Revision as of 20:29, 18 April 2019

Text

REVISED Epips, Including REVISION 25 to EPIP 1.3, REVISION 18 to EPIP 2.1, REVISION 29 to EPIP 4.1, REVISION 14 to EPIP 4.2, REVISION 22 to EPIP 4.3, REVISION 0 to EPIP 4.7, REVISION 12 to EPIP 5.1and REVISION 11 to EPIP 5.2. with 12/23/99
	ML993630482
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	12/23/1999
From:	Cayia A J; Wisconsin Electric Power Co
To:	; NRC/OCIO/IMD/RMB
References
	-nr, -RFPFR, NPL 99-0713
	Download: ML993630482 (337)
	v • d • e

Wisconsin Electnc A WISCONSIN ENERGY COMPANY Point Beach Nuclear Plant 6610 Nuclear Rd. Two Rivers, WI 54241 Phone 920 755-2321 NPL 99-0713 December 23, 1999 Document Control Desk U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555 Ladies/Gentlemen:

DOCKETS 50-266 & 50-301 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE REVISIONS POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS I & 2 Enclosed are copies of revised procedures to the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

The revised procedures dated November 30, 1999, should be filed in your copies of the manual in accordance with the attached instructions.

Sincerely, M ger, R~etory Services & Licensing tat Enclosures cc: NRC Resident Inspector (w/o/e)iqDXJ-74N, 15-F'Of?-

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555 Manual: EPIP Manual No. 80 Issue Date: November 30, 1999 The following changes have been made to the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Manual. Please remove the previous revision(s) and replace them IMMEDIATELY with the current revision(s) that are attached.

I. EPIP Index, Revision 62. 2. EPIP Canceled Index, Revision 1. 3. EPIP 1.1, Course of Actions, Revision 34. 4. EPIP 1.2, Emergency Classification, Revision 33. 5. EPIP 1.3, Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations, Revision 25. 6. EPIP 2.1, Notifications

-ERO, State & Counties, and NRC, Revision 18. 7. EPIP 4. 1, Technical Support Center (TSC) Activation and Evacuation, Revision 29. 8. EPIP 4.2, Operations Support Center (OSC) Activation and Evacuation, Revision 14. 9. EPIP 4.3, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Activation and Evacuation, Revision 22. 10. EPIP 4.7, Offsite Radiation Protection Facility (OSRPF) Activation and Evacuation, Revision 0. 11. EPIP 5.1, Personnel Emergency Dose Authorization, Revision 12. 12. EPIP 5.2, Radioiodine Blocking and Thyroid Dose Accounting, Revision 11. 13. EPIP 6.1, Assembly and Accountability, Release and Evacuation of Personnel, Revision 16. 14. EPIP 7.3.1, Offsite Radiation Sampling and Survey, Revision 20. 15. EPIP 10.1, Emergency Reentry, Revision 19. 16. EPIP 10.2, Core Damage Estimation, Revision 18. 17. EPIP 11.2, Medical Emergency, Revision 12. 18. EPIP12.1, Emergency Event De-escalation, Termination, or Recovery Operations, Revision 7. 19. EPIP 12.2, Recovery Implementation, Revision 12.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555 Manual: EPIP Manual No. 80 Issue Date: November 30, 1999 The following index/procedure(s)/form(s) are being CANCELED.

Please remove them from your manual and discard.

I. EPIP Form Index, Revision 56, dated 09/30/99.

2. EPIP Form Canceled Index, Revision I, dated 03/31/99.

3. EPIP 1.1.1, Radiological Release Evaluation, Revision 21, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 1.3) 4. EPIP 1.1.2, General Emergency

-Protective Actions, Revision 14, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 1.3) 5. EPIP-1.3a, Emergency Event -Immediate Actions -Duty Shift Superintendent, Revision 5, dated March 31, 1999. (Merged into EPIP 1.1) 6. EPIP-1.3b, Emergency Event -Immediate Actions -Shift Technical Advisor, Revision 4, dated February 26, 1999. (Merged into EPIP 1.1) 7. EPIP-12, PBNP Incident Report Form, Revision 10, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 2.1) 8. EPIP-13, PBNP Status Update -Plant, Revision 4, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 2.1) 9. EPIP-13a, PBNP Status Update -Radiological, Revision 2, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 2.1) 10. EPIP 2.2, NRC Notification, Revision 10, dated February 26, 1999. (Merged into EPIP 2.1) 11. EPIP-14, Event Notification Worksheet, Revision 1, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 2.1) 12. EPIP 3.2, Emergency Response Organization Notification, Revision 21, dated June 30, 1999. (Merged into EPIP 2.1) 13. EPIP-04, PBNP Status Report on Plant Systems and Controls for Affected Unit, Revision i, dated December 29, 1997. (Merged into EPIP 2.1) 14. EPIP-05, PBNP RMS Status Release Point Monitors, Revision 1, dated December 29, 1997. (Merged into PIM TSC 2.8 and PIM EOF 4.6) 15. EPIP-06, PBNP RMS Status -Area Type Monitors, Revision 3, dated December 29, 1997. (Merged into PIM TSC 2.8 and PIM EOF 4.6) 16. EPIP-07, RMS Status (Process Monitors), Revision 2, dated March 31, 1997. (Merged into PIM TSC 2.8 and PIM EOF 4.6) 17. EPIP-4.2g, Reentry Team Qualification Listing, Revision 2, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into PIM OSC 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7) 18. EPIP-5.1a, Emergency Plan Dose Authorization, Revision 3, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 5.1) 19. EPIP-5.2a, Dose Accountability for Exposures to Airborne Radioiodine, Revision 1, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 5.2) 20. EPIP 6.2, Plant and Exclusion Area Evacuation to Onsite Assembly Areas, Revision 19, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 6.1) 21. EPIP 6.3, Plant and Exclusion Area Evacuation to Offsite Assembly Areas, Revision 15, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 6.1) 22. EPIP 6.5, Energy Center Evacuation, Revision 12, dated December 29, 1997. (Merged into EPIP 6.1) 23. EPIP 6.6, Personnel Assembly and Accountability, Revision 20, dated March 31, 1999. (Merged into EPIP 6.1) 24. EPIP 6.7, Emergency Release of Personnel from the Plant Site, Revision 7, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 6.1) 25. EPIP-6.7a, Event Involvement Summary, Revision 1, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 6.1) 26. EPIP-6.7b, Emergency Event Information Sheet, Revision 2, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 6.1) 27. EPIP-6.7c, Personnel "Dismissal-From-Site" Briefing Checklist, Revision 2, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 6.1) 28. EPIP 7.1, Radiation Protection Notification and Initial Response, Revision 7, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 1.1, 2.1 and 6.1) 29. EPIP 7.1.3, Radiation Protection Actions by On-Shift RP Technologist Prior to Arrival of Additional Radiation Protection Support, Revision 12, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 1.1 and 10.1) 30. EPIP 7.2.1, Offsite Radiation Protection Facility Activation and Evacuation, Revision 17, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 4.7) 31. EPIP-7.2.le, Dosimetry Device Issue Record and Exposure Log, dated May 1990. (Merged into PIM OSC 3.2 and PIM OSRPF 5.3) 32. EPIP-7.2.1f, Meteorological Data, Revision 1, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into PIM TSC 2.8 and PIM EOF 4.6) 33. EPIP-7.3.la, Offsite Airborne Radiation Survey Sample Analysis, Revision 1, dated January 1, 1993. (Merged into EPIP 7.3.1) 34. EPIP-7.3.1b, Ground Deposition, Revision 1, dated April 27, 1999. (Merged into EPIP 7.3.1) 35. EPIP-7.3.1c, Dose Factor Calculations for Specific Noble Gas Analysis Results, Revision 0, dated January 31, 1992. (Merged into EPIP 7.3.1) 36. EPIP-7.3.Id, Offsite Airborne Radiation Survey Sample Data, Revision 1, dated December 29, 1997. (Merged into EPIP 7.3.1) 37. EPIP 8.1, Chemistry Notification and Initial Response, Revision 6, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 1.1, 6.1 and 10.1) 38. EPIP 9.2, Manual Radiological Dose Evaluation, Revision 24, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 1.3) 39. EPIP 9.3, Protective Action Evaluation, Revision 21, dated October 28. 1998. (Merged into EPIP 1.3) 40. EPIP-10.1a, Reentry Team Preparation and Deployment, Revision 5, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 10.1) 41. EPIP-10.1b, Reentry Team Debrief, Revision 3, dated October 28. 1998. (Merged into EPIP 10.1) 42. EPIP-10.1c, Operations Support Center Team Status, Revision 2, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 10.1) 43. EPIP 11.3, Offsite Medical Assistance, Revision 18, dated December 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 11.2) 44. EPIP-l 1.3a, Offsite Medical Assistance Checklist, Revision 7, dated December 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 11.2) 45. EPIP-I 1.3c, Radiation Protection Response Checklist Emergency Room (ER), Revision 6, dated December 28, 1999. (Merged into EPIP 11.2) 46. EPIP-12.2a, Recovery Plan Action Items, Revision 1, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into EPIP 12.2) 47. EPIP Appendix A, Emergency Plan -Abbreviations and Acronyms, Revision 9, dated February 26, 1999. (Contained in EP 2.0) 48. EPIP Appendix B, Radio Operation, Revision 5, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into ETD 08) 49. EPIP Appendix C, Use of Emergency Plan Telephones, Revision 7, dated October 28, 1998. (Merged into ETD 07) 50. EPIP-22, Plant Personnel Emergency Call List, Revision 36, dated September 30, 1999. (Merged into ETD 01) 51. EPIP-23, Offsite Agency Emergency Call List, Revision 33, dated September 30, 1999. (Merged into ETD 02) 52. EPIP-24, Emergency Response Facilities Phone Directory, Revision 21, dated September 28, 1998. (Merged into ETD 03) 53. EPIP-25, Headquarters Support Personnel Emergency Call List, Revision 32, dated September 30, 1999. (Merged into ETD 04) 54. EPIP-26, Oil and Hazardous Material Spill Call List, Revision 29, dated September 30, 1999. (Merged into ETD 05)

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES INDEX EPIP INDEX Revision 62 November 30, 1999 PROCEDURE NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION EFFECTIVE PERIODIC NUMBER DATE REVIEW DATE EPIP 1.1 EPIP 1.2 EPIP 1.3 EPIP 2.1 Course of Actions .................................................

34 Emergency Classification

......................................

33 Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations

..............................................

25 Notifications a- ERO, State & Counties, and NRC:..,. 18 EPIP 4.1 Technical Support Center (TSC) Activation and Evacuation

...................................................

29 EPIP 4.2 Operations Support Center (OSC) Activation and Evacuation

..................................................

14 EPIP 4.3 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Activation and Evacuation

...........................

22 EPIP 4.7 Offsite Radiation Protection Facility (OSRPF) Activation and Evacuation

...................................

0 EPIP 5.1 EPIP 5.2 EPIP 6.1 EPIP 7.3.1. EPIP 7.3.2 EPIP 7.3.7 EPIP 8.4.1 EPIP 8.4.2 EPIP 8.4.3 EPIP 10.1 EPIP 10.2 EPIP 10.3 Personnel Emergency Dose Authorization

............

12 Radioiodine Blocking and Thyroid Dose A ccounting

.............................................................

11 Assembly and Accountability, Release and Evacuation of Personnel

....................................

16 Offsite Radiation Sampling and Survey ...............

20 Post-Accident Sampling of the Auxiliary Building and Drumming Area Vent Stacks Using the Isokinetic Stack Sampling System ......................

5 Estimating Radioiodine Air Concentrations

...........

3 Post-Accident Sampling and Analysis of Potentially High Activity Reactor Coolant ..... 13 Post-Accident Sampling of Containment Atmosphere

..........................................................

8 Emergency Containment Sump "A" Sampling ..... 5 Emergency Reentry .............................................

19 Core Damage Estimation

.......................................

18 Post Accident Containment Ventilation System Operation

.............................................................

4 C R 11/30/99 11/30/99 R 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 R 11/30/99 11/30/99 R 11/30/99 11/30/99 R 11/30/99 11/30/99 R 11/30/99 11/30/99 R R R R R 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 10/28/98 10/28/98 10/28/98 10/28/98 10/28/98 11/30/99 11/30/99 R 10/28/98 10/28/98 C 04/27/99 C R R R 10/28/98 10/28/98 11/30/99 11/30/99 10/28/98 10/28/98 (T -Temporary Change)NAMES AND TEt.EP: !ONE NUMBERS D.U:LE FED Page I of 2 C = Continuous Use R = Reference Use I = Information Use NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EPIP INDEX Revision 62 November 30, 1999 INDEX PROCEDURE NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION EFFECTIVE PERIODIC NUMBER DATE REVIEW DATE EPIP 11.2 Medical Emergency

...................................................

12 R EPIP 12.1 Emergency Event De-Escalation, Termination, or Recovery Operations

................................................

7 R EPIP 12.2 Recovery Implementation

.........................................

12 R (T -Temporary Change) Page 2 of 2 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 C = Continuous Use R = Reference Use I = Information Use NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EPIP CANCELED INDEX Revision 1 November 30, 1999 CANCELED INDEX PROCEDUR REVISION PROCEDURE TITLE NUMBER Radiological Release Evaluation (Incorporated into EPIP 1.3) ...................................................

21 General Emergency

-Protective Actions (Incorporated into EPIP 1.3) ..............................

14 NRC Notification (Incorporated into EPIP 2.1) ...... .10 EPIP 3.1 Emergency Event -Plant and Company Personnel Notification

.......................................................

10 EPIP 3.2 Emergency Response Organization Notification (Incorporated into EPIP 2.1) ............................

21 EPIP 3.3 Notification and Response for Headquarters Support Personnel

..............................................

18 EPIP 3.4 External Affairs -Notification and Immediate Response (Incorporated into EPIP-1.3a)

...........

14 EPIP 4.4 Alternate Emergency Operations Facility (AEOF) Activation (Incorporated into EPIP 4.3 and PIM EOF Manuals) ........................

5 EPIP 4.5 Alternate Offsite Health Physics Facility Activation (Incorporated into EPIP 7.2.1 and PIM OSRPF 5.1) ................................................

2 EPIP 4.6 Corporate Emergency Center Activation

...............

2 EPIP 5.3 General Emergency

-Offsite Agency Notification

..... 5 EPIP 6.2 EPIP 6.3 EPIP 6.4.2 EPIP 6.4.3 EPIP 6.4.4 EPIP 6.4.5 Plant and Exclusion Area Evacuation to Onsite Assembly Areas (Incorporated into EPIP 6.1) ....... 19 Plant and Exclusion Area Evacuation to Offsite Assembly Areas (Incorporated into EPIP 6.1) ....... 15 Technical Support Center/Operations Support Center (TSC/OSC)

Evacuation (Incorporated into EPIP 4.1 and PIM TSC 2.1) ....... 4 Emergency Operations Facility Evacuation (Incorporated into EPIP 4.3 and PIM EOF 4.2) ....... 8 Offsite Health Physics Facility (OSHPF) Evacuation (Incorporated into EPIP 7.2.1 and PIM OSRFP Manuals) .........................................

6 Alternate Offsite Health Physics Facility Activation

.............................................................

0 Page 1 of 4 EFFECTIVE DATE PROCEDURE NUMBER EPIP 1.1.1 EPIP 1.1.2 EPIP 2.2 CANCELED DATE CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED*

CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED NAMES AND NUMBERS L.:LETED 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 01/01/93 11/30/99 10/28/98 10/28/98 10/28/98 10/28/98 10/28/98 12/17/85 11/30/99 11/30/99 10/28/98 10/28/98 10/28/98 01/23/92 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EPIP CANCELED INDEX Revision 1 November 30, 1999 CANCELED INDEX PROCEDURE NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION EFFECTIVE NUMBER DATE EPIP 6.5 Energy Center Evacuation (Incorporated into EPIP 6.1) ..........................................................

12 EPIP 6.6 Personnel Assembly and Accountability (Incorporated into EPIP 6.1) ..............................

20 EPIP 6.7 Emergency Release of Personnel from the Plant Site (Incorporated into EPIP 6.1) .........

................

7 EPIP 7.1 EPIP 7.1.1 EPIP 7.1.2 EPIP 7.1.3 EPIP 7.2.1 EPIP 7.2.2 EPIP 7.2.4 EPIP 7.2.5 EPIP 7.3.3 EPIP 7.3A EPIP 7.3.5 EPIP 7.3.6 EPIP 7.4.1 EPIP 7.4.2 Radiation Protection Notification and Initial Response (Incorporated into EPIP 1.1, 2.1 and 6.1) ...............................................................

7 Chemistry and Health Physics On-Site Notification and Response .................................

10 Chemistry and Health Physics Offsite Notification and Response ..................................

5 Radiation Protection Actions by On-Shift RP Technologist Prior to Arrival of Additional Radiation Protection Support (Incorporated into EPIP 1.1 and 10.1) ..............................................

12 Offsite Radiation Protection Facility Activation and Evacuation (Incorporated into EPIP 4.7) .........

17 Activation of Health Physics Facilities at Technical Support Center/Operations Support Center (Incorporated into PIM OSC 3.2) .......................

14 Health Physics Communications

............................

6 Control and Use of Vehicles ....................................

1.. I Post-Accident Sampling of Containment Atmosphere

.............

! ..........................................

20 Movement of Required Chemistry Equipment and Materials to the Technical Support Center Counting Room and Mini-Laboratory

..................

4 Post-Accident Sampling of the Auxiliary Building and Drumming Area Vent Stacks Using the Isokinetic Stack Sampling System ......................

4 Emergency Containment Surnp "A" Sampling ..... 0 Routine Check, Maintenance, Calibration and Inventory Schedule for Health Physics Emergency Plan Equipment

.................................

7 Emergency Plan Equipment Routine Check, Maintenance and Calibration Instructions

...........

4 CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED DATE 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 11/30/99 09/13/89 09/13/89 11/30/99 11/30/99 10/28/98 10/31/89 09/09/83 09/13/89 09/13/89 02/06/90 09/13/89 11/09/83 06/08/83 Page 2 of 4 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CANCELED INDEX EPIP CANCELED INDEX Revision I November 30, 1999 REVISION PROCEDURE TITLE NUMBER PROCEDURE NUMBER EPIP 7.4.3 EPIP 7.4.3.1 EPIP 7.4.4 EPIP 8.1 Chemistry Notification and Initial Response (Incorporated into EPIP 1.1, 6.1 and 10.1) ..........

6 EPIP 8.2 Activation of Chemistry Facilities at Technical Support Center/Operations Support Center (Incorporated into PIM OSC 3.6) ........................

3 EPIP 8.3 Movement of Chemistry Equipment and Materials to the Technical Support Center Counting Room and Mini-Laboratory (Incorporated into PIM OSC 3.6) ......................................................

3 EPIP 8.4.4 Estimating Radioiodine Air Concentrations

...........

0 EPIP 9.1 EPIP 9.2 EPIP 9.3 Emergency Off-Site Dose Estimations

......................

11 Manual Radiological Dose Evaluation (Incorporated into EPIP 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.3 and 9.3).. 24 Protective Action Evaluation (Incorporated into EPIP 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.3 and 9.2) ...........................

21 EPIP 11.1 Search and Rescue .................................................

10 EPIP 11.3 Offsite Medical Assistance (Incorporated into EPIP 11.2) ..........................................................

18 EPIP 11.4 Personnel Decontamination

.....................................

0 EPIP 14.1 Testing of Communications Equipment

..................

0 EPIP 15.1 EPIP 15.2 EPIP 15.3 EPIP 15.4 Employee Training ......................................................

1 Offsite Personnel Training .....................................

0 Drills and Exercises

................................................

2 Emergency Preparedness Review ...........................

0 EFFECTIVE DATE Use of Baird Model 530 Single Channel Iodine Spectrometer to Determine Airborne Iodine A ctivities

..................................................................

1 Use of Canberra Model 3100 Series 30 Multichannel Analyzer to Determine Airborne Iodine Activities...............................0 AMS-2 Air Particulate, Iodine and Noble Gas Sampler/Detector

......................................................

1 Page 3 of 4 CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED CANCELED DATE 08/31/84 01/21/88 03/18/86 11/30/99 10/28/98 10/28/98 05/04/90 10/31/89 11/30/99 11/30/99 02/17/89 11/30/99 03/19/85 06/08/83 06/08/83 06/08/83 06/08/83 06/08/83 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EPIP CANCELED INDEX Revision 1 November 30, 1999 CANCELED INDEX PROCEDURE NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE REVISION EFFECTIVE NUMBER DATE EPIP Appendix A EPIP Appendix B EPIP Appendix C Emergency Plan -Abbreviations and Acronyms (Contained in EP 2.0) ..............

9 Radio Operation (Incorporated into ETD 08) .. 5 Use of Emergency Plan Telephones (Incorporated into ETD 07) ......................

7 CANCELED 11/30/99 CANCELED 11/30/99 CANCELED 11/30/99 Page 4 of 4 CANCELED DATE EPIP 1.1. COURSE OF ACTIONS Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION:

REVISION:

EFFECTIVE DATE: PROCEDURE OWNER: Technical NNSR 34 November 30, 1999 Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS DELETED NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 34 November 30, 1999 COURSE OF ACTIONS TOTAL REWRITE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PU RPO SE .......................................................................................................................

3 2.0 PREREQUISITES

.................................................................................................

3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

..................................................................

3 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

..........................................................................................

3 5.0 PROCEDURE

............................................................................................................

3

6.0 REFERENCES

.........................................................................................................

8 7.0 BA SES ............................................................................................................................

8 ATTACHMENT A ANNOUNCEMENT OF CLASSIFIED EVENT ........................................

9 ATTACHMENT B AFFECTED SECTORS BASED ON WIND DIRECTION

.......................

10 CONTINUOUS USE Page 2 of 10 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES COURSE OF ACTIONS EPIP 1.1 NNSR Revision 34 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions for Control Room personnel responding to an off-normal event at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP). 2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3 2.1.4 The Duty Shift Superintendent (DSS) is responsible for this procedure.

The DSS is responsible for taking immediate actions to mitigate the consequences of the emergency.

The DSS is responsible for implementing Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) as referenced by this procedure until formally relieved by key personnel in emergency response facilities.

The DSS may delegate assignments to qualified personnel as necessary.

2.2 Equipment

None 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS None.4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS An off-normal occurrence exists (or has existed) at PBNP.5.0 PROCEDURE NOTE 1: Steps may be completed out of sequence, as appropriate.

NOTE 2: Steps already formally turned over to Emergency Response Facilities (per Step 5.18) may be marked "not applicable." 5.1 Implement procedures, or take other actions as required, to place the affected unit(s) in a safe condition.

5.2 Verify

the on-shift Shift Technical Advisor (STA) is in the Control Room.CONTINUOUS USE INITIALS Page 3 of 10 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 34 November 30, 1999 COURSE OF ACTIONS TOTAL REWRITE INITIALS 5.3 Direct the Security Shift Commander to report to the Control Room. 5.4 Evaluate the event using EPIP 1.2, Emergency Classifications, for classification.

5.5 Complete

the appropriate sections of Attachment A, Announcement of Classified Event. 5.6 Sound the evacuation alarm and make the plant Gai-Tronics announcement using the completed Attachment A, Announcement of Classified Event. NOTE: If the event is classified as a GENERAL EMERGENCY, then minimum protective action recommendations are required, (per Attachment B). "* Evacuate 0-2 miles, all sectors "* Evacuate 2-5 miles, downwind sectors (3-4) 5.7 Complete EPIP 2.1, Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form, and assign personnel to make notifications per EPIP 2.1. 5.7.1 Emergency Response Organization.

5.7.2 State

& Counties (within 15 minutes of declaration).

5.7.3 W.E. Media Line and KNPP. 5.7.4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (immediately after State/County notifications, NOT to exceed 60 minutes from declaration).

5.8 IF emergency involves plant conditions which suggest a radioactive release is in progress or anticipated, THEN initiate EPIP 1.3, Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations.

5.9 IF a backshift or weekend, THEN contact the onshift Radiation Protection Technologist and Radiochemical Technician to report to the Control Room for further instructions in support of the event. (Reference EPIP 10.1, Emergency Reentry)CONTINUOUS USE Page 4 of 10 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES COURSE OF ACTIONS EPIP 1.1 NNSR Revision 34 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE INITIALS 5.10 Assign reentry teams per EPIP 10.1, Emergency Reentry.

5.11 IF the event is an Unusual Event and additional staff is desired, THEN call in personnel using the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Call List, ETD 01. CAUTION If event is security related, then discuss the consequences of conducting an assembly and accountability with Security prior to implementation.

5.12 Implement the appropriate sections of EPIP 6.1, Assembly and Accountability, Release and Evacuation of Personnel, for the following circumstances:

5.12.1 Limited plant evacuation.

5.12.2 Full-site assembly and accountability (Site Emergency or higher unless desired earlier).

5.12.3 Release of personnel (no radiological impediments).

5.12.4 Evacuation of site to offsite assembly areas (includes radiological monitoring prior to leaving the plant site). 5.13 IF Alert or higher, THEN: 5.13.1 Activate Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) per EPIP 4.1, Attachment E, Activation of Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) (60 minutes of declaration).

5.13.2 Issue high range dosimetry to Control Room personnel.

5.13.3 Ensure backshift RPTs and RCTs have high range dosimetry.

CONTINUOUS USE Page 5 of 10 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 34 November 30, 1999 COURSE OF ACTIONS TOTAL REWRITE ,. INITIALS 5.14 IF the event is a General Emergency AND the following criteria is met, THEN implement expanded PARS of evacuation for 0-5 miles all sectors and 5-10 miles downwind sectors. (Reference Step6.13) 5.14.1 Substantial core damage in progress or projected

(>20%) (> 30,000 R/hr in containment high radiation monitors) 5.14.2 Large fission product inventory in containment (more than GAP) (LOSS criteria for RCS barrier in EPIP 1.2, Attachment C, exceeded) 5.14.3 Imminent projected containment failure or release underway (LOSS criteria for containment barrier in EPIP 1.2, Attachment C, exceeded) 5.15 IF event involves a liquid release to the lake, THEN notify local water utilities per Offsite Agency Call List, ETD 02. 5.16 IF TSC and/or EOF are NOT activated, THEN ensure periodic status updates are provided to the State, Counties, and NRC per EPIP 2.1. 5.17 IF activating the Emergency Response Facilities, THEN provide a turnover briefing to TSC Manager upon arrival in the Control Room. 5.17.1 Plant status 5.17.2 Notifications status and current EPIP 2.1, Attachment B form 5.17.3 Protected Worker Log 5.17.4 Assembly and accountability status CONTINUOUS USE Page 6 of 10 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 34 November 30, 1999 COURSE OF ACTIONS TOTAL REWRITE INITIALS 5.18 Conduct a formal turnover of responsibilities to Emergency Response Facilities as they are activated.

5.18.1 Technical Support Center (TSC) a. Plant assessment on classification recommendations per EPIP 1.2 b. Onsite protective actions c. Onsite radiological assessment

d. NRC Notifications per EPIP 2.1 e. Assembly and Accountability, Release and Evacuation of Personnel per EPIP 6.1 5.18.2 Operations Support Center (OSC) a. Tracking dispatched reentry teams (repair, fire, search and rescue) b. Tracking of non-PBNP/WE repair teams inside/outside protected area (switchyard, contractors, etc.) c. Medical emergencies per EPIP 11.2 5.18.3 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) a. Classification of emergencies per EPIP 1.2 b. Offsite protective action recommendations per EPIP 1.3 c. State and County notifications per EPIP 2.1 d. Overall management of ERO activities

e. Request for Federal Assistance, if needed f. Review and approval of news releases technical content g. Authorize the use of potassium iodide per EPIP 5.1 h. Authorize emergency radiation exposures in excess of 10 CFR 20 requirements per EPIP 5.2 CONTINUOUS USE Page 7 of 10 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 34 November 30, 1999 COURSE OF ACTIONS TOTAL REWRITE INITIALS 5.19 Initiate a condition report associated with the event and insert a copy in the Operations Notebook. (Reference Step 6.12)

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 EPIP 1.2, Emergency Classifications 6.2 EPIP 1.3, Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations 6.3 EPIP 2.1, Notifications

-ERO, State & Counties, and NRC 6.4 EPIP 4.1, Attachment E, Activation of Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) 6.5 EPIP 5.1, Personnel Emergency Dose Authorization 6.6 EPIP 5.2, Radioiodine Blocking and Thyroid Dose Accounting 6.7 EPIP 6.1, Assembly and Accountability, Release and Evacuation of Personnel 6.8 EPIP 10.1, Emergency Reentry 6.9 EPIP 11.2, Medical Emergency 6.10 ETD 01, Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Call List 6.11 ETD 02, Offsite Agency Call List 6.12 IR 94-013, NPNPD-94-014, Response to Notice of Violation, October 5, 1994 6.13 NUREG-0150, Volume 1, Revision 4, RTM-96, Response Technical Manual, Figures A-5 and A-6, March 1996 7.0 BASES B-1 10 CFR 50.47(b), Emergency Plans B-2 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix E.IV, Content of Emergency Plans B-3 NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, November 1980 CONTINUOUS USE Page 8 of 10 NUCLEAR POWER BUSiNESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES COURSE OF ACTIONS EPIP 1.1 NNSR Revision 34 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT A ATTACHMENT A ANNOUNCEMENT OF CLASSIFIED EVENT "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL.

ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL.

THERE ARE CONDITIONS AT THE PLANT THAT WARRANT A (AN) o UNUSUAL EVENT o ALERT o SITE EMERGENCY o GENERAL EMERGENCY THESE CONDITIONS ARE: (Announce ifALERTor higher) ALL ERO PERSONNEL REPORT TO YOUR ASSIGNED EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY. (IFfilled in, THEN announce)

AVOID THE FOLLOWING AREAS: it REPEAT ALARM AND ANNOUNCEMENT.

CONTINUOUS USE Page 9 of 10 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES COURSE OF ACTIONS EPIP 1.1 NNSR Revision 34 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B AFFECTED SECTORS BASED ON WIND DIRECTION NOTE: If wind speed is less than three (3) mph or lake breeze conditions exist, then recommend protective actions for all sectors (3600) 0-5 miles. Lake breeze conditions exist if the difference between actual wind direction values for inland and near shore meteorological towers is greater than 900.Wind Direction* (Degrees From) 0-11 > 11 -34 > 34 -56 > 56 -79 > 79 -101 > 101 -124 > 124- 146 > 146- 169 > 169- 191 > 191 -214 > 214 -236 > 236 -259 > 259 -281 > 281 -304 > 304 -326 > 326 -349 > 349 -360 >360-371 ** >371-394 * > 394- 416 ** > 416- 434 * >434-461 ** >461-484 ** > 484 -506 * > 506 -520 **Sectors in Downwind Area H, J, K J,K,L K, L, M L,M,N M, N, P N,P,Q P,Q,R Q,R,A R, A, (B) A, (B), (C) (B), (C), (D) (C), (D), (E) (D), (E), (F) (E), (F), (G) (F), (G), H (G), H, J H,J,K H,J,K J, K, L K,L,M L, M, N M, N, P N,P,Q P,Q,R Q,R,A* As read on PPCS or control room instruments.

- As read on chart recorder. ( ) Denotes sectors over Lake Michigan.CONTINUOUS USE Page 10 of 10 EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION:

REVISION:

EFFECTIVE DATE: PROCEDURE OWNER: Technical NNSR 33 November 30, 1999 Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS DELETED NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PU R PO SE .......................................................................................................................

3 2.0 .PREREQUISITES

......................................................................................................

3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

....................................................................

3 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

..........................................................................................

4 5.0 PROCEDURE

.......................................................................................................

4 5.1 Classifying an Emergency

........................................................................................

4 5.2 Terminating an Emergency

.........................................................................................

5 5.3 M issed Classifications

...............................................................................................

6

6.0 REFERENCES

......................................................................................................

6 7.0 B A SE S ............................................................................................................................

7 AATTACHMENT A EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) OVERVIEW MATRIX .................

8 ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) ...................................................

9 ATTACHMENT C FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER (FPB) MATRIX .........................................

84 ATTACHMENT D SAFETY AND SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS ..........................................

92 REFERENCE USE Page 2 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions to classify off-normal occurrences at PBNP into one of four standardized emergency classes.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 This procedure is intended for immediate use by the Duty Shift Superintendent (DSS). Following the activation of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) the overall responsibility for classification is assumed by the Emergency Director.

He is supported in this effort by Control Room, TSC, and EOF personnel.

2.1.2 When relieved of Emergency Director duties by the Emergency Director, the Duty Shift Superintendent shall no longer be responsible for performance of actions specified in this procedure, however as an NRC licensee the DSS shall bring to the attention of the Emergency Director changing plant conditions which may affect the emergency classification.

2.1.3 Upon activation of the TSC, the Operations Coordinator shall monitor plant conditions and provide event classification recommendations to the Emergency Director.

2.2 Equipment

None 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

3.1 Notifications

to state and local authorities must be made within 15 minutes of the declaration of an emergency.

Notifications to the NRC must be made immediately following these, not to exceed one hour from declaration..

3.2 Category

8 EALs (Judgement) provide the ability to classify any set of plant conditions based on the Emergency Class definitions, derived from NUREG-0654.

3.3 Certain

conditions or occurrences, while not meeting the threshold for classification as an emergency, may nonetheless be reportable to the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72. (Guidance on interpretation of the 10 CFR 50.72 criteria may be found in NUREG-1022.)

3.4 Continuously

reference both plant conditions and the EALs in this procedure for potential re-classification.

REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS EPIP 1.1 has been initiated because an off-normal occurrence exists (or has existed) at PBNP. 5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 Classifying

an Emergency

5.1.1 Record

the time this procedure is entered in the station log (Emergency Director should log subsequent use in his log). NOTE: A large version of Attachment A is available in the Control Room, TSC, and EOF. 5.1.2 Determine the category (or categories) of the event. (Column I of Attachment A). The categories are: 1. Fission Product Barriers 2. System Malfunction

3. Electrical Power 4. Radiological

5. Internal Events 6. External Events 7. Fuel Handling/ISFSI Events 8. Emergency Director Judgement 5.1.3 Make an initial EAL selection from Attachment A. If the EAL relates to Category 1 (Fission Product Barriers), Attachment C provides additional information on the CHALLENGE and LOSS criteria.

NOTE: Do not "anticipate" challenge or loss of a barrier unless the trend is rapid, and the values are close to the threshold/criteria.

5.1.4 Reference

the individual EAL page(s) in Attachment B for the EAL(s) selected.

Read all fields on the page to determine/confirm that the EAL applies.REFERENCE USE Page 4 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE 5.1.5 Also reference the individual EAL pages for the next higher and lower emergency class -in that category- (if such EALs exist). This should further confirm the initial selection and specific EAL. 5.1.6 IF an event has been categorized on Attachment A, and the threshold of the EAL and surrounding conditions verified to have been met or exceeded (Attachments B and C), THEN declare the eieirgency, .. . a. Record the time of declaration, the emergency class, and the EAL number in your log. b. Make an announcement to your facility (Control Room or EOF) of the emergency and that you are assuming the duties of Emergency Director.

NOTE: IF this procedure is being implemented from the EOF, THEN verify Control Room is in EPIP 1.1. c. Return to EPIP 1.1 to ensure all appropriate Control Room actions are taken (and coordinated with actions of the TSC and EOF) if activated.

5.1.7 IF it is determined that no EAL is met, THEN record the time this procedure was exited on the station log and review plant conditions against the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72 for one-hour and four-hour notifications to the NRC (Ref. NUREG-1 022). 5.2 Terminating an Emergency IF conditions have improved where an EAL is no longer met, and it is believed that the plant is stable, i.e., the EAL is not anticipated to be exceeded again, THEN the emergency may be terminated per EPIP 12.1, WITH THE FOLLOWING CAVEATS: 5.2.1 IF Emergency Response Facilities have been activated, or personnel have been called to activate these facilities, THEN the event shall NOT be terminated until the TSC and EOF have been activated, and the TSC Manager concurs with the assessment of plant conditions.

5.2.2 IF any General Emergency has been declared, or any Protective Action Recommendation made to or by off-site authorities, THEN the emergency shall NOT be terminated until the NRC (for any General Emergency) and/or off-site authorities (for Protective Action Recommendations) concur.REFERENCE USE Page 5 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE 5.3 Missed Classifications A missed classification is defined as a set of circumstances or events, which although no longer existing, if recognized at the time of their existence would have resulted in an emergency classification (i.e., met or exceeded an EAL of this procedure).

This definition does not include conditions described in EALs which are based on expected plant response which does not occur, but where operator action was successful-such as failure of RPS. NOTE: In ALL cases, the DSS is vested with unilateral authority to classify an emergency and initiate any actions deemed appropriate to place the plant in a safe condition (per NUREG-0654, II.A.l.d, II.B.2).

5.3.1 If the missed classification would have been one classification, but current plant conditions warrant a lower classification, the lower classification shall be declared, but parties notified shall be informed of the temporary higher classification during the notification process.

5.3.2 If NO current plant conditions meeting any EAL exist at the time of discovery of the missed classification, the emergency shall still be declared and terminated with the same notification calls. If the missed classification would have been an Alert or higher the ERO does not have to be activated, however, key Station Management shall be notified.

The ERO may be activated at the discretion of the DSS.

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 Technical

Specifications

6.2 Final

Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Chapter 14, Appendix A 6.3 Point Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan 6.4 Point Beach Design Basis Document (DBDs) 6.5 Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) 6.6 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) 6.7 Emergency Contingency Actions (ECAs) 6.8 Critical Safety Procedures (CSPs) 6.9 Point Beach Setpoint Document (STPT)REFERENCE USE Page 6 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE 6.10 Point Beach Modified Amended Site Security Plan 6.11 WCAP 7525-L, Likelihood and Consequences of Turbine Overspeed at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. 6.12 Reg Guide 1.115, Protection Against Low-Trajectory Turbine Missiles 6.13 EPRI Document, "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to anJEarthquake," dated October, 1989 6.14 Probabilistic Safety Assessment

-High Winds, and Others Sec 9, Rev 0, Dated July 1995 6.15 Bechtel Corporation, "Westinghouse Electric Corporation-Wisconsin Michigan Power Company-Point Beach Atomic Power Station-Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants Against Tornadoes," March 12, 1970, B-TOP-3.

6.16 SOER 85-5, Internal Flooding of Power Plant Buildings 6.17 NUREG/CR-4982, "Severe Accident in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82" 6.18 NRC Information Notice 90-08, "Kr-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel" 7.0 BASES B-1 Code of Federal Regulation, 10 CFR 50 B-4 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Plants, Revision 1, published November, 1980. B4 NUMARC NESP-007, Methodology for Development of Emergency Actions Levels, Revision 2, January 1992. B-4 U.S. Regulatory Commission Position Paper, Branch Position on Acceptable Deviations to Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, dated July 11, 1994.REFERENCE USE Page 7 of 94

IF I i;. k- -I IS I _ S Wi I j jf c I: I .1 0j 363 It -SL ,SL~<II I SLrIii-Ii i at~r- 1 -~ ~ -4. ik ~-~~r .-.

f U -*~~~--~m.

i t .... .. ..... .--a- --III ---~ ~ --fir VQ .

NUCLEAR POWER BUSiNESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TOTAL REWRITE ATiACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Fission Product Barriers EAL 1.1,1.1 Sub-Category:

None.EmergencyClassification: -UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: kReactor coolant sample activity greater than Technical Specification 15.3.1. C. Basis: This EAL is related to a Fission Product Barrier challenge.

See Attachment C for additional information.

Elevated reactor coolant activity represents a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and is a potential precursor of more serious problems.

This EAL addresses reactor coolant samples exceeding coolant Technical Specifications.

Technical Specifications allow exceeding normal coolant activities for limited time periods. This EAL does not apply while operating within these allowances.

Because RCS leakage and coolant activity are considered precursors to more serious events, and because they should be treated alike (each relating to a Fission Product Barrier) declaration shall be upon validation and shall NOT be delayed until Technical Specification's actions are taken.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 3b REFERENCE USE Page 9 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Fission Product Barriers EAL 1.1.1.2 Sub-Category:

Loss of One Barrier .. EmergencyClassification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: Exceed the LOSS threshold of either Fuel Clad OR Reactor Coolant System (RCS) barrier based on-] FPB Matrix (See Attachment Cfor thresholds).

Basis: This Fission Product Barrier (FPB) EAL refers to exceeding the LOSS threshold of either the Fuel Cladding or Reactor Coolant System barrier by comparing plant conditions to the thresholds outlined in the FPB Matrix (Attachment C). The FPB Matrix LOSS criteria indicate values at which either the Fuel Cladding or RCS barrier has been breached to the point that it no longer serves as an effective barrier to the travel of fission products.

This value is not intended to represent total loss, however one of these two essential barriers is no longer serving its function.

A substantial reduction in the level of safety at the plant exists, therefore an Alert classification is appropriate.

Loss of the Containment barrier (by itself) does not create an immediate transport of fission products as the Containment is designed to be a backup to the cladding and RCS barriers.

Therefore, if only the Containment barrier is lost, it will be dealt with by Technical Specification action statements.

However, if either the Fuel Cladding or RCS barrier is lost, the Containment barrier will be considered at the same level as these.

References:

NEI 97-03 Rev. 2 NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Alert lb,lc, 5 REFERENCE USE Page 10 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Fission Product Barriers EAL 1.1.1.3 Sub-Category:

Loss of Two Barriers --Emergencyi-Cassification:--SITE-EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: [ Exceeding the LOSS threshold of any 2 fission product barriers based on FPB Matrix (See Attachment C for thresholds).

Basis: This Fission Product Barrier (FPB) EAL refers to exceeding the LOSS threshold of any two of the three fission product barriers; fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, or containment by comparing plant conditions to the thresholds outlined in the FPB Matrix (Attachment C). The third barrier must remain INTACT. If challenged or lost, a General Emergency exists. The FPB Matrix LOSS criteria indicate values at which barriers have been breached to the point that they no longer serve as effective barriers to the travel of fission products.

These values are not intended to represent total loss, however two important barriers are no longer serving their function.

This represents a major failure in plant systems needed to protect the public, therefore a Site Emergency classification is appropriate.

References:

NEI 97-03 NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency 5 REFERENCE USE Page I11 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Fission Product Barriers EAL 1.1.1.4 Sub-Category:

Loss of Three Barriers ..-EmergencyC lassification:.

GENERAL-EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Exceeding the LOSS threshold of any 2fission product barriers AND exceeding the loss OR challenge threshold of the 3rd barrier based on the FPB Matrix (See Attachment Cfor thresholds).

Basis: This Fission Product Barrier (FPB) EAL refers to exceeding the LOSS threshold of any TWO of the three fission product barriers; fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, or containment AND also exceeding EITHER the loss OR challenge threshold on the third barrier by comparing plant conditions to the thresholds outlined in the FPB Matrix (Attachment C). The FPB Matrix LOSS criteria indicate values at which barriers have been breached to the point that they no longer serve as effective barriers to the travel of fission products.

These values are not intended to represent total loss, how~ever the barriers are no longer serving their function.

The loss of two and a loss or challenge of the third available barrier represents major failures to plant systems needed to protect the public with the actual or potential release of significant amounts of radioactive materials offsite, therefore a General Emergency classification is appropriate.

References:

NEI 97-03 Rev.2 NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

General Emergency 2 Page 12 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Fission Product Barriers EAL 1.1.2.1 Sub-Category:

None----Emergency'Classification-:-UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: Failedfuel monitor [1(2) RE-I 09] reading greater than 120 mRem/hr, or 2 of 3 containment high range monitors read greater than 1000 Rem/hr. Basis: This EAL is related to a Fission Product Barrier challenge.

See Attachment C for additional information.

Other indications should accompany this indication, such as increased radiation on RE-106 or on hand-held instruments.

Elevated reactor coolant activity as indicated by the failed fuel monitor [1 (2) RE-109] represents a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and is a potential precursor of more serious problems.

This EAL addresses failed fuel monitor readings exceeding approximately 0.1% fuel clad failures.

Because RCS leakage and coolant activity are considered precursors to more serious events, and because they should be treated alike (each relating to a Fission Product Barrier) declaration shall be upon validation and shall NOT be delayed until Technical Specification's actions are taken.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 3c REFERENCE USE Page 13 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Fission Product Barriers EAL 1.1.2.2 Sub-Category:

Loss of One Barrier ..........

--Emergency-elassification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: Unisolable steam line break outside containment with greater than 10 gpm , but less than 50 gpm, Lprimary to secondary leakage.

Basis: This EAL reflects a unique Initiating Condition from NUREG-0654.

It does not meet the loss of one barrier criteria from Attachment C (Fission Product Barrier matrix), yet will be classified as an Alert. Because an unisolable steam line break is evaluated under the Containment section of the Fission Product Barrier matrix, it would not result in an Alert by itself Because the primary to secondary leakage rate (10 gpm) is less than the LOSS criteria for RCS, it would not result in an Alert. The 10 gpm does meet the CHALLENGE criteria therefore is an Unusual Event. However, there is no logic in the FPB matrix for combinations of LOSS of Containment with CHALLENGE of another barrier.

Due to the unique, specific criteria of NUREG-0654, Appendix 1 criteria, this EAL covers the unique condition of an unisolable steam line break, combined with a small primary to secondary leak. If the steam line can be isolated, no emergency is warranted.

If the steam line cannot be isolated, and the other Fission Product Barriers are INTACT (No leakage, or leakage below 10 gpm) then no emergency is applicable UNLESS the DSS determines a potential degradation in the level of safety. If the steam line cannot be isolated AND primary to secondary leakage is greater than 10 gpm, but less than 50 gpm, then this EAL applies and an Alert must be declared.

If the primary to secondary leak rate exceeds 50 gpm, then the LOSS criteria for RCS Fission Product Barrier has been met. This would constitute LOSS of two barriers, and would be a Site Emergency on EAL 1.1.1.3.

References:

NEI 97-03 Rev. 2 K NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Alert 4 REFERENCE USE Page 14 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Fission Product Barriers EAL 1.1.3.1 Sub-Category:

None EmergencyClassification-UNUSUAL--EVENT Emergency Action Level: Primary to secondary leakage greater than Technical Specification Reference 15.3. J.D.4 (500 gallons per day in either steam generator).

Basis: This EAL is related to a Fission Product Barrier challenge.

See Attachment C for additional information.

Leakage from the RCS in excess of Technical Specifications is considered by the NRC to be a precursor to more serious events. Therefore, an Unusual Event must be declared even if Technical Specification actions are taken. Because RCS leakage and coolant activity are considered precursors to more serious events, and because they should be treated alike (each relating to a Fission Product Barrier) declaration shall be upon validation and shall NOT be delayed until Technical Specification's actions are taken.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 5 REFERENCE USE Page 15 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Fission Product Barriers EAL 1.1.4.1 Sub-Category:

None .. emerigency Classificatio--:

UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: Un isolable primary system leakage greater than Technical Specification Reference 15.3. 1.D.2 (10 gallons per minute).

Basis: This EAL is related to a Fission Product Barrier challenge.

See Attachment C for additional information.

Leakage from RCS in excess of Technical Specifications which cannot be isolated is considered by the NRC to be a precursor to more serious events. Therefore, an Unusual Event must be declared even if Technical Specification actions are taken. Because RCS leakage and coolant activity are considered precursors to more serious events, and because they should be treated alike (each relating to a Fission Product Barrier) declaration shall be upon validation and shall NOT be delayed until Technical Specification's actions are taken.

References:

PBNP Technical Specifications NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 5 Page 16 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Fission Product Barriers EAL 1.1.5.1 Sub-Category:

None ....-- -Emergency-Classificatior-U43NUSUAL-EVENT Emergency Action Level: Excess RCS cooldown or cold overpressurization of the RCS (S"-4 Integrity Orange path) Basis: The following conditions meet ST-4 Integrity

-Orange Path criteria.

A challenge to the RCS barrier is present due to excessive cooldown or cold overpressurization as indicated below: Decrease in temperature in either cold leg greater than 1 00'F in the last 60 minutes AND temperature in either cold leg less than 31 51F. K. OR Temperature in either cold leg less than 315*F and RCS pressure greater than 425 psig. Any actual loss of RCS barrier warrants declaration of an Alert per the FPB matrix, Attachment C.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 17 REFERENCE USE Page 17 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TOTAL REWRITE A'ITACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

System Malfunctions Sub-Category:

Failure to Trip ---Emergency Classification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: F Failure of the reactor protection system to initiate and complete a trip (automatic or manual) which brings the reactor subcritical.

Basis: The reactor protection system may be actuated either by automatic means (exceeding pre-determined thresholds which result in trip signals) or by operator action (manual trip). The failure of EITHER of these means to cause a trip with subsequent subcriticality meets this EAL (an Alert). If BOTH these means and all other means from the Control Room fail, see EAL 2.1.1.3 (a Site Emergency).

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Alert 11 Page 18 of 94 REFERENCE USE EAL 2.1.1.2 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE KJ ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

System Malfunctions EAL 2.1.1.3 Sub-Category:

Failure to Trip -'Emergency-Classification:

SITE'EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: I Reactorpower greater than or equal to 5%following a reactor trip. (ST-1 Subcriticality Red Path) Basis: CSFST Subcriticality

-RED path is entered based on failure of power range indication (N-41, N-42, N-43, N-44) to decrease below 5% following a reactor trip. This EAL addresses any manual trip or automatic trip signal followed by a manual trip or other actions which fails to rapidly shut down the reactor.

This condition indicates failure of both the automatic and manual protection systems to trip the reactor, to an extent that emergency boration is required.

The combination of failure of both front line and backup protection systems to function in response to a plant transient, along with the continued production of heat, poses a direct threat to fuel clad and RCS integrity and thus warrants declaration of a Site Emergency.

If any actions must be taken outside the Control Room to effect a reactor trip this EAL is also met.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency 9 Page 19 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE \'-j ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

System Malfunctions EAL 2.2.1.1 Sub-Category:

Technical Specification Requirements -Emergency Classification: -UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: Failure to reach Technical Specification required condition within the specified time limit of the LCO Iaction statement.

Basis: Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) action statements require the plant to be brought to a required condition (often shutdown) when the Technical Specification required configuration cannot be restored.

Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not be an emergency or precursor to a more severe condition.

In any case, the initiation of plant shutdown required by the site Technical Specification requires a one hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b) non-emergency events. The plant remains within its .evaluated safety envelope while changing conditions or being shut down so long as it is accomplished within the completion time for the required action in the Technical Specifications.

An immediate Unusual Event is required when the plant is not brought to the required operating mode or condition within the allowable action statement time of the Technical Specifications.

Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which the LCO-specified action statement time period elapses w.der the site Technical Specifications and is not related to how long a condition may have existed.

If a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) is approved by the NRC prior to the LCO action statement time expiration an emergency need not be declared.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 15 REFERENCE USE Page 20 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

System Malfunctions EAL 2.3.1.1 Sub-Category:

Loss of Indications/Cominunications

". EmergencyClassification:.JUNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: Unplanned loss of most (approximately 75%1) safety system annunciators or indications on Control Room Panels for greater than 15 minutes AND increased monitoring is requiredfor safe plant operation.

Basis: This EAL recognizes the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment.

Recognition of the normal availability of computer based indication equipment is considered. "Unplanned" loss of annunciators or indicators excludes scheduled maintenance and testing activities, which should not disable such large portions of the system(s).

It is not intended that personnel perform a count of the instrumentation or annunciation lost but use the judgement of the DSS as the threshold for determining the severity of the plant condition.

The increased monitoring portion of this EAL is met if the DSS determines that additional personnel are required to provide increased monitoring of system operation to safely operate the plant. It is recognized that most plant designs provide redundant safety system indication powered from separate uninterruptable power supplies.

While failure of a large portion of annunciators is more likely than a failure of a large portion of indications, the concern is included in this EAL due to difficulty associated with assessment of plant conditions.

