ML12334A451: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
Line 3: | Line 3: | ||
| issue date = 11/21/2012 | | issue date = 11/21/2012 | ||
| title = SL-2012-10795, Rev. 0, Sgs Flood Walkdown Report, 10 CFR 50.54(f) Section 2.3 (Flood) Response. | | title = SL-2012-10795, Rev. 0, Sgs Flood Walkdown Report, 10 CFR 50.54(f) Section 2.3 (Flood) Response. | ||
| author name = Idell M | | author name = Idell M | ||
| author affiliation = PSEG Nuclear, LLC, Sargent & Lundy, LLC | | author affiliation = PSEG Nuclear, LLC, Sargent & Lundy, LLC | ||
| addressee name = | | addressee name = |
Revision as of 13:54, 22 June 2019
ML12334A451 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Salem ![]() |
Issue date: | 11/21/2012 |
From: | Idell M Public Service Enterprise Group, Sargent & Lundy |
To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
References | |
SL-2012-10795, Rev 0 | |
Download: ML12334A451 (71) | |
Text
0 PSEG NUCLEAR LLC Salem Generating Station Units 1 & 2 SGS Flood Walkdown Report 10 CFR 50.54(f) Section 2.3 (Flood) Response Report SL-2012-10795 Revision 0 November 20, 2012 Project No: 12800-217 Z Safety-Related D Non-Safety-Related Prepared By S :-wgrit G, Lundy.500 Delaware Avenue Wilmington, DE 19801-7400 302-622-7200 www.sargentlundy.com o PSEG NUCLEAR LLC Salem Generating Station Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 November 21, 2012 Page No. 2 of 44 LEGAL NOTICE This report was prepared by Sargent & Lundy, L.L.C. ("S&L"), expressly for the sole use of PSEG Nuclear ("Client")
in accordance with the agreement between S&L and Client. This Deliverable was prepared using the degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised by engineers practicing under similar circumstances.
Client acknowledges:
(1) S&L prepared this Deliverable subject to the particular scope limitations, budgetary and time constraints, and business objectives of the Client; (2) information and data provided by others may not have been independently verified by S&L; and (3) the information and data contained in this Deliverable are time sensitive and changes in the data, applicable codes, standards, and acceptable engineering practices may invalidate the findings of this Deliverable.
Any use or reliance upon this Deliverable by third parties shall be at their sole risk.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC o PSEG NUCLEAR LLC Salem Generating Station Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 November 21, 2012 Page No. 3 of 44 Signatures:
Preparer: Mark W. Idell (S&L)Report Reviewer: 11/21/2012 Date 11/21/2012 Date 11/21/2012 Date Michael J. Shervin (S&L)Attachments Reviewer:--ý ý,'I Daniel Blount (S&L)Approver: 11/21/2012 Sandra Jannetty (S&L)Date SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC s~c=,-.t a ~.
0 PSEG SLR eport No.: SL-2012-10795 PSLEA Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 4 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report TABLE OF CONTENTS 1) EXECUTIVE SUM M ARY ...............................................................................................................................
6 A ) P U R PO S E .............................................................................................................................................................
6 B ) S C O P E .................................................................................................................................................................
6 C) M ETH O D O LO G Y ...................................................................................................................................................
6 D) RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
....................................................................................................................................
7 2) PURPOSE ...................................................................................................................................................
8 A) BACKGROUND
...........................................................................................
8 B) S IT E D ESC RIPTIO N ..................................................................................................................................................
9 C) REQUESTED ACTIONS ...........................................................................................................................................
10 D) REQUESTED INFORMATION
.........................................................................
....................................
10 3) M ETHODOLOGY
........................................................................................................................................
12 A) OVERVIEW OF NEI 12-07 (W ALKDOWN GUIDANCE)
..............................................................................................
12 B) APPLICATION OF NEI 12-07 ..................................................................................................................................
13 C) REASONABLE SIMULATIONS
...................................................................................................................................
14 D) W ALKDOWN INSPECTION GUIDANCE .......................................................................................................................
15 4) REQUESTED CONTENT ...............................................................................................................................
16 A) DESIGN BASIS FLOOD HAZARD LEVEL(S) .................................................................................................................
16 i) NRC Request ...............................................................................................................................................
16 ii) SGS Response .............................................................................................................................................
16 B) PROTECTION M ITIGATION FEATURES CONSIDERED IN THE LICENSING BASIS ................................................................
22 i) NRC Request ...............................................................................................................................................
22 ii) SGS Response .............................................................................................................................................
22 C) W ARNING SYSTEMS TO DETECT THE PRESENCE OF W ATER .......................................................................................
28 i) NRC Request ...............................................................................................................................................
28 ii) SGS Response .............................................................................................................................................
29 D) EFFECTIVENESS OF FLOOD PROTECTION FEATURES ..................................................................................................
30 i) NRC Request ...............................................................................................................................................
30 ii) SGS Response .............................................................................................................................................
31 E) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE W ALKDOWN PROCESSES
....................................................................................................
33 F) RESULTS OF THE FLOOD PROTECTION FEATURE W ALKDOWN ........................................................................................
34 i) NRC Request ...............................................................................................................................................
34 ii) SGS Response .............................................................................................................................................
35 G ) C LIFF EDG E E FFECTS .............................................................................................................................................
4 0 i) NRC Request ...............................................................................................................................................
40 ii) SGS Response .............................................................................................................................................
41 H) OTHER PLANNED AND/OR NEWLY INSTALLED FLOOD PROTECTION FEATURES OR M EASURES .............................................
41 i) NRCRequest
...............................................................................................................................................
41 SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG NUCLEAR LLC Salem Generating Station Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 November 21, 2012 Page No. 5 of 44 ii) SGS Response .............................................................................................................................................
42 5) CONCLUSIONS
...........................................................................................................................................
42 6) REFERENCES
..............................................................................................................................................
43 7) ATTACHM ENTS .........................................................................................................................................
44 A) NOTIFICATION LIST --SGS UNIT 1 FLOOD PROTECTION FEATURES .............................................................................
44 B) INACCESSIBLE
-SGS UNIT 1 FLOOD PROTECTION FEATURES ........................................................................................
44 c) RESTRICTED ACCESS -SGS UNIT 1 FLOOD PROTECTION FEATURES ..........................................................
................
44 D) NOTIFICATION LIST --SGS UNIT 2 FLOOD PROTECTION FEATURES .............................................................................
44 E) INACCESSIBLE-SGS UNIT 2 FLOOD PROTECTION FEATURES ........................................................................................
44 F) RESTRICTED ACCESS -SGS UNIT 2 FLOOD PROTECTION FEATURES ............................................................................
44 G) PROJECT ORGANIZATION
.......................................................................................................................................
44 H) CHANGES IN W ALKDOW N PROCESS / M ETHODOLOGY
................................................................................................
44 SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.
DOC 0 PSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 6 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report 1) EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
a) Purpose In response to the NRC Request for Information regarding Near Term Task Force (NTTF)Recommendation 2.3, a flooding protection walkdown was conducted at Salem Generating Station (SGS) Units 1 and 2 to identify and address plant specific degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions of the plant's flood protection features.
The flooding walkdowns at SGS were conducted between 9/10/2012 and 11/16/2012.
b) Scope The scope of the flooding walkdown was developed following a detailed review of all relevant licensing documents.
Certain safety-related structures, systems and components (SSCs) at SGS are situated below the design basis flood level. The station relies almost entirely on passive features incorporated in the design to keep water out of the plant. The flooding walkdown scope consisted of five main parts: " An outdoor walkdown was conducted to ensure no topography changes, added structures or security barriers affect site drainage as described in the Current Licensing Basis (CLB).* The Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) above-grade and below grade passive flood protection structures (i.e., walls, floors, and ceilings and penetrations through those walls, floors and ceilings) were inspected." The powerblock above-grade and below-grade passive flood protection structures (i.e., walls, floors, and ceilings and penetrations through those walls, floors and ceilings) were inspected." The SWIS and powerblock active flood protection features such as sump pumps, associated check valves and flood protection doors were inspected." A review of procedures that implement active flood protection features was performed to confirm that the procedures are effective in ensuring their flood protection function.These areas are credited in the CLB to keep flood water from the bounding flooding event (a hurricane surge) out of the safety related buildings.
c) Methodology The methodology and acceptance criteria for the evaluation of flood protection features was developed based on NEI Report 12-07 [Rev O-A], "Guidelines for Performing Verification Walkdowns of Plant Flood Protection Features" [Ref. 2]. Visual inspections of walls, floors, ceilings and penetrations through the walls, floors, and ceilings were conducted to verify there are no observable structural deficiencies that may impact the structure's ability to remain watertight.
Visual inspection of active plant flood protection features was similarly performed to verify there are no observable structural defects or leakage. Implementing procedures for flood protection features were reviewed to verify, including the following:
that the procedures can be executed as specified/written, that credited time-dependent activities can be completed SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEGSL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 7 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report in the time required, that resources required to complete the actions are available and are in good working order, and adequate staffing is available to implement the credited actions.d) Results and Conclusions Inspections of the SGS Flood Protection Features were performed in accordance with the NEI 12-07 Rev. OA [Ref. 2]. With the exception of potential deficiencies noted in Attachments A and D for SGS Units 1 and 2, respectively, the SGS Flood Protection Feature Inspections found that the SGS flood protection active and passive features, e.g., walls; floors, roofs, penetration seals, doors, sump pumps, check valves, etc., were confirmed to be installed per design, functional, in general good material condition, and appropriately controlled procedurally to ensure continued functionality.
Attachments A and D of this Report for SGS Units l and 2, respectively, identify and provide a summary of the potential deficiencies identified during the SGS Flood Protection Walkdowns that have not yet been dispositioned.
A small portion of the building surfaces (floors and walls) and some penetrations within the scope of the flood protection feature walkdown scope were deemed to be inaccessible and were not inspected.
Reasonable assurance that these portions of the buildings surfaces and the penetrations in these buildings are acceptable is based on the visual inspection of other similar walls, floors, and penetrations in similar elevations in these buildings that revealed no deficiencies or degradation that would prevent performance of flood protection features.
No visible signs of leakage were observed in the vicinity of those inaccessible flood protection features located below grade. Attachments B and E of this Report for SGS Unit 1 and 2, respectively, identify and provide a justification for the features that have been determined to be inaccessible.
Performance of the walkdowns provided confirmation that flood protection features are in place, are in good condition and will perform as credited in the current licensing basis (CLB).Minor issues were identified and entered into the PSEG corrective action program (CAP). No operability concerns were identified.
Attachments C and F of this Report for SGS Units 1 and 2, respectively, identify and provide a summary of the features that have been determined to have restricted access. Planning to perform the required flood protection feature walkdown / assessments is addressed within the PSEG CAP.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 8 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report 2) PURPOSE a) Background In response to the nuclear fuel damage at the Fukushima-Dai-ichi power plant due to the March 11, 2011 earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established the NTTF to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations, and to make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction.
The NTTF reported a set of recommendations that were intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena.
On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued an information request pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 50.54(f) (10 CFR 50.54(f) or 50.54(f))
[Ref. 3] which included six (6) enclosures:
- [NTTF] Recommendation 2.1: Seismic* [NTTF] Recommendation 2.1: Flooding* [NTTF] Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" [NTTF] Recommendation 2.3: Flooding* [NTTF] Recommendation 9.3: EP* Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits In Enclosure 4 of Ref. 3, the NRC requested that licensees perform flood protection walkdowns to identify and address plant-specific degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions and cliff-edge effects (through the corrective action program) and verify the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance procedures.
1 SSCs important to safety are designed either in accordance with, or meet the intent of, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criteria (GDC) 2. GDC 2 states that SSCs important to safety at nuclear power plants must be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, including floods, without loss of capability to perform their intended safety functions.
Flooding walkdowns identify/address plant-specific degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions (through the corrective action program) and verify the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance procedures associated with flood protection and mitigation
' Cliff-edge effects were defined by the NTTF Report [Ref. 5], which noted that 'the safety consequences of a flooding event may increase sharply with a small increase in the flooding level'. While the NRC used the same term as the NTTF Report in the March 12 50.54(f)information request (Ref. 3), the information the NRC expects utilities to obtain during the Recommendation 2.3: Flooding Walkdowns is different.
To clarify, the NRC is now differentiating between cliff-edge effects (which are dealt with under Enclosure 2 of Ref. 3) and a new term, Available Physical Margin (APM). APM information will be collected during the walkdowns, but will not be reported in the response to Enclosure 4 of Ref. 3. The collected APM information will be available for use in developing the response to Enclosure 2 of Ref. 3.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEGSL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 9 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report features credited in the current design/licensing basis. New flood hazard information will be considered in response to Enclosure 2 of Ref. 3.This Report provides the information requested in the March 12, 50.54(f) letter; specifically, the information listed under the 'Requested Information' section of Enclosure 4, paragraph 2 ('a'through 'h'). The 'Requested Information' section of Enclosure 4, paragraph 1 ('a' through 'j'), regarding flooding walkdown procedures, was addressed via the PSEG Nuclear (PSEG) June 07, 2012, acceptance
[Ref. 1] of the industry walkdown guidance [Ref. 2].b) Site Description The SGS is located in the southern region of the Delaware River Valley, which is defined as the area immediately adjacent to the Delaware River and extending from Trenton to Cape May Point, New Jersey on the eastern side, and from Morrisville, Pennsylvania, to Lewes, Delaware, on the western side. This region is characterized by extensive tidal marshlands and low-lying meadowlands.
More precisely, the SGS is located on the southern part of Artificial Island on the east bank of the Delaware River in Lower Alloways Creek Township, Salem County, New Jersey. While called Artificial Island, the site is actually connected to the mainland of New Jersey by a strip of tideland formed by hydraulic fill from dredging operations on the Delaware River by the U.S.Army Corps of Engineers.
The site is 15 miles south of the Delaware Memorial Bridge, 18 miles south of Wilmington, Delaware, 30 miles southwest of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and 7- 1/2 miles southwest of Salem, New Jersey, and approximately 50 river miles upstream of the mouth of Delaware Bay.The Delaware River Estuary system consists primarily of Delaware Bay, Delaware Estuary, and Delaware River. At the SGS site, tidal flows dominate over fresh water discharge.
The station is located on the east shore of the estuarian zone of the Delaware River -Delaware Bay system. Delaware River flow enters the head of Delaware Bay 2 miles downstream of the site. The largest tributaries of the Delaware River are the Schuylkill River in Pennsylvania; the Christina River in Delaware; the Assunpink, Crosswicks, Rancocas, and Salem Rivers; and Big Timbers, Hope, and Alloways Creeks in New Jersey.The head of the Delaware Estuary is at Trenton, New Jersey, about 83 miles upstream of the site. The Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, which connects the Delaware River with Chesapeake Bay, is located about 7 miles north of the Salem site.The water body to the west of the SGS is considered to be a tidally affected estuary by the U. S.Geologic Survey. As such, water levels are recorded by tidal gauges and no "flood record" is kept. The tidal flow in the site area is estimated to be more than an order of magnitude greater than the average fresh water flow in the site vicinity.
Thus, maximum and minimum water levels that may be of concern to plant safety were derived through considerations of coastal environmental conditions rather than riverine conditions.
The site area is generally flat with natural drainage flowing toward the Delaware River and into the marsh areas toward the north and east, previously having an average elevation of about 9 SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC S. L~~V" 0 PSEGSL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 NULEG Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 10 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report feet above sea level. This was raised slightly in the plant area, to Elevation
+10.5 Mean Sea Level (MSL) or 99.5 Public Service Datum (PSD). Herein, Mean Sea Level (MSL) refers to the National Geodetic Vertical Datum (NGVD) datum, which at 0 feet is equal to the Public Service Electric and Gas Company datum (PSD) of + 89 feet. The SGS Turbine and Auxiliary Building ground floor levels are at Elevation 11.0 feet MSL (100 feet PSD). Herein, the MSL and MLW levels reported in the SGS UFSAR are converted to PSD for simplicity.
The main access to the plant is from a road constructed by PSEG. This road connects with Alloways Creek Neck Road about 2-1/2 miles east of the site. Access to the plant site and all activities thereon is under the control of PSEG.c) Requested Actions Per Enclosure 4 of Ref. 3, the NRC requests that each licensee confirm use of the industry-developed, NRC-endorsed, flood walkdown procedures or provide a description of plant-specific walkdown procedures.
In a letter dated June 07, 2012 [Ref. 1], PSEG confirmed that the flooding walkdown procedure
[Ref. 2], endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012, will be used as the basis for the flooding walkdowns.
Other NRC requested actions include: (1) Perform flood protection walkdowns using an NRC-endorsed walkdown methodology; (2) Identify and address plant-specific degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions, as well as, cliff-edge effects through the corrective action program, and consider these findings in the Recommendation 2.1 hazard evaluations, as appropriate; (3) Identify any other actions taken or planned to further enhance the site flood protection; (4) Verify the adequacy of programs, monitoring and maintenance for protection features;and (5) Report to the NRC the results of the walkdowns and corrective actions taken or planned.Enclosure 4 of Ref. 3 also states, 'If any condition identified during the walkdown activities represents a degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed condition (i.e. noncompliance with the current licensing basis) for an SSC, describe actions that were taken or are planned to address the condition using the guidance in' Ref. 6, 'including entering the condition in the corrective action program. Reporting requirements pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 should also be considered.'
d) Requested Information Per Enclosure 4 of Ref. 3, 1. The NRC requests that each licensee confirm that it will use the industry-developed, NRC endorsed, flooding walkdown procedures or provide a description of plant-specific walkdown procedures.
