IR 05000313/2015003

NRC Inspection Report 05000313/2015003 and 05000368/2015003

ML15313A499
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	11/09/2015
From:	O'Keefe N F NRC/RGN-IV/DRP
To:	Jeremy G. Browning Entergy Operations
Okeefe M
References
IR 2015003
Download: ML15313A499 (37)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 1600 E. LAMAR BLVD.

ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511 November 9, 2015 Mr. Jeremy Browning, Site Vice President Arkansas Nuclear One

Entergy Operations, Inc.

1448 SR 333 Russellville, AR 72802

-0967

SUBJECT: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2015003 and 05000368/2015003

Dear Mr. Browning:

On September 30, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Arkansas Nuclear One facility, Units 1 and 2. On October 6, 2015, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

Both of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating these violations as non

-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555

-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One.

If you disagree with a cross

-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One.

On September 30, 2015, the NRC completed a quarterly performance review of Arkansas Nuclear One. The NRC determined that continued plant operation was acceptable and oversight in the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone of the Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix remained appropriate.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading

-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Neil O'Keefe, Chief Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.

50-313 and 50-368 License Nos

. DRP-51 and NPF-6 Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000313/2015003 and 05000368/2015003

w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information

ML15313A49 9 SUNSI Review By: NFO ADAMS Yes No Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available OFFICE SRI:DRP/E RI:DRP/E RI:DRP/E PE:DRP/E DRS/EB2 DRS/OB NAME BTindell ABarrett MTobin BCorrell GWerner VGaddy SIGNATURE /RA/E-O'Keefe /RA/E-O'Keefe /RA/E-O'Keefe /RA/E-O'Keefe /RA/ /RA/KClayton for DATE 10/30/15 11/2/15 11/3/15 11/2/15 11/6/15 11/5/15 OFFICE DRS/PSB1 DRS/PSB2 DRS/TSS DRS/EB1 BC:DRP/E NAME MHaire HGepford ERuesch TRFarnholtz NO'Keefe SIGNATURE /RA/RLanfear for /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA DATE 11/5/15 11/3/15 11/6/15 11/4/15 11/9/15 Letter to Jeremy Browning from Neil O'Keefe dated November 9, 2015

SUBJECT: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE

- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2015003 and 05000368/2015003 DISTRIBUTION

Regional Administrator (Marc.Dapas@nrc.gov)

Deputy Regional Administrator (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov) DRP Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)

DRS Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)

DRS Deputy Director (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)

DRP Deputy Director (Ryan.Lantz@nrc.gov)

Senior Resident Inspector (Brian.Tindell@nrc.gov)

Resident Inspector (Margaret.Tobin@nrc.gov)

Resident Inspector (Andrew.Barrett@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRP/E (Neil.OKeefe@nrc.gov)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (John.Dixon@nrc.gov

) Project Engineer, DRP/E (Brian.Correll@nrc.gov)

Project Engineer, DRP/E (Jackson.Choate@nrc.gov)

ANO Administrative Assistant (Vacant)

Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)

Project Manager (Andrea.George@nrc.gov)

Acting Team Leader, DRS/TSS (Eric.Ruesch@nrc.gov)

ACES (R4Enforcement.Resource@nrc.gov)

RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)

Technical Support Assistant (Loretta.Williams@nrc.gov)

Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)

RIV Congressional Affairs Officer (Angel.Moreno@nrc.gov)

RIV/ETA: OEDO (Cindy.Rosales

-Cooper@nrc.gov)

ROPreports ROPAssessments Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket: 05000313; 05000368 License: DPR-51; NPF-6 Report: 05000313/2015003; 05000368/201500 3 Licensee: Entergy Operations Inc.

Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 Location: Junction of Hwy. 64 West and Hwy. 333 South Russellville, Arkansas Dates: July 1 through September 30, 2015 Inspectors:

B. Tindell, Senior Resident Inspector A. Barrett, Resident Inspector M. Tobin, Resident Inspector B. Correll, Project Engineer J. Dixon, Senior Project Engineer R. Egli, Chief, Reactor Technology Instructor T. Farina, Project Engineer Z. Hollcraft, Reactor Operations Engineer M. Williams, Reactor Inspector Approved By: Neil O'Keefe Chief, Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

IR 05000313/2015003; 05000368/2015003; 07/01/2015 - 09/30/2015; Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, Integrated Inspection Report

Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments and Problem Identification and Resolution

. The inspection activities described in this report were performed between July 1 and September 30, 2015, by the resident inspectors at Arkansas Nuclear One and inspectors from the NRC's Region IV office and other NRC offices. Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Both of these findings involved violation s of NRC requirements

. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas." Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process."

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for the failure to correct conditions adverse to quality.

Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly replace short bus stabs with longer bus stabs in six 480V safety-related motor control centers as planned following a 2007 motor control center fault. Subsequently, safety-related motor control centers remain ed susceptible to a fault because corrective actions had not been implemented.

This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action progr am as Condition Report 2015

-2661. The licensee has completed the modifications to all breakers except those requiring an outage.

The failure to promptly correct conditions adverse to quality associated with 480V breaker connections to bus bars was a performance deficiency

. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensur e the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, untimely corrective actions allowed an increas ed likelihood of a fault to continue to exist that would result in the loss of the associated safety-related motor control centers if the fault occurred

. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding wa s not a deficiency affecting design or qualification

, d id not represent a loss of system and/or function

, and d id not represent an actual loss of function.

This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because it was not indicative of current plant performance; the licensee decided to remove the corrective actions from the corrective action program more than years ago.

(Section 4OA2.3)

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

Green.