The loss of specific safety system indicators should remain a function of that specific system or component operability status, and is addressed by the specific Technical Specifications.

Safety systems as used here designates systems with safety-related functions.

Attachment D lists safety systems and systems with safety-related functions.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 14 REFERENCE USE Page 21 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE AT-ACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

System Malfunctions EAL 2.3.1.2 Sub-Category:

Loss of Indications/Communications

---Emergency-Classification: -ALERT Emergency Action Level: Unplanned loss of most (approximately 75%) safety system annunciators or indications on Control Room Panels for greater than 15 minutes AND Increased monitoring is requiredfor safe plant operation AND either. A significantplant transient is in progress OR Plant Process Computer is unavailable.

Basis: This EAL recognizes the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment during a transient.

Recognition of the normal availability of computer based indication equipment is also considered. "Unplanned" loss of annunciators or indicators excludes scheduled maintenance and testing activities, which should not disable such large portions of the system(s).

Safety systems as used here designates systems with safety-related functions.

Attachment D lists safety systems and systems with safety-related functions.

It is not intended that personnel perform a count of the instrumentation or annunciation lost but the use the judgement of the DSS as the threshold for determining the severity of the plant conditions.

The increased monitoring portion of this EAL is met if the DSS determines that additional personnel are required to provide increased monitoring of system operation to safely operate the plant. It is recognized that most plant designs provide redundant safety system indication powered from separate uninterruptable power supplies.

While failure of a large portion of annunciators is more likely than a failure of a large portion of indications, the concern is included in this EAL due to difficulty associated with assessment of plant conditions.

The loss of specific, or several, safety system indicators should remain a function of that specific system or component operability status and is addressed by the specific Technical Specifications.

Page 22 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) "Significant transient" includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as trips, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or thermal power ramps of 10% or greater.

If both a major portion of the annunciation system and all computer monitoring is unavailable to the extent that additional personnel are required to-monitor indications, lhe.Alert is required.

If the operating crew cannot monitor the transient in progress this will be escalated to a Site Emergency.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Alert 14 Page 23 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

System Malfunctions EAL 2.3.1.3 Sub-Category:

Loss of Indications/Communications

.-Emergency-Classification:-SiTE EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Unplanned loss of most (approx. 75%) safety system annunciators or indications on Control Room Panels. AND Loss of ability to monitor critical safety function status AND A significantplant transient in progress.

Basis: This EAL recognizes the INABILITY of the Control Room staff to monitor the plant response to a transient.

A Site Emergency is considered to exist if the Control Room staff cannot monitor safety functions needed for protection of the public. "Significant transient" includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as trips, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or thermal power ramps of 10% or greater.

Safety systems as used here designates systems with safety-related functions.

Attachment D lists safety systems and systems with safety-related functions. "Unplanned" loss of annunciators or indicators excludes scheduled maintenance and testing activities, which should not disable such large portions of the system(s).

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency 12 Page 24 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSiNESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

System Malfunctions EAL 2.3.2.1 Sub-Category:

Loss of Indications/Communications Emergency Action Level:... --Emergency Classification--

UNUSUAL EVENT Loss of all communications capability affecting the ability to either: Perform routine operations OR Notify offsite agencies or personnel.

Basis: The purpose of this EAL is to recognize a loss of communications capability that EITHER defeats the plant operation's or staffs ability to perform routine tasks necessary for plant operations OR the ability to communicate problems with offsite authorities.

The loss of offsite communications ability anticipated by this EAL is expected to be significantly more comprehensive than the condition addressed by 10 CFR 50.72. The onsite communications loss must encompass the loss of all means of routine communications (i.e., plant telephone system, Gaitronics page system, portable radios).

The offsite communications loss must encompass the loss of all means of communications with offsite authorities.

This should include Emergency Notification System (ENS) for NRC, Microwave lines, and radio. This EAL is also met when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (relaying of information from radio transmissions, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.). Procedure DCS 2.1.1 describes lesser communications losses which must be reported to the NRC in one hour.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 11 REFERENCE USE Page 25 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSiNESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATJ7ACHMEENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

System Malfunctions EAL 2.4.1.2 Sub-Category:

Degradation of Safety System Performance

.. .-- --Emergency Classification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: I Inability to maintain reactor coolant temperature less than 200 I.Basis: This EAL addresses complete loss of functions required for core cooling during refueling and cold shutdown modes. Escalation to Site Emergency or General Emergency would be through other EALs. An uncontrollable reactor coolant temperature increase that approaches or exceeds the cold shutdown technical specification limit warrants declaration of an Alert. The concern of this EAL is the loss of control resulting in the loss of ability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown which is defined by reactor coolant temperature.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Alert 10 REFERENCE USE Page 26 of 94 roll I I NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE AITACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

System Malfunctions EAL 2.4.1.3 Sub-Category:

Degradation of Safety System Performance

..Emergency Ciassification-SITE EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Primary to secondary leakage greater than 400 gallons per minute AND Inability to power BOTH buses A-05 AND A-06 from offsite sources.

Basis: 400 gallon per minute is the value used by PBNP to differentiate between a "tube leak" and "tube rupture".

400 gpm is also the expected output from a single SI pump @ 1400 psia RCS pressure. (See DBD-09).

SLoss of offsite power combined with an RCS leak (from Primary to Secondary) of this magnitude constitute several major challenges to the protection of the public: 1. Operating on diesel generators.

2. Leak (rupture) near the capacity of a single Safety Injection pump. 3. Transport of any fission products from Primary to Secondary.

Therefore, major plant functions needed for the protection of the public have been affected.

A Site Emergency is warranted.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency 3 Page 27 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Loss of Electrical Power EAL 3.1.1.1 Sub-Category:

Loss of Vital AC Power ...-- Emergency Classification: -UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: Loss of all offsite AC capability to vital buses as indicated by the inability to power BOTH buses A-05 AND A-06 from offsite sources for greater than 15 minutes.

Basis: Prolonged loss of offsite AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete loss of AC power (station blackout).

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. Therefore, this condition (which is indicative of degraded conditions, but with no adverse consequences on the public health and safety) is classified as an UNUSUAL EVENT. If primary to secondary leakage also exists, see EAL 2.4.1.3.

References:

FSAR Section 8, Electrical Systems DBD-22, 4160 VAC System NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 7a REFERENCE USE Page 28 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSIN EMERGENCY PLAN IMPL] EMERGENCY CLASSIFICI ESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 LTION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Loss of Electrical Power Sub-Category:

Loss of Vital AC Power .. .Emergency Classification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: Loss ofall safeguard bus AC power as indicated by the inability to power BOTH- buses A-O5 AND A-06 OR B-03 AND B-04 for less than 15 minutes.

Basis: Loss of all AC power safeguards buses compromises critical plant safety functions including RHR, ECCS, containment heat removal, and maintaining the ultimate heat sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power safeguards buses may result in uncovering the core and loss of containment integrity, thus this event can escalate to a General Emergency.

The site blackout coping analysis assumes that AC power can be restored in one hour. This condition is entered when there are indications of a total loss of power to the safeguards buses A-05 and A-06 OR B-03 and B-04 from any source (on or off-site) for less than 15 minutes.

This condition is indicative of actual or potential substantial degradation to plant systems with possible adverse consequences on the public health and safety. An ALERT is warranted and must be declared.

This EAL escalates to a SITE EMERGENCY if loss of AC power continues for greater than 15 minutes.

References:

FSAR Section 8, Electrical Systems DBD-22, 4160 VAC System NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Alert 7 Page 29 of 94 REFERENCE USE EAL 3.1.1.2 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Loss of Electrical Power EAL 3.1.1.3 Sub-Category:

Loss of Vital AC Power ..Emergency-Classification:-SITE-EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Loss of all safeguard bus ACpower as indicated by the inability to power BOTH buses A-05 AND A-06 OR B-03 AND B-04 for greater than 15 minutes.

Basis: Loss of all AC power safeguards buses compromises critical plant safety functions including RHR, ECCS, containment heat removal, and maintaining the ultimate heat sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power safeguards buses may result in the uncovering core and loss of containment integrity, thus this event can escalate to a General Emergency.

The site blackout coping analysis assumes that AC power can be restored in one hour. This condition is entered when there are indications of a total loss of power to the safeguards buses A-05 and A-06 OR B-03 and B-04 from any source (on or off-site) for more than 15 minutes.

Therefore, this condition (which is indicative of serious plant system conditions with adverse consequences on the public health and safety) is classified as a SITE EMERGENCY.

References:

FSAR Section 8, Electrical Systems DBD-22, 4160 VAC System NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency 6 Page 30 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Loss of Electrical Power EAL 3.1.1.4 Sub-Category:

Loss of Vital AC Power .Emergency Classification:

GENERAL-EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Loss of allsafeguard bus AC power as indicated by the inability to power BOTH buses A-OS AND A-06 OR B-03AND B-04for greater than 15 minutes.

AND Any narrow range SIG level less than [51%l] 29% and total feedwater flow to SIGs less than 200 gpm. (ST-3 Heat Sink Red path) Basis: Loss of all AC power safeguards buses compromises critical plant safety functions including RHR, ECCS, containment heat removal, and maintaining the ultimate heat sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power safeguards buses may result in the uncovering core and loss of containment integrity, thus this event can escalate to a General Emergency.

The site blackout coping analysis assumes that AC power can be restored in one hour. This EAL assures that in the event of a prolonged station blackout, timely recognition of the loss of heat sink occurs. Therefore, this condition is indicative of grave plant conditions with potential adverse consequences on the public health and safety. A GENERAL EMERGENCY is warranted and must be declared.

References:

FSAR Section 8, Electrical Systems DBD-22, 4160 VAC System NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

General Emergency 5d Page 31 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Loss of Electrical Power EAL 3.1.2.1 Sub-Category:

Loss of Vital AC Power -Emergency Classification: -UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: Loss of all onsite AC power capability to power BOTH buses A-OS AND A-O6 from onsite sources (GO) through G04)for greater than 15 minutes.

Basis: Loss of onsite safety related AC power sources reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete loss of AC power (station blackout).

Therefore, an Unusual Event is warranted and must be declared.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient losses. SjThis condition is entered when there are indications of the unavailability of all the emergency diesel generators (GO1 through GO4) or that none of these sources can be aligned to either A-05 or A-06 for greater than 15 minutes.

Therefore, this condition (which is indicative of degraded conditions, but with no adverse consequences on the public health and safety) is classified as an Unusual Event.

References:

FSAR Section 8, Electrical Systems DBD-22, 4160 VAC System NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 7b Page 32 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE AITACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Loss of Electrical Power EAL 3.2.1.2 Sub-Category:

Loss of Vital DC Power ....- .Emergency'lassification:-

ALERT Emergency Action Level: Loss of all vital DC power as indicated by less than 105 vdc on all station battery buses (DOI, D02, ID03, D04) for less than 15 minutes.

Basis: Loss of all vital DC power compromises the ability to monitor and control plant safety fimctions.

Prolonged loss of all DC power may result in uncovering the core and loss of containment integrity.

Loss of DC power to any AC bus creates the following conditions:

1. Associated breakers cannot be electrically opened or closed remotely or locally; 2. Electrical protection/interlock tripping of associated breakers is rendered inoperable including undervoltage stripping.

The one exception is the 480 V individual breaker overloads which remain operable;

3. All associated breaker positions remain AS IS. Loss of all vital onsite DC power may also be indicated by an "Annunciator Power Failure" alarm. This EAL escalates to a SITE EMERGENCY if the power loss continues for greater than 15 minutes.

References:

FSAR Section 8, Electrical Systems DBD-19, 125 VDC System NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Alert 8 REFERENCE USE Page 33 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Loss of Electrical Power EAL 3.2.1.3 Sub-Category:

Loss of Vital DC Power .Emergency C-lassification.--SITE.

EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Loss of a ital [ power as indicated by less than 105 vdc on all station battery buses (D D03, DO4) for greater than 15 minutes.

Basis: Loss of all vital DC power compromises the ability to monitor and control plant safety functions.

Prolonged loss of all DC power may result in uncovering the core and loss of containment integrity.

Loss of DC power to any AC bus creates the following conditions:

S1. A ssociated breakers cannot be electrically opened or closed rem otely or locally; 2. Electrical protection/interlock tripping of associated breakers is rendered inoperable including undervoltage stripping.

The one exception is the 480 V individual breaker overloads which remain operable.

3. All associated breaker positions remain AS IS. Loss of all vital onsite DC power may also be indicated by an "Annunciator Power Failure" alarm. This condition (which is indicative of possible loss of control of the reactor coolant and containment barriers, with possible adverse consequences on the public health and safety) is classified as a SITE EMERGENCY.

References:

FSAR Section 8, Electrical Systems DBD-19, 125 VDC System NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency 7 Page 34 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TOTAL REWRITE ATMACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Radiological Conditions Sub-Category:

Off-site Radiological Release Emergency Action Level: EAL 4.1.1.1 Emergency Classification:

UNUSUAL EVENT Vent radiation reading(s) exceed the high alarm setpoints for greater than 60 minutes, OR Liquid release in excess of Technical Specifications.

Vent Radiation High Alarm Setpoints Reference RMSARB for current 9/99 setpoint values 1 RE 212 2.73 E-4 uCi/cc if purging, 1.62E-2 if forced vent. 1 RE 215 2.71 E+O uCi/cc RE 214 1.02 E-4 uCi/cc RE 221 1.58 E-4 uCi/cc RE 224 2.09 E-3 uCi/cc RE 225 1.36 E+O uCi/cc 2 RE 212 1.78 E-4 uCi/cc if purging, 1.82E-2 if forced vent. 2 RE 215 2.71 E + 0 uCi/cc Liqui Release Limits Service Water Discharge 1(2) RE-229 High Alarm AND: 1 Circ. Water pump AND: 2 Service Water pumps 3 Service Water pumps 4 Service Water pumps 5 Service Water pumps 6 Service Water pumps RETS Limit (uCi/cc):

4.12 E-5 3.27 E-5 3.03 E-5 2.87 E-5 2.78 E-5 Retention Pond Discharge RE-230 High Alarm AND: 1 Circ. Water pump RETS Limit (uCi/cc):

3.70 E-4 2 Circ. Water pump RETS Limit 2 Circ. Water pump AND: (uCi/cc):

RETS Limit (uCi/cc):

2 Service Water pumps 7.00 E-5 6.29 E-4 3 Service Water pumps 5.56 E-5 4 Service Water pumps 5.15 E-5 5 Service Water pumps 4.88 E-5 6 Service Water pumps 4.73 E-5 "e ference: C.H. Onesti to G.J. Maxfield, 11/17/92, RE-229 and RE-230 Alarm Setpoints, NPM 92-1035.Page 35 of 94 REFERENCE USE I I I NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION ATTACHMIENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Basis: EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE (EALs)Unplanned releases in excess of the site technical specifications, that cannot be reduced to within technical specifications within 60 minutes, represent an uncontrolled situation and hence, a potential degradation in the level of safety. The final integrated dose (which is very low in the Unusual Event emergency class) is not the.primary concern he=eit is the-degradation in-plant 4 contrl-implied by. the fact that the release was not controlled to within Technical Specification limits within 60 minutes.

Therefore, it is not intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes. For example, a release of 2 times Technical Specifications for 30 minutes, but which is terminated, does not exceed this EAL. However, the DSS should not wait until 60 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 60 minutes.

References:

STPT 13.4, Effluent Monitors NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 2 Page 36 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSiNESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Radiological Conditions Sub-Category:

Off-site Radiological Release Emergency Action Level: EAL 4.1.1.2 Emergency Classification:

ALERT PVent radiation readings exceed ten times the high alarm setpoints for greater than 15 minutes.

OR Liquid release in excess often times Technical Specifications.

0times ct R ation ig e erence or current setpoint vaues Alarm Setpoints 9/99 1 RE 212 2.73 E-3 uCi/cc if purging, 1.62E-I if forced vent 1 RE 215 2.71 E+1 uCi/cc RE 214 1.02 E-3 uCi/cc RE 221 1.58 E-3 uCi/cc RE 224 2.09 E-2 uCi/cc RE 225 1.36 E+1 uCi/cc 2 RE 212 1.78 E-3 uCi/cc if purging, 1.82E-1 if forced vent 2 RE 215 2.71 E+I uCi/cc Liquid Release Limits I Service Water Discharge 1(2) RE-229 High Alarm AND: 1 Circ. Water pump AND: 2 Service Water pumps 3 Service Water pumps 4 Service Water pumps 5 Service Water pumps 6 Service Water pumps 2 Circ. Water pump AND:-Ten times RETS Limit (uCi/cc):

4.12 E-4 3.27 E-4 3.03 E-4 2.87 E-4 2.78 E-4 Ten times RETS Limit (uCi/cc): Retention Pond Discharge RE-230 High Alarm AND: 1 Circ. Water pump Ten times RETS Limit (uCi/cc):

3.70 E-3 2 Circ. Water pump Ten times RETS Limit 2 Service Water pumps 7.00 E-4 6.29 E-3 3 Service Water pumps 5.56 E-4 4 Service Water pumps 5.15 E-4 5 Service Water pumps 4.88 E-4 6 Service Water pumps 4.73 E-4

Reference:

C.H. Onesti to G.J. Maxfield, 11/17/92, RE-229 and RE-230 Alarm Setpoints, NPM 92-1035.REFERENCE USE Page 37 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Basis: Release rates in excess often times technical specifications which continue for 15 minutes or longer represent a serious situation.

Ideally, most releases will begin small, then increase, hence will progress through the Unusual Event classification, allowing time to stop or mitigate them. Assuming this is the case, significant time has passed during which attempts to.reduce-or terminate the-release have failed. Therefore the required release duration for meeting this EAL was reduced to 15 minutes in recognition of the increased severity.

The final integrated dose (which is still expected to be low at these release rates) is not the primary concern here; it is the degradation in plant control implied by the fact that the release cannot be controlled.

References:

STPT 13.4, Effluent Monitors NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Alert 15 REFERENCE USE Page 38 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Radiological Conditions EAL 4.1.1.3 Sub-Category:

Off-site Radiological Release ....--Emergency-assification:-

SIE-EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Release of airborne radioactive material resulting in a dose projection at or beyond the site boundary (by any means) of either: Greater than or equal to 100 mRem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) OR Greater than or equal to 500 mRem Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) [thyroid]

OR Closed window dose rate exceeding 100 mRem/hr measured at or beyond the site boundary.

Basis: The 100 mR integrated dose is based on the 10 CFR 20 annual average population exposure.

This value also provides a desirable gradient (one order of magnitude) between the Site Emergency and General Emergency c:lasses.

It is deemed that exposures less than this limit are not consistent with the Site Emergency class description.

The 500 mR CDE thyroid dose was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA Protective Action Guidelines for whole body to thyroid.

Integrated doses are not monitored in real-time but are projected.

In establishing the duration used for the projection, care should be exercised to ensure the time estimates are realistic.

If no educated guess can be made regarding estimated duration, the default (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) shall be used.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency 13a Page 39 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Radiological Conditions EAL 4.1.1.4 Sub-Category:

Off-site Radiological Release -EmergencyeOassification:-GENERAL EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Release of airborne radioactive material result'ng in a dose projection at or beyond the site boundary (by any means) of either: Greater than or equal to 1 Rem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) OR Greater than or equal to 5 Rem Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) [thyroid]

OR Closed window dose rate exceeding I Rem/hr measured at or beyond the site boundary.

Basis: The I REM TEDE and the 5 REM CDE thyroid integrated doses are based on the EPA protective action guidance which indicates that public protective actions are indicated.

This is consistent with the emergency class description for a General Emergency.

Integrated doses are not monitored in real-time but are projected.

In establishing the duration used for the projection, care should be exercised to ensure the time estimates are realistic.

If no educated guess can be made regarding estimated duration, the default (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) shall be used.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

General Emergency Ia Page 40 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Radiological Conditions EAL 4.2.1.2 Sub-Category:

In-Plant Radiological Conditions

Emergency Classification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: Basis: By themselves indications of increased levels of radiation would only meet the Unusual Event class description (potential degradation in the level of safety). However, there is no specific Unusual Event EAL on increased radiation.

This would be ajudgement call by the DSS. However, when increased radiation of this magnitude (1000x) is combined with "loss of control" a higher classification is warranted.

Non-essential personnel should be assembled to ensure their safety. Additional manpower or other resources may be needed. The ALERT classification is appropriate.

The operative phrase in this EAL is "loss of control".

Combined with this is the phrase "or expected levels". For most plant evolutions increases of radiation can be estimated, most within a factor of 1000. If, in the judgement of those concerned, control has been lost, AND radiation levels increase beyond 1000X normal or expected levels, this EAL is met.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Alert 6 REFERENCE USE Page 41 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Internal Events EAL 5.1.1.1 Sub-Category:

Security Threats .. .P--Emergency-C1assification.

--UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: Bomb, credible bomb threat, indication of sabotage, or attempted entry into the Protected Area by a hostile force. Basis: This EAL is based on the PBNP Security Plan. An actual bomb, credible bomb threat, act of sabotage, or attempted entry into the Protected area by a hostile force indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety at the plant. Therefore an Unusual Event classification is warranted.

The Plant Protected Area Boundary is defined in the Security Plan. Note: The Independent Spent Fuel K> Storage Installation (ISFSI) is part of the site Protected Area. A bomb discovered in or near a Plant Vital Area which could affect Safety-Related Functions would result in escalation of the emergency classification.

An actual explosion (of a bomb or other source) would be classified based on EALs 5.3. 1.1 through 5.3.1.3 depending upon its effects.

Security events that do not represent at least a potential degradation in the level of plant safety are reported under either 10 CFR 73.71 or 10 CFR 50.72 and do not require implementation of the Emergency Plan. Accidental, non-hostile entry, although reportable as a security event, does not warrant declaration of an emergency.

The operative consideration is 'intent'.

If no malicious intent is determined the EAL does not apply.

References:

PBNP -Modified Amended Site Security Plan NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 12 REFERENCE USE Page 42 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATrACHIMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Internal Events EAL 5.1.1.2 Sub-Category:

Security Threats -EmergencyC-lassification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: IIntrusion into the Protected Area by a hostile force. Basis: For the purposes of this EAL, the intrusion into the Protected Area can be considered a significant security threat. An Alert classification is warranted.

If entry is attempted, but not gained by a hostile force see the Unusual Event EAL. The Plant Protected Area Boundary is defined in the Security Plan. Note: The Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) is part of the site Protected Area. Intrusion into a Plant Vital Area escalates this event to a Site Emergency.

Security events that do not represent at least a potential degradation in the level of plant safety are reported under either 10 CFR 73.71 or 10 CFR 50.72 and do not require implementation of the Emergency Plan. Accidental, non-hostile entry, although reportable as a security event, does not warrant declaration of an emergency.

The operative consideration is 'intent'.

If no malicious intent is determined the EAL does not apply.

References:

PBNP -Modified Amended Site Security Plan NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Alert 16 Page 43 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Internal Events Sub-Category:

Security Threats EAL 5.1.1.3-....Emergency Classification:

SITE-EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: 11, "301 oris u psun, r UL ov nosite orce.Basis: Hostile takeover of Vital Areas could lead to loss of physical control of the plant. Therefore a Site Emergency classification is warranted.

The Plant Vital Areas are defined in the Security Plan. Security events that do not represent at least a potential degradation in the level of plant safety are reported under either 10 CFR 73.71 or 10 CFR 50.72 and do not require implementation of the Emergency Plan. Accidental, non-hostile entry, although reportable as a security event, does not warrant declaration of an emergency.

The operative consideration is 'intent'.

If no malicious intent is determined the EAL does not apply.

References:

PBNP -Modified Amended Site Security Plan NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency 14 REFERENCE USE!Page 44 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Internal Events Sub-Category:

Security Threats EAL 5.1.1.4......-Emergency Classification:-GENERAL EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: A Security Event which results in either: Loss ofphysical control of the Control Room OR Loss of remote shutdown capability.

Basis: This EAL encompasses conditions under which unauthorized personnel have taken physical control of vital areas required to reach and maintain safe shutdown, with the potential that the intruders can cause a significant event with damage to plant systems, damage to the core, and ultimately a release of large amounts of radioactivity.

References PBNP -Modified Amended Site Security Plan AOP-10A, Safe Shutdown -Local Control NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

General Emergency 3 REFERENCE USE Page 45 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Internal Events EAL 5.2.1.2 Sub-Category:

Control Room Habitability

..-. -EmergencyClassification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: acuataon ofthe Control Room has been initiated with control of shutdown systems establishedfrom Slocal stations.

Basis: AOP-OA directs shutdown activities performed outside the Control Room. This EAL does not imply that all actions associated with Alternate Shutdown shall be completed in order to avoid the higher EAL pertaining to Control Room evacuation (EAL 5.2.1.3).

If the reactor successfully trips, if level, pressure, temperature, etc., are being controlled, and no impediments to the associated Shutdown activities are being encountered, this emergency classification is appropriate.

If impediments are being encountered in completing critical Shutdown functions, and more than 15 minutes expire, EAL 5.2.1.3 is met. Located within the Control Room are the controls, indications, annunciators, and communications equipment necessary for the safe operation of the plant. The ability to assess and control plant conditions and abnormal situations is significantly degraded without access to the Control Room. With the Control Room evacuated, additional support, monitoring, and direction through the resources of the TSC and/or other emergency facilities is assumed to be necessary

-therefore, the declaration of an Alert is appropriate and required.

References:

AOP-10A, Safe Shutdown -Local Control NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Alert 20 REFERENCE USE Page 46 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Internal Events EAL 5.2.1.3 Sub-Category:

Control Room Habitability

---Emergency-Classification:-

SITE EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Evacuation of the Control Room without establishment ofplant control from remote shutdown stations within approximately 15 minutes.

Basis: Located within the Control Room are the controls, indications, annunciators, and communications equipment necessary for the safe operation of the plant The ability to assess and control plant conditions and abnormal situations is significantly degraded without access to the Control Room. Once the Control Room is evacuated, if control is not established from remote shutdown stations within K2a reasonable amount of time (approximately 15 minutes), a significant threat to multiple fission product barriers exists should a plant transient or other emergency condition occur. If plant control cannot be established within this time frame, declaration of a Site Emergency is warranted due to extended lack of control of the plant. Escalation to a higher classification, if appropriate, will be based on system malfunctions, fission product barrier degradation, radiation levels, or Emergency Director judgement.

References:

AOP-10A, Safe Shutdown -Local Control NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency 18 REFERENCE USE Page 47 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Internal Events EAL 5.3.1.1 Sub-Category:

Fire / Explosion

..Emergency Classification: -UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: Explosion near or in the Protected Area affecting permanent plant equipment or structures.

Basis: Only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent plant structures or equipment within the Protected Area meet the threshold of this EAL. Other minor explosions should be evaluated for reportability 10 CFR 50.72. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess the magnitude of damage. Reports of any damage to permanent structures or equipment is sufficient for declaration.

Specifically excluded from this EAL are stored equipment or non-permanent structures such as trailers, K)Sea Vans, or skids which are not being relied upon to perform the function of installed plant equipment.

The Plant Protected Area Boundary is defined in the Security Plan. Note: The Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) is part of the site Protected Area. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment imparting significant energy to nearby structures and materials.

If the explosion damages Safety Systems the event escalates to an Alert or Site Emergency.

The security aspects of the explosion should be considered.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 14c Page 48 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Internal Events EAL 5.3.1.2 Sub-Category:

Fire / Explosion .Emergency Classification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: plosion affecting operability of one (1) train ofaf s se Basis: Safety systems as used here designates systems with safety-related functions.

Attachment D lists safety systems and systems with safety-related functions.

Only explosions that actually cause damage to equipment required for safe operation AND only damage that renders a single train of a safety system unable to perform its intended safety function meet the threshold of this EAL. A lengthy damage assessment should not be performed.

The occurrence of the explosion with evidence of damage likely to prevent one train from performing its intended safety function is sufficient for declaration.

As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts significant energy to nearby structures and equipment.

If the explosion damages more than one train of a Safety System the event escalates to a'Site Emergency.

The security aspects of the explosion should be considered.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Alert 18c Page 49 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)EAL 5.3.1.3 Category:

Internal Events Sub-Category:

Fire / Explosion S...... --E-fmergency-lassification:

Site Emergency Emergency Action Level: Explosion affecting operability of two (2) trains of safety systems.

Basis: Safety systems as used here designates systems with safety-related functions.

Attachment D lists safety systems and systems with safety-related functions.

Only explosions that actually cause damage to equipment required for safe operation of more than one safety system train AND only damage that affects the systems' ability to perform intended functions meet the threshold of this EAL. A lengthy damage assessment should not be performed.

An immediate assessment of the probability of damage making multiple trains incapable of performing their safety function is all that is required.

The occurrence of the explosion with evidence of damage likely to prevent the equipment in more than one train of a safety system from performing intended safety functions is sufficient for declaration.

As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts significant energy to nearby structures and equipment.

If only one train of a safety system is. affected, see ALERT classification EAL. The security aspects of the explosion should be considered.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Alert 18c REFERENCE USE Page 50 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Internal Events Sub-Category:

Fire / Explosion

.. .Emergency Classification-UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: I Fire within the ProtectedArea lasting more than 10 minutes after use offire extinguishing equipment.

Basis: The purpose of this EAL is to address fires which are potentially significant precursors to damage to safety systems. This condition applies to buildings or areas contiguous to plant vital areas or other significant buildings or areas. Specifically excluded are small fires within administration buildings, wastebasket fires, or fires in areas of no safety consequence.

Escalation to a higher emergency class occurs if the fire affects one or more train(s) of a Safety System(s).

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 10 Page 51 of 94 REFERENCE USE EAL 5.3.2.1 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE K: AITACHMENT B T EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Internal Events EAL 5.3.2.2 Sub-Category:

Fire / Explosion

.~ -Emergency-Classification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: I Fire affeting operability of one (1) train of a safety system. Basis: Safety systems as used here designates systems with safety-related functions.

Attachment D lists safety systems and systems with safety-related functions.

This condition is entered when the Fire Brigade Leader reports a fire affects one train of a safety system or if Control Room Operators become aware of indications of impact to a safety system after a fire has been reported.

Only those fires that actually cause damage to equipment as reported by the Fire Brigade Leader or as noted by Control Room operators meet this EAL. Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, is based on further system malfunctions, fission product barrier degradation, abnormal radiation levels, or Emergency Director judgement.

References':

NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Alert 13 Page 52 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE k-j ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Internal Events EAL 5.3.2.3 Sub-Category:

Fire / Explosion

..-Emergenc-lassification: -SITE EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Fire affecting operability of two (2) trains of safety systems.

Basis: Safety systems as used here designates systems with safety-related functions.

Attachment D lists safety systems and systems with safety-related functions.

This condition is entered when the Fire Brigade Leader reports a fire that affects more than one train of a safety system or if Control Room Operators become aware of indications of impact on more than one train of a safety system after a fire has been reported.

Only fires that actually cause damage to equipment required for safe operation of more than one safety system train AND only damage that affects the systems' ability to perform intended functions meet the threshold of this EAL. A lengthy damage assessment should not be performed.

An immediate assessment of the probability of damage making multiple trains incapable of performing their safety function is all that is required.

The occurrence of a fire with evidence of damage likely to prevent the equipment in more than one train of a safety system from performing intended safety functions is sufficient for declaration.

This condition is indicative of severe degradation of the level of safety at the plant with possible adverse consequences on the public health and safety. A Site Emergency is warranted.

Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on fission product barrier degradation or emergency management judgement.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency I 1 Page 53 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Internal Events EAL 5.4.1.1 Sub-Category:

Turbine Rotating Component Failures ...... -Emergency lassification:-UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: Visual confirmation of turbine housingpenetration by a blade or rotating component.

Basis: This initiation condition addresses the consequences of turbine failure and turbine missile effects.

Analyses documented in the FSAR on the consequences of turbine overspeed indicate that there would be only a low energy missile generated external to the low pressure turbine casing in the event of a turbine overspeed.

The study determined that the following components are subject to the possible effects of a turbine missile: one main steam line, the condensate storage tanks, reactor makeup water storage tanks, the reactor makeup water storage tank pumps, the refueling water storage tank, diesel generator fuel oil line, and the service water pump electrical leads. These components should be evaluated for damage. Escalation to a higher emergency classification, if appropriate, is based on further missile damage from any source, system malfunctions, fission product barrier degradation, abnormal radiation levels, or emergency management judgement.

References:

WCAP 7525-L, Likelihood and Consequences of Turbine Overspeed at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. Reg Guide 1.115, Protection Against Low-Trajectory Turbine Missiles FSAR 14.1.12, Likelihood of Turbine-Generator Unit Overspeed NUREG 0654; Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 14e and Alert I ge REFERENCE USE Page 54 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSiNESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

External Events EAL 6.1.1.1 Sub-Category:

Natural Destructive Phenomena

--. -EmergencyClassificationr-UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: Any earthquake felt by Control Room Operators.

OR An indicator light on two or more of the following Seismic Event Monitors SEI-6210 #3 Warehouse SEI-6211 Unit I Facade SEI-6212 Drum Prep Room SEI-6213 El. 8 'between vital switchgear room and auxfeedwater tunnel Basis: As defined in the EPRI sponsored "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake," dated October 1989, a "felt earthquake" is: An earthquake of sufficient intensity such that: (a) the ground motion is felt at the nuclear plant site and recognized as an earthquake based on a consensus of control room operators on duty at the time, and (b) for.plants with operable seismic instrumentation, the seismic detectors of the plant are activated.

The seismic event monitors are set to alarm at 0.0.1g. Minor damage to some portions of the site may occur at these levels but should not affect the ability to safely operate the plant. Additional inspections may be desired to determine the extent of any damage. Therefore an Unusual Event classification is warranted.

This EAL requires two valid seismic alarms to eliminate classification due to plant operations or maintenance activities, such as heavy equipment moving near the monitor or an accidental impact to a monitor. Further validation may be accomplished by contacting the University of Wisconsin

-Milwaukee Seismic Center.REFERENCE USE Page 55 of 94[ i NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)

References:

PBNP FSAR, Appendix A Setpoint Document STPT 22.1, Seismic Event Monitoring EPRI Document, "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake," dated October, 1989 NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 13a REFERENCE USE Page 56 of 94] [

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

External Events EAL 6.1.1.2 Sub-Category:

Natural Destructive Phenomena-7 --.--Emergency Classification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: Valid Seismic Event Monitor readings of an intensity greater than 0. 04g vertical or 0. 06g horizontal.

Basis: This EAL addresses events that may have resulted in the plant's vital equipment being subjected to forces beyond operational limits. Therefore an Alert classification is warranted.

Classification should occur prior to a detailed damage assessment.

Values in this EAL are based on the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) limits (ground accelerations of .04g vertical and .06g horizontal) as defined by the FSAR. Validation of seismic activity would be by severe ground shaking or by contacting University of Wisconsin

-Milwaukee Seismic Center (Emergency Telephone Directory).

References:

PBNP FSAR, Appendix A Setpoint Document STPT 22.1, Seismic Event Monitoring EPRI Document, "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake," dated October 1989 NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Alert 17a REFERENCE USE Page 57 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATITACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

External Events EAL 6.1.1.3 Sub-Category:

Natural Destructive Phenomena

-..--Emergency Classification:-SITE EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Valid Seismic Event Monitor readings of an intensity greater than 0. 08g vertical or 0. 12g horizontal.

Basis: This EAL addresses events that may have resulted in the plant's vital equipment being subject to forces that may prevent safe shutdown and cooldown of the plant. Therefore a Site Emergency classification is warranted.

Classification should occur prior to a detailed damage assessment.

Values in this EAL are based on the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) limits (ground accelerations of .08g vertical and. 12g horizontal) as defined by the FSAR. Validation of seismic activity would be by severe ground shaking or by contacting University of Wisconsin

-Milwaukee Seismic Center (Emergency Telephone Directory).

References:

PBNP FSAR, Appendix A Setpoint Document STPT 22.1, Seismic Event Monitoring EPRI Document, "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake," dated October 1989 NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency 15a Page 58 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMIENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

External Events EAL 6.1.2.1 Sub-Category:

Natural Destructive Phenomena

-- Emergency-C-iassification:--UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: I Report by plant personnel that a tornado is within, or has been inh the Protected Area or Switchyard Basis: This EAL is based on the assumption that a tornado within the Protected Area may potentially damage plant structures containing functions or systems required for the safe shutdown of the plant Due to the rapid transient nature of tornadoes only those which actually occur within the Protected Area are considered, as these have the potential of actually damaging plant structures.

An Unusual Event classification is warranted.

If damage to safety-related equipment is confirmed (either by observation or plant instrumentation) the event may be escalated to an Alert. Other EALs should also be considered such as loss of electrical power. The Protected Area Boundary is defined in the Security Plan. Note: The Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) is part of the site Protected Area.

References:

AOP-13C, Severe Weather Conditions Probabilistic Safety Assessment

-High Winds, and Others Sec 9, Rev 0, Dated July 1995 NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 13c REFERENCE USE Page 59 of 94 ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)---I NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

External Events EAL 6.1.2.2 Sub-Category:

Natural Destructive Phenomena-ALERT Emergency Action Level: Basis: This EAL addresses events that may have resulted in a plant vital area being subjected to forces approaching or beyond design limits. It is assumed that damage may have occurred to plant safety systems. Therefore an Alert classification is wanranted.

Classification should occur prior to a detailed damage assessment.

The 90 MPH sustained wind speed was chosen as a value approaching the design basis for non-Class 1 metal structures at the plant. Although no damage to permanent plant structures should occur at this level, non-permanent structures (trailers, work shacks, temporary storage, etc.) could have significant damage and impact plant operations.

Winds at this level would also impact personnel movement within and to the plant.

References:

AOP-13C, Severe Weather Conditions FSAR 5.1, Containment System Structure Probabilistic Safety Assessment

-- High Winds, and Others Sec 9, Rev 0, Dated July 1995 Bechtel Corporation, "Westinghouse Electric Corporation--Wisconsin Michigan Power Company-Point Beach Atomic Power Station--Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants Against Tornadoes," March 12, 1970, B-TOP-3.

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Alert 17c REFERENCE USE Page 60 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATJTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

External Events EAL 6.1.2.3 Sub-Category:

Natural Destructive Phenomena

.Emergency Classification:

SITE EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Sustained winds greater than 10O0 MPH AND Reports or indications of damage to vital equipment or structures.

Basis: This EAL addresses events that have resulted in plant areas being subjected to forces beyond design limits. It is assumed that substantial damage has occurred to plant structures with probable damage to safety systems.

It is inferred from Section 5.1 in the FSAR that the design straight wind speed of 108 mph was used in the design of the non-Class 1 metal structures.

This is consistent with the Bechtel topical report. 100 mph was used in this EAL due to limitations of available instrumentation.

Therefore, this condition is indicative of serious plant system conditions with possible adverse consequences on the public health and safety. A Site Emergency is warranted.

Emergency classifications under other EALs may also be appropriate due to offsite effects caused by high winds, particularly status of offsite power lines.

References:

AOP-13C, Severe Weather Conditions FSAR 5.1, Containment System Structure Probabilistic Safety Assessment

-High Winds, and Others Sec 9, Rev 0, Dated July 1995 Bechtel Corporation, "Westinghouse Electric Corporation-Wisconsin Michigan Power Company-Point Beach Atomic Power Station-Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants Against Tornadoes," March 12, 1970, B-TOP-3.

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency 15c Page 61 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE (EALs)Category:

External Events Sub-Category:

High Lake/Low Forebay Water Level ---Emergency-Classification:-UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: Less than -11 'forebay or pump bay level with one unit's CWpumps off. Basis: This condition is considered a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant due to Circulating Water Pumps and/or Service Water losing suction. Water levels at or below these levels impairs the ability of these pumps to provide water to their loads, and may result in subsequent loss of the safety function of the ultimate heat sink. Therefore, an Unusual Event classification is warranted.

References:

AOP-5A, Loss of Condenser Vacuum AOP-13A, Circulating Water System Malfunction NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 13b Page 62 of 94 REFERENCE USE m EAL 6.2.1.1 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

External Events EAL 6.2.2.1 Sub-Category:

High Lake/Low Forebay Water Level .....-Emergency-Classification:-UJNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: I Anyflooding whichprecludes access to the site or areas of the plant. Basis: This condition is considered to be a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant due to limited access to the site or potential safety concerns for onsite personnel.

Therefore an Unusual Event classification is warranted.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 13b Page 63 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

External Events EAL 6.2.2.2 Sub-Category:

High Lake/Low Forebay Water Level .Emergency-Classification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: Flooding as indicated by greater than 6" of water in the 8foot elevation of the Turbine Bldg. Basis: This EAL addresses an event that may result in a plant vital area being subjected to conditions beyond design limits adversely affecting plant safety systems. Therefore, this condition is indicative of abnormal plant conditions with possible adverse consequences on plant safety and is classified as an Alert. This condition is entered when there is greater than six inches of water in the turbine hall. Although this EAL is in the category High Lake/Low Forebay, the cause of the flooding is not a factor. A broken Service Water or Circulating Water pipe could also create this condition.

The Turbine Building would flood before other plant areas, therefore it provides a representative indication of other possible problem areas. The feedwater pumps each sit on a base that is eight inches above the floor. The turbine seal oil pumps are approximately ten inches above the floor. Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on Flooding in Vital Equipment Areas.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Alert 17b REFERENCE USE Page 64 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

External Events EAL 6.2.2.3 Sub-Category:

High Lake/Low Forebay Water Level ---

EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Greater than 2"of water in vital switchgear room OR Greater than 2 'of water in auxiliary feedwater pump room. Basis: This EAL addresses conditions where plant vital equipment may be subjected to conditions beyond design limits, and damage may be assumed to have occurred to plant safety systems. Therefore, this condition is indicative of serious plant system conditions with possible adverse consequences on the public health and safety. A Site Emergency is warranted.

Plant vital area designations are contained in the PBNP Security Plan. Water levels in excess of two feet in the vital switchgear room severely threaten safe plant operations.

Several 125-volt DC station batteries are installed in the vital switchgear room. The bottom and top of these batteries are 6 and 36 inches above the floor, respectively.

Numerous electrical cabinets containing electrical components for the safety injection pumps, the station service transformers, and the 4.16 kV electrical system are also located in the room. Water levels in excess of two feet in the auxiliary feedwater pump room threatens operation of the feedwater system and ultimately the ability to cool the reactor core. The turbine-operated auxiliary feedwater pumps are located approximately 18 inches above the floor and the motor operated auxiliary feedwater pumps are located approximately two feet above the floor. Additionally, the Source Range Output Expansion Control Panel is approximately two feet above the floor. This EAL used to also contain criteria of greater than three feet of water in both EDG rooms, however this was before G03 and G04 were installed, hence spoke of G01 and G02 only. Due to the electrical arrangement of G03 and G04 as backups to GO1 and G02 and the fact that G03 and G04 are at a significantly higher elevation, they have been removed from this EAL. Emergency classifications under other EALs may be appropriate due to offsite effects caused by severe weather, particularly the status of offsite power lines.Page 65 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)

References:

SOER 85-5, Internal Flooding of Power Plant Buildings NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency 15b REFERENCE USE Page 66 of 94 I NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE AT-ACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

External Events EAL 6.3.1.1 Sub-Category:

Toxic/Flammable Gas Intrusion

.. .Emergency Classification: -UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: A toxic or flammable gas release in or near the Protected Area. Basis: The release of toxic or flammable gas in or near the Protected Area may pose a potential threat to reactor plant and personnel safety. It is the potential threat to normal operation or hazard to personnel which must be evaluated.

If no such threat exists, the EAL is not met. If, however, personnel safety or plant operation is threatened, an Unusual Event is warranted.

For the purpose of this EAL, 'in or near' is considered to include those owner-controlled areas immediately surrounding the Protected Area and all areas within the Protected Area. Flammable gases are typically more limiting than toxic gases. Although an SCBA could protect from toxicity, detonation of a flammable gas could be immediately hazardous to personnel.

The Plant Protected Area Boundary is defined in the Security Plan. Note: The Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) is part of the site Protected Area.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 14d REFERENCE USE Page 67 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

External Events EAL 6.3.1.2 Sub-Category:

Toxic/Flammable Gas Intrusion---.-..Emergency-Classification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: I Entry of toxic orflammable gas into aplant building atmosphere affecting operation or access.Basis: The release of toxic or flammable gas significant enough to affect plant operation (i.e., initiate a plant transient or preclude access to plant equipment) warrants declaration of an Alert: Flammable gases are typically more limiting than toxic gases. Although an SCBA could protect from toxicity, detonation of a flammable gas could be immediately hazardous to personnel.

An area where access is not required for plant operation, which could be evacuated, does not warrant an Alert, but may warrant an Unusual Event if the potential exists to affect operation or personnel.

Any affected area normally accessed for plant operation (PAB, Turbine hall, etc.) meets the Alert level. If vital areas are affected, see EAL 6.3.1.3.

The primary flammable gases considered are acetylene, propane and the hydrogen.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Alert 18d REFERENCE USE Page 68 of 94-1 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATfACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

External Events EAL 6.3.1.3 Sub-Category:

Toxic/Flammable Gas Intrusion

-.Emergency-Classification:

SITE EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Entry of toxic or flammable gas into a plant vital area affecting operation or personnel safety AND Reactor coolant temperature greater than 200 OF. Basis: The release of toxic or flammable gas into a plant vital area poses a significant threat to plant safety by precluding access to plant vital equipment which may be needed for Safe Shutdown.

Therefore this condition warrants declaration of a Site Emergency.

Flammable gases are typically more limiting than toxic gases. Although an SCBA could protect from toxicity, detonation of a flammable gas could be immediately hazardous to personnel.

This EAL does not apply in cold shutdown or refueling modes due to the significantly reduced probability that the loss of access would result in fuel failure and/or a release.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency 16c Page 69 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSiNESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

External Events EAL 6.4.1.1 Sub-Category:

Vehicle/Missile Impacts S--- --Em ergency lassification: -U N U SUA L EV E NT Emergency Action Level: I

-...L -l 9II L 4JJ LI U.)( W"it5n Jr, srhUW1vlva ArcU Or aWitCnVara.

Basis: This event may warrant the prompt notification of state and local authorities and perhaps a precautionary notification of Emergency Response Organization personnel.

This event could pose a potential threat to plant operation or personnel safety and therefore warrants declaration of an Unusual Event. The Plant Protected Area is defined in the PBNP Security Plan. Note: The Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) is part of the site Protected Area.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 14a REFERENCE USE Page 70 of 94 I NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

External Events EAL 6.4.1.2 Sub-Category:

Vehicle/Missile Impacts-Emergency Classification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: Aircraft crash affecting operability of one(l) train of a safety system. Basis: Safety systems as used here designates systems with safety-related functions.

Attachment D lists safety systems and systems with safety-related functions.

This condition is entered when Control Room Operators become aware of impact on a safety function after an aircraft crash has been reported.

Only a crash that actually causes damage to equipment required for safe operation AND only damage that renders a single train of a safety system unable to perform its intended safety function meet the threshold of this EAL. A lengthy damage assessment should not be performed.

The occurrence of a crash with evidence of damage likely to prevent one train from performing its intended safety function is sufficient for declaration.

This condition is indicative of abnormal plant system conditions with possible adverse consequences on the public health and safety is classified as an ALERT. Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on further system malfunctions, fission product barrier degradation, abnormal radiation levels, or Emergency Director judgement.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Alert I 8a REFERENCE USE Page 71 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATI'ACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

External Events EAL 6.4.1.3 Sub-Category:

Vehicle/Missile Impacts--- -Emergency-Classification:--SITE EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: I Aircraft crash affecting operability of two (2) trains of safety systems.Basis: This condition is indicative of severe degradation of the level of safety at the plant and with possible adverse consequences on the public health and safety is classified as a Site Emergency.

Only crashes that actually cause damage to equipment required for safe operation of more than one safety system train AND only damage that affects the systems' ability to perform intended functions meet the threshold of this EAL. A lengthy damage assessment should not be performed.

The occurrence of a crash with evidence of damage likely to prevent the equipment in more than one train of a safety system from performing intended safety functions is sufficient for declaration.

Safety systems as used here designates systems with safety-related functions.

Attachment D lists safety systems and systems with safety-related functions.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency 16a REFERENCE USE Page 72 of 94---1 l NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

External Events EAL 6.4.2.2 Sub-Category:

Vehicle/Missile Impacts .-Emergency Classification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: -Any missile impact affecting operability of one(I) train of a safety system. Basis: Safety systems as used here designates systems with safety-related functions.

Attachment D lists safety systems and systems with safety-related functions.

This condition is entered when Control Room Operators become aware of impact on a safety functions after a missile impact has been reported.

K>Only a missile that actually causes damage to equipment required for safe operation AND only damage that renders a single train of a safety system unable to perform its intended safety function meet the threshold of this EAL. A lengthy damage assessment should not be performed.

The occurrence of a missile impact with evidence of damage likely to prevent one train from performing its intended safety function is sufficient for declaration.

This condition is indicative of abnormal plant system conditions with possible adverse consequences on the public health and safety is classified as an ALERT. Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on further system malfunctions, fission product barrier degradation, abnormal radiation levels, or emergency management judgement.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Alert 18b REFERENCE USE Page 73 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATIACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

External Events EAL 6.4.2.3 Sub-Category:

Vehicle/Missile Impacts .....Emergency Classification:

SITE EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Missile impact affecting operability of two (2) trains of safety systems.

Basis: Safety systems as used here designates systems with safety-related functions.

Attachment D lists safety systems and systems with safety-related functions.

Only missile impacts that actually cause damage to equipment required for safe operation of more than one safety system train AND only damage that affects the systems' ability to perform intended functions meet the threshold of this EAL. A lengthy damage assessment should not be performed.

An immediate assessment of the probability of damage making multiple trains incapable of performing their safety function is all that is required.

The occurrence of a missile impact with evidence of damage likely to prevent the equipment in more than one train of a safety system from performing intended safety functions is sufficient for declaration.

Major losses of plant safety systems, as defined by failure of the ability of two or more of the safety systems to perform their intended function, warrants declaration of a Site Emergency.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency 16b REFERENCE USE Page 74of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Fuel Handling/ISFSI Events EAL 7.1.1.2 Sub-Category:

Fuel Handling Events "-Emergency Classification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: Report of possible damage to irradiatedfuel combined with an alarm on any of the following radiation monitors RE-2 11, Containment air particulate monitor RE-212 Containment noble gas monitor RE-221 Drumming Area Vent Manipulator Area Monitor Spent Fuel Bridge Area Monitor.

Basis: A report of possible damage to irradiated fuel, combined with an alarm on any of the radiation monitors indicates the probable damage to spent fuel. NUREG/CR-4982 states that even if no corrective actions are taken, no prompt fatalities are predicted and the risk of injury is low. In addition, NRC Information Notice No. 90-08 presents the following clarifications: "In the event of a serious accident involving decayed spent fuel, protective actions would be needed for personnel on site, while offsite doses (assuming an exclusion area radius of one mile from the plant site) would be well below the Environmental Protection Agency's Protective Action Guides. Accordingly, it is important to be able to properly survey and monitor for Kr-85 in the event of an accident with decayed spent fuel." An Alert classification is appropriate for this event. Escalation would be based on actual radiological releases and/or DSS judgement.

Page 75 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)

References:

NUREG/CR-4982, "Severe Accident in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82" NRC Information Notice No. 90-08, "Kr-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel" AOP-8B, Irradiated Fuel Handling Accident in Containment AOP-8C, Fuel Handling Accident in Primary Auxiliary Building NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Alert 12 REFERENCE USE Page 76 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Fuel Handling/ISFSI Events Sub-Category:

Irradiated Fuel Events EAL 7.2.1.2---Emergency Classification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: Indications of irradiatedfuel uncovered Basis: This EAL applies to any area where irradiated fuel is located; reactor cavity, reactor vessel, or the spent fuel pool. Any releases caused by uncovering the fuel are not generally the primary concern. The primary concern of this EAL is two-fold.

