedure:

Core exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE (NO)

WHEN core exit TCs less REQUIRED TEMPERATURE THEN do Steps 13b AND c.

13.b Stop RCS cooldown.

13.c Maintain core exit TCs less than required temperature.

Maintain RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM And 13 RO GPM.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

If an AFW isolation to an intact SG occurs, the signal may be reset to allow restoration of AFW. (An AFW isolation will occur if a main steam line isolation signal is present AND one SG pressure decreases 100 PSIG below the other two SGs.)

If the steam supply valve from the ruptured SG to TDAFW pump reopens due to decreasing SG level, it must be restored to the shut position. (Two out of three SG levels decreasing below 25°k will open both steam supply vales to the TDAFW pump.)

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 34 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE BOP Check Intact SG Levels:

Any intact SG level - GREATER THAN 25% [40%]

(YES)

AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE (YES)

Control feed flow to maintain intact SG levels between 25% and 50% [40% and 50%]

Any intact SG level - INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 16.

RO Check PRZ PORV AND Block Valves:

Verify power to PORV block valves - AVAILABLE (YES-one)

Check PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

GO TO Step 16f.

Check block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

IF a PRZ PORV opens on high pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint.

RO Reset SI.

Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of SRO Offsite Power.

Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals. (Phase A only RO is actuated)

RO Establish Instrument Air AND Nitrogen To CNMT:

Open the following valves:

11A-819 1SI-287 RO Check RHR Pump Status:

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 35 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE

RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)

Stop RHR pumps. ("B")

RO Check If RCS cooldown Should Be Stopped:

Core exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE (YES/NO)

BOP

Stop RCS cooldown.

Maintain core exit TCs less than required temperature.

BOP Check Ruptured SG Pressure

Check ruptured SG pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

GO TO Step 24.

RO Check RCS Subcooling - GREATER THAN 30 of - C (YES)

RO Depressurize RCS To Minimize Break Flow AND Refill PRZ:

Normal PRZ spray - AVAILABLE (NO)

SRO

Observe CAUTION prior to Step 26 AND GO TO Step 26.

PROCEDURE CAUTION

The PRT may rupture if a PRZ PORV is used to depressurize the RCS. This may result in abnormal containment conditions.

Cycling of the PRZ PORV should be minimized to avoid the possibility of the valve sticking.

PROCEDURE NOTE: The upper head region may void during RCS depressurization if RCPs are not running. This will result in a rapidly increasing PRZ level.

Depressurize RCS Using PRZ PORV To Minimize Break Flow RO AND Refill PRZ:

PRZ PORV - AT LEAST ONE AVAILABLE Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 36 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE Open one PRZ PORV until any of the following conditions satisfied:

PRZ level- GREATER THAN 75% [60%]

RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 10 of [40DF] - C Both of the following:

RCS pressure - LESS THAN RUPTURED SG(s)

PRESSURE

PRZ level - GREATER THAN 10% [30%]

RO Check RCS Pressure:

Pressure -INCREASING (YES)

Observe CAUTION prior to Step 28 AND GO TO Step 28.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: To prevent overfilling the ruptured 5~(s), 51 termination should NOT be delayed.

RO Check SI Termination Criteria:

RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 10 of - C (YES)

BOP Check secondary heat sink using any of the following:

Total feed flow to SGs- AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE

Level in at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 25%

[40%]

RO RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

RO PRZ level - GREATER THAN 10% [300/0] (YES)

RO Stop All But One CSIP.

'RO Isolate High Head SI Flow:

Check CSIP suction - ALIGNED TO RWST Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 37 of 39

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE Open normal miniflow isolation valves:

1CS-182

1CS-196

1CS-210

1CS-214 Critical Shut BIT outlet valves:

Task

151-3

1SI-4 (No power)

Shuts 151-3 before SG "O" level indication reaches 95%.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when 151-3 is SHUT.

Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 38 of 39

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 2008 HARRIS NRC SCENARIO 2 EVENT 7 LOOP/SG "C" TUBE RUPTURE RevlslonSurnmary

1. Corrected initial IC to be IC-5, not IC-9

2. Clarified overfill as "exceeding 95%"

3. Corrected errors in Sim Setup

4. Added MS-70 & MS-72 tagged and de-energized to Sim Setup

5. Clarified order and priority of alarms for Event 3

6. Added TS 3.6.1.5 as a TS that will be referenced though not applicable during Event 3

7. Clarified where procedure direction is coming from in Event 3 '

8. Added more information on TS 3.3.3.6.a. applicability during Event 5

9. Extended the guide to allow Event 6 to run until completion of Attachment 1 in AOP-016

10. Moved 1CS-1* in guide to reflect order operator is expected to operate valve

11. Changed answer for SG Level> 25% [40%] to YES/NO depending on pace

12. Added note that Attachment is clipped to back of Guide

13. Added clarification on what steps would be skipped if crew identifies and shuts open PORV early on in scenario.

14. 'Added a second line in guide for evaluators to record both required Core Exit Temperature and Lowest Ruptured SG Pressure during step to Prepare for RCS Cooldown

15. Clarified that "A" SG PORV will only be available to control locally Appendix 0 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2 Page 39 of 39

I Appendix D Scenario Outline ______ Fo_r_m_ES-D-IJ Facility: HARRIS Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 2008 NRC Examiners: Operators:

r:

Initial Conditions: From IC-27:

4.20/0 power, MOL, Boron 1570 PPM.

Plant startup to full power in progress. Perform GP-005 to Step 95.

No equipment out-of-service.

)

Turnover:

The previous shift continued a plant startup following a short maintenance outage. GP-005, POWER OPERATION, is in progress with Step 94 completed. Continue the startup but maintain steady state power at 7-9% while I&C Technicians complete testing of the P-7 permissive.

Critical Tasks:

Start CSIP "B" no later than the PATH-1 SI flow verification step

Close at least one Phase "A" Isolation Valve in each open line no later than the completion of GUIDE 1, Attachment 6 Event Malt. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 N/A N - BOP, Shift to the MFW Regulating Valves SRO Raise power and stabilize <P-7 2 Z1974TDI C- BOP, Spurious start of the TDAFW pump Z1975TDI SRO 3 TI:144 C- RO, SRO Letdown Temperature Controller fails LO/Diversion Valve fails to JTB1438 bypass demineralizers 4 RCS098 C-RO, SRO RCP "B" rising vibration TS-SRO 5 CFW16A C-BOP, Running MFW Pump trips SRO XB1.1155 Standby MFW Pump fails to start ZR211158 Both MDAFW Pump AUTO start failure ZR211113 6 RCS01AA M-ALL Small Break LOCA CVC05A CSIP "A" breaker trips 7 DSG04A C- RO, SRO Sequencer "B" skips CSIP load block 8 ZRPK630A C-BOP Same slave relay in each train fails to actuate respective Phase ZRPK630B "A" Isolation Valves

(N)ormal, (Rjeactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Page 1 ot 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3

SUMMARY

The crew will assume the watch pre-briefed on the initial conditions and the procedure in effect (GP-005, POWER OPERATION). No equipment is out-of-service but I&C Technicians are performing P-7 permissive testing. Steady state power must be maintained at < 10°10 power until the P-7 testing is complete. This direction is actually to ensure power is less than 10°10 when RCP vibration occurs and the running MFW Pump trips.

When the evaluating team is satisfied with the power change and the feedwater control valves are in AUTO (so that the BOP can respond), the Lead Evaluator can cue the spurious start of the*TDAFW Pump. The BOP should respond to the changing plant parameters and recognize that the TDAFW Pump has started.

The Lead Evaluator can cue the Letdown Temperature Controller failure once the plant has stabilized. The crew should respond in accordance with the alarm procedure. The RO should manually bypass the CVC Demineralizers and restore letdown temperature to normal in MANUAL control. The CVC Demineralizers will remain bypassed pending an engineering evaluation.

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, RCP "B" vibration will begin to rise. The crew will respond to alarms and/or indications and enter AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS. Vibration will continue to rise until RCP trip criteria is met.

Since power is <P-7, the RCP can be stopped without a reactor trip. The SRO should enter TS 3.4. 1.1.

When the plant is stable and the RCP-related TS entry is complete, the Lead Evaluator can cue the trip of the running MFW Pump. The BOP should report the loss of the pump and/or respond to alarms. The SRO should enter and conduct AOP-010, FEEDWATER MALFUNCTIONS. Actions will include starting the AFW System and lowering power as necessary to maintain SG levels.

When the plant is stable, the Lead Evaluator can cue the SBLOCA. This will result in a MANUAL or automatic SI initiation. Coincident with the SI, CSIP "A" breaker will trip and the Load Sequencer will skip the CSIP "B" load block. The crew should manually start CSIP "8" to establish HHSI in the early steps of PATH-1. The BOP should close at least one isolation valve in any unisolated Phase "A" line in the process of performing GUIDE-1, Attachment 6. The crew will continue in PATH-1 until the transition to EPP-009, POST-LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION, occurs. The scenario can be terminated when the first RCS pressure reduction is complete in EPP-009.