The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for failure to follow the instructions in the chemical volume control system charging pump pulsation dampener bladder charging procedure. Specifically, maintenance personnel used a gas cylinder containing argon, carbon dioxide, and oxygen rather than a pure nitrogen cylinder to charge the dampener as required by procedure 2411.066, "Charging Pump Dampener Bladder 115A, B, C and 2M

-116A, B, C Checking and Depressurization," Revision 05. Because the dampener had an existing bladder leak

, the gas leaked into the reactor coolant system and the argon subsequently activated when it passed through the reactor. Reactor coolant system activity significantly increased, which elevated dose rates in the auxiliary building.

The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2015-02576. The licensee revised the procedure to require an independent verification of the gas before charging the pulsation dampe ners. The failure to follow the dampener charging procedure, which resulted in increased reactor coolant system activity and elevated dose rates in the auxiliary building, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, charging argon into a pulsation dampener with a known bladder leak caused elevated dose rates in several plant areas. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix, C, "Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process," issued August 19, 2008, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve ALARA planning or work controls, did not involve an overexposure, did not have a substantial potential to be an overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. The inspectors determined this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Avoid Complacency, because the plant maintenance mechanics failed to implement appropriate error reduction tools such as self-checking and peer-checking [H.12].

(Section 1R15)

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 operated at 100 percent power for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 began the period at 100 percent power. On July 23, 2015, operators reduced unit power to 96 percent due to oscillations in hotwell level, condenser pressure, and main feedwater pump turbine exhaust pressures. The power reduction stabilized the conditions in the condenser, and the unit remained at the lower power level until September 20, 2015, when Unit 2 was shut down for the planned refueling outage. The unit remained shut down throug h the end of the inspection period.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1 R 01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

On July 2, 2015, the inspectors completed an inspection of the station's readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's adverse weather procedures for seasonal high temperatures and evaluated the licensee's implementation of these procedures. The inspectors verified that prior to the onset of hot weather, the licensee had corrected weather-related equipment deficiencies identified during the previous weather season.

The inspectors selected two risk-significant systems that were required to be protected from hot temperatures

Emergency cooling p ond Startup transformers The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and design information to ensure the systems and components would remain functional when challenged by hot weather. The inspectors verified that operator actions described in the licensee's procedures were adequate to maintain readiness of these systems. The inspectors walked down portions of these systems to verify the physical condition of the hot weather protection features.

These activities constitute d one sample of readiness for seasonal adverse weather , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.0 1.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

Partial Walk down

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walk

-downs of the following risk

-significant systems: August 4, 2015, Unit 2, low pressure safety injection system, while relief valve 2PSV-5082 was being replaced for maintenance September 29, 2015, Unit 2, shutdown cooling system, while reactor coolant system was in lowered inventory September 30, 2015, Unit 2, refueling level indication, while reactor coolant system was in lowered inventory The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems and trains were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration

. These activities constitute d three partial system walk

-down sampl es as defined i n Inspection Procedure 71111.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

Quarterly Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on f our plant areas important to safety

July 15, 2015, Unit 1, Fire Zone 97

-R, cable spreading r oom July 29, 2015, Unit 1, Fire Z one 98-J, access corridor September 3, 2015, Unit 1, Fire Zone 197

-X, turbine building September 30, 2015, Unit 2, Fire Zone s 2032-K and 2033-K , containment building For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensee's fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.

These activities constitute d four quarterly inspection sample s , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)

Triennial Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

On July 16, 2015, the inspectors completed inspections of the readiness and availability of three risk-significant heat exchangers. The inspectors observed and reviewed visual inspections of the Unit 2 alternate ac diesel generator aftercooler 2E-132 and lube oil cooler 2E-130. Additionally, the inspectors walked down reactor coolant pump seal return cooler E-26A/B and the auxiliary feedwater pump forced air lube oil cooler 2 C-72. The inspectors observed the material condition of these component heat exchangers and verified that they were correctly categorized under the Maintenance Rule and were receiving the required maintenance.

These activities constitute completion of one heat sink performance triennial revie w sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.07.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance (71111.11)

.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On August 20, 2015, the inspectors observed Unit 2 simulator training for an operating crew. On September 2, 2015, the inspectors observed a Unit 1 simulator training for an operating crew.

The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators' critique of their performance.

These activities constitute completion of two quarterly licensed operator requalification program sampl es, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Revi ew of Licensed Operator Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the performance of on

-shift licensed operators in the plant's Unit 1 and Unit 2 main control room s. The inspectors observed the operators' performance of the following activitie s: August 27 , 2015, Unit 1

, decay heat removal pump A surveillance September 29, 215, Unit 2, reactor coolant system drain to lowered inventory for reactor head removal In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators' adherence to plant procedures, including conduct of operations procedure and other operations department policies.

These activities constitute completion of two quarterly licensed operator performance samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs): June 26, 2015, Unit 1, electrical equipment room essential chiller failure August 18, 2015, Unit 2, service water system The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensee's characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.

These activities constitute d completion of two maintenance effectiveness sample s , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:

July 9, 2015, Unit 2 , service water train B traveling screen out of service August 27, 2015, Unit 2, refueling water tank to emergency core cooling system A valve closure September 3, 2015, Unit 1, heavy lift near borated water storage tank September 23, 2015, Unit 2, shutdown cooling loop B inoperable in Mode 5 September 26, 2015, Unit 2, refueling outage risk assessment The inspectors verified that these risk assessment s were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures.

The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensee's risk assessment and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessment.