As indicated previously, PSEG's letter dated June 07, 2012[Ref. 1], confirmed that the flooding walkdown procedure
[Ref. 2], endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012, will be used as the basis for the flooding walkdowns.
SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 11 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report 2. The NRC requests that each licensee conduct the walkdown and submit a final report which includes the following:
- a. Describe the design basis flood hazard level(s) for all flood-causing mechanisms, including groundwater ingress.b. Describe protection and mitigation features that are considered in the licensing basis evaluation to protect against external ingress of water into SSCs important to safety.c. Describe any warning systems to detect the presence of water in rooms important to safety.d. Discuss the effectiveness of flood protection systems and exterior, incorporated, and temporary flood barriers.
Discuss how these systems and barriers were evaluated using the acceptance criteria developed as part of Requested Information item 1.h.e. Present information related to the implementation of the walkdown process (e.g., details of selection of the walkdown team and procedures,)
using the documentation template discussed in Requested Information item 1.J, including actions taken in response to the peer review.f. Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions.
Include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned to address these conditions using the guidance in Regulatory Issues Summary 2005-20, Revision 1, Revision to NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, "Operability Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety," including entering the condition in the corrective action program.g. Document any cliff-edge effects identified and the associated basis. Indicate those that were entered into the corrective action program. Also include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned to address these effects. See note in paragraph 2a (of this Report) regarding the NRC's change in position on cliff-edge effects.h. Describe any other planned or newly installed flood protection systems or flood mitigation measures including flood barriers that further enhance the flood protection.
Identify results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC SPSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 12 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report 3) METHODOLOGY a) Overview of NEI 12-07 (Walkdown Guidance)In a collaborative effort with NRC staff, NEI developed and issued Report 12-07 [Rev O-A], Guidelines for Performing Verification Walkdowns of Plant Protection Features, dated May 2012[Ref. 2]. The NRC endorsed NEI 12-07 on May 31, 2012 with amendments.
NEI 12-07 was updated to incorporate the amendments and re-issued on June 18, 2012. On June 7, 2012, PSEG issued a letter to the NRC [Ref. 1] stating that the endorsed flooding walkdown procedure
[Ref.2] will be used as the basis for the flooding walkdowns.
NEI 12-07 provides guidance on the following items: Definitions o Incorporated Barrier/Feature o Temporary Barrier/Feature o Exterior Barrier/Feature o Current Licensing Basis (CLB)o Design Bases o Inaccessible o Restricted Access o Deficiency o Flood Protection Features o Reasonable Simulation o Visual Inspection o Cliff-Edge Effects o Available Physical Margin o Variety Of Site Conditions o Flood Duration Scope o Basis for Establishing Walkdown Scope o Identify Flood Protection Features (Walkdown List)Methodology o Develop Walkdown Scope o Prepare Walkdown Packages o Walkdown Team Selection and Training o Perform Pre-Job Briefs o Inspection of Flood Protection and Mitigation Features" General" Incorporated or Exterior Passive Flood Protection Features" Incorporated or Exterior Active Flood Protection Features" Temporary Passive Flood Protection Features" Temporary Active Flood Protection Features" Procedure Walk-through and Reasonable Simulation o Review of The Maintenance and Monitoring of Flood Protection Features SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC SPSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 13 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report o Review of Operating Procedures o Documentation of Available Physical Margins o Documenting Possible Deficiencies o Restricted Access, or Inaccessible
- Acceptance Criteria* Evaluation and Reporting Results of the Walkdown* Related Information Sources* Examples* Walkdown Record Form* Sample Training Content* Walkdown Report b) Application of NEI 12-07 PSEG's approach to the flooding walkdowns included three phases: Phase 1 -Preparation, Training, Data Gathering, and Scoping All walkdown team members completed the applicable NANTeL training and testing.Data gathering began with identification of station-specific licensing commitments and station design basis relative to external flooding events. This included review of the SGS UFSAR [Ref.13], identification of drawings showing flood protection features and review of station procedures and calculations relative external flooding events. A walkdown scope was developed to ensure station features credited as performing a flood protection function in the current licensing basis would be inspected.
Based on the walkdown scope, a walkdown list per building was prepared identifying the specific features to be inspected.
Walkdown packages per building room / floor were prepared for the specific features contained within those areas for use by the walkdown team in performing and documenting the walkdown.The scope developed for the walkdowns at SGS included the following: " The Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) flood barrier surfaces, e.g., walls, floors, and ceilings.
The scope included the inspection of all exterior surface penetrations, as well as any active flood protection feature within the SWIS, e.g., sump pumps, check valves, doors and hatches.* Powerblock (SGS Auxiliary Building, Main Steam / Feedwater Penetration Areas, and Fuel Handling Building) flood barrier surfaces, e.g. walls, floors, and ceilings up to Elevation 130 feet PSD. The SGS Containment portion of the reactor building was not included in the inspection scope because its exterior walls and the floor are credited with leak tightness based on the periodic Integrated Leak Rate Testing." The potential for conduits from manholes or cable vaults to provide a path for ground water or rain water to enter safety related buildings was considered relative to the walkdown scope. For penetrations located within flood barrier surfaces, the plant information database SAP was reviewed to determine and include those SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC S jact 0 PSEGSL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 14 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report penetrating commodities which originate within the flood barrier and terminate exterior to the flood barrier.An outdoor walkdown was conducted to ensure no topography changes, added structures or security barriers affected site drainage as described in the CLB.Phase 2 -Inspections and Reasonable Simulations Inspections of credited walkdown features were performed by the walkdown team following the guidance provided in NEI 12-07. Where potential deficiencies or other conditions were identified, these findings were documented and entered into the station CAP. The performance of a reasonable simulation was performed for the implementation procedure SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001(Q), "Adverse Environmental Conditions"[Ref. 18]).Phase 3 -Final Reporting This Report has been developed to document the implementation of the program and to respond to the 50.54(f) information request regarding NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Flooding.c) Reasonable Simulations The purpose of reasonable simulations is to verify required flood protection procedures or activities can be executed as specified/written.
SGS relies on active incorporated watertight doors to function in a flooding event. To ensure that these active incorporated flood protection features are functional (closed / sealed) for an imminent flooding event, SGS Procedures:
OP-AA-108-111-1001 "Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines" [Ref. 17] and SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001(Q) "Adverse Environmental Conditions" [Ref. 18] identify the performance of manual /operator actions intended to mitigate or protect against external flooding.Per NEI 12-07 [Ref. 2], reasonable simulation includes the following: " Verify that any credited time dependent activities can be completed in the time required.Time dependent activities include detection (some signal that the event will occur, has occurred, or is occurring), recognition (by someone who will notify the plant), communication (to the control room), and action (by plant staff)." Verify that specified equipment/tools are properly staged and in good working condition." Verify that connection/installation points are accessible." Verify that the execution of the activity will not be impeded by the event it is intended to mitigate or prevent. For example, movement of equipment across unpaved areas on the site could be impeded by soft soil conditions created by excessive water." Review the reliance on the station staff to execute required flood protection features.
If during the review several activities are identified to rely on station staff, then perform and document an evaluation of the aggregate effect on the station staff to demonstrate all actions can be completed as required.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 15 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report" Verify that all resources needed to complete the actions will be available. (Note that staffing assumptions must be consistent with site access assumptions in emergency planning procedures.)" Show that the execution of the activity will not be impeded by other adverse conditions that could reasonably be expected to simultaneously occur (for example, winds, lightning, and extreme air temperatures).-" Personnel/departments that have responsibility for supporting or implementing the procedure should participate in the simulation effort." The simulation should demonstrate that the personnel assigned to the procedure do not have other duties that could keep them from completing their flood protection activities during an actual event. Actions that would be performed in parallel during an event should be simulated in parallel; not checked individually and the results combined." Reasonable simulation need not require the actual performance of the necessary activities if they have been previously performed and documented or it is periodically demonstrated and documented that the activities can be completed in the credited time.d) Walkdown Inspection Guidance The "Walkdown Inspection Guidance" as provided in NEI 12-07 [Ref. 2] was used to provide inspection guidance for specific features that are applicable to SGS. These applicable features are listed below.* Incorporated or Exterior Passive Features: o Earthen Features (i.e., Flood Protection Dike)o Concrete and Steel Structures
/Surfaces o Wall, Ceiling, and Floor Seals (e.g. Penetration Seals)o Floor Hatches* Incorporated or Exterior Active Features: o Credited Water Tight Doors o Pumps o Water Level Indication o Check Valves" Temporary Passive Features: o N/A" Temporary Active Feature o Pumps SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC o PSEG NUCLEAR LLC Salem Generating Station Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 November 21, 2012 Page No. 16 of 44 4) REQUESTED CONTENT a) Design Basis Flood Hazard Level(s)i) NRC Request Describe the design basis flood hazard level(s)for allflood-causing mechanisms, including groundwater ingress.* Identify allflood hazards that were evaluated in the site's design basis and the flood level resulting from each. Identify hazards that were screened out.* Note that some flood hazards may be limiting for flood level and some for other considerations such as warning time and dynamic loading.* Describe any key assumptions (e.g., all culverts were assumed blocked).* Include information on the methodology used in developing the design basis flooding hazard.* If differences or contradictions in flood hazard levels were found in design or licensing basis documentation, include a description of the basis for flood level used [Ref. 1].ii) SGS Response The bounding site flood event is based on hurricane induced surge and wave flooding.
No other possible sources of flooding exceed the hurricane flood level; hence, station design is predicated upon the worst possible Probable Maximum Hurricane (PMH) meteorological event.The maximum stillwater level associated with the PMH surge at the safety related structures and equipment is Elevation 113.8 feet PSD. The wave runup elevations on safety-related structures inside the sea wall are calculated to be a maximum of 120.4 feet PSD.The maximum wave run up elevation on the service water intake structure is calculated to be 127.3 feet PSD.Structure Max. Stillwater Level Max. Wave Runup Elevation PSD [feet] PSD [feet]* Powerblock Structures 113.8 120.4" Intake Structure 113.8 127.3 Descriptions of the design basis flood hazard level(s) for all flood-producing mechanisms, including groundwater ingress, as described in the SGS UFSAR Section 2.4, are summarized below.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 PSLEA Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 17 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report (1) Probable Maximum Flood For SGS, the probable maximum flood due to river flooding is bounded by the hurricane flood level and is not applicable, per SGS UFSAR Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.5 [Ref. 13].(2) Probable Maximum Precipitation The maximum probable rainfall is of consideration only in design of yard drainage facilities and as a possible loading on critical structures, not as it may pertain to river flooding.
The Yard Drainage System is designed to pass the drainage associated with a rainfall rate of 4 inches per hour for a period of 20 minutes (based on 90 percent runoff from paved areas and 50 percent runoff from graded areas). This rainfall intensity has a return frequency of 15 years (see SGS UFSAR Figure 2.4-5 [Ref. 13]) and therefore, an unusually severe storm producing a rainfall rate in excess of 4 inches per hour for time periods of less than 20 minutes can be handled by the system.In the unlikely event that the Yard Drainage System was to be loaded beyond its capacity, the excess water would accumulate and run off (surface run off to the river) as the storm subsided.
All doors and penetrations in the Class I (seismic) buildings are watertight up to Elevation 115 feet (PSD). As a point of reference, the flood door threshold elevations are minimum 100 feet PSD, and the site grade adjacent to the Seismic Category I structures is 99.5 feet PSD. The interior drains in the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Buildings are independently piped to the Liquid Waste Disposal System and are not connected to the Yard Drainage System.Roof drains are designed to dispose of a maximum rainfall rate of 4 inches per hour for a period of 20 minutes through the Yard Drainage System. Roof slabs are watertight to prevent building interiors from being damaged by severe rainstorms.
The slabs are designed to withstand a loading equivalent to a depth of water up to the full height of the building's parapet or roof curb. In the unlikely event that some of the roof drains become plugged, the backed up water will spill down the outside of the building.
Wall penetrations above Elevation 115 feet (PSD) on Class I (seismic) buildings are designed to prevent roof spillage or heavy rain from seeping inside the building.In the event the capacity of the Yard Drainage System were to be exceeded as a result of an unusually severe rainstorm, the excess water would accumulate in puddles in the vicinity of the catch basins and run off. This water would not enter any safety-related structure, since these structures are watertight up to Elevation 115 feet (PSD).Therefore, safety-related equipment would not be adversely affected as a result of a severe rainstorm.
(3) Potential Dam Failures For SGS, the potential dam failures are not applicable, see SGS UFSAR Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.4 [Ref. 13].SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 PSLEA Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 18 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report (4) Probable Maximum Surge and Seiche Flooding (Design Basis Flooding Hazard)The maximum stillwater elevation at the site is based on a combination of the storm surge and the crosswind setup or drawdown.
The Maximum Postulated Storm surge elevations have been calculated for the six fetches chosen and are presented in SGS UFSAR Table 2.4-1 [Ref. 13] with the computed crosswind setup and the maximum stillwater elevation at the site. The associated PMH was located so as to produce maximum waves. In the vicinity of the site, the PMH winds had a maximum sustained wind velocity of 85 miles per hour from the southeast.
With the surge level at 113.8 feet PSD, wave runup elevations on safety-related structures inside the sea wall were calculated to be a maximum of 120.4 feet PSD. Maximum wave run up elevation on the service water intake structure was calculated to be 127.3 feet PSD. The following sections summarize the SGS UFSAR discussion of the calculation of the PMH maximum storm surge, the maximum stillwater level, and maximum wave run up elevations.(a) Probable Maximum Winds and Associated Meteorological Parameters PMH storm surges have been calculated for the site using the bathystropic storm tide theory described by Marinos and Woodward (1968) (SGS UFSAR Section 2.4 Ref. 1) [Ref. 13]. The hurricane surge was computed at the mouth of Delaware Bay and routed up the bay in accordance with a method described by Bretschneider (1959) (SGS UFSAR Section 2.4 Ref. 2) [Ref. 13].Components of the stillwater level are: 1. the mean low water depth, 2. the astronomical tide, 3. the rise in water level resulting from the hurricane's atmospheric pressure reduction, 4. the wind stress component perpendicular to the bottom contours (onshore wind components), 5. the wind stress component parallel to the bottom contours which produces a longshore flow that is deflected to the right (in the northern hemisphere) by the Coriolis forces, and 6. the initial surge (a slow general rise in sea level existing before the actual hurricane winds arrive).The PMH is defined by the U. S. Department of Commerce Report HUR 7-97 (SGS UFSAR Section 2.4.14 Ref. 3) [Ref. 13] as: "A hypothetical hurricane having that combination of characteristics which will make it the most severe that can probably occur in the particular region involved.The hurricane should approach the point under study along a critical path and at an SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 PSLEA Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 19 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report optimum rate of movement." Indices used to calculate maximum storm surge are taken in part from HUR 7-97 where values are grouped according to defined coastal zones.and by latitude within each zone.The track of the postulated hurricane is shown on SGS UFSAR Figure 2.4-6 [Ref. 13].Two different forward speeds of translation were used to determine the effect that the rate of forward movement of the hurricane would have on the surge elevation.
The PMH utilized in the analyses was a large radius, moderate forward speed hurricane which generated the maximum surge on the open coast. The quantitative meteorological parameters describing the PMH are: 1. Central Pressure Index: 27.09 inches Hg 2. Peripheral Pressure:
30.72 inches Hg 3. Radius of Maximum Winds: 39 nautical miles 4. Maximum Wind Speed: 132 miles per hour 5. Forward Speed: 27 knots A computer program was developed by Dames and Moore using previous work by the Galveston District Corps of Engineers.
Input data to the computer program describing the storm and the bathymetric conditions included the basic parameters of the hurricane, an initial surge of 1 foot, wind friction factor, bottom friction factor (0.008), wind speed at various radial distances and angles of wind direction relative to the translational velocity vector of the hurricane, bathymetric traverse data and astronomical tide (5.6 feet).Winds which approach the site from a direction off the axis of the bay produce a component which is perpendicular to the axis of the bay. This cross-wind component causes the water surface to be raised on the upwind side of the bay and depressed an equal amount on the downwind side of the bay.As the PMH is moved along its postulated track, wind speed and direction at the site change because of the effects of friction and filling over land and also because of the position of the storm center with respect to the site. The cross-wind effects were calculated for the six wind directions chosen for analysis.
The six wind directions or fetches radiate downbay from the site at 15-degree intervals from the east bank of Delaware Bay.The calculations consist of determining the corrected wind speed along the fetch, the cross-wind component of the wind speed, and the resulting cross-wind setup or drawdown.
A summary. of the calculations for each of the fetches is presented in SGS UFSAR Table 2.4-1 [Ref. 13].The wind speed was corrected to include the effect of the fetch distance from the storm center and also for friction and filling overland.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 NULEA Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 20 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report The computed maximum surge elevation at the mouth of Delaware Bay was 21.9 feet above mean low water. This surge included the effects of the astronomical high spring tide.The maximum surge of 21.9 feet above mean low water at the mouth of Delaware Bay was routed to the site using the procedure of Bretschneider.
The model surge hydrographs for Delaware Bay computed by Bretschneider were then used to determine hurricane surge values at the Salem site as a function of time.The maximum stillwater elevation at the site is a combination of the storm surge and the crosswind setup or drawdown.