Appendix D Page 2 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS* 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 SETUP SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Clip a copy of GUIDE-1 Attachment 1 (SI Alignment) and Attachment 6 (Safeguards Actuation Verification) to each scenario guide for use by the evaluators.

Clip a copy of AOP-018, Attachment 1 - RCP Trip Limits, to the back of this scenario guide.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

IC-27, 4.2% power, MOL, Boron 1580

GP-005 completed through Step 94

Reactivity Plan for intended evolution (Raise power to just below 100/0)

Turnover Sheet

Ensure rod step counters reset to the correct value PRE-LOAD:

imf dsg04a: Load Sequencer "B" skips CSIP load block

zrpk630a: Phase "A" isolation slave relay failure

zrpk630b: Phase "A" isolation slave relay failure

xb1i155: Standby MFW Pump fails to start

zr211158/zr211113: MDAFW Pumps fail to AUTO start TRIGGERS:

Event 2: Z1974/Z1975 TDI_ENERGIZED (Spurious start of TDAFW)

Event 3: tt:144 Letdown Temperature Controller fails LO/imf jtb143b FAIL_RESET,FAIL_ASIS Demineralizer Bypass fails to bypass automatically Event 4: rcs09b 30 RCP "B" vibration Event 5: cfw16a MFW Pump "A" trips Event 6: rcs01a SBLOCA .09 severity (450 GPM)/cvc05a TRUE CSIP "A" trips Appendix D Page 3 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE EVALUATOR'S NOTE: Cue Event 2 after power is stabilized in band of 7% to 9% and the BOP is available to respond to indications of a spurious TDAFW pump start.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: OP-107 is a "Reference Use" procedure.

BOP Adjusts steam dump demand signal as necessary.

RO Initiates dilution as necessary DETERMINE the volume of makeup water to be added. This RO may be done by experience or via the reactivity plan associated with the Simulator IC.

SETS FIS-114, TOTAL MAKEUP WTR BATCH COUNTER, to RO obtain the desired quantity.

RO SET total makeup flow as follows:

IF performing DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for less than or equal to 90 qprn,

IF performing ALT DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been, placed in the RO STOP position.

RO VERI FY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

PLACE the control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the DIL RO OR the ALT DIL position.

Appendix D Page 4 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline. Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE PROCEDURE NOTE: When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure

ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure

Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure NOTE: SRO concurrence should be obtained prior to energizing the BUH in MANUAL.

OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm.

RO START the makeup system as follows:

TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentariiy.

VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

RO VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are RO stepping out to the desired height. (N/A - rod control is in MANUAL)

VERIFY dilution automatically terminates when the desired RO quantity has been added.

RO PLACE Reactor Makeup in AUTO per Section 5.1.

Appendix D Page 5 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

Is in the STOP position.

The GREEN light is LIT.

RO PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

RO START the makeup system as follows:

TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

Directs BOP to perform Step 95, PREPARE to place the Main SRO Feedwater Regulating valves in service.

PREPARE to place the Main Feedwater Regulating valves in BOP service as follows:

VERI FY the following Main Feedwater Regulating valves are shut with the flow controllers in manual with zero (0 or minimum) controller output:

1FW-133, MAIN FW A REGULATOR (FK-478)

1FW-249, MAIN FW B REGULATOR (FK-488)

1FW-191, MAIN FW C REGULATOR (FK-498)

VERIFY SHUT the following Main Feed Regulating Block BOP valves:

1FW-130, MAIN FW A BLOCK VLV

1FW-246, MAIN FW B BLOCK VLV

1FW-188, MAIN FW C BLOCK VLV Appendix D Page 6 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D.. 1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 1 - POWER CHANGE BOOTH OPERATOR NOTE:

In the following step, report smooth operation of each FCV. When requested to verify: report 1FW-136, 1FW-252, 1FW-194 (Main Feed Reg Valve Outlet Isolation Valves) all OPEN.

CYCLE the following controllers to open then shut the flow BOP control valves, while monitoring locally for smooth operation:

1FW-133, MAIN FW A REGULATOR (FK-478)

1FW-249, MAIN FW B REGULATOR (FK-488)

1FW-191, MAIN FW C REGULATOR (FK-498)

VERIFY OPEN the following Main Feed Regulating Isolation BOP Valves:

1FW-130, MAIN FW A BLOCK VLV'

1FW-246, MAIN FW B BLOCK VLV

1FW-188, MAIN FW C BLOCK VLV

1FW-136, MAIN FEED REG VALVE A OUTLET ISOL

1FW-252, MAIN FEED REG VALVE B OUTLET ISOL

1FW-194, MAIN FEED REG VALVE C OUTLET ISOL EVALUATOR CUE: Cue next event once power increase has been observed but before the BOP begins to Transfer SG Level Control to the MFRVs. Next step is included but crew is not expected to reach this step.