First, is the evident loss of control of inventory.

The second is the immediate, life threatening dose which could be present in the area due to loss of shielding.

An Alert classification is appropriate for this event. Escalation, if required, would be based on actual radiological releases or Emergency Director judgement.

This EAL applies to spent fuel requiring water coverage and is not intended to address spent fuel which is licensed for dry storage.

References:

NUREG/CR-4982, "Severe Accident in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82" NRC Information Notice No. 90-08, "Kr-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel" AOP-8F, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Alert 12 REFERENCE USE Page 77 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTIACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Fuel Handling/ISFSI Events EAL 7.3.1.1 Sub-Category:

ISFSI Events.Emergency-Classification: -UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: I A loaded spent fuel cask dropped or tipped Basis: The Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) stores spent fuel in vertical casks outside the main Protected Area. Engineering safeguards and procedures insure these casks are not dropped or tipped for the duration of their expected lifetimes.

If they should be dropped or tipped it is appropriate to declare an Unusual Event until the situation is analyzed and corrected.

References:

NUREG/CR-4982, "Severe Accident in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82" NRC Information Notice No. 90-08, "Kr-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel" AOP-8G, Ventilated Storage Cask (VSC) Drop or Tipover NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Alert 12 REFERENCE USE I Page 78 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Fuel Handling/ISFSI Events EAL 7.3.1.2 Sub-Category:

ISFSI Events.. -Emergency Classification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: I Breach of a loaded spent fuel cask as indicated by a reading of greater than 1000 mRemfhr at I meter.Basis: The Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) stores spent fuel bundles in vertical cask in an area outside the main Protected Area. Engineering safeguards and procedures are in place to insure these casks are not subjected to forces that could breach their integrity.

If a cask is breached it is appropriate to declare an Alert due to the potential threat to site personnel.

References:

NUREG/CR-4982, "Severe Accident in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82" NRC Information Notice No. 90-08, "Kr-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel" NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Alert 12 REFERENCE USE I Page 79 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Emergency Management Judgement Sub-Category:

None .-Emergency Classification:- -UNUSUAL EVENT Emergency Action Level: Any event which in the judgement of the Duty Shift Superintendent or the Emergency Director could lead to, or has led to, a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. I Basis: This EAL would pertain to conditions not explicitly addressed elsewhere in the EALs, but which warrant the declaration of an emergency due to the potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The Duty Shift Superintendent or Emergency Director makes this determination.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Unusual Event 15 Page 80 of 94 REFERENCE USE a EAL 8.1.1.1 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE AATfACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs) Category:

Emergency Management Judgement EAL 8.1.1.2 Sub-Category:

None .... .- -Emergency Classification:

ALERT Emergency Action Level: Any event which in the judgement of the Duty Shift Superintendent or the Emergency Director could cause or has caused actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Basis: This EAL would pertain to conditions not explicitly addressed elsewhere in the EALs, but which warrant the declaration of an emergency due to the actual or substantial potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The Duty Shift Superintendent or Emergency Director makes this determination.

In keeping with other EALs, generally events which challenge single (RCS or Fuel Cladding) barriers, or affect only single safety systems or functions fall in this category.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix I Initiating Condition:

Alert 19 Page 8 1 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Emergency Management Judgement EAL 8.1.1.3 Sub-Category:

None .. .Emergency-Classification: -SITE EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Any event which in the judgement of the Duty Shift Superintendent or the Emergency Director could indicate actual or likely major failures ofplant functions needed to protect the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposures in excess of EPA PAGs. Basis: This EAL would pertain to conditions not explicitly addressed elsewhere in the EALs, but which warrant the declaration of an emergency due to the actual or likely failure of major plant functions needed for the protection of the public. The Duty Shift Superintendent or Emergency Director makes this determination.

In keeping with other EALs, generally events which challenge two barriers (but not three), or affect more than one safety system or safety function, fall into this category.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

Site Emergency 17 REFERENCE USE Page 82 of 94 I Ill NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE AT'ACHEMENT B EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (EALs)Category:

Emergency Management Judgement EAL 8.1.1.4 Sub-Category:

None--Emergency-0assification: -GENERAL EMERGENCY Emergency Action Level: Any event which in the judgement of the Duty Shift Superintendent or the Emergency Director could lead to actual or imminent core damage and the potential for a large release of radioactive material (in excess of EPA PAGs) outside the site boundary.Basis: This EAL pertains to conditions not explicitly addressed elsewhere in the EALs but which warrant declaration of an emergency due to actual or imminent core damage and the potential exists for a release of large amounts of radioactive material.

The Duty Shift Superintendent or Emergency Director makes this determination.

In keeping with other EALs, generally events which challenge all three barriers, indicate the potential for core damage, or which reflect possible large releases fall into this category.

References:

NUREG 0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition:

General Emergency 4 and 7 REFERENCE USE Page 83 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT C FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER (FPB) MATRIX This attachment is used to determine the status of the three primary Fission Product Barriers as they relate to classification.

Wherever possible existing well-known parameters have been selected as thresholds for determining the status of the barriers.

This is to integrate setpoints and thresholds already in existence in EOPs and Critical Safety Status Trees into the classification process. The intended purpose is to minimize the number of-separate limits and values thatimust be memorized.

NOTE: Do not "anticipate" challenge or loss of a barrier unless the trend is rapid, and the values are close to the threshold/criteria.

The table on the following page may be used to 'check off the status of the three Fission Product Barriers.

Next to each code (FC-1, RL-2, etc.) is an empty box. If the plant conditions meet the conditions in the box, the associated box may be checked, either in the Challenged or Loss column. The number and status of Fission Product Barriers may then be compared to the EALs that specifically address Fission Product Barrier status (category 1 of Attachment A). Generally, one barrier LOST is an Alert (unless the barrier is Containment alone), two barriers LOST is a Site Emergency, and two barriers LOST, with a CHALLENGE or LOSS of the third barrier is a General Emergency.

The codes (FC-1, RL-2, etc.) may be used to obtain further explanation as to the basis of their development.

Each initial code letter; 'F' for Fuel Cladding, 'R' for Reactor Coolant System, or 'C' for Containment is followed by either 'C' for Challenge or 'L' for Loss. (For example FL-# indicates a parameter for Fuel Cladding LOSS, RC-# indicates a parameter for Reactor Coolant System Challenge.)

The bases are on the pages following the Table, arranged by barrier, Challenge then Loss.REFERENCE USE Page 84 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT C FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER (FPB) MATRIX FUEJL CLAD CHALLENGE FC-1 ST-2 (Core Cooling) Orange Path. Degraded core cooling as indicated by ANY of the following:

CET <700t F AND reactor <. 5 NR *CET >700°F AND reactor >25' NR sReactor vessel <[1291)l0'WRwith 2 RCPs OR <[60]50' withlI RCP. FC-2 Failed fuel mon itor angE-09) reading greater than 120 mRem/hr.

Unusual Event (1.1.2.1)

FC-3 2 of 3 cont~inment hig range Tmonitors reading greater than 1000 Rem/hr. Unusual Event (1.1.2.1)

F Coolant activity greater than Tecnic Specification 15.3.1.C.

Unusual Event (1.1.1.1)

FC-5 Any condition which in the judgement of the Emergency Director is indicative of a challenge to the Fuel Cladding barrier.FUEL CLAD LOSS ST-2 (Core Cooling) Red Path. Inadequate core cooling as indicated by EITHER: "* CETs >1200*F Also SAMG entry. "* CETs > 700*F and reactor vessel level <25' NR Page 85 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT C FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER (FPB) MATRIX Fuel Cladding -CHALLENGE FC-1 ST-2 (Core Cooling) Orange Path indicates that RCS subcooling has been lost as well as loss of RCS inventory.

RCS subcooling and reactor vessel level are fundamental indications of the assurance of adequate core cooling. These conditions indicate a challenge to the fuel cladding barrier due to degraded core cooling.

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered CHALLENGED.

FC-2 The function of the failed fuel monitor is to monitor coolant activity.

As the fuel cladding barrier degrades increasing amounts of activity are present in the coolant, and seen by this monitor. The value selected is approximately Technical Specifications, hence an Unusual Event must also be declared at this value, if this is the only fission product barrier affected.

(1.1.2.1)

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered CHALLENGED.

FC-3 In-containment high radiation monitors monitor activity in the coolant. As the fuel cladding barrier degrades increasing amounts of activity are present in the coolant, and seen by these monitors.

This parameter may be the first indication of cladding degradation due to the location of the failed fuel monitor and possible containment isolation.

The value is not correlated to a specific percentage of clad damage. For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered CHALLENGED.

FC-4 Coolant activity greater than Technical Specifications is considered a precursor to loss of the fuel cladding barrier.

For purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered CHALLENGED.

FC-5 It is unlikely that any classification scheme can anticipate every circumstance.

Therefore this 'threshold' criteria is based on an ad hoc judgement call. If the Emergency Director has reason to believe the integrity of this barrier is being challenged, he may declare it so. He should have objective reason to believe the barrier is challenged.

Simply not knowing (for example loss of indications) should not be used as a basis for declaring a barrier challenged or lost. If the barrier is subsequently determined not to have been challenged, it may be declared intact. If it is determined that the barrier was challenged, but is no longer challenged, the barrier must remain as challenged, until the Recovery phase of the emergency.

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered CHALLENGED.

REFERENCE USE Page 86 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT C FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER (FPB) MATRIX Fuel Cladding -LOSS ST-2 (Core Cooling) Red Path indicates that RCS subcooling has been lost as well as significant loss of RCS inventory.

RCS subcooling and reactor vessel level are fundamental indications of the assurance of adequate core cooling. These conditions indicate the fuel cladding barrier has been subjected to conditions which may cause its failure due to inadequate core cooling..

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered LOST. Core exit thermocouple reading in excess of 1200°F is also an entry condition for Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs).

FL-2 The function of the failed fuel monitor is to monitor coolant activity.

As the fuel cladding barrier degrades increasing amounts of activity are present in the coolant, and seen by this monitor. The value is not correlated to a specific percentage of clad damage, but is beyond Technical Specifications.

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered LOST. FL-3 In-containment high radiation monitors monitor activity in the coolant. As the fuel cladding barrier degrades increasing amounts of activity are present in the coolant, and seen by these monitors.

This parameter may be the first indication of cladding degradation due to the location of the failed fuel monitor and possible containment isolation.

The value is not correlated to a specific percentage of clad damage, but is beyond Technical Specifications.

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered LOST. FL-4 Coolant activity greater than this level is not correlated to a specific percentage of clad damage, but is beyond Technical Specifications.

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered LOST. FL-S It is unlikely that any classification scheme can anticipate every circumstance.

Therefore this 'threshold' criteria is based on an ad hoc judgement call. If the Emergency Director has reason to believe the integrity of this barrier is lost, he may declare it so. He should have objective reason to believe the barrier is lost. Simply not knowing (for example loss of indications) should not be used as a basis for declaring a barrier challenged or lost. If the barrier is subsequently determined not to have been lost, it may be declared intact, or challenged, as appropriate.

If it is determined that the barrier was lost, but is no longer lost, the barrier must remain as lost, until the Recovery phase of the emergency.

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered LOST.REFERENCE USE Page 87 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT C FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER (FPB) MATRIX Reactor Coolant System -CHALLENGE REFERENCE USE ID I'11 These conditions represent minor leakage from the RCS. Because the source of the leak may not be known, and leaks can become worse, these conditions are considered precursors to more serious events. As such, an Unusual Evenit must be declared on these conditions, if the RCS is the only barrier affected.

.(1.1.3.1, 1.1A.41) For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered CHALLENGED.

RC-2 Conditions of ST-4 (Integrity)

Orange Path reflect an excessive cooldown of the vessel or cold overpressurization of the RCS. These conditions represent a challenge to the RCS barrier. An Unusual Event must be declared.

(1.1.5.1)

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered CHALLENGED.

RC-3 It is unlikely that any classification scheme can anticipate every circumstance.

Therefore this 'threshold' criteria is based on an ad hoc judgement call. If the Emergency Director has reason to believe the integrity of this barrier is being challenged, he may declare it so. He should have objective reason to believe the barrier is challenged.

Simply not knowing (for example loss of indications) should not be used as a basis for declaring a barrier challenged or lost. If the barrier is subsequently determined not to have been challenged, it may be declared intact. If it is determined that the barrierwas challenged, but is no longer challenged, the barrier must remain as challenged, until the Recovery phase of the emergency.

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered CHALLENGED.e II Page 88 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT C FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER (FPB) MATRIX Reactor Coolant System -LOSS This value is derived from NUREG-0654, Appendix 1. Although 50 gpm is well within the capacity of available pumps, this leak can be either into Containment or from Primary to Secondary systems. Thus, the RCS barrier is no longer serving its function of preventing the transport of fission products.

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered LOST. RL-2 Conitinsof ST-4 (integrity)

Red Path reflect an excessive cooldown of the vessel. These conditions indicate the RCS barrier has been subjected to conditions which may cause its failure For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered LOST. RL-3 It is unikeyta any classification scheme can anticip-ate every circumstance.

Therefore this 'threshold' criteria is based on an ad hoc judgement call. If the Emergency Director has reason to believe the integrity of this barrier is lost, he may declare it so. He should have objective reason to believe the barrier is lost. Simply not knowing (for example loss of indications) should not be used as a basis for declaring a barrier challenged or lost. If the barrier is subsequently determined not to have been lost, it may be declared intact, or challenged, as appropriate.

If it is determined that the barrier was lost, but is no longer lost, the barrier must remain as lost, until the Recovery phase of the emergency.

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered LOST.Page 89 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT C FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER (FPB) MATRIX Containment

-CHALLENGE CC-1 ST-5 (Containment)

Orange Path represent conditions beyond normal operating parameters due to either pressure or sump "B" level. For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered CHALLENGED CC-2 Existence of hydrogen at these concentrations does not yet represent an explosive mixture, however, there are limited means to reduce hydrogen in containment, especially during an emergency.

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered CHALLENGED.

CC-3 This challenge threshold is designed to ensure that if Fuel Cladding AND RCS barriers are LOST, a General Emergency would be declared if the atmospheric dump valves or relief valves on the affected steam generator open (or are opened) and greater than 10 gpm Primary to Secondary leakage exists. If the Primary to Secondary leakage is less than 10 gpm the RCS barrier may be considered intact. This threshold is included to address NUREG-0654, Appendix 1 Initiating Condition A4. For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered CHALLENGED.

CC-4 It is unlikely that any classification scheme can anticipate every circumstance.

Therefore this 'threshold' criteria is based on an ad hoc judgement call. If the Emergency Director has reason to believe the integrity of this barrier is being challenged, he may declare it so. He should have objective reason to believe the barrier is challenged.

Simply not knowing (for example loss of indications) should not be used as a basis for declaring a barrier challenged or lost. If the barrier is subsequently determined not to have been challenged, it may be declared intact. If it is determined that the barrier was challenged, but is no longer challenged, the barrier must remain as challenged, until the Recovery phase of the emergency.

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered CHALLENGED.

REFERENCE USE Page 90 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TOTAL REWRITE K>f ATTACHMENT C FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER (FPB) MATRIX Containment

-LOSS CL-I ST-5 (Containment)

Red Path represent conditions indcate the containment barrier has been subjected to conditions which may cause its failure.

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered LOST. CL-2 Hydrogen at these concentrations may detonate.

This would create an explosion in Containment.

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered LOST. CL-3 Main steam line piping outside containment, and the isolation valves may be considered a part of the Containment barrier.

The inability to isolate assumes it is desired and has been attempted.

This attempt includes only actions which may be taken from the Control Room. If actions must be taken outside the Control Room to isolate, the barrier must be considered lost. For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered LOST. CL-4 This crite includes all isolation paths, including access hatches. Only one valve or door in a given path need be closed. A physical loss of integrity (crack or hole) also meets this criteria.

For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered LOST. CL-s It is unlikely that any classification scheme can anticipate every crcumstance.

Thereore this 'threshold' criteria is based on an ad hoc judgement call. If the Emergency Director has reason to believe the integrity of this barrier is lost, he may declare it so. He should have objective reason to believe the barrier is lost. Simply not knowing (for example loss of indications) should not be used as a basis for declaring a barrier challenged or lost. If the barrier is subsequently determined not to have been lost, it may be declared intact, or challenged, as appropriate.

If it is determined that the barrier was lost, but is no longer lost, the barrier must remain as lost, until the Recovery phase of the emergency.

K. For the purposes of emergency classification, the barrier is to be considered LOST.Page 91 of 94 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT D SAFETY AND SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS System Auxiliary Feedwater ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry Boron Recycle Component Cooling Water Containment Integrity Computers Containment Structures Containment Penetrations Condensate and Feedwater Chemical and Volume Control Diesel Starting Air Diesel Generator Engineered Safety Features (Safeguards)

Fuel Handling In core Flux Mapping Fuel Oil Fire Protection Feedwater (I&C only) Auxiliary Steam, Heating Steam & Condensate, Chilled & Hot Water Safety-Related Functions Feedwater supply Non-safety-related isolation Supports Safety Injection Cools safety-related equipment Containment integrity Monitoring Containment integrity Containment integrity Core Cooling Emergency cooling, containment integrity Diesel start Emergency power supply Core Cooling and Integrity Fuel integrity Fuel integrity Power supply Fire Protection Non-safety-related isolation Containment cooling and integrity REFERENCE USE Designator AF AMSAC BS CCW CI COMP CONT CP CS CV DA DG ESF FH FM FO FP FW HV Page 92 of 94 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATI'ACHM[ENT D SAFETY AND SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS Designator IA IST MRR MS System Instrument Air Inservice Test Equipment (i.e., steam generator nozzle dams) Metering, Relaying, & Regulation Main, Extraction, Gland Seal & Reheat Steam Nitrogen Gas Nuclear Instrumentation Post-Accident Vent, Drains, etc. Reactor Coolant Rod Drive Control Residual Heat Removal (LPSI) Radiation Monitoring Reactor Protection Radwaste Steam Structures Service Air Spent Fuel Cooling and Filtration Primary Sampling Safety Injection (HPSI)REFERENCE USE Safety-Related Functions Containment isolation and integrity Reactor coolant system integrity Monitoring Containment integrity, heat removal Monitoring Reactor protection Containment integrity, containment hydrogen control Reactor coolant system integrity, reactor protection, containment integrity Reactor coolant system integrity, reactor protection Containment integrity, emergency cooling Monitoring, RCS and containment integrity Reactor protection, monitoring, Non-safety-related isolation Safety-related equipment safety Containment integrity Heat removal and containment integrity Containment and RCS integrity Emergency cooling, heat removal, containment integrity NG NI PACV RC RDC RH RM RP RS S SA SF SC SI Page 93 of 94 ATTACHMENT D SAFETY AND SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS II I II NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION EPIP 1.2 NNSR Revision 33 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE A1TACHMENT D SAFETY AND SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS Designator SW VNBI VNCC VNDG VNPSE Safety-Related Functions Feedwater supply, heat removal, containment integrity Heat removal, battery room hydrogen control Heat removal Support Diesel operation Containment integrity System Service Water PAB Battery & Inverter Room H&V Containment Accident Fans H&V Diesel Generator Room H&V Containment Purge Supply & Exhaust H&V Reactor Cavity Cooling H&V Waste Gas Waste Liquid Vital Instrument Bus 120 VAC 4160V Electrical 480V Electrical 125VDC Electrical Page 94 of 94 REFERENCE USE Containment integrity Containment integrity Containment integrity Power supply Power supply Power supply Power supply VNRC WG WL Y 4.16KV 480V 125V EPIP 1.3 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: Technical.

CLASSIFICATION:

NNSR REVISION:

25 EFFECTIVE DATE: November 30, 1999 PROCEDURE OWNER: Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS DELETED NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I of 2 SECTION 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 6.0 7.0 TABLES TITLE PAGE PURPOSE .......................................................................................................................

4 PREREQUISITES

.........................................................................................................

4 PRECAUTIONS AND LIM ITATIONS ..................................................................

5 INITIAL CONDITIONS

..........................................................................................

5 PROCEDURE

............................................................................................................

6 Meterological And Dose Assessment

-Control Room (MAD-CR) ..........................

6 Radiation Monitoring System-Computer Terminal (RMS-CT) .....................................

8 Offsite Field M easurements

.....................................................................................

15 Wisconsin Electric Dose Assessment Program (WEDAP) ......................................

16 M anual Calculations

...............................................................................................

20 REFERENCES

.........................................................................................................

50 BASES ...........................................................................................................................

50 TABLE I RELEASE MONITORS ALARMING ....................................................................

9 TABLE 2 RELEASE RATE CALCULATIONS

...........................................................................

11 TABLE 3 RELEASE RATE CONVERSION FACTORS -SURVEY METER METHOD .........

23 TABLE 4 CLASSIFICATION OF ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY BY SIGMA THETA AND AT/A- ..........................................................................

29 TABLE 5 BACKUP DETERMINATION OF ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY CLASS ..........

30 TABLE 6 TABLE OF CENTERLINE Xu/Q VALUES VERSUS DISTANCE FROM THE SITE ................................................................................

31 TABLE 7 SOURCE TERM ACTIVITY FRACTIONS

..........................................................

42 REFERENCE USE Page 2 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS' EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 2 of 2 SECTION ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT A ATTACHMENT B WORKSHEETS WORKSHEET 1 WORKSHEET 2 WORKSHEET 3 WORKSHEET 4 WORKSHEET 5 WORKSHEET 6 TITLE PAGE AFFECTED SECTORS BASED ON WIND DIRECTION

.....................

51 GENERAL EMERGENCY OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ...... 52 RELEASE RATE CALCULATIONS

............................................................

24 X/Q DETERMINATION

.........................................................................

28 ESTIMATED WHOLE BODY DOSE .....................................................

33 ESTIMATED THYROID DOSE ............................................................

35 ESTIMATED GROUND DEPOSITION

................................................

38 ESTIMATED POPULATION DOSE .....................................................

41 REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30, 1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides several methods to project offsite dose due to a release of radioactive material.

These projections will be used to provide Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) to the State and Counties.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 The Duty Shift Superintendent (DSS) is responsible for the radiological dose assessment and protective action recommendations using MAD-CR, prior to TSC/EOF activation and formal transfer of responsibilities to the Emergency Director.

RMS-CT is used in the absence of MAD-CR and Field Monitoring Team data is used in the absence of RMS-CT. 2.1.2 The Emergency Director may delegate the performance of radiological release evaluation portion of this procedure to the Dose/PAR Coordinator.

The Dose/PAR Coordinator will advise the Emergency Director of the need to escalate the emergency classification or change protective action K>j recommendations.

2.1.3 The Dose/PAR Coordinator is responsible for the continuing dose assessment and Protective Action Recommendations to the Emergency Director using WEDAP, Field Monitoring Team data, RMS-CT, and/or manual calculations.

2.1.4 IF the Dose/PAR Coordinator is unable to perform radiological release evaluations, THEN the Rad/Chem Coordinator in the TSC will assume this responsibility.

2.2 Equipment

2.2.1 Meterological

and Dose Assessment

-Control Room (MAD-CR) Program 2.2.2 Radiation Monitoring System-Computer Terminal (RMS-CT) 2.2.3 Wisconsin Electric Dose Assessment Program (WEDAP) 2.2.4 Plant Process Computer System (PPCS)REFERENCE USE Page 4 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30,1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

3.1 Complete

this procedure regardless of changing plant conditions.

3.2 Recommendations

of protective actions to be taken offsite shall be approved only by the Emergency Director.

3.3 Protective

action recommendations are typically made a full 3600 within 2 miles of the plant and a 67.50 -900 downwind sector centered on the average wind direction (keyhole) for 5 miles. 3.4 Consider recommending protective actions for ALL sectors (3600) to 5 miles if wind speeds are less than 3 mph or the difference between actual (i.e., none greater than 3600) wind direction values for inland and near shore meteorological towers is greater than 900 (i.e., indications of a lake breeze).

3.5 Use 15 minute averaged values for wind speed and wind direction.

This information can be obtained from the plant process computer system (PPCS) and digital locations.

3.6 Use a realistic estimate of release duration in these calculations whenever possible, with input from the Reactor/Core Physics Engineer.

IFthe duration of the radiological release can NOT be determined from the current plant conditions, THEN, assume a duration of four hours. 3.7 IF the meteorological data can NOT be obtained from the PPCS or the control room instruments, THEN obtain the data from any of the following sources: (Reference ETD 02, Offsite Agency Call List): 3.7.1 National Weather Service in Green Bay 3.7.2 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant 3.7.3 Two Rivers Coast Guard Station 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS 4.1 EPIP 1.1, Course of Actions, in progress.

4.2 RMS or plant conditions suggest that a release is in progress or anticipated.

REFERENCE USE Page 5 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30, 1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE 5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 Meterological

And Dose Assessment

-Control Room (MAD-CR) 5.1.1 Obtain and record the following information:

a. Affected Unit: I / 2 / Both b. Number of Unit 1 purge exhaust fans in use: c. Number of Unit 2 purge exhaust fans in use: d. Atmospheric steam dump open? Y / N e. Number of SG safeties open on affected unit: 0 1 2 3 4 f. Was containment spray used? Y / N g. Is the primary release path through the condenser?

Y / N NOTE: IF estimated release duration is unknown, THEN use 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . h. Estimated release duration:

hours. NOTE: IF MAD-CR is NOT available, THEN go to Step 5.2 for assessment by using RMS-CT. 5.1.2 Verify MAD-CR dose projection program is available:

a. RMS-CT operable * "Mon" and "Control" lights are intermittently flashing (indicates both CTs are operating).

OR "Control" light is ON and "field" light flashing (indicates one CT is operating).

b. Successful log-on using operator aid attached to MAD-CR terminal keyboard.

5.1.3 Run MAD-CR program following user prompts and entering appropriate data from Step 5.1.1.REFERENCE USE Page 6 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE When prompted, display the Incident Report Form and log the results.

a. Event Classification:

b. PARS:

Compare the results of Stek 5.1.4 against the current classification and PARS. IF the results of this assessment are an escalation of classification and/or PARS, THEN go to EPIP 1.1, Step 5.5, OR else exit this procedure.

REFERENCE USE 5.1.4 5.1.5 Page 7 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 5.2 Radiation Monitoring System-Computer Terminal (RMS-CT)5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.3* <ENTER>REFERENCE USE IF MAD-CR AND RMS-CT are unavailable, THEN declare an ALERT to activate the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) so dose assessment can be performed using field data and/or WEDAP, AND go to EPIP 1.1, Step 5.5,....

AND Step 5.3 of this procedure, performing both simultaneously.

Verify RMS-CT is available:

a. "Mon" and "Control" lights are intermittently flashing (indicates both CTs are operating).

OR b. "Control" light is ON and "field" light flashing (indicates one CT is operating).

Estimate Release Rate Using Data From RMS-CT a. Obtain a list of alarming release monitors by pressing, in order: * <PRINT> * <6> * <ENTER> b. Review CT printout for release monitor high alarms. c. Call up (gCi/cc) data on the CT LCD for each alarming monitor by pressing the following keys in order and log on Table I. * <HIST 10 MIN> 0 <##> (Dam) 0 <-> * <##> (Channel)Page 8 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE NOTE: Each monitor needs to be displayed to print history files. d. IF printing the data on the CT tape, THEN follow the entries in Step 5.2.3.c with: * <PRINT> "* <FILE> "* <ENTER> TABLE 1 RELEASE MONITORS ALARMING MONITOR UI Cont. Purge U2 Cont. Purge SG IA SG 2A SG IB Drum Area Vent Comb A. E. High Range Steam Line Gas Stripper Building SG2B Comb A. E. Low Range Aux Building Vent Low Range Gas, Ul Purge Medium Range Gas, U1 Purge High Range Gas, U I Purge Low Range Gas, U2 Purge Medium Range Gas, U2 Purge High Range Gas, U2 Purge Low Range Gas, Aux Bldg Vent Medium Range Gas, Aux Bldg Vent High Range Gas, Aux Bldg Vent Low Range Gas, Drumming Area Vent READING (jiCi/cc)1 2 3 4 5 5 5 6 6 7 7 21 21 21 22 22 22 23 23 23 24 24 REFERENCE USE 3 3 9 9 2 7 8 6 2 1 4 5 7 9 5 7 9 5 7 9 5 7 RMS # 1RE-212 2RE-212 1RE-231 2RE-231 1RE-232 RE-221 RE-226 RE-224 2RE-232 RE-225 RE-214 IRE-305 1RE-307 1RE-309 2RE-305 2RE-307 2RE-309 RE-315 RE-317 RE-319 RE-325 RE-327 Medium Range Gas, Drumming Area Vent Page 9 of 52 READING (ILtCi/cc)

DAM CHANNEL NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE IF the release path monitor(s) is/(are) failed high and the associated SPING(s) is/(are) out of service, THEN declare an ALERT to activate the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) so dose assessment can be performed using field data and/or WEDAP, AND go to EPIP 1.1, Step 5.5, to end, AND Step 5.3 of this procedure, performing both simultaneously.

Record the highest in-range (NOT failed),alarming RMS channel readings (pCi/cc) for each release path on Table 2 and calculate the release rate.REFERENCE USE 5.2.4 5.2.5 Page 10 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999£~J¶L tu1%EW RU 1 r TABLE 2 RELEASE RATE CALCULATIONS Conversion factors assume nominal flow rates.Page II of 52 REFERENCE USE NOTE:

NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE NOTE: IF PPCS is out of service, THEN obtain crO and lapse rate readings from the Control Room indications, AND THEN reference Table 5 to determine stability class. 5.2.6 Calculate the Dispersion Factor (X/Q) at the Site. a. Obtain the wind speed and stability class from PPCS indication (Page 351 of PPCS). Record wind speed in Step 5.2.6.c equation.

b. Select the appropriate Xu/Q factor value from the table below based upon the stability class. Record the X/Q factor value in Step 5.2.6.c equation.Stability Class A B C D E F G Xu/Q 9.92E-07 1.18E-05 4.28E-05 1.34E-04 2.55E-04 5.38E-04 1.04E-03 c. Calculate the dispersion factor: (step b above) XuIQ(mph/M 3 /S) wind speed (mph) = X/Q(s/m 3 Determine the Estimated Duration (ERD) of release. Use four hours as a default if the ERD is unknown.

Estimate the Projected Whole Body Dose (TEDE) at the Site Boundary.

3 2 8 0 rem- 3 x Rem Ci/hr (Table 2 Total) (Step 5.2.6.c) (ERD) = [PROJ. W. B. DOSE (TEDE)] Calculate Projected Thyroid Dose (CDE) at the Site Boundary.REFERENCE USE 5.2.7 5.2.8 5.2.9 Page 12 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE NOTE: Choose LOCA accident type unknown PROJECTED CONVERSION PROJECTED WHOLE BODY FACTOR THYROID DOSE ACCIDENT DOSE (TEDE) (Rem) (CDE) TYPE (From Step 5.2.8) (Rem) LOCA x 15 = Gap Activity x 3 = Fuel Handling x 20 -SG Tube Rupture x 12 -5.2.10 IF the event meets the following criteria for a GENERAL EMERGENCY, ;TIEN go to Step 5.2.14 and determine PARS. a. Projected Whole Body Dose (TEDE) at Site Boundary is >1 Rem. OR b. Projected Thyroid Dose (CDE) at Site Boundary is .5 Rem. 5.2.11 IF the event meets the following criteria for a SITE EMERGENCY, THEN go to Step 5.2.15. a. Projected Whole Body Dose (TEDE) at Site is >0.1 Rem. OR b. Projected Thyroid Dose (CDE) at Site Boundary is >0.5 Rem. 5.2.12 IF the event meets the following criteria for an ALERT, THEN go to Step 5.2.15. One of more effluent radiation alarming monitor readings is >10 times high alarm setpoint for >15 minutes [Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Setpoint & Response Book (RMSASRB)].

5.2.13 IF the event meets the following criteria for an UNUSUAL EVENT, THEN go to Step 5.2.15. One or more effluent radiation alarming monitor readings is >high alarm setpoint for >60 minutes [(Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Setpoint & Response Book (RMSASRB)].

REFERENCE USE Page 13 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 5.2.14 Determine Protective Action Recommendations NOTE: If wind speed is less than three (3) mph or lake breeze conditions exist, then recommend protective actions for all sectors (3600) 0-5 miles. Lake breeze conditions exist if the difference between actual wind direction values for inland and near shore meteorological towers is greater than 900. a. To determine protective action recommendations compare values from Step 5.2.9 and the values in the "Integrated Projected Dose" column below. INTEGRATED PROTECTIVE PROJECTED DOSE ACTION MILES SECTORS <1 rem TEDE None AND N/A N/A <5 rem-'-CDE Required N/NA >5 rem TEDE 21 rem TEDE Evacuate 0-2 miles All (3600) R rEvacuate 2-5 miles Downwind Sectors

rein CDE b. Select downwind sectors using Attachment A. 5.2.15 Compare the results against the current classification and PARS. IF the results of this assessment is an escalation of classification and/or PARS, THEN go to EPIP 1.1, Step 5.5, OR else exit this procedure.

Performed By: Performer (Print and Sign) Date I Time REFERENCE USE Page 14 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 5.3 Offsite Field Measurements Check if Plume Impacts Terrestrial Areas a. Wind Direction

> 3050 OR b. Wind Direction

< 210 0 Use Field Monitoring Team(s) to measure gamma dose rate at 1 -mile from the site and log. Maximum measured gamma dose rate: R/hr IF measurement from Step 5.3.2 is _>1 R/hr, THEN event is a GENERAL EMERGENCY.

IF a General Emergency, THEN determine minimum Protective Action Recommendations, AND go to Step 5.3.6. a. Evacuation of 0-2 miles for all sectors, and 2-5 miles in the downwind sectors.

OR b. Evacuation of all sectors (3600) to 5 miles, IF wind speed less than three (3) mph-or lake breeze conditions exist. IF measurements from Step 5.3.2 is 0.1 R/br, THEN event is a SITE EMERGENCY, AND go to Step 5.3.6. Compare the results of your assessment against the current classification and PARS. IF the results of this assessment is an escalation of classification and/or PARS, THEN go to EPIP 1.1, Step 5.5, OR else exit this procedure.

Performed By: Performer (Print and Sign) Date / Time REFERENCE USE 5.3.1 5.3.2 5.3.3 5.3.4 5.3.5 5.3.6 Page 15 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 5.4 REFERENCE USE Wisconsin Electric Dose Assessment Program (WEDAP) 5.4.1 Verify WEDAP dose projection program available.

5.4.2 Individual

Dose Assessment Based Upon Given Set Of Conditions

a. Case Data Screen Inputs "* Title of Case "* Verify time of case, meteorological data, shutdown, and release start times "* Release End Time (four hours default if unknown) "* Meteorological Data (a) Stability Class from PPCS (1) IF stability class NOT available, THEN value of sigma theta (>3 mph wind speeds).

(2) IF lapse rate is appropriate to use for determining stability class (<3 mph wind speeds), THEN value of lapse rate. (b) Lake breeze, if applicable (c) Wind speed and direction 0 Select "ON" if building wake effect used for case 0 Select data source "Actual" if RMS or field monitoring team data will be used for dose projection 0 Select source term ("case basis") (a) Plant conditions (b) Gross release (c) Offsite measurements Page 16 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30, 1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE b. Plant Conditions Screen Inputs

Select Accident Type (a) LOCA/GAP -Plant Conditions (b) SGTh (c) Containment Bypass (d) LOCA -High Range Monitor (e) Spent Fuel Handling Accident

Select source term characteristics

"* Select release path characteristics

"* "OK" to return to "Case Data" screen displaying updated data c. Gross Release Input Screen Inputs

Using RMS Data (a) Select the alarming RMS monitor(s) and adjust monitor (stack release rate) conversion factors if accident flow is NOT standard flow for the release path. (b) Enter RMS reading value. (c) Gross release rate will be calculated in Ci/sec.

Type of Accident (a) LOCA/GAP inside containment (b) SGTh (c) LOCA outside of containment (bypass of containment

-Event V) (d) Fuel Handling "* Select source term characteristics

"* Select release path characteristics

"* "OK" to return to "Case Data" screen displaying updated data REFERENCE USE Page 17 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30, 1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE d. Offsite Measurement Inputs "* Survey reading or isotopic (air sample results) "* Measurement distance in tenths of mile from plant *

Measurement location in degrees downwind

Select radiac survey instrument readings or isotopic data (a) Radiac survey instrument readings are in mrem/hr and must re-select accident types. (b) Isotopic data by selecting nuclides from list and entering values from sample result form(s).

"OK" to return to "Case Data" screen displaying updated data e. Dose Calculation Inputs .Verify estimated release duration (four-hour default if unknown)

Select "Calculate"

Projection results displayed: (a) Whole body dose (TEDE) (b) Thyroid dose-rate (CDE) (c) Protective Action Recommendations (d) Classification information (must select "Display Dose Rates") (e) KI issue for emergency workers (must select "Display Dose Rates") f. Adding a new case to existing file "* Select "Add Case" "* Enter new case time and date, as needed 2* Adjust meteorology and release source information as needed REFERENCE USE Page 18 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30, 1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE g. Print case to local printer h. Save existing case file to disk i. Optional features Calculate Population 0 View Trends 0 View Nuclide Physical Data

View Dose Conversion Factor Data 5.4.3 Compare the results of Step 5.4.2.e calculations against the current classification and PARS. IF the results of this assessment is an escalation of classification and/or PARS, THEN immediately inform the Emergency Director and assist with EPIP 2.1 for initiating notifications.

REFERENCE USE Page 19 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30,1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE 5.5 Manual Calculations

5.5.1 Manual

Calculation of Release Rates (Source Terms) a. Airborne effluents may be discharged from PBNP through the following vent stacks and their associated monitors:

"* Auxiliary building vent (ABVNT) RE-214, RE-315, RE-317, and RE-319 "* Drumming area vent (DAVNT) RE-221, RE-325, and RE-327 "* Unit 1 containment purge vent (Cont. 1) IRE-212, 1RE-305, 1RE-307, and IRE-309

Unit 2 containment purge vent (Cont. 2) 2RE-212, 2RE-305, 2RE-307, and 2RE-309

Gas stripper building vent (GSBVNT) RE-224 NOTE: This CAE pathway vents to the Auxiliary Building Vent Stack. "* Combined air ejector decay duet (CAE) 1(2)RE-215, RE-225, RE-226 "* Main steam safety valves and atmospheric dump valves 1(2)RE-231 "A" Steam Generator 1(2)RE-232 "B" Steam Generator

b. The release rates may be estimated using any of the following monitoring systems: "* PPCS "* Radiation monitoring system (which is designed to monitor low and high level releases)REFERENCE USE Page 20 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30,1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE NOTE: The contact reading method is used when the other monitoring systems are inoperable.

Contact readings using a hand-held survey meter. It is assumed that the direct contact readings are determined using an RO-2A, Teletector, or equivalent survey meter. NOTE: The actual number of main steam safety valves and atmospheric dump valves open should be obtained from the Duty Shift Superintendent to estimate the release rate. c. Record above normal monitor reading(s) in the "Reading" column in Section A of Worksheet

1. Enter a comment for any monitor reading that is off-scale or inoperable..

d. Multiply the reading by the conversion factor and entering the result in the "Release Rate" column on Section A of Worksheet

1. e. IF monitor readings are available for all release paths, THEN go to Step 5.5. l.j. NOTE: The direct contact survey is accomplished under the direction of the Rad/Chem Coordinator.

It must be approved by the TSC Manager and the Duty Shift Superintendent.

f. Do NOT perform direct contact readings using a hand-held survey meter until the following actions have been done:

Evaluate the radiological conditions prior to entering the Auxiliary Building or the Containment Building facade. * .Choose the proper survey meter and the most direct and desirable route to the stack, pipe, or vent. g. Perform direct contact readings using a hand-held survey meter when RMS readings are NOT available.

Enter direct contact readings in the "Meter Reading" column of Section B of Worksheet

1. To take the survey of the main steam safety valves and the atmospheric dump valves place the meter probe in contact with the centerline of the main steam header, three feet from the main steam line.

Shield the survey probe with a minimum of k inch of lead on the main steam line/containment building side of the probe. S* Obtain the probe shield from the Radiation Protection supply locker in the Operations Support Center (OSC).REFERENCE USE Page 21 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30,1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE K>h. For each direct contact reading in any area, enter the conversion factor from Table 3 in the "Conversion Factor" column on Worksheet

1. Conversion factors are accident type dependent.

i. Multiply the direct contact reading by the conversion factor to calculate the release rate. Enter the release rate in the "Release Rate" column of Section B of Worksheet

1. j. IF actual flow rates vary significantly from the assumed flow rates listed on Worksheet 1, THEN adjust the flow rates using Section C of Worksheet

1. k. Enter all calculated release rates in the appropriate spaces in Section D of Worksheet

1. Total all release rates to calculate the gross release rate. 1. Sign and date Worksheet I and fax upon completion to the Dose/PAR Coordinator.

REFERENCE USE Page 22 of 52 C C C NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TABLE 3 RELEASE RATE CONVERSION FACTORS -SURVEY METER METHOD Units of expression are Ci-h/s-rem.

ACCIDENT TYPE Gap Accident 1 4' Steam Generator Tube Rupture(')

Vent Pathway LOCA. ) 0-12 hours > 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months FHA._ No condenser Condenser Aux. Building 9.40 12.6 79.0 373 Drumming Area 6.00 8.00 41.1 104 Cont. Purge 2.60 3.50 20.0 74.0 Gas Stripper 2.48 3.31 20.0 83.0 Air Ejector 1.40 1.40E+04 Steam Line Atmospheric

-164 Safety, I -410 Steam Driven AFWP -0.235 Note: (1) The accident type acronyms are: LOCA -Loss of Coolant Accident and FHA -Fuel Handling Accident (2) No condenser means that the vent pathway is NOT through the condenser.

Condenser means the vent pathway is through the condenser.

(3) The release rate conversion factors were calculated using the following flow rates: Vent Pathway Flow Rate (ft 3/min) Auxiliary Building 70000 Drumming Area 43100 Containment Purge 12500 Gas Stripper 13000 Air Ejector 25 Atmospheric Vent 3200 Safety, 1 8000 Steam Driven AFWP 4.2 (4) The time intervals referred to in the Gap Accident are for the time periods 0 to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and greater than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after reactor shutdown Page 23 of 52 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE WORKSHEET 1 RELEASE RATE CALCULATIONS Page 1 of 3 A. OPERATIONAL LOW-RANGE RELEASE MONITOR READOUTS (Assumed flow rates are in parentheses)

Monitor Auxiliary Building Vent (70,000 cfm) (RE-214, RE-315, RE-317, or RE-319) Drumming Area Vent (43,100 cfmi) (RE-221, RE-325, or RE-327) Unit I Containment Purge (RE-212, RE-305, RE-307, or RE-309) (0 or I fan -12,500 cfin) (2 fans -25,000 cfmi) Unit 2 Containment Purge (RE-212, RE-305, RE-307, or RE-309) (0 or I fan -12,500 cfmi) (2 fans -25,000 cfmi) Gas Stripper Building Vent (13,000 cfmi) (RE-224) Combined Air Ejector (25 cfmi) (RE-215, RE-225, and RE-226) Steam Driven Aux FW Pump [1(2)P-29J (4.2 cfmn ea) (RE-219, RE-23 1, RE-232, or measured conc.) 1 pump 2 pumps Steam Line Vent (RE-23 i and RE-232) Atmospheric (3200 cfmn) 1 Safety (8000 cfin) 2 Safeties (16000 cfmi) 3 Safeties (24000 cfm) 4 Safeties (32000 cfmi)Reading (J~i/ce Conversion Factor (cc-Ci/s-uCi) 33 Release Rate (CiLs)20 6 12 6 12 6 0.01 0.002 0.004 1.5 4 8 12 16 REFERENCE USE Page 24 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE WORKSHEET I RELEASE RATE CALCULATIONS Page 2 of 3 B. PLANT EFFLUENT VENT STACK CONTACT READINGS (Assumed flow rates are in parentheses)

Accident type: LOCA Gap Activity Fuel Handling S/G Tube Rupture Other Conversion Factor Meter Reading (Ci-h/s-rem)

Ri Monitor (R/hr) (Table 3)elease Rate (Ci/s)Auxiliary Building Vent (70,000 cfin) Drumming Area Vent (43,100 cfin) Unit 1 Containment Purge (0 or I fan -12,500 cfmn) (2 fans -25,000 cfmn) Unit 2 Containment Purge (0 or I fan -12,500 cfin) (2 fans -25,000 cfm) Gas Stripper Building Vent (13,000 cfin) Combined Air Ejector (25 cfin) Steam Driven AFWP Steam Line Vent Atmospheric (3200 cfin) I Safety (8000 cfin) 2 Safeties (16000 cfin) 3 Safeties (24000 cfmn) 4 Safeties (32000 cfm)REFERENCE USE Page 25 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER- BUSINESS -UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE WORKSHEET 1 RELEASE RATE CALCULATIONS Page 3 of 3 C. ACTUAL VERSUS CONVERSION CURVE FLOW RATE RATIO Actual Flow Rate, cfmi x Release Rate -Corrected Release Rate Assumed Flow Rate, cfin ( cfin) Ci Ci ( cfi) s s D. ESTIMATE OF GROSS RELEASE RATE NOTE: The combined air ejector decay duct exhausts through the auxiliary building vent. Should a release occur through the combined air ejector duct, do NOT include its monitor reading in the gross release rate calculations because it will be reflected in the auxiliary building vent monitor reading.Vent Release Rate (curies/s)

I. Auxiliary Building 2. Drumming Area 3. Gas Stripper Building 4. Combined Air Ejector Duct 5. Main Steam Line Vent 6. Unit I Containment Purge 7. Unit 2 Containment Purge 8. Steam Driven AFW Pump 9. Total Completed By: Route to Dose/PAR Coordinator upon completion.

Date/Time REFERENCE USE Page 26 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS 5.5.2 EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TOTAL REWRITE Determination of X/Q, Atmospheric Dispersion Factor (Worksheet

2) a. Obtain the following information from the indicated source and enter this in the appropriate space on Worksheet 2.Data Source S-Wind speed(mph,.15-minute average)

Wind direction (degrees, 15-minute average) Wind direction fluctuation (ce, degrees)

Temperature lapse rate (AT/AH, 0 F/35 m) "* Time of reactor shutdown "* Time of RCS breach "* Time of release from the plant.PPCSDr Control Room Instrumentation PPCS or Control Room Instrumentation PPCS or Control Room Instrumentation PPCS or Control Room Instrumentation Operations Coordinator Operations Coordinator Operations Coordinator NOTE: Realistic estimates of the duration of the release should be made whenever possible, with input from the Reactor/Core Physics Engineer.

If the duration of the release is unknown, assume four hours.Estimated or actual duration of the release (hours) Gross release rate (curies/second)

Operations Coordinator or projected estimate Worksheet I REFERENCE USE Page 27 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30, 1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE WORKSHEET 2 X/Q DETERMINATION Complete this form every two hours during a release or whenever changing radiological or meteorological conditions.

1. Wind speed, 15 minute average, mph 2. Wind direction, 15 minute average, degrees 3. Wind direction fluctuation, a 9 , degrees 4. Temperature lapse rate, AT/AH, "F/35 m 5. Time of reactor shutdown 6. Time of RCS breach 7. Time of release from plant NOTE: Realistic estimates should be used whenever possible.

If the duration release is unknown, assume four hours. >8 8. Estimated or actual duration of release, hours 9. Gross release rate, curies per second 10. Pasquill category 11. Centerline Xu/Q from Table 6: Site Boundary Two Miles Five Miles Ten Miles Other x sec)2 4 ( sec-mi Xu (hr) Q'M hr--n- Q m wind speed mi 12. Centerline X/Q: Site Boundary Two Miles Five Miles Ten Miles Other Completed By: Date/Time Route to Dose/PAR Coordinator upon completion.

REFERENCE USE Page 28 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE NOTE: Do NOT use ao to determine the stability class when the wind speed is less than three miles per hour. b. Determine the stability class (Pasquill category) using the ao or AT/AH chart recorder values in the Control Room and Table 4. Enter the stability class on Worksheet

2. TABLE 4 CLASSIFICATION OF ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY BY SIGMA THETA AND AT/AN NOTE: When wind speed is less than three miles per hour, do NOT use ao to determine the stability class.Stability Classification Extremely unstable Moderately unstable Slightly unstable Neutral Slightly stable Moderately stable Extremely stable Pasquill Class A B C D E F G Wind Direction Fluctuation (co, degrees)*

ao0> 22.5° 22.50 > ao 17.50 17.50> oe 2 12.50 12.50 > ao > 7.50 7.50 > ao > 3.80 3.80 > ao;> 2.10 2.10> ao Temperature Lapse Rate (AT/AH, 0 F/35 m) AT/AHl _-1.2 -.2 < AT/AHl <-1.1 -1.1 < AT/AH _-0.9 -0.9 < AT/Al _ -0.3 -0.3 < AT/ANl _0.9 0.9 < AT/A _< 2.5 2.5 < AT/Al Determined for a 15-minute to one-hour period for horizontal diffusion.

REFERENCE USE Page 29 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30, 1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE c. IF necessary to determine the backup stability class determination, THEN visually check the cloud cover and the incoming solar radiation.

Using this visual information and Table 5, enter the stability class on Worksheet

2. TABLE 5 BACKUP DETERMINATION OF ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY CLASS Surface Wind Speed (U mph @ 50 meter DAY NIGHT height) Incoming Solar Radiation Thinly Overcast Strong Moderate > low < m cloud U<4 A A-B B F G 4_<U<7 A-B B C E F 7U< 11 B B-C C D E 11: U< 13 C C-D D D D 13 low and <1- cloud" refers to the percentage of cloud or sky overcast.

NOTE: To determine if there is lake effect wind, compare the wind direction at the inland tower to the wind direction at the main or backup tower. If the wind direction at the main or backup tower is easterly and the wind direction at the inland tower is westerly, the wind at the plant may be a lake effect breeze. If a lake breeze is suspected, the field monitoring teams must be advised to pay close attention to the wind direction.

d. Enter the Xu/Q values for the site boundary, two miles, five miles, and ten miles from the site on Worksheet

2. The Xu/Q values can be taken from Table 6.REFERENCE USE Page 30 of 52 C, NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES C.DOSE ASSESSMENT AND .PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 (7 TOTAL REWRITE TABLE 6 TABLE OF CENTERLINE Xu/Q VALUES VERSUS DISTANCE FROM THE SITE (Units are m" 2) NOTE: To calculate the atmospheric dispersion factor, the centerline Xu/Q value is divided by the wind speed (in meters per second).