Storm surge elevations have been calculated for the six fetches chosen and are presented in SGS UFSAR Table 2.4-1[Ref. 13] with the computed crosswind setup and the maximum stillwater elevation at the site. The six wind fetches radiate downbay from the site at 15-degree intervals from the east bank of the Delaware Bay. Subsequently, site hydrologic design parameters were developed using a maximum surge elevation of 113.8 feet PSD, as recommended by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission consultants.(b) Wave Action The primary factors influencing the generation of waves will be the maximum wind speed over the water, the effective fetch length, and the average depth of water along the fetch. The values of these parameters used in the computations of wave heights and periods were determined for the fetches analyzed by: 1. Determining the location of the center of the storm required to produce winds along the fetch, 2. Calculating corrected wind speeds to account for friction and filling over the land and distance from the storm center to the fetch center, 3. Calculating the still water elevation at the center of the fetch due to storm surge at the time the storm center is located to produce the maximum wind speed along the pre-selected fetch, 4. Computing the average depth along the fetch.The basic assumptions used in the analyses were: 1. Storm generated waves from the open sea are dissipated at the mouth of Delaware Bay.2. Steady state waves are generated along each fetch (these waves are independent of time).3. Only the area northwest of Ben Davis Point generates significant wave energy at the site.The PMH was located so as to produce maximum waves. In the vicinity of the site, the PMH winds had a maximum sustained wind velocity of 85 miles per hour from SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 0 PSEG Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 21 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report the southeast.
With the surge level at 113.8 feet PSD, wave runup elevations on safety-related structures inside the sea wall were calculated to be a maximum of 120.4 feet PSD. Maximum wave run up elevation on the service water intake structure was calculated to be 127.3 feet PSD.(c) Resonance As a result of the nature of the estuary upon which the site is located, resonance was not a necessary consideration.(d) Runup The maximum wave runup elevation was calculated to be +120.4 feet PSD on critical structures inside the sea wall and 127.3 feet PSD on the service water intake structure.
The Sainflou method was used, assuming a minimum sea wall height of Elevation 108 feet PSD in the most critical area.(5) Probable Maximum Tsunami Flooding The occurrence of tsunamis is infrequent in the Atlantic Ocean. Other than the tidal fluctuation recorded on the New Jersey Coast during the Grand Banks earthquake of 1929, there has been no record of tsunamis on the northeastern United States coast.The earthquake of November 18, 1929, on the Grand Banks about 170 miles south of Newfoundland, resulted in a tsunami which struck the south end of Newfoundland about 750 miles northeast of the Massachusetts coast. The tsunami occurred at a time of abnormally high tide and resulted in some loss of life and destruction of property.
The effect of this tsunami was recorded on tide gages along the United States east coast, as far south as Charleston, South Carolina.
A tidal fluctuation of approximately nine-tenths of one foot was noted at Atlantic City, New Jersey and Ocean City, Maryland.The Lisbon earthquake of November 1, 1755, produced great waves, which contributed heavily to the destruction on the coast of Portugal.
These waves were noticeable in the West Indies. It had been reported that the Cape Ann, Massachusetts, earthquake of November 18, 1755, caused a tsunami in Saint Martin's Harbor in the West Indies;however, there is no record of a tsunami occurrence along the east coast of the United States at this time and it has since been determined that the Saint Martin's Harbor report actually refers to the tsunami caused by the Lisbon earthquake, which occurred within three weeks of the Cape Ann shock. Some tsunami activity has occasionally followed earthquakes in the Caribbean, but none of these was reported in the United States.There is no evidence of surface rupture in East Coast earthquakes and no history of significant tsunami activity in the region. Hence, we do not believe that the plant site would be subjected to any significant tsunami effect. The maximum expected tsunami would result in only minor wave action, and the maximum expected storm wave effect is the critical factor in design.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 22 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report (6) Ice Flooding The SGS CLB does not address flooding potential for ice-induced flooding.(7) Groundwater Table Normal ground water table for the site is at Elevation 96 feet PSD.(8) Differences or Contradictions in Flood Hazard Levels No differences or contradictions were identified.
b) Protection Mitigation Features Considered in the Licensing Basis I) NRC Request Describe protection and mitigation features that are considered in the licensing basis evaluation to protect against external ingress of water into SSCs important to safety." Describe the flooding licensing basis including what plant configurations (modes of operation;for example, full power operations, startup, shutdown, and refueling) were considered.
This description should be consistent with the scope of the flooding walkdowns.
- Document the flood duration assumed in the CLB. If the CLB does not provide information on the flood duration, this lack of information should be documented in the walkdown report.* Describe the flood protection features that are credited in the CLB, such as incorporated, exterior and temporary barriers, time required for credited actions under flood conditions, active flood protection features, procedures, warnings credited for external floods, site drainage plan, etc." Describe weather conditions or flood levels that trigger procedures and associated actions for providing flood protection and mitigation.
- Describe the adverse weather conditions that were assumed concurrent with flood protection features and associated actions.ii) SGS Response (1) Flooding Licensing Basis The design-basis flooding event is applicable to all modes of operation (e.g., full power operations, reduced power operations, startup, hot shutdown, cold shutdown, and refueling).
The design-basis flood is the result of the PMH surge with wave runup. The PMH was located so as to produce maximum waves. In the vicinity of the site, the PMH winds had a maximum sustained wind velocity of 85 miles per hour from the southeast.
With the surge level at 113.8 feet PSD, wave runup elevations on safety-related SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEGSL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 23 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report structures inside the sea wall were calculated to be a maximum of 120.4 feet PSD.Maximum wave run up elevation on the service water intake structure was calculated to be 127.3 feet PSD.(2) Flood Duration Assumed in the CLB The expected duration of the site flooding associated with the PMH event is not identified in the SGS UFSAR / CLB.The SGS flood protection features are however designed to be permanent and are therefore not dependent on the flood duration.(3) Flood Protection Features that are Credited in the CLB (a) Incorporated or Exterior Passive Flood Protection Features Safety-related equipment required for cold shutdown is located inside the containment, service water intake, Auxiliary Building, and main steam and feedwater pipe penetration areas. The containment is watertight and can withstand the static and dynamic loads associated with a storm producing stillwater level of 113.8 feet PSD and the corresponding wave runup to 120.4 feet PSD.The portion of the service water intake enclosing the pumps, motors, and vital switchgear is watertight up to Elevation 126.0 feet PSD with wave runup protection to Elevation 128.0 feet PSD. The service water intake can also withstand the static and dynamic effects of the storm. Each vertical, turbine type service water pump column bowl and suction bell is installed in an individual chamber which is open to the river. The chamber is isolated from the watertight compartments where the pump discharge heads and motors are located. The pump discharge heads are bolted down to pads to Elevation 92.5 feet PSD. The joint between the pump discharge head and the pad at Elevation 92.5 feet PSD is watertight to prevent leakage of water into the compartments.
Provisions have also been made to prevent leakage from the discharge head glands and leakoff connections into the watertight compartments.
A sump pump is provided in each compartment to remove any accumulated water in the event a minor leak should occur.The Auxiliary Building is watertight up to Elevation 115 feet PSD. All doors in the outer Auxiliary Building walls below Elevation 120.4 feet PSD are watertight.
All watertight doors and structural walls can withstand the static and dynamic effects associated with a storm that produces a stillwater level of Elevation 113.8 feet PSD with wave runup to Elevation 120.4 feet PSD. Conduit penetrations above Elevation 115 feet PSD and below Elevation 120.4 feet PSD are packed to eliminate gross inleakage during the storm.The main steam and feedwater pipe penetration area is watertight below Elevation 120.4 feet PSD. The structural walls and watertight doors are also capable of SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG Report No.: SL-2012-10795 NULEA Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 24 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report withstanding the static and dynamic effects of the storm which produces a stillwater level of Elevation 113.8 feet PSD and wave runup to Elevation 120.4 feet PSD.All flood barrier penetrations in the Class I (seismic) buildings are watertight up to Elevation 115 feet (PSD).The buoyancy effect of ground water has been included in the assessment of the sliding and overturning potential of the Category I structures.
Hydrostatic loadings from the hurricane condition were applied to the structures to check their stability.
The design and placement of the protective rockfill dike located along the portion of the Delaware estuary is such that it is subjected to maximum wind wave forces, thereby limiting the wave runup levels at the safety related structures and equipment to Elevation 120.4 feet PSD.The protective dikes are south of the power block between the Salem barge slip and the Salem circulating water intake structure, between the Salem circulating water and service water intake structures, and North of the Salem service water intake structu re.The shoreline protection and dike system is inspected by station operating personnel prior to storms and hurricanes and following the passage of such storms and hurricanes.
Additionally, a more complete annual inspection is conducted both by boat and from the dike itself. The station security forces also make regular patrols of these areas as part of their surveillance duties, and are instructed to report any abnormalities observed in the structure.
Waterproofing The underground portion of the containment structure is waterproofed in order to avoid seepage of ground water through cracks in the concrete.
The waterproofing consists of an impervious membrane which is placed under the mat and on the outside of the walls and extends vertically up to six (6) inches below yard grade. The Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomers (by Uniroyal, Inc.) membrane will not tear in handling or placing of backfill against it.(b) Incorporated or Exterior Active Flood Protection Features Watertight Doors In the event of rising water levels, all watertight doors will be closed to maintain watertight integrity.
SGS Technical Specifications specify the flood levels at which (1) watertight integrity will be established (at which time flood protection procedures will be initiated on a site-wide basis to protect the plant from flood waters) and (2) plant shutdown will be initiated.
All flood barrier doors in the Class I (seismic) buildings are watertight up to Elevation 115 feet (PSD).SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG NUCLEAR LLC Salem Generating Station Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 November 21, 2012 Page No. 25 of 44 Closure of the Technical Specification Protective Doors is controlled administratively when the River Water Level exceeds Elevation 97.5 feet PSD per SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001(Q) "Adverse Environmental Conditions" [Ref. 18]. The list of Technical Specification Protective Doors is provided in SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001 Attachment 1.(c) Temporary Passive Flood Protection Features Temporary Passive Flood Protection Features are not credited in the SGS CLB.(d) Temporary Active Flood Protection Features In the event of a major storm, which may be expected to cause flooding of the site, a number of temporary sump pumps will be available to remove any water which may enter the SGS Auxiliary Building.
The minimum total capacity of these temporary pumps will be 2000 gpm and each pump will be capable of pumping from the lowest building elevation to above Elevation 121 feet PSD.(4) Weather Conditions or Flood Levels that Trigger Procedures and Associated Actions for Providing Flood Protection and Mitigation Specific plant actions in response to potential flooding conditions are addressed in three procedures: " OP-AA-108-111-1001, "Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines" [Ref. 17]" SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001(Q), "Adverse Environmental Conditions
[Ref. 18]" SGS Technical Specifications
[Ref. 20]OP-AA-108-111-1001
[Ref. 17] provides guidelines for actions to be taken in preparation for potential flooding events. Specific actions /preparations identified within OP-AA-108-111-1101
[Ref. 17] for potential flooding are summarized below; the timing refers to hours prior to the expected arrival time of a severe weather event.Phase / time Action(s)I / Once a Year
- Review out of service equipment logs focusing on SBO equipment (May) and sump pumps to determine where redundancy may be needed.Ensure work is prioritized to promptly restore such equipment to an operable status.* Ensure Material Center has adequate sump pumps totaling 2000 gpm to supply additional sump pumps staged in the material center." Ensure that adequate water removal pumps, hoses, drain plugs... are available and prestaged in the material center.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC o PSEG NUCLEAR LLC Salem Generating Station Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 November 21, 2012 Page No. 26 of 44 Phase / time Action(s)II / 48 hrs" Verify any/all intake structure sump pumps operable." Review plant work activities having breaches that could cause flooding in the plant due to flood tides; (any high risk system manways or pipe openings).
Direct Maintenance to provide water tight closings for these areas." Consider implementation of SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001(Q)
[Ref. 18]." Initiate Notification to Mechanical
/ Civil Design to perform a shoreline protection and dike system inspection prior to and following a hurricane and to document the inspection in a notification.
- Verify all watertight doors are secured." Consider maximizing room in the Waste Holdup tanks (WHUTs) to support potential water intrusion into the Aux. building III / 24 hrs
- Close Watertight doors listed in SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001(Q)
[Ref. 18]IV / present
- Consider implementation of SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001(Q)
[Ref. 18]The specific actions identified within SC.OP-AB.ZZ-O001(Q)
[Ref. 18] along with their associated River Water level have been reiterated below: SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 27 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report River Level Action(s)>95.5 ft 2 Evaluate the need to move sump pumps as required by OP-AA-108-111-1001 [Ref. 17] to a flood protected area.* Close 1WD74 Seismic Gap Drain Isolation Valve -* Close 2WD74 Seismic Gap Drain Isolation Valve* Send Operators to inspect the following areas for seal or excessive crack leakage which could cause flooding in rooms containing safety related equipment:
o Auxiliary Building o Fuel Handling Building o Service Water Intake Structure o Outer Penetration Area o Inner Penetration Area>97.5 ft 2 Notify SM/CRS to refer to Event Classification Guide* Record river level in Control Room Narrative Log, at least every 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, until river has stabilized at < 97.5 ft.* Close all doors listed in Attachment 1, Technical Specification Protective Doors, within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.* Post signs on all Attachment I listed Protective Doors, to maintain closed.* If Containment Equipment Hatch is open then o Remove obstructions from inner Containment Equipment Hatch and install inner Containment Hatch with all bolts to eliminate air gaps o Or install Outage Equipment.Hatch and ensure all penetrations are closed or blind flanged to eliminate air gaps." Send Maintenance Service Department to close and seal all access hatches and manway covers listed on Attachment 2, Protective Doors." Send Operators to close all doors listed in Attachment 2, Protective Doors and post signs on all watertight doors indicating following passage, door closure is required lAW SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001(Q), Adverse Environmental Conditions.
[Ref. 18]2 SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001(Q) states in paragraph 2.5.9 of the therein attached Technical Basis Document, "Engineering Evaluation SC-SW004-01 determined loop uncertainties could affect the control room indications by as much as 2 feet. Therefore, action levels are adjusted to account for this uncertainty".
SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DO0 0 PSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 28 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report River Level Action(s)> 98.5 ft 2
- Initiate actions to place the Unit in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.SGS Technical Specification 3.7.5.1 initiates actions based on river water level measured at the Service Water Intake Structure exceeding a predetermined Elevation 10.5 ft Mean Sea Level, which is equal to 99.5 ft PSD, as follows: "Flood protection shall be provided for all safety related systems, components and structures when the water level of the Delaware River exceeds 10.5' Mean Sea Level USGS datum, at the service water intake structure.""a. With the water level at the service water intake structure above elevation 10.5' Mean Sea Level USGS datum, close all watertight doors within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.b. With the water level at the service water intake structure above elevation 11.5' Mean Sea Level USGS datum, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. " (5) Adverse Weather Conditions that were Assumed Concurrent with Flood Protection Features and Associated Actions The design-basis flood for SGS is the result of the PMH surge with wave runup. Per SGS UFSAR 2.4.5.1, the PMH utilized in the analyses was a large radius, moderate forward speed hurricane which generated the maximum surge on the open coast. In the vicinity of the site, the PMH winds have a maximum sustained wind velocity of 85 miles per hour from the southeast.
See paragraph 4 a)ii)(4)(a) for further discussion on the Probable Maximum Winds and associated meteorological parameters.
With the surge level at 113.8 feet PSD, wave runup elevations on safety-related structures inside the sea wall are calculated to be a maximum of 120.4 feet PSD. Maximum wave run up elevation on the service water intake structure is calculated to be 127.3 feet PSD. The associated actions are addressed above in Paragraph (4).c) Warning Systems to Detect the Presence of Water i) NRC Request Describe any warning systems to detect the presence of water in rooms important to safety.* Describe the room water level warning systems credited for their flood protection function in the plant's external flooding licensing basis.* Note that systems that detect internal flooding sources are not part of the scope of the walkdown.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC SPSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 29 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report ii) SGS Response (1) Floor Drains / Level Alarms No temporary or installed permanent plant warning system is credited with a flood protection function in the SGS external flooding licensing basis. During adverse weather conditions, Operators, per paragraph 3.9.2 of SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001(Q) "Adverse Environmental Conditions" [Ref. 18], are instructed to monitor plant areas (rooms containing safety related equipment) for water ingress (seal or excessive crack leakage).Flood alarms installed and credited for internal flooding sources are available for detecting the accumulation of water resulting from ingress; however they are not credited for their flood protection function in the plants external flooding licensing basis. Such flooding alarms (sump level) are located in the Service Water Intake Structure bays as well in the Auxiliary Building.The design of the watertight pump compartments in the intake structure include a high sump level alarm in the event that a pipe rupture occurs which is larger than the capacity of the sump pump (125 gpm). The high sump level for the affected compartment is alarmed in the control room.Each residual heat removal pump room, the lowest point in the Auxiliary Building, contains two sump pumps, each adequate to provide the minimum capacity of 50 gpm (nominal 100 gpm each), which discharge to the Waste Disposal System. The design operating leakage rate of the RHR System is 50 gpm due to a pump seal failure. In the event of a major storm, which may be expected to cause flooding of the site, a number of temporary sump pumps are made available to remove any excess water which may enter the building.
The minimum total capacity of these temporary pumps is 2000 gpm and each pump is capable of pumping from the lowest building elevation to above Elevation 121 feet.In the Auxiliary Building the floor drains at Elevations 84 feet, 100 feet and 122 feet are piped to the waste holdup tanks. Elevation 64 foot drains are piped to the waste holdup tanks via the Auxiliary Building sump tanks and sump tank pumps. All drains below the elevation of the Auxiliary Building sump tank drain ultimately to the waste holdup tank. In addition, stairwells descending to elevation 55 feet PSD will also facilitate distribution of ground / flood water due to ingress to the RHR sumps.(2) Procedural Plant procedures provide direction for all plant personnel to report observed leakage in order to facilitate appropriate corrective action. Plant procedures (OP-AA-111-101-1001, "Use and Development of Operating Logs", S1(2).OP-DL.ZZ-0006(Q), "Primary Plant Log" and S1(2).OP-DL.ZZ-0005(Q), "Secondary Plant Log") provide direction for SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC a
- OSL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 30 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report Operators on their routine inspections during their watch to report observed leakage, to facilitate appropriate corrective action.d) Effectiveness of Flood Protection Features i) NRC Request Discuss the effectiveness of flood protection systems and exterior, incorporated, and temporary flood barriers.