SRO Declares mode change once power is >5%.

WHEN Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valve FCV Controller demand is between 700/0 and 80%, OR when Reactor Power is BOP between 7 and 9%, THEN TRANSFER SG level control to the Main Feedwater Regulating valves as follows:

PLACE the following Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCV Controllers in MAN:

1FW-140, MN FW A REG BYP FK-479.1

1FW-256, MN FW B REG BYP FK-489.1

1FW-198, MN FW C REG BYP FK-499.1 Appendix D Page 7 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC.SCENARIO 3 EVENT 2 - TDAFW SPURIOUS START

.Booth Operator Instructions: Actuate Event 2- Spurious start of TDAFW (ET-

2) on cue from Lead Evaluator.

Indications Available: ALB-017-7-1 AFW TURB DISCHARGE LOW SUCTION/LOW PRESSURE (flashes in on start), increasing power, rising SG Levels, open indication on MS-70 BOP Responds to indications of spurious start of TDAFW BOP Refers to APP-ALB-7-1 CREW Determines TDAFW pump should not be running.

.~

CREW Dispatches an AO to investigate.

BOOTH OPERATOR'S CUE: When contacted,wait 2-3 minutes then report TDAFW Pump is running. No indications locally as to the cause.

BOP Refers to OP-137, Auxiliary Feedwater, section 7.2 Verify 1MS-70 SA SHUT (NO)

BOP Shuts 1MS-70.

BOP Verify 1MS-72 SB Shut (YES)

BOP Verify AFW FCV and Isolations indicate OPEN (YES)

Set AFW FCVs Output Demand to 1000/0 for 1AF-129, 1AF-BOP 130, 1AF-131. (YES)

Verify TDAFW Speed Controller in AUTO and set per Curve F-BOP X-10.

EVALUATOR CUE: SRO may also reference OWP-MS-05, but this OWP has no actions.

Appendix D Page 8 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 2 - TDAFW SPURIOUS START PROCEDURE NOT~: The following step makes the TDAFW pump operable, and aligns TDAFW pump to a standby alignment.

Complete Attachment 7, TDAFW Restoration. (Clipped to back BOP of guide)

Evaluates Tech specs from APP and OWP T.S. 3.3.2, Action 21. (6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months )

SRO T.S.3.6.3, Action a. (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months )

T.S. 3.7.1.2, Action (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months )

T.S. 3.9.4. (Not applicable)

If not already done, may complete and Equipment Failure SRO Checklist and contact WCC for assistance.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: Cue Event 3 (Letdown Temperature Controlier/Demin Bypass valve Failure) when the standby chiller is in service and the TS entry has been completed or AOP-026 is exited.

'Appendix 0 Page 9 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 3 - LETDOWN TEMPERATURE CONTROL FAILURE Booth Operator Instructions: Actuate Event 3 - Letdown Temperature controller failure (tt:144/jtb143b) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications Available: ALB-007-3-2, DEMIN FLOW DIVERSION HIGH TEMP.

RO Responds to alarm and enters APP-ALB-007-3-2.

RO CONFIRM alarm using TI-143, LP Letdown Temperature.

RO VERIFY Automatic Functions:

Manually positions 1CS-50, Letdown to VCT/Demin, to divert flow to the VCT.

RO PERFORM Corrective actions:

VERIFY that 1CS-50 diverts flow to the VCT, bypassing the BTRS and Purification Demineralizers.

PERFORM the following as needed to lower letdown temperature:

VERIFY proper charging flow is established. (YES)

LOWER letdown flow. (N/A - CCW Problem)

IF CCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger appears low, THEN:

TAKE manual control of TK-144.

OPEN 1CC-337, to raise CCW flow.

SRO Contacts Work Control and/or System Engineer for assistance.

BOOTH OPERATOR: If contacted as WCC or System Engineer: "maintain flow bypassing the demineralizers until a resin damage assessment is completed".

I EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 4 (RCP "B" high vibration) when letdown temperature is under control.