Distance From the Site (miles) Stability Class Site Boundary 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A B C D E F G Lake Breeze 4.43E-07 4.99E-06 1.91 E-05 5.99E-05 1. 14E-04 2.40E-04 4.65E-04 4.54E-05 5.53E-08 7.83E-07 5.81E-06 2.14E-05 4.32E-05 9.86E-05 2.21 E-04 2.35E-06 3.93E-08 1.92E-07 2.94E-06 1.17E-05 2.47E-05 5.91 E-05 1.36E-04 1.3 1E-05 3.07E-08 6.93E-08 1.77E-06 7.61 E-06 i .67E-05 4.12E-05 9.56E-05 1.02E-05 2.54E-08 3.21E-08 1.211E-06 5.48E-06 1 .24E-05 3.12E-05 7.30E-05 8.37E-06 2.17E-08 2.76E-08 8.82E-07 4.22E-06 9.64E-06 2.49E-05 5.89E-05 7.07E-06 i .90E-08 2.42E-08 6.90E-07 3.39E-06 7.79E-06 2.08E-05 4.94E-05 6.33E-06 1 .69E-08 2.17E-08 5.66E-07 2.80E-06 6.54E-06 1.78E-05 4.24E-05 5.74E-06 1.53E-08 1 .96E-08 4.721E-07 2.377E-06 5.70E-06 1.55E-05 3.72E-05 5.11 E-06 1.40E-08 1.80E-08 3.95E-07 2.05E-06 5.06E-06 1.37E-05 3.3 1 E-05 4.75E-06 Page 31 of 52 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30, 1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE e. IF a possible location other than the standard specified location is wanted, THEN enter the Xu/Q value for that distance from Table 6 on Worksheet

2. Example: The Xu/Q value for Class C stability

@ 5 miles is 1.21 E-06 m" 2.Calculate the X/Q values by dividing the Xu/Q value by the wind speed (in meters per second). This can be represented by the equation:

Z sec sec- mile zu/Q (m" 2) Shr-r x W ind Speed (m iles/ hr) Enter the X/Q values on Worksheet

2. f. Sign and date Worksheet 2 and fax upon completion to the Dose/PAR Coordinator.

5.5.3 Whole

Body Estimate (Worksheet

3) a. Enter the accident type on Worksheet

3. If the accident type is unknown, assume the accident type is a LOCA. b. Enter the gross release rate from Worksheet 2, Item 9, on Worksheet

3. NOTE: The activity fractions are dependent on the accident type, the time from shutdown, whether containment spray was used, and, for steam generator tube rupture accidents, whether the release was through the condenser.

Select only those activity fractions that are bolded. c. Enter the activity fractions on Worksheet 3 for the selected accident type. Activity fractions are listed in Table 7. d. Enter the X/Q value for the desired distance from Worksheet 2, Item 12, on Worksheet 3.REFERENCE USE Page 32 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE WORKSHEET 3 ESTIMATED WHOLE BODY DOSE Complete this form every two hours during a release or whenever changing radiological or meteorological conditions.

Accident type: LOCA Gap Activity Fuel Handling SG Tube Rupture Other Calculate the projected whole body dose using the equation:

SECTOR DISTANCE Dosei = Q X Fi x _ x DCFi x ERD Q TIME where: Dose, Q Fi X/Q DCFi ERD is the whole body dose due to radionuclide i; rem; is the gross release rate, curies/s.

is the activity fraction for radionuclide i, dimensionless.

Activity fractions for radionuclides released in the LOCA, Gap Activity, Fuel Handling, and Steam Generator Tube Rupture accident types are listed in Table 7. The activity fractions for those radionuclides that contribute more than 90 percent of the total dose are printed in bold type. Those radionuclides that are NOT printed in bold type need NOT be included in the dose calculations.

is the atmospheric dispersion factor, s/m 3; is the whole body dose conversion factor for the radionuclide i, rem-m 3/Ci-hr; is the estimated duration of the release, hours. (If unknown, assume 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .)Nuclide Q 1-131 1-132 1-133 1-134 1-135 Kr-85 Kr-85m Kr-87 Kr-88 Rb-88 Cs-138 Xe-131m Xe-133 Xe-133m Xe-135 Xe-135m Xe-138 Total Dose F, X/Q DCFi 5.3E+04 4.9E+04 1.5E+04 3.1E+04 8.IE+03 1.3E+00 9.3E+01 5.IE+02 1.3E+03 5.2E+02 1.6E+03 4.9E+00 2.OE+01 1.7E+01 1.4E+02 2.5E+02 7.2E+02 ERD Dosei NOTE: Dose at other distances can be calculated by ratioing the X/Q values and multiplying by the dose calculated above.Completed By: Route to Dose/PAR Coordinator upon completion.

DateiTime I REFERENCE USE miles Page 33 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30, 1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE e. Enter the estimated release duration (ERD), in hours, from Worksheet 2, Item 8, on Worksheet

3. f. Calculate the projected whole body (WB) dose on Worksheet 3 using the equation:

DoeSewbobody QXF X-X DCFi xERD where: Dosei, whole body = whole body dose, rem; Fi = activity fraction for radionuclide i, dimensionless.

Activity fractions for radionuclides released in the LOCA, Gap Activity, Fuel Handling, and Steam Generator Tube Rupture accident types for various time periods post accident are listed in Table 7. The activity fractions for those radionuclides that contribute more than 90 percent of the total dose are bolded. Those radionuclides that ate NOT bolded need NOT be included in the dose calculations.

Q gross release rate, curies per second; X/Q = atmosheric dispersion factor, seconds per m.; DCFi whole body dose conversion factor for nuclide i, rem-m 3/Ci-hr; ERD = estimated duration of the release, hours. g. Sum the calculated doses and enter it on Worksheet

3. h. Sign and date Worksheet 3 and fax to the Dose/PAR Coordinator.

5.5.4 Thyroid

Dose Estimate (Worksheet

4) NOTE: If the type of accident is unknown, then assume the accident type is a LOCA. a. Enter the accident type on Worksheet 4.REFERENCE USE Page 34 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE WORKSHEET 4 ESTIMATED THYROID DOSE Complete this form every two hours during a release or whenever changing radiological or meteorological conditions.

Accident type : LOCA Gap Activity Fuel Handling SG Tube Rupture Other Calculate the projected whole body dose using the equation:

SECTOR _____________

DISTANCE ___________

Dosei = Q X Fi X Q DCFi x ERD Q TIME where: Dosei Q Fi X/Q DCFi ERD Nuclide 1-131 1-132 1-133 1-134 1-135 is the thyroid dose due to radionuclide i, rem; is the gross release rate, curies/s.

is the activity fraction for radionuclide i, dimensionless.

Activity fractions for radionuclides released in the LOCA, Gap Activity, Fuel Handling, and Steam Generator Tube Rupture accident types are listed in Table 7. The activity fractions for those radionuclides that contribute more than 90 percent of the total dose are underlined.

Those radionuclides that are NOTunderlined need NOT be included in the dose calculations.

is the atmospheric dispersion factor, s/m 3; is the whole body dose conversion factor for the radionuclide i, rem-m 3/Ci-hr; is the estimated duration of the release, hours. (If unknown, assume 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .)Q Fi X/Q DCFi 1.3E+06 7.7E+03 2.2E+05 1.3E+03 3.8E+04 ERD Dose, Total Dose NOTE: Dose at other distances can be calculated by ratioing the X/Q values and multiplying by the dose calculated above.Completed By: Route to Dose/PAR Coordinator upon completion.

Date/Time I REFERENCE USE miles Page 35 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30, 1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE k"/; b. Enter the gross release rate from Worksheet 2, Item 9, on Worksheet

4. NOTE: The activity fractions are dependent on the accident type, the time from shutdown, whether containment spray was used, and, for steam generator tube rupture accidents, whether the release was through the condenser.

Select only those activity fractions that are underlined.

-c. -Enter the activity.fractions.

on Worksheet 4 for the selected accident type. Activity fractions are listed in Table 7. d. Enter the X/Q value for the desired distance from Worksheet 2, Item 12, on Worksheet

4. e. Enter the estimated duration of the release (ERD), in hours, from Worksheet 2, Item 8, on Worksheet

4. f. Calculate the projected thyroid dose on Worksheet 4 using the equation:

Doseitbyyid QxFix-Kx-DCFixERD Q where: Dosei, thyroid thyroid dose, rem; Q release rate for nuclide i, curies per second; Fi activity fraction for radionuclide i, dimensionless.

Activity fractions for radionuclides released in the LOCA, Gap Activity, Fuel Handling, and Steam Generator Tube Rupture accident types for various time periods post accident are listed in Table 7. The activity fractions for those radionuclides that contribute more than 90 percent of the total dose are underlined.

Those radionuclides that are NOT underlined need NOT be included intffhe dose calcur-ins.

X/Q atmospheric dispersion factor, seconds perm; DCFi thyroid dose conversion factor for nuclide i, rem-m 3/Ci-hr; ERD -estimated duration of the release, hours.REFERENCE USE Page 36 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30, 1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE g. Sum the calculated doses and enter it on Worksheet

4. h. Sign and date Worksheet 4 and fax to Dose/PAR Coordinator.

5.5.5 Radionuclide

Ground Deposition Estimation (Worksheet

5) NOTE: If the type of accident is unknown, then assume the accident type is a LOCA. a. Enter the accident type on Worksheet

5. b. Enter the gross release rate from Worksheet 2, Item 9, on Worksheet

5. NOTE: The activity fractions are dependent on the accident type, the time from shutdown, whether containment spray was used, and, for steam generator tube rupture accidents, whether the release was through the condenser.

Select only those activity fractions that are bolded. c. Enter the activity fractions on Worksheet 5 for the selected accident type. Activity fractions are listed in Table 7. Sd. Enter the X /Q value from W orksheet 2, Item 12, for the desired distance on Worksheet

5. e. Enter the estimated release duration (ERD), in hours, from Worksheet 2, Item 8, on Worksheet 5.REFERENCE USE Page 37 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE WORKSHEET 5 ESTIMATED GROUND DEPOSITION Complete this form every six hours during a release or whenever changing radiological or meteorological conditions.

Accident type: LOCA Gap Activity Fuel Handling SG Tube Rupture Other Calculate the projected ground deposition using the equation:

SECTOR DISTANCE Depi = Q x Fi x x VeL x ERD x 3600 Q TIME where: Depi Q Fi X/Q Veli ERD 3600 Nuclide 1-131 1-132 1-133 1-134 1-135 Rb-88 Cs-138 is the deposition of radionuclide i, curies/m 2; is the gross release rate, curies/s.

is the activity fraction for radionuclide i, dimensionless.

Activity fractions for radionuclides released in the LOCA, Gap Activity, Fuel Handling, and Steam Generator Tube Rupture accident types are listed in Table 7. is the atmospheric dispersion factor, s/i 3; is the deposition velocity for radionuclide i, m/s; is the estimated duration of the release, hours. (If unknown, assume 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .) is the factor to convert hours to seconds.Q F 1 X/Q Veli 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001 ERD Depi Total Dose NOTE: Deposition at other distances can be calculated by ratioing the X/Q values and multiplying by the deposition calculated above.Completed By: Route to Dose/PAR Coordinator upon completion.

Date/Time/REFERENCE USE miles Page 38 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30, 1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE f. Calculate the ground deposition values using the equation:

Depi = Q x Fi X X x Veli x ERD x 3600 Q where: Dep. = .......deposition of radionuclide i, curies per meter 2; Q = gross release rate, curies per second; Fi activity fraction for radionuclide i, dimensionless.

Activity fractions for radionuclides released in the LOCA, Gap Activity, Fuel Handling, and Steam Generator Tube Rupture accident types for various time periods post accident are listed in Table 7. X/Q -atmosheric dispersion factor, seconds per m Veli -deposition velocity of radionuclide i, 0.01 m/s for radioiodines and 0.001 m/s for all other radionuclides; ERD -estimated duration of the release, hours; 3600 = factor to convert hours to seconds.

g. Sum the calculated depositions and enter it on Worksheet

5. h. Sign and date Worksheet 5 and fax to the Dose/PAR Coordinator.

5.5.1 Population

Exposure (Worksheet

6) a. Calculate the projected population dose by using Worksheet

6. b. Enter the centerline whole body dose from Worksheet 3, on Worksheet

6. c. Enter the population figures. Use the population numbers for the sector and distance categories used in the dose calculations.

REFERENCE USE Page 39 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE d. Sum the population doses calculated for each radius to calculate the total population dose. e. Sign and date Worksheet 6 and fax to the Dose/PAR Coordinator.

Determine Protective Action Recommendations by evaluating the calculation results with the values in the "Integrated Projected Dose" column below, selecting downwind sectors using Attachment A. INTEGRATED PROTECTIVE PROJECTED DOSE ACTION MILES SECTORS <1 rem TEDE None NAN AND Required N/A N/A 5 rem CDE 1 remn TEDE Evacuate 0-2 miles All (3600) OR O5 Evacuate 2-5 miles Downwind Sectors >:5 rem CDE IF a General Emergency, THEN evaluate Attachment B for the potential need to issue expanded PARs. Compare the results against the current classification and PARS. IF the results of this assessment is an escalation of classification and/or PARS, THEN immediately inform the Emergency Director and assist with EPIP 2.1 for initiating notifications.

Performed By: Performer (Print and Sign) Date / Time REFERENCE USE 5.5.2 5.5.3 5.5.4 Page 40 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE WORKSHEET 6 ESTIMATED POPULATION DOSE Complete this form using the calculation from Worksheet

3. Complete this form every six hours during a release or whenever changing radiological or meteorological conditions.

Calculated Population Dose Population dose (in person-rem)

= Dose (in rem) X Population Dose Population Population Dose (person-rem) 2 5 10 Total Dose Population Figures (By Sector and Distance)0 to 2 miles 0 33 19 22 15 32 39 29 41 22 NOTE: All other sectors have zero population.

Completed By: Route to Dose/PAR Coordinator upon completion.

Distance 2 to 5 miles 20 45 231 131 606 980 403 345 286 87 Date/Time 5 to 10 miles 231 0. 6036 4866 S79 632 695 450 416 435 I REFERENCE USE Sector Distance (miles Sector A H J K L M N P Q R Page 41 of 52 C NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS-TOTAL RFWRITE-TABLE7 LOCA SOURCE TERM ACTIVITY FRACTIONS

-CONTAINMENT SPRAY NOT USED Page I of 8 1-131 1-132 1-133 1-134 1-135 Kr-85 Kr-85m Kr-87 Kr-g8 Rb-S8 Cs-138 2.46E-02 3.52E-02 5.51E-02 1 Time 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 12.0 18.0 24.0 30.0 36.0 42.0 48.0 72.0 96.0 120.0 144.0 168.0 336.0 504.0 672.0 720.0 3.40E.02 3.25E-02 3.09E-02 2.89E-02 2.66E-02 2.42E-02 1.97E-02 1.57E-02 1.24E-02 9.65E-03 7.47E-03 5.73E-03 4.39E-03 2.54E-03 4.64E-04 8.11 E-05 1.39E-05 2.36E-06 3.96E-07 6.60E-08 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.70E-02 8.24E-02 9.199M0 1.02E-01 1.03E-01 4.97E-02 2.04E-02 9.81E-02 .J28E-03 3.30E-02 4.97E-02 2.58E-02 1.3 1 E-02 6.5813-03 3.30E-03 1.65E-03 1.28E-05 9.49E-08 0.000 0.000 4.82E-02 3.61E-02 2.69E-02 I.96E-02 1.41E-02 1.01E-02 4.99E-03 2.44E-03 1.1 7E-03 5.58E-04 2.64E-04 1.24E-04 5.80E-05 1.25E-05 1. 19E-07 1.08E-09 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0..000 Notes: I.- The activity fractions that are NOT highlighted contribute IesA than ten percent of the whole body dose. 2. The..activityW fra~ctions that are W-OT underlined contribute less than ten percent of the thyroid dose. 3. Radionuclides that do NOT a~ppear in the table contribute less than ten percent of the whole body and thyroid dose totals. P ag e 4 2 o f 5 2. ....J.IUL-Uz 5.43E.02 5.79E-02 6.OSE-02 6.27E-02 6.39E-02 6.43E-02 6.42E-02 6.27E-02 6.07E-02 5.79E-02 5.49E-02 5.16E-02 4.84E-02 4.20E-02 2.59E-02 1.53E-02 8.88E-03 5.08E-03 2.88E.03 1,62E-03 1.59E-04 1.51E-05 1.43E-06 1.35E-07 1.27E-08 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.017 0.039 0.086 0.106 0.043 0.044 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.046 0.043 0.040 0.037 0.033 0.030 0.027 0.024 0.018 0.008 0.004 0.001 0,001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.071 0.061 0.05I 0.042 0.035 0.028 0.018 0.011 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.117 0.116 0.115 0.112 0.108 0.103 0.097 0.083 0.070 0.059 0.049 0.040 0.033 0.026 0.017 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.113 0.120 0.119 0.114 0.108 0.093 0.079 0.066 0.054 0.045 0,036 0.030 0.019 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.057 0.053 0.037 0.024 0.014 0.008 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n nnn/'KVItPRENCE USE EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 C 2.73M0 Y .FE-01 TW4E-_02 3.96E-02 4.63ME4 5.62E0 "6.7EM02 7.60E0 9.60E0 1.15E.01 1.25E-01 2.60E401 C C.NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS IV~ I AL, IUMMW K IV,~TABLE 7 LOCA SOURCE TERM ACTIVITY FRACTIONS

-CONTAINMENT SPRAY USED Page 2 of 8 Time 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 12.0 18.0 24.0 30.0 36.0 42.0 48.0 72.0 96.0 120.0 144.0 168.0 336.0 504.0 672.0 720.0 1-131 3.199E-06 5.12E-06 6.4713-0 6.89M-0 7.26E-06 7.90M.O 9.50E-06 1.0 1E-05 T.-I 0E-203 1.13E-05 I .20 E Tr5 M 1.43E-05 3.32E-0 UTIM Xe-133 1-133 7.16E-06 I1.07E-0S 7.32E-05 T 3"4E-0 1.23E-05 T.TTM 5.83E-06 2.96E-06 1 .49E-06 7.49E-07 3.77E-07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Kr-87 1.OSE-01 9.17E-02 7.84E-02 6.60E-02 5.47E-02 4.48E.02 3.62E-02 2.32E-02 1.46E-02 9.04E-03 5.54E-03 3.37E-03 2.03E-03 1.22E-03 4.36E-04 1.86E-05 7.60E-07 3.05E-08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Kr-8" 1.52E-01 1.50E-01 1.48E-01 1.45E-01 1.40E-01 1.33E-01 1.25E-01 1.07E-01 9.08E-02 7.63E-02 6.26E-02 5.15E-02 4.19E-02 339E-02 2.19E-02 5.61 E-03 1-37E-03 3.31E-04 7.89E-05 1.871-05 4.4 ! E-06 1.34E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Xe-135 6.08E-02 6.92E-02 7.80E-02 8.64E-02 9.36E-02 1.09E-01 1.06E-OI I.15E-O1 1.22E-01 1.27E-01 IJOE-01 1.32E-01 1.33E-01 !.33E-01 IJOE-O1 1.09E-OI 8.41E-02 6.22E-02 4.45E-02 3.14E-02 2.17E-02 4.53E-03 8.84E-04 1.67E-04 3.14E-05 5.84E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Xe-135m 7.73E-02 3.86E-02 2.81E.02 2.59E-02 2.57E-02 2.59E-02 2.60E-02 2.60E-02 2.54E-02 2.45E-02 2.33E-02 2.21 E-02 2.08E-02 1.94E-02 1.67E-02 1.01E-02 5.88E-03 3.35E-03 1.90E-03 1.06E-03 5.94E-04 5.70E-05 5.38E-06 5.08E-07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 The activity fractions that are NOT highlighted contribute less than ten percent of the whole body dose. The activity fractions that are IVYT underlined contribute less than ten percent of the thyroid dose. Radionuclides that do NOT ap-ear in the table contribute less than ten percent of the whole body and thyroid dose totals.REFERENCE USE EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 Xe-138 2.52E-01 8.57E-02 2.93E-02 9.90E-03 3.30E-03 1.0E-03 3.511E-04 3.61E-05 3.65E-06 3.63E-07 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Rb-88 0.00 1.09E-01 1.46E-01 1.55E-01 1.54E-bl i 1.47E-01 1.39E-.1 1.20E-01.

1.02E-01 8.52E-02 7.03E-02 5.76E-02 4.69E-02 3.79E-02 2.46E-02 6.27E-03 1.53E-03 3.70E-04 8.81E-05 2. 1 OE-05 4.93E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Cs-139 0.00 7.34E-02 6.84E-02 4.83E-02 3.04E-02 1.89E-02 1.03E-02 3.24E-03 9.70E-04 2.87E-04 8.39E-05 2.41 E-05 6.93E-06 1.98E-06 1.59E-07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .0.00 Notes: I. 2. 3.Page 43 of 52 2.85E-01 3.17E-01 3.55E-01 3.92E-01 4.26E-01 4.57E-01 4.85E-01 5.34E-01 5.77E-01 6.14E-01 6.47E-01 6.77E-01 7.02E-01 7.25E-01 7.63E-01 8.37E-01 8.81E-01 9.IOE-01 9.30FE-01 9.45E-01 9.56E-01 9.75E-01 9.80E-01 9.82E-01 9.83E-01 9.83E-01 9.75E-01 9.46E-01 8.78E-01 8.48E-01 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS Revision 25 Novemfber 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TABLE 7 GAP ACTIVITY RELEASE SOURCE TERM ACTIVITY FRACTIONS

-CONTAINMENT SPRAY NOT USED Page 3 of 8 Time 1-131 1-133 1-135 Kr-85m Kr-87 Kr-88 Xe-133 Xe-135 Xe-138 Rb-88 Cs-138 0.0 6.34E.04 1.42E.03 1.31E-03 0.055 0.108 0.151 0.284 0.060 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.5 7.18E-04 1.58E-03 1.41E-03 0.057 0.093 0.151 0.322 0.067 0.086 0.110 0.074 1.0 8.11E-04 1.76E-03 1.51E-03 0.060 0.080 0.151 0.361 0.074 0.030 0.148 0.069 1.5 9.01E-04 1.92E-03 1.601-03 0.062 0.068 0.149 0.402 0.080 0.010 0.159 0.049 2.0 9.82E-04 2.07E-03 1.66E-03 *0.062 0.056 0.144 0.439 0.084 3.38E-03 0.158 0.031 2.5 1.06E-03 2.20E-03 1.711-03 0.062 0.046 0.137 0.471 0.088 1.12f-03 0.153 0.019 3.0 1.13E-03 231E-03 1.731-03 0.062 0.038 0.129 0.502 0.090 3.631-04 0.144 0.011 4.0 1.25E-03 2.48E-03 1.73E-03 0.058 0.024 0.112 0.558 0.093 3.751-05 0.125 0.003 5.0 136E-03 2.62E-03 1.70E-03 0.055 0.015 0.096 0.605 0.094 3.821-06 0.107 0.001 6.0 1.46E-03 2.73E-03 1.66E-03 0.050 0.010 0.081 0.646 0.094 3.841-07 0.090 0.000 7.0 1.55E-03 2.79E-03 1.58E-03 0.045 0.006 0.067 0.685 0.093. 0.d0 0.075 0.000 8.0 1.63E-03 2.85E-03 1.50E-03 0.041 0.004 0.055 0.717 0.091 0.000 0.062 0.000 9.0 1.69E-03 2.87E-03 1.41E-03 0.037 0.002 0.045 0.747 0.088 0.000 0.050 0.000 10.0 1.75E-03 2.89E-03 1.33E-03 0.033 0.001 0.036 0.772 0.085 0.000 0.041 0.000 12.0 1.85E-03 2.87E-03 1.15E-03 0.025 0.000 0.024 0.813 0.078 0,000 0.026 0.000 18.0 2.05E-03 2.65E-03 6.96E-04 0.011 0.000 0.006 0.885 0.056 0.600 0.007 0.000 24.0 2.15E-03 2.31 E-03 3.99E-04 0.005 0.000 0,001 0.919 0.038 0.000 0.002 0.000 30.0 2.21E-03 1.97E-03 2.261-04 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.937 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 36.0 2.26E-03 1.69E-03 1.271-04 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.948 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 42.0 2.30E-03 1.42E-03 7.06E-05 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.955 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 48.0 2.33E-03 1.21E-03 3.94E-05 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.959 7.47E-03 0.600 0.000 0.000 72.0 2.46E-03 6.09E-04 3.75E-06 0.000 0.000 0,000 0.967 1.401-03 0.000 0.000 0.000 96.0 2.56E-03 3.07E-04 3.53E-07 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.968 2.59E-04 0.000 0.000 0.000 120.0 2.68E-03 1.54E-04 3.34E-08 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.968 4.81E-05 0.000 0.000 0.000 144.0 2.80E-03 7.72E-05 3.14E-09 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.967 8.85E-06 0.000 0,000 0.000 168.0 2.93E-03 3.86E-05 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.965 1.63E-06 0.000 0.000 0.000 336.0 3.89E-03 3.03E-07 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.933 1.16E-I I 0.000 0.000 0.000 504.0 4.91E-03 2.26E-09 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.854 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 672.0 5.57E-03 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.704 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 720.0 5.62E-03 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.649 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Notes: I. The activity fractions that are NOT highlighted contribute less than ten percent of the whole body dose. 2. The activity fractions that are NOT underlined contribute less than ten percent of the thyroid dose. 3. Radionuclides that do NOT appear in the table contribute less than ten percent of the whole body and thyroid dose totals. Page 44 of 52 REFERENCE USE C C.C NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS TABLE 7 GAP ACTIVITY RELEASE SOURCE TERM ACTIVITY FRACTIONS

-CONTAINMENT SPRAY USED Page 4 of 8 Time 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 12.0 18.0 24.0 30.0 36.0 42.0 48.0 72.0 96.0 120.0 144.0 168.0 336.0 504.0 672.0 720.0 1-131 1-133 Xe-1l3Yp Ii Kr-87 1.08E-01 9.31E-02 8.03E-02 6.81 E-02 5.65E-02 4.66E-02 3.78E-02 2.44E-02 1.552-02 9.641-03 5.92E-03 3.62E-03 2.19E-03 1.32E-03 4.71E-04 2.021-05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Kr-88 1.52E-01 1.52E-01 1.52E-01 150E-01 1.44E-01 1138E-01 1.30E-01 1.13E-O1 9.64E-02 8.13E-02 6.70E-02 5.54E-02 4.50E-02 3.66E-02 2.37E-02 6.07E-03 1.47E-03 3.50E-04 8.291-05 1.95E-05 4.58E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Xe-133 2.861-01 3.241-01 3.63E-01 4.041-01 4.42E-04 4.74E-0I 5.05E-01 5.61E-01 6.08E-01 6.50E-01 6.89E-01 7.21E-01 7.51E-01 7.76E-01 8.18E-01 8.90E-01 9.24E-01 9.42E-01 9.52E-01 9.59E-01 9.63E-01 9.70E-01 9.71 E-01 9.71E-01 9.70E-01 9.68E-01 9.37E-01 8.58E-01 7.08E-01 6.52E-01 REFERENCE USE EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 6.06E-02 6.79E-02 7.46E-02 8.01 E-02 8.45E-02 8.811-02 9.04E-02 9.36E-02 9.48E-02 9.46E-02 9.35E-02 9.16E-02 8.87E-02 8.54E-02 7.81E-02 5.65E-02 3.85E-02 2.58E-02 1.71E-02 I. 14E-02 7.50E-03 1.40E-03 2.601-04 4.82E-05 8.88E-06 1.64E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.51 E-0 I 8.67E-02 3.00E-02 1.02E-02 3.40E-03 1. 12E-03 3.65E-04 3.78E-05 3.84E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.38E-08 E-O 8 1.07E-07 T37E-1.562-07 1.8613-0 2.06E-07 2.16EZ0 T2--.T97 2.342-07 2.57E-07 239M 2.941-07 3.9302 TO6M-0 3TM3W72R 1.43E-07 T3-M 1.771-07 2.81E-07 2.22E-07 Tn7 ! .29E-07 2.811E-07 2.87E-0M 2.899MO 2.6613-07 1.25E-07 6.1 lE-08 3.08E-08 1 .54E-OS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Notes: I. 2. 3.The activity fractions that are NOT highlighted contribute less than ten percent of the whole body dose. The activity fractions that are NMY' underlined contribute less than ten percent of the thyroid dose. Radionuclides that do NOT apea-r in the table contribute less than ten percent of the whole body and thyroid dose totals..Page 45 of 52 Cs-138 0.00 7.45E-02 6.98E-02 4.95E-02 3.13E-02 1.87E-02 1.02E-02 3.38E-03 1.032-03 3.05E-04 8.92E-05 2.592-05 7.451-06 2.12E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Rb-88 0.00 1.10E-01 1.49E-01 1.60E-01 1.59E-01 1.54E-01 1.45E-01 1.26E-01 1.08E-01 9.06E-02 6.19E-02 5.04E-02 4.10E-02 2.66E-02 6.79_,03 1.64E-03 3.92E-04 9.261-05 2.18E-05 5.13E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 C (7 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS 1%T ~~lIT .L.r , VY 1%11 r TABLE 7 FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT SOURCE TERM ACTIVITY FRACTIONS

-CONTAINMENT SPRAY NOT USED Page 5 of 8 Time 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 12.0 18.0 24.0 30.0 36.0 42.0 48.0 72.0 96.0 120.0 144.0 168.0 336.0 504.0 672.0 720.0 1-131 2.17E-03 2. f7E0M 2.17E-03 2.18E-03 2.18E-03 2.21E--0 3 2.21E-03 2F3M 2.229:03 2.25E-03 2.32E-0J -i 2.37E.03 2.94E-3 2.94E-03 T5.OOE--03 1-132 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1-133 2.59E.04 2.55E-04 2.52E-04 2.48E-04 2.45E-04 2.41E-04 2.38E-04 2.30E-04 2.24E-04 2.18E-04 2.12E-04 2.05E-04 2.00E-04 1.95E-04 1.83E-04 1.55E-04 1.30E-04 1.101E-04 9.24E-05 7.77E-05 6.53E-05 3.28E-05 1.64E-05 8.24E-06 4.133E-06 2.07E-06 1.59E-08 0.000 0.000 0.000 1-134 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1-135 3.03E-07 2.88E-07 2.75E-07 2.62E-07 2.50E-07 2.37E1-07 2.25E-07 2.05E-07 1.86E-07 1.69E-07 1.52E-07 1.38E-07 1.25E-07 1.13E-07 9.33E-08 5.18E-08 2.87E-08 1.60E-08 8.83E-09 4.89E-09 2.71E-09 0,000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Kr-85 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.018 0,019 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.031 0.035 0.084 0.187 0.364 0.427 Kr-85m 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Xe-133 0.963 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.94 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.965 -0.9656 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.965 0.963 0.961 0.958 0.95s 0.907 0.802 0.623 0.560 Kr-87 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0,000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 The activity fractions that are NOT highlighted contribute less than ten percent of the whole body dose. The activity fractions that are NOT underlined contribute less than ten percent of the thyroid dose. Radionuclides that do NOT appar In the table contribute less than ten percent of the whole body and thyroid dose totals.REFERENCE USE EPIP 1.3. NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 C Rb-88 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Notes: I. 2. 3.Cs-138 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 '0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Page 46 of 52 C C C NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TABLE 7 FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT SOURCE TERM ACTIVITY FRACTIONS

-CONTAINMENT SPRAY USED Page 6 of 8 Time 1-131 Xc-133 0.0 2.171-07 9.66E-01 0.5 TgRM 9.66E-"1 1.0 2.17E-0) 9.66E-01 1.5 f8UW7 9.66E-0o 2.0 " Z 9.66E-01 2.5 2.18E-07 9.66E-01 3.0 TT'M 9.66E-e1 4.0 T 9.67E-01 5.0 6 9.67E-01 6.0 276 9.67E-01 7.0 2.21E-07 9.67E-01 8.0 2.2fE7 9.67E-01 9.0 121 -E-07 9.67E-01 10.0 2T'7 9.67E-01 12.0 F 9.67E-01 18.0 2.26E-07 9.68E-01 24.0 TM 70 9.68E-01 30.0 2=Z7 9.68E-01 36.0 2.33E--0 9.68E-01 42.0 T 9.68E-01 48.0 2.372-07 9.68E-01 72.0 2.49E 9.68E-01 96.0 T 9.66E-01 120.0 271-0 9.64E-01 144.0 2r7 9.61E-01 168.0 2.94E-07 9.58F-01 336.0 .E--7 9.10E-01 504.0 4 8.06E-01 672.0 5.02FZ0 6.26E-01 720.0 4.-4-0EZ7 5.63E-01 Notes: I. The activity fractions that are NOT highlighted contribute less than ten percent of the whole body dose. 2. The activity fractions that are underlined contribute less than ten percent of the thyroid dose. 3. Radionuclides that do NOT appear in the table contribute less than ten percent of the whole body and thyroid dose totals.REFERENCE USE Page 47 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 'rf'rAI 6 ~tD 'P IIIA Mutinr,i TABLE 7 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE SOURCE TERM --RELEASE MODE -THROUGH THE CONDENSER

-ACTIVITY FRACTIONS Page 7 of 8 C.1-131 1-133 3.92E-08 3.05E-08 3.93E-08 3.00E-08 3.94E-01 2.98E-08 3.951-08 2.94E-08 3.96E-08 2.90E-08 3.98E-08 2.86E-08 3.97E-08 2.81 -08 3.99E-08 2.74E-08 3.99E-08 2.66E-08 3.98E-08 2.58-E_.-08 3.99E-08 2.50E-08 3.98E-08 2.42E-08 397E-08 2.35E-08 ___6__ 2.27E-08 3.95E-08 2.13E-08 Time 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 12.0 18.0 24.0 30.0 36.0 42.0 48.0 72.0 96.0 120.0 144.0 168.0 336.0 504.0 672.0 720.0 1.74E-08 1.42E-08 1.16E-08 9.48E-09 7.72E-09 6.291-09 2.78E-09 1.23E-09 5.401-10 2.381-10 1.051-10 3.401-13 0.00 0.00 0.00 1-135 3.162-08 3.02E-08 2.88E-08 2.751-08 2.61E-08 2.50E-08 2.37E-08 2.151-08 1.95E-08 1.761-08 1.59E-08 1.44E-08 1.30E-08 1. 1 8E-08 9.57E-09 5.17E-09 2.78E-09 1.49E-09 8.011E-10 4.30E-10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Kr-85 0.933 0.937 0.943 0.947 0.952 0.955 0.955 0.963 0.967 0.970 0.973 0.976 0.978 0.979 0.982 0.987 0.989 0.990 0.990 0.991 0.901 0.992 0.993 0.994 0.995 0.996 0.998 0.999 L.oo0 1.000 Kr-85m 0.030 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.021 0.019 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Kr-88 ~Xe-133 XC- 135 .IR Rha "-i 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 9.80E-03 9.48E-03 9.24E-03 8.91E-03 8.66E-03 7.57E-03 6.64E-03 5.83E-03 5.11E-03 4.48E-03 1.791-03 7.09E-04 2.84E-04 2.18E-04 4.031-03 3.90E-03 3.77E-03 3.65E-03 3.531-03 3.41E-03 3.28E-03 3.08E-03 2.86E-03 2.66E-03 2.471-03 230E-03 2.14E-03 1.98E-03 1.71E-03 1.09E-03 6.92E-04 4.39E-04 2.79E-04 1.77E-04 1.12E-04 1..83E-05 2.96E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.013 0.004 1.24E-03 3.78E-04 1.16E-04 3.551-05 1.082-05 1.02E-06 9.51E-08 8.89E-09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 4.902-03 5.89E-03 5.71E-03 5.22E-03 4.67E-03 4.14E-03 3.27E-03 2.56E-03 2.01E-03 1.57E-03 1.23E-03 9.61E-04 7.53E-04 4.60E-04 1.0412-04 2.38E-05 5.38E-06 1.22E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 3.43E-03 2.87E-03 1.84E-03 1.06E-03 5.92E-04 3.20E-04 9.06E-05 2.54E-05 7.02E-06 1.94E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 The activity fractions that arm NOT highlighted oont0ibute less than ten percent of the whole body dose. The activity fractions that are OT underlined contribute less than ten percent of the thyroid dose. Radionuclides that do NOT appear in the table contribute less than ten percent of the whole body and thyroid dose totals.REFERENCE USE C 3.89E-08 3.81E-08 3.73E-08 3.65E-08 3.58E-08 3.51E-08 3.22E-08 2.95E-08 2.71E-08 2.28E-08 1.261-08 .-3.80E-09 3.1913-09 Notes: I. 2. 3.Kr-88 Xe-133 Me-135 Rk.RR t'++_ I *J O Page 48 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TABLE7 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE SOURCE TERM --RELEASE MODE -NOT THROUGH THE CONDENSER

-ACTIVITY FRACTIONS Page 8 of 8 Time 1-131 1-133 1-135 Kr-85 Kr-85m Kr-g8 Xe-133 Xe-135 Xe-138 Rb-gg Cs-138 0.0 3.92E-04 3.05E-04 3.16E-04 0.933 0.030 0.008 0.011 4.03E-03 0.013 0.00 0.00 0.5 3.93E-04 3.OOE-0 3.011E-04 0.937 0.028 0.007 0.011 3.90E-03 0.004 4.89E-03 3.43E-03 1.0 Y9-4E-04 2.98F,04 2.87E-04 0.943 0.026 0.006 0.011 3.77E-03 1.24E-03.

5.89E-03 2.86E-03 1.5 39-5E-04 2.94E-04 2.74E-04 0.947 0.024 0.005 0.011 3.65E-03 3.78E-04 5.70E-03 1.84E03 2.0 Y9E-04 2.90E-04 2.61E.04 0.952 0.023 0.005 0.011 3.53E-03 1.16E-04 5.22E-03 1.06E-03 2.5 3.9"E-04 2.86E-04 2.49E-04 0.955 0.021 0.004 0.011 3.411E-03 3.55E-05 4.67E-03 5.91E-04 3.0 Y9-7E-04 2.81E-04 2.37E-04 0.955 0.019 0.004 0.011 3.28E-03 1.08E-05 4.14E.03 3.19E.03 4.0 3.99E-04 r7-4E-04 2.15E-04 0.963. 0.017 0.003 0.011 3.08E-03 1.02E-06 3.27E-03 9.05E-05 5.0 3.99E-04 2.66E.04 1.95E-04 0.967 0.014 0.002 0.011 2.86E-03 9.51E-08 2.56E-03 2.53E-05 6.0 98E-04 258-04 1.76E-04 0.970 0.012 0.002 0.011 2.66E-03 8.89E-09 2.00E-03 7.01E.06 7.0 3.99E-04 2.50E-04 1.59E-04 0.973 0.011 0.001 0.011 2.47E-03 0.00 1.57E-03 1.94E-06 8.0 3.98E.04 2.42F,-04 1.44E-04 0.976 0.009 0.001 0.011 2.30E-03 0.00 1.23E-03 0.00 9.0 3.97E.04 2.35E-04 1.30E-04 0.978 0.008 0.001 0.010 2.14E-03 0.00 9.60E-04 0.00 10.0 1.96E-04 2.27E-04 1.18E-04 0.979 0,007 0.001 0.010 1.98E-03 0.00 7.52E-04 0.00 12.0 3.95E-04 2.13E-04 9.57E-05 0.982 0.005 0.00 0.010 1.71E-03 0.00 4.59E-04 0.00 18.0 3.89E-04 1.74E-04 5.16E-05 0.987 0.002 0.00 0.010 1.09E-03 0.00 1.04E-04 0.00 24.0 Y -IE-O4 1.42E-04 2.77E-05 0.989 0.001 0.00 9.80E-03 6.92E-04 0.00 2.37E-05 0.00 30.0 3.73E.04 1.16E-04 1.49E-05 0.990 0.00 0.00 9.48E-03 4.39E-04 0.00 5.38E-06 0.00 36.0 3.65E-04 9.48E-05 8.00E-06 0.990 0.00 0.00 9.24E-03 2.79E.04 0.00 *1.22E-06 0.00 42.0 3.58E-04 7.72E-05 4.29E-06 0.991 0.00 0.00 8.91E-03 1.77E-04 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.0 3.51E-04 6.29E-05 2.3 1E-06 0.991. 0.00 0.00 8.66E-03 .123E-04 0.00 0.00 0.00 72.0 32-2E.04 2.78E-05 0.00 0.992 0.00 0.00 7.57E-03 1.83E-05 0.00 0.00 0.00 96.0 2.95 ,E.04 i.23E-05 0.00 0.993 0.00 0.00 6.64E-03 2.96E-06 0.00 0.00 0.00 120.0 2.71 E-04 5.40E-06 0.00 0.994 0.00 0.00 5.831E-03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 144.0 2.49E-04 2.38E-06 0.00 0.995 0.00 0.00 5.11 E-03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 168.0 2.28E-04 I.05E-06 0.00 0.996 0.00 0.00 4.48E-03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 336.0 1.26E-04 3.40E-09 0.00 0.998 0.00 0.00 1.79E-03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 504.0 6.87E-05 0.00 0.00 0.999 0.00 0.00 7.09E-04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 672.0 80-E- 05 0.00 0.00 1.000 0.00 0.00 2.84E-04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 720.0 3.19E-05 0.00 0.00 1.000 0.00 0.00 2.18E-04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Notes: 1. The activity fractions that are NOT highlighted contribute less than ten percent of the whole body dose. 2. The activity fractions that are NOT underlined contribute less than ten percent of the thyroid dose. 3. Radionuclides that do NOT appear In the table contribute less than ten percent of the whole body and thyroid dose totals.Page 49 of 52 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 1.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 25 DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION November 30, 1999 RECOMMENDATIONS TOTAL REWRITE

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 EDS Report to Wisconsin Electric Power Company concerning NUREG-0578, March 7, 1980. 6.2 EPIP 1.1, Course of Actions 6.3 EPIP 2.1, Notifications

-ERO, State & Counties, and NRC 6.4 ETD 02, Offsite Agency Call List. 6.5 NUREG/BR-0150, Volume 1, Revision 4, RTM-96, Response Technical Manual, Figures A-5 and A-6, March 1996. 6.6 Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Setpoint & Response Book 6.7 Radiological Engineer to Plant Manager/EP Coordinator memo dated June 13, 1988. 6.8 Reactor Engineer to Plant Manager memo dated April 6, 1984. 6.9 TID 14844, Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites, March 23, 1962. 6.10 U. S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.109, Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Release of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, Revision 1, October 1977. 6.11 U. S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.4, Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss-of Coolant Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors, Revision 2, June 1976. 7.0 BASES B-I NUREG-0654, Revision 1, Supp. 3, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, July, 1996. B-2 Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Emergency Plan, Appendix J, Evacuation Time Estimates for the Area Surrounding the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. B-3 IE Information Notice No. 83-28, Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for General Emergencies.

B-4 EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guidelines for Nuclear Incidents, May, 1992.REFERENCE USE Page 50 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT A AFFECTED SECTORS BASED ON WIND DIRECTION NOTE: If wind speed is less than three (3) mph or lake breeze conditions exist, then recommend protective actions for all sectors (3600) 0-5 miles. Lake breeze conditions exist if the difference between actual wind direction values for inland and near shore meteorological towers is greater than 900.Wind Direction* (Degrees From) 0-11 > 11 -34 > 34 -56 > 56 -79 > 79 -101 > 101 -124 > 124- 146 > 146- 169 > 169- 191 > 191 -214> 214- 236 > 236 -259 > 259 -281 > 281 -304 > 304 -326 > 326 -349 > 349 -360 > 360 -371 > 371 -394 > 394 -416 > 416 -434 > 434 -461 > 461 -484 > 484 -506 > 506 -520 Sectors in Downwind Area H,J,K J,K,L K,L,M L, M, N M, N, P N,P,Q P,Q,R Q,R,A R,A, (B) A, (B), (C) (B), (C), (D) (C), (D), (E) (D), (E), (F) (E), (F), (G) (F), (G), H (G), H, J H, J, K H,J,K J,K,L K, L,M L, M,N M,N,P N,P, Q P,Q,R Q,R,A** ** ** ** ** ** *** As read on PPCS or control room instruments.

- As read on chart recorder. ( ) Denotes sectors over Lake Michigan.REFERENCE USE=, Page 51 of 52 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS EPIP 1.3 NNSR Revision 25 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B GENERAL EMERGENCY OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS GENERAL EMERGENCY Declared Recommend Evacuation of 2-mile Radius and 5 rmiles Downwind.

(1) Core Damage In Progress or N Projected? (ActualiPotential for N (2) Yes (1) Situations requiring urgent action Initial Recomm by offsite officials (based on control Fission Product Is qppropr room Indicators, no dose Inventory in Containment?

No-. Evacuate 2 projections required).

< (More than Gap) Radius and I (3) DowrW~nd (2) :30,0OO R/hr in containment high radiation monitors.

Yes (3) LOSS crteria for RCS barrier in EPIP 1.2, Attachment C, exceeded.

(4) LOSS criteria for containment inent barrier in EPIP 1.2, Attachment C. Projected Containment Failure or No exceeded.

No " REFERENCE USE Page 52 of 52 EPIP 2.1 NOTIFICATIONS--

ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION:

REVISION:

EFFECTIVE DATE: PROCEDURE OWNER: Technical NNSR 18 November 30, 1999 Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS, DELETED NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC EPIP 2.1 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE ................................................

3 2.0 PREREQUISITES

...................................................................................................

3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

.................................................................

4 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

.........................................................................................

4 5.0 PROCEDURE

..............................................

5 5.1 Notification of Emergency Response Organization (ERO) ......................................

5 5.2 Notifications to State and Counties .........................................................................

14 5.3 Notifications to WE Media Line and KNPP ............................................................

17 5.4 Notifications to the NRC ................................. , .......................................................

18 5.5 Status Updates to State and Counties ......................................................................

19 5.6 Status Updates to the NRC ....................................................................................

21

6.0 REFERENCES

........................................................................................................

22 7.0 BA SES ...........................................................................................................................

22 ATTACHMENT A AUTOMATED NOTIFICATION SYSTEM SCENARIO SELECTION MATRIX .............................................................................

23 ATTACHMENT B NUCLEAR ACCIDENT REPORTING FORM .........................................

24 ATTACHMENT C PLANT STATUS UPDATE ......................................................................

25 ATTACHMENT D RADIOLOGICAL STATUS UPDATE ....................................................

26 ATTACHMENT E STATUS REPORT ON PLANT SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS FOR AFFECTED UNIT ..............................................................................

29 REFERENCE USE Page 2 of 30 m NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 2.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC November 30, 1999 K> 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure is to provide guidance for making initial and subsequent notifications of a classified emergency to members of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Response Organization (ERO), State of Wisconsin, Manitowoc County, Kewaunee County, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 Duty Shift Superintendent (DSS) has the ultimate responsibility to complete notifications per this procedure until a formal turnover to the Emergency Director has been conducted.

2.1.2 IF available to assist with this procedure, THEN the DSS may assign these tasks to: "* Security Shift Commander

"* Operating Supervisor(s)

"* Shift Technical Advisor 2.1.3 State and County Communicator shall assume notifications to the State and Counties upon activation of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). 2.1.4 ENS Communicator shall assume notifications to the NRC upon activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC). 2.2 Equipment

2.2.1 Notification

of the Emergency Response Organization

"* Point Beach Automated Notification System (accessed via telephone)

"* Corporate alpha-numeric paging system (accessed via TSO)

Corporate alpha-numeric paging system (accessed via telephone)

2.2.2 Notification

of the State and County Emergency Managements

"* Two-Digit Dial Select Telephone

"* Commercial Telephones (PBX, GTE, Microwave)

2.2.3 Notification

of the NRC "* FTS-2000 Emergency Notification System (ENS) "* Commercial Telephones (PBX, GTE, Microwave)

REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 2.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC November 30, 1999 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

3.1 Completion

of this procedure shall not prevent the operators from bringing the plant to a safe condition to protect the health and safety of the general public. 3.2 The State of Wisconsin Emergency Management, Manitowoc County Emergency Management, and Kewaunee County Emergency Government shall be notified within 15-minutes of event classification.

3.3 The NRC shall be notified immediately following the state and county notifications, not to exceed one hour from declaration of a classified emergency.

3.4 TSO knowledge is required for IBM mainframe access to the paging system. 3.5 Only pre-designated personnel may activate the Point Beach Automated Notification System, using their scenario activation password.

4.0 INITIAL

CONDITIONS 4.1 An emergency has been declared or terminated.

4.2 A change from one emergency classification to another has occurred.

4.3 Further

degradation of the level of safety of the plant, major changes in equipment or reactor status, or other major changes NOT involving a change in emergency classification have occurred.REFERENCE USE Page 4 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 2.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC November 30, 1999 5.0 PROCEDURE NOTE: The notifications of the Emergency Response Organization, State and Counties, Other Pertinent Agencies, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission should be completed simultaneously if possible.

5.1 Notification

of Emergency Response Organization (ERO) NOTE: Complete Step 5.1.2, Step 5.1.3, or Step 5.L4, respectively, if the Point Beach Automated Notification System is unavailable.

5.1.1 PBNP Automated Notification System a. Determine the information desired to be sent to the Emergency Response Organization using Attachment A. Record the information at the bottom of Attachment A. For example, "Site Emergency, Activate All ERFs, use normal routes" would be Scenario 320. b. From any on-site telephone, dial 7158 to access the PBNP Automated Notification System. c. When prompted, enter your scenario activation password when the system has answered using the keypad on the telephone.

d. When prompted, enter the 3-digit SCENARIO number obtained in Step 5.1.1 .a corresponding to the information desired to be sent to the ERO. (Attachment A) e. When the PBNP Automated Notification System says, "The scenario is building," press the "#" key, listen to "good-bye," and then hang up. Other menu options are available at this point (i.e., cancel scenario).

NOTE: IF the ERO pager(s) in the Control Room do not activate and display the message within 3-4 minutes, THEN go to Step 5.1.2 to send the page. f. Monitor the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) pager(s) in the Control Room for verification of activation.

Page 5 of 30 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT -EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC EPIP 2.1 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 November 30, 1999 g. Periodic fax printouts will automatically be sent to the Control Room, Technical Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility to show who is responding and their estimated time of arrival.

h. If the pager activation was successful, skip Steps 5.1.2 through 5.1.4 and return this procedure section and completed Attachment A to Emergency Preparedness or include in the TSC Manager turnover package.Page 6 of 30 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSiNESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC EPIP 2.1 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 November 30, 1999 November 30, 1999 5.1.2 REFERENCE USE Alpha-Numeric Paging Accessed Via Telephone NOTE 1: Enter pager number 0799 to do a PBNP All-Call page of the ERO. NOTE 2: Enter the 4 digit pager number to page a specific individual. (Ref. Emergency Telephone Directory)

NOTE 3: You must enter the asterisks and two digit code to have the message sent to the pagers (i.., ",**50', would display "PBNP UE, No Action Needed" or "**017556247" would display "Call Immediately 7556247").

a. Determine the pager message required:

Use the following preprogrammed codes to provide event declarations.

- 50 = PBNP UE, No Action Needed **51 = PBNP ALERT. ReportNormal Route **52 = PBNP ALERT. ReportFrom South **53 = PBNP ALERT. ReportFrom North **54 = PBNP SE. Report, Normal Route **55 = PBNP SE. Report, From South **56 = PBNP SE. Report, From North **57 = PBNP GE. Report, Normal Route **58 = PBNP GE. Report, From South **59 = PBNP GE. Report, From North Use the following preprogrammed codes to provide other information, with a call back number, if appropriate:

- 60 = Drill UE. No Action Needed **61 = Drill. AL/SE/GE.

Report **01 = Call Immediately

- 02 = Urgent Call **03 = Call when Available

- 07 = Please Call the Office **99 = Phone Home Page 7 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 2.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC November 30, 1999 b. Access the paging system by dialing c. Listen to the prerecorded message and an audible tone. Enter the four-digit pager number of the person or group you want to page as determined in the above notes. d. Listen to the next prerecorded message that asks you to enter your callback number. Enter the "**:'.code-determined in Step 5.1.2.a and a phone number the person should call (only if appropriate).

e. Listen for an audible tone again. The recording should then state that your message has been dispatched via the Wisconsin Electric paging system. Your page has now been completed.

NOTE: IF the ERO pager(s) in the Control Room do not activate and display the message within 3-4 minutes, THEN go to Step 5.1.3 to send the page. f. Monitor the ERO pager(s) in the control room for verification of activation.

g. If the pager activation was successful, skip Steps 5.1.3 and 5.1.4 and return this procedure section to Emergency Preparedness or include in the TSC Manager turnover package.REFERENCE USE Performed By: Performer (Print and Sign) Date / Time Page 8 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 2.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC November 30, 1999 5.1.3 Alpha-Numeric Paging Accessed Via IBM Mainframe (TSO) NOTE: You must have TSO access to page via the IBM Mainframe system. If you do not have TSO access, notify DSS to re-assign to an individual with TSO access. a. Access the mainframe MULTSESS menu from a computer.

b. After selecting the TSO applicationand receiving the READY text, type in "PAGE" and the enter key. NOTE 1: Do not use symbols.