Discuss how these systems and barriers were evaluated using the acceptance criteria developed as part of Requested Information Item 1.h.* The purpose of the 2.3 walkdowns is to verify the conformance with the CLB; the adequacy of the CLB will be addressed as part of the 2.1 flood reevaluations if an integrated assessment is required." The acceptance criteria for the walkdowns are described in section 6 of the guideline.
This approach is consistent with requested information item 1.h of the 50.54(f) letter.Discuss how the plant implemented this approach.* This discussion should include an evaluation of the overall effectiveness of the plant's flood protection features to perform their credited functions during a variety of site conditions (as defined previously), as determined by the results of the walkdowns (the features are available, functional, and implementable).
The CAP [corrective action program] process will determine which of the walkdown observations are deficiencies and what actions were taken or planned to address them. Questions such as the following should be evaluated for a variety of site conditions:
-Is the barrier system functional?
-Are operator actions feasible?* Describe how other existing plant equipment, structures, and procedures might mitigate the effects of an external flood under a variety of plant configurations.
- Clearly describe what additional existing, if any, plant structures, systems, components, and procedures that are not part of the flooding CLB and that could be used to mitigate an external flood. Note that the Walkdown Report should include a description of existing plant capability, not an assessment of plant vulnerabilities to flooding that might exist under all susceptible plant configurations.
The assessment of plant vulnerabilities to all susceptible plant configurations will be completed, if applicable, as part of an Integrated Assessment performed in response to Enclosure 2 of Ref. 1.* Note: NUMARC 93-01, Rev 4A provides guidance on implementation of the maintenance rule. Section 11.3.4.2 of that document recommends an assessment of maintenance activities that expose SSCs to flood hazards in a manner that degrades their capability to perform key safety functions.
Credit for this activity could be included in this discussion.
SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 31 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report ii) SGS Response (1) Purpose of the Walkdowns The purpose of the flood protection feature walkdown was to verify the conformance of exterior and incorporated flood protection features with the CLB.In addition to the visual component of the flood protection feature walkdown, a review of the preventative maintenance and surveillance programs was performed.
The purpose of the review was to validate that the credited features were contained in a program that would ensure their continued conformance with the CLB.The results of the flood protection feature walkdown investigation will be reviewed against the hazard reevaluation, as required, after the reassessment of flooding levels.If determined by the flood hazard reevaluation that an integrated assessment is warranted, a further evaluation of the adequacy of the CLB will be performed as result of the integrated assessment.
(2) Acceptance Criteria The acceptance criteria for visual inspections performed during the SGS flood protection feature walkdowns were taken from the general acceptance criteria provided within the NEI 12-07 Section 6 and Appendix A [Ref. 1] guidance.
These criteria were used, as applicable, for each type of SGS flood protection feature listed in Section 4) b) of this report. This approach is consistent with the Requested Information Item 1.h from Enclosure 4 of the 50.54(f) letter.(3) Evaluation of the Overall Effectiveness of the Plant's Flood Protection Features (a) Procedures The review of the flood protection features design and licensing documentation, and subsequent field inspection of the applicable physical flood protection features was implemented per the guidance provided within NEI 12-07. PSEG Nuclear has implemented ER-AA-310-1009 "Condition Monitoring of Structures" [Ref. 15] for condition monitoring of Maintenance Rule structures, such as with regard to the monitoring of flood control features:
concrete walls and slabs, water-control structure elements, penetration seals, etc. Specific instructions regarding the inspection of SGS Penetration seals are addressed in SC.FP-SV.FBR-0026(Q) "Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection." Instruction regarding the inspection and maintenance of the SGS plant bulkhead doors is addressed in: SC.MD-PM.ZZ-0036(Q) "Watertight Door Inspection and Repair" [Ref. 19]. Therein, SC.MD-PM.ZZ-0036(Q) adequately identifies the Technical Specification related doors, requires a review to initiate a Plant Barrier Impairment (evaluation of taking the barrier out of service), and provides adequate notification
/ coordination with the Plant Operators.
SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 32 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report SGS includes active flood protection features (Watertight Perimeter Doors) that require the implementation of procedures to initiate the performance of manual/operator actions (closing of the doors) in order for the feature to perform its intended flood protection function and the staging of temporary sump pumps in a flood protected area.A reasonable simulation was performed at SGS which confirmed that the actions described within the implementing procedure SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001(Q), "Adverse Environmental Conditions" [Ref. 18] can be performed within the required period of time, and sufficient resources are allocated and staged to perform those actions.The SGS UFSAR Section 3.4.3.1 states: "In the event of a major storm, which may be expected to cause flooding of the site, a number of temporary sump pumps are available to remove any water which may enter the building.
The minimum total capacity of these temporary pumps is 2000 gpm and each pump is capable of pumping from the lowest building elevation to above Elevation 121 feet." OP-AA-108-111-1001
[Ref. 17] and SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001(Q)
[Ref. 18] require confirmation that the pumps are available and to evaluate the need to relocate the pumps to a flood protected area in the event of a hurricane or flood. During preparations for Hurricane Sandy (October 28 through 30, 2012), availability of the temporary sump pumps was confirmed, thereby satisfying the UFSAR Section 3.4.3.1 commitment.
A notification has been issued to suggest enhancements to OP-AA-108-111-1001 (20584969) and SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001 (20584978).
It is suggested that the procedures be supplemented with instructions as required to facilitate the implementation of the temporary sump pumps.(b) Accessibility The flood protection features that could be accessed were evaluated against the NEI 12-07 acceptance criteria.
Those features that were found to be restricted or partially accessible were entered into the PSEG CAP, i.e., a Notification was entered in SAP. Attachments C and F of this Report provide a list of the restricted-access features.
as well as the associated Notification number. The plan to perform the inspection of the restricted access flood protection features is provided in the PSEG CAP. Flood protection features classified as inaccessible are identified in Attachments B and E and are discussed in paragraph
- 4) f) of this Report.(c) Effectiveness The SGS Flood Protection Features were found to be in conformance with that described within the CLB. Based on inspection of the installed passive and installed active SGS Flood Protection Features, and the review of the applicable SGS flood protection feature procedures (Abnormal Weather Warning procedure, Abnormal Weather Implementing procedure, preventative maintenance and surveillance procedures) the SGS flood protection features are considered functional, and the cited operator actions are considered appropriate for maintaining flood protection SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 33 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report for SGS. The design of the SGS flood protection features consider protection of safety related SSCs under all plant operating and abnormal conditions considered within the CLB. Discrepancies found between the plant physical configuration and that described in the design / licensing documentation were noted and entered into the PSEG CAP for evaluation and disposition, as identified in Attachments A and D.Paragraph
- 4) f) of this Report provides a detailed discussion of the results from the flood protection feature walkdown program.(4) Other Existing Plant Equipment, Structures, and Procedures that Might Mitigate the Effects of an External Flood under a Variety of Plant Configurations The current basis for protection and mitigation of an external flooding event, including plant equipment, structures, and procedures, is discussed in paragraph
- 4) b) of this Report.No other existing plant equipment, structures, or procedures were identified as being able to mitigate external flooding events that are not already credited in the CLB.(5) Assessment of Maintenance Activities that Expose SSCs to Flood Hazards No maintenance activities were identified that would degrade any of the identified flood protection features from performing their credited function.
The associated preventative maintenance and surveillance programs were evaluated for each feature, with no negative findings.
The implementation procedure, SC.MD-PM.ZZ-0036(Q)
[Ref.19], that closes the SGS watertight doors references CC-AA-201
[Ref. 21], which provides controls for plant barrier impairment.
e) Implementation of the Walkdown Processes i) NRC Request Present information related to the implementation of the walkdown process (e.g., details of selection of the walkdown team and procedures,)
using the documentation template discussed in Requested Information Item 1.J, including actions taken in response to the peer review." Confirm that guidance was followed (and options selected when available within the guidance) and any exceptions taken to the guidance.
See Sections 5.3, 7, Appendix B.* Describe how the walkdown teams were organized (e.g., number of members, general background, etc.). See Sections 5.3 and 7.* Describe the approach used to comply with Section 5.3 guidance on walkdown team selection and training.ii) SGS Response SGS Flood Protection Features walkdowns were implemented in accordance with the guidelines provided in NEI 12-07 [Ref. 2]. The SGS Flooding walkdown teams included a SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 PSLEA Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21., 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No.r34 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report minimum of two (2) qualified individuals (Civil/ Mechanical discipline) per team. See Attachment G for Team organization and member qualifications.
All team members are familiar with the station design / licensing basis relative to external flooding, and completed the training developed by the NEI Fukushima Flooding Task Force as provided by INPO's NANTeL training regarding NEI 12-07 guidelines.
Each team member performed a visual inspection of each feature within the scope of the applicable walkdown package. Walkdown data / results were documented consistent with the guidelines provided within NEI 12-07. Features that were found to be questionable
/degraded or inaccessible
/ partially accessible were identified and were entered into the PSEG CAP for further action.f) Results of the Flood Protection Feature Walkdown i) NRC Request Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed conditions.
Include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned to address these conditions using the guidance in Regulatory Issues Summary 2005-20, Rev 1, Revision to NRC Inspection Manual Port 9900 Technical Guidance, "Operability Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety," including entering the condition in the corrective action program.* Include the following items-Description of all deficiencies as determined by the CAP. Observations that are entered into the CAP and not dispositioned as deficiencies do not need to be reported.-Description of any observations reported in the CAP that were not dispositioned at the time of the report.-Describe actions that were taken or are planned to address the deficiencies using the guidance in Regulatory Issues Summary 2005-20 Revision 1.-Flood protection features that could not be inspected, including:
- Features affected by restricted access (see Section 5.1):-Justification for delay-Schedule-Any necessary special procedures" Inaccessible features (see Section 5.1):-Basis for reasonable assurance that the feature is available and will perform its credited function or an assessment of the impact of non-performance of the function.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 35 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report-If more than one "inaccessible" flood protection feature with potential loss of function is reported, then an evaluation of the aggregate effect flood protection features must be provided.-Walkdown record forms are not submitted to the NRC, but as discussed in Section 7 are retained onsite for NRC inspection.
ii) SGS Response Summary of Findings The plant flood protection features were found to be as described in the CLB (available, functional, and maintained), with the exception of issues that are evaluated as a potential deficiency.
These issues are listed and described in Attachments A and D of this report. In general, the inspection of the flood protection features, confirmed that the SGS credited flood protection features / barriers were found to be in place, in good condition, and capable of performing their design function as credited in the CLB. For the applicable flood protection features which were identified as potential deficiencies during the flood protection feature walkdowns, detailed observations, photographs, and qualitative dispositions were presented for consideration and input into the PSEG CAP process.Those flood protection features listed in Attachments B and E are "Inaccessible" in accordance with the guidelines provided within NEI 12-07 Rev. 0-A [Ref. 2]. A brief evaluation is provided below to provide reasonable assurance that the inaccessible flood protection feature can perform its design function.Those flood protection features listed In Attachments C and F have "Restricted Access" in accordance with the guidelines provided within NEI 12-07 Rev. 0-A. Access to perform the walkdown / inspection is currently prevented due to, typically, plant operating conditions preventing
/ limiting access or full or partial disassembly of plant structures is required to facilitate the inspection.
Flood protection features identified as being restricted access are entered in the PSEG CAP to schedule the performance of a future walkdown and evaluation.
Flood Protection Feature Walkdown Results Number of Features Total Flood Protection Features 2,790 3 Inaccessible Flood Protection Features 9 Restricted Access Flood Protection Features 252 Flood Protection Features Walked-Down 2,526 Total Potential/Actual Deficiencies 512 4 3 Includes 1 Yard Walkdown Structure, and 2 Guideline
/ Abnormal Weather Procedures 4 Includes Materiel Condition issues identified in Att. A and D. This total also include features with apparent negative margin. One notification is included in Att. A to investigate actual margin for these additional features.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 0 PSEG Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 36 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report Flood Protection Feature Types Number of Features Installed Passive 2,691 Installed Active 96 Temporary Passive 0 Temporary Active 1 Procedures 2 (1) Deficiencies For those SGS flood protection features which were identified as having potential deficiency during the flood protection feature walkdowns, detailed observations, photographs, and qualitative dispositions were presented for consideration and input into the PSEG CAP process. A review of the potential deficiencies is performed, as part of the PSEG CAP process, to determine if the potential deficiency is a deficiency.
Potential deficiencies are identified and described in Attachments A and D of this Report for SGS Units 1 and 2, respectively.
Additional reviews to evaluate potential deficiencies and implement corrective actions to rectify the identified discrepancy are addressed within the PSEG CAP process.(2) Description of any Observations Reported in the CAP that were not Dispositioned Attachments A and D of this Report for SGS Units 1 and 2, respectively, include a listing and description of SGS flood protection feature walkdown observations (potential deficiencies) to be entered into the PSEG CAP.(3) Flood Protection Features that could not be Inspected (a) Restricted Access Features Those SGS flood protection features that were found to have restricted access are identified and described in Attachments C and F of this Report for SGS Units 1 and 2, respectively.
Additionally, Attachments C and F provide the justification for a delay in performing the flood protection feature walkdown / inspection and assessment.
The associated plan and schedule for performing the flood protection feature walkdown / inspection and assessment for those SGS flood protection features identified as having restricted access are addressed within the PSEG CAP. It is anticipated that no special procedures will be required to perform the flood protection feature walkdown inspection
/ assessment for those features considered SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEGSL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 37 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report as having restricted access. Identification of the required instructions and criteria will be addressed within the PSEG CAP for the applicable flood protection feature.(b) Inaccessible Features Those SGS flood protection features that were found to be inaccessible are waterproofing, waterstops and items identified in Attachments B and E of this Report for SGS Units 1 and 2, respectively.
These inaccessible features are summarized below, (i) Waterproofing (Common to Unit 1 and Unit 2)The underground portion of the containment structure, auxiliary building and fuel handling buildings are waterproofed in order to avoid seepage of ground water through cracks in the concrete.
The waterproofing consists of an impervious membrane which is placed under the mat and on the outside of the walls. The membrane will not tear in handling or placing of backfill against it.To waterproof the subgrade exterior walls and foundations, a rubber waterproof membrane was installed under all foundations and was extended vertically up to 6 inches below yard grade. The horizontal waterproofing membrane was 1/16-inch thick Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomers (EPDM rubber). The waterproofing membrane used on vertical surfaces was 3/64-inch thick nylon reinforced Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomers (Nylon Fabric Inserted EPDM).Reason Inaccessible The waterproofing is located below grade and as such, ground adjacent to the plant structures would need to be extensively excavated to accommodate an inspection.
Functional Requirement Waterproofing and rubber waterstops prevent or limit water intrusion at the concrete construction joints and seismic gap joints so that safety-related equipment is not impacted by groundwater ingress.Basis for Reasonable Assurance that Feature is Available and Functional As the ground water level is only a few feet below site grade, the waterproofing is subjected to a continuous hydraulic gradient.
The Control Room Alarms are provided on sump level reaching pre-established sump level setpoints.
The ability of the existing waterproofing systems at SGS to perform their design basis function of protecting safety-related equipment from the effects of water ingress is confirmed by the fact that the plant drain system s are not challenged by the ingress of groundwater.
SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 PSLEA Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 38 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report (i) Waterstops (common to Unit 1 and Unit 2)A waterstop is installed at the vertical and horizontal seismic joints between the reactor building to auxiliary building, reactor building to fuel handling building, and auxiliary building to fuel handling building to prevent groundwater and floodwaters from entering safety related structures through the seismic joints.The waterstop consists of a combination of lead coated copper metal flashing, a fabric reinforced silicone rubber gasket / seal, and stainless steel clamping bars secured with anchor bolts and/or keyed in to the concrete structure in reglets with a sealant as applicable.
Reason Inaccessible The waterstop construction is partially visible and a fire barrier would need to be partially disassembled in some areas to accommodate an inspection.
Functional Requirement Waterstops prevent or limit water intrusion past the seismic joints so that safety-related equipment is not impacted by the flood level.Basis for Reasonable Assurance that Feature is Available and Functional Control Room Alarms are provided on sump level reaching pre-established sump level setpoints.
The ability of the existing waterproofing systems at SGS to perform their design basis function of protecting safety-related equipment from the effects of water ingress is confirmed by the fact that the plant drain systems are not challenged by the ingress of groundwater.(ii) Elevator Shaft -Projection Bevel Plates (Common for Unit 1 and Unit 2)(Applicable to Features E-15333-EL 84, E-15333-EL 100, E-15333-EL 122)Two (2) auxiliary building elevator shaft walls have installed steel plate structures that preclude inspection of approximately 20% of one wall per elevator shaft. These plate structures are installed per Safety Code requirements to eliminate a personnel shear hazard at several elevations within the elevator shaft. The plates are installed in locations that are below grade as well locations that are above grade.Reason Inaccessible The plate structures obscure / prevent the observation of approximately 20% of the below grade wall surface. To inspect the wall behind the steel plate structures, the plates would have to be removed. The other sides of the elevator shaft walls are either below grade or are within the seismic gap between the auxiliary building and the containment building; so direct visual inspection is not feasible.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 PSLEA Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No.r39 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report Functional Requirement The wall behind the steel plate structures is part of the auxiliary building flood boundary.