Appendix D Page 10 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scen-ario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 4 - RCP "B" HIGH VIBRATION Booth Operator Instructions: Actuate trigger for Event 4 (RCS09B) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications Available: ALB-010-2-5, RCP-B TROUBLE RO Responds to alarm ALB-010-2-5.

Evaluator's Note: Crew may enter ALB-010-1-5 but will likely go directly to AOP-018 when high vibration is recognized.

Enters and directs actions of AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT SRO PUMP ABNORMAL OPERATIONS.

Immediate Action RO Perform Immediate Action

Verifies one CSIP running. (YES)

Inform SSO to refer to PEP-110, Emergency Classification and SRO Protective Action Recommendations.

SRO Proceeds to Section 3.2, RCP High Vibration.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The answer to the following question may be YES at this time but the limit will be exceeded in short order. This is a continuous action step that should be implemented when the limit is exceeded. The scenario guide is therefore written as if the limit is exceeded when the step is read.

Attachment 1 is attached to the back of this scenario guide for evaluator use.

SRO Check all RCP's operating within limits of Attachment 1.

SRO Check reactor power> P-8. (NO)

RO Check more than one Rep affected. (NO)

Appendix D Page 11 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 4 - RCP "B" HIGH VIBRATION EVALUATOR NOTE: The SRO may conduct a brief on Attachment 7 before the Rep is stopped.

RO Perform the following:

STOP the affected RCP. (RCP "B")

SRO REFER TO Attachment 7, Operation With Two RCPs.

GO TO Step 11.

RO CHECK all RCPs RUNNING. (NO)

PERFORM the following:

IF RCP A is SECURED, THEN SHUT 1RC-107, PRZ Spray Loop A. (N/A)

IF RCP B is SECURED, THEN SHUT 1RC-103; PRZ Spray Loop B.

BOP

VERIFY SG levels being maintained between 52% and 62%.

RO

MONITOR rod insertion limits (Refer to Section F curve from Curve Book).

INITIATE a plant shutdown using ONE of the following:

SRO

GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operation to Hot Standby

AOP-038, Rapid Downpower CONFIRM the vibration alarm VALID by checking BOTH of the RO following:

a. The Green vibration monitor OK light is LIT.

b. Either of the following conditions exist:

Shaft AND frame vibration are proportionally rising

Vertical AND Horizontal vibration are proportionally rising CHECK the following parameters normal for the affected RCP RO (reference HNP POM Group Trends for AOP-018):

All parameters listed in Attachment 6, ERFIS Points for Reactor Coolant Pumps

Seal liP

Upper Oil Reservoir level

Lower Oil Reservoir level

RCS Loop Flow Appendix D .Page 12 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 4 - RCP "B" HIGH VIBRATION CONSULT with the Responsible Engineer for recommended SRO follow-up actions.

REFER TO the following Tech Specs: TS 3.4.1.1 is the most SRO limiting: Be in at least HSB within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 5 (MFW Pump trip) after the TS declaration.

Appendix D Page 13 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 5 - RUNNING MFW PUMP TRIP Booth Operator Instructions: Ensure power is < 100/0 then actuate the trigger for Event 5 (Running MFW Pump trip) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

Indications Available: ALB-016, FW PUMP AlB HIGH BACK FLOW O'R LOW SUCTION PRESS OR TRIP Evaluator Note: MFW Pump 2 should not be started due to overfeed concerns.

Responds to indication of running Main Feedwater (MFW)

BOP Pump trip and/or multiple alarms.

BOP Reports MFW Pump 1 tripped.

SRO Enters AOP-010, FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION.

BOP Performs immediate actions of AOP-01 O.

CHECK ANY Main Feedwater Pump TRIPPED. (YES)

CHECK initial Reactor power less than 900/0. (YES)

CHECK initial Reactor power less than 80%. (YES)

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Turbine runback will automatically terminate at approximately 500k power with DEH in AUTO.

Turbine runbacks are quickly identified by ALB-020-2-2, TURBINE RUNBACKOPERATIVE, in alarm and RUNBACK OPER light LIT as long as the initiating signal is present on DEH Panel A.

BOP/RO CHECK initial Reactor power less than 60%. (YES)

CHECK DEH controlling Turbine Valves PROPERLY. (N/A-BOP/SRO turbine not on line)

SRO GO TO Step 7.

Appendix D Page 14 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 5 - RUNNING MFW PUMP TRIP BOP MAINTAIN ALL of the following:

At least ONE Main Feedwater Pump RUNNING (NO)

EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew may start both MDAFW Pumps and the TDAFW Pump in the next block of steps.