The inspectors also observed portions of one emergent work activit y that had the potential to cause an initiating event

August 18, 2015, voltage regulator gas cylinder replacement in switchyard The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs. These activities constitute completion of five maintenance risk assessments and one emergent work control inspection sample , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewe d operability determinations and functionality assessments that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming SSCs: July 10, 2015, Unit 1, operability determination for decay heat removal pump A degrading differential pressure trend August 17, 2015, operability determination for emergency diesel generator fuel oil storage tank following deluge system activation August 18, 2015, Unit 1, functionality assessment for degraded intermediate cooling water pump discharge check valve August 26, 2015, Unit 2, operability determination for increasing trend in reactor coolant system argon activity September 15, 2015, Unit 2, operability determination for time delay relay capacitor failures September 24, 2015, Unit 2, operability determination for shutdown cooling heat exchanger B shell corrosion The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensee's evaluation.

Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable or functional, the inspectors verified that the licensee's compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability or functionality.

The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded

conditions on the operability or functionality of the degraded SSC.

These activities constitute completion of six operability and functionality review samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The inspectors reviewed a Green self

-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, & Drawings," for failure to follow the instructions in the chemical volume control system charging pump pulsation dampener bladder charging procedure. Specifically, the licensee used a gas cylinder containing argon, carbon dioxide, and oxygen rather than a pure nitrogen cylinder to charge the dampener. The gas leaked into the reactor coolant system and was subsequently activated by neutrons. Reactor coolant system activity significantly increased, which elevated dose rates in the auxiliary building.

Description.

The Unit 2 chemical volume control system charging pumps ha ve suction and discharge dampeners to reduce pressure pulsations caused by these positive displacement pumps

. These dampeners are an accumulator tank with a nitrogen filled bladder. Nitrogen leakage through the bladder can result in the nitrogen entrainment in the water, which is pumped into the reactor coolant system.

The licensee had been aware of leakage from the dampeners and had implemented quarterly preventative maintenance tasks to check the pressure and fill the dampeners with nitrogen, if necessary.

On July 31, 2015, a reactor coolant sample i n dicated a rising trend in argon-41.

argon-41 is a radioactive isotope of argon that is created when argon-40 in reactor coolant passes through the reactor and becomes irradiated. It undergoes decay, giving off a high

-energy beta particle, increasing dose rates in the plant

. A failure m ode analysis team investigated the possible causes and identified the most likely cause to be a leaking charging pump dampener bladder filled with the incorrect gas.

On September 3 , 2015 , the licensee performed gas chromatograph sampling on the 2P

-36 C charging pump suction and discharge dampeners. Although the test equipment cannot test for percent argon content, the test determined that the suction dampener only had a 14.4 percent nitrogen content. The discharge dampener only had a 15.4 percent nitrogen content.

If the dampeners were charged with nitrogen as expected

, the content would be expected to be over 90 percent nitrogen. The licensee recharged the pulsation dampener with pure nitrogen, and dose rates in the plant returned to normal.

The addition and subsequent activation of argon caused the reactor coolant activity to increase by a factor of three over a period of two months. This increased the dose rates in the vicinity of piping associated with the chemical and volume control system, increasing dose to operators and radwaste personnel.

The licensee performed a cause analysis and determined that a human performance error caused the wrong gas to be used. Plant maintenance mechanics had performed pulsation dampener preventative maintenance on July 28, 2015.

The mechanics retrieved a pressure gauge from the hot machine shop and went to the compressed gas cylinder storage rack.

The mechanics measured pressure in the cylinders and chose the first cylinder that contained sufficient gas. The mechanics the n proceeded to 2P

-36C charging pump dampener fill connection, connected the cylinder to the charging header

, and recharged the pulsation dampeners.

All of the gas cylinders in this storage location were the same color

, and the labelling appeared similar unless read carefully. The mechanics failed to check the label on the gas cylinder to ensure that they chose a nitrogen bottle, and they incorrectly chose the single cylinder that contained a mixture of carbon dioxide, oxygen, and argon. The licensee revised the procedure to require independent verification of the gas prior to charging pulsation dampeners.

Chemistry samples confirmed there was no change in oxygen content in the reactor coolant.

Analysis.

The failure to follow the pulsation dampener charging procedure

, which resulted in increase d reactor coolant system activity and elevated dose rates in the auxiliary building, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the plant facilities/equipment attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, charging argon into a pulsation dampener with a known bladder leak resulted in an increase in reactor coolant activity, causing elevated dose rates in several plant areas. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix, C, "Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process," issued August 19, 2008, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve ALARA planning or work controls, did not involve an overexposure, did not have a substantial potential to be an overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. The inspectors determined this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area, Avoid Complacency, because the plant maintenance mechanics failed to implement appropriate error reduction tools such as self-checking and peer

-checking. [H.12]

Enforcement.

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instruction, Procedures, & Drawings ," states that "Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.

" Contrary to the above, on July 28, 2015, the licensee failed to accomplish an activity affecting quality in accordance with the procedure. Specifically, the licensee failed to charge a charging pump pulsation dampener, an activity affecting quality, with nitrogen as required by quality Procedure OP

-2411.066, "Charging Pump Dampener Bladder 2 M-115 A, B, C and 2M-116A, B, C Charging, Checking a nd Depressurization

," Revision 5, Attachment 3, Supplement 1. Step 1.3 of this procedure require d that nitrogen be connected to the charging pump pulsation dampener supply valve during the charging process, but a bottle with a mix of gases including argon was used instead

. The error resulted in a significant increase in re actor coolant activity, with a resulting increase in dose rates in various areas of the plant. As corrective action, the licensee recharged the dampener with pure nitrogen and degassed the reactor coolant system to reduce dose rates in the plant. This violation is being treated as a non

-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy because it was of very low safety significance (Green) and it was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report ANO-2-CR-2015-02576: NCV 05000 368/201500 3-01 , "Failure to Follow Procedure Results in Increased Reactor Coolant Activity."