The auxiliary building flood boundary is designed to preclude ground/ flood water intrusion so that safety-related equipment is not impacted by the flood level.Basis for Reasonable Assurance that Feature is Available and Functional The remainder of the wall surfaces were inspected and found to be without visible defects, and no signs of previous water marks on the wall surfaces below the steel structures.
Control Room Alarms are provided on sump level reaching pre-established sump level setpoints.(iii) Pipe Chase.(Applicable to S-15206, W-25206)The exterior walls of the East Pipe Chase are below grade. The East Pipe Chase communicates with the pipe alley on Elevation 84 feet and with the RHR pump room sumps at Elevation 55 feet.Reason Inaccessible The east pipe shafts are accessible from the pipe alley at El. 84, but access is dose restricted.
Functional Requirement The exterior pipe chase walls are below grade and are part of the auxiliary building flood boundary.
The auxiliary building flood boundary is designed to preclude ground / flood water intrusion so that safety-related equipment is not affected.Basis for Reasonable Assurance that Feature is Available and Functional Drainage in the east Pipe Chase is designed for Moderate Energy Line (MEL)Breaks (internal flooding).
MEL Flooding in the RHR pump rooms can occur as a result of MEL fluid from breaks in the pipe alley on Elevation 84 feet which in turn communicates with Elevation 55 feet via a pipe chase. High RHR Sump sump level Alarms in the control room resulting from the ingress and accumulation of ground / external flood water will alert the control room operator to take compensatory action to limit the increase in sump level via the installation of temporary sump pumps.(iv) Penetration Seals Located Inside Concrete (Applicable to E-25504-001, E-25504-002, E-25504-249, E-25504-250)
Reason Inaccessible SGS FLOOD WALKOOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.000 0 PSEGSL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 40 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report The penetration seals are physically located/ embedded in concrete.Functional Requirement Preclude water ingress of water into safety-related areas / structures.
Basis for Reasonable Assurance that Feature is Available and Functional The additional embedment of the penetrating commodities in concrete provides additional length that seeping ground water would have to travel to reach the inside of the room.Control Room Alarms are provided on sump level reaching pre-established sump level setpoints.(c) Inaccessible Feature Aggregate Effects The construction of the seismic category I structures includes several flood protection features configured in series that function to prevent / limit ingress of ground / flood water into the plant. In order for ground water to ingress into the plant several layers of the flood protection features would have to have been compromised
/ failed. Condition Monitoring of Structures via ER-AA-310-1009
[Ref.15] provides assurance that concrete structural elements (e.g., walls, slabs, etc.)remain capable of performing their design function.
As such, there is reasonable assurance that the failure of multiple in-series flood protection features is not likely.Control room alarms are provided on sump level reaching pre-established sump level setpoints.
As such, operator response would limit flood effects and prevent i mpact to safety-related equipment from groundwater ingress. In addition, the CLB identifies the availability of temporary sump pumps, having a total capacity of 2,000 gpm, for use in removing ground / flood water from areas containing safety related equipment.
g) Cliff Edge Effects i) NRC Request Document any cliff-edge effects identified and the associated basis. Indicate those that were entered into the corrective action program. Also include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned to address these effects.* Cliff edge effects and physical margins do not need to be reported to the NRC as part of the Walkdown Report. However, the Appendix B walkdown records, which include the collected APM information, need to be retained and available for NRC audits and inspections.
- While the NRC used the sqme term as the NTTF Report [Ref. 5] in its 50.54(f) information request [Ref. 3] related to Flooding Recommendation 2.3, the information that the NRC expects utilities to obtain during the Recommendation 2.3 walkdowns is different.
To SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEGSL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 41 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report clarify, the NRC is now differentiating between cliff-edge effects (which are dealt with in Recommendation 2.1) and a new term, Available Physical Margin (APM). APM information will be collected during the walkdowns, but will not be reported in the response to Ref. 3, Enclosure
- 4. The APMs determined by the Recommendation 2.3 walkdowns do not involve calculating the cliff-edge effects (i.e., the safety consequences).
During the Recommendation 2.1 integrated assessment, the cliff-edge effects and the associated safety risks will be determined using the APMs as well as other information, such as the specific SSCs that are subjected to flooding and the potential availability of other systems to mitigate the risk.Instead of submitting cliff-edge effects, this report documents that Available Physical Margins have been collected and documented in the Walkdown Record form [Ref. 2 Appendix B]. This information will be used in the flood hazard reevaluations performed in response to Item 2.1: Flooding in the 50.54(f) letter.ii) SGS Response (2) Cliff Edge Effects and Physical Margins As indicated in Section 3.12 of NEI 12-07, the NRC is no longer expecting the response to the Recommendation 2.3: Flooding Walkdowns of the 50.54(f) letter to include an evaluation of cliff-edge effects. The available physical margin (APM) has been estimated and documented, as applicable, in the walkdown record forms. The guidance provided in FAQ-006, Applicable Features for Quantifying APM, was also followed.
This information will be used in the flood hazard reevaluations performed in response to Item 2.1: Flooding in the 50.54(f) letter.h) Other Planned and/or Newly Installed Flood Protection Features or Measures i) NRC Request Describe any other planned or newly installed flood protection systems or flood mitigation measures including flood barriers that further enhance the flood protection.
Identify results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review." Describe changes determined to be necessary by the flood walkdowns and whether they have been completed or their schedule for completion.
- For the purposes of the flooding design basis walkdown verification, the peer review is the process described in section 7. The only actions and results that should be reported are those that resulted in a change to the walkdown process or methodology.
Corrections and resolution of differences resulting from the normal process of performer/ reviewer interaction are not reported.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.D00 SPSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 42 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report ii) SGS Response No new flood protection systems or flood mitigation measures including flood barriers were found necessary to enhance the SGS flood protection.
No changes were found necessary to flood protection or mitigation measures as a result of the SGS Flood Protection Feature Walkdowns.
Attachment H provides a review of changes to the walkdown process /methodology.
- 5) CONCLUSIONS Inspections of the SGS Flood Protection Features were performed in accordance with the NEI 12-07 Rev. OA [Ref. 2]. With the exceptions noted in Attachments A and D for SGS Units 1 and 2, respectively, as potential deficiencies, the SGS Flood Protection Feature Inspections found that the SGS flood protection active and passive features, e.g., walls, floors, roofs, penetration seals, doors, sump pumps, check valves, etc., were confirmed to be installed per design, functional, in good material condition, and appropriately controlled procedurally to ensure continued functionality.
A small portion of the building surfaces (floors and walls) and penetrations within the flood protection feature walkdown scope were deemed to be inaccessible and were not inspected.
Reasonable assurance that these portions of the buildings surfaces and the penetrations in these buildings are acceptable is based on the visual inspection of other similar surfaces and penetrations in similar elevations within these buildings, which revealed no potential deficiencies or degradation that would prevent performance of flood protection features.
No visible signs of leakage were observed in the vicinity of those inaccessible flood protection features located below grade.Performance of the walkdowns provided confirmation that flood protection features are in place, are in good condition and will perform as credited in the current licensing basis (CLB). Minor issues were identified under the PSEG CAP. No operability concerns were identified.
Attachments A and D of this Report for SGS Units 1 and 2, respectively, identify and provide a summary of the potential deficiencies that have not yet been dispositioned.
Attachments B and E of this Report for SGS Units 1 and 2, respectively, identify and provide a summary of the features that have been determined to be inaccessible.
Attachments C and F of this Report for SGS Units 1 and 2, respectively, identify and provide a summary of the features that have been determined to have restricted access. Planning to perform the required flood protection feature walkdown / assessments is addressed within the PSEG CAP.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 43 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report 6) REFERENCES
- 1. PSEG Letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, LR-N12-0170.
PSEG Nuclear LLC's Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Flooding Aspects of Recommendations 2.1 and 2.3 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, June 07, 2012.2. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), Report 12-07 [Rev 0-A]. Guidelines for Performing Verification Walkdowns of Plant Flood Protection Features.
May 2012 [NRC endorsed May 31, 2012; updated and reissued June 18, 2012].3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Letter to Licensees.
Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident.
March 12, 2012.4. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in Response to Fire. NUREG-1852.
October 2007.5. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 2 1 st Century, The Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident.
July 12, 2011.6. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
& Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety. N RC Inspection Manual. Part 9900: Technical Guidance.
Regulatory Issues Summary 2005-20, Revisions
- 1. September 26, 2005.7. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.
Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Caused by Earthquake and Tsunami. INPO Event Report 11-1. March 15, 2011.8. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Follow-up to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event. Inspection Manual. Temporary Instruction 2515/183.
November 2011.9. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Inspection of Structures, Passive Components, and Civil Engineering Features at Nuclear Power Plants. Inspection Manual. Inspection Procedure 62002.Section 03.01(h), Dams, Embankments and Canals.10. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Evaluate Readiness to Cope with External Flooding.Inspection Procedures.
Attachment 71111.01.
Adverse Weather Protection.
Section 02.04 11. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
NRC Inspector Field Observation Best Practices.
NUREG/BR-0326, Rev. 1. August 2009.12. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Flood Protectionfor Nuclear Power Plants. Regulatory Guide 1.101 13. Salem Generating Station (SGS) Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Rev. 26 SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC SPSEG SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 0Rev. No. 0 NUCLEAR LLC November 21, 2012 Salem Generating Station Page No. 44 of 44 Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report 14. SGS Structural Design Criteria 15. PSEG Procedure ER-AA-310-1009, Rev. 2, Condition Monitoring of Structures
- 16. Salem Generating Station -Safety Evaluation Report Rev. 26 17. OP-AA-108-111-1001, Rev. 7, Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines
- 18. SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001(Q), Rev. 14, Adverse Environmental Conditions
- 19. SC.MD-PM.ZZ-0036(Q), Rev. 7, Watertight Door Inspection and Repair 20. SGS Technical Specifications, up to Amendment No. 301 (Ul), 286 (U2)21. CC-AA-201, Rev. 4, Plant Barrier Control Program 7) ATTACHMENTS a) Notification List-SGS Unit 1 Flood Protection Features b) Inaccessible-SGS Unit 1 Flood Protection Features c) Restricted Access -SGS Unit 1 Flood Protection Features d) Notification List -SGS Unit 2 Flood Protection Features e) Inaccessible
-SGS Unit 2 Flood Protection Features f) Restricted Access -SGS Unit 2 Flood Protection Features g) Project Organization h) Changes in Walkdown Process / Methodology SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC Salem Unit 1 Notification List -Flood Protection Features Attachment A Report No. SL-2012-10795 Pa( e 1 nf 10 No. Room Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Description of Condition Notification
- 1 15615 / 0112203 S-15615-PEN1 none Unidentified HVAC Penetration through 20585526 wall 2 15616 / 0112204 W-15616- none calcification, superficial cracking 20585183/0112205 /0112206 /0112207 3 15101 / 0104505 W-15101- none Signs of historical leakage 20584047/0104506 4 15101 / 0104505 S-15101- none Signs of historical leakage 20584047/0104506 5 15101 / 0104505 F-15101- none Signs of historical leakage 20584047/0104506 6 15202 / 0105505 E-15102- none Signs of historical leakage 20584049 7 15102 / 0104501 F-15102- none Signs of historical leakage 20584049/_0104502 8 15103 / 0104507 W-15103- none signs of historical leakage 20585185 9 15103 / 0104507 S-15103- none signs of historical leakage 20585185 10 15103 / 0104507 F-15103- none signs of historical leakage 20585185 11 15103 / 0104507. S-15103- none signs of.historical leakage 20585185 12 15104 / 0104503 E-15104- none signs of historical leakage 20584054 13 15104 / 0104503 S-15104- none signs of historical leakage 20584054 14 15104 / 0104503 F-1 5104- none Signs of historical leakage near Residual 20584054 Heat Exchanger 15 15104/0104503 E-15104- none signs of historical leakage 20584054 16 15104 / 0104503 S-15104- none signs of historical leakage 20584054 17 15201 / 0105505 W-15201- none signs of historical leakage Pending 18 15202 / 0105505 W-1 5202- none signs of historical leakage 20584056 19 15203 / 0105501 E-15203- none signs of historical leakage 20173983 20 15204 / 0105502 E-15204- none signs of historical leakage 20584056 21 15205 / 0105502 E-15205- none Signs of historical leakage in the screen 20584056 area near the PC basket and ladder.22 15206 / 0105505 W-1 5206- none signs of historical leakage 20585187 23 15206 / 0105505 S-15206- none signs of historical leakage 20585187 Salem UI Flooding Walkdown Final / CAP Items Salem Unit 1 Notification List -Flood Protection Features Attachment A Report No. SL-2012-10795 P'aýNo. Room Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Description of Condition Notification
- 24 15209 / 0105505 W-1 5209- none Signs of historical leakage on next to Fire 20584056 Door Al-1 25 15301 / 0106401 S-15301- none Cracks and signs of historical leakage 20528770 26 15301 / 0106401 E-15301- none Cracks and signs of historical leakage 20528770 27 15301 / 0106401 F-1 5301-unidentified floor drain none East of column line C-C, unidentified 20585526 feature 28 15301 / 0106401 F-1 5301-unidentified floor drain none East of column line C-C, unidentified 20585526 feature 29 15306 / 0106404 S-15306- none Cracks and signs of historical leakage 20584063/0106405 30 15306 / 0106404 F-15306- none Paint peeling and crack between wall and 20584063/0106405 floor.31 15307 / 0106407 F-1 5307- none Superficial cracking on floor. 20584065 32 15307 / 0106407 F-1 5307-unidentified floor pen none Unidentified penetration 20585526 33 15307 / 0106407 F-1 5307-unidentified floor pen none Unidentified penetration 20585526 34 15308 / 0106408 S-15308- none Cracking and mineralization, historical 20584066 leakage 35 15308 / 0106408 F-1 5308-unlabelled floor drain none Unidentified penetration 20585526 36 15309 / 0106409 S-15309- none historical leakage 20584066 37 15310 / 0106410 F-1 531 0-unidentified floor pen none Unidentified penetration 20585526 38 15311 /0106411 S-15311- none Mineral Deposits and Historical Leaks 20584066 39 15312 / 0106412 F-15312-unidentified floor penetration none Unidentified penetration 20585526 40 15312 / 0106412 F-15312-unidentified floor penetration none Unidentified penetration 20585526 41 15314 / 0106414 S-15314- none signs of leakage (calcification) on corners 20584067 of wall.42 15314/0106414 F-15314-unlabelled floor penetration none Unidentified penetration 20585526 43 15315 / 0106415 F-1 5315- none Moisture on floor with signs of historical 20585189 leakage 44 15316 / 0106416 S-15316- none calcification on wall 20585191 45 15316 / 0106416 F-15316- none Moisture on floor with signs of historical 20585191 leakage e oT 10U Salem U1 Flooding Walkdown Final / CAP Items Salem Unit 1 Notification List -Flood Protection Features Attachment A Report No. SL-2012-10795 Pac No. Room Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Description of Condition Notification
- 46 15317 / 0106419 W-1 5317- none signs of significant historical leakage -20584832/0106426 cracking, mineralization.
47 15319 / 0106420 S-15319- none Signs of leakage / mineralization.
20584831 Cracking observed.48 15320 / 0106420 F-1 5320-unidentified floor penetration none Unidentified penetration 20585526 49 15320 / 0106420 F-1 5320-unidentified floor penetration none Unidentified penetration 20585526 50 15321 / 0106421 F-1 5321- none Signs of historical leakage on floor -20584831 calcification
/ mineralization.
51 15323 / 0106423 E-1 5323- none Signs of leakage / mineralization on wall 20584831 in vestibule area and in the corner behind the tank.52 15323 / 0106423 F-1 5323- none Signs of historical leakage observed.