NOTE 2: Enter pager number 0799 to do a PBNP AU-Call page of the ERO. NOTE 3: To page an individual, hit the enter key and select the name from the list of pager users displayed using a last name search. c. A paging screen will appear asking you for an alpha-numeric message and the pager number you want to reach. Type the message per the event classification and any activation needs of the Emergency Response K.> Facilities.

d. Tab to the pager number blank and enter the pager or group number. e. Press ENTER to have your message sent. f. After a slight delay, a message comes up showing that your message was sent and who was paged. g. This completes the page. You can continue with another page or press PF3 as needed to return to the READY prompt. Type CESF and the enter key to log off TSO at this point.REFERENCE USE Page 9 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC EPIP 2.1 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 November 30, 1999 NOTE: IF the ERO pager(s) in the Control Room do not activate and diplay the message within 3-4 minutes, THEN go to Step 5.1.4 to send the page. h. Monitor the ERO pager(s) in the control room for verification of

activation.

i. If the pager activation was successful, skip Step 5.1.4 and return this

procedure section to Emergency Preparedness or include in the TSC Manager turnover package.REFERENCE USE Page 10 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 2.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC November 30, 1999 5.1.4 Manual Call Tree (reference Emergency Telephone Directory)

NOTE 1: Use this process if all automated methods of notifying the ERO fail. NOTE 2: IF unable to contact any of the following personnel, THEN assign that section to onsite individual.

a. Contact two people from the Emergency Preparedness staff -(ref.Step 5.1 .4.(a),(b))"and the On-Call Management (ref Step 5.1.4.(c)-(g)), instructing them to: Notify qualified ERO personnel for each position listed (ref ETD 01), determine FFD, fill the "*" minimum positions first, and staff each position to the (#) level indicated. (a) FFD #1 -"Are you able to respond?" (b) FFD #2 -If yes, "Have you consumed alcohol in the last five hours?" (c) FFD #3 -If no, instruct person to report immediately to emergency response facility and fill the position of

Contact you with periodic status updates.

K>a Report to their emergency response facility upon completion of the notifications. (a) EP Staff #1 (Name) (1) *TSC Manager (1) (2) *TSC/EOF Communicator (1) (3) *EOF/CR Communicator (1) (4) *Engineering Coordinator.(1)

(5) *Operations Coordinator (1) (6) *OSC Coordinator (1) (7) *ENS Communicator (1) (8) *Rad/Chem Coordinator (I) (9) Security Coordinator (1) (10) Plant Status Monitor-TSC (1) (11) Administrative Support Leader-TSC (1) (12) Rad/Chem Monitor (1) (13) Reactor/Core Physics Engineer (1) .(14) PRA Engineer (1) (15) Mechanical Systems Engineer (1) (16) Electrical/I&C Engineer (1) (17) WE Executive Spokesperson (1)REFERENCE USE Page I11 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 2.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC November 30, 1999 (b) EP Staff #2 (Name) (1) *Emergency Director (1) (2) *EOF Manager (1) (3) *TSC/CR Communicator (1) (4) *Dose/PAR Coordinator (1) (5) *State/Counties Communicator (1) (6) *JPIC Communicator (1) .(7)..-. -*Resource Coordinator (1). (8) Plant Status Monitor-EOF (1) (9) Dose/PAR Monitor (1) (10) HPN/SRC Communicator (1) (11) State Liaison (1) (12) Offsite Assembly Area Coordinator (1) (13) Corporate Communicator (1) (14) Administrative Support Leader-EOF (1) (15) Kewaunee County Liaison (1) (16) Manitowoc County Liaison (1) (17) EOF Communicator at JPIC (1) (18) JPIC Technical Advisor (1) (19) JPIC Technical Spokesperson (1) (c) Operations (Name) (1) *DSS (Reentry Team Coordinator) from "off' crews (I) (2) *Operating Supervisor (Operations Leader) from "off' crews (2) (3) CO Reentry from "off' crews (4) (4) AO Reentry from "off' crews (4) (d) Radiation Protection (Name) (1) *Offsite Radiation Protection Coordinator (1) (2) *Radiation Protection Leader (1) (3) *Field Team Leader (1) (4) *Offsite RP Reentry (6) (5) Onsite RP Reentry (4) (e) Maintenance Supervisor (Name) (1) Mechanical Leader (1) (2) Electrical Leader (1) (3) Mechanical Reentry (4) (4) Electrical Reentry (4)REFERENCE USE Page 12 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC EPIP 2.1 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 November 30, 1999 (f) I&C Supervisor (Name) (1) I&C Leader (1) (2) I&C Reentry (4) (g) Chemistry Supervisor (Name) (1) Chemistry Leader (1) (2) -ChemistyReentry_(4)

b. Return this procedure section to Emergency Preparedness or include in the TSC Manager turnover package.

Performed By: Performer (Print and Sign) Date / Time REFERENCE USE Page 13 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 2.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC November 30, 1999 5.2 Notifications to State and Counties NOTE 1: The notification of state and county emergency government agencies shall be completed within 15 minutes of event classification, event termination, or change in protective action recommendations.

NOTE 2: The State Radiological Coordinator may place a separate call to obtain additional information for purposes of determining State and County Emergency Operation Center(s) activations...

NOTE 3: Priority levels are assigned to Two-Digit Dial-Select communications as follows: 1 Siren Activation 2 Event Notification/PAR Upgrade 3 -Status Update 4 General Information NOTE 4: IF the event is classified as a General Emergency, THEN recommend minimum protective actions.

5.2.1 The Emergency Director shall complete or delegate the completion of Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form. 5.2.2 The Emergency Director shall approve the contents of Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form, prior to the release of the information.

5.2.3 Provide

this procedure and the completed form to the person designated to make the communications, conducting a verbal review of the information as required.

NOTE: IF the Two-Digit Dial-Select is out-of-service, THEN use commercial telephones (ref. Emergency Telephone Directory) to make the notification.

5.2.4 Record

the callback number for the facility you are calling from on Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form.

Control Room

Emergency Operations Facility

Technical Support Center -Page 14 of 30 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC EPIP 2.1 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 November 30, 1999 November 30, 1999 5.2.5 NOTE-I: Using the Two-Digit Dial-Select telephone:

"* Pick up the handset and ask if the line is clear. (Similar to Gai-tronics)

"* IF the line is busy, THEN inform them of your Priority 2 notification.

"* They will clear the line, unless a Priority 1 discussion is in progress.

"* When the line is clear, continue with the notification. -IF unable to contact-a specific-agency after- five-(5) rings, THE. N press the # key to stop the ringing and continue with the notification to the agencies online. Then use commercial telephone lines to contact those agencies which were not reached.NOTE 2: Two locations will ring for the State: WEM in Madison and State Patrol (off-hours).

Press the # key to stop the ringing if one location does not answer. 5.2.6 Dial "22" to contact the following agencies simultaneously:

"* Manitowoc County Sheriff Dispatcher

"* Kewaunee County Sheriff Dispatcher

"* State of Wisconsin Emergency Management (WEM) 5.2.7 Record the time and the name of the person who answers FOR EACH AGENCY on Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form, you are transmitting.

5.2.8 Request

each agency to remain on the line while you communicate the event information.

5.2.9 Request

each agency to remain on the line while you ask one agency (preferably the State) to repeat the information as a confirmation of accuracy.

5.2.10 Request each agency to transmit the event information to appropriate personnel within their agency, instructing those individuals to place a return call to you to verify the notification.

Page 15 of 30 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 2.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC November 30, 1999 5.2.11 IF commercial telephone lines must be used to complete the notifications, THEN call each of the following agencies as appropriate, repeating Steps 5.2.7 through Step 5.2.10. e Manitowoc County Sheriff Dispatcher, e Kewaunee County Sheriff Dispatcher, e State of Wisconsin Emergency Management (WEM). NOTE: -IFunable toremain at-the-callback-number, THEN ensure an alternate person has assumed your responsibilities at that location.

5.2.12 Fax Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form, to the following agencies using the pre-programmed keys or referencing the Emergency Telephone Directory.

a State of Wisconsin Emergency Management (WEM)

Manitowoc County Emergency Management e Kewaunee County Emergency Government

Emergency Response Facilities (If Activating) 5.2.13 Remain at the callback number until the callback verifications have been received from the three agencies, recording the time and name of each caller on Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form. 5.2.14 Return Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form, to the Emergency Director.Page 16 of 30 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 2.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC November 30, 1999 5.3 Notifications to WE Media Line and KNPP 5.3.1 Obtain an approved copy of Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form. 5.3.2 Contact the Wisconsin Electric Communications and Community Relations Department at, and relay the event information on Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form. (Outside normal working hours, you may.be asked to provide a callback number and an On-Call Nuclear InformationRepresentative will return your call.) Contact Name: Time: Classification Transmitted:

5.3.3 Contact

the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Control Room at (920) 388-8200 and relay the event information on Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form. Contact Name: Time: Classification Transmitted:

5.3.4 Return

this procedure section and Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form, to the Emergency Director.Page 17 of 30 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 2.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC November 30, 1999 5.4 Notifications to the NRC NOTE: The notification to the NRC shall be completed immediately following the notifications to the state and counties and not exceeding 60-minutes from event classification, event termination, or change in protective action recommendations.

5.4.1 Emergency

Director shall provide this procedure and the completed

-Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form, from Step 5.2.1 to the person designated-to make-the-notificationr-conduoting a-verbal review of the information, as required.

NOTE 1: Do not dial "1" prefix on the NRC ENS phone. NOTE 2: If the FTS-2000 ENS phone is out-of-service, use commercial telephones (ref Emergency Telephone Directory) to make the notification.

NOTE 3: The NRC may request a continuous open line of communication be maintained without regard to event classification.

This request shall be honored if at all possible.

5.4.2 Contact

the NRC Operations Center via the FTS-2000 ENS phone by dialing the number listed on the NRC sticker on the phone cradle. If number is busy, try the next number listed. 5.4.3 Record the time and name of the NRC Duty Officer on Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form, you are transmitting.

5.4.4 Communicate

the event information clearly and concisely.

5.4.5 Fax the Nuclear Accident Reporting Form to the NRC using the pre-programmed fax key or referencing the Emergency Telephone Directory.

5.4.6 Make an entry into the appropriate NRC phone log. "* Control Room "* Technical Support Center 5.4.7 IF not previously notified, THEN contact the NRC resident inspector.

Contact Name: Time: Classification Transmitted:

5.4.8 Return

Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form, to the Emergency Director.REFERENCE USE Page IS of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 2.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC November 30, 1999 K.... 5.5 Status Updates to State and Counties NOTE: Status updates should be made to State and County Emergency agencies approximately hourly, upon a major change in plant/radiological status, or at their request.

5.5.1 Use Attachment C, Plant Status Update, and/or Attachment D, Radiological Status Update, as a guideline for verbally communicating status updates.

NOTE: IF unable to contact a specific agency, THEN continue with the notification to other agencies, attempt to contact those agencies which have not been contacted.

NOTE: IF the Two-Digit Dial-Select is out-of-service, !THEN use commercial telephones (preferably via conference call referring to the Emergency Telephone Directory) to make the status update. 5.5.2 Using the Two-Digit Dial-Select telephone:

"* Pick up the handset and ask if the line is clear. (Similar to Gai-tronics)

"* IF the line is busy, ThEN inform them of your Priority 3 notification.

"* They will clear the line, unless a Priority 1 or 2 discussion is in progress.

"* When the line is clear, continue with the notification.

NOTE: IF unable to contact a specific agency after five (5) rings, THEN press the # key to stop the ringing. Contact those agencies by commercial telephone after completing the status update. 5.5.3 Dial "53, 43, and 83" consecutively to contact the following agencies simultaneously:

53 -Manitowoc County EOC

43 -Kewaunee County EOC

83 -State of Wisconsin Emergency Management (WEM) EQC 5.5.4 Request each agency remain on the line while you communicate the status update event information and answer questions.

REFERENCE USE Page 19 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 2.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC November 30, 1999 5.5.5 IF commercial telephone lines must be used to complete the notifications, THEN call the following agencies (ref. Emergency Telephone Directory):

"* Manitowoc County EOC "* Kewaunee County EOC "* State of Wisconsin Emergency Management (WEM) EOC 5.5.6 IF a request has been made by the State or County for a hard copy -Attachment C,-Plant Status Update,-or Attachment D, Radiological Status Update, THEN complete the appropriate section(s), obtain the Emergency Director approval, and fax using the pre-programmed fax keys or referencing the Emergency Telephone Directory.

"* State of Wisconsin Emergency Management (WEM) "* Manitowoc County Emergency Management

"* Kewaunee County Emergency Government

"* Emergency Response Facilities (If Activating)

5.5.7 Repeat

Steps 5.5.2 through 5.5.6 each time a status update is required.

5.5.8 IF a completed Attachment C, Plant Status Update, or Attachment D, Radiological Status Update, was faxed to the State or County, THEN return the appropriate completed attachment(s) to the Emergency Director.REFERENCE USE Page 20 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 2.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC November 30, 1999 5.6 Status Updates to the NRC NOTE 1: The NRC should receive status updates approximately hourly, upon a major change in plant/radiological status, or at their request.

NOTE 2: Do not dial "1" prefix on the NRC FTS-2000 ENS phone. NOTE 3: IF the FTS-2000 ENS phone is out-of-service, THEN use commercial telephones.(ref.

Emergency Telephone Directory) to make the notification.

NOTE 4: The NRC may request that a continuous open line of communication be maintained without regard to event classification.

5.6.1 Use Attachment E, Status Report on Plant Systems and Controls for Affected Unit, as a guideline for verbally communicating status updates.

5.6.2 Contact

the NRC Operations Center via the FTS-2000 ENS phone by dialing the number listed on the NRC sticker on the phone cradle. If number is busy, try the next number listed. 5.6.3 IF a request is made by the NRC to fax a completed Attachment E, Status Report on Plant Systems and Controls for Affected Unit, THEN complete the form, obtain the Emergency Director approval, and fax to the NRC. 5.6.4 IF a completed status update form was faxed to the NRC, THEN return the completed Attachment E, Status Report on Plant Systems and Controls for Affected Unit, to the Emergency Director.REFERENCE USE Page 21 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC EPIP 2.1 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 November 30, 1999

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 WE-NRC (Plant 12.3), May 19, 1983, Staffing Levels for Emergency Situations, Point Beach Nuclear Plant 6.2 NRC-WE, December 20, 1985, Inspection Report Nos. 50-266/83-01 and 50-301/83-01

6.3 Emergency

Plan, EP 5.0, Organizational Control of Emergencies

7.0 BASES

B-1 10 CFR 50.47(b), Emergency Plans B-2 10 CFR 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors B-3 NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73, Rev 1, January 1998 REFERENCE USE Page 22 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC EPIP 2.1 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 November 30, 1999 November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT A AUTOMATED NOTIFICATION SYSTEM SCENARIO SELECTION MATRIX Emergency Facility Plant Class Activation Approach 1 -Unusual Event 0 -NO Facility 0 -Use NORMAL Activation routes 2 -Alert I- Activate PBNP 1 -Approach PBNP ERFs from the SOUTH 3 -Site 2 -Activate all ERFs 2 -Approach PBNP Emergency from the NORTH 4 -General Emergency 555 Disregard previous page. 1. Determine the 3-digit scenario to be activated from matrix above choosing one number from each column. Record here: Example Scenario: "Site Emergency/Activate All ERFs/Use normal routes" would be Scenario 320. 2. Call extension 7158. 3. ENTER your scenario activation password using the keypad on the telephone when prompted.

4. ENTER the 3-digit scenario number (Step 1) when prompted.

5. When the system says, "the scenario is building," press the "#" key, listen to the "good-bye," and then hang up. 6. Monitor the Control Room pager for the message sent. 7. Send this completed attachment to Emergency Preparedness or include in the TSC Manager turnover package.REFERENCE USE Page 23 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC EPIP 2.1 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT B NUCLEAR ACCIDENT REPORTING FORM NOTE: Direct state and counties to record the information on the State of Wisconsin Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS form).1. Status (A) Actual (C) Drill -(B) Exercise (D) Termination

4. Incident Classification/Termination Time: Date: EAL #________________

I ________________

________________

/ ________________

7. Wind Direction Degrees From: Downwind Sector: 9. Protective Actions Recommended

2. Station 3. On-site Incident Classification

"(T) Point Beach (A) Unusual Event (D) General Emergency (B) Alert (E) Recovery .--(C) Site.Emergency

--( F) Not Applicable

5. Release to Environment

6. Type of Release (A) None (A) Not Applicable (B) Potential (B) Radioactive Gas (C) Occurring (C) Radioactive Liquid (D) Terminated

& Wind Speed (B) Miles/hr.(A) None (B) Evacuate 0-2 mile radius (D) Evacuate 2-5 (C) Evacuate 0-5 miles radius (E) Evacuate 5-1 (F) Other 10. Additional Information From EAL Table -Affected Unit: miles for Sectors 0 miles for Sectors Emergency Director Approval:

Date / Time / *--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11. Immediately upon Emergency Director approval, relay information to Emergency Managements (EM) listed. Request the answering parties to have the appropriate EM personnel call 920/ -for notification verification.

State/County message transmitted by in the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (Name) (CRJTSC/EOF/AEOF)

12. STATE/COUNTY ANSWERED CALLBACK VERIFICATION Agency Time Name Position Time Name Contact Phone # Manitowoc Co EM Director Kewaunee Co EM Director Wisconsin Duty Officer -- ------------------------------ ----- -------------------------------------

13. NRC ANSWERED -Callback Verification Not Required Duty Officer Name Time _ Continuous phone link requested:

__No _._Yes NRC message transmitted by in the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (Name) (CR/TSC/EOF/AEOF)

-- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------REFERENCE USE Page 24 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC EPIP 2.1 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 November 30, 1999 November30, 1999 ATTACHMENT C PLANT STATUS UPDATE Check One: 0 Actual 03 Drill 03 Exercise 1. Point Beach Nuclear Plant 2. Date/Time:

3. DescriptonofEvent

3. Description of Event: ____________________

___________

4. Emergency Action Level(s):_________________

______________

5 Major Equipment Affected: (LIST)a. C. e. 6. Reactor Status: (Check one) a. Critical b. Shutdown b. d. f. 7. Radiological boundaries Lost(L) or Threatened(T): (Indicate all that apply) a. Fuel Cladding b. Reactor Coolant System c. Containment

8. Plant Personnel Status (Enter # or N/A for each type incident):

a. # Deaths b. # Overexposure to Personnel

c. # -- Injured Personnel Treated On-Site d. #___ Injured Personnel Treated Off-Site e. # _ Contaminated Personnel On-Site f. #_-_ Contaminated Personnel Off-Site g. Other (explain):

9. Areas Affected by A Radiological Release a. Plume Path (Downwind Sectors):

____:_:Distance (mi) b. Deposition (Describe Location):

10. News Statement from the JPIC or Established Media Center a. The Next News Statement is Scheduled for: Date: Time: 11. State or Local Assistance Requested by the Plant Emergency Director Approval:

Date / Time ---------------------------------------------------

-- ------Manitowoc Co. __ ______Kewaunee Co. _ _____ Wisconsin WEM------(Time) Communicated By: (Time)(Time)Page 25 of 30 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC EPIP 2.1 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT D RADIOLOGICAL STATUS UPDATE Page 1 of 3 Check One: 03 Actual [] Drill [3 Exercise 1. Point Beach Nuclear Plant 2. Date/Time:

/3. Plant Status: a. General: b. Electrical Power: Improving Satisfactory

_ _Stable _ _Problems Degrading If problems, describe: 4. Offsite Radiological Conditions:

a. Release Prognosis:

__ No Release is expected __ Release is expected at the start time listed in 4b. __ Release is in progress b. Event Times (Complete all applicable times): __ Reactor Trip Start of release to containment Start of release to environment

Release Stop *(Actual / Estimated

/ Default) Line out inappropriate word(s)c. Type of Release: __ Liquid Airborne Release Path: Controlled

__ Uncontrolled Monitored Unmonitored

d. Plume Path (Downwind Sectors):

: : _ Distance (mi)e. Downwind Doses at the Plume Centerline:

Based on: I Mi (SBCC) 2Mi. 5 Mi. 10 Mi._Projections

__rem TEDE rem TEDE rem TEDE rem TEDE Field Measurement

__rem CDE Thyroid rem CDE Thyroid __rem CDE Thyroid ___rem CDE Thyroid REFERENCE USE Page 26 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC EPIP 2.1 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT D RADIOLOGICAL STATUS UPDATE Page 2 of 3 f. Surface Deposition:

Based on: dpm/100 cm 2 -Ci/m 2 dpm/100 cm 2 -Ci/m 2 dpm/100 cm 2 -Ci/m 2 (Line out inappropriate unit)Projection Location:

Location:

Location: Field Measurement

g. Recommended protective actions were made at (Time: Accident Reporting System form. 5. Meteorological Conditions:

a. Wind Speed: MPH b. Wind Direction:

Degrees c. Stability Class (circle one): A B C d. Mixing Layer Height: Ft. e. Precipitation (check one): __ Light Rain Moderate Rain Light Snow Moderate Snow on the Wisconsin Nuclear D E F G Heavy Rain Heavy Snow__None 6. Reactor Status:__ At Power ( Megawatts Thermal) _ Tripped (Power Level at trip Megawatts Thermal) _ Hot Shutdown (Current RCS Temperature deg. F.) __Cold Shutdown (RCS is less than 200°F.)7. Core Status: Core Exit Temperature:

_ No Damage Expected Core Damage sequence in progress _ Gap Release In-Vessel Severe Core Damage Vessel Melt Through.Increasing

___Stabl (Est. Time: ) (Est. Time: ) (Est. Time: ) (Est. Time: ) _..... Decreasing

8. Containment Status: a. Containment Spray: ON OFF c. Pressure:

__ Increasing Stable __ Decreasing

b. Containment Leak Rate None Calculated (c cc/sec) Design Rate (0.1% per day) S_100% per Day 100% per Hour d. Temperature:

__Increasing Stable __Decreasing REFERENCE USE Q-)Page 27 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC EPIP 2.1 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT D RADIOLOGICAL STATUS UPDATE Page 3 of 3 9. Steam Generator Status: a. Leak Rate (Check One): None ____ Full Pressure (# of tubes ) ____ Low Pressure (# of charging pumps ) ____ Calculated (Gallons per minute ) c. Partitioning:

__ N/A (No leak) __ Leak is above steam generator water level (default)

__ Leak is below steam generator water level 10. Containment Bypass Status: a. Containment Bypass Leak Rate None _ _ Calculated ( cc/sec) S0.1% per Day S_ 100% per Day __ 100% per Hour 11. Gross Release Rate Data: a. _ Not Applicable (No Leak)b. Reactor Coolant Concentrations:

-N/A (No Leak) Normal 100x normal non-nobles Calculated Concentration (Attached Analysis)

d. Release Path None Safety Valve (or PORV) __ Air Ejector b. Release Path: None Filtered Unfiltered b.Not Available c. Total Ci/sec Kr, Xe % Ba, Sr %lodines % Ru, Mo %Cs % Te, Sb__ La, Y, Ce, Np %12.- Specific Isotopic Release Data (Ci/sec):

a. __ Not Applicable (No leak) c. H-3 Sr-91 Mn-54 Y-91 Co-58 Mo-99 Kr-85 Te-99m Kr-85m _ Ru-103 Kr-87 Ru-106 Kr-88 Sb-127 Sr-89 Sb-129 Sr-90 Te-129m b. Te-131m Te-132 1-131 1-132 1-133 1-134 1-135 Xe-131l Xe-133 Not available Xe-133m Xe-135 Xe-138 Cs-134 Cs-136 Cs-137 Ba-140 La-140 Ce-144 Emergency Director Approval:

Date / Time /Manitowoc Co.Kewaunee Co.(Time)Wisconsin WEM (Time)Communicated By: REFERENCE USE (Time)Page 28 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC EPIP 2.1 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT E STATUS REPORT ON PLANT SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS FOR AFFECTED UNIT Page 1 of 2 Check One: 0 Actual 03 Drill 0 Exercise 1. Basic Accident Information (Unit ) a. Status Report Date/Time: (Date)b. C. d. e./ ; Report# (Time-24 Hours)-Emergency Classification:

.. ... _ __ (If applicable)

Time of Reactor Shutdown: (If applicable)

Time of Radiological Release to Containment: (If applicable)

Time of Radiological Release from Plant: hrs. hrs. hrs.2. Status of Reactivity Control Subcritical Yes No 3. Status of Core Cooling Highest Tb OF Coldest Tc _F Incore Thermocouples:

Average Temperature

_F Pressurizer Heaters Available Yes No Subcooling Margin: OF 4. Status of Reactor Coolant System Integrity

a. Pressurizer or Reactor System Pressure b. Pressurizer Level c. Primary System Relief Valves Closed d. Letdown Flow e. Charging Pump Flow psig Yes No gpm gpm 5. Status of Secondary Systems a. Steam Generator Pressure b. Steam Generator Level c. Feedwater Flow, Auxiliary Main"A" psig "A" % "A" gpm "A" klbm/h"B" psig "B" % "B" gpm "B" klbm/h 6. Containment

a. Pressure WR psig NR psig b. Containment Spray Flow gpm c. NaOH Addition Yes No Time Lei d. Containment Recirculation Coolers Running (Circle) 1 2 e. Sump B Level inches f. H 2 Concentration

% g. Containment Isolation Valves (Note any not closed),el % 3 4 REFERENCE USE a. b. C. d.Page 29 of 30 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NOTIFICATIONS

-ERO, STATE & COUNTIES, AND NRC EPIP 2.1 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 18 November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT E STATUS REPORT ON PLANT SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS FOR AFFECTED UNIT Page 2 of 2 7. Safeguards Systems a. Safety Injection Train A Train B High Head ___gpm ___gpm Low Head ___gpm ___gpm b. Accumulators Level % % Pressure psig psig Isolation Valve Open Yes/No Yes/No c. Refueling Water Storage Tank Level % d. Component Cooling Water Temperature inlet _ F outlet OF Flow gpm e. Service Water No. of pumps running Temp. OF f. ESF pump (SI, RHR, AFW, CS) recirculation status, enter in remarks.8. State of Meteorology Primary Tower Inland Tower 1OM Wind Direction (avg.) Wind Speed GO AT/AH Atmospheric Stability Class Lake Breeze Conditions Exist? (circle)45M-0 0 mph mph 0 0 OF Yes / No 9. Status of Power Supplies a. Offsite Power b.. Diesel Running Diesel Loaded Unit I GO0 G01 Y/N Y/N Y/N Unit 2 G02 G02 Y/N Y/N Y/N Gas Turbine G03 Y/N G03 Y/N 10. Other Equipment Remarks: Emergency Director Approval:

Communicated to NRC By: Date I Time Date / Time REFERENCE USE a. b. C. d. e. f.Y/N G04 G04 Y/N Y/N I I Page 30 of 30 EPIP 4.1 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION:

REVISION:

EFFECTIVE DATE: PROCEDURE OWNER: Technical NNSR 29 November 30, 1999 Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS DELETED NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PU RPO SE .......................................................................................................................

3 2.0 PREREQUISITES

...........................................

3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LDMITATICONS

...................................................................

5 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

..........................................................................................

6 5.0 PROCEDURE

............................................................................................................

6 5.1 A ctivation

........................................................................................................................

6 5.2 Evacuation

.......................................................................................................................

7

6.0 REFERENCES

........................................................................................................

8 7.0 BA SES ............................................................................................................................

9 ATTACHMENT A TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER LAYOUT ...........................................

10 ATTACHMENT B OPERATION OF THE EMERGENCY VENTILATION AT THE TSC .........

II ATTACHMENT C TSC EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY .....................................................

15 ATTACHMENT D ACTIVATION OF THE IODINE AND NOBLE GAS (ING) RADIATION MONITORS ........................................................................

19 ATTACHMENT E ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS) ...21 ATTACHMENT F ACCESS OF THE WISCONSIN ELECTRIC DOSE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (WEDAP) .....................................................

22 ATTACHMENT G PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS) ........................

...............

24 REFERENCE USE Page 2 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions for the activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC). The TSC is activated upon declaration of an ALERT, or higher classification, or at any other time deemed necessary by the Duty Shift Superintendent (DSS). Activation of the TSC does NOT require the declaration of an emergency.

Attachment A, Technical Support Center Layout, describes the facility layout. This procedure also describes the method by which the TSC and OSC is evacuated and responsibilities transferred to alternate locations.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 Technical

Support Center Manager:.

a. Directs all onsite emergency response in support of the Control Room. b. Upon activation of the TSC, assumes a formal turnover of responsibilities from the DSS for: e Assessment of plant conditions and classification recommendations to the Emergency Director per EPIP 1.2, Emergency Classifications.

9 Onsite radiological assessments mnd protective action recommendations (PARs).

NRC (ENS) Communications.

Assembly and Accountability, Release and Evacuation of Personnel per EPIP 6.1. c. Decision to evacuate the TSC and OSC and relocate to alternate areas. 2.1.2 Engineering Coordinator:

a. TSC activation prior to the arrival of the TSC Manager.

b. Directs the engineering staff in providing technical support.REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE 2.1.3 Operations-Coordinator:

a. TSC Emergency Power per Attachment C, TSC Emergency Power Supply. b. Interface with Control Room and input to classification based on plant conditions. -c. Monitors EPIP 1=2-based on plant-conditions and provides event classification recommendations.

Assists in setting priorities in support of the Control Room. 2.1.4 Rad/Chem Coordinator:

a. Activates the TSC emergency ventilation system per Attachment B, Operation of The Emergency Ventilation at the TSC. b. Activates the Wisconsin Electric Dose Assessment Program -WEDAP (if EOF is NOT being activated) per Attachment F, Access of the Wisconsin Electric Dose Assessment Program (WEDAP).

c. Activates the Iodine and Noble Gas (ING) Monitors per Attachment D, Activation of the Iodine and Noble Gas Radiation Monitors.

d. Assesses onsite radiological conditions in addition to plant and facility habitability.

e. Assumes offsite dose assessment and protective action recommendations (PARs) to the Emergency Director in the event the EOF cannot perform that function.

2.1.5 ENS Communicator

-Maintains communications with NRC headquarters.

2.1.6 Plant

Status Monitor: a. Activates Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) workstation per Attachment G, Plant Process Computer System (PPCS). b. Activates the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) at an ALERT or higher classification if NOT previously done in the Control Room per Attachment E, Activation of Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). c. Supports event monitoring by serving as resource for plant and environment data. d. Maintains plant status boards.REFERENCE USE Page 4 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE 2.1.7 EOF/CR Communicator

-Maintain continuous communication between Control Room, EOF, and TSC. Assists with monitoring plant conditions and event classifications.

2.1.8 OSC Coordinator

-Ensures OSC priorities and reentry teams are in direct support of the Control Room and TSC. 2.1.9 Rad/Chem Monitor -Support radiological response by serving as resource for :onsite assessment of rdi16logical c6iiditionsin aadition to plant and facility habitability.

Maintains rmd/met status boards. 2.1.10 Security Coordinator

-Controls ingress/egress to PBNP and a liaison between Emergency Response Organization and Security.

2.1.11 Reactor/Core Physics Engineer -Provides engineering support.

2.1.12 PRA Engineer -Provides engineering support.

2.1.13 Mechanical System Engineer -Provides engineering support.

2.1.14 Electrical/I&C

-Provides engineering support.

.) 2.1.15 Administrative Support Leader -Provides clerical and administrative support to the Emergency Response Organization.

2.2 Equipment

2.2.1 TSC inventory per EPMP 1.3, Routine Inventory of TSC, EOF, AEOF, JPIC, and OSC Emergency Preparedness Supplies 2.2.2 TSC Satellite File and Drawing System Aperture Cards 2.2.3 PPCS Workstations

2.2.4 WEDAP

Workstation

2.2.5 Radiation

Monitoring System 2.2.6 Communications equipment per EPMP 2.1, Testing of Communications Equipment

3.0 PRECAUTIONS

AND LIMITATIONS Evacuation of the TSC shall include the coordination of the evacuation for the OSC.Page 5 of 28 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS This procedure shall be implemented upon declaration of an ALERT or higher classification or at the discretion of the Duty Shift Superintendent to provide the Control Room technical support.

Evacuation of the TSC and OSC shall be considered when any of the following conditions exist: 4.1 Radiation levels surrounding the TSC/OSC are: 4.1.1 Whole body (TEDE) 500 mrem/hr (measured or calculated)

4.1.2 Thyroid

(CDE) 3000 mrem/hr (calculated)

NOTE: Higher dose rates can be tolerated for short periods of time if projections do NOT exceed the limits below: 4.2 Emergency response personnel radiation doses in the TSC/OSC are exceeding or are projected to exceed the following for the duration of the event: 4.2.1 Whole body (TEDE) 5 rem (calculated)

4.2.2 Thyroid

(CDE) 25 rem (calculated)

4.3 Other

emergency conditions (i.e., fire, toxic or flammable gases, or loss of power). 5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 Activation

5.1.1 The TSC Manager shall ensure the completion of the TSC Position Instruction Manual, PIM TSC 2.1, TSC Manager.

NOTE: The facility may be activated earlier based upon the TSC Manager's discretion if determined there is an understanding of the events in progress and adequate staffing resources in place to respond to the emergency.

5.1.2 Minimum

staff positions are: a. TSC Manager b. Operations Coordinator

c. EOF/CR Communicator

d. OSC Coordinator REFERENCE USE Page 6 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE e. Rad/Chem Coordinator

f. Engineering Coordinator

g. ENS Communicator 5.1.3 The TSC emergency ventilation system, iodine and noble gas (ING) radiation "monitors, ERDS, and PPCS equipment will be activated per the attachments within this procedure.

-... 5.1.4 The WEDAP equipment and emergency power supply will be activated, as appropriate, per the attachments within this procedure.

5.1.5 Each ERO position shall activate and assume their area of responsibility and function within the TSC using their Position Instruction Manual. 5.2 Evacuation 5.2.1 The TSC and OSC shall be evacuated under the direction of the TSC Manager.

5.2.2 The key to an orderly evacuation is good communications, formal turnover with personnel who are assuming TSC/OSC responsibilities, and documentation of actions and notifications.

5.2.3 The Operations Coordinator and Operations Support Center Coordinator shall report to the Control Room to coordinate current and projected support of the operating crew. 5.2.4 Select the best relocation area(s) (i.e., the EOF, upper level of the Admin Building, North Service Building cafeteria, computer room above the Control Room) within the plant to relocate all remaining TSC and OSC personnel.

5.2.5 Transfer

responsibility for all communications to the EOF. The ENS Communicator may relocate to that facility.

5.2.6 Direct

the Control Room to take responsibility for in-plant teams until the relocation area is functional.

5.2.7 Ensure

all personnel are accounted for after reaching the relocation area(s).

5.2.8 Develop

an immediate plan for reentry of the TSC/OSC area, if possible.REFERENCE USE Page 7 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 Point

Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan 6.2 EPIP 1.2, Emergency Classifications 6.3 EPIP 1.3, Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations 6.4 EPIP 4.2, Operations Support Center (OSC)Activafion and Evacuation 6.5 EPIP 6.1, Assembly and Accountability, Release and Evacuation of Personnel 6.6 EPMP 1.3, Routine Inventory of TSC, EOF, AEOF, JPIC, and OSC Emergency Preparedness Supplies 6.7 EPMP 2.1, Testing of Communications Equipment 6.8 PIM TSC 2.1, TSC Manager 6.9 PIM TSC 2.2, Administrative Support Leader 6.10 PIM TSC 2.3, Operations Coordinator 6.11 PIM TSC 2.4, EOF/CR Communicator 6.12 PIM TSC 2.5, Plant Status Monitor 6.13 PIM TSC 2.6, Operations Support Center Coordinator 6.14 PIM TSC 2.7, Rad/Chem Coordinator 6.15 PIM TSC 2.8, Rad/Chem Monitor 6.16 PIM TSC 2.9, Engineering Coordinator 6.17 PIM TSC 2.10, Reactor/Core Physics Engineer 6.18 PIM TSC 2.11, Probabilistic Risk Assessment Engineer 6.19 PIM TSC 2.12, Mechanical Systems Engineer 6.20 PIM TSC 2.13, Electrical/Instrumentation

& Control Engineer 6.21 PIM TSC 2.14, ENS Communicator 6.22 PIM TSC 2.15, Security Coordinator REFERENCE USE Page 8 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION

7.0 BASES

EPIP 4.1 NNSR Revision 29 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TOTAL REWRITE B-i 10 CFR 50.47(b), Emergency Plans B-2 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix E.IV, Content of Emergency Plans B-3 NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants B-4 NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements REFERENCE USE Page 9 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.1 NNSR Revision 29 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT A TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER LAYOUT Microwave Lines -Milw-(414)221-5190

--Appleton -(920) 380AS501 -Kewaunee -Future 6398 755-3190 OSC Coordinator RADICHEM Coordinator RADICHEM Monitor TSCIOSC REFERENCE USE S Plant Status Monitor Page 10 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.1 NNSR Revision 29 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B OPERATION OF THE EMERGENCY VENTILATION AT THE TSC Page 1 of 4

1.0 DESCRIPTION

-EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM The Technical Support Center (TSC) heating and ventilating system has a normal and emergency operating mode. Undernormal operation, tlhe airintaike is from Tihe outside air vent on the east wall of the TSC building.

The intake air under normal operation is essentially unfiltered.

TSC Normal Figure 1 Ventilation Flow Paths REFERENCE USE Page I11 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.1 NNSR Revision 29 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B OPERATION OF THE EMERGENCY VENTILATION AT THE TSC Page 2 of 4 In the emergency mode, there are two optional air intake locations.

One is adjacent to the normal intake on the east wall of the TSC building (see Figure 2), and the other is on the north wall of the Unit 2 turbine hall. (See Figure 3)."Figure 2 TSC Emergency Ventilation Flow Path (South Inlet)Figure 3 TSC Emergency Ventilation Flow Path (North Inlet)2.0 OPERATION OF THE EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM 2.1 Assure that air flow is from the TSC to the turbine building at Door 116. Check DPI-4713A on the annunciator panel (El. 18.5') to verify that the TSC is pressurized relative to the turbine building.

If NOT, coordinate manipulation of the turbine building supply fans, dampers, and exhaust fans with the Operations Coordinator to achieve air flow from the TSC at Door 116.REFERENCE USE Page 12 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.1 NNSR Revision 29 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B OPERATION OF THE EMERGENCY VENTILATION AT THE TSC Page 3 of 4 2.2 To shift the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning system from the normal to emergency mode, locate Panel M-1. Figure 4 'El. 18.5' -Adfmirnistrative'Building"WifliTSC 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 Turn the "auto/off/occupied" switch on Panel M-1 to the "occupied" position.

Turn the "normal/emergency" control switch on Panel M-I to the "evemergency" position.

Select the north or south (east) emergency intake depending on meteorological conditions.

Select the upwind intake duct.REFERENCE USE Page 13 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30,1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B OPERATION OF THE EMERGENCY VENTILATION AT THE TSC Page 4 of 4 2.3 TSC Auxiliary Air Conditioning

2.3.1 Select

"hand" on compressor CH2 located on the west wall of El. 18.5' of the TSC building (see Figure 4). 2.3.2 Turn the air handling unit (W89) to the "on" position in the TSC room north wall (see Attachment A). 3.0 RETURNING THE EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM TO NORMAL MODE 3.1 Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System 3.1.1 Turn the "auto/off/occupied" switch on Panel M-1 to the "auto" position (see Figure 4). 3.1.2 Turn the "normal/emergency" control switch on Panel M-1 to the "normal" position (see Figure 4). 3.2 TSC Auxiliary Air Conditioning

3.2.1 Select

"off' on compressor CH2 located on the west wall of El. 18.5' of the TSC building (see Figure 4). 3.2.2 Turn the air handling unit (W89) to the "off' position in the TSC room north wall (see Attachment A).REFERENCE USE Page 14 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.1 NNSR Revision 29 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT C TSC EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY Page 1 of 4

1.0 DESCRIPTION

1.1 The power source for the Technical Support Center (TSC) is IB-01 480 V. (See Figure 1 for the main disconnect locations.)

Figure 1 El. 18.5' -Administrative Building With TSC 1.2 The emergency power supply is available by operation of the auxiliary diesel for G05 and the auto bus transfer switch. (See Figure 1 for the emergency transfer switch location.)

REFERENCE USE Page 15 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT C TSC EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY Page 2 of 4 1.3 Narrative Description 1.3.1 The small 225 kV diesel generator, which supplies backup power to the gas turbine auxiliary loads, has the capability of supplying an alternate source of power to the TSC via 480V brefker (52T) located in the southwest cormer of the gas turbine building.

Control power is directly from the output of the auxiliary diesel generator.

However, Breaker 52T close-open (maintained position) control switch is only electrically in the circuit when the auto/manual selector switch is in the manual position.

1.3.2 The TSC's normal (IB-01) and alternate (52T) power supplies are connected on El. 18.5' of the TSC, via normal manual fused disconnects, to a normal seeking auto bus transfer (ABT) switch. Upon sensing an undervoltage on the TSC's normal feeder (1B-01) for one second, the electronics within the ABT energize relay 52TX off the 24 Vdc TSC emergency lighting batteries via a 10 amp fuse located within the battery enclosure.

Energizing the 52TX relay starts the diesel generator and with selector switch in auto, allows closure of alternate breaker 52T as soon as sufficient voltage is present on the output of the generator unless 5G auxiliaries have taken priority (52E emergency supply closed and/or 5G auxiliary bus undervoltage).

The closing of breaker 52T establishes voltage on the alternate feeder, and the ABT switches to the alternate supply; this connects the TSC loads to the diesel generator.

Subsequently, when voltage is restored to the TSC normal feeder for 30 minutes to assure stability, the ABT shifts to the "preferred" normal supply. This action activates a 5-minute time delay relay. The diesel generator continues to operate until the 5 minutes expire, whereupon relay 52TX deenergizes, opening alternate supply breaker (52T) and shutting down the diesel engine. 1.3.3 Apparently all time delays associated with this system are generated by the electronics package located within the auto bus transfer (ABT) switch. Relay 52TX is located just above and to the left of the TSC heating and ventilating control air compressors, also on El. 18.5'. The TSC emergency lighting batteries are located adjacent to the manual fused disconnect of the alternate supply to the ABT. 1.3.4 The control logic on breaker closure is arranged such that the need for the diesel to supply gas turbine auxiliaries has priority over the need to supply the TSC loads. This is true so long as the auto/manual selector switch on the original breaker control panel (in the 5G building) is left in the "AUTO" position.REFERENCE USE Page 16 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4. 1 NNSR Revision 29 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT C TSC EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY Page 3 of 4 2.0 OPERATION 2.1 With the diesel generator supplying the 5G auxiliaries should it be discovered that 5G is inoperable, and it is deemed necessary to supply the TSC with emergency power, complete Steps 2. Li through 2.1.4 IN ORDER: CAUTION No generator overload protection is provided to trip open breaker 52T. However, it does have breaker thermal and magnetic overcurrent trips. CAUTION In the manual mode it is possible to operate both breaker 52E and 52T to the closed position.

If the normal feed to the TSC is deenergized, this could result in an abrupt overload of the diesel generator with no automatic tripping of either output breaker (the 480 V supply to breaker 52T is taken off upstream of the overload protection which trips breaker 52E) unless all 5G auxiliary 480 VAC loads are stripped except for P105, the fuel oil transfer pump. This stripping should only be done if it is obvious that 5G will remain inoperable for a relatively long period.2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3 2.1.4 Place 52T control switch to OPEN position.

The auto/manual selector switch must be placed to MANUAL. Breaker (52E) to 5G auxiliaries, OPENED locally via its control switch. Breaker (52T) TSC loads, CLOSED locally via its control switch.REFERENCE USE CAUTION With the diesel generator in operation (voltage present), breaker 52T will operate to its control switch "maintained position" (close or open) coincident with placing the auto/manual selector switch to manual.Page 17 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30,1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT C TSC EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY Page 4 of 4 2.2 It should be realized that so long as an undervoltage condition exists on the 5G auxiliaries the fuel oil transfer pump (P105) is inoperable.

The diesel generator fuel tank limits operation to approximately three hours at full TSC load. It is recommended that you attempt to fill the fuel oil tank utilizing the static head provided by the fuel oil storage tanks. If this proves to be inadequate, placing the auto/manual selector switch to "AUTO" will energize the 5G auxiliaries but simultaneously deenergize the TSC. In the interim, should the normal supply to the 5G auxiliaries (HO1 bus) be restored, breaker 52N should be manually closed to provide power to the fuel oil transfer pump in lieu of repositioning the auto manual transfer switch. The fuel usage for the auxiliary diesel is a conservative estimate based on communications with the diesel manufacturer, operational experience and calculations provided by the system engineer.REFERENCE USE Page 18 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT D ACTIVATION OF THE IODINE AND NOBLE GAS (ING) RADIATION MONITORS Page 1 of 2 1.0 ACTIVATION

1.1 Technical

Support Center "1.1i -Install a new-charcoatfilter in-the iodine-and noble gas (ING) monitor.

1.1.2 Start

the iodine and noble gas sample pump on the west side of the El. 18.5' mechanical equipment room. 1.1.3 Record the initial sample flow rate and start time. Flow Rate Start Time 1.2 North Service Building 1.2.1 Install a new air particulate and charcoal filter in the NSB ING. 1.2.2 Plug in the monitor and start the pump. 1.2.3 Record the initial sample flow rate and start time. Flow Rate Start Time 2.0 INTERPRETATION OF RMS READOUTS 2.1 .The concentration of noble gas is determined by multiplying the observed count rate on the readout labeled "RE-238" by the calibration constant posted adjacent to the meter. The units are Xe-133 dose equivalents.

2.2 The iodine activity in the charcoal cartridge is determined by multiplying the observed count rate on the readout labeled "RE-237" by the calibration constant posted adjacent to the meter. The units are pCi 1-131 dose equivalents.

2.3 To convert the iodine activity into a concentration, calculate the volume of air that passed through the filter. The concentration of iodine is approximately the activity on the filter (pCi) divided by the total volume (cm 3) for sampling periods less than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months assuming no short-lived isotopes are present.REFERENCE USE Page 19 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT D ACTIVATION OF THE IODINE AND NOBLE GAS (ING) RADIATION MONITORS Page 2 of 2 NOTE: For longer sampling periods and when short-lived isotopes are expected to be present, the following formula may be used to calculate the iodine concentration.

C (AAe~t) ts F XI1-eAt-)

Where: Units C = concentration in air AiCi/cc F = sample volume cc 2, = decay constant, 0.693/T 1/2 rin-' A = total activity on filter ACi t = elapsed time from sample stop to count start min ts = total sample time min p = filter collection efficiency 2.4 Any changes to the alarm setpoints shall be made in accordance with the Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Setpoint & Response Book (RMSASRB).

REFERENCE USE Page 20 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30,1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT E ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS) NOTE: ERDS shall be activated within one hour of declaration of an Alert or higher emergency.

1.0 TO INITIATE THE ERDS: -NOTE: Ensure the correct unit is displayed on'PPCS prior to activating ERDS. 1.1 Sign on to a PPCS display station.

1.2 Call up the DIALOGUE page. 1.3 Select the ERDS page (Option 6). 1.4 Follow directions as listed on the display.

NOTE: The NRC must provide verbal concurrence before ERDS can be deactivated from PBNP. 2.0 TO DEACTIVATE THE ERDS: NOTE: You must have Security Level 3 (Control Room operators) to deactivate ERDS. 2.1 Sign on to a PPCS display station.

2.2 Call up the DIALOGUE page. 2.3 Select the ERDS page .(Option 6). 2.4 Follow directions as listed on the display.REFERENCE USE Page 21 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT F ACCESS OF THE WISCONSIN ELECTRIC DOSE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (WEDAP) Page 1 of 2 1.0 NOTEBOOK PERSONAL COMPUTER (PC) ACCESS NOTE: IF WEDAP is unavailable, THEN perform manual calculations per EPIP 1.3, Radiological Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations.

1.1 The Wisconsin Electric Dose Assessment Program is resident of the hard drive of the Level A notebook personal computer in the TSC dose assessment area. The directory location is "J:\Apps\NP\WEDAP".

1.1.1 Turn on the notebook PC using the master power switch. It should "boot up" into Windows NT. You may be presented with a selection of configurations during bootup. If so, select the "stand-alone" configuration.

1.1.2 Log on to the notebook PC using the PC number as both the identification number and password, entering it in lower case. The PC number can be found on a label affixed to the notebook PC. 1.1.3 Launch WEDAP by clicking on the WEDAP menu item under "Business Applications".

1.2 IF the WEDAP directory and files are NOT found on the hard drive, THEN the notebook PC must be recloned and WEDAP reinstalled using the CD-Roms located in the TSC inventory cabinet.

1.2.1 Recloning

the notebook PC a. Insert the cloning CD-Rom. b. Reboot the notebook PC. c. Wait for the prompt, following any instruction prompts given. 1.2.2 Installing WEDAP from the cloning CD a. Insert the application CD-Rom. b. Go to the Start bar -* Enterprise applications

-Application install -4 Install/update application (top choice).

c. Click on "install" to run the auto install.Page 22 of 28 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT F ACCESS OF THE WISCONSIN ELECTRIC DOSE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (WEDAP) Page 2 of 2 d. Click on "Okay" when the installation is complete.

e. Take the application CD-Rom out and return to the TSC inventory cabinet.

f. Log out and then log-baC& in. g. Repeat Stepl.1 to access WEDAP. 2.0 PRINTING DATA TO LOCAL PRINTER IN TSC 2.1 Select File -Print or the printer icon to print to the laserjet printer located within the TSC. 2.2 IF unable to print, THEN reset the printer connection.

2.2.1 Select

Start -> Printers -+ Add Computer -> My Computer.

2.2.2 Verify

LPT1 is selected and Close window.REFERENCE USE Page 23 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT G PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS) Page 1 of 5 1.0 PPCS START UP 1.1 If the monitor is NOT on, then turn on the monitor.

12 Adjust the brightness control on the monitor, a. hiecessbij.

1.3 If the affected Unit is NOT selected on the PPCS logon screen, enter the correct unit number and press the START key. NOTE 1: Only one user may be logged on for each password.

Logging on with a password used by the other Monitor will cause their terminal to be logged off the system. NOTE 2: You must be logged off to change the Unit selected.

NOTE 3: PPCS emergency plan passwords enable read only and print functions.

1.4 Log onto the PPCS at emergency response facility in which you are located. Do NOT enter a space between the letters and number. 1.4.1 IF you are located in the Technical Support Center, THEN -Enter TSC1 or TSC2 -Press START 1.4.2 IF you are located in the Emergency Operations Facility, THEN -Enter EOF1 or EOF2 -Press START 2.0 PPCS DATA RETRIEVAL

-SCREEN SEARCH 2.1 The DIRECTORYkey will provide a display of all the screens available to the PPCS user. 2.2 Keyboard Use 2.2.1 Functional area keys take the user directly to the screen selected.

2.2.2 Other

keyboard entries require pressing the START key to enter the data. 2.2.3 Pressing the DELETE key will delete the last character entered.REFERENCE USE Page 24 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT G PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS) Page 2 of 5 2.3 Seven system function keys located on the left side of the keyboard may be used to select data screens. These functional areas are: 2.3.1 CORE -Reactor core information 2.3.2 PRIMARY- Reactor coolant system information 2.3.3 SEC -Turbine and feedwater information 2.3.4 VC&RHX- Volume control and residual heat removal information 2.3.5 CONT -Containment, release and meteorological information 2.3.6 BOP -Balance of Plant, miscellaneous systems 2.3.7 RMS -Radiation monitoring system information

2.4 Retrieval

of plant status data NOTE: Plant status information is unit dependent.