1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed three post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk

-significant SSCs: July 22, 2015, Unit 1, service water pump B breaker

, following auxiliary switch maintenance July 28, 2015, Unit 2, motor driven emergency feedwater pump suction and discharge motor operated valves, following operator inspections September 2, 2015, startup transformer 2 voltage regulator , following leak checks and bypass switch repairs The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design

-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures.

The inspectors observed the performance of the post

-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs

.

These activities constitute completion of three post-maintenance testing inspection sample s , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20)

a. Inspection Scope

For the portion of the Unit 2 refueling outag e that occurred during this inspection period , the inspectors evaluated the licensee's outage activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee considered risk in developing and implementing the outage plan, appropriately managed personnel fatigue, and developed mitigation strategies for losses of key safety functions. This verification included the following:

Review of the licensee's outage plan prior to the outage Review and verification of the licensee's fatigue management activities Monitoring of shut

-down and cool

-down activities Verification that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth during outage activities Observation and review of reduced

-inventory activities These activities constitute completion of one refueling outage sample outage activities sample , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.20.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1 R 22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed three risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:

In-service test s: August 27, 2015, Unit 1, decay heat removal pump A Containment isolation valve surveillance tests: September 25, 2015, Unit 2, containment integrated leak rate test Other surveillance tests:

September 1, 2015 , Units 1 and 2, transformer deluge tests The inspectors verified that these test s met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.

These activities constitute completion of three surveillance testing inspection sample s , as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1 EP 6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill on July 22, 2015, to verify the adequacy and capability of the licensee's assessment of drill performance. The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario, observed the drill from the simulator, technical support center, and operations support center, and attended the post

-drill critique. The inspectors verified that the licensee's emergency classifications, off

-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post

-drill critique and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.

These activities constitute completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security 4OA 1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Mitigating Systems Performance Index:

Emergency AC Power System s (MS06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's mitigating system performance index data for the period of September 1, 2014, through August 31, 2015, to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data. These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for emergency ac power systems for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Mitigating Systems Performance Index

High Pressure Injection Systems (MS07)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's mitigating system performance index data for the period of October 1, 2014, through September 3 0, 2015, to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data. These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for high pressure injection systems for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Mitigating Systems Performance Index

Heat Removal System s (MS08)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's mitigating system performance index data for the period of October 1, 2014, through September 30, 2015, to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data. These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for heat removal systems for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA 2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)

.1 Routine Review

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program and periodically attended the licensee's condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Semi annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program, performance indicators, system health reports, work orders, and other documentation to identify trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors verified that the licensee was taking corrective actions to address identified adverse trends.

These activities constitute completion of one semiannual trend review sample , a s defined in Inspection Procedure 71152. b. Observations and Assessments Door Deficiencies On August 18, 2015, the licensee identified an adverse trend in unsecured doors, as documented in Condition Report CR

-ANO-C-2015-03229. Specifically, the condition report documented that 15 condition reports had been written since May 1, 2015, for fire or high energy line break doors found open and unattended. The licensee addressed this trend by conducting a personal interface campaign at the plant entry area. As persons entered the station

, managers stopped them, discussed the importance of barriers , and handed them a one page document with further information on why barriers are important to safety. In addition, departmental managers were given an action to develop a plan to verify or improve employee behaviors. Following these actions, two more condition reports identified doors that had been left open. Station management held a stand down on September 28, 2015, with all station employees to ensure that they underst ood the importance of door design and configuration

. The inspectors found that the station had appropriately identified the adverse trend in regards to station behaviors

, but had failed to document an adverse trend in the number of documented door deficiencies. In the past year , 31 condition reports documented deficient conditions on doors required for security, fire, high energy line break or flooding. Although the licensee failed to identify the trend, the inspectors determined that the licensee was addressing the conditions appropriately in the work management system. The licensee documented the observation in Condition Reports CR-ANO-C-2015-03972 and CR

-ANO-C-2015-03973.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Annual Follow

-up of Selected Issues

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected three issues for an in

-depth follow

-up: On July 9, 2015, inspectors reviewed a cause evaluation for a Unit 1 service water cross connect valve failure to open.

On July 30, 2015, inspectors reviewed a cause evaluation for a Unit 1 service water isolation valve failure to close.

On September 17, 2015, inspectors reviewed a cause evaluation for a Unit 2 motor control center fault. The inspectors assessed the licensee's problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the condition.

These activities constitute completion of three annual follow

-up sample s , as defined i n Inspection Procedure 71152.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The inspectors reviewed a self

-revealing violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for the failure to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly replace short bus stabs with longer bus stabs in six safety-related motor control centers (MCC s) following a 2007 motor control center fault.

Description

. On April 21, 2015, non-safety MCC 2B-35 experienced a fault which melted bus bars and caused the feeder breaker to the MCC to open to isolate the fault, de-energizing multiple non

-vital loads in the turbine building. Subsequent inspection and analysis determined that the fault was caused by a high resistance con nection between the break er for turbine building recirculation fan and the associated bus bars. Contributin g to this condition, the licensee observed indications that water had dripped onto the bus bars from above from turbine building roof leaks. This event led the licensee to review a previous similar event and to assess the corrective actions for that event

. In October 2007, a fault had occurred in a Unit 2 motor control center when starting a charging pump, which tripped the motor control center feeder breaker and secur ed power to all the loads supplied by that motor control center. The licensee documented in Condition Report CR

-ANO-2-2007-01512 that the cause of the fault was "limited physical stab engagement on bus". The limited contact area between the breaker stabs and the bus bars was determined to be marginal for the current needed to run the chargin g

pump. This condition was determined to exist in many other loads to varying degrees in both units, affecting both safety and non

-safety loads. To address this root cause, t he licensee initiated corrective actions to replace the marginal breaker stabs with longer stabs to increase the current

-carrying surface area between bus bars and breaker stabs.