20584831 53 15324 / 0106424 E-15324 none Signs of leakage / mineralization 20584831 54 15324 / 0106424 F-1 5324- none Signs of leakage / mineralization with 20584831 excessive cracking, water on ground.55 15325 / 0106428 S-15325- none Moisture on floor, calcification 20585193/0106429 56 15325 / 0106428 F-1 5325- none signs of historical leakage 20585193/ 0106429 57 15326 / 0106428 F-1 5326- none Small floor cracks 20584834 58 15327 / 0106429 F-1 5327- none Small Cracks 20584833 59 15328 / 0106430 W-15328- none Cracks, Mineralization 20584835 60 15328 / 0106430 S-15328- none Cracks, Standing water 20584835 61 15328 / 0106430 F-1 5328- none Small Puddle of standing water due to 20584835 wall crack 62 15328 / 0106430 F-15328-unidentified floor penetration none Floor Drain Unidentified floor penetration 20585526 63 15329 / 0106427 W-15329- none Cracks and signs of historical leakage 20584846 64 15329 / 0106427 F-1 5329-unidentified floor penetration none Unidentified penetration 20585526 65 15330 / 0106425 F-1 5330-unidentified floor penetration none Unidentified penetration 20585526 ie 3 of 10 Salem Ul Flooding Walkdown Final / CAP Items Salem Unit I Notification List -Flood Protection Features Attachment A Report No. SL-2012-10795 PaýNo. Room Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Description of Condition Notification
- 66 15330/0106425 F-15330-unidentified floor penetration none Unidentified penetration 20585526 67 15332 / 0106436 F-15332- none debris and loose particulate on floor, oil 20584828 staining, unable to visualize floor surface 68 15333 / 0106435 F-1 5333- none Cracking, mineral deposits, and moisture 20584829 visible 69 15333 / 0106435 E-15333-EL64 none Oil staining and corrosion present 20584829 70 15401 / 0108401 E-15401- none Cracking and mineralization 20530111 71 15419 / 0108407 S-15419- none cracks in surface 20584312 72 15426 / 0108443 W-15426- none cracks in surface 20584317 73 15427 /0108443 W-15427- none cracks in surface 20584317 74 15428 /0210003 E-15428- none Cracking 20584824/ 0210004 75 15428 / 0210003 E-15428-136 S1FBR-E-15428-136 concrete chipped away in 3rd quadrant 20584824/0210004 76 15428 / 0210003 E-15428-180 S1FBR-E-15428-180 Corrosion of penetration 20584824/0210004 77 15428 / 0210003 E-15428-181 S1FBR-E-15428-181 Corrosion of penetration 20584824/ 0210004 78 15428 / 0210003 E-15428-182 S1FBR-E-15428-182 heavy corrosion 20584824/ 0210004 79 15428 / 0210003 E-1 5428-183 SlFBR-E-15428-183 heavy corrosion 20584824/ 0210004 80 15428 / 0210003 E-1 5428-188 SIFBR-E-15428-188 heavy corrosion 20584824/ 0210004 81 15428 / 0210003 E-15428-189 SI FBR-E-1 5428-189 heavy corrosion 20584824/ 0210004 82 15428 / 0210003 E-15428-190 S1FBR-E-15428-190 heavy corrosion 20584824/ 0210004 83 15428 / 0210003 E-1 5428-191 S1 FBR-E-1 5428-191 seal appears to be peeling near the top 20584824/_0210004 84 15428 / 0210003 E-15428-192 S1FBR-E-15428-192 heavy corrosion 20584824/_0210004 1 e4 OT 1U Salem Ul Flooding Walkdown Final / CAP Items Salem Unit 1 Notification List -Flood Protection Features Attachment A Report No. SL-2012-10795 Pa, No. Room Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Description of Condition Notification
- 85 15428 / 0210003 E-1 5428-193 S1FBR-E-15428-193 heavy corrosion 20584824/0210004 86 15428 / 0210003 E-1 5428-194 S1FBR-E-15428-194 heavy corrosion 20584824/0210004 87 15428 / 0210003 E-15428-196 S1FBR-E-15428-196 heavy corrosion 20584824/0210004 88 15428/0210003 E-15428-197 S1FBR-E-15428-197 heavy corrosion 20584824/ 0210004 89 15428 /0210003 E-15428-198 S1FBR-E-15428-198 heavy corrosion 20584824/ 0210004 90 15428 / 0210003 E-15428-199 S1FBR-E-15428-199 heavy corrosion 20584824/0210004 91 15428 / 0210003 E-15428-201 S1FBR-E-15428-201 heavy corrosion 20584824/_0210004 92 15428 / 0210003 E-15428-202 S1FBR-E-15428-202 heavy corrosion 20584824/ 0210004 93 15428 / 0210003 E-15428-204 S1FBR-E-15428-204 heavy corrosion 20584824/ 0210004 94 15428 / 0210003 E-15428-205 S1FBR-E-15428-205 heavy corrosion 20584824/_0210004 95 15428 / 0210003 E-15428-206 S1FBR-E-15428-206 heavy corrosion 20584824/ 0210004 96 15428 / 0210003 E-15428-207 S1FBR-E-15428-207 heavy corrosion 20584824/ 0210004 97 15428 / 0210003 E-1 5428-208 SiFBR-E-15428-208 heavy corrosion 20584824/ 0210004 98 15428 / 0210003 E-15428-209 S1FBR-E-15428-209 heavy corrosion 20584824/ 0210004 99 15429 / 0108427 S-15429-031 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-031 Signs of historical leakage (calcification) 20584846/ 0108430 100 15432 / 0108429 W-1 5432- none Calcification, signs of historical leakage, 20584303 cracking observed 101 15433 / 0108432 S-15433-001 S1FLB-S-15433-001 Leakage observed on wall at rear of 20584307 diesel oil tank room on south wall.e 5of 10 Salem Ul Flooding Walkdown Final / CAP Items Salem Unit 1 Notification List -Flood Protection Features Attachment A Report No. SL-2012-10795 No. Room Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Description of Condition Notification
- 102 15433 / 0108432 S-15433-002 S 1FLB-S-15433-002 Missing foam and rust streaks below 20584307 103 15433 / 0108432 S-1 5433-003 $1 FLB-S-15433-003 Leakage observed on wall at rear of 20584307 diesel oil tank room on south wall.104 15433 / 0108432 S-1 5433-004 S1 FLB-S-1 5433-004 Missing foam 20584307 105 15434 / 0207801 F-1 5434-001 S1FBR-F-15434-001 Corrosion product observed on seismic 20584856 gap near the south wall. Corrosion product and signs of mineralization
/calcification observed in various other_________________locations.
106 15434 / 0207801 E-15434- none Cracking observed throughout wall. Signs 20584856 of mineralization
/ calcification present____________
________________________________________along length of wall.107 15434 / 0207801 S-15434-UN1 S-15434-UNI Unidentified duct penetration on south 20585526 along wall.108 15435 / 0207802 F-1i5435-UNI F-15435-UN1 Unidentified penetration on floor 20585526 109 15435 / 0207802 F-15435-UN2 F-15435-UN2 Unidentified penetration on floor 20585526 110 15437 / 0207805 W-1 5437- none Signs of historical leakage, mineralization 20584853/0207806 and calcification present.ill 15437 / 0207805 S-1 5437-010 51 FLB-S- 1 5437-010 Signs of rust / corrosion product on bolts. 20584853/_0207806
_______________
_________________
112 15437 / 0207805 F-1 5437-001 SIFLB-F-15437-001 Rust on seismic gap across from Boron 20584853/0207806 Injection tank room. Standing water on_____________________________________
eismic gap.113 15439 / 0207809 W-15439- none Leakage observed on wall, mineralization 20578435 and calcification present.114 15439 / 0207809 F-1 5439- none Standing water throughout floor. Source 20584854 1 5 1 4 4 0207813_________
E-15444-_____________none________s is unclear.s leaka e20 8485 115 15444 / 0207813 F-1 5444- none signs of historical leakage 20584857 116 15444 / 0207813 F-i 5444- none signs of historical leakage 20584857 117 15544 / 0110025 W-15544- none Mineralization and signs of historical 20584857 leakage on South edge of wall.e 6 ot 1U Salem Ul Flooding Walkdown Final / CAP Items Salem Unit 1 Notification List -Flood Protection Features Attachment A Report No. SL-2012-10795 PaýNo. Room Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Description of Condition Notification
- 118 15546 / 0110017 S-1 5546-001 S1FLB-S-15546-001 Cannot see seal. Piping goes thru flood 20584747 barrier wall and there is an annular gap which appears to have no seal.119 15546 / 0110017 S-15546-002 S1FLB-S-15546-002 Cannot see seal. Piping goes thru flood 20584747 barrier wall and there is an annular gap which appears to have no seal.120 15546 / 0110017 W-15546-UN1 W-15546-UN1 Unidentified penetration 20585526 121 15548 / 0110019 W-1 5548- none Cracks along exterior 20584859 122 15548 / 0110019 W-15548-003 S1FLB-W-15548-003 Conduit LB fitting is missing cover 20584859 123 15548 / 0110019 W-1 5548-005 S1FLB-W-15548-005 Crack on sealant material at 1100 20584859 124 15555 / 1210019 W-15555- none Cracking on ext wall 20584862 125 15557 / 0210001 S-15557-UN1 S-15557-UN1 Unidentified penetration 20585526 126 15557 / 0210001 S-1 5557-UN2 S-15557-UN2 Unidentified penetration 20585526 127 15502 / 0110001 E-15502-008 S1FBR-E-15502-008 foam seal on both sides 20585199/1210001 128 15502 / 0110001 E-15502-107 S1FBR-E-15502-107 foam seal on both sides 20585199/ 1210001 129 19401 / 0310001 E-19401-012 S1FLB-E-19401-012 corrosion products visible 20575717 130 19401 / 0310001 W-19401-008 S1FLB-W-19401-008 Evidence of leakage. Large amounts of 20584863 calcification
/ mineralization are evident on the concrete around the boot seal and cascading down the wall 131 16901 C-16901-003 S1FLB-C-16901-003 Underside (ceiling side) of seal is gone. 20585202 The seal on the roof side appears to be intact.132 16901 E-16901-046 SIFLB-E-16901-046 Small amounts of seal material along with 20574220 /corrosion products were observed in the 20575254 /annular space of the penetration.
Most of 20576548 the sealing material was missing.133 16901 E-16901-048 S1FLB-E-16901-048 Seal material has partially degraded on 20574410 the bottom.134 16901 E-16901-052 S1FLB-E-16901-052 Seal material is axially displaced.
A 2-4 20574413 mm gap is visible.e 7 of 10 Salem UI Flooding Walkdown Final / CAP Items Salem Unit 1 Notification List -Flood Protection Features Attachment A Report No. SL-2012-10795 PaýNo. Room Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Description of Condition Notification
- 135 16901 E-16901-054 S1FLB-E-16901-054 Corrosion products and brown staining 20574412 were observed around the seal and continuing down the wall to the floor.136 16901 E-16901-055 SlFLB-E-16901-055 Seal material has partially degraded.
20574411 137 16901 F-16901 0.00 Signs of historical leakage 20585203 138 16901 W-16901-001 S1FLB-W-16901-001 Corrosion product observed on pipe going 20585207 through penetration.
No sign of active leakage.139 16901 W-16901-002 SlFLB-W-16901-002 Corrosion product observed on pipe going 20585207 through penetration.
No sign of active leakage.140 16901 W-16901-003 SIFLB-W-16901-003 Corrosion product observed on pipe going 20585207 through penetration.
No sign of active leakage.141 16902 E-16902-011 S1FLB-E-16902-011 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 142 16902 E-16902-012 S1FLB-E-16902-012 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 143 16902 E-16902-013 S1 FLB-E-16902-013 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 144 16902 E-16902-014 S1FLB-E-16902-014 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 145 16902 E-16902-015 S1FLB-E-16902-015 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 146 16902 E-16902-016 S1FLB-E-16902-016 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 147 16902 E-16902-017 S1FLB-E-16902-017 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 148 16902 E-16902-018 S 1FLB-E-16902-018 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 149 16902 E-16902-019 S 1 FLB-E-16902-019 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 150 16902 E-16902-020 S1FLB-E-16902-020 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 151 16902 E-16902-021 S1FLB-E-16902-021 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 152 16902 E-16902-022 S1FLB-E-16902-022 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 153 16902 E-16902-023 S1FLB-E-16902-023 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 154 16902 E-16902-024 51 FLB-E-16902-024 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 155 16902 E-16902-025 S1FLB-E-16902-025 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 156 16902 E-16902-026 S1FLB-E-16902-026 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 157 16902 E-16902-027 S1FLB-E-16902-027 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 158 16902 E-16902-028 S1FLB-E-16902-028 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 159 16902 E-16902-029 S1FLB-E-16902-029 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 160 16902 E-16902-030 S1FLB-E-16902-030 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 ie 8 of 10 Salem Ul Flooding Walkdown Final / CAP Items Salem Unit 1 Notification List -Flood Protection Features Attachment A Report No. SL-2012-10795 Pa e9 of 10 No. Room Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Description of Condition Notification
- 161 16902 E-16902-031 S 1 FLB-E-16902-031 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 162 16902 E-16902-032 S1FLB-E-16902-032 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 163 16902 E-16902-033 S1FLB-E-16902-033 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 164 16902 E-16902-034 S1FLB-E-16902-034 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 165 16902 E-16902-035 S1FLB-E-16902-035 Signs of historical leakage 20574855 166 16902 W-16902-001 S1FLB-W-16902-001 Rusting was found 20574136 167 16902 W-16902-002 S1FLB-W-16902-002 Extensive rusting was found 20574138 168 16902 W-16902-003 S1FLB-W-16902-003 There was no boot present. 20574016 169 12403 E-1 2403 NONE Crack in corner near north wall 20585210 170 12404 W-12404 NONE Water damage present throughout length 20585212 of wall.171 12404 F-1 2404 NONE Water damage, cracking, corrosion 20585212 products -some appears to be a result of leakage from the west wall, and some appears to be groundwater intrusion.
172 12501 E-12501 NONE Unlabeled penetrations 20585526 173 12501 S-12501-010 SIFLB-S-12501-010 Possible separation of the seal from the 20585215 conduit.174 12501 S-12501-013 S1FLB-S-12501-013 Possible separation of the seal from the 20585215 conduit.175 12501 S-12501-014 SIFLB-S-12501-014 Possible separation of the seal from the 20585215 conduit.176 12501 S-12501-015 S1FLB-S-12501-015 Possible separation of the seal from the 20585215 conduit.Salem Ul Flooding Walkdown Final / CAP Items Salem Unit I Notification List -Flood Protection Features Attachment A Report No. SL-2012-10795 Paqe 10 of 10 No. Room Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Description of Condition Notification
- 177 Various Various Various There are several penetration seals 20585541 throughout the plant do not have a hydrostatic rating that is sufficient for the licensing basis flood level. These seals require further investigation to determine if there is an error in the documentation or if the seals are credited external flood boundaries.
This issue is common for both Salem units.178 Various Various Various There are several penetration seals 20585526 throughout the plant that do not have sufficient documentation to determine their hydrostatic rating. Further investigation is required to ensure the hydrostatic rating is sufficient to provide protection from an external flood. This issue is common for both Salem units.179 Various Various Various Restricted access items -schedule and 20585220 track the inspection of the features that are restricted.
See Attachment C for a list of restricted access features.
This issue is common for both Salem units.Salem Ul Flooding Walkdown Final / CAP Items Salem Unit 1 Inaccessible
-Flood Protection Features Attachment B Report No. SL-2012-10795 Paae 1 of 1 No. Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Reason Inaccessible Justification 1 S-15206- N/A Pipe chase -cannot access from this See Report Section 4)f)ii)3)b) elevation.
2 E-15333-EL84 N/A Wall 90% covered with steel plates See Report Section 4)f)ii)3)b) 3 E-1 5333-E~l 00 N/A 20% of wall inaccessable due to steel See Report Section 4)fii)3)b) 3 E-15333-EL100 N/A plates, balance of wall is acceptable SeeReportSection_4)fii)3)b) 4 Wall covered with steel plates. Concrete See Report Section 4)f)ii)3)b)
E-1 5333-EL122 N/A not visible on >90% of wall.Salem Ul Flooding Walkdown Final / Inaccessible Salem Unit 1 Restricted Access -Flood Protection Features Attachment C Report No. SL-2012-10795 Page 1 of 3 No. Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Short Description of Justification 1 E-15606- none no signs of leakage, however wall could not be inspected due to drywall 2 E-15605- none no signs of leakage, however wall could not be inspected due to drywall 3 E-15605-003 S1FBR-E-15605-003 Could not be inspected due to drywall 4 E-15605-004 S1 FBR-E-1 5605-004 Could not be inspected due to drywall 5 E-15604- none Wall could not be inspected due to drywall 6 E-15603- none Wall could not be inspected due to tile 7 S-15612-009 SI FBR-S-1 5612-009 Penetrations inside box, maintenance support required for access.8 S-15612-010 S1 FBR-S-1 5612-010 Penetrations inside box, maintenance support required for access.9 S-15612-011 S1 FBR-S-1 5612-011 Penetrations inside box, maintenance support required for access.10 S-15612-012 S1 FBR-S-1 5612-012 Penetrations inside box, maintenance support required for access.11 S-1 5612-013 S1 FBR-S-1 5612-013 Penetrations inside box, maintenance support required for access.12 13 BLD & EQUIP DRAINS(WD)RESID HEAT Si WD -1 LD7756 Located in room 15101, inside the sump pit, cannot access due to dose concerns REMOVAL SUMP PMP START-STOP SW 13 14 BLD & EQUIP DRAINS(WD)RESID HEAT S1WD -1LD7755 Located in room 15101, inside the sump pit, cannot access due to dose concerns REMOVAL SUMP PMP START-STOP SW 14 11 BLD & EQUIP DRAINS(WD)
RESID HEAT SlWD -1LD7753 Located in room 15102, inside the sump pit, cannot access due to dose concerns REMOVAL SMP PMP START-STOP SW 15 12 BLD & EQUIP DRAINS(WD)
RESID HEAT S1WD -1 LD7754 Located in room 15102, inside the sump pit, cannot access due to dose concerns REMOVAL SMP PMP START-STOP SW 16 F-15331- none scaffolding parts are laid on the floor which covers a lot of the area. What is inspectable looks adequate 17 E-15403-105-BS S1FBR-E-15403-105-BS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 18 W-1 5417-092-BS S1 FLB-W-1 5417-092-BS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 19 W-15417-093-BS S1 FLB-W-1 5417-093-BS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 20 W-1 5417-096-BS S1 FLB-W-1 5417-096-BS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 21 W-1 5417-104-BS 51 FLB-W-1 5417-104-BS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 22 W-15417-109-BS S1FLB-W-15417-109-BS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 23 W-1 5417-11 0-BS S1 FLB-W-1 5417-110-BS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 24 W-1 5417-116-BS S1 FLB-W-1 5417-116-BS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 25 W-15417-130-BS S1FLB-W-15417-130-BS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 26 W-15417-131 -BS S1FLB-W-15417-131-BS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 27 W-1 5417-133-BS S1 FLB-W-1 5417-133-BS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 28 W-1 5417-134-BS S1 FLB-W-1 5417-134-BS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 29 E-15428-151-AS S1 FBR-E-15428-151-AS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 30 E-1 5428-152-AS S1 FBR-E-1 5428-152-AS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 31 E-1 5428-165-AS S1 FBR-E-1 5428-165-AS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 32 E-1 5428-167-AS S1 FBR-E-1 5428-167-AS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 33 E-1 5428-168-AS S1 FBR-E-1 5428-168-AS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 34 E-15428-170-AS S1FBR-E-15428-170-AS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 35 E-15428-171-AS S1FBR-E-15428-171-AS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 36 E-15428-172-AS S1FBR-E-15428-172-AS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 37 E-15428-174-AS S1FBR-E-15428-174-AS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 38 E-15428-175-AS 51 FBR-E-1 5428-175-AS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access 39 E-15428-176-AS S1FBR-E-15428-176-AS Internal conduit seal -maintenance support required for access Salem U1 Flooding Walkdown Final / Restricted Access Salem Unit 1 Restricted Access -Flood Protection Features Attachment C Report No. SL-2012-10795 Page 2 of 3 No. Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Short Description of Justification 40 S-15429-034 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-034 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.41 S-15429-035 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-035 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.42 S-15429-036 31 FLB-S-15429-036 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.43 S-15429-037 SI FLB-S-1 5429-037 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.44 S-15429-038 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-038 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.45 S-15429-039 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-039 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.46 S-15429-040 31 FLB-S-1 5429-040 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.47 S-15429-041 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-041 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.48 S-15429-042 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-042 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.49 S-15429-043 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-043 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.50 S-15429-044 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-044 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.51 S-15429-045 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-045 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.52 S-15429-046 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-046 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.53 S-15429-047 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-047 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.54 S-15429-048
$1FLB-S-15429-048 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.55 S-15429-049 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-049 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.56 S-15429-050 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-050 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.57 S-1 5429-051 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-051 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.58 S-1 5429-052 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-052 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.59 S-1 5429-053 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-053 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.60 S-1 5429-054 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-054 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.61 S-15429-055 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-055 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.62 S-15429-056 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-056 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.63 S-15429-057 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-057 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.64 S-15429-058 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-058 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.65 S-15429-059 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-059 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.66 S-15429-060 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-060 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.67 S-15429-061 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-061 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.68 S-15429-063 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-063 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.69 S-15429-064 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-064 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.70 S-15429-065 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-065 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.71 S-15429-066 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-066 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.72 S-15429-068 S1 FLB-S-1 5429-068 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.73 S-15434-001 S1 FLB-S-1 5434-001 The portion of the vertical riser of the seismic gap above head level can only be examined by entering a contaminated area and looking up.74 W-1 5440-001 S1 FLB-W-1 5440-001 Access restricted due to presence of insulation.