BOP PERFORM the following:

IF ANY SG level drops to 30% THEN TRIP the Reactor AND GO TO EOP Path-1.

IF Above POAH AND Reactor power is LESS THAN 10%,

THEN:

INITIATE AFW flow to maintain Steam Generator levels between 52 and 62%.

PROCEDURE NOTE: Mode change occurs at 50/0 Reactor power.

RO REDUCE power as necessary to maintain SG level.

SRO IF below POAH, THEN: (N/A)

Starts both MDAFW Pump and adjusts flow using the BOP associated flow control valves.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

The crew will continue in AOP-010 but the procedure actions are not intended for this situation. Allow the crew time to match power to AFW capability then cue the next event (LOCA).

Since a shutdown will be in progress for the failed RCP, the SRO may elect to direct a reactor trip rather than to continue keeping the plant at power. If so, then cue the BOOTH OPERATOR to initiate Event 6 (LOCAICSIP Trip) coincident with the reactor trip.

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Be prepared to actuate Event 6 (LOCAICSIP Trip) if the SRO directs a MANUAL reactor trip.

RO Adjust power using MANUAL Rod Control and/or boration as Appendix D Page 15 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 5 - RUNNING MFW PUMP TRIP directed by the SRO.

Lead Evaluator: Cue Event 6 (LOCAICSIP Trip) when the plant is in a stable condition with power matched to AFW capability.

Appendix D Page 16 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCA/CSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY.FAILURE BOOTH OPERATOR: Actuate Event 6 SBLOCAICSIP "A" trip (RCS01 A1CVC05A) on cue from the Lead Evaluator.

INDICATIONS: RCS Low Pressure alarms/Rapidly Decreasing RCS Pressure and Pressurizer Level EVALUATOR NOTE: Depending on which indications the crew notices first they may take the Immediate Actions for AOP-018 first due to the trip of the running CSIP. However, shortly into that procedure they should recognize the SBLOCA in progress and transition to PATH-1.

The crew may also initiate a MANUAL SI before the AUTO setpoint is reached.

RO Respond to ALB-06 Alarms for trip of "A" CSIP SRO Enter AOP-018, RCP Abnormal conditions Immediate Action RO Check any CSIP running (NO)

Immediate Isolate Letdown by SHUTTING Action RO

1CS-7 (SHUT)

1CS-8 (SHUT)

1CS-9 (Verify SHUT)

EVALUATOR NOTE: By the time the immediate actions are complete the crew should identify the indications that a SBLOCA is in progress.

SRO Enters PATH-1 RO VERI FY Reactor Trip:

AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

CHECK for any of the following:

Trip breakers RTA and BYA OPEN (YES)

Appendix D Page 17 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCA/CSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE

Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)

ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES)

NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:

CHECK for any of the following:

ALL turbine throttle valves - SHUT (YES)

ALL turbine governor valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP VERI FY power to AC Emergency Buses

1A-SA AND 1B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDG's. (YES)

RO CHECK SI Actuation:

CHECK for any of the following - LIT: (YES)

SI Actuated bypass permissive light

ALB-11-2-2

ALB-11-5-1

ALB-11-5-3

ALB-12-1-4 SRO Perform The Following:

Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

Evaluate EAL Network using entry point X. (Refer to PEP-110)

SRO Informs Crew Foldout A applies.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The following actions should be taken in accordance with FOLDOUT A criteria during the scenario:

Appendix D Page 18 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCAICSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE

Verify Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves or Miniflow Block Valves CLOSE when RCS Pressure lowers to less than 1800 PSIG.

If the crew is slow to start CSIP "B" then RCP trip criteria could be met.

RO Verify ALL CSIPs AND RHR pumps - RUNNING.

Critical Task

Starts CSIP "B" after Load Block 9, but by no later than the completion of GUIDE 1, Attachment 6.

Reports RHR Pumps running (YES)

RO Check SI Flow:

SI flow- GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)

RO Verifies CSIP miniflow valves closed (YES)

RO RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG. (YES)

EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew may manually initiate Main Steam Isolation because Containment Pressure is rising towards the automatic setpoint.

RO/BOP Check Main Steam Isolation:

Main Steam Isolation - ACTUATED. (NO)

Check CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 RO PSIG. (YES)

RO/BOP Check AFW Status:

AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE. (YES)

(MS-70)

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: MS-70 will not automatically open due to the previous relay failure.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE: The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 6. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment in accordance with Attachment 6 without SRO approval. The Scenario Appendix D Page 19 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCA/CSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE Guide still identifies tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 6 is not predictable.