The licensee grouped the cubicles into phases of repairs, based on the perceived risk that higher current loading corresponded to a higher probability of failure. Phase 0 cubicles were corrected by October 26, 2007, Phase 1 breakers were completed on November 14, 2007, and Phase 2 breakers were completed on March 25, 2008.

The inspectors concluded that these corrective actions were timely.

The licensee changed the corrective action plan for the Phase 3 cubicles following completion of Phase 2 cubicle repairs , judging that the last group of ten safety-related and twenty non-safety MCCs were low

-risk. The remaining corrective actions were removed from the corrective action program (i.e., the actions were closed) and placed in the preventive maintenance program. Specifically, the licensee modified a preventative maintenance procedure to require a modification to install longer breaker stabs if the stabs were not observed to have the longer style, so that the Phase 3 modifications would be done during the regularly scheduled preventative maintenance for the breakers. Once this was placed in the preventive maintenance process, the licens ee no longer tracked the a ctions to ensure effective and timely corrective actions were completed. Subsequently, the licensee extended that breaker preventative maintenance frequency from 6 year s to 9 years, and later to 12 years

, without recognizing that this delayed the original corrective action to replace MCC breaker stabs. Multiple susceptible cubicles remained unmodified and untracked for timeliness. Following the MCC 2B35 fault in April 2015, the root cause evaluation in Condition Report CR

-ANO-2-2 015-00902 identified the root cause to be "inadequate program to program interface." Specifically, "corrective actions to perform corrective maintenance for the low risk bus repairs were inappropriately placed in the preventive maintenance process vs

. creating corrective maintenance work orders in the 2007 root cause evaluation

." The inspectors reviewed the decision

-making process used to divide the original large population of breakers into groups in order to prioritize the corrective actions. The licensee assigned groupings on the perceived risk that higher current draw was equal to a higher failure probability. This approach failed to assess the potential plant impact from the resulting failure in the risk assessment and prioritization process. The plant impact from the two faults described in this section involved loss of power to the entire MCC that was affected, but the licensee did not assess the risk consequences associated with the combined impact of losing all the loads on each affected MCC. The loads in the low-priority Phase 3 group that remained to be corrected included safety-related MCCs, while many of the breakers that had higher priority involved non

-safety loads. Therefore, the inspectors observed that the licensee had not used a consistent process that used a systematic approach to decisions that appropriately incorporated risk insights when the original population of breakers was grouped and corrective actions were prioritized.

The inspectors noted that since April 21, 2015, some safety-related loads designated as Phase 3 actions in CR-ANO-2-2007-01512 remained susceptible to faults. While there remained breakers in six safety-related and eleven non-safety MCCs with an increased susceptib i lity to faults, the inspectors determined that the motor control centers re tained a high reliability, as indicated by having had only one fault since the October 2007 event. The licensee had corrected those breakers with the highest susceptibilities following the 2007 event such that the remaining breakers were less susceptible. In addition, the inspectors determined that the increased fault probability did not lead to a higher fire probability for equipment in the same room because the actual faults had been contained inside of the motor control centers and were stopped when the upstream supply breakers tripped. The licensee has modified most of the affected breakers and has scheduled all motor control center stab replacement actions to complete by April 201 6.

Analysis.

The fail ure to promptly correct conditions adverse to quality associated with safety-related 480V breaker connections to bus bars following a 2007 motor control center fault was a performance deficiency

. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensur e the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, untimely corrective actions allowed an increas ed likelihood of a fault to continue to exist with the potential for the loss of power to all the loads on the associated safety-related motor control centers.

Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At

-Power," dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a deficiency affecting design or qualification

, d id not represent a loss of system and/or function

, and d id not represent an actual loss of function.

This finding was not assigned a cross

-cutting aspect because it was not indicative of current plant performance; the licensee decided to remove the corrective actions from the corrective action program more than three years ago.

Enforcement.

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, and deficiencies are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, since October 2007, the licensee did not promptly correct a condition adverse to quality for equipment deficiencies. Specifically, as of April 2015, the licensee failed to promptly complete planned corrective actions to replace safety-related motor control center breakers stabs with longer stab connections, leaving the six safety-related motor control centers susceptible to an increased probability of a fault and power loss. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2015-02661. The licensee has modified most of the affected breakers and has scheduled all motor control center stab replacement actions for Unit 2 to complete by April 2016, and by the end of the refueling outage in fall of 2016 for Unit 1. Because the finding is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000313; 05000368/2015003

-002 "Failure to Promptly Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Involving Motor Control Center Bus Stabs."

4OA 5 Other Activities Quarterly Performance Assessment In the NRC's annual assessment letter (ML15063A499), dated March 4, 2015, the NRC documented that the performance of Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, was within the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column (Column 4) of the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix.

In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, "Operating Reactor Assessment Program," Issued April 9, 2015, a quarterly review of performance is required for a plant whose performance is in Column 4 of the Action Matrix.

On September 30, 2015, NRC management reviewed inspection and performance indicator results for Units 1 and 2.

The NRC determined that continued plant operation was acceptable in the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone of the Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix.

In addition, no additional regulatory actions beyond those described in the annual assessment letter were identified.

4OA 6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On July 16, 2015, the inspectors presented the final inspection results of the triennial heat sink inspection to Mr. Jeremy Browning, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.

No proprietary information was identified.