75 W-15440-UN1 W-15440-UN1 Unidentified penetration.
Access restricted due to presence of insulation.
76 W-1 5441-001 51FLB-W-15441-001 Access restricted due to presence of insulation.
77 W-15441-UN1 W-15441-UN1 Unidentified penetration.
Access restricted due to presence of insulation.
78 S-15520-010 S1 FLB-S-1 5520-010 Access restricted due to presence of insulation.
79 W-1 5544-002-AS 31 FLB-W-1 5544-002-AS Internal conduit seal (ICS) -maintenance support required for access 80 S-1 5559-008-AS
$1 FLB-S-1 5559-008-AS ICS -maintenance support required for access 81 S-15559-009-AS IS1 FLB-S-1 5559-009-AS ICS -maintenance support required for access 82 S-1 5559-01 0-AS $S1iFLB-S-1 5559-01 0-AS ICS -maintenance support required for access Salem Ul Flooding Walkdown Final / Restricted Access Salem Unit 1 Restricted Access -Flood Protection Features Attachment C Report No. SL-2012-10795 Page 3 of 3 No. Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Short Description of Justification 83 S-1 5559-026-AS S1 FLB-S-1 5559-026-AS ICS -maintenance support required for access 84 S-1 5559-028-AS S1 FLB-S-1 5559-028-AS ICS -maintenance support required for access 85 S-15559-032-AS S1FLB-S-15559-032-AS ICS -maintenance support required for access 86 E-19401-009 S1 FLB-E-19401-009 ICS -maintenance support required for access 87 E-19401-013 S1 FLB-E-19401-013 ICS -maintenance support required for access 88 1 SWE-41 1SW -1 SWE41 Bolted Sump pit -Requires Maintenance for Access 89 E-16901-004 S1FLB-E-16901-004 Need scaffold for visual inspection.
90 E-16901-020 S1 FLB-E-16901-020 Need scaffold for visual inspection.
91 E-16901-058 S1FLB-E-16901-058 Card Reader, need SMART Team to remove for access to seal.92 S-16904-002
$1 FLB-S-16904-002 Card Reader, need SMART Team to remove for access to seal.93 S-16904-003 51 FLB-S-16904-003 Card Reader, need SMART Team to remove for access to seal.94 12BD68 S1BD -12BD68 Bolted sump pit cover. Require maintenance support to open.95 1LD14900 SISW-1LD14900 Bolted sump pit cover. Require maintenance support to open.96 1 LD3545 SISW-1 LD3545 Bolted sump pit cover. Require maintenance support to open.97 1SWE4 S1 SW-1 SWE4 Bolted sump pit cover. Require maintenance support to open.98 1 SWE40 1 SW -1 SWE40 Bolted sump pit cover. Require maintenance support to open.99 1SWE5 $1SW -1SWE5 Bolted sump pit cover. Require maintenance support to open.100 1SWE6 $1SW -1SWE6 Bolted sump pit cover. Require maintenance support to open.101 E-16902-057 S1 FLB-E-16902-057 Visual inspection of the penetration seal will require scaffolding.
102 E-16902-058 Si FLB-E-16902-058 Visual inspection of the penetration seal will require scaffolding.
103 E-16902-061 S1 FLB-E-1 6902-061 Card Reader, need SMART Team to remove for access to seal.104 S-12403-001-AS S1FLB-S-12403-001-AS ICS -scaffolding, electrician required to access.105 E-12501-002-AS S1FLB-E-1 2501-002-AS ICS -scaffolding, electrician required to access.106 E-12501-003-AS S1FLB-E-12501-003-AS ICS -scaffolding, electrician required to access.107 E-12501-004-AS S1FLB-E-12501-004-AS ICS -scaffolding, electrician required to access.108 E-12501-005-AS S1FLB-E-12501-005-AS ICS -scaffolding, electrician required to access.109 E-12501-008 S1FLB-E-12501-008 Inside junction box -need electrician, scaffold, RP to access.110 E-12501-015 S1FLB-E-12501-015 Inside junction box -need electrician, scaffold, RP to access.111 E-12501-023 S1FLB-E-12501-023 Inside junction box -need electrician, scaffold, RP to access.112 S-12501-001 S1FLB-S-12501-001 ICS -need scaffolding, electrician to access.113 S-12501-002 S1 FLB-S-12501-002 ICS -need scaffolding, electrician to access.114 S-12501-003 S1 FLB-S-12501-003 ICS -need scaffolding, electrician to access.115 S-12501-016 S1FLB-S-12501-016 ICS -need scaffolding, electrician to access.116 S-12501-017
_S1FLB-S-12501-017 ICS -need scaffolding, electrician to access.117 S-12501-018
$S1FLB-S-12501-018 ICS -need scaffolding, electrician to access.118 S-12501-019 S1 FLB-S-12501-019 ICS -need scaffolding, electrician to access.119 S-12501-020 S1FLB-S-12501-020 ICS -need scaffolding, electrician to access.120 W-12505-025 S1FLB-W-12505-025 ICS -scaffolding, electrician required to access.121 W-12505-026 Si FLB-W-12505-026 ICS -scaffolding, electrician required to access.Salem Ul Flooding Walkdown Final / Restricted Access Salem Unit 2 Notification List -Flood Protection Features Attachment D Report SL-2012-10795 Page 1 of 4 No. Room Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Description of Condition Notification
- 1 22403 E-22403 NONE Cracking in coating on wall. 20585282 2 22403 N-22403-001 S2FLB-N-22403-001 Separation on 90' from vertical.
20585283 3 22404 W-22404 NONE Cracking, leaking water onto floor. 20585285 4 22501 N-22501 (at EL. 100) NONE Cracks present on wall. 20585286 5 22501 N-22501 (at EL. 113) NONE Cracks present on wall. 20585286 6 22501 E-22501 NONE Unlabeled penetration, left of E-22501-001 20585624 7 22501 N-22501-XXX S2FLB-N-22501-XXX Unlabeled penetration on room 22501 North wall 20585624 8 26901 C-26901-010 S2FLB-C-26901-010 Surface crack and missing sealant at joint on 20585901 south side of penetration.
Wall shows peeling paint, mineral staining, and 9 26901 E-26901 NONE evidence of past water intrusion on surfaces within 20585287 3 ft of floor 10 26901 W-26901-001 S2FLB-W-26901-001 rust stain in on boot, boot seal does not match ref 20585291 drawing.11 26901 W-26901-002 S2FLB-W-26901-002 rust stain in on boot and pipe, boot seal does not 20585291 match ref drawing.rust stain in on boot and pipe, tear in boot with 12 26901 W-26901-003 S2FLB-W-26901-003 stains showing at tear, boot seal does not match 20585291 ref drawing.13 26901 W-26901-006 S2FLB-W-26901-006 CORRSION PRODCS AND STAINS VISIBLE ON 20585291 CABLE AT SEAL INTERFACE 14 26901 W-26901-025 S2FLB-W-26901-025 CORRSION PRODCS AND STAINS VISIBLE ON 20574851 CABLE AT SEAL INTERFACE Concrete slab was wet near operating equipment.
15 26902 F-26902 None Additionally, seepage was occuring at EL 90'-0" at 20585293 the south wall. This seems to be due to groundwater.
16 25202 2 WD NO.23 RHR SUMP S2WD -2WD13 valve flange separated below valve In room 25101 Order 30166480 1PUMP CHECK VLV ____________________
20529375, 20529419, 20529480, 20529481, 20529558, 17Cracking and mineralization, evidence of historical 20529560, 20529561, 20529632, 20530065, 20530187, leakage observed throughout 20530188, 20530189, 18 25444 F-25444- none CALCIFICATION LARGE AMOUNTS AND 20585294 18 _25444 F-25444-1none CRACKING ON FLOOR 20585294 Salem U2 Flooding Walkdown Final / CAP Items Salem Unit 2 Notification List -Flood Protection Features Attachment D Report SL-2012-10795 Page 2 of 4 No. Room Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Description of Condition Notification
- LARGE AMOUNTS OF CALCIFICATION ON WALL AND CRACKING ON WALL AS WELL.20 25104 C-25104- none large amounts of calcification 20577074 21 25103 C-25103- none large amounts of calcification 20577084 / 20577091 S2AUX2DOOR-surface corrosion present, sealing dogs also lightly 22 0 2DOOR-AUX134-2 AUX134-2 corroded.
Seal and sealing surface appear to be 20585295 / 20552967 AU -1intact.23 25204 ? none Unidentified Penetration:
floor drain not on drawing 20585624 24 25311 N-25311- none water damage, cracking 20584766 25 25309 N-25309- none water damage, cracking 20584766 726 25436 F-25436- none cracking in the coating & unidentified floor drain 20585120 27 25434 F-25434- none Floor has significant water damage and cracking.
20584792 28 25332 F-25332- none water damage and cracks visible in wall 20584783 29 25326 F-25326- none crack on floor under tank aligned along tank axis 20584779 between 4th and 5th supports from the S wall Unidentified floor drain next to No. 2 Waste Monitor Hold-up Tank Pump 30 25310 F-25310- none Unidentified cover for pit 20585624 Unidentified floor drain next to U2 Liquid Waste Filter Signs of active leakage on the floor near the 31 25306 F-25306- none entrance.
Also, two unidentified floor penetrations 20584764 one to the right of each CVCS Tank Manway 32 25304 F-25304- none Water damage, active leakage 20584762 33 25104 F-25104- none Large amounts of calcification 20577074 34 25103 F-25103- none Large amounts of calcification 20577084 35 25102 F-25102- none Large amounts of calcification 20577069 /20577072 36 25101 F-25101- none Large amounts of calcification 20577075 37 29401 W-29401-005 S2FLB-W-29401-005 Seal appears damaged. 20584793 38 25551 W-25551-001 S2FLB-W-25551-001 Ssigns of historical leakage 20585299 Two unidentified penetrations in wall -el. 130.08 39 25616 N-25616-005 S2FBR-N-25616-005 and 129.3. Aux building air intake at elevation 20585624 1_ 1 123.7 40 25547 N-25547-002 S2FLB-N-25547-002 Minor corrosion products present. 20585300 41 25433 N-25433-004 S2FLB-N-25433-004 Cotton only visible (below grade) 20584790 42 25433 N-25433-003 S2FLB-N-25433-003 Cotton & rust streaks 20584790 43 25433 N-25433-002 S2FLB-N-25433-002 Rust streaks 20584790 44 25433 N-25433-001 S2FLB-N-25433-001 Cotton only visible (below grade) 20584790 45 25435 F-25435-001 S2FLB-F-25435-001 Active water on floor near seismic gap, corrosion 20584794 product observed Salem U2 Flooding Walkdown Final / CAP Items Salem Unit 2 Notification List -Flood Protection Features Attachment D Report SL-2012-10795 Page 3 of 4 No. Room Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Description of Condition Notification
- 46 29401 W-29401-007 S2FLB-W-29401-007 Rusted 20584793 47 25551 N-25551-033 S2FLB-N-25551-033 Signs of historical leakage 20585299 48 25623 W-25623- none Signs of minimal water damage on north side 20585301 49 25433 W-25433- none Calcification 20584790 50 25432 W-25432- none water damage and cracks visible in wall 20584789 51 25427 W-25427- none Calcification and cracking 20584788 52 25417 W-25417- none Calcification 20575536 53 25329 W-25329- none Water damage 20584781 54 25328 W-25328- none Water damage, cracks 20584780 55 25317 W-25317- none Water damage, active leakage 20584778 56 25209 W-25209- none Cracking and signs of historical leakage visible on 20585302 the wall 57 25202 W-25202- none Large amounts of calcification 20584761 58 25103 W-25103- none Large amounts of calcification 20577084 59 25101 W-25101- none Large amounts of calcification 20577075 60 25623 N-25623- none Unidentified ductwork penetration at el. 7.7. 20585624 61 25419 N-25419- none Wall covered in calcification 20584787 62 25328 N-25328- none Mineralization 20584780 63 25325 N-25325- none Water damage 20585303 64 25316 N-25316- none Water damage, cracking 20584769 65 25314 N-25314- none Water damage, cracking 20584769 66 25308 N-25308- none Water damage, cracking 20584766 67 25306 N-25306- none Significant water damage along entire north wall, 20584764 evidence of past repairs.North wall has numerous cracks and mineralization 20529375, 20529419, 20529480, 20529481, 20529558, 68 25301 N-25301- none throughout.
Documented by EMIS tags- 20529560, 20529561, 20529632,20530065, 20530187, 20530189, 20497755, 20143874 20530188, 20530189,20497755,20143874 69 25104 N-25104- none Penetrations thru wall / rust streaks 20577074 / 20577089 70 25103 N-25103- none Large amounts of calcification 20577084 / 20577091 71 25101 N-25101- none Large amounts of calcification 20577075 72 25434 E-25434- none Calcification on wall 20584792 73 25332 E-25332- none Water damage and cracking visible on wall 20584783 74 25324 E-25324- none Water damage 20584777 75 25323 E-25323- none Water damage 20584777 76 25322 E-25322- none Water damage 20584777 Cracking and mineralization, evidence of historical 20529375, 20529419, 20529480, 20529481, 20529558, 77 25301 E-25301- none Crakig admeraliztion, 20529560, 20529561, 20529632, 20530065, 20530187, leakage observed throughout 20530188, 20530189, 20575396 78 25204 E-25204- none Large amounts of calcification 20577087 79 25203 E-25203- none Large amounts of calcification 20577085 80 25104 E-25104- none Large amounts of calcification 20577074 81 25102 E-25102- none Large amounts of calcification 20577069 / 20577072 Salem U2 Flooding Walkdown Final / CAP Items Salem Unit 2 Notification List -Flood Protection Features Attachment D Report SL-2012-10795 Page 4 of 4 No. Room Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Description of Condition Notification
- There are several penetration seals throughout the plant do not have a hydrostatic rating that is sufficient for the licensing basis flood level. These 82 Various Various Various seals require further investigation to determine if 20585542 there is an error in the documentation or if the seals are credited external flood boundaries.
This issue is common for both Salem units.There are several penetration seals throughout the plant that do not have sufficient documentation to determine their hydrostatic rating. Further 83 Various Various Various investigation is required to ensure the hydrostatic 20585624 rating is sufficient to provide protection from an external flood. This issue is common for both Salem units.Restricted access items -schedule and track the inspection of the features that are restricted.
See 84 Various Various Various Attachment F for a list of restricted access 20585522 features.
This issue is common for both Salem units.Salem U2 Flooding Walkdown Final / CAP Items Salem Unit 2 Inaccessible
-Flood Protection Features Attachment E Report No. SL-2012-10795 Page 1 of 1 No. Flood Protection FLOC Reason Inaccessible Justification Feature ID 1 E-25504-250 S2FBR-E-25504-250 Located inside a concrete block -cannot be See Report Section 4)f)ii)3)b) seen.2 E-25504-249 S2FBR-E-25504-249 Located inside a concrete block -cannot be See Report Section 4)f)ii)3)b) seen.3 E-25504-002 S2FBR-E-25504-002 Located inside a concrete block -cannot be See Report Section 4)f)ii)3)b) seen.4 E-25504-001 S2FBR-E-25504-001 Located inside a concrete block -cannot be See Report Section 4)f)ii)3)b) seen.Located inside the pipe chute. Inaccessible 5 W-25206- none due to high dose rates not reasonably See Report Section 4)f)ii)3)b) expected to be reduced in the near future.Salem U2 Flooding Walkdown Final / Inaccessible Salem Unit 2 Restricted Access -Flood Protection Features Attachment F Report No. SL-2012-10795 Page 1 of 5 No. Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Short Description of Justification 1 N-22403-001AS S2FLB-N-22403-001AS Pullbox -labelled.