Ensure the correct information is being displayed for the affected unit. 2.4.1 The key functional areas for the Plant Status Monitor to reference during emergency response are: a. CONTAINMENT (page 250), b. CORE (page 210), and c. PLANT STATUS (page 353) 2.4.2 Plant Status Board information retrieval, via sector: a. Press the CONT b. Press SECTOR 3, and then c. Press START. or REFERENCE USE Page 25 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION 2.4.3 EPIP 4.1 NNSR Revision 29 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT G PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS) Page 3 of 5 Plant Status Board information retrieval, via page number: a. Press PAGE .b. ..Enter 353.and.then

c. Press START. NOTE: RMS data is NOT unit dependent and is valid for cases when either Unit 1 or 2 has been selected during logon. 2.4.4 Retrieval of RMS data a. The key functional area for the Rad/Chem Monitor to reference during emergency response is the RMS Grid (page 104). b. To read monitor readings directly from the screen: 1. Press SECTOR. 2. Select and enter the appropriate sector number in which the monitor is located.

3. Press START. c. To display RMS monitor trends; return to page 104, then: 1. Press SECTOR, 2. Enter 7, 3. Press START. 4. Select the RMS monitor for trend viewing REFERENCE USE Page 26 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30,1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT G PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS) Page 4 of 5 NOTE: If the monitor is common to both Unit 1 and 2, make no numerical entry between the R and the E; just RE and the number. (a) Enter the mofiitor number in the format of RXEYYY (b) Press START. where: X is the unit number (1 or 2) and YYY is the monitor number 5. Select the time increment for the trend (a) Press 1, START (1 minute increments) (b) Press 2, START (10 minute increments)

K. (c) Press 3, START(1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months increments) (d) Press 4, START (1 day increments)

d. Meteorology Data should be taken from the "Plant Releases" (page 351). 2.5 The "Poke" function may be used to identify component names and numbers from the various screens.

NOTE: Only components or numerical values that are displayed in a color can be "poked" for information.

2.5.1 To view component information, move the cursor to the icon or data value and press the POKE key. 2.5.2 Component or numerical data information will be displayed at the bottom of the screen.REFERENCE USE Page 27 of 28 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 29 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) November 30,1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT G PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS) Page 5 of 5 3.0 PPCS DATA RETRIEVAL

-HARD COPY NOTE: Emergency plan forms are selected for printing from the dialogue screen. 3.1 Press DIALOGUE.

3.2 Enter

5. 3.3 Press START. 3.4 Select the form you wish to print. NOTE: There are portions of form EPIP 2.1, Attachment E, that require written input. Be sure to complete these entries prior to dissemination.

3.4.1 EPIP 2.1, Attachment E, Status Report on Plant Systenis and Controls for Affected Unit, enter 1, or 3.4.2 PIM EOF 4.6/TSC 2.8, Attachment B, Release Path Monitors, enter 2, or 3.4.3 PIM EOF 4.6/TSC 2.8, Attachment C, Area Monitors, enter 3, or 3.4.4 PIM EOF 4.6/TSC 2.8, Attachment D, -Process Monitors, enter 4 3.5 Press START. 4.0 PPCS LOGOFF 4.1 Select the security screen, page 190. 4.2 Logoff by pressing the STOP key.REFERENCE USE Page 28 of 28 EPIP 4.2 OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION:

REVISION:

EFFECTIVE DATE: PROCEDURE OWNER: Technical NNSR 14 November 30, 1999 Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS.

DELETED, NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 14 OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC) ACTIVATION November 30, 1999 AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE ................................................................

3 2.0 PREREQUISITES

...... ..............................................................................................

3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

....................................................................

4 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

..........................................................................................

4 5.0 PROCEDURE

.........................................................................................................

5 5.1 A ctivation

........................................................................................................................

5 5.2 Evacuation

.......................................................................................................................

5

6.0 REFERENCES

......................................................................................................

6 7.0 BA SES ............................................................................................................................

6 ATTACHMENT A OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER LAYOUT .............................................

7 REFERENCE USE Page 2 of 7 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 14 OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC) ACTIVATION November 30,1999 AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions for the activation of the Operations Support Center (OSC). The OSC is activated upon declaration of an ALERT or higher classification, or at any other time deemed necessary by the Duty Shift Superintendent (DSS). Activation of the OSC does not require the declaration of an emergency.

Attachment A, Operation Support Center Layout, describes the facility layout. This procedure also describes the evacuation of the OSC, which will be done in unison with the TSC. 2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 Reentry

Team Coordinator:

a. Activation and oversight of the OSC activities and reentry team dispatch (repair, fire, search and rescue), including non-PBNP or contractor teams per EPIP 10.1, Emergency Reentry.

b. Tracking reentry teams previously dispatched from the Control Room prior to OSC activation.

c. Medical emergencies per EPIP 11.2, Medical Emergency.

2.1.2 Operations

Leader: a. OSC activation prior to the arrival of the Reentry Team Coordinator.

b. Supervises the operations.reentry teams. 2.1.3 Radiation Protection (RP) Leader -Supervises onsite radiation protection tasks and briefs/debriefs reentry teams on radiological concerns.

2.1.4 Instrumentation

and Control (I&C) Leader -Supervises I&C reentry teams. 2.1.5 Mechanical Leader -Supervises mechanical reentry teams. 2.1.6 Electrical Leader -Supervises electrical reentry teams. 2.1.7 Chemistry Leader -Supervises chemistry reentry teams. 2.1.8 Team Lead -Reentry team member assigned to direct reentry team response during dispatch.

2.1.9 TSC Manager -Decision to evacuate the OSC and relocate to alternate areas.REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 7 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 14 OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC) ACTIVATION November 30,1999 AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE 2.2 Equipment 2.2.1 OSC Inventory

a. EPMP 1.1, Routine Check, Maintenance, Calibration and Inventory Schedule for Radiation Protection Emergency Preparedness Equipment

b. EPMP 1.3, Routine Inventory of TSC, EOF, AEOF, JPIC and OSC Emergency Preparedness Supplies 2.2.2 Communications equipment per EPMP 2.1, Testing of Communications Equipment

2.2.3 Other

equipment determined necessary to support the event (i.e., Maintenance, Radiation Protection, Radiochemical, etc.) 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS Until the OSC is activated and formally assumes responsibility for teams, the DSS maintains responsibility for reentry teams. 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

4.1 Declaration

of an ALERT or higher classification or in conjunction with the Technical Support Center (TSC) if it is deemed necessary to support plant operations.

4.2 Evacuation

of the TSC and OSC shall be considered when any of the following conditions exist: 4.2.1 Radiation levels surrounding the TSC/OSC are: a. Whole body (TEDE) 500 mrem/hr (measured or calculated)

b. Thyroid (CDE) 3000 mrem/hr (calculated)

NOTE: Higher dose rates can be tolerated for short periods of time if projections do NOT exceed the limits below. 4.2.2 Emergency response personnel radiation doses in the TSC/OSC are exceeding or are projected to exceed the following for the duration of the event: a. Whole body (TEDE) 5 rem (calculated)

b. Thyroid (CDE) 25 rem (calculated)

4.2.3 Other

emergency conditions (i.e., fire, toxic or flammable gases, or loss of power).REFERENCE USE Page 4 of 7 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 14 OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC) ACTIVATION November 30, 1999 AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE 5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 Activation

5.1.1 The Reentry Team Coordinator shall ensure the completion of the OSC Position Instruction Manual, OSC 3.1, Reentry Team Coordinator.

NOTE: The facility-may be activated earlier-based upon. the Reentry Team. Coordinator's discretion if determined there is an understanding of the events in progress and adequate staffmg resources in place to respond to the emergency.

5.1.2 Minimum

staff position in the OSC are: a. Reentry Team Coordinator

b. Operations Leader c. I&C Leader d. Mechanical Leader or Electrical Leader e. RP Leader f. Chemistry Leader 5.1.3 Each ERO position shall activate and assume their area of responsibility and function within the OSC using their Position Instruction Manual. 5.2 Evacuation 5.2.1 The OSC will be evacuated in accordance with EPIP 4.1, Technical Support Center (TSC) Activation and Evacuation, under the direction of the TSC Manager and coordinated with the Reentry Team Coordinator.

5.2.2 The key to an orderly evacuation is good communications, conducing a formal turnover with personnel assuming OSC responsibilities, and documentation of actions.

5.2.3 The Control Room will take responsibility for in-plant teams until the relocation area is functional.

5.2.4 Ensure

all personnel are accounted for after reaching the relocation area(s).REFERENCE USE Page 5 of 7 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.2 NNSR Revision 14 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 Point

Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan 6.2 EPIP 4.1, Technical Support Center (TSC) Activation and Evacuation 6.3 EPIP 10.1, Emergency Reentry 6.4 EPIP 11.2, Medical Emergency 6.5 EPMP 1.1, Routine Check, Maintenance, Calibration and Inventory Schedule for Radiation Protection Emergency Preparedness Equipment 6.6 EPMP 1.3, Routine Inventory of TSC, EOF, AEOF, JPIC and OSC Emergency Preparedness Supplies 6.7 PIM OSC 3.1, Reentry Team Coordinator 6.8 PIM OSC 3.2, Radiation Protection Leader 6.9 PIM OSC 3.3, I&C Leader 6.10 PIM OSC 3.4, Mechanical Leader 6.11 PIM OSC 3.5, Electrical Leader 6.12 PIM OSC 3.6, Chemistry Leader 6.13 PIM OSC 3.7, Operations Leader .6.14 PIM TSC 2.1, TSC Manager 7.0 BASES B-1 10 CFR 50.47(b), Emergency Plans B-2 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix E.IV, Content of Emergency Plans B-3 NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants B-4 NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements REFERENCE USE Page 6 of 7 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.2 NNSR Revision 14 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT A OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER LAYOUT REFERENCE USE Page 7 of 7 EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCYODPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: Technical CLASSIFICATION:

NNSR REVISION:

22 EFFECTIVE DATE: November 30, 1999 PROCEDURE OWNER: Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS DELETED NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.3 NNSR Revision 22 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TABLE OF CONTENTS 1ON TITLE PAC PU RPO SE .......................................................................................................................

3 PREREQU ISITE S ....................................................................................................

3 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

...............................

.............................

5 IN ITIA L CON D ITION S ..........................................................................................

6 PRO CED U RE .................................................................................................................

7 5.1 A ctivation

........................................................................................................................

7 5.2 Evacuation

.......................................................................................................................

8 REFEREN CES ........................................................................................................

8 BA SES .............................................................

....................................................

9 ATTACHMENT A ATTACHMENT B ATTACHMENT C ATTACHMENT D ATTACHMENT E ATTACHMENT F ATTACHMENT G ATTACHMENT H EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY LAYOUT .................................

10 OPERATION OF THE EOF EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM & ANNUNCIATOR PANEL ..................................................................................

11 ACCESS OF THE WISCONSIN ELECTRIC DOSE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (WEDAP) ...................................................................................

13 ACTIVATION.OF THE IODINE AND NOBLE GAS (ING) RADIATION MONITORS ...........................................................................

15 PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS) ....................................

17 WPS -KNPP SITE BOUNDARY FACILITY ..............................................

22 AEOF -MILWAUKEE CORPORATE OFFICES .......................................

23 ACTIVATION OF THE REMOTE EOF DATALINK SYSTEM (REDS) -WINDOWS NT .............................................................

24 REFERENCE USE SECT] 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 ,E Page 2 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions for the activation of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The EOF is activated upon declaration of an ALERT, or higher classification, or at any other time deemed necessary by the Duty Shift Superintendent (DSS). Activation of the EOF does not require the declaration of an emergency.

Attachment A, Emergency Operations Facility Layout, describes the facility layout..

This procedure also describes the method by which the EOF and Offsite Radiation Protection Facility (OSRPF) is evacuated and responsibilities transferred.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 Emergency

Director:

a. Directs the overall management of the emergency response and recovery operations.

b. Upon activation of the EOF, assumes a formal turnover from the DSS for non-delegable responsibilities, including:

Classification/Re-classification of emergencies

Protective Action Recommendations

Notification of Federal, State, and County authorities

Authorizing the use of potassium iodide

Authorizing emergency radiation dose extensions

c. Decision to evacuate the EOF and OSRPF and relocate to alternate areas. 2.1.2 EOF Manager: a. EOF activation prior to the arrival of the Emergency Director.

b. Commands and controls the EOF emergency response activities.

REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE 2.1.3 Dose/PAR Coordinator:

a. Directs the Offsite Radiation Protection Facility Coordinator to activate the EOF emergency ventilation system per Attachment B, Operation of the EOF Emergency Ventilation System & Annunciator Panel. b. Activates the Wisconsin Electric Dose Assessment Program -WEDAP per Attachment C, Access of the Wisconsin Electric Dose Assessment Program (WEDAP).

c. Initiates the activation of the Iodine and Noble Gas (ING) Monitors per Attachment D, Activation of the Iodine and Noble Gas (ING) Radiation Monitors.

d. Directs offsite dose assessment.

Develops Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) based on dose for the Emergency Director's approval.

2.1.4 Plant

Status Monitor: a. Activates Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) workstation per Attachment E, Plant Process Computer System (PPCS). b. Supports event monitoring by serving as the resource for plant and environmental data. Maintains plant status boards. 2.1.5 TSC/CR Communicator

-Maintains continuous communications between the CR, TSC and EOF. Assists with event classification.

2.1.6 Dose/PAR Monitor -Supports radiological response by serving as resource for offsite assessment of radiological conditions and assists with development of Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) based on dose. Maintains rad/met status boards. 2.1.7 HPN/SRC Communicator

-Communicates information to NRC and State of Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services ý- State Radiological Coordinator.

2.1.8 State/County Communicator

-Communicates information to State and County agencies.

2.1.9 State

Liaison -Ensures that the State of Wisconsin has adequate information to implement offsite emergency plans. Reports to the State Emergency Operations Center.REFERENCE USE Page 4 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE 2.1.10 County Liaison -Ensures that Kewaunee County and Manitowoc County has adequate information to implement offsite emergency plans. Reports to the County Emergency Operation Centers.

2.1.11 Resource Coordinator

-Obtains resources needed for emergency response.

2.1.12 Offsite Assembly Area Coordinator

-Assists the Security Coordinator in controlling site ingress/egress, includinag release and/or evacuation of personnel to offsite assembly areas. 2.1.13 JPIC Communicator

-Communicates information about onsite activities to the JPIC for development of news releases.

2.1.14 Corporate Communicator

-Maintains communications with Wisconsin Electric Corporate officials and supporting agencies.

2.1.15 Administrative Support Leader -Provides clerical and administrative support to emergency organization.

2.2 Equipment

2.2.1 EOF inventory per EPMP 1.3, Routine Inventory of TSC, EOF, AEOF, JPIC and OSC Emergency Preparedness Supplies.

2.2.2 PPCS Workstations

2.2.3 WEDAP

Workstation

2.2.4 Communications

equipment per EPMP 2.1, Testing of Communications Equipment.

3.0 PRECAUTIONS

AND LIMITATIONS Evacuation of the EOF shall include the coordination of the evacuation for the OSRPF.REFERENCE USE Page 5 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.3 NNSR Revision 22 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS 4.1 This procedure shall be implemented upon declaration of an ALERT or higher classification or at the discretion of the Duty Shift Superintendent to provide the Control Room support with offsite interfaces.

4.2 Evacuation

of the EOF and OSRPF will be considered when any of the following conditions exist 4.2.1 Radiation levels surrounding the EOF/OSRPF are: a. Whole body (TEDE) b. Thyroid (CDE)500 mrem/hr (measured or calculated) 3000 mrem/hr (calculated)

NOTE: Higher dose rates can be tolerated for short periods of time if projections do NOT exceed the limits below. 4.2.2 Emergency response personnel radiation doses in the EOF/OSRPF are exceeding or are projected to exceed the following for the duration of the event: a. Whole body (TEDE) b. Thyroid (CDE)5 rem (calculated) 25 rem (calculated)

Other emergency conditions exist (i.e., fire, toxic or flammable gases, or loss of power).REFERENCE USE 4.2.3 Page 6 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE 5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 Activation

5.1.1 The EOF Manager shall ensure the completion of the EOF Position Instruction Manual 4.2, EOF Manager.

NOTE: The facility may be activated earlier based upon the EOF Manager's discretion if determined there is an understanding of the events in progress and adequate staffing resources in place to respond to the emergency.

5.1.2 Minimum

staff positions are: a. Emergency Director b. EOF Manager c. Dose/PAR Coordinator

d. State/Counties Communicator

e. TSC/CR Communicator

f. OSRPF Coordinator

g. Resource Coordinator

h. JPIC Communicator 5.1.3 The EOF emergency ventilation system, iodine and noble gas (ING) radiation monitors, WEDAP, and PPCS equipment shall be activated per the attachments to this procedure.

5.1.4 Each ERO position shall activate and assume their area of responsibility and function within the EOF using their Position Instruction Manual.'REFERENCE USE Page 7 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE 5.2 Evacuation 5.2.1 The EOF and OSRPF will be evacuated under the direction of the EOF Manager.

5.2.2 The key to an orderly evacuation is good communications, formal turnover with personnel assuming EOF and OSRPF responsibilities, and documentation of actions and notifications.

5.2.3 Minimize

the number of vehicles used to transport people and equipment to other facilities.

a. The Alternate Offsite Radiation Protection Facility is the KNPP Site Boundary Facility (SBF) located about one mile west of KNPP on Kewaunee County Nuclear Road per Attachment F, WPS -KNPP Site Boundary Facility.

b. The Alternate EOF (AEOF) is located in Wisconsin Electric's Public Service Building on 231 W. Michigan Street in Milwaukee, Room P197 (per Attachment G, AEOF -Milwaukee Corporate Offices).

Data from the PPCS is obtained per Attachment H, Activation of the Remote EOF Datalink System (REDS) -Windows NT. 5.2.4 Transfer responsibility for all communications to the TSC until the AEOF is activated.

Some communicators may temporarily relocate to that facility prior to activation of the AEOF. 5.2.5 Transfer responsibility for the OSRPF oversight and offsite dose assessments for protective action recommendations to the TSC. 5.2.6 Ensure all personnel are accounted for after reaching the relocation area(s).

5.2.7 Develop

an immediate plan for reentry of the EOF/OSRPF area, if possible.

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 Point

Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan 6.2 EPIP 1.3, Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations 6.3 EPIP 4.7, Offsite Radiation Protection Facility (OSRPF) Activation and Evacuation 6.4 EPMP 1.3, Routine Inventory of TSC, EOF, AEOF, JPIC and OSC Emergency Preparedness Supplies REFERENCE USE Page 8 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.3 NNSR Revision 22 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10 6.11 6.12 6.13 6.14 6.15 6.16 6.17 6.18 6.19 6.20 7.0 BASEl B-I 10 CFR 50.47(b), Emergency Plans B-2 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix E. IV, Content of Emergency Plans B-3 NUREG 0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants B-4 NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements REFERENCE USE Page 9 of 26 EPMP 2.1, Testing of Communications Equipment PIM EOF 4.1, Emergency Director PIM EOF 4.2, EOF Manager PIM EOF 4.3, Administrative Support Leader PIM EOF 4.4, Resource Coordinator PIM EOF 4.5, Dose/PAR Coordinator PIM EOF 4.6, Dose/PAR Monitor PIM EOF 4.7, HPN/SRC Communicator PIM EOF 4.8, Corporate Communicator PIM EOF 4.9, JPIC Communicator PIM EOF 4.10, State/County Communicator PIM EOF 4.11, State Liaison PIM EOF 4.12, County Liaison PIM EOF 4.13, Offsite Assembly Area Coordinator PIM EOF 4.14, TSC/CR Communicator PIM EOF 4.15, Plant Status Monitor S NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.3 NNSR Revision 22 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT A EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY LAYOUT REFERENCE USE OSRPF I 0 0 'ii Page I10 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B OPERATION OF THE EOF EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM & ANNUNCIATOR PANEL Page I of 2 NOTE: Contact the Control Room prior to implementing this procedure to advise them of the RMS alarm they will be receiving.

1.0 DESCRIPTION

-EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM The EOF's emergency ventilation system has a normal and emergency operation mode. Under all modes of operation, fresh air is taken in from the vent on the south end of the west side of the building.

Under normal conditions the air is filtered by roughing and electrostatic filters. In the emergency mode, a minimum amount of outside air is taken into the building and incoming air is routed through an additional high efficiency particulate filter. 2.0 EMERGENCY OPERATION OF THE EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM 2.1 The control panel for the SBCC ventilation system (Ml) is located in the mechanical equipment room. Access to the mechanical equipment room is through the men's restroom and locker area. 2.2 To shift from the normal to the emergency mode, manually place the switch S3 on panel Ml to the "Emergency" position.

3.0 EMERGENCY

OPERATIONS POWER SUPPLY Electrical power to the Site Boundary Control Center, and therefore the EOF, is provided by Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPSC) via a distribution feeder. In case of loss of electrical power, call WPSC. The telephone number for WPSC can be found in the Emergency Telephone Directory.

4.0 DESCRIPTION

-EOF ANNUNCIATOR PANEL 4.1 The EOF's annunciator panel monitors eight parameters in the Site Boundary Control Center building.

The control room may receive a common alarm upon annunciation of some of the eight alarms. 4.1.1 Holding tank high level -alarms on high level, holding tank must be pumped by a contractor.

4.1.2 Dosing

tank high level -alarms on high level. 4.1.3 Fire detector -annunciates upon detection of a fire. 4.1.4 Emergency mode -annunciates when building HVAC system is switched to the emergency mode.REFERENCE USE Page I11 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30,1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B OPERATION OF THE EOF EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM &ANNUNCIATOR PANEL Page 2 of 2 4.1.5 Building temperature low -annunciates upon exceeding the setpoint for the building temperature.

This usually indicates a heating system failure.

4.1.6 Pump failure -annunciates whenever a pump associated with control panel Ml, does not start on demand, after a 30-second time delay. 4.1.7 Air filter plugged -annunciates when the electrostatic air filter is plugged and the differential pressure across the filter exceeds the setpoint.

4.1.8 Compressed

air low pressure -annunciates when the air pressure in the supply header to the Johnson Controls control system falls below the setpoint.

4.2 Response

to annunciator panel alarms. 4.2.1 Be prepared to respond to the Control Room questions regarding the cause of the alarm. 4.2.2 Take actions and/or call for the assistance as required.REFERENCE USE Page 12 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT C ACCESS OF THE WISCONSIN ELECTRIC DOSE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (WEDAP) Page 1 of 2 1.0 NOTEBOOK PERSONAL COMPUTER (PC) ACCESS NOTE: IF WEDAP is unavailable, THEN perform manual calculations per EPIP 1.3, Radiological DoseAssessment and Protective Action Recommendations.

1.1 The Wisconsin Electric Dose Assessment Program is resident of the hard drive of the Level A notebook personal computer in the EOF dose assessment area. The directory location is "JAApps\NP\WEDAP".

1.1.1 Turn on the notebook PC using the master power switch. It should "boot up" into Windows NT. You may be presented with a selection of configurations during bootup. If so, select the "stand-alone" configuration.

1.1.2 Log on to the notebook PC using the PC number as both the identification number and password, entering it in lower case. The PC number can be found on a label affixed to the notebook PC. 1.1.3 Launch WEDAP by clicking on the WEDAP menu item under "Business Applications".

1.2 IF the WEDAP directory and files are not found on the hard drive, THEN the notebook PC must be recloned and WEDAP reinstalled using the CD-Roms located in the EOF inventory cabinet.

1.2.1 Recloning

the notebook PC a. Insert the cloning CD-Rom. b. Reboot the notebook PC. c. Wait for the prompt, following any instruction prompts giveli. 1.2.2 Installing WEDAP from the cloning CD a. Insert the application CD-Rom. b. Go to the Start bar + Enterprise applications , Application install _ Install/update application (top choice).

c. Click on "install" to run the auto install.REFERENCE USE Page 13 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT C ACCESS OF THE WISCONSIN ELECTRIC DOSE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (WEDAP) Page 2 of 2 d. Click on "Okay" when the installation is complete.

e. Take the application CD-Rom out and return to the EOF inventory cabinet.

f. Log out and then log back in. g. Repeat Step 1.1 to access WEDAP. 2.0 PRINTING DATA TO LOCAL PRINTER IN TSC 2.1 Select File -Print or the printer icon to print to the laserjet printer located within the EOF. 2.2 IF unable to print, THEN reset the printer connection.

2.2.1 Select

Start _., Printers ... Add Computer _..+ My Computer.

2.2.2 Verify

LPT1 is selected and Close window.REFERENCE USE Page 14 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT D ACTIVATION OF THE IODINE AND NOBLE GAS (ING) RADIATION MONITORS Page 1 of 2 Coordinate with the Offsite Radiation Protection Coordinator:

1.0 ACTIVATION

1.1 Install

a new charcoal filter in the Iodine and Noble Gas Monitor.

1.2 Start

the iodine and noble gas sample pump in the heating and ventilation room adjacent to the men's lavatory.

1.3 Record

the initial sample flow rate and start time. Flow Rate Start Time 2.0 INTERPRETATION OF RMS READOUTS 2.1 The concentration of noble gas is determined by multiplying the observed count rate on the readout labeled "RE-242" by the calibration constant posted adjacent to the meter. The resulting units are pCi/cc Xe-133 dose equivalents.

2.2 The iodine activity on the charcoal cartridge is obtained by multiplying the observed count rate on the readout labeled "RE-241 " by the calibration constant posted adjacent to the meter. The resulting units are 1 1 Ci 1 31 dose equivalents.

REFERENCE USE Page 15 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT D ACTIVATION OF THE IODINE AND NOBLE GAS (ING)RADIATION MONITORS Page 2 of 2 2.3 To convert the iodine activity into a concentration, calculate the volume of air that passed through the filter. The concentration of iodine is approximately the activity on the filter (pCi) divided by the total volume (cm 3) for sampling periods less than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , this assumes no short-lived isotopes are_present.

NOTE: For longer sampling periods and when short-lived iodine isotopes are expected to be present, the following formula may be used to calculate the iodine concentration:

C = (XAekt)ts F p(1-e-'ts)

Where: Units C = concentration in air 1 ACi/cc F = sample volume cc = decay constant, 0.693T'/2 min-' A = total activity on filter 1 4 Ci t = elapsed time from sample stop to count start min ts = total sample time min p -filter collection efficiency Any changes to the alarm setpoints shall be made in accordance with the Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Setpoint & Response Book (RMSASRB) kept in the Control Room.REFERENCE USE Page 16 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT E PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS) Page 1 of 5 1.0 PPCS START UP 1.1 If the monitor is not on, then turn on the monitor.

1.2 Adjust

the-brightness control on the monitor, as 'necessary.

1.3 If the affected Unit is not selected on the PPCS logon screen, enter the correct unit number and press the START key. NOTE: Only one user may be logged on for each password.

Logging on with a password used by the other Monitor will cause their terminal to be logged off the system. NOTE: You must be logged off to change the Unit selected.

NOTE: PPCS emergency plan passwords enable read only and print functions.

1.4 Log onto the PPCS at emergency response facility in which you are located. Do not enter a space between the letters and number. 1.4.1 IF you are located in the Technical Support Center, THEN -Enter TSCI or TSC2 -Press START 1.4.2 IF you are located in the Emergency Operations Facility, THEN -Enter EOF1 or EOF2 -Press START 2.0 PPCS DATA RETRIEVAL

-SCREEN SEARCH 2.1 The DIRECTORykey will provide a display of all the screens available to the PPCS user. 2.2 Keyboard Use 2.2.1 Functional area keys take the user directly to the screen selected.

2.2.2 Other

keyboard entries require pressing the START key to enter the data. 2.2.3 Pressing the DELETE key will delete the last character entered.REFERENCE USE Page 17 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT E PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS) Page 2 of 5 2.3 Seven system function keys located on the left side of the keyboard may be used to select data screens. These functional areas are: 2.3.1 CORE -Reactor core information 2.3.2 PRIMARY- Reactor coolant system information 2.3.3 SEC -Turbine and feedwater information 2.3.4 VC&RPX- volume control and residual heat removal information 2.3.5 CONT- Containment, release and meteorological information 2.3.6 BOP -Balance of Plant, miscellaneous systems 2.3.7 RMS -Radiation monitoring system information K) 2.4 Retrieval of plant status data NOTE: Plant status information is unit dependent.

Ensure the correct information is being displayed for the affected unit. 2.4.1 The key functional areas for the Plant Status Monitor to reference during emergency response are: a. CONTAINMENT(page 250), b. COjE (page 210), and c. pLANT STATUS (page 353).REFERENCE USE Page 18 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30,1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT E PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS) Page 3 of 5 2.4.2 Plant Status Board information retrieval, via sector: a. Press the CONTr b. Press SECTOR 3 ,-and then c. Press START. or 2.4.3 Plant Status Board information retrieval, via page number: a. Press PAGE b. Enter 353 and then c. Press START. NOTE: RMS data is not unit dependent and is valid for cases when either Unit 1 or 2 has been selected during logon. 2.4.4 Retrieval of RMS data a. The key functional area for the Dose/PAR Monitor to reference during emergency response is the RMS Grid (page 104). b. To read monitor readings.

directly from the screen 1. Press SECTOR. 2. Select and enter the appropriate sector number in which the monitor is located.

3. Press START. c. To display RMS monitor trends; return to page 104, then: 1. Press SECTOR, 2. Enter 7, 3. Press START.REFERENCE USE Page 19 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.3 NNSR Revision 22 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT E PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS) Page 4 of 5 4. Select the RMS monitor for trend viewing.

NOTE: If the monitor is common to both Unit 1 and 2, make no numerical entry. between the R and the E; just RE and the number. (a) Enter the monitor number in the format of RXEYYY (b) Press START. where: X is the unit number (1 or 2) and YYY is the monitor number 5. Select the time increment for the trend (a) Press 1, START (1 minute increments). (b) Press 2, START(IO minute increments). (c) Press 3, START (I hour increments). (d) Press 4, START (I day increments).

d. Meteorology Data should be taken from the "Plant Releases" (page 351). 2.5 The "Poke" function may be used to identify component names and numbers from the various screens.

NOTE: Only components or numerical values that are disniaved in a color can be 2.5.1 2.5.2"poked" for information.

To view component information, move the cursor to the icon or data value and press the POKE key. Component or numerical data information will be displayed at the bottom of the screen.REFERENCE USE Page 20 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.3 NNSR Revision 22 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT E PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER SYSTEM (PPCS) Page 5 of 5 3.0 PPCS DATA RETRIEVAL

-HARD COPY NOTE: Emergency plan forms are selected for printing from the dialogue screen. 3.1 Press DIALOGUE.3.2 3.3 3.4 Enter 5.Press START. Select the form you wish to print NOTE: 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 There are portions of form EPIP 2.1, Attachment E, that require written input. Be sure to complete these entries prior to dissemination.

EPIP 2.1, Attachment E, Status Report on Plant Systems and Controls for Affected Unit, enter 1, or PIM EOF 4.6/TSC 2.8, Attachment B, Release Path Monitors, enter 2, or PIM EOF 4.6/TSC 2.8, Attachment C, Area Monitors, enter 3, or PIM EOF 4.6/TSC 2.8, Attachment D, Process Monitors, enter 4.3.5 Press START. 4.0 PPCS LOGOFF 4.1 Select the security screen, page 190. 4.2 Logoff by pressing the STop key.REFERENCE USE Page 21 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.3 NNSR Revision 22 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT F WPS -KNPP SITE BOUNDARY FACILITY IU z uJ WPS -KNPP SITE BOUNDARY FACILITY KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR PLANT POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT REFERENCE USE Page 22 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT G AEOF -MILWAUKEE CORPORATE OFFICES 231 WEST MICHIGAN AVENUE WISCONSIN AVENUE MICHIGAN wiETm 99 SCONSIN z'M ~ELECMhC SC w>N 143 L...~nP197 ARzG '.to 794. w *.East L LECTMCL E ................. ....-----. ---794 East to Plankington Exit I .... 1-94 ".

East : AEOF FLOOR PLAN -P197 Status Boards -Systems, Rad/Met, PARs, Fission, EPZ Map \Phone, 0._ n,, ference Tabl , ,, RED'% White Board ERO Status Board REFERENCE USE Page 23 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.3 NNSR Revision 22 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT H ACTIVATION OF THE REMOTE EOF DATALINK SYSTEM (REDS) -WINDOWS NT Page I of 3 CAUTION -Periodically verify. REDS data is identical.

to.PP.CS.datadisplayed atthe TSC. 1.0 Startup network connected Windows NT PC with a User ID that has Telnet Session Software available.

This must be done from one of the following workstations.

These PCs running Windows NT have had fixed TCP/IP addresses assigned and authorized for access to the "B" PPCS and to the Simulator.

TCP/IP Address 156.76.225.173 156.76.220.42 157.76.222.57 156.76.220.140 156.76.80.182 156.76.80.178 Location PC No.Milw. P197 -AEOF Milw. P128 -Pillar B13 -Cube E31 Milw. P128 -Pillar B13 -Cube E30 Milw. P128 -Pillar C13 -Cube E32 PBNP -Computer Room Above Control Room PBNP -NES -Cube 98 PC #11885 PC #15642 PC #15647 PC #20481 PC # 16694 PC #18888 2.0 Click on "Start" in the lower left comer of the screen. 3.0 Click on the "Run" icon. 4.0 Type "Telnet" in the box and select "OK". 5.0 A Telnet window will appear, from which you can then select the appropriate data source. You can select these from the list that shows when you select the "Connect" pull-down menu or by selecting the "Remote System" option and then entering the TCP/IP address, per the below sources, as the Host Name and selecting "Connect".

5.1 FOR DRILLS/EXERCISES ONLY FROM THE SIMULATOR:

Select or in the Remote System box, enter TCP/IP address "156.76.14.31".

5.2 FOR REAL-TIME INFORMATION FROM THE "B" (PREFERRED)

PPCS: Select or in the Remote System box, enter TCP/IP address "156.76.14.36".

5.3 FOR REAL-TIME INFORMATION FROM THE "A" (ALTERNATE)

PPCS: Select or in the Remote System box, enter TCP/IP address "156.76.14.35".

REFERENCE USE Page 24 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT H ACTIVATION OF THE REMOTE EOF DATALINK SYSTEM (REDS) -WINDOWS NT Page 2 of 3 6.0 You will get an "OS/32 Terminal Monitor 08.02.3 WP108240" message and then a "*" prompt. If this did not happen, contact the PBNP Reactor Engineering, PBNP Information Resources, or PBNP Simulator for assistance (listed in order of preference).

7.0 At the "*" prompt, TYPE IN ALL CAPS, with the single space, exactly as shown: "S REDS,135,REDS" and press the <ENTER> key. 8.0 Note: If a second REDS session is needed, start at Step 1.0 above but in this step use: "S REDS2,135,REDS".

9.0 It may take some time for the system connections to be made and then a series of messages will appear. You will then receive a "GIVE UNIT=" prompt. 10.0 Respond with the number for the PBNP unit for which you desire data to be displayed:

Type "1" and <CR> for Unit 1 or "2" and <CR> for Unit 2 [or "0" and <CR> to quit]. 11.0 Typing "H" and <CR> will display the help screen with a list of the available screens and the screen selection codes. Simply type the "screen code" and a <CR> to call up the desired screen. NOTE: If an update or new screen is not requested periodically, the PPCS will time-out REDS and terminate the session after one-half hour of inactivity.

12.0 Typing "U" and <CR> or just <CR> will update the current screen. 13.0 Screen printing can be done from the active Telnet window: 13.1 Select "Start Logging" from the "Terminal" pull-,down menu. This opens an "Open log file" window to allow you to enter teinet.lof as the File name. Then select "Open" to start the telnet.log to capture all of the text (screens) which are viewed until the log is stopped.

13.2 Using the REDS screen selection codes, select whichever screen(s) it is desired to be printed.

13.3 After the screens you wish to print have been selected and viewed, you need to stop the telnet.log-Select "Stop Logging" from the "Terminal" pull-down menu.REFERENCE USE Page 25 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.3 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 22 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT H ACTIVATION OF THE REMOTE EOF DATALINK SYSTEM (REDS) -WINDOWS NT Page 3 of 3 13.4 The file telnet.log must then be selected and printed.

NOTE: The printout will be routed to the login user's default Windows printer.

Theprinter closest to the.Alternate.EOF.is a IP-LaserJet 4 Plus/4M Plus on queue PSBAQCPD/P1280498.

Any network printer can be selected through the "Page Setup" from the "File" pull-down menu just prior to printing.

Start the telnet.log print as follows: 13.4.1 Click on "Start" in the lower left portion of the screen. 13.4.2 Select the "Documents" icon and move the cursor to the right (arrow) and a list of current documents will appear. 13.4.3 Select the telnet.log created in Step 13.1 above. This will open a Notepad session with the contents of the telnet.log displayed.

13.4.4 Select "Print" from the "File" pull-down menu and it will print. 13A.5 Selecting the "File" pull-down menu in the Notepad session and "Exit" will return you to the active Telnet window of REDS to continue.

NOTE: To change units, you must stop the program and repeat the process of REDS login starting at Step 5.0. Select the other unit in Step 9.0. 14.0 Typing "Q" and <CR> will stop the program and quit REDS. 15.0 After quitting REDS using the "Q" command, you will get a "Connection to host lost" message window. Click on "OK" to return to the Telnet window. 16.0 At this point you can either reinitiate a REDS session or closeout the Telnet session. To close the Telnet window and session, click on the "Connect" pull-down menu and select "Exit". 17.0 If no other LAN Functions are needed, logoff the PC. Select "Cntrl + Alt + Del," then "Logoff," and "OK". Turn off the power to the monitor ONLY.REFERENCE USE Page 26 of 26 EPIP 4.7 OFF SITE. RAD IATION..PROTECTION FACILITY (OSRPF) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: Technical CLASSIFICATION:

NNSR REVISION:

0 EFFECTIVE DATE: November 30, 1999 PROCEDURE OWNER: Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS DELETED NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.7 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 0 OFFSITE RADIATION PROTECTION FACILITY (OSRPF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PU RPO SE .......................................................................................................................

3 2.0 PREREQUISITES

...............................................

3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

...................................................................

4 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

..........................................................................................

4 5.0 PROCEDURE

..........................................................................................................

5 5.1 A ctivation

........................................................................................................................

5 5.2 Evacuation

.......................................................................................................................

5

6.0 REFERENCES

.......................................................................................................

6 7.0 BA SES ............................................................................................................................

6 t ATTACHMENT A OFFSITE RADIATION PROTECTION FACILITY LAYOUT .....................

7 REFERENCE USE Page 2 of 7 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.7 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 0 OFFSITE RADIATION PROTECTION FACILITY (OSRPF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION

1.0 PURPOSE

This procedure provides instructions for activating the Offsite Radiation Protection Facility (OSRPF). The OSRPF is activated at an ALERT or higher classification, or at any other time deemed necessary by the Duty Shift Superintendent (DSS). Activation of the OSRPF does not require the declaration of an emergency.

Attachment A, Offsite Radiation Protection Facility Layout, describes the facility layout. This procedure also describes the evacuation of the OSRPF, which will be done in unison with the EOF. 2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 The Offsite Radiation Protection Coordinator is responsible for the activation and oversight of the offsite radiological monitoring activities of the OSRPF in support of the EOF. 2.1.2 The Field Team Leader is responsible for: a. OSRPF activation prior to the arrival of the Offsite Radiation Protection Coordinator.

b. Coordinating the offsite sample radiological survey activities and evaluating changing meteorological conditions.

2.1.3 The Radiation Protection Technicians (RPT) are responsible for: a. Performing field surveys as directed, b. Surveys SBCC for habitability, c. Issue TLDs and SRDs to emergency response personnel.

2.1.4 The EOF Manager is responsible for the decision to evacuate the EOF and OSRPF and relocating the responsibilities to alternate locations.

REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 7 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.7 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 0 OFFSITE RADIATION PROTECTION FACILITY (OSRPF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION

2.2 Equipment

2.2.1 OSRPF

Inventory

a. EPMP 1.1, Routine Check, Maintenance, Calibration and Inventory Schedule for Radiation Protection Emergency Preparedness Equipment.

b. EPMP 1.3, Routine Inventory of TSC, EOF, AEOF, JPIC and OSC -Emergency-Preparedness -Supplies.

2.2.2 Communications

equipment per EPMP 2.1, Testing of Communications Equipment.

2.2.3 Other

equipment determined necessary to support the event (i.e., Radiation Protection, Radiochemical, etc.). 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 3.1 The decision to evacuate the OSRPF will be made by the EOF Manager and coordinated with the Offsite Radiation Protection Coordinator.

3.2 Evacuation

of the OSRPF may include the evacuation of the EOF. 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS 4.1 This procedure shall be implemented upon declaration of an ALERT, or higher classification or at the discretion of the DSS to provide Control Room support.

4.2 Evacuation

of the EOF and OSRPF shall be considered when any of the following conditions exist: 4.2.1 Radiation levels surrounding the TSC/OSC are: a. Whole body (TEDE) 500 mrem/hr (measured or calculated)

b. Thyroid (CDE) 3000 mrem/hr (calculated)

NOTE: Higher dose rates can be tolerated for short periods of time if projections do NOT exceed the limits below. 4.2.2 Emergency response personnel radiation doses in the TSC/OSC are exceeding or are projected to exceed the following for the duration of the event: a. Whole body (TEDE) 5 rem (calculated)

b. Thyroid (CDE) 25 rem (calculated)

4.2.3 Other

emergency conditions (i.e., fire, toxic or flammable gases, or loss of power).REFERENCE USE Page 4 of 7 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 4.7 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 0 OFFSITE RADIATION PROTECTION FACILITY (OSRPF) November 30, 1999 ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION

5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 Activation

5.1.1 The OSRP Coordinator shall ensure the completion of the OSRPF Position Instruction Manual 5.1, Offsite Radiation Protection (OSRP) Coordinator.

NOTE: The facility may be activated earlier based upon the Offsite Radiation Facility Coordinator's discretion if determined there is an understanding of the events in progress and adequate staffing resources in place to respond to the emergency.

5.1.2 Minimum

staff positions at the OSRPF are: a. OSRP Coordinator.

b. Field Team Leader. c. One Radiation Protection Technician (RPT) for Field Monitoring Team (FMT) #1. d. One Radiation Protection Technician (RPT) for Field Monitoring Team (FMT) #2. 5.1.3 Each ERO position shall activate and assume their area of responsibility and function within the OSRPF using their Position Instruction Manual. 5.2 Evacuation 5.2.1 All actions -and notifications should be appropriately documented.

5.2.2 The OSRPF will be evacuated in accordance with EPIP 4.3 and under the direction of the EOF Manager.

5.2.3 When evacuating this facility, minimize the number of vehicles used to transport people and equipment to other facilities.

5.2.4 The key to an orderly evacuation is good communications, formal turnover with the personnel who are assuming OSRPF responsibilities, and documentation of actions.

5.2.5 The TSC will assume responsibility for the OSRPF. 5.2.6 Ensure all personnel are accounted for after reaching the relocation area.REFERENCE USE Page 5 of 7 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES OFFSITE RADIATION PROTECTION FACILITY (OSRPF) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.7 NNSR Revision 0 November 30, 1999

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 Point

Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan 6.2 EPIP 4.3, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Activation and Evacuation 6.3 EPMP 1.1, Routine Check, Maintenance, Calibration and Inventory Schedule for Radiation Protection Emergency Preparedness Equipment 6.4 EPMP 1.3, Routine Inventory of TSC, EOF, AEOF, JPIC and OSC Emergency Preparedness Supplies 6.5 EPMP 2.1, Testing of Communications Equipment 6.6 PIM EOF 4.2, EOF Manager 6.7 PIM OSRPF 5.1, Offsite Radiation Protection (OSRP) Coordinator 6.8 PIM OSRPF 5.2, Field Team Leader 6.9 PIM OSRPF 5.3, SBCC Survey Leader 7.0 BASES B-1 10 CFR 50.47(b), Emergency Plans B-2 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix E. IV, Content of Emergency Plans B-3 NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants B-4 NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements REFERENCE USE Page 6 of 7 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES OFFSITE RADIATION PROTECTION FACILITY (OSRPF) ACTIVATION AND EVACUATION EPIP 4.7 NNSR Revision 0 November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT A OFFSITE RADIATION PROTECTION FACILITY LAYOUT Rad Monitoring

& Decon Parking Lot BUT Parking Stora ge Secure Entry on Activation Emergency Operations Facility 1 Classroom 6279 ERO Parking Lot REFERENCE USE Page 7 of 7 EPIP 5.1 PERSONNEL EMERGENCY DOSE AUTHORIZATION Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION:

REVISION:

EFFECTIVE DATE: PROCEDURE OWNER: Technical NNSR 12 November 30, 1999 Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS DELETED NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 5.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 PERSONNEL EMERGENCY DOSE AUTHORIZATION TOTAL REWRITE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE ......................................................

3 2 .0 ..........................................................................................................

3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

.................................................................

5 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

.................................................................................................

5 5.0 PROCEDURE

...........................................................................................................

6 5.1 Emergency Response Personnel

................................................................................

6 5.2 Determination of Need to Exceed Personnel Occupational Limits .........................

6 5.3 M edical Evaluations

..................................................................................................

7

6.0 REFERENCES

.............................................7 7.0 BA SES ............................................................................................................................

8 ATTACHMENT A HEALTH AFFECTS......................................9 ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY PLAN DOSE AUTHORIZATION

........................................

10 Page 2 of 10 REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES PERSONNEL EMERGENCY DOSE AUTHORIZATION EPIP 5.1 NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure establishes personnel dose guidelines and responsibilities for exposure control in the event activation of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan makes it necessary to deviate from normal operating procedures.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 The Rad/Chem Coordinator or Dose/PAR Coordinator shall recommend the need to extend personnel dose limits. 2.1.2 The Emergency Director shall approve the dose extensions.

2.1.3 The Radiation Protection Leader or a designee shall brief the employee of the hazards associated with the dose extension.

2.1.4 The employee must voluntarily accept the dose extension after being briefed on the hazards.

2.2 Equipment

2.2.1 Thermoluminescent

dosimeters (TLDs) 2.2.2 Self-reading dosimeters (SRDs) 2.3 Definitions

2.3.1 Individual

-as defined in 10 CFR 20.1003, any human being. 2.3.2 Adult -an individual 18 or more years of age. 2.3.3 Minor -an individual less than 18 years of age. 2.3.4 Employee -an individual employed to work at PBNP who is subject to occupational radiation exposure.

2.3.5 Dose -a generic term for the dose equivalents stated in 10 CFR 20.1003.

2.3.6 Exposure

-being exposed to ionizing radiation or to radioactive material.REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 10 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 5.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 PERSONNEL EMERGENCY DOSE AUTHORIZATION TOTAL REWRITE 2.3.7 Personnel Exposure Monitoring Device -A device that indicates the amount of external radiation dose received.

a. Self-reading Dosimeter (SRD) -A device which is read directly by an individual to provide an estimate of exposure.

b. Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD) -A device which records the amount of dose rec6ived; read by an offsite vendor. 2.3.8 External dose -that portion of the dose equivalent received from radiation sources outside the body. a. Whole body -as applied to external exposure, head trunk (including male gonads), arms above the elbow, or legs above the knee. b. Deep-dose equivalent, Hd -the external whole body dose equivalent at a tissue depth of I cm (1000 mg/cm 2). c. Eye dose equivalent

-the external exposure of the lens of the eye; the dose equivalent at a tissue depth of 0.3 cm (300 mg/cm 2). d. Shallow-dose equivalent, H -the external exposure of the skin or an extremity at a tissue depth of 0.007 cm (7 mg/cm2) averaged over an area of 1 square centimeter.

e. Extremity

-hand, elbow, arm below elbow, foot, knee, or leg below the knee. 2.3.9 Internal dose -the portion of the dose equivalent received from radioactive material taken into the body. 2.3.10 Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE) -the sum of the products of the weighting factors applicable to each of the body organs or tissues that are irradiated and the committed dose equivalent to these organs or tissues.

2.3.11 Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) -the sum of the deep-dose equivalent (for external exposures) and the committed effective dose equivalent (for internal exposures).

2.3.12 Planned Special Exposure (PSE) -an infrequent exposure to radiation separate from and in addition to the annual dose limits.REFERENCE USE Page 4 of 10 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES PERSONNEL EMERGENCY DOSE AUTHORIZATION EPIP 5.1 NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

3.1 During

a plant emergency condition, personnel will be allowed to receive up to 4 rem, TEDE, unless authorized exposures as listed below have been approved by the Emergency Director.Reference Table 2-2, EPA-400-R-92-001

0) Only on a voluntary basis per NRC Regulatory Guide 8.29.3.2 Emergency situations that involve immediate measures required to save human lives or equipment important to safety are not considered Planned Special Exposures (PSEs). However, all exposures received during accident and emergency situations must be determined and subtracted from the 25 rem allowed for lifetime PSEs. [see 10 CFR 20.1206(e)]

3.3 All personnel performing emergency evaluation or recovery activities where the potential exists for exposure to ionizing radiation will be provided with personnel monitoring devices consisting of thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD) and self-reading dosimeters (SRD). 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS Emergency workers require dose authorizations if expected dose in excess of: 4.1 Maximum PBNP yearly administrative level (4 rem), or 4.2 Excess of the limits in 10 CFR 20.1201 (5 rem).REFERENCE USE Personnel Emergency Dose Guidelines TEDE Lens of Eye Any Other Organ (Including Activity (rem) (rem) Skin & Extremities) (rem) All () 5 15 50 Protecting Valuable Property () 10 30 100 Life-Saving or Protection of Large Populations 25 75 250 Life-Saving or Protection of Large Populations

() > 25 > 75 > 250 Page 5 of 10 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 5.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 PERSONNEL EMERGENCY DOSE AUTHORIZATION TOTAL REWRITE 5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 Emergency

Response Personnel

5.1.1 Ensure

your SRD is set to zero upon receipt and be aware of Radiation Protection expectations.

5.1.2 Verify

that correct TLD was issued to you upon receipt.

5.1.3 Ensure

that exposures authorized under this procedure are not exceeded and that all SRD rezeros are documented for entry into the individual exposure accounting records.

5.1.4 Ensure

you are briefed on the hazards of accepting a higher radiation dose. 5.2 Determination of Need to Exceed Personnel Occupational Limits 5.2.1 The Rad/Chem Coordinator and/or Dose/PAR Coordinator shall ensure an evaluation of the published Personnel Radiation Exposure Reports is completed.

Complete copies are maintained at the following locations:

a. Radiation Protection Station b. Operations Support Center c. Radiation Protection Records Office (south service building)

d. Offsite Radiation Protection Facility 5.2.2 IF emergency workers expected dose is in excess of the maximum PBNP yearly administrative level (4 rem) or the limits in 10 CFR 20.1201 (5 rem), THEN Attachment B, Emergency Plan Dose Authorization, shall be used to document the authorization.

REFERENCE USE Page 6 of 10 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 5.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 PERSONNEL EMERGENCY DOSE AUTHORIZATION TOTAL REWRITE 5.2.3 The Rad/Chem Coordinator or Dose/PAR Coordinator shall ensure personnel have be been made fully aware of: a. Risks involved per Attachment A, Health Affects, including the dose at which acute effects of radiation may be experienced and the numerical estimates of the risk of delayed effects.

b. IF the proposed exposure is to support life-saving efforts AND the victim's exposure is known to be fatal or the victim is determined to be fatally injured, THEN personnel exposure in excess of 5 rem shall be avoided.