On October 6, 2015, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Jeremy Browning, Site Vice President

, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

D. Barborek, Engineer

L. Blocker, Nuclear Oversight Manager

J. Browning, Site Vice President

P. Butler, Design and Program Engineering Manager

B. Daiber, Recovery Manager

B. Davis, Engineering Director

T. Evans, General Manager of Plant Operations

K. Gaston, Engineer

T. Hatfield, Systems and Components Engineer

D. Marvel, Radiation Protection Manager

N. Mosher, Licensing Specialist

D. Pehrson, Unit 1 Assistant Operations Manager

S. Pyle, Regulatory Assurance Manager

B. Short, Senior Licensing Specialist

J. Toben, Security Manager

D. Varvil, Engineer

NRC Personnel

D. Alley, Chief, Component Integrity Branch

S. Cumbridge, Component Integrity Branch

R. Deese, Senior Reactor Analyst

K. Hoffman, Component Integrity Branch

T. Lupold, Chief, Mechanical and Civil Engineering Branch

J. Tsao, Component Integrity Branch

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000 368/201500 3-0 1 NCV Failure to Follow Procedure Results in Increased Reactor Coolant Activity (Section 1R15)

05000 313/201500 3-0 2 05000 368/201500 3-0 2 NCV Failure to Promptly Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Involving Motor Control Center Bus Stabs

(Section 4OA2.3

)

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures

Number Title Revision Date

LO-ALO-2014-0054,CA59 2015 Summer Time Reliability

- Transformers and Switchyard

2015 1015.044 Summer Reliability Operations

009 1306.019 Annual Emergency Cooling Pond Sounding

015 2203.008 Natural Emergencies

036

PL-158 Summer Reliability Plan 0

EN-FAP-EP-010 Severe Weather Response

Miscellaneous

Number Title

SU1 Temperature Trend

1UAT Temperature Trend

ECP Average Temperature Trend

ECP Level Trend

WO-ANO-52562283 Eradicate Fish from Emergency Cooling Pond

WO-ANO-52530677 Perform Annual ECP Sounding and Visual Insp IAW Procedure 1306

Condition Reports

(CRs)

CR-ANO-C-2014-02840

CR-ANO-1-2014-01197

Section 1R04

Equipment Alignment

Procedures

Number Title Revision

OP-2103.011 Draining the Reactor Coolant System

OP-2104.004 Shutdown Cooling System

Drawings

Number Title Revision M-2232, Sh. 1

Piping and Instrument Diagram, Safety Injection System

20 M-2236, Sh. 1

Piping and Instrument Diagram, Containment Spray System

Condition Reports

(CRs)

CR-ANO-2-2014-03113

CR-ANO-2-2015-02183 CR-ANO-C-2015-01978

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Procedures

Number Title Revision 1a-372-98-J.doc Access Corridor 98

OP-1003.014 ANO Fire Protection Program

OP-1000.120 ANO Fire Protection Impairment Program Drawing Number Title Revision

FZ-1032 Fire Zone Detail No. & So. Diesel Gener. Room Elec. Pene. Room & Uncount. Access

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision Date 1a-372-97-r.doc Prefire Plan for Cable Spreading Room and Relay Room Fire Hazards Analysis

(FHA) Subsection 26.1, Fire Zone

98-J 16

Fire Protection Impairments # 337, 349, 350, 351, & 352 for

FZ 98-J

Standing Order Compensatory Measures for Changing License Basis for Fires February 17, 2014

Condition Reports

(CRs)

CR-ANO-1-2009-01561

CR-ANO-C-2015-01316

CR-HQN-E-2015-0822

Work Orders

(WOs)

172818

204526

Section 1R07

Heat Sink Performance

Procedure

Number Title Revision

OP-2104.029 Service Water System Operations

101

OP-1104.029 Service Water and Auxiliary Cooling System

110

OP-1309.016 Decay Heat Cooler Thermal Test

Calculations

Number Title Revision

EC 55127 1R25 E-35B Decay Heat Thermal Performance Evaluation

EC 55677 Verification of Six Abandoned Footing Excavations

EC 55667 Reactor Building Cooler Curve Changes from 1R25 Service Water Flow Tests

EC 50888 Incorporate As

-Found and As

-Left Service Water Flow Data from 2R23 0

EC 44043

ANO-1 FLEX Modifications

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision STM 1-43 Intermediate Cooling water

STM 2-19-2 Emergency Feedwater & Auxiliary Feedwater Systems

STM 2-33

Unit 2 Alternate AC Diesel Generator System Health Reports Q1

-2015, Q4-2014, Q3-2014, Q2-2014

Condition Reports

(CRs)

CR-ANO-2-2012-02271

CR-ANO-1-2013-00629

CR-ANO-C-2013-02921

CR-ANO-C-2013-03034

CR-ANO-C-2013-01223

CR-ANO-C-2014-01248

CR-ANO-C-2014-00091

CR-ANO-C-2014-02305

CR-ANO-C-2014-03199

CR-ANO-C-2014-02847

CR-ANO-C-2014-02840

CR-ANO-2-2012-02271

CR-ANO-C-2014-02840

CR-ANO-C-2014-02847

CR-ANO-C-2013-01248

CR-ANO-C-2013-03034

CR-ANO-C-2013-02921

CR-ANO-C-2014-00091

CR-ANO-C-2014-02305

CR-ANO-2-2015-01930

CR-ANO-2-2015-01942

CR-ANO-C-2013-02524

CR-ANO-2-2015-00184

CR-ANO-C-2015-02668

Work Orders

(WOs)

52437092

52554440

52490024

52507417

52525255

52532360

52497861

52517392

52438123

366938-01

52453198

349137-01

52501125

379044-07

51695716

52021448

51702043

51660885

51695716 52530677

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program

and Licensed Operator Performance

Procedures

Number Title Revision

OP-2103.011 Draining the Reactor Coolant System

AOP-2203.029 Loss of Shutdown Cooling

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision Date

ANO-2 Open Simulator Differences August 26, 2015

List of Open DRs August 26, 2015 A2SPGLOR160102

Operator Simulator Training: Shutdown Cooling Operations Section 1R12

Maintenance Effectiveness

Procedures

Number Title Revision

OP-1203.012N Annunciator K16 Corrective Action

EN-DC-203 Maintenance Rule Program

EN-DC-206 Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process

FLP-TADM-MNTRULE Maintenance Rule 2

Procedures

Number Title Revision RG 1.160 Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants

EN-DC-205 Maintenance Rule Monitoring

OP-1104.027 Battery and Switchgear Emergency Cooling System

26, 36, 47

OP-1015.045 Att 2: Safety Function Determination Worksheet 00-02-0

COPD-024 Risk Assessment Guidelines

Miscellaneous

Number Title Date

Unit 1 AC System FF Determination Report Maintenance Rule Database, Unit 1 Chilled Water System Maintenance Rule (A)(1) Plan, 1AC System

WO-00412294 01,

TCV-6052, Adjust Hot Gas Bypass July 15, 2015

ANO Unit 1 Service Water

ANO Unit 1 Service Water

TIMX105-CODE VALUE PROMPT

August 24, 2015

ANO Unit 1 & 2 (a)(1) Systems List September 30, 2015

Maintenance Rule Database: Unit 1, ANO, Service Water System August 17, 2015

11210599 Unit 1, SW, System FF Determination Report September 6, 2015

System Health Report, ANO, Unit 1 Service Water July 27, 2015

Work Order History: ANO, Unit 1, Service Water August 1, 2012 - August 17, 2015

Maintenance Rule Database: Unit 2, ANO, Service Water System August 17, 2015

11209052 Unit 2, SW, System FF Determination Report September 2, 2015

System Health Report, ANO, Unit 2 Service Water August 13, 2015

Procedures

Number Title Revision

Work Order History: ANO, Unit 2, Service Water August 1, 2012 - August 17, 2015 Condition Reports (CRs)

CR-ANO-1-2015-02605

CR-ANO-1-2013-00515

CR-ANO-1-2015-02600

CR-ANO-1-2015-02611

CR-ANO-1-2007-0339

CR-ANO-1-2013-0495

CR-ANO-1-2015-02872

CR-ANO-1-2015-01541

CR-ANO-1-2015-01601

CR-ANO-1-2015-02931

CR-ANO-C-2015-03536 CR-

ANO-1-2013-545 CR-

ANO-1-2014-1628 CR-

ANO-1-2014-1936 CR-

ANO-2-2013-434 CR-

ANO-C-2014-2812

CR-ANO-C-2 015-1032

Engineering Changes (ECs)

25759 41466 27602 28640

Section 1R13

Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Procedures

Number Title Revision

COPD-024 Risk Assessment Guidelines

1015.048 Shutdown Operations Protection Plan

EN-OP-111 Operational Decision

-Making Issue Process: R

-1 Reactor Vessel Flange Inner O

-ring Leakage 11

2104.040 LPSI System Operations

1015.033 ANO Switchyard and Transformer Yard Controls

EN-WM-107 Post Maintenance Testing Calculation Number Title Revision

CALC-89-E-0044-03 Unit 2 Service Water Pump Suction Requirements

Calculation Number Title Revision Miscellaneous Number Title Revision Date

ER-ANO-2005-0148-001

ANO-2 SW Pump Strainers System Hardening NCP

Agenda for On

-Site Safety Review Committee

2R24 Outage Risk Assessment Team Report

2R24 Outage Risk Assessment Team Report, Supplement 1

Allowed Operator Action Exclusions Review for HPSI & LPSI Systems

CR-C-2001-0099

NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Operational Impact for Work Order MWO 50240686

-01 January 31, 2015

Component/Plant Impact for Work Order 50240686

-01 August 27, 2013

Operational Impact for Work Order MWO 50240686

-01 January 31, 2015

Operational Impact for Work Order 374772

-32 March 10, 2015

Component / Plant Impact for Work Order 00374772

-32 June 23, 2014

Condition Reports

(CRs)

CR-ANO-2-2015-03059

CR-ANO-C-2001-00099

Work Order (WO

)

00311860

Section 1R15

Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Procedures

Number Title Revision

OP-1104.004 Decay Heat Removal Operating Procedure

117

SEP-ANO-1-IST-1 ANO Unit 1 IST Basis Document

SEP-ANO-1-IST-2 ANO Unit 1 IST Plan

SEP-ANO-1-IST-3 IST Cross Reference Document ANO Unit 1

2 Procedures Number Title Revisio n

EN-OP-104 Operability Determination Process

9

EN-IS-117 Welding and Cutting

5

OP-1412.054 Unit 1 AC Motor Control Centers

2

OP-2412.074 Unit 2 AC Motor Control Centers

019

Engineering Request

s Number Title Revisio n

ER-002413-E101 Determine Acceptance Criteria for P

-34A/B at Temps Up to

200F 00

ER-992054-R101 P-34B Surveillance Requirements

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revisio n Date

CALC-92-E-0077-08

ANO-1 LPI System Pump Performance Requirements

000

CALC-86-E-0036-41 Shutdown Heat Exchanger Design

00

Apparent Cause Evaluation Report

Adverse Failure Trend of ATC Model

365A300Q30PX Time Delay Relays Section 5.8

EC 52680 0 STM 1-43 ANO Unit 1 System Training Manual, Intermediate Cooling Water 12

ANO 2: RCS Isotopic Radio Gas Chart January 1, 2010 - August 25, 2015

ANO RCS Isotopic Radio Gas Chart

2011

ANO RCS Crud_Co_CR_Mn Chart January 1, 2010 - August 25, 2015

ANO RCS Isotopic Radio Gases Chart July 1, 2015

- September 27, 2015

ANO White Paper Selected Nuclear Power Plan Radioisotopes

2E-35B Operability Evaluation Calculation

s Number Title

2E-35 Wall Thickness Calculation Calc-86-E-0036-41 SDHX Design Calculation

Condition Reports

(CRs)