Need scaffold / electrician to access.2 E-22501-002-AS S2FLB-E-22501-002-AS Internal Conduit Seal -scaffold / electrician, RP support required.3 E-22501-004-AS S2FLB-E-22501-004-AS Internal Conduit Seal -scaffold / electrician, RP support required.4 E-22501-006-AS S2FLB-E-22501-006-AS Internal Conduit Seal -scaffold / electrician, RP support required.5 E-22501-011 S2FLB-E-22501-011 Internal Conduit Seal -scaffold / electrician, RP support required.6 E-22501-013-AS S2FLB-E-22501-013-AS Internal Conduit Seal -scaffold / electrician, RP support required.7 E-22501-014-AS S2FLB-E-22501-014-AS Internal Conduit Seal -scaffold / electrician, RP support required.8 E-22501-024 S2FLB-E-22501-024 Electrician, RP support required for access.9 E-22501-025 S2FLB-E-22501-025 Electrician, RP support required for access.10 N-22501-001 S2FLB-N-22501-001 Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.11 N-22501-002 S2FLB-N-22501-002 Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.12 N-22501-003 S2FLB-N-22501-003 Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.13 N-22501-004 S2FLB-N-22501-004 Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.14 N-22501-005 S2FLB-N-22501-005 Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.15 N-22501-006 S2FLB-N-22501-006 Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.16 N-22501-010 S2FLB-N-22501-010 Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.17 N-22501-011 S2FLB-N-22501-011 Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.18 N-22501-012 S2FLB-N-22501-012 Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.19 N-22501-013 S2FLB-N-22501-013 Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.20 N-22501-015 S2FLB-N-22501-015 Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.21 N-22501-016 S2FLB-N-22501-016 Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.22 N-22501-018 S2FLB-N-22501-018 Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.23 N-22501-019 S2FLB-N-22501-019 Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.24 N-22501-020 S2FLB-N-22501-020 Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.25 W-22505-008-AS S2FLB-W-22505-008-AS Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.26 W-22505-009-AS S2FLB-W-22505-009-AS Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.27 W-22505-021-AS S2FLB-W-22505-021-AS Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.28 W-22505-024-AS S2FLB-W-22505-024-AS Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.29 W-22505-025-AS S2FLB-W-22505-025-AS Internal conduit seal -scaffolding, electrician required to inspect.30 12D3544 S2SW -2LD3544 Can not be inspected due to bolted sump pit cover, need maintenance support to open.31 21BD68 S2BD -21BD68 Can not be inspected due to bolted sump pit cover, need maintenance
_support to open.32 2LD14899 S2SW -2LD14899 Can not be inspected due to bolted sump pit cover, need maintenance I_ _support to open.Salem U2 Flooding Walkdown Final / Restricted Access Salem Unit 2 Restricted Access -Flood Protection Features Attachment F Report No. SL-2012-10795 Page 2 of 5 No. Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Short Description of Justification 33 2SWE-40 S2SW -2SWE40 Can not be inspected due to bolted sump pit cover, need maintenance support to open.34 E-26901-054 S2FLB-E-26901-054 Need Scaffold to inspect.35 E-26901-055 S2FLB-E-26901-055 Need Scaffold to inspect.36 E-26901-058 S2FLB-E-26901-058 Need SMART Team to remove card reader for visual access to seal.37 22BD68 S2BD -22BD68 Sump pump 2SWE41 is not currently operational and being worked on per Work Order 30191149.38 2LD14900 S2SW-2LD14900 Sump pump 2SWE41 is not currently operational and being worked on per Work Order 30191149.39 2LD3545 S2SW -2LD3545 Sump pump 2SWE41 is not currently operational and being worked on per Work Order 30191149.40 2SWE4 S2SW -2SWE4 Sump pump 2SWE41 is not currently operational and being worked on per Work Order 30191149.41 2SWE41 S2SW -2SWE41 Sump pump 2SWE41 is not currently operational and being worked on per Work Order 30191149.42 2SWE5 S2SW -2SWE5 Sump pump 2SWE41 is not currently operational and being worked on per Work Order 30191149.43 2SWE6 S2SW -2SWE6 Sump pump 2SWE41 is not currently operational and being worked on per Work Order 30191149.44 W-26902-025 S2FLB-W-26902-025 Scaffolding required for a more accurate measurement reading.45 W-26902-026 S2FLB-W-26902-026 Scaffolding required for a more accurate measurement reading.46 W-26902-027 S2FLB-W-26902-027 Scaffolding required for a more accurate measurement reading.47 W-26902-028 S2FLB-W-26902-028 Scaffoldinq required for a more accurate measurement reading.48 24 BLD & EQUIP DRAINS(WD)
RESID HEAT S2WD -2LD7755 In sump pit, high dose rate precluded access, in room 25101 REMOVAL SMP PMP START-STOP SW 49 23 BLD & EQUIP DRAINS(WD)
RESID HEAT S2WD -2LD7756 In sump pit, high dose rate precluded access, in room 25101 REMOVAL SMP PMP START-STOP SW 50 22 BLD & EQUIP DRAINS(WD)
RESID HEAT S2WD -2LD7754 In sump pit, high dose rate precluded access, in room 25101 REMOVAL SMP PMP START-STOP SW 51 21 BLD & EQUIP DRAINS(WD)
RESID HEAT S2WD -2LD7753 In sump pit, high dose rate precluded access, in room 25101 REMOVAL SMP PMP START-STOP SW 52 W-25440-001 S2FLB-W-25540-001 SCAFFOLD REQUIRED (ROUGHLY 8.5 FT OFF GROUND)53 W-25417-066-BS S2FBR-W-25417-066-BS REQUIRES SCAFFOLD AND ELECTRICIAN TO OPEN CONDUIT / PULL BOX INSIDE AUX BUILDING 54 W-25417-061-BS S2FBR-W-25417-061-BS REQUIRES SCAFFOLD AND ELECTRICIAN TO OPEN CONDUIT / PULL BOX INSIDE AUX BUILDING 55 W-25417-058-BS S2FBR-W-25417-058-BS REQUIRES SCAFFOLD AND ELECTRICIAN TO OPEN CONDUIT / PULL I __ IBOX INSIDE AUX BUILDING Salem U2 Flooding Walkdown Final / Restricted Access Salem Unit 2 Restricted Access -Flood Protection Features Attachment F Report No. SL-2012-10795 Page 3 of 5 No. Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Short Description of Justification 56 W-25417-057-BS S2FBR-W-25417-057-BS REQUIRES SCAFFOLD AND ELECTRICIAN TO OPEN CONDUIT / PULL BOX INSIDE AUX BUILDING 57 W-25417-054-BS S2FBR-W-25417-054-BS REQUIRES SCAFFOLD AND ELECTRICIAN TO OPEN CONDUIT / PULL I_ BOX INSIDE AUX BUILDING 58 W-25417-052-AS S2FLB-W-25417-052-AS REQUIRES SCAFFOLD AND ELECTRICIAN TO OPEN CONDUIT / PULL BOX INSIDE AUX BUILDING 59 W-25417-049-BS S2FBR-W-25417-049-BS REQUIRES SCAFFOLD AND ELECTRICIAN TO OPEN CONDUIT / PULL BOX INSIDE AUX BUILDING 60 W-25417-048-AS S2FLB-W-25417-048-AS REQUIRES SCAFFOLD AND ELECTRICIAN TO OPEN CONDUIT / PULL BOX INSIDE AUX BUILDING 61 W-25417-047-BS S2FBR-W-25417-047-BS REQUIRES SCAFFOLD AND ELECTRICIAN TO OPEN CONDUIT / PULL BOX INSIDE AUX BUILDING 62 W-25417-047-AS S2FLB-W-25417-047-AS REQUIRES SCAFFOLD AND ELECTRICIAN TO OPEN CONDUIT / PULL BOX INSIDE AUX BUILDING 63 N-25612-027 S2FBR-N-25612-027 Located behind steel plate enclosure, need maintenance to assess if plate can be removed.64 N-25612-026 S2FBR-N-25612-026 Located behind steel plate enclosure, need maintenance to assess if plate can be removed.65 N-25612-025 S2FBR-N-25612-025 Located behind steel plate enclosure, need maintenance to assess if plate can be removed.66 N-25612-004 S2FBR-N-25612-004 Located behind steel plate enclosure, need maintenance to assess if plate I _can be removed.67 N-25612-003 S2FBR-N-25612-003 Located behind steel plate enclosure, need maintenance to assess if plate can be removed.68 N-25549-007 S2FLB-N-25549-007 Conduit LB fittings -maintenance necessary to open 69 N-25549-006 S2FLB-N-25549-006 Conduit LB fittings -maintenance necessary to open 70 N-25522-028 S2FLB-N-25522-028 Conduit LB fittings -require maintenance support 71 N-25522-025 S2FLB-N-25522-025 Conduit LB fittings -require maintenance support 72 N-25522-024 S2FLB-N-25522-024 Conduit LB fittings -require maintenance support 73 N-25522-023 S2FLB-N-25522-023 Conduit LB fittings -require maintenance support 74 N-25522-022 S2FLB-N-25522-022 Conduit LB fittings -require maintenance support 75 N-25522-021 S2FLB-N-25522-021 Conduit LB fittings -require maintenance support 76 N-25522-020 S2FLB-N-25522-020 Conduit LB fittings -require maintenance support 77 N-25522-019 S2FLB-N-25522-019 Conduit LB fittings -require maintenance support 78 N-25522-018 S2FLB-N-25522-018 Conduit LB fittings -require maintenance support 79 N-25522-017 S2FLB-N-25522-017 Conduit LB fittings -require maintenance support 80 N-25522-016 S2FLB-N-25522-016 Conduit LB fittings -require maintenance support 81 N-25522-015 S2FLB-N-25522-015 Conduit LB fittings -require maintenance support 82 N-25522-013 S2FLB-N-25522-013 SCAFFOLD REQUIRED Salem U2 Flooding Walkdown Final / Restricted Access Salem Unit 2 Restricted Access -Flood Protection Features Attachment F Report No. SL-2012-10795 Page 4 of 5 No. Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Short Description of Justification 83 N-25522-012 S2FLB-N-25522-012 SCAFFOLD REQUIRED 84 N-25522-011 S2FLB-N-25522-011 SCAFFOLD REQUIRED 85 N-25522-010 S2FLB-N-25522-010 SCAFFOLD REQUIRED 86 N-25522-009 S2FLB-N-25522-009 SCAFFOLD REQUIRED 87 N-25522-008 S2FLB-N-25522-008 SCAFFOLD REQUIRED 88 N-25522-007 S2FLB-N-25522-007 SCAFFOLD REQUIRED 89 N-25437-010-AS S2FLB-N-25437-010-AS SCAFFOLD REQUIRED 90 N-25437-001 S2FLB-N-25437-001 SCAFFOLD REQUIRED 91 N-25429-036 S2FLB-N-25429-036 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.92 N-25429-035 S2FLB-N-25429-035 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.93 N-25429-034 S2FLB-N-25429-034 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.94 N-25429-033 S2FLB-N-25429-033 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.95 N-25429-032 S2FLB-N-25429-032 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.96 N-25429-031 S2FLB-N-25429-031 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.97 N-25429-030 S2FLB-N-25429-030 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.98 N-25429-029 S2FLB-N-25429-029 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.99 N-25429-028 S2FLB-N-25429-028 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.100 N-25429-027 S2FLB-N-25429-027 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.101 N-25429-026 S2FLB-N-25429-026 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.102 N-25429-025 S2FLB-N-25429-025 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.103 N-25429-024 S2FLB-N-25429-024 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.104 N-25429-023 S2FLB-N-25429-023 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.105 N-25429-021 S2FLB-N-25429-021 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.106 N-25429-020 S2FLB-N-25429-020 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.107 N-25429-019 S2FLB-N-25429-019 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.108 N-25429-018 S2FLB-N-25429-018 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.109 N-25429-017 S2FLB-N-25429-017 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.110 N-25429-016 S2FLB-N-25429-016 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.111 N-25429-015 S2FLB-N-25429-015 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.112 N-25429-014 S2FLB-N-25429-014 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.113 N-25429-013 S2FLB-N-25429-013 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.114 N-25429-012 S2FLB-N-25429-012 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.115 N-25429-011 S2FLB-N-25429-011 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.116 N-25429-010 S2FLB-N-25429-010 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.117 N-25429-009 S2FLB-N-25429-009 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.118 N-25429-005 S2FLB-N-25429-005 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.119 N-25429-003 S2FLB-N-25429-003 Access restricted due to presence of fire wrap.120 E-29401-001 S2FLB-E-29401-001 Conduit LB fitting -requires maintenance Salem U2 Flooding Walkdown Final / Restricted Access Salem Unit 2 Restricted Access -Flood Protection Features Attachment F Report No. SL-2012-10795 Page 5 of 5 No. Flood Protection Feature ID FLOC Short Description of Justification 121 E-25549-005 S2FBR-E-25549-005 unction box -requires maintenance to open 122 E-25549-004
? junction box -requires maintenance to open 123 E-25434-028 S2FLB-E-25434-028 REQUIRES SCAFFOLDING 124 E-25403-057 S2FBR-E-25403-057 BOROSCOPE AND SCAFFOLD REQUIRED 125 NO. 2 DIESEL GENERATOR SUMP PUMP S2BD -2BDE11 Can not be inspected due to bolted sump pit cover, need maintenance support to open.126 24 WD RHR SUMP PMP S2WD -2WDE4 In room 25101 SUMP PIT (HIGH DOSE)127 23 WD RHR SUMP PMP S2WD -2WDE3 In room 25101 SUMP PIT (HIGH DOSE)128 22 WD RHR SUMP PMP S2WD -2WDE2 In room 25102 SUMP PIT (HIGH DOSE)129 21 WD RHR SUMP PMP S2WD -2WDE1 In room 25102 SUMP PIT (HIGH DOSE)130 W-25426- none CAN NOT ACCESS DUE TO DOSE RATES, BEHIND REMOVABLE CONCRETE WALL IN SPENT RESIN TANK ROOM, REASSESS AT OTHER PLANT MODES 131 N-25206- none CAN NOT ACCESS DUE TO DOSE RATESREASSESS AT OTHER I_ I_ PLANT MODES Salem U2 Flooding Walkdown Final / Restricted Access Attachment G SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Flood Protection Feature Walkdown Project Organization Chart!Saragrteo 5Lundyv-O PSEG NUCLEAR LLC 0 PSEG NUCLEAR LLC Salem Generating Station Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report Attachment H SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 November 21, 2012 Page No. I of 2 Changes in Walkdown Process / Methodology NEI 12-07 Rev. OA Prescribed Flood SGS Flood Prevention Feature Walkdown Prevention Feature Walkdown Methodology Methodology
- 1. Documentation of field observations shall be Walkdown package forms were used to record recorded on a form provided in the field data.walkdown package.The recommended form is provided in An alternate tabular form containing the Appendix B. applicable fields to collect the Appendix B identified field data was used.2. Section 5.3 recommends that two people All walkdowns were performed by minimum of should participate in walkdown inspections, two men teams.3. The individual who prepares the Walkdown Alternate Walkdown Record Forms were Record Form or who performs the visual generated containing the requested NEI 12-07 inspection or other review documented by Rev. OA data. "Prepared By", "Performed By" the form should sign "Prepared By", and or "Evaluated By" initials were obtained in"Performed By" or "Evaluated By" space in accordance with NEI 12-07 Rev. OA guidance.the applicable section of the form.4 The second individual performing the visual Initials for both participants of the visual inspection should sign in the "Performed By" inspection walkdowns were provided.space of section C of the sheet.5. The individuals reviewing the information in The reviewer of the Walkdown Record Form the form should sign in the "Reviewed By" initialed in sections B or E, as applicable.
space in sections B or E as applicable.
- 6. It is recommended that all of the Walkdown Walkdown Record Sheets for each Flood Record Sheets be packaged together with a Protection Feature inspected
/ reviewed are cover page that documents Management provided in a separate reviewed document.review of the entire package.7. Perform an overall evaluation of the PSEG review of this Report was routed to include walkdown results including station staff and station interface.
the aggregate effect to assure all actions can be completed as required.The reviews described above satisfy the"peer review" activities requested in Reference 8.2, Enclosure 4.8 Photographs of visual inspection observations Photographs taken during the performance of are recommended to create a permanent the walkdowns were indexed and provided with record. the Walkdown Record Forms document.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC 0 PSEG NUCLEAR LLC Salem Generating Station Project No. 12800-217 SGS Flood Walkdown Report Attachment H SL Report No.: SL-2012-10795 Rev. No. 0 November 21, 2012 Page No. 2 of 2 NEI 12-07 Rev. OA Prescribed Flood SGS Flood Prevention Feature Walkdown Prevention Feature Walkdown Methodology Methodology
- 9. All failures to meet acceptance criteria will be All observations were submitted to PSEG for entered into the CAP. review and input into the PSEG CAP for evaluation and disposition as applicable.
- 10. All flood protection features that could not A listing of the flood protection features that be inspected because of access limitations could not be inspected because of access (inaccessible or restricted access) will be limitations (inaccessible or restricted access)evaluated using the guidance in section 5.1 were provided to PSEG for evaluation and and reported in the response to the 50.54(F) inclusion in the 50.54(f) response.letter.11. The 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter enclosure entitled Guidance reviewed and applied as applicable."Recommendation 2.3: Flooding" contains a"Requested Information section that lists all the information that must be included in licensee responses.
Appendix D contains guidance for completing the walkdown report.SGS FLOOD WALKDOWN REPORT 11-21-2012.DOC