5.2.4 Determine

all exposures received during accident and emergency situations and subtract from the 25 rem allowed for lifetime PSEs. IRfI0cIR20o.2We)]

5.3 Medical

Evaluations

5.3.1 Personnel

who have received external whole body exposures in excess of 4 rem shall be removed from normal work activities in radiologically controlled areas. Although it is extremely unlikely that there will be any detectable health effects, the Emergency Director may refer the exposed person to a physician.

5.3.2 Personnel

who have received external whole body exposures of 25 rem or greater shall be removed from emergency duty and referred to a physician for medical evaluation.

5.3.3 The company Medical Services Division shall be informed of any employee referred to a physician for medical evaluation.

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 Point

Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan 6.2 NP 4.2.14, Administrative Dose Levels/Dose Level Extension Procedure 6.3 NP 4.2.18, Planned Special Exposure REFERENCE USE Page 7 of 10 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES PERSONNEL EMERGENCY DOSE AUTHORIZATION

7.0 BASES

EPIP 5.1 NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE B-i 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation B-2 NUREG 0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants B-3 NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements B4 EPA, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, EPA-400-R-92-001, May 1992* B-5 Regulatory Guide 8.29, Instruction Concerning Risks from Occupational Exposure, Revision 1, February 1996 REFERENCE USE Page 8 of 10 NUCLEAR POWER BUSiNESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES PERSONNEL EMERGENCY DOSE AUTHORIZATION EPIP 5.1 NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT A HEALTH AFFECTS TABLE 1 WHOLE BODY ABSORBED DOSES RECEIVED WITHIN A FEW HOURS'Whole Body Early Whole Body Absorbed Dose Fatalities 2 Absorbed Dose Radiation Sickness 3 (rad) (percent) (rad) (percent affected)140 200 300 400 460 5 15 50 85 95 50 100 150 200 250 2 15 50 85 98 NOTES: 1. Risks will be lower for protracted exposure periods.

2. Supportive medical treatment may increase the dose at which the frequency of early fatalities occur by approximately 50 percent.

3. Radiation sickness may include: vomiting, diarrhea, etc., which may be forewarning symptoms of more serious health effects associated with large doses of radiation.

TABLE 2 APPROXIMATE CANCER RISK TO AVERAGE INDIVIDUALS FROM A 25 REM DOSE EQUIVALENT DELIVERED PROMPTLY Appropriate Risk of Average Years of Life Premature Death Lost if Premature Age At Exposure (deaths per 1000 Death Occurs (years) persons exposed) (years) 20 to 30 9.1 24 30 to 40 7.2 19 40 to 50 5.3 15 50 to 60 3.5 11 REFERENCE USE Page 9 of 10 NUCLEAR POWER BUSNESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES PERSONNEL EMERGENCY DOSE AUTHORIZATION EPIP 5.1 NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B EMERGENCY PLAN DOSE AUTHORIZATION

1.0 Employee

Information:

Name SSN / /Company or WE Work Group 2.0 Task Requiring Dose Extension Authorization:

3.0 Authorization

and Approvals Check one: 3.1 [- Authorization to receive up to the dose limits (TEDE) in 10 CFR 20.1201 (5 rem). 3.2 [' Authorization to receive dose in excess of the limits in 10 CFR 20.1201 (> 5 rem). 3.3 I have been briefed on the hazards associated with radiation exposure and I voluntarily accept extension of my dose limit beyond that specified above.Employee Signature Radiation Protection Leader or Designee Signature Date/Time Date/Time 3.4 Recommendation Rad/Chem Coord. OR Dose/PAR Coord. Signature/ Date/Time 3.5 Approval Emergency Director Signature/ Date/Time Route copy to Radiation Protection Records.

Retain original with documentation from event and return to Emergency Preparedness.

REFERENCE USE Page 10 of 10 EPIP 5.2 RADIOIODINE BLOCKING AND THYROID DOSE ACCOUNTING Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: Technical CLASSIFICATION:

NNSR REVISION:

11 EFFECTIVE DATE: November 30, 1999 PROCEDURE OWNER: Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS DELETED NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 5.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 11 RADIOIODINE BLOCKING AND THYROID DOSE November 30, 1999 ACCOUNTING TOTAL REWRITE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PU RPO SE .......................................................................................................................

3 2.0. PREREQUISITES

....................................................................................................

3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

..............................................................

3 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

...............................................................................................

4 5.0 PROCEDURE

.........................................................................................................

4 5.1 Dose Accountability For Exposures To Airborne Radioiodine and Thyroid Dose Calculations

..................................................................................

4 5.2 Administration

.......................................................................................................

5

6.0 REFERENCES

..........................................................................................................

6 7.0 BA SES ............................................................................................................................

6 ATTACHMENT A POTASSIUM IODIDE TABLETS PATIENT PACKAGE INSERT ...............

7 ATTACHMENT B AIRBORNE RADIOIODINE DOSE ACCOUNTABILITY AND POTASSIUM IODIDE DISTRIBUTION

........................................................

8 ATTACHMENT C RECORD OF KNOWN ALLERGY TO OR VOLUNTARY REFUSAL TO TAKE POTASSIUM IODIDE ...............................................

9 REFERENCE USE Page 2 of 9 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 5.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 11 RADIOIODINE BLOCKING AND THYROID DOSE November 30, 1999 ACCOUNTING TOTAL REWRITE 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides a method for quickly estimating the dose rate to the thyroid following a known or predicted exposure to radioactive iodine. It also provides guidelines to assist in determining when to issue potassium iodide. Potassium iodide (KI) is a stable iodine which will saturate the thyroid gland, preventing unnecessary thyroid gland exposure from radioiodine.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 The Rad/Chem Coordinator or Dose/PAR Coordinator shall recommend the need to issue KI. 2.1.2 The Emergency Director shall approve the use of KI, documenting the approval on Attachment B, Airborne Radioiodine Dose Accountability and Potassium Iodide Distribution.

2.1.3 Company

Medical Services personnel will determine who may be administered KI. 2.1.4 Company Medical Services personnel, or a designated physician, will determine the need for KI on a continued basis (after an initial dose of one tablet).

2.2 Equipment.

Bottles of 130 mg KI tablets 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 3.1 To be most effective, KI must be taken within I to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months after exposure to radioiodine, with maximum effectiveness when taken immediately prior to exposure.

3.2 IF KI is administered more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months after an acute ingestion or inhalation of i-dioiodine, THEN its effectiveness as a thyroid blocking agent is less than 50 percent.

3.3 A copy of the pharmaceutical company instructions, Potassium Iodide Tablets Patient Package Insert, for the use of KI tablets is reproduced as Attachment A. This attachment is furnished for information only. 3.4 KI should NOT be taken by persons allergic to iodine.REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 9 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 5.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 11 RADIOIODINE BLOCKING AND THYROID DOSE November 30, 1999 ACCOUNTING TOTAL REWRITE 3.5 KI should only be taken by individuals on the approved list, and on a voluntary basis. 3.6 Distribution of KI to non-WE and Security personnel will be the responsibility of the organizations to which these personnel belong. 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS 4.1 An emergency occurs where thejprojected dose to the thyroid is likely to exceed 25 rem. 4.2 IF the projected dose to the thyroid is NOT likely to exceed 25 rem, THIREN the issuance of KI to approved pe-rsonnel is determined based upon the event. 5.0 PROCEDURE 5.1 Dose Accountability For Exposures To Airborne Radioiodine and I hyroid Dose Calculations It is imperative that accurate exposure times and radioiodine concentrations encountered be maintained for each individual's exposure to airborne radioiodine.

The dose to the thyroid from airborne radioiodine may be estimated as follows, completing Attachment B, Airborne Radioiodine Dose Accountability and Potassium Iodide Distribution.

5.1.1 Inhaled

Dose Conversion Factors, rads/t 1 Ci: 1-131 1.480 rads/gCi 1-132 0.054 rads/gCi 1-133 0.400 rads/gCi 1-134 0.025 rads/,Ci 1-135 0.124.rads/4Ci

5.1.2 Breathing

Rates a. Assume 1.25E06 cc/hour (= 3.47E-04 m 3/sec.) for short exposure times or exposures while working.

b. Assume 8.35E05 cc/hour (= 2.32E-04 m 3/sec.) for long exposure times (in excess of a single day).REFERENCE USE Page 4 of 9 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 5.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 11 RADIOIODINE BLOCKING AND THYROID DOSE November 30, 1999 ACCOUNTING TOTAL REWRITE 5.1.3 IF the concentration of each iodine isotope is NOT known, T;HEN use the dose conversion factor for I-1 3TIh=sed in Step 5.1.1 and illutrted in the Step 5.1.5 example.

5.1.4 The total amount of radioiodine inhaled in ýtCi is estimated by multiplying the average airborne concentration in PCi/cc by the breathing rate in cc/hour by the total time of exposure in hours. The thyroid dose in rads is then calculated by multiplying the total amount in PCi by the dose conversion factors -(rads/p.tCi) from-Step 5.1.1. 5.1.5 Example: Gross Iodine = 5.4E-07 pCi/cc in air Breathing Rate = 1.25E06 cc/hour Expected Exposure Time = 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Inhaled Dose Conversion Factor (1-131) = 1.48 rads/aCi Calculation:

(5.4E-07 Ci/cc) (1.25E06 cc/hour) (1.48 rads/ttCi)

(1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) = 0.999 rads Thyroid Dose 5.2 Administration

5.2.1 Single

dose 130 mg tablets of KI and rosters of WE and security personnel approved to use KI as a blocking agent are maintained in the following locations: (Reference Emergency Telephone Directory)

a. Operations Support Center b. Offsite Radiation Protection Facility c. Control Room 5.2.2 IF the following conditions are met, 'TiHEN KI should be distributed to approved personnel for self administration.

a. The projected dose to the thyroid is likely to exceed 25 rem, OR b. The projected dose to the thyroid is NOT likely to exceed 25 rem; however, based upon the event it is reco-mmended by the Rad/Chem Coordinator or Dose/PAR Coordinator, AND k> c. The Emergency Director has approved the distribution of KI.REFERENCE USE Page 5 of 9 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 5.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 11 RADIOIODINE BLOCKING AND THYROID DOSE November 30, 1999 ACCOUNTING TOTAL REWRITE 5.2.3 Contact the Security Shift Commander for approval to issue KI to security personnel.

5.2.4 List the people who are NOT approved to take KI, or who refuse KI, on Attachment C, Record oT'iiown Allergy To or Voluntary Refusal to Take Potassium Iodide. 5.2.5 Verify the shelf life of KI tablets is current as indicated on the pharmaceutical container prior to issuing.

5.2.6 Prior

to issue to each individual:

a. Furnish a copy of Attachment A, Potassium Iodide Tablets Patient Package Insert, for informational purposes.

b. Ask each person if they are allergic to iodine. DO NOT issue KI if the answer is YES. Log their name on AttachmenFC, Record of Known Allergy TEFo-"Voluntary Refusal to Take Potassium Iodide. c. Ask if they are accepting the KI on a voluntary basis for self administration.

DO NOT issue KI if their answer is NO. Log their name on Attachment C, Record of Known Allergy To or V-o1iitary Refusal to Take Potassium Iodide. 5.2.7 Personnel listed on Attachment C, Record of Known Allergy To or Voluntary Refusal to Take Potassium Iodide, require alternate protective measures be provided and/or their emergency response duties reassigned.

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 Letter

Wisconsin Electric medical department, dated November 6, 1980, and Attachment 1, Protection Against Radioactive lodines.

6.2 Memo NPM 91-0273, Potassium Iodide -Issuance Dose Level, dated February 7, 1991. 7.0 BASES B-1 NRC Information Notice No. 88-15: Availability of U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-Approved Potassium Iodide for Use in Emergencies Involving Radioactive Iodine, April 18, 1988. B-2 NUREG-1210, Public Protective Actions -Predetermined Criteria and Initial Actions, Volume 4, Pilot Program: NRC Severe Reactor Accident Incident Response Training Manual, February 1987.REFERENCE USE Page 6 of 9 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RADIOIODINE BLOCKING AND THYROID DOSE ACCOUNTING EPIP 5.2 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 11 November 30, 1999 A1TACHMENT A ATTACHMENT A POTASSIUM IODIDE TABLETS PATIENT PACKAGE INSERT Note: This attachment is furnished for information only.Patt Package kusit For THYRO-BLOCKO TABLETS (POTASSIUM IOOIDE TABLETS. USP) (promounced po-TASS-m'n EYEo-dy TAKE POTASSIUM IODIDE ONLY WHEN PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICIALS TELL YOU. IN A RADIATION EMERGENCY, RADIOACTIVE IODINE COULD BE RELEASED INTO THE AIR. POTASSIUM IODIDE (A FORM OF IODINE) CAN HELP PROTECT YOU. IF YOU ARE TOLD TO TAKE THIS MEDICINE, TAKE IT ONE TIME EVERY 24 HOURS. DO NOT TAKE IT MORE OFTEN. MORE WILL NOT HELP YOU AND MAY INCREASE THE RISK OF SIDE EFFECTS. DO NOT TAKE THIS DRUG IF YOU KNOW YOU ARE ALLERGIC TO IODIDE. (SEE SIDE EFFECTS BELOW.) INDICATIONS THYROID BLOCKING IN A RADIATION EMERGENCY ONLY. DIRECTIONS FOR USE Use only as directed by State or local public health authorities in the event of a radiation emergency.

DOSE Tablets: ADULTS AND CHILDREN 1 YEAR OF AGE OR One (1) tablet once a B IEUNER 1 YEAR OF AGE: One-half (112) tablet once a day. Crush first. Take for 10 days unless directed otherwise by State or local public health authorities.

Store at controlled room temperature between 150 and WC (59* to 86°F). Keep container tightly closed and protect from light. WARNING Potassium iodide should not be used by people allergic to iodide. Keep out of the reach of children.

In case of overdose or allergic reaction, contact a physician or the public health authority.

DESCRIPTION Each white, round, scored, monogrammed THYRO-BLOCKS TABLET contains 130 mg of potassium iodide. Other ingredients:

magnesium stearate, microcrystalline cellulose, sinica gel, and sodium thiosulfate.

HOW POTASSIUM IODIDE WORKS Certain forms of iodine help your thyroid gland work right. Most people get the iodine they need from foods, like iodized salt or fish. The thyroid can "store" or hold only a certain amount of iodine. In a radiation emergency, radioactive iodine maybe released in --the eir; -This-material may-be breathed or swallowed.

It may enter the thyroid gland and damage it- The damage would probably not show itself for years. Children are most likely to have thyroid damage. If you take potassium iodide, it will fill up your thyroid gland. This reduces the chance that harmful radioactive iodine will enter the thyroid gland. WHO SHOULD NOT TAKE POTASSIUM IODIDE The only people who should not take potassium iodide are people who know they are allergic to iodide. You may take potassium iodide even if you are taking medicines for a id problem (for example, a thyroid hormone or antithyroid drug). Pregnant and nursing women and babies and children may also take this drug. HOW AND WHEN TO TAKE POTASSIUM IODIDE Potassium iodide should be taken as soon as possible after public health officials tell you. You should take one dose ever 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . More will not help you because the thyroid can hold" oniy limited amounts of iodine. Larger doses will increase the ;:Z of side effects. You will probably be told not to take the drug for more than 10 days. SIDE EFFECTS Usually, side effects of potassium iodide happen when people take higher doses for a long time. You should be careful not to take more than the recommended dose or take it for longer than you are told. Side effects are unlikely because of the low dose and the short time you will be taking the drug. Possible side effects include skin rashes, swelling of the salivary glands, and "iodism" (metallic taste, burning mouth and throat, sore teeth and gums, symptoms of a head cold, and sometimes stomach upset and diarrhea).

A few people have an allergic reaction with more serious symptoms.

These could be fever and joint pains, or swelling of arts of the face and body and at tunes severe shortness of eath requiring immediate medical attention.

Taking iodide may rarely cause overactivity of the thyroid gland, underactivity of the thyroid gland, or enlargement of the thyroid gland (goiter).

WHAT TO DO IF SIDE EFFECTS OCCUR If the aide effects are severe or if you have an allergic reaction.

atop taking potassium iodide. Then, if possible, call a doctor or public health authority for instructions.

HOW SUPPLIED THYRO-BLOCKO TABLETS (Potassium Iodide Tablets, USP) are white, round tablets, one side scored, other side debossed 472 WALLACE, each containing 130 mg potassium iodide. Available in bottles of 14 tablets (NDC 0037-0472-20).

WALLACE LABORATORIES Division of CARTER-WALLACE.

INC. Cranbury, New Jersey 05512 IN-0472-03 Rev. 5/94 REFERENCE USE Page 7 of 9 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RADIOIODINE BLOCKING AND THYROID DOSE ACCOUNTING EPIP 5.2 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision II November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT B AIRBORNE RADIOIODINE DOSE ACCOUNTABILITY AND POTASSIUM IODIDE DISTRIBUTION TABLE --THYROID DOSE RATE CALCULATION Location: IOOE CONCENTRATION DOSEESIAD IOOE pCi/CC (3M4) CONVERSION (2 BREATHING RATE THYROID DOSE RATE __ __ _ __ __ __ __ __ FACTOR (rads/pCi) (rads/br) 1-131 1_______ _ AS4O rads/pCi ___________

1-132 0_________

.054 Fads/pCi 1-133 ___________

0.400 rads/pCi_____________

1-134 ________ _ 0.025 rads/piCi

____________

1-135 __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.124 radslpCi _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ TOTAL DOSE RATE (rads/hr)

TABLE 2 -THYROID DOSE FROM AIRBORNE RADIOIODINE AND POTASSIUM IODIDE DISTRIBUTION NAESOCIAL EXPOSURE ESTIMATED TOTAL POTASSIUM NAESECURITY DURATION THYROID THYROID IODIDE ISSUED LS FIS I NUMBER (hours) DOSE RATE DOSE LAT IRT I(rads/hr) (rads) DATE TIME") From Table I (2) Short Exposure Times or Exposures While Working Assume 1 .25E06 cc/hour. Long Exposure Times (Excess of Single Day) -Assume 8.35EO5 cc/hour () If NOT known, conservatively use the DCF for 1-131 (4) Record sample number(s) data is from, or how long airborne radioiodine concentration was derived: Recommended By: Approved By: Rad/Chem Coordinator or Dose/PAR Coordinator Emergency Director Date/Time Date/Time REFERENCE USE Page 8 of 9 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RADIOIODINE BLOCKING AND THYROID DOSE ACCOUNTING EPIP 5.2 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision II November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT C RECORD OF KNOWN ALLERGY TO OR VOLUNTARY REFUSAL TO TAKE POTASSIUM IODIDE NAME SOCIAL REASON ALTERNATE SFIRST.---.---.........

.... SECURITY PROTECTIVE MEASURE LAST FIRST MI NUMBER (Optional)

TAKEN Recommended By: Rad/Chem Coordinator or Dose/PAR Coordinator Approved By: Emergency Director Date/Time

/ Date/Time REFERENCE USE Page 9 of 9 EPIP 6.1 ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: Technical CLASSIFICATION:

NNSR REVISION:

16 EFFECTIVE DATE: November 30, 1999 PROCEDURE OWNER: Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS DELETED NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 6.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 16 ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND November 30,1999 EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL TOTAL REWRITE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PU RPO SE ......................................................................................................................

3 2.0 PREREQUISITES

.............................................

..........................................................

3..3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

.............................

5 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

...........................................................................................

6 5.0 PROCEDURE

.................................................................................................................

g 5.1 Limited Plant Evacuation

...........................................................................................

8 5.2 Full-Site Assembly and Accountability

....................................................................

9 5.3 Release of Non-Essential Personnel from Site .......................................................

12 5.4 Evacuation of Non-Essential Personnel to Offsite Assembly Areas ........................

14 5.5 Reentering the Site ....................................................................................................

17

6.0 REFERENCES

........................................................................................................

17 7.0 BA SES ...........................................................................................................................

17 ATTACHMENT A ANNOUNCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE ACTION .......................................

18 ATTACHMENT B NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL OUTSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA .... 19 ATTACHMENT C EVACUATION OF THE POINT BEACH ENERGY CENTER ..................

20 ATTACHMENT D ACCOUNTABILITY ANNOUNCEMENT

................................................

21 ATTACHMENT E ASSEMBLY AREA ACCOUNTABILITY SIGN-IN ..................................

22 ATTACHMENT F EVENT INVOLVEMENT

SUMMARY

.....................................................

23 ATTACHMENT G PERSONNEL "RELEASE-FROM-SITE" BRIEFING CHECKLIST

...... 24 ATTACHMENT H EMERGENCY EVENT INFORMATION SHEET .......................................

25 ATTACHMENT I EVACUATION ROUTES ...........................................................................

26 REFERENCE USE Page 2 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 6.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 16 ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND November 30, 1999 EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL TOTAL REWRITE 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure describes protective actions to be taken for personnel within the protected area and exclusion areas. These actions include assembly, accountability, release, and evacuation.

These actions may be performed on a limited plant or a full-site basis. 1.1 Assembly will consist Of an orderly gathering of people into designated assembly areas onsite or offsite. An assembly will be conducted at a Site Emergency or higher classification, or under any circumstance deemed necessary by the Duty Shift Superintendent (DSS), or TSC Manager.

1.2 Accountability

is the gathering of the names of people assembled and maintaining control of their movement.

1.3 Release

of personnel is the orderly dismissal of personnel not immediately needed for response when no radiological conditions prohibit an unmonitored release from the site. 1.4 Evacuation is the process implemented where radiological or other hazards require additional actions, such as radiological monitoring and relocation of assembly areas, in conjunction with the release of personnel.

An early release of visitors, contractors, and non-essential plant and company personnel from the site eliminates the need, in most cases, for burdensome radiological screening of persons and vehicles associated with an evacuation.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 This procedure is the responsibility of the Duty Shift Superintendent (DSS) until assumed by the TSC Manager.

2.1.2 The DSS may assign this procedure to an operating supervisor, typically from the unaffected unit. 2.1.3 Upon activation of the emergency response facilities, this procedure is the responsibility of the TSC Manager, who may designate responsibilities to other qualified personnel.

2.1.4 The Rad/Chem Coordinator and Offsite Radiation Protection Coordinator are responsible for the radiological monitoring of personnel and vehicles if required prior to leaving site property.REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL EPIP 6.1 NNSR Revision 16 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 2.2 Equipment 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 2.2.4 2.2.5 Fisherman's Alarm Gai-Tronics Point Beach Automated Notification System Point Beach PBX Telephone System Public Address system in the Nuclear Engineering Support Building 2.3 Onsite Assembly Areas (WithinOwner-Cbntrolled Area)*Assembly areas with card readers REFERENCE USE LOCATION PERSONNEL ASSEMBLED NSB Cafeteria*

Plant Personnel

-Workstations in PA (Ops Office & North) Admin Bldg -El 26'* Plant Personnel

-Workstations in PA (South of Ops Office) Warehouse

4 Plant Personnel

-Workstations outside PA (North end) Other company personnel, Contractors, Visitors Nuclear Eng. Bldg Cafeteria Plant Personnel

-Workstations outside PA (South end) Other company personnel, Contractors, Visitors Training Bldg North Foyer Plant Personnel

-Workstations outside PA (South end) Other company personnel, Contractors, Visitors RP Station* Chemistry inside RCA & all RP Control Room* Onshift Operations Personnel Technical Support Center* Assigned ERO Personnel Emergency Operations Facility Assigned ERO Personnel Operations Support Center* Chemistry outside RCA, Assigned ERO Personnel, Operations Relief/Training Crews CAS* Security Personnel Other temporary assembly areas Personnel affected by these temporary assembly areas will be may be assigned to directly notified in the announcemnts for assembly accommodate unusual situations (i.e., construction)

Page 4 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL EPIP 6.1 NNSR Revision 16 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 2.4 Offsite Assembly Areas (Outside Owner-Controlled Area)3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

3.1 Radiological

conditions may make it necessary to use alternate routes and/or assembly areas. 3.2 IF personnel cannot access their designated assembly areas, THEN personnel should report to the nearest assembly area. 3.3 Unless otherwise directed by the announcement, personnel exiting the controlled area should: 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.3.4 Remove protective clothing.

Frisk at the RCA checkpoint.

Retain dosimetry.

Report to assigned assembly area.3.4 Accountability of personnel in the protected area shall be accomplished within 30 minutes of the evacuation alarm for a full-site assembly.

3.5 Protracted

emergencies must consider 24-hour staffing, neither retaining or releasing too many persons from any particular group. 3.6 Emergency response facilities shall reference the appropriate EPIPs for activation and evacuation of each specific facility.REFERENCE USE PROBABLE ONSITE ASSEMBLY AREAS ALTERNATE LOCATIONS NEEDING RELOCATION Admin Building El. 26' Two Creeks Town Hall NSB Cafeteria Two Rivers National Guard Armory NES Building Cafeteria TrainingBuilding North Foyer Warehouse

4 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Alternate EOF Offsite Radiation Protection Facility (OSRPF) TSC (partial EOF positions)

KNPP Site Boundary Facility (OSRPF Only) Technical Support Center (TSC) Admin Bldg El. 26' Operations Suport Center (OSC) Control Room or Computer Room Above NSB Cafeteria Site Boundary Control Center Page 5 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL EPIP 6.1 NNSR Revision 16 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 4.0 REFERENCE USE INITIAL CONDITIONS 4.1 A limited plant evacuation shall be considered under any of the following conditions:

4.1.1 Area radiation monitor high-level alarm in excess of 100 mR/hr. 4.1.2 Airborne radioactive concentrations in excess of the derived air concentrations (DACs) specified in Appendix B to 10 CFR 20. 4.1.3 Valid containment alarm is necessary.

4.1.4 Excessive

radioactive surface contamination levels due to a major spill of radioactive materials.

4.1.5 Other

emergency conditions that may endanger human life or health (i.e., fire, flooding, toxic gases, etc.). 4.2 A full-site assembly and accountability shall be conducted under any of the following conditions:

4.2.1 A Site Emergency or higher classification has been declared.

4.2.2 Radiation

levels in general areas of the protected area exceed 100 mR/hr. 4.2.3 Airborne activity in general areas of the protected area exceed derived air concentration and exposures are expected to exceed 40 DAC hours (equivalent to approximately 100 mR). 4.2.4 Other emergency conditions in general areas of the protected area that may endanger human life or health (i.e., fire, flooding, toxic gases, etc,). 4.2.5 The DSS or TSC Manager has determined that assembly and accountability of all personnel is desired.

4.3 A full-site assembly and accountability shall be completed prior to the release or evacuation of non-essential personnel from the site.Page 6 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL EPIP 6.1 NNSR Revision 16 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 4.4 An evacuation of non-essential personnel to offsite assembly areas shall be considered under any of the following conditions:

4.4.1 Gross

activity outside the protected area are greater than 5.3 x 10" pCi/cc. (This would result in a two-hour dose to the thyroid of 2 rem assuming the predominate isotope is 1-131.) 4.4.2 Projected doses in assembly areas are approaching or exceed the following:

a. Whole body gamma b. Thyroid c. Beta skin dose 4.4.3 4.4.4 1.5 rem 5 rem 3 rem Radiation levels in the exclusion areas outside the protected area are in excess of 10 mrem/hr whole body. Other emergency conditions that may endanger human life or health (i.e., fire, flooding, toxic gases, etc.).REFERENCE USE Page 7 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 6.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 16 ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND November 30, 1999 EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL TOTAL REWRITE 5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 Limited

Plant Evacuation NOTE: IF a security event, THEN contact Security to discuss the consequences of conducting a "limited plant evacuation and the appropriate actions to implement.

5.1.1 Remove

and complete Attachment A, Announcement of Protective Action. 5.1.2 Sound the plant evacuation alarm (and fire alarm, if appropriate).

5.1.3 Read the completed Attachment A, Announcement of Protective Action, over the Gai-tronics.

5.1.4 Repeat

Step 5.1.2 and 5.1.3. 5.1.5 Contact the Radiation Protection Supervisor/Technologists to implement the appropriate Radiation Protection practices.

NOTE: Unrestricted reentry to a(n) evacuated area(s) can be restored when it has been determined by the DSS and Radiation Protection Supervision that there is no longer a hazard to personnel.

5.1.6 Evaluate

the conditions and initiate actions to: a. isolate affected area(s).

b. allowreentry to evacuated area(s).

5.1.7 IF the hazard continues to increase in severity, THEN consider the implementation of Step 5.2, Full-Site Assembly and Accountability.

5.1.8 Return

this procedure section and completed Attachment A, Announcement of Protective Action, to Emergency Preparedness or to the TSC Manager.REFERENCE USE Performed By: Performer (Print and Sign) Date / Time Page 8 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 6.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 16 ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND November 30, 1999 EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL TOTAL REWRITE 5.2 Full-Site Assembly and Accountability

5.2.1 Notification

of Personnel NOTE 1: IF a security event, THEN contact Security to discuss the consequences of conducting an assembly and the appropriate actions to implement.

NOTE 2: When the TSC is activated, the responsibility for assembly, accountability, release, and evacuation of personnel is transferred from the DSS to the TSC Manager.

a. Remove and complete Attachment A, Announcement of Protective Action, for personnel inside and outside the protected area. b. Contact CAS and direct Security to implement sections of their security plan, including:

Activate accountability readers and notify the Duty Shift Superintendent when accountability is achieved OR if personnel remain unaccounted for.

Notify personnel outside the protected area via broadcast message and security sweep and advise them of protective actions to implement per Attachment A. c. Sound the fisherman's alarm. d. Sound the plant evacuation alarm (and fire alarm, if appropriate) to initiate assembly and accountability.

e. Read the completed Attachment A, Announcement of Protective Action, over the Gai-tronics.

f. Repeat Steps 5.2.1.d and 5.2.1. e. g. IF Security is unable to notify personnel outside the protected area, THEN initiate and complete Attachment B. h. Contact the Supervisor-Point Beach Energy Center and direct them to complete Attachment C, Evacuation of the Point Beach Energy Center, of this procedure.

REFERENCE USE Page 9 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 6.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 16 ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND November 30, 1999 EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL TOTAL REWRITE 5.2.2 Accountability NOTE 1: IF accountability of the protected area personnel is not complete within 30 minutes of an evacuation alarm, THEN make preparations to implement EPIP 10.1, Emergency Reentry.

NOTE 2: Teams dispatched from the Control Room shall be tracked by the DSS or a designee until relieved by the OSC. a. Monitor accountability with Security and implement Attachment D, Accountability Announcement, if personnel remain unaccounted forAND/OR when accountability within the protected area has been achieved.

NOTE: In the absence of a designated Assembly Area Leader, anyone reporting may fulfill these duties. b. Assembly Area Leaders at each assembly area shall: 0 Ensure personnel arriving are entering safely and quickly, remaining quiet during the assembly.

0 Request assistance in the assembly area from other personnel as needed. 0 Direct personnel arriving to sign-in on Attachment E, Assembly Area Accountability Sign-In, (excluding the CR, TSC, OSC, EOF, OSRPF, and RP Station unless the accountability readers are inoperable).

Direct all personnel to complete Attachment F, Event Involvement Summary, (excluding the CR, TSC, OSC, EOF, OSRPF, and RP Station).REFERENCE USE Page 10 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 6.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 16 ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND November 30, 1999 EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL TOTAL REWRITE "* Update Attachment E, Assembly Area Accountability Sign-In, as personnel arrive at, or depart from, the assembly area. Personnel shall only leave the assembly area if (a) a valid request is received from an emergency response facility to assist in the event. (b) specific directions are received from the TSC Manager, or designee, to conduct a release of personnel from site. "* Maintain accountability if personnel are relocated to a different assembly area. "* Provide information from completed Attachment E, Assembly Area Accountability Sign-In, to CAS, as requested.

"* Contact Security Coordinator in the TSC at ext. 6742, only if critical concerns arise. c. Return this procedure section and completed Attachments A, B, and D to Emergency Preparedness or to the TSC Manager.REFERENCE USE Performed By: Performer (Print and Sign) Date / Time Page I11 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 6.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 16 ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND November 30,1999 EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL TOTAL REWRITE 5.3 Release of Non-Essential Personnel from Site NOTE: Step 5.2 shall be completed prior to this section.

5.3.1 IF the Rad/Chem Coordinator and Offsite Radiation Protection Coordinator determine radiological monitoring of personnel and vehicles is required prior to leaving the site property, THEN exit this section and go to Step 5.4. 5.3.2 Determine immediate staffing needs and near-term shift schedule for: a. Technical Support Center (by TSC Manager) b. Operations Support Center (by Reentry Team Coordinator)

c. Control Room (by Duty Shift Superintendent)

d. Emergency Operations Facility (by EOF Manager) e. Offsite Radiation Protection Facility (by Offsite RP Coordinator)

5.3.3 Evaluate

releasing personnel in groups to minimize congestion.

5.3.4 Prior

to the release of personnel from site, the TSC Manager should coordinate their release with the: a. Offsite Assembly Area Coordinator for organizing the release with Offsite Radiation Protection Coordinator and SBCC Security.

b. Security to collect SRDs and TLDs prior to release from assembly areas and/or site boundaries.

c. EOF Manager to alert Manitowoc and Kewaunee County Emergency Managements for traffic control.

5.3.5 Complete

Attachment G, Personnel "Release-From-Site" Briefing Checklist, providing the process to follow upon dismissal, as time permits.

5.3.6 Complete

Attachment H, Emergency Event Information Sheet, evaluating implications that may occur from that data being distributed, as time permits.

5.3.7 Complete

Attachment I, Evacuation Routes, if personnel should avoid certain areas upon release, as required.REFERENCE USE Page 12 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 6.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 16 ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND November 30, 1999 EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL TOTAL REWRITE 5.3.8 Distribute copies of the completed Attachment G, H, and I to each Assembly Area Leader for communication and/or distribution to assembled personnel.

5.3.9 Personnel

being released from the site should: a. Exit via their usual gatehouse (unless otherwise instructed).

b. Leave their badge, TLD, and SRD (if they .already have them) at the gatehouses or at SBCC (unless otherwise instructed).

c. Proceed to their homes (or to their reception area if home has been evacuated) and remain available.

5.3.10 Return this procedure section and completed Attachments G, H, and I to Emergency Preparedness or to the TSC Manager. Exit this procedure.

REFERENCE USE Performed By: Performer (Print and Sign) Date / Time Page 13 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 6.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 16 ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND November 30, 1999 EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL TOTAL REWRITE 5.4 Evacuation of Non-Essential Personnel to Offsite Assembly Areas NOTE: IF the Two Creeks Town Hall and/or Two Rivers National.

Guard Armory are to be used for personnel assembly, THEN verify Security has contacted those agencies to make the facility available for an assembly area prior to the evacuation of personnel.

5.4.1 Determine

immediate staffing needs and near-term shift schedule for: a. Technical Support Center (by TSC Manager) b. Operations Support Center (by Reentry Team Coordinator)

c. Control Room (by Duty Shift Superintendent)

d. Emergency Operations Facility (by EOF Manager) e. Offsite Radiation Protection Facility. (by Offsite RP Coordinator)

5.4.2 Evaluate

evacuating personnel in groups and car pools to minimize congestion.

5.4.3 Prior

to the evacuation of personnel from site, the TSC Manager should coordinate their release with the: a. Rad/Chem Coordinator and/or Offsite Radiation Protection Coordinator to establish radiological monitoring of personnel and vehicles, per Step 5.4.9, prior to leaving the site property.

Establish a monitoring and/or decontamination station for personnel and vehicles at one or more of the following locations: (a) Site Boundary Control Center (b) Two Creeks Town Hall (c) Two Rivers National Guard Armory (d) Along the evacuation route, if appropriate REFERENCE USE Page 14 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 6.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 16 ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND November 30, 1999 EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL TOTAL REWRITE .IF extensive contamination of vehicles is encountered, THEN impound non-essential vehicles within posted area for later decontamination.

Coordinate decontamination efforts of essential vehicles with: (a) Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant, (b) Wisconsin-Public Service Corporation in Two Rivers, (c) Manitowoc County Emergency Management at Roncalli High School. b. Emergency Director to alert Manitowoc and Kewaunee County Emergency Managements for traffic control.

c. Offsite Assembly Area Coordinator for organizing the release with Offsite Radiation Protection Coordinator and SBCC Security.

d. Instruct Security to establish a check point at each offsite assembly area. 5.4.4 Complete Attachment G, Personnel "Release-From-Site" Briefing Checklist, providing the process to follow upon dismissal, as time permits.

5.4.5 Complete

Attachment H, Emergency Event Information Sheet, evaluating implications that may occur from that data being distributed, as time permits.

5.4.6 Complete

Attachment I, Evacuation Routes, to determine specific routes that should be taken to offsite assembly areas, forwarding to the Assembly Area Leaders.

5.4.7 Distribute

copies of the completed Attachment G, H, and I to each Assembly Area Leader for communication and/or distribution to assembled personnel.

5.4.8 Personnel

being evacuated from the site should: a. Exit via their usual gatehouse (unless otherwise instructed).

b. Follow instructions of Security and/or RP in regard to badges, TLDs and dosimetry.

c. Proceed to the designated offsite assembly area(s).

d. Upon release from the assembly area, return to their homes (or a reception area if their home has been evacuated) and remain available.

REFERENCE USE Page 15 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL EPIP 6.1 NNSR Revision 16 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 5.4.9 REFERENCE USE Guidelines For Vehicle Surveys a. A representative smear survey and frisk are required prior to release of vehicles if an airborne release of radioactive materials has occurred or is suspected.

b. Smears should be taken of vehicle surfaces and tires, including tread. "A direct 13y frisk may be taken of a representative portion of the vehicle surface only if the ambient count rate is < 200 cpm. "* P3ysmears and frisk results of vehicles with beta/gamma contamination>

100 cpm/l00cm 2 above background should be decontaminated prior to release.

c. Return this procedure section and completed Attachment G, H, and I to Emergency Preparedness or to the TSC Manager.

Performed By: Performer (Print and Sign) Date / Time Page 16 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 6.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 16 ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND November 30, 1999 EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL TOTAL REWRITE 5.5 Reentering the Site 5.5.1 IF public protective measures have been implemented, THEN verify access to the plant site has been pre-arranged between the Security Coordinator, Manitowoc and Kewaunee County Sheriffs Department, and the Manitowoc and Kewaunee County Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs). 5.5.2 Notify Security to allow Emergency Response Organization and NRC personnel with picture IDs onsite. Personnel without IDs shall be assessed on a case-by-case basis with the Offsite Assembly Area Coordinator.

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 EP 5.0, Organizational Control of Emergencies 6.2 EP 6.0, Emergency Measures 6.3 PBSRP 1.6.1, Plant Emergency Evacuation Response 7.0 BASES B-i NUREG 0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants B-2 10 CFR 50.47(b), Emergency Plans B-3 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix E. IV, Content of Emergency Plans REFERENCE USE Page 17 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 6.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 16 ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND EVACUATION November 30, 1999 OF PERSONNEL TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT A ANNOUNCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE ACTION "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL CONDITIONS AT THE PLANT WARRANT A: 13 LIMITED PLANT EVACUATION OF THE FOLLOWING AREAS: ALL PERSONNEL IN THESE AREA(S) REPORT TO THE: El (In RCA) RP STATION 13 (Outside RCA) NORTH SERVICE BUILDING CAFETERIA 13 (Other)_ AND AWAIT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS." El FULL SITE ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ALL ERO PERSONNEL REPORT TO YOUR ASSIGNED EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY AND PERFORM ACCOUNTABILITY.

ALL REMAINING PERSONNEL REPORT TO: o YOUR ASSIGNED ASSEMBLY AREA El NORTH SERVICE BUILDING CAFETERIA E3 ADMIN BUILDING EL 26' OFFICE AREA El ENGINEERING BUILDING CAFETERIA 0 TRAINING BUILDING NORTH FOYER El WAREHOUSE

4 El (OTHER) E[ TWO CREEKS TOWN HALL E3 TWO RIVERS NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY AND PERFORM ACCOUNTABILITY.

EXIT THROUGH El YOUR NORMAL GATEHOUSE El THE NORTH GATEHOUSE El THE SOUTH GATEHOUSE (IFfilled in, THEN announce:)

AVOID THE FOLLOWING AREA(S) WHEN ASSEMBLING: (Optional)

THE PLANT CONDITIONS REQUIRING AN ASSEMBLY ARE: REPEAT ALARM AND ANNOUNCEMENT Return the completed form to Emergency Preparedness or TSC Manager.REFERENCE USE Page IS of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 6.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 16 ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND November 30, 1999 EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL OUTSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA 1.0 PBNP AUTOMATED NOTIFICATION SYSTEM NOTE: IF PBNP Automated Notification System is unavailable, THEN go to Step 2.0. 1.1 From any on-site telephone, dial ext. 7158 to access the PBNP Automated Notification System. 1.2 When prompted, enter your scenario activation password using the keypad on the telephone.

1.3 When prompted, enter the 3-digit SCENARIO number "700." 1.4 When prompted to record a message, communicate the protective actions to take per Attachment A, Announcement of Protective Action. Press the "#" key to stop recording.

Press keys as prompted to finish activating the scenario.

1.5 When the Point Beach Automated Notification System says, "The scenario is building," press the "#" key, listen to "good-bye," and then hang up. NOTE: Skip Step 2.0 if Step 1.0 was successful.

2.0 PBX BROADCAST SYSTEM 2.1 Dial 6666 and input your personal work-phone number and password 2.2 Press 75 2.3 When prompted, press 8003## 2.4 Press 5 2.5 Communicate the protective actions to take per Attachment A, Announcement of Protective Action, and press # when done recording.

2.6 Press

79 to send the message 2.7 Press 83 to exit the PBX Broadcast System REFERENCE USE Page 19 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 6.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 16 ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND November 30, 1999 EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT C EVACUATION OF THE POINT BEACH ENERGY CENTER NOTE: This attachment is to be completed by.the Supervisor

-Point Beach Energy Center or a designee upon direction from the Duty Shift Superintendent.

1.0 Instruct

all Energy Center staff to gather the general public from the Energy Center and surrounding nature trails, providing them with the following directions:

1.1 ALERT

or SITE EMERGENCY

-Direct all people to leave the PBNP property immediately.

1.2 GENERAL

EMERGENCY

-Direct all people to: 1.2.1 Drive to the SBCC, 1.2.2 Remain in their vehicles, and 1.2.3 Follow directions of Security or Radiation Protection personnel.

2.0 Record

the number of people affected and confirm their departure:

/ 3.0 Secure the building.

4.0 Inform

Security that the Energy Center has been evacuated and ask them to assume responsibility for the area. 5.0 Reliort to the NES Building Cafeteria and await further instructions.

Completed By: Date/Time Return the completed form to Emergency Preparedness or TSC Manager.REFERENCE USE Page 20 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL EPIP 6.1 NNSR Revision 16 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT D ACCOUNTABILITY ANNOUNCEMENT This announcement is to be made by the Duty Shift Superintendent or a designee, upon completion of the accountability process.

0 IF all persons are accounted for, THEN make the following announcement over the Gai-tronics system: "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL.

ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL.

INITIAL ACCOUNTABILITY HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND ALL PERSONS ARE ACCOUNTED FOR. MAINTAIN ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGHOUT THE EMERGENCY." Repeat the announcement.

0 IF some persons remain unaccounted for, THEN make the following announcement over the plant Gai-tronics system: "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL.

ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL.

INITIAL ACCOUNTABILITY HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND THE FOLLOWING PERSONS REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR: IF YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION REGARDING THE WHEREABOUTS OF THESE INDIVIDUALS, PROVIDE THAT INFORMATION TO: 0 C.A.S. 03 Other ." Repeat the announcement.

Return the completed form to Emergency Preparedness or TSC Manager.REFERENCE USE Page 21 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL EPIP 6.1 NNSR Revision 16 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT E ASSEMBLY AREA ACCOUNTABILITY SIGN-IN Assembly Area:__________

______ Assembly Area Leader: ________________

NOTE: Personnel should only leave the assembly area if a valid request is made from all -emergency -response facility to assist in the event OR specific directions are received from the TSC Manager, or designee, to conduct a release of personnel from site.REFERENCE USE NAME COMPANY/GROUP SLOT # IN OUT Return the completed form to Emergency Preparedness or TSC Manager.Page 22 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL EPIP 6.1 NNSR Revision 16 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT F EVENT INVOLVEMENT

SUMMARY

Name: Event Date: Home Telephone:

Report Date: Address: Report Time: INSTRUCTIONS:

To assist in reconstructing the event, describe any knowledge of, or involvement with, the emergency event and/or event response.(Use the back of this page if necessary.)

Complete the following portion only if your home is within the 10-mile EPZ. In response to this event, you MAY soon be released from the plant site. In the event your home has been or will be evacuated where would you stay? With family or friends outside of EPZ. Family Name: Telephone:

At the public shelters.

Unknown. If necessary, I'll call the plant when I've made arrangements.

Return the completed form to the Assembly Area Leader prior to release.REFERENCE USE Page 23 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL EPIP 6.1 NNSR Revision 16 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT G PERSONNEL "RELEASE-FROM-SITE" BRIEFING CHECKLIST 1.0 TSC MANAGER OR DESIGNEE 1.1 Procedures for departure (i.e., TLD, SRD, Protective clothing, radiation monitoring, etc.) 1.2 Logistics for departure (i.e., Where to go, Transportation, Accountability, etc.) 1.3 Process to return to site (i.e., Reachability, Transportation, Security Issues, etc.) 1.4 Offsite Protective Actions Implemented or Pending by State and Counties: Completed By Date/Time Approved By Date/Time

2.0 ASSEMBLY

AREA LEADERS 2.1 Ensure all personnel have signed in on Attachment E, Assembly Area Accountability Sign-In, and turned in Attachment F, Event Involvement Summary.

.2.2 Review the approved Attachment H, Emergency Event Information Sheet, with personnel and provide them with a copy, if available.

Stress the portion relative to media information.

2.3 If offsite protective actions have been implemented or are impending by the State and Counties, discuss 2.3.1 Reception Center in Manitowoc County is Roncalli High School. 2.3.2 Reception Center in Kewaunee County is Algoma High School. 2.3.3 Red Cross workers at county receDtion centers will held workers locate their familie if they were evacuated.

Communicated By Assembly Area Return the completed form to Emergency Preparedness or TSC Manager./i Date/Time REFERENCE USE Page 24 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 6.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 16 ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND EVACUATION November 30. 1999 OF PERSONNEL TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT H EMERGENCY EVENT INFORMATION SHEET 1.0 BASIC ACCIDENT INFORMATION 1.1 1.2 1.3 Affected Unit: Reactor Shutdown:

Event

Description:

O3 Unit 1 13 Yes o3 Unit 2 [] No I.4 Major Equipment Problems:

1.5 Radiological

release to the environment?

2.0 EMERGENCY

EVENT INFORMATION D3 Yes 03 Common 13 No 2.1 Event classification:

0 Unusual Event [3 Alert El Site Emergency 13 General Emergency

2.2 Offsite

Protective Actions Implemented by Local Authorities:

03 None E3 Evacuate or 0 Shelter 0 0-2 mile radius 0 0-5 mile radius 0 2-5 miles downwind 0 5-10 miles downwind 2.3 Injured Personnel:

E3 Yes 0 No Family Contacted:

0 Yes 0 No Status: 3.0 NUMBERS TO CALL FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NOTE: Please do not ask for a specific individual.

This will tie up the system due to the potential volume of calls. State your.name and message and where you can be reached, if necessary.

3.1 Employees

[3 -i 'esource Coordinator

0. Other (i.e., Return to work during event and protective actions, offsite lodging if home evacuated)

3.2 Contractors

13 ' Resource Coordinator 0 Other (i.e., Return to work during event and associated protective actions) 3.3 Media Information (i.e., If contacted by media representatives for information about the emergency evefit, DO NOT CONSENT to interviews; instead, direct them to obtain official information by calling this number.)Completed By Date/Time Communicated By Approved By Assembly Area Date/Time i Date/Time Return the completed form to Emergency Preparedness or TSC Manager.REFERENCE USE Page 25 of 26 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RELEASE AND EVACUATION OF PERSONNEL EPIP 6.1 NNSR Revision 16 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT I EVACUATION ROUTES Return the completed form to Emergency Preparedness or TSC Manager.REFERENCE USE Page 26 of 26 EPIP 7.3.1 OFFSITE RADIATION SAMPLING AND SURVEY Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION:

REVISION:

EFFECTIVE DATE: PROCEDURE OWNER: Technical NNSR 2O November 30, 1999 Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS DELETED NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 7.3.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 20 OFFSITE RADIATION SAMPLING AND SURVEY November 30, 1999 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PU RPO SE .......................................................................................................................

3 2.0 PREREQUISITES

..................................................................................................

3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

..................................................................

3 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

.........................................................................................

4 5.0 PROCEDURE

............................................................................................................

4 5.1 General Directions for Offsite Radiation Monitoring

....................................................

4 5.2 Pre-departure Actions ..............................................................................................

5 5.3 Direct Radiation Monitoring

.....................................................................................

6 5.4 Air Sampling ..............................................................................................................

7 5.5 Environmental Sampling ..........................................................................................

8

6.0 REFERENCES

........................................................................................................

9 7.0 BA SES ............................................................................................................................

9 ATTACHMENT A OFFSITE AIRBORNE SURVEY SAMPLE ANALYSIS ..........................

10 ATTACHMENT B DIRECT RADIATION SURVEYS .............................................................

I I I ATTACHMENT C SMEAR SURVEYS ....................................................................................

12 .ATTACHMENT D VEGETATION, GROUND SCRAPINGS, SNOW, MISCELLANEOUS SAMPLES ...............................................................

13 ATTACHMENT E DOSE FACTOR CALCULATIONS FOR SPECIFIC NOBLE GAS ANALYSIS RESULTS ..............................................................................

14 ATTACHMENT F OFFSITE AIRBORNE SURVEY SAMPLE DATA ...................................

15 REFERENCE USE Page 2 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 7.3.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 20 OFFSITE RADIATION SAMPLING AND SURVEY November 30,1999 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions for obtaining particulate, iodine, and noble gas samples and for performing direct plume and ground deposition surveys. These are used to assess radiological conditions outside the Protected Area due to a release of radioactive material.

This procedure also provides instructions for obtaining environmental samples such as soil, vegetation; water, or snow. 2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 The Radiation Protection Technologist, as part of the Field Monitoring Team, implements the sampling portions of this procedure when assigned.

2.1.2 The Field Team Leader coordinates the activities of the Field Monitoring Teams. 2.1.3 The Offsite Radiation Protection Coordinator directs the offsite radiological assessment activities of the OSRPF in support of the EOF. 2.2 Equipment

2.2.1 OSRPF

inventory (EPMP-I.lb, EPMP-I.lm) 2.2.2 EP vehicles 2.2.3 EP vehicle kits (EPMP-1.lb)

3.0 PRECAUTIONS

AND LIMITATIONS

3.1 Personnel

may be subjected to radiological hazards including high radiation, contamination or airborne radioactivity.

3.2 Field

Monitoring Teams shall use survey instruments, wear protective clothing, and use protective equipment as appropriate to maintain dose ALARA. 3.3 Field Monitoring Teams shall wear appropriate dosimetry, and shall not exceed the maximum authorized exposure.REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 7.3.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 20 OFFSITE RADIATION SAMPLING AND SURVEY November 30, 1999 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS There has been a release of radioactive material, it is probable that a release may occur, or the Duty Shift Superintendent, Dose/PAR Coordinator, or Rad/Chem Coordinator requests offsite sampling or survey. 5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 General

Directions for Offsite Radiation Monitoring 5.1.1 Each survey team shall have a minimum of two persons.

5.1.2 One person shall be a trained RP or have been trained in offsite sampling and survey techniques.

5.1.3 The Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs) shall be briefed on current conditions and expectations prior to departure.