Verify Alignment of Components From Actuation of ESFAS BOP Signals Using Attachment 6, "Safeguards Actuation Verification", While Continuing with this Procedure.

Critical Closes at least one of the valves in each of the following Task BOP combinations before exiting Attachment 6:

1SP-948/1 SP-949, RCS LOOPS B&C HOT LEG CNMT ISOL

1ED-94/1 ED-95, CNMT SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE AND closes at least one set of the following:

1SP-16/1SP-939, RCS LEAK DET SAMPLE ISOL

1SP-916/1SP-918, RCS LEAK DET SAMPLE ISOL BOP/RO Control RCS Temperature:

Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize RCS temperature between 555°F AND 559°F u~ing Table 1.

BOP/RO Energize AC buses 1A 1 AND 1B1.

RO Check PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

Check PZR PORV block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

RO (YES)

RO PRZ spray valves - SHUT. (YES)

RO/BOP Identify any faulted SG:

Check for any of the following:

Any SG pressures - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)

Any SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO)

Appendix D Page 20 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCAICSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE CREW Check Secondary Radiation:

Check for all of the following:

Condenser Vacuum Pump Effluent radiation - NORMAL.

(YES)

SG Blowdown radiation - NORMAL. (YES)

Main Steam line radiation - NORMAL. (YES)

BOP/RO Any SG with an uncontrolled level increase (NO)

SRO Check RCS Intact:

Check for all of the following:

CNMT pressure - NORMAL. (NO)

Proceeds TO Step 44. (Entry Point C)

CONTINUOUS ACTION: Implement Function Restoration SRO Procedures As Required. (None required)

SRO CONTINUOUS ACTION: Foldouts A and B Apply.

Evaluator Note: The crew may review foldout criteria. Foldout A actions should be complete. No Foldout B actions apply.

The crew should use Adverse Values () when Containment Pressure exceeds 3 PSIG.

Maintain RCP Seal Injection flow between 8 GPM AND RO 13 GPM.

BOP Check Intact SG Levels:

Any level- GREATER THAN 25% [40%]. (YES)

Control feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 250/0 BOP AND 50% [40% AND 50%].

Appendix D Page 21 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCA/CSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE BOP Verify AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 - ENERGIZED. (YES)

RO Check PRZ PORVs - SHUT. (YES)

Check PZR PORV block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

RO (YES)

CONTINUOUS ACTION: IF a PRZ PORVopens on high SRO pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint.

RO Check SI Termination Criteria:

RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN (YES)

10°F [40°F] - C

20°F [50°F] - M BOP Check secondary heat sink by observing any of the following:

Level in at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 25%

[40%] (YES)

Total feed flow to intact SGs - GREATER THAN 210 KPPH (YES)

RO RCS Pressure stable or increasing (NO)

WHEN the SI termination criteria are met, THEN GO TO EPP-SRO 008, "SI TERMINATION", Ste'p 1.

RO Check CNMT Spray Status:

Check any CNMT Spray Pump - RUNNING. (NO)

RO Check Source Range Detector Status:

Intermediate range flux - LESS THAN 5x10-11 AMPS.

Verify source range detectors - ENERGIZED.

Transfer nuclear recorder to source range scale .

Appendix D Page 22 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCA/CSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE RO Check RHR Pump status:

RCS Pressure greater than 230 PSIG (YES)

Evaluator's Note: The evaluation/trend of RCS pressure in the nextseveral steps is dependent on how long it took the crew to reach these steps (Decay Heat/Break Flow/ECCS flow).

RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. (NO)

RO Check for both of the following:

All SG Pressures - STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)

RCS pressure - STABLE OR DECREASING. (YES)

RO Establish CCW Flow To The RHR Heat Exchangers:

Verify both CCW Pumps running (YES)

Open the following valves: (CCW Return From RHR HX Trains "A" and "B")

1CC-147

1CC-167 RO Verify CCW flow to the RHR Heat Exchangers (YES)

Perform one of the following to establish two independent CCW systems:

Shut train A CCW non-essential supply AND return valves:

1CC-99

1CC-128 Shut train B CCW non-essential supply AND return valves:

1CC-113

1CC-127 BOP/RO Check EDG status:

Check AC emergency buses 1A-SA AND 1B-SB -

ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER (YES)

Check Bus voltages (Normal)

Verify breakers 105 and 125 closed (YES)

BOP/RO

Shutdown any unloaded EDGs using OP-155, "Diesel Generator Emergency Power System", Section 7.0.