CR-ANO-1-1996-0083

CR-ANO-1-2015-02408

CR-ANO-1-2015-02738

CR-ANO-2-2015-02879

CR-ANO-2-2015-02337

CR-ANO-2-2015-02355

CR-ANO-2-2015-02356

CR-ANO-C-2014-01151

CR-ANO-1-2008-00953

CR-ANO-1-2010-03741

CR-ANO-1-2015-03103

CR-ANO-1-2011-1214

CR-ANO-2-2015-02449

CR-ANO-2-2015-02098

CR-ANO-2-2015-02576

CR-ANO-2-2015-02992

CR-ANO-2-2015-02992

CR-ANO-2-2007-01512

CR-ANO-2-2015-00902

CR-ANO-2-2015-02661

Work Orders

(WOs)

52506921

52563114

00419308

425718

00162225 01

2574439 01

Section 1R19

Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures

Number Title Revision

OP-1412.001 Preventative Maintenance Of Limitorque SB/SMB Motor Operators, Supplement 1

OP-2106.006 Emergency Feedwater Operations, Supplement 3A

COPD001 Operations Expectations and Standards

Work Orders

(WOs)

396614

396616

52547722-02

52572966-01

52531881-03

52531882-03

52517940 01

Section 1R20

Outage Activities

Miscellaneous

Number Title Date

2R24 Outage Newsletter: Outage Manager Discusses Risk September 11, 2015

Outage Meeting and Communication Schedule Section 1R22

Surveillance Testing

Procedures

Number Title Revision 2305.036 Operations Control of Integrated Leak Rate Test

5120.401 Unit Two Integrated Leak Rate Test

5120.403 Unit 2 Primary Containment Leak Rate Running Total

5120.405 Unit Two - Integrated Leak Rate Test Instrumentation System Setup

EN-OM-126 Management and Oversight of Supplemental Personnel

SEP-APJ-002 Arkansas Nuclear One Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing (Appendix J) Program Section

1107.001 Electrical System Operations

109 1305.0 33 Switchyard Auto

-Transformer Deluge and Unit 1 Transformer Deluge Tests

2107.001 Electrical System Operations

113

EN-IS-109 Compressed Gas Cylinder Handling and Storage

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision

ISP 2015-072 Industrial Safety Plan Outage Oversight Plan, Arkansas Nuclear One 2R24

0, 1

Condition Reports

(CRs)

CR-ANO-C-2015-3788

CR-ANO-C-2015-3754

CR-ANO-2-2015-2967

Work Order (WO)

205222

Section 1EP6

Drill Evaluation

Procedures

Number Title Revision

OP-1903.010 Emergency Action Level Classification

051

OP-1903.064 Emergency Response Facility

- Control Room

014

OP-1903.067 Emergency Response Facility

- Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

035

Condition Reports

(CRs)

CR-ANO-C-2015-02961

CR-ANO-C-2015-02957

CR-ANO-C-2015-02954

CR-ANO-C-2015-02809

Section 4OA1

Performance Indicator Verification

Miscellaneous

Number Title Date

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 1 Emergency AC Power

July 7, 2014

ANO-2 MSPI Basis Document Support Analysis

February 23, 2012

ANO1 Mitigation System Performance Index Basis Document

February 21, 2012

MSPI Derivation Report, Unit 1 High Pressure Injection System, Unavailability Index September, 2014

MSPI Indicator Margin Report, Unit 1 High Pressure Injection System

September, 2014

MSPI Derivation Report, Unit 1 High Pressure Injection System, Unreliability Index September, 2014

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 2, Emergency Feedwater System April 7, 2015

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 1, Emergency Feedwater System April 8, 2015

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 2, High Pressure Injection System April 9, 2015

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 1, High Pressure Injection System April 9, 2015

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 2 Emergency AC Power

April 9, 2015

Miscellaneous

Number Title Date

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 1 Emergency AC Power

April 9, 2015

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 2, Emergency Feedwater System January 13, 2015

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 1, Emergency Feedwater System January 13, 2015

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 2, High Pressure Injection System January 13, 2015

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 1, High Pressure Injection System January 13, 2015

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 2 Emergency AC Power

January 13, 2015

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 2, Emergency Feedwater System October 15, 2014

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 1, Emergency Feedwater System October 15, 2014

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 2, High Pressure Injection System October 15, 2014

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 1, High Pressure Injection System January 20, 2015

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 2 Emergency AC Power

October 14, 2014

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 1 Emergency AC Power

October 15, 2014

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 2, Emergency Feedwater System October 15, 2014

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 1, Emergency Feedwater System July 7, 2014

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 2, High Pressure Injection System July 8, 2014

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 1, High Pressure Injection System July 8, 2014

NRC Performance Indicator Technique/Data Sheet, Unit 2 Emergency AC Power

July 7, 2014

Condition Reports

(CRs)

CR-ANO-1-2014-01129

CR-ANO-1-2014-01279

CR-ANO-1-2014-01300

CR-ANO-1-2015-048

CR-ANO-2-2014-01403

CR-ANO-2-2014-02000

CR-ANO-2-2014-02818

Section 4OA2

Problem Identification and Resolution

Procedures

Number Title Revision

EN-LI-118

Cause Evaluation Process

1104.029

Service Water and Auxiliary Cooling System

110 1000.006

Procedure

Control

67

EN-DC-127 Control of Hot Work and Ignition Sources

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision

EC 44627

EVALUATION OF ENERTECH VALVES IN U1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

EC 44915

CV-3640 / 3644 VALVE ROTATION 180 DEGREES

Condition Reports

(CRs)

CR-ANO-1-2013-545 CR-ANO-C-2015-03229