Information such as the following shall be included in the briefing:

a. Plant status/condition

b. Release information

c. Meteorological information

d. Communications expectations means, frequency, content, repeat back e. Use of protective clothing f. Authorized exposure g. Availability, criteria, and use of Potassium Iodine (KI) 5.1.4 FMTs are directed by the FMT Leader. Typically they are assigned to downwind locations using pre-designated X, Y coordinates or road intersections from the 11" x 17" radiological monitoring maps.REFERENCE USE Page 4 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 7.3.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 20 OFFSITE RADIATION SAMPLING AND SURVEY November 30,1999 5.1.5 FMT Leader should attempt to position FMTs downwind prior to a release.

Stationing teams at 1 mile and 2 miles center line downwind is recommended.

a. If wind direction is unstable, or other indications make plume location uncertain, one of the teams may be directed to 'search' for a plume by zig-zagging a suspected area. b. For plumes released to Lake Michigan, but which could make landfall, locations of possible landfall shall be monitored.

5.1.6 FMTs-shall remain within the 10 mile EPZ. Significant radiological impacts at or near the edge of the EPZ shall be reported to the State authorities by the Dose/PAR Coordinator in the EOF. 5.1.7 The primary duty of the FMTs is to locate and track the plume, and to make INITIAL, gross measurements to enable evaluation of the impact. More detailed analysis may be performed using the samples obtained.

5.2 Pre-departure Actions 5.2.1 Perform communications checks with the Offsite Radiation Protection Facility (OSRPF) prior to departure.

5.2.2 Receive

briefing from the FMT Leader, OSRP Coordinator, or designee prior to departure.

5.2.3 Don protective clothing and dosimetry as directed.

5.2.4 Assemble

air sample holders, filters, cartridges, etc., prior to departure.

5.2.5 Perform

operational checks on survey instruments and leave 'ON' while traveling to designated locations.

5.2.6 Fuel and start the portable generator prior to departure.

REFERENCE USE Page 5 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES OFFSITE RADIATION SAMPLING AND SURVEY EPIP 7.3.1 NNSR Revision 20 November 30, 1999 5.3 Direct Radiation Monitoring 5.3.1 Once a plume is located, the FMT Leader shall direct one team to traverse the plume (travel across the plume at a right angle to wind direction) to locate the centerline.

Team should return to the location of the highest readings (centerline) and perform a 'set' of readings per Attachment B.NOTE 1: A high BETA:GAMMA ratio at 3 feet indicates the presence of the plume at ground level (an air sample may be warranted).

NOTE 2: A high BETA:GAMMA ratio at 3 inches indicates ground deposition (environmental sampling may be warranted).

NOTE 3: No large BETA:GAMMA ratio indicates the plume may be overhead, weak, or you are not in the plume. 5.3.2 Relay results to the OSRPF. 5.3.3 Perform additional sampling as directed by the OSRPF, or exit the plume. a. See Section 5.4 for Air Sampling.

b. See Section 5.5 for Environmental Sampling.

5.3.4 Notify

OSRPF when outside the plume. 5.3.5 The FMT Leader shall direct the FMTs to continually monitor the location of the plume and/or obtain samples from the plume. This will likely require 'leap-frogging' the teams (e.g., 1 and 2 miles, then 3 and 5 miles, then 7 and 10 miles). 5.3.6 Deliver samples as directed.REFERENCE USE CAUTION If dose rates of 1 rem/hr are encountered, stop and immediately notify the OSRPF.I Page 6 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 7.3.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 20 OFFSITE RADIATION SAMPLING AND SURVEY November 30, 1999 5.4 Air Sampling 5.4.1 Assemble filters, cartridges, etc., for sampling desired.

5.4.2 Particulate

filter must be upstream of silver zeolite or charcoal cartridges.

An 'X' should be marked on the INLET side of the particulate filter. 5.4.3 Recommended minimum sample size for each sample by type is: Particulate I E 6 cc (35.3 cubic feet) Radioiodines I1 E 6 cc (35.3 cubic feet) Noble es 1,075 cc (one polybottle) 5.4.4 Set up generator and air sampler at designated location.

5.4.5 Draw desired volume for particulate and/or radioiodine samples.

5.4.6 Obtain

a 1-liter noble gas sample by emptying a water-filled polybottle in the plume, then tightly cap. 5.4.7 Record collection data (flow, times, volume, etc.) on Attachment F. 5.4.8 Secure equipment and exit the plume. 5.4.9 Obtain sample contact readings in a low background area and record on Attachment F. 5.4.10 Attach copies of Attachment F to each sample as indicated:

a. White -Attach to Attachment A and give to Chemistry.

b. Pink -Particulate filter. c. Yellow -Iodine cartridge (silver zeolite or charcoal).

d. Green -Noble Gas sample (polybottle).

5.4.11 Relay contact readings to the OSRPF. 5.4.12 Deliver samples as directed.

5.4.13 Upon completion of noble gas sample analysis, the true beta-gamma skin dose rate may be calculated using Attachment E.REFERENCE USE Page 7 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES OFFSITE RADIATION SAMPLING AND SURVEY EPIP 7.3.1 NNSR Revision 20 November 30, 1999 5.5 Environmental Sampling NOTE: Use standard RP practices to avoid cross-contamination.

5.5.1 Smears

a. Sample site should be unsheltered, undisturbed and a hard surface.

b. Smear approximately 100 cm 2 , _place smear in polybag, and label. c. Complete Attachment C and attach to or place in polybag(s) with smear(s).

d. Deliver samples as directed.

5.5.2 Vegetation

a. Only vegetation exposed to probable deposition is desired for the sample. Sample site should be unsheltered and undisturbed (for example an open field not a road). b. Collect 100 cm 2 of vegetation.

Place in polybag and label. c. Complete Attachment D and attach to or place in polybag with sample. d.. Deliver samples as directed.

5.5.3 Soil a. Only the very top layer of soil is desired for the sample. Sample site should be unsheltered and undisturbed (for example an open field not a road). b. Collect top 1/4" or less of soil from an area of approximately 100 cm 2 , I place in polybag, and label. I c. Complete Attachment D and attach to or place in polybag with sample. d. Deliver samples as directed.REFERENCE USE Page 8 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 7.3.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 20 OFFSITE RADIATION SAMPLING AND SURVEY November 30, 1999 5.5.4 Snow a. Only the very top layer of snow is desired for the sample. Sample site should be unsheltered and undisturbed (for example an open field not near a road). b. Collect snow approximately 1/4" or less from approximately 100 cm 2 , place in polybag, and label. c. -Place first-polybag inside another-polybag (double bag). d. Complete Attachment D and attach to or place in outer polybag.

e. Deliver samples as directed.

5.5.5 Water

a. Only surface water is desired for the sample. Sample should be from 'quiet' waters, not running sources (for example a puddle, livestock tank, not a creek). b. Collect water by slowly submerging (with a gloved hand) a polybottle in the water and attempting to 'skim' surface water into the bottle. K.. [ c. Place polybottle into a polybag and label. d. Complete Attachment D and attach to or place in outer polybag.

e. Deliver samples as directed.

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 EPIP 7.3.7, Estimating Radioiodine Air Concentrations 6.2 EPMP 1.1, Routine Check, Maintenance, Calibration and Inventory Schedule for Radiation Protection Emergency Preparedness Equipment 6.3 EPMP-1.1 b, Radiation Protection

-Specialized Emergency Preparedness Quarterly Checklist 6.4 EPMP-I.lm, Radiation Protection

-General Emergency Preparedness Quarterly Checklist

6.5 Health

Physics Implementing Procedures (HPIPs) 7.0 BASES B-1 NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants REFERENCE USE Page 9 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES OFFSITE RADIATION SAMPLING AND SURVEY EPIP 7.3.1 NNSR Revision 20 November 30,_1999 ATTACHMENT A OFFSITE AIRBORNE SURVEY SAMPLE ANALYSIS Survey Geographical Location:

Survey X,Y Coordinate Location:

Sample No: AIR PARTICULATE ANALYSIS RESULTS: Isotopic Analysis Analysis By: Spectrum Index No: Date/Time:

Isotope -Concentration Isotope Concentration

-- -Isotope -Concentration (ACi/cc) (9Ci/cc) (ACi/cc) Total IODINE ACTIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS: Isotopic Analysis Analysis By: Spectrum Index No: Date/Time:

Total Iodine + Total Additional pCi/cc GASEOUS ACTIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS: Isotopic Analysis Analysis By: NOBLGS Spectrum Index No: Reviewed By: Date/Time:

REFERENCE USE I Isotope Concentration Isotope Concentration (ACi/cc) _(Ci/cc) 1-131 CI-38 1-132 Br-82 1-133 1-134 1-135 Total Total Iodine Additional Date/Time:

/Isotope Concentration Isotope Concentration Isotope Concentration (ACi/cc) (1Ci/cc) Total (pCi/cc) _____ ________ ________________

Total I Page 10 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES OFFSITE RADIATION SAMPLING AND SURVEY C EPIP 7.3.1 NNSR Revision 20 W .RIAIJ. A~J I nn W V ,I&&mhs fL 10 ATTACHMENT B DIRECT RADIATION SURVEYS C Instrument Type: Serial #: Survey Geographical Location:_______________

Date/Time:

Survey X,Y Coordinate Location: Team Identifier Team Member (RP): Team Member (Driver): NET DOSE RATE (mrem/hr)

Time At 3 Foot At 3 Inch DOSIMETER READINGS in (mrem) Monitoring Results Window Window Window Window (Name) (Name) Location Reported Closed Open Closed Open In Out Net In Out Net Dose Dose Route this completed form to Emergency Preparedness after termination of event.REFERENCE USE C Page I I of i15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES OFFSITE RADIATION SAMPLING AND SURVEY C.EPIP 7.3.1 NNSR Revision 20 Wnvpmr r In 1000O ATT'ACHMENT C SMEAR SURVEYS Survey Geographical Location:

Team Identifier:

Team Member (RP):_________________

________Survey X,Y Coordinate Location:

Date/Time:

Team Member (Driver): Smear Survey Calculations By: Reviewed by: Route this completed form to Emergency Preparedness after termination of event.Date: REFERENCE USE C C Smear MDA Gross Bkgd Net Smear MDA Gross Bkgd Net (cpm) (cpm) (cpm) (cpm) Eff. (%) dpm/1OOcm 2 # (cpm) (cpm) (cpm) (cpm) Eff. (%) dpm/IOOcm 2 1. I10. 2. 11. 3. 12. 4. 13. 5. 14. 6. 15. 7. 16. 8. 17. 9. ---18.Page 12 of !15 C'NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES OFFSITE RADIATION SAMPLING AND SURVEY Survey Geographical Location:

Team Identifier:

Team Member (RP): ISOTOPIC ANALYSIS BY: (7 EPIP 7.3.1 NNSR Revision 20 November 30 1 OQQQ.ATTACHMENT D VEGETATION, GROUND SCRAPINGS, SNOW, MISCELLANEOUS SAMPLES Survey X,Y Coordinate Location:

Date/Time:

/ Team Member (Driver):

Date/Time Spectrum C Index No.: Sample Sample Activity Sample Sample Activity # Desc. Isotope (pCi/per area sampled) % Total Activity # Desc. Isotope (pCi/per area sampled) % Total Activity 1. 10. 2. !!. 3. 12. 4. 13. 5. 14. 6. 15. 7. 16. 8. 17. 9. 18.Reviewed by: Route this completed form to Emergency Preparedness after termination of event.Date: REFERENCE USE.Page 13 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES OFFSITE RADIATION SAMPLING AND SURVEY C, EPIP 7.3.1 NNSR Revision 20 Wntv~mh'ur

'A 1000O ATITACHMENT E DOSE FACTOR CALCULATIONS FOR SPECIFIC NOBLE GAS ANALYSIS RESULTS REM/HOUR PER pCi/cc(5)(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (H) Gamma Whole Sample Activity Total Skin Dose Body rem/hr .... Isotope [.Skin~ ""Skin(2) Total-Skin° gCi/cc rem/hr (D x E) y-Whole Body(4) (E x G) Kr-83m Negligible 2.45 2.45 0.00863 Kr-85m 167.0 156.00 323.0 134.0 Kr-85 153.0 2.18 155.0 1.84 Kr-87 1110.0 782.0 1892.0 676.0 Kr-88 271.0 1926.0 2197.0 1678.0 Kr-89 1153.0 2192.0 3345.0 1895.0 Kr-90 832.0 2065.0 2897.0 1781.0 Xe-131m 54.3 19.8 74.1 10.4 Xe-133m 114.0 41.4 155.4 28.7 Xe-133 34.9 44.7 79.6 33.6 Xe-135m 81.2 426.0 507.0 356.0 Xe-135 212.0 243.0 455.0 207.0 Xe-137 1393.0 191.0 1584.0 162.0 Xe-138 471.0 1167.0 1638.0 1008.0 Ar-41 307.0 1178.0 1485.0 1009.0 1 0ral Total Beta dose to skin takes credit for absorption in outer dead layer of skin, 7 mg/cm. Gamma dose to skin is calculated from gamma dose to air by multiplying by 1. 11, the average tissue/air energy absorption coefficient.

Total skin dose factor is the sum of(B) and (C). Gamma dose to the whole body takes credit for absorption in the first 5 cm of tissue. Derived from Table B-2, Regulatory Guide 1.109.Calculated By: Date/Time:

Reviewed By: Date/Time:

REFERENCE USE C'C..(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Page 14 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES OFFSITE RADIATION SAMPLING AND SURVEY EPIP 7.3.1 NNSR Revision 20 November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT F OFFSITE AIRBORNE SURVEY SAMPLE DATA Instrument Type: Survey Geographical Location:

Survey X,Y Coordinate Location: Team Identifier:

Team Member (RP): Date/Time:

Team Member (Driver): AP/1 2 Start time: Stop time: Total sample time: min. Noble Gas Sample time: Volume: cc/I (1075 cc in I L gas sample)White Pink Yellow Green Flow Rate: Flow C.F. Volume Sample Dose Rates AP 12 NG (Attach to Attachment A; give to Chemistry) (Attach to AP) (Attach to 12) (Attach to NG)REFERENCE USE Serial #:/ipm mrem/br mrem/hr mrem/hr Page 15 of 15 EPIP 10.1 EMERGENCY REENTRY Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION:

REVISION:

EFFECTIVE DATE: PROCEDURE OWNER: Technical NNSR 19 November 30, 1999 Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS DELETED NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 10.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 19 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY REENTRY TOTAL REWRITE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE .......................

.............................

3 2.0 PREREQUISITES

.....................................................................................................

3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

....................................................................

4 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

..........................................................................................

5 5.0 PROCEDURE

.........................................................................................................

5 5.1 Initial Control Room Response ..................................................................................

5 5.2 Reentry Team Deployment

........................................................................................

6 5.3 Reentry Teams Debriefing

........................................................................................

9 5.4 Work Order Control ....................................................................................................

9 5.5 Tagouts .................................................................. , ........................................................

10 6.0 REFEREN CES ..............................................................................................................

11 7.0 BA SES ............................................................................................................................

12 ATTACHMENT A REENTRY TEAM MANAGEMENT

..........................................................

13 ATTACHMENT B REENTRY TEAM DISPATCH ......................................................................

14 ATTACHMENT C REENTRY TEAM DEBRIEF ........................................................................

15 REFERENCE USE Page 2 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 10.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 19 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY REENTRY TOTAL REWRITE 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides the guidance and requirements necessary to conduct emergency reentry operations.

These operations can include reentry for radiological surveys, repairs, operational functions, fire, medical emergencies, or search and rescue. The guidance in this procedure includes directions fortheproper radiological protection and monitoring of personnel involved.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 Prior

to the activation of the Operations Support Center (OSC), the Duty Shift Superintendent (DSS), or a designee, is responsible for a. Dispatch of reentry teams b. On-Shift Radiation Protection Technologists (RPTs) c. On-Shift Radiochemical Technicians (RCTs) d. Non-PBNP Wisconsin Electric or contractor teams that may be conducting repairs outside the protected area 2.1.2 The TSC Manager is responsible for the prioritization of reentry teams, coordinated with the OSC Coordinator, Reentry Team Coordinator, and DSS. 2.1.3 The Reentry Team Coordinator, under the direction of the OSC Coordinator, is responsible for the oversight of all OSC Leaders, reentry teams and recovery operations (Attachment A, Reentry Team Management).

2.2 Equipment

2.2.1 FM radio base station and portable radios (EPMP 2.1). 2.2.2 Radiation Protection equipment (PIM OSC 3.2, Attachment A). 2.2.3 OSC Radiation Protection Specialized and General Inventory (EPMP 1.1). 2.2.4 Chemistry equipment (PIM OSC 3.6, Attachment A).REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 10.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 19 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY REENTRY TOTAL REWRITE 2.2.5 OSC emergency preparedness inventory (EPMP 1.3). a. First aid kits, bum kits, trauma kits, and stretchers.

b. OSC tools 2.2.6 Other equipment deemed appropriate for the specific event. 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

3.1 Radiological

controls, as specified in HP 3.2, Radiological Posting and Labeling Requirements, are to be maintained during all reentry operations, if circumstances allow. 3.2 Radiation Protection practices must be adhered to in accordance with Radiation Protection Procedure NP 4.2.19, General Rules for Work in a Radiologically Controlled Area, if circumstances allow. 3.3 Personnel shall wear radiological protection equipment as prescribed in NP 4.2.27, Personnel Exposure Monitoring Device Minimum Requirements and General Use and NP 4.2.22, Requirements for Use of Protective Clothing; shall be used for guidance.

3.4 The use of self-contained respiratory protection equipment should be considered for on-shift RPTs and Operations personnel having a necessity to enter any area where a spill or other discharge of reactor coolant has caused, or has the potential for causing, an increase in airborne activity.

3.5 During

the performance of radiation surveys, personnel may be subjected to radiological hazards, including high radiation areas, contaminated areas, and airborne radioactivity areas. 3.6 Improper handling of radioactive material can result in personnel contamination, radioactive material uptake, or unplanned personnel exposure.

3.7 When processing fire brigade teams, follow established fire brigade response policies.

3.8 Personnel

should exercise the principles of time, distance, and shielding to minimize radiation exposure.REFERENCE USE Page 4 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 10.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 19 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY REENTRY TOTAL REWRITE 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

4.1 Assembly

and accountability of personnel has been completed and/or persons are known to be missing or in need of help -Search and Rescue. 4.2 Emergency response requires reentry to support plant repair and/or recovery, radiological release termination, or damage assessment.

4.3 Fire or potential fire. 5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 Initial

Control Room Response 5.1.1 The DSS shall dispatch all necessary reentry teams and maintain accountability of all on-shift personnel prior to the activation of the OSC. 5.1.2 Prior to allowing entries into and/or work to continue in the RCA, the DSS and RPT shall review the radiation monitoring system area and process monitors to determine area radiation levels and possible high airborne activity that could affect personnel exposure.

Possible abnormal conditions may be indicated by: a. Increased count rates above the alarm setpoints on the Auxiliary Building vent stack monitor (RE-214).

b. Any continuous air sampler(s) exceeding the alarm setpoint(s) and/or indicating a rising trend. c. Local area monitors above alarm setpoints.

5.1.3 Direct

personnel working within the radiation control area (RCA) to periodically check the count rate on the following continuous air samplers for indications of increasing Auxiliary Building airborne activity:

a. C59 panel area b. Spent fuel pool c. Outside the charging pump cubicles d. Outside the CVCS holdup tank REFERENCE USE Page 5 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 10.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 19 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY REENTRY TOTAL REWRITE 5.1.4 IF on-shift RPTs, RCTs, or Operations personnel need to enter an area where there is a known or suspected spill, leak, or release of radioactive material or airborne activity, THEN consult with the on-shift RPT and consider the following:

a. Self-contained respiratory protection equipment.

b. Dosimetry, appropriate protective clothing,.and-survey instruments for continuous exposure monitoring.

c. Implementing radiation surveys of affected area(s) to determine the scope of the radiation and contamination problem.

d. Radiation protection postings of the affected area(s), if required.

e. Decontamination operations, if necessary.

5.1.5 Direct

all entries and/or exits of personnel from the RCA to be by way of the checkpoint unless an alternate route is appropriate.

5.1.6 If appropriate, direct RCTs to report to TSC Count Room and begin activation of that area using PIM OSC 3.6, OSC Chemistry Leader. 5.2 Reentry Team Deployment NOTE: All teams should-be dispatched promptly.

A 15 minute goal has been established, commensurate with urgency of the task and available resources.

NOTE: Reentry teams for life saving, fire fighting, release termination, and search and rescue shall have the highest priority and be dispatched immediately, completing Attachment B, Reentry Team Dispatch, after dispatch.

NOTE: Teams shall consist of a minimum of two people, one qualified in first aid/CPR if a medical emergency.

5.2.1 IF a medical emergency, THEN also implement EPIP 11.2. 5.2.2 The routine procedure for development of work orders WILL NOT be used during emergencies.

An unforeseen Work Order (WO) shall be used to document and control repair work per Step 5.4.REFERENCE USE Page 6 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 10.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 19 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY REENTRY TOTAL REWRITE 5.2.3 The routine procedure for development of tagouts WILL NOT be used during emergencies.

An emergency Tagout shall be used per Step 5.5. 5.2.4 The Reentry Team Coordinator shall assign team priorities consistent with the priorities of the TSC. 5.2.5 IF radiological conditions are present or suspected, THEN the Reentry Team Coordinator shallnotify theRadiation Protection Leader. 5.2.6 When a reentry team is required, the Reentry Team Coordinator shall assign an OSC Leader per the task required.

The OSC Leader shall prepare and deploy the reentry team, completing Attachment B, Reentry Team Dispatch.

a. IF radiological conditions are present, THEN the OSC Leader shall coordinate the reentry team dispatch with the Radiation Protection Leader. The Radiation Protection Leader shall prepare and brief reentry teams, completing Attachment B, in lieu of an RWP. "* Obtain and issue HRA keys. "* Ensure appropriate dosimetry, survey and respiratory equipment, and protective clothing is issued.

Review dose records and the likely need to extend dose limits (reference EPIP 5.1 prior to dispatch if the potential exists to exceed PBNP administrative or 10 CFR 20 requirements).

Review the likely need for issuance of KI (reference EPIP 5.2 prior to dispatch if potential exists to approach or exceed 25 rem). b. Assign a team identifier which reflects the team's function.

c. Determine and record the job scope and appropriate tagouts for the task. d. Obtain DSS approval for tagouts.

e. Determine the appropriate repair parts and tools for the task. f. Issue and test the FM portable radios or other communication devices, as appropriate.

g. Select and assign personnel to the team evaluating team member qualifications for the (i.e., SCBA, First Aid, CPR) reentry per ETD 01.REFERENCE USE Page 7 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 10.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 19 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY REENTRY TOTAL REWRITE h. Assign a team lead to be responsible for communications, keys, dose checks, and the need for reliefs.

i. Determine the appropriate personal protection equipment necessary for the task. j. Evaluate the safety precautions that should be adhered to. k. Conduct a short, concise job brief consisting of: "* Scope of task, location, hazards, and stay times. "* Expected or suspected elevated or adverse in-plant radiological conditions

"* Appropriate ALARA concepts, stay times, low dose and backout areas. Reminder to maintain visual or vocal contact with other team members.

- Relevant information from other reentry teams.

Use plant maps available in the OSC to illustrate routes, low dose areas, and backout areas.

During reentry task, monitor progress and be observant of unexpected conditions.

5.2.7 After

team deployment, the OSC Leader shall: a. Inform the OSC Communicator of the team deployment.

b. Inform the OSC Technical Monitor of the team deployment.

c. Form a standby team to be used for reliefs and/or search and rescue if necessary.

d. Monitor reentry team dispatched for work in progress, unexpected conditions, and safety concerns.

e. Complete Attachment B, Reentry Team Dispatch, to track reentry team dispatch.REFERENCE USE Page 8 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY REENTRY EPIP 10.1 NNSR Revision 19 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE REFERENCE USE 5.3 Reentry Teams Debriefing

5.3.1 Complete

the appropriate sections of Attachment C, Reentry Team Debrief.

a. Log exposure of each team member and obtain their initials.

b. Anyone >4 rem, >25 rem or suspected

>10,000 DAC-hours (ref. EPIP 5.1 Sif answ er is yes). c. Status of task team was assigned to and related comments.

d. General observations regarding damage, water spills, leaks, route problems, etc. e. Status of team members physical condition.

f. Disposition of team members.

g. Update OSC status boards and plant maps with current conditions.

5.3.2 Advise

Reentry Team Coordinator of reentry team task status and comments for use in future reentry team assignments.

5.4 Work Order Control 5.4.1 Tasks desired by the TSC or Control Room will be defined as clearly and briefly as possible.

All personnel required will be used to define and clarify the tasks (i.e., TSC Engineers, respective OSC Leaders per task requirements, etc.) 5.4.2 Obtain an Unforeseen Work Order number from the Unforeseen Work Order log (located in the OSC file cabinet) and record on Attachment B, Reentry Team Dispatch.

This form "becomes" the work order for emergencies.

5.4.3 Record

the reentry task on Attachment B, in the "job scope" block. Attach additional sheets as necessary.

5.4.4 Ensure

any required Tagout is defined (Referce stp 5.s). 5.4.5 At the termination of the event, ensure all paperwork is collected for reconstruction of work completed, actions taken, etc.Page 9 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY REENTRY EPIP 10.1 NNSR Revision 19 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 5.5 Tagouts Determine the required boundaries to be tagged to perform the task. Ensure all sources (water, air, steam, and electricity) are addressed.

All personnel required will be used to define and clarify the tasks (i.e., TSC Engineers, respective OSC Leaders per task requirements, etc.).Obtain a tagging number from the PBF-1906d, Danger Tag Protected Worker log and record on Attachment B, Reentry Team Dispatch.

This log may have been brought to the TSC by the TSC Manager. Attachment B "becomes" the tagout for emergencies.

Record the Tagout description on Attachment B. Attach additional sheets as necessary.

Obtain verbal approval from the Control Room DSS. This may require faxing more complex tagouts or may be accomplished by verbal coordination for a few valves or breakers.

Record the DSS initials and time per the verbal approval on Attachment B.NOTE: The purpose of danger tags is to protect workers and allow emergency work. 5.5.6 Complete the Danger Tags, at a minimum each tag shall include: a. Tagging number or Team ID b. Exact component description

c. Desired position and/or state 5.5.7 Review the Danger Tag(s) with the person(s) who will be responsible for hanging the tag(s).REFERENCE USE 5.5.1 CAUTION* If tags must be hung in a required order, ensure this is clearly indicated on both the tagout and the tags.5.5.2 5.5.3 5.5.4 5.5.5 Page 10 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 10.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 19 November 30, 1999 EMERGENCY REENTRY TOTAL REWRITE NOTE: Operating Permit Tags WILL NOT be used under emergency conditions.

Instructions below will take precedence.

5.5.8 IF it becomes necessary to remove a tag (and change component status) temporarily (for example, to check pump rotation), THEN the Reentry Team Coordinator is responsible to ensure ALL personnel are protected.

5.5.9 Obtain

verbal approval to remove the tag (and change component status) from the Control Room DSS. 5.5.10 Make a Gai-tronics announcement warning personnel of the impending status change. 5.5.11 Contact each team in the plant directly and warn them of the impending status change. 5.5.12 Ensure immediate means are available to contact the person lifting the tag (i.e., radio). 5.5.13 Brief person lifting tags on expected results-and actions to take if the results K>are not obtained.

5.5.14 Monitor for unexpected conditions as tag is lifted.

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 EPIP 4.2, Operations Support Center (OSC) Activation and Evaluation 6.2 EPIP 5.1, Personnel Emergency Dose Authorization 6.3 EPIP 5.2, Radioiodine Blocking and Thyroid Dose Accounting 6.4 EPIP 11.2, Medical Emergencies 6.5 EPMP 1.1, Routine Check, Maintenance, Calibration and Inventory Schedule for Radiation Protection Emergency Preparedness Equipment REFERENCE USE Page I11 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY REENTRY EPIP 10.1 NNSR Revision 19 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 6.6 EPMP 1.3, Routine Inventory of TSC, EOF, ABOF, JPIC and OSC Emergency 6.6 EPMP 1.3, Routine Inventory of TSC, EOF, AEOF, JPIC and OSC Emergency Preparedness Supplies 6.7 EPMP 2.1, Testing of Communications Equipment 6.8 ETD 01, Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Call List 6.9 HP 3.2, Radiological Labeling, .Postingand Barricading Requirements 6.10 BP 4.7, Emergency Response with Respiratory Equipment 6.11 NP 1.6.4, Verbal Communication Procedure 6.12 NP 4.2.19, General Rules for Work in a Radiologically Controlled Area 6.13 NP 4.2.22, Requirements for Use of Protective Clothing 6.14 NP 4.2.32, Respiratory Protection Program 6.15 NP 4.2.27, Personnel Exposure Monitoring Device Minimum Requirements and General Use 6.16 PBF-1 906d, Danger Tag Protected Worker Log 6.17 PIM OSC 3.2, Radiation Protection Leader 6.18 PIM OSC 3.6, Chemistry Leader 7.0 BASES B-1 B-2 10 CFR 50.47(b), Emergency Plans 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix E.IV, Content of Emergency Plans REFERENCE USE Page 12 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY REENTRY EPIP 10.1 NNSR Revision 19 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT A REENTRY TEAM MANAGEMENT REFERENCE USE Page 13 of 15 C (*.EMERGENCY REENTRY EPIP 10.1 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 19 November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT B REENTRY TEAM DISPATCH NOTE 1: This attachment is used In lieu of an Radiation Work Permit, Maintenance Work Order, and Tagout. NOTE 2: Teams shall consist of a minimum of two people. Each team member's qualifications required for this reentry task are current.

JOB BRIEF-OSC Leader Date/Time RP BRIEF-RP Leader Date/Time (Signature) (Signature)

Team ID Team Lead Keys (HRA) Stay Times Communications Equip _0 w/OSC 0 w/CR Protective Clothing Keys Dose Checks In-Plant Radiological Conditions Need for Reliefs Other Job Scope & WO # Survey Instruments Respiratory protection

_0 Low range SRD (e.g., 0-500 mR) 0 Extremity dosimetry Tagout #s & Desc _0 Medium range SRD (e.g., 0-5 R) 0 Time keeping/high dose tasks _0 High range SRD (e.g., 0-200 R) Other DSS Approval El SCBAs Donned -Estimated empty time Parts/Tools

_ >4 rem or >10 CFR 20 limits (per EPIP 5.1 prior to disptach)

Procedures/Drawings

__0 Issue KI >25 rem thyroid (per EPIP 5.2 prior to dispatch)

Safety Precautions/PPE Review dose records and assign dose limits (<25 Rem Whole body) 0 Visual or vocal contact with team member Members Allowable Dose Received Dose 0 Maps and information from other teams 0 Changing conditions (e.g., flooding, steam, damages) 0 In-plant routes, Low dose areas, Back-out Areas After Team Deployment:

0 Inform OSC Communicator

& Tech Monitor of team deployment 0 Form standby team (for reliefs and/or search and rescue-optional)

Time Deployed:

Expected Return Time: Actual Return Time: Distribution Upon Dispatch:

Original in OSC Copy to Team Lead and TSC Distribution Upon Return: Original to TSC REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES C Page 14 of 15 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY REENTRY EPIP 10.1 NNSR Revision 19 November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT C REENTRY TEAM DEBRIEF Team ID Task Time/Time Deployed Time Returned Exposure IInitials I I I I I Dose (mRem) Anyone > 25 rem or suspected

> 10,000 DAC-hours?

If yes, remove from emergency duty and notify the Emergency Director for referral to a physician for medical evaluation (EPIP 5.1). L]NO f]YES (Name) Anyone > 4 rem? If yes, consult Emergency Director for potential referral to physician (EPIP 5.1) f- NO [l YES (Name) Task Status/Comments General Observations Damage Water/Spills/Leaks Radiological Concerns Route Problems Other . Team Members Physical Status Team Members Standby Status Standby -OSC E, El. 8', El. 26', or as conditions or space allow Released to go home Other []Update OSC status boards and plant maps.Respective OSC Leader Review Time/Date

/ Time/Date

/Reentry Team Coordinator Review Route to the Rad/Chem Coordinator and OSC Coordinator when completed REFERENCE USE Page 15 of 15 EPIP 10.2 CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION:

REVISION:

EFFECTIVE DATE: PROCEDURE OWNER: Technical NNSR 18 November 30, 1999 Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS DELETED NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 TITLE PAGE PU RPO SE .......................................................................................................................

4 PREREQ U ISITE S ....................................................................................................

4 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

..................................................................

4...... IN ITIA L C ON D ITION S ..........................................................................................

5 PR O CED U RE ............................................................................................................

5 REFEREN CES .........................................................................................................

21 BA SES ...........................................................................................................................

21 TABLES TABLE A SAMPLE RESULTS ...................................................................................................

6 TABLE B DECAY CORRECTION OF (RCS/ATMOSPHERIC/SUMP)

SAM PLE RESULTS ...................................................................................................

7 TABLE C DECAY CORRECTION OF SAMPLE RESULTS WITH PARENT/DAUGHTER RELATIONSHIPS

............................

9 TABLE D DETERMINATION OF THE DECAY OF THE HYPOTHETICAL DAUGHTER ACTIVITY FOR SAMPLE RESULTS WITH PARENT/DAUGHTER RELATIONSHIPS

...............................................................

10 TABLE E DETERMINATION OF THE MEASURED SAMPLE SPECIFIC ACTIVITY FOR SAMPLE RESULTS WITH PARENT/DAUGHTER RELATIONSHIPS

.....................

11 TABLE F DETERMINATION OF THE DECAY CORRECTED SPECIFIC ACTIVITY FOR SAMPLE RESULTS WITH PARENT/DAUGHTER RELATIONSHIPS

................

12 TABLE G TEMPERATURE

/ PRESSURE CORRECTION

........................

13 REFERENCE USE Page 2 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE SECTION TABLE H-1 TABLE H-2 TABLE H-3 TABLE I TABLE J TITLE PAG TOTAL ACTIVITY OF EACH MEDIUM -ATMOSPHERE

.............................

15 TOTAL ACTIVITY OF EACH MEDIUM -RCS ................................................

16 TOTAL ACTIVITY OF EACH MEDIUM -SUMP ............................................

17 TOTAL ACTIVITY RELEASED (ATMOSPHERIC, RCS, AND SUMP) ...............

18 FRACTION OF CORE RELEASED (ATMOSPHERE, RCS, AND SUMP) ............

19 E REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 10.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION TOTAL REWRITE 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure is used to implement the Westinghouse Owner's Group (WOG) Core Damage Assessment Methodology.

The WOG methodology is the primary method for estimating core damage through the measurement of fission product concentrations in the coolant system, containment atmosphere and containment sump. Auxiliary indicators:

core exit thermocouple temperature, reactor vessel water level, containment radiation monitors, and containment hydrogen concentrations are also used to verify the extent of core damage. 2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 The Rad/Chem Coordinator is responsible for the completion of this procedure.

2.1.2 The Reactor/Core Physics Engineer will assist by obtaining data such as: a. Plant power history K>b. Reactor shutdown time c. Dilution quantities.

2.2 Equipment

Plant Process Computer System 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 3.1 The completion of this procedure does NOT have a specific time frame but will be performed whenever needed and appropiiae.

Implementation of this procedure shall NOT interfere with the overall response to the emergency.

3.2 The procedure user(s) should use as many indications as possible to differentiate between the various core damage states. Because of overlapping values of release and potential simultaneous conditions of core damage, overtemperature, and/or core melt, considerable judgment needs to be applied.

3.3 The Westinghouse Owner's Group (WOG) Post-Accident Core Damage Assessment Methodology is available for reference.

3.4 Plant

data required for performance of this procedure is available from the Plant Process Computer System or documented on EPIP 2.1, Attachment E, Status Report on Plant Systems and Controls for Affected Units.REFERENCE USE Page 4 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS 4.1 If fuel damage or loss of reactor coolant system integrity has occurred, some or all of the following will be present: 4.1.1 The failed fuel monitor, l(2)RE109, may be unusually high or offscale.

4.1.2 The containment airborne radiation monitors, 1 (2)RE2 11 or 1 (2)RE212, may be unusually high or offscale.

4.1.3 The containment area radiation monitors, 1(2)RE102 or the seal table monitors, 1(2)RE107 may be unusually high or offscale.

NOTE: Normal full power high range values are 1.2 -1.5 R/hr. 4.1.4 The containment high range radiation monitors, 1(2)RM126, 127 or 128 may be elevated.

4.2 Reactor

coolant, containment atmosphere and/or containment sump samples have been taken and analyzed in accordance with: 4.2.1 EPIP 8.4.1, Post-Accident Sampling and Analysis of Potentially High Activity Reactor Coolant.

4.2.2 EPIP 8.4.2, Post-Accident Sampling of Containment Atmosphere.

4.2.3 EPIP 8.4.3, Emergency Containment Sump "A" Sampling.

5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 Obtain

the following information:

5.1.1 Started

Reactor Shutdown Time 5.1.2 Reactor Shutdown Time 5.1.3 Power level at time of Shutdown % 5.1.4 Sample Time 5.1.5 Delta Time hours 5.1.6 Sample Temperature oF 5.1.7 Temperature of Where Sample was Taken REFERENCE USE Page 5 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 5.2 Enter the sample results, in ACi/cc, for the appropriate sample location in Table A. TABLE A SAMPLE RESULTS SAMPLE REACTOR CONTAINMENT

CO:NTAINMENT LOCATION COOLANT ATMOSPHERE SUMP SYSTEM I POSSIBLE ISOTOPE SPECIFIC-SAMPLE ACTIVITY IN pCi/cc (A) CORE DAMAGE STATE CLAD FAILURE Kr-87 *Xe-131m *Xe-133m *Xe-133 *Xe-135 1-131 "*1-132 1-133 1-135 Rb-88 FUEL OVERHEAT Cs-134 Cs-137 Te-129 Te-132 FUEL MELT Ba-140 *La-140 La-142 Pr-144

Isotopes with parent/daughter relationships

5.3 Compare

the isotopes identified in the samples with the core damage state listed to the left of Table A to determine the most likely type of fuel damage that may have occurred.

Most likely fuel damage (circle one): CLAD FAILURE / FUEL OVERHEAT / FUEL MELT REFERENCE USE Page 6 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 5.4 Decay correct sample results, for isotopes without parent/daughter relationships to the time of reactor shutdown using the formula: A A0= e.AAt Where: A o = Sample Specific Activity at Time of Reactor Shutdown A = Sample Activity I = Decay constant (hours") At = Time of Sample -Time of Reactor Shutdown NOTE: If more than one location was sampled for this evaluation, use a separate copy of Table B for each sample location.

TABLE B DECAY CORRECTION OF (RCS/ATMOSPHERIC/SUMP)

SAMPLE RESULTS (circle one) ISOTOPE SPECIFIC SAMPLE DECAY CONSTANT SAMPLE CORRECTED ACTIVITY (A) (X) hours- ACTIVITY (Ao) iiCi/cc Kr-87 5.46E-1 1-131 3.58E-3 1-133 3.41E-2 1-135 1.04E-1 Rb-88 2.34E0 Cs-134 3.95E-5 Cs-137 2.60E-6 Te-129 6.05E-1 Te-132 8.92E-3 Ba-140 2.26E-3 La-142 4.501E-1 Pr-144 2.41E0 REFERENCE USE Page 7 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 10.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION TOTAL REWRITE 5.5 If time allows, or if there is a large number of isotopes with parent-daughter relationships (those identified with an asterisk on Table A, decay correct the sample results by completing Steps 5.5.1 through 5.5.4. If time is limited or the activity of isotopes with parent-daughter relationships is low, go directly to Step 5.6. 5.5.1 Calculate the hypothetical daughter concentration (QB) at the time of the sample analysis assuming 100 percent release of the parent and daughter source inventory.

Use the following equation: -A t -11Bt) + 0 e-ABt QA(t) = K. A AA "-AA* (eA-A -eA-B') + Where: QB f Concentration of daughter at time of sample analysis QA 100% Source Inventory of Parent QO= 100% Source Inventory of Daughter K f Decay Branching Factor AA Parent Decay Constant =B = Daughter Decay Constant t = Time of Sample -Time of Shutdown XeC..m QB(t) = .011 (-2.168X4.1E7)

.[e"-eiE3X

' -_e"(2453X i)1 + 2.7E5

e .(245--3X in) Xe'3 3 m QB(t) = .029 (-0.601X8.5E7)

[e-(3.41E2 2 X 'n -e1 3 2 9wX hrS) "+" 1.2E7 -e"-F'E 2 X hi) Xe1 3 3 QB(t) = .971 (-.1915(8.5E7).

[e"O 3 AlE'2 X &-)- -e" -(.48E-3X 1-] + 8.5E7

e45-4E-3x bi) Xe 1 3 5 QE(t) = .835 (-2.650X7.7E7)-

[eL.04E-IX

-e-v-F-'2 x h)] + 1.6E7. e"47BE'2 X hsn) 1132 QB(t)=1.00(1.03)(6.1E7).[e-r92E-3x `)-e4-3 TF-'x h)]+6.1E7.e43.o--'X his) La4" QB(t) = 1.00 (2.26E-3X7.7E7)

.[e-26E 3x hr)- e-2 E-2x s)] + 7.7E7. e"'-'-2 X hi) For each isotope enter the decay time to be considered.

Perform the calculation for each of the isotopes and list the results in Table C on the following page.REFERENCE USE Page 8 of 21 C CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION C NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES TOTAL REWRIfTE TABLE C DECAY CORRECTION OF SAMPLE RESULTS WITH PARENT/DAUGHTER RELATIONSHIPS NOTE: Branching factors are taken from Kocher, David. C., "Radioactive Decay Data Tables," 1981. DOE/TIC -11026.Technical Information Center, USDOE, REFERENCE USE EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 C DAUGHTER VARIABLES FOR PARENT/DAUGHTER DECAY CORRECTIONS IN STEP 5.5 HYPOTHETICAL ISOTOPE DAUGHTER ACTIVITY AT SAMPLE TIME (QB t) CURIES BRANCHING SOURCE SOURCE DECAY CONSTANT DECAY CONSTANT FACTOR INVENTORY

-INVENTORY (k) hours' (M) hours-' (K) PARENT -DAUGHTER PARENT DAUGHTER Curies Curies Xe-131m .011 4.!E7 2.7E5 3.58E-3 2.45E-3 (1-131) (Xe-131m)

Xe-133m .029 8.5E7 1.2E7 3.41E-2 1.32E-2 (1-133) (Xe-133mn)

Xe-133 .971 8.5E7 8.5E7 3.41E-2 5.48E-3 (1-133) (Xe-133) Xe-135 .835 7.7E7 1.6E7 1.04E-1 7.61E-2 (1-135) (Xe-130) 1-132 1.00 6.11E7 6.IE7 8.92E-3 3.011E-1 (Te-132) (I-132J La-140 1.00 7.31E7 7.7E7 2.26E-3 1.72E-2 (Ba-140) (La-140)Page 9 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE Using Table D and the formula below, calculate the fraction of contribution of the decay of the initial inventory of the daughter to the hypothetical daughter activity at sample time: S o e- A B Fr- B QBt Where: Fr = Fraction of Contribution of Decay of Initial Inventory of Daughter Qo = 100% of Source Inventory of Daughter QBt = Hypothetical Daughter Activity at Sample Time XB = Daughter Decay Constant (hours -1) At = Time of Sample -Shutdown Time (hours)TABLE D DETERMINATION OF THE DECAY OF THE HYPOTHETICAL DAUGHTER ACTIVITY FOR SAMPLE RESULTS WITH PARENT/DAUGHTER RELATIONSHIPS DAUGHTER 100 % SOURCE HYPOTHETICAL DECAY CONSTANT FRACTION ISOTOPE INVENTORY OF DAUGHTER (X) hours' DAUGHTER ACTIVITY (QB) CURIES (QBAt) DAUGHTER (Fr) Xe-131m 2.7E5 2.45E-3 Xe-133m 1.2E7 1.32E-2 Xe-133 8.5E7 5.48E-3 Xe-135 1.6E7 7.61E-2 1-132 6.1E7 "3.01E-I La-140 7.7E7 i.72E-2 Using Table E and the formula below, calculate the amount of the measured sample activity associated with the decay of the daughter released:

Me = Fr x measured specific activity (pCi/cc) Where: MB = Measured Sample Activity of Daughter Fr = Fraction of Contribution of Decay of Initial Inventory of Daughter REFERENCE USE 5.5.2 5.5.3 Page 10 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TABLE E DETERMINATION OF THE MEASURED SAMPLE SPECIFIC ACTIVITY FOR SAMPLE RESULTS WITH PARENT/DAUGHTER RELATIONSHIPS DAUGHTER FRACTION MEASURED SAMPLE ACTIVITY SAMPLE SPECIFIC ISOTOPE (Fr) OF ISOTOPE (pCi/cc) ACTIVITY FROM TABLE A (Me) Xe-13 im Xe-133m Xe-133 Xe-135 Xe-135m 1-132 La-140 Decay correct the measured sample activity (MB) to the time of reactor shutdown using the following formula: me Ma O = Corrected Activity of Daughter at Time of Reactor Shutdown MB = Measured Sample Activity of Daughter XB = Daughter Decay Constant At = Time of Sample -Time of Reactor Shutdown (hrs) Enter the results on Table F located on the following page.REFERENCE USE 5.5.4 Page I11 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSiNESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TABLE F DETERMINATION OF THE DECAY CORRECTED SPECIFIC ACTIVITY FOR SAMPLE RESULTS WITH PARENT/DAUGHTER RELATIONSHIPS DAUGHTER SPECIFIC SAMPLE DAUGHTER DECAY SAMPLE SPECIFIC ISOTOPE ACTIVITY CONSTANT ACTIVITY AT TIME OF (MB) pCi/cc )LB REACTOR SHUTDOWN FROM TABLE E (MBo) Xe-131m 2.45E-3 Xe-133m 1.32E-2 Xe-133 5.48E-3 Xe-135 7.61E-2 1-132 3.01E-I La-140 1.72E-2 5.6 If the samples were taken from the reactor coolant system or containment sump and the temperature of the reactor coolant system or sump exceeded 200oF, then the specific sample activities need to be adjusted for temperature and volume. Correct the sample activities in Table B and Table F for temperature and pressure using Table G on the next page. If only containment atmosphere sampling was performed, then proceed to Step 5.7, since containment atmosphere samples are corrected for temperature and pressure during analysis.

If the coolant or sump samples are < 200oF then use 1.0 as the water density ratio and proceed to Step 5.7. Reference Figure 1, "Water Density Ratio," for the temperature of the sample. Enter the water density ratio on Table G and multiply the Specific Sample Activity by the water density ratio to obtain the adjusted specific activity.

Figure 1. P/P @STP u Water density ratlo .. (temperature vs. STP)Tempemture, F REFERENCE USE Page 12 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSiNESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TABLE G TEMPERATURE

/ PRESSURE CORRECTION REFERENCE USE ISOTOPE SPECIFIC SAMPLE WATER DENSITY ADJUSTED SPECIFIC ACTIVITY (pCi/cc) RATIO ACTIVITY (pCi/gm) Kr-87 *Xe-131m *Xe-133m *Xe-133 *Xe-135 1-131 *1-132 1-133 1-135 Rb-88 Cs-134 Cs-137 Te-129 Te-132 Ba-140 *La-140 La-142 Pr-14 Page 13 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 5.7 Calculate the total activity for each sample location, in Curies (Ci), at the time of reactor shutdown by adjusting for sample dilution and volumes for each isotope in Table H-I through Table H-3 for each sample location of Atmosphere, RCS, or Sump. Estimated volumes: Containment volume = 1 x 106 WV = 2.83 x 1010cc Reactor Coolant System = 6,040 ft2 = 1.71 x 10 8 gm @ STP Available dilution sources for sump or coolant: Accumulators:

RWST BAST (1 of 3) Spray Additive Tank 2 at 8,000 gallons each 275,000 gallons 5,000 gallons 2,574 gallons Total Estimated Injection Volume (EIV)gallons Convert ElY gallons to mass at STP. Total EWV (gm) = ESV (gallons) x .1337 ft3/gal x 2.832E4gm/ft 3 Add EIV to sump or RCS volume to obtain total mass from which sample was drawn.REFERENCE USE Page 14 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TABLE H- I TOTAL ACTIVITY OF EACH MEDIUM -ATMOSPHERE ISOTOPE ADJUSTED SAMPLE VOLUME/MASS OF RCS (gin), TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY (piCi/gm)

SUMP (gin) OR CONTAINMENT (Ci) ATMOSPHERE (cc) Kr-87 xlCi/o 6 paCi *Xe-13lm x 1 0/1 0 6 11Ci *Xe-133m x M/1 0 6 ttCi *Xe-133 xc/m pCi 6_pa *Xe- 135 x1/o6 pCi _________

1-131 xICI/1 0 6 ICi *I- 132 x 0/1 0 6 pCi 1-133 xnCi/1 o6 6pCi 1-135 xlCi/1 0 6 pCi Rb-88 x CI/1 0 6 pCi Cs-134 xai/1 0 o6 pCi Cs-137 xM/, 6 pCia Te-129 xla/1,6 ACi Te-132 x CI/IO6 itCi Ba-140 x 0 Ci/1 0 6 jtCi *La-140 x 1 0/1 0 6 paCi La-142 xlCi/1 o6 6pCi Pr-144 xICi/1 6 6pCi 5.8 Determine total activity release for each isotope by adding the total Curies released.

Enter the results in Table I.REFERENCE USE Page 15 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TABLE H-2 TOTAL ACTIVITY OF EACH MEDIUM -RCS REFERENCE USE ISOTOPE ADJUSTED SAMPLE VOLUME/MASS OF RCS (gin), TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY (ItCi/gm)

SUMP (gin) OR CONTAINMENT (Ci) ATMOSPHERE (cc) Kr-87 xM 9/1 0 6 ttCi *Xe-131m .'i 10/6 ttCi *Xe-133m xlCi/1 o6 6Ci *Xe- 133 x 10i/io 6pCi *Xe-135 x CI/, 0 6 IjCi 1-131 x ICi/o6 6pCi *1-132 xa/o 0 6 paCi 1-133 x19i/1 0 6 PCi 1-135 xICa/,o6 ] Ci Rb-88 x 1a/1 0 o 6Ci Cs-134 x M/1 0 6PCi Cs-137 xKCI/1 0 6 PCi Te-129 x Ci/1 0o pCi Te-132 x C1i/1 0 6 pCi Ba-140 x l1i/o 6 PCi *La-140 xCMl 1 0 6,PCi La-142 xCi/o ICi 6pa Pr-144 xICi/o 6 pCi 5.9 Determine total activity release for each isotope by adding the total Curies released.

Enter the results in Table I.Page 16 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TABLE H-3 TOTAL ACTIVITY OF EACH MEDIUM -SUMP REFERENCE USE ISOTOPE ADJUSTED SAMPLE VOLUME/MASS OF RCS (gin), TOTAL ACTIVITY ACTIVITY (piCi/gm)

SUMP (gin) OR CONTAINMENT (CO ATMOSPHERE (cc) Kr-87 xlCi/, 0 6 PCi *Xe-131m x 6 pa *Xe-133m x1Ci/o6 paCi *Xe-133 x 10/1o0 PCi *Xe- 135 x' ' jICi 6_pa 1-131 x Wi/o 6 ttCi *1-132 x' ' ljCi 6_pa 1-133 x ItCi 6_pa 1-135 xC10/1 0 6 jiCi Rb-88 x M/1 6 PCi Cs-134 xICi/1 o6 aCi Cs-137 x/ho* 101 6Ci Te-129 xi/o ] Ci 6pa Te-132 x'Ci/1 0 6 PCi Ba-140 x IlCi _