Appendix D Page 23 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCA/CSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE SRO RHR system - CAPABLE OF COLD LEG RECIRCULATION.

(YES).

Check auxiliary AND radwaste processing building radiation -

SRO NORMAL (YES)

SRO GO TO Step 58.

RO Check RCS Status:

Check for both of the following:

RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG (NO)

Any RHR HX header flow - GREATER THAN 1000 GPM (NO)

GO TO EPP-009, "POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND SRO DEPRESSURIZATION", Step 1.

SRO Reviews EPP-009 FOLDOUT Criteria (None will require action)

RO Reset SI Manually realign safeguards equipment if a loss of off-site SRO power occurs.

RO Reset Phase A and Phase B Isolation signals RO Establish Instrument Air and Nitrogen to CNMT Open the following valves:

11A-819

1SI-287 Monitor AC Buses:

BOP/RO Check AC emergency buses 1A-SA AND 1B-SB -

ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER:

Check bus voltages

Check breakers 105 AND 125 - CLOSED (YES)

Appendix D Page 24 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6-8 -SBLOCA/CSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE SRO

GO TO Step 5e.

BOP/RO Check all non-emergency AC buses - ENERGIZED (YES)

PROCEDURE CAUTION: PRZ heaters should NOT be energized until PRZ water level indicates greater than minimum recommended by plant operations staff to ensure heaters are covered.

RO Secure PRZ Heaters:

Verify control heaters - OFF

Place backup heaters in the OFF position.

Verify control heaters - OFF Consult plant operations staff for a recommended minimum indicated PRZ water level that will ensure heaters are covered.

(Refer to USER1S GUIDE, IIUSERIS GUIDE II, Attachment 2, Evaluating Pressurizer Water Level Indication.)

RO Check RHR Pump Status:

RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)

RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

Check RHR pump suction - ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)

Stop RHR Pumps BOP Check Intact SG Levels:

Any level - GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (YES)

Control feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 25% and 50% [40% and 50%].

PROCEDURE NOTE: After thelow steam pressure 81 signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

RO Check PRZ Pressure:

Pressure -less than 2000 PSIG (YES)

Block low steam pressure SI Appendix D Page 25 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCAICSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE SRO Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown:

Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs - LESS THAN 100

°F/HR RO

Check RHR system - OPERATING IN SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 10f.

Check all of the following to determine if steam can be dumped to condenser:

BOP

Check any intact SG MSIV - OPEN (NO)

Dump steam from intact SGs using any of the following (listed in order of preference):

BOP

SG PORVs SRO Go to Step 11 SRO .Monitor Shutdown Margin While Continuing RCS Cooldown:

a. Coordinate with plant operations staff AND chemistry to perform the following to obtain primary and secondary samples:

1) Operate the primary AND secondary sample panels.

2) Open CCW to sample HX valves:

1CC-114

1CC-115

3) Open CCW to GFFD valves:

1CC-304

1CC-305

4) Align AND obtain activity AND boron samples of the following:

RCS hot legs

AIISGs (Refer to OP-1 01, "SAMPLI NG SYSTEM", Section 5.0.)

b. Determine boron required for shutdown margin for anticipated RCS temperatures. (Refer to OST-1036, II "SHUTDOWN MARGIN CALCULATION .)

c. Check RCS loop boron - GREATER THAN BORON REQUIRED FOR SHUTDOWN MARGIN Check RCS Subcooling - GREATER THAN 10 of [40 OF] - C RO (YES)

RO Check SI Status:

SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

Appendix D Page 26 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2008 NRC SCENARIO 3 EVENT 6 SBLOCA/CSIP FAILURE/PHASE "A" SLAVE RELAY FAILURE ' .

SRO Observe CAUTION prior to Step 14 AND GO TO Step 14.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: Voiding may occur in the RCS during RCS depressurization. This will result in a rapidly increasing PRZ level.

PROCEDURE NOTE: RCS depressurization should NOT be stopped if RCS subcooling is lost. SUbcooling should be restored as the cooldown continues.

RO Depressurize RCS To Refill PRZ:

PRZ level - LESS THAN 25% [40%] (YES)

Depressurize using normal spray.

EVALUATOR NOTE: If the crew previously reached RCP Trip Criteria due to slow response in starting a CSIP then the depressurization will be done via the PORV.

However, RCP TRIP CRITERIA does not apply during EPP-009.

PRZ level- GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (YES)

WHEN level is greater than 25% [40%], THEN stop ReS depressurization.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when the depressurization is secured.

Appendix D Page 27 of 27 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 HARRIS 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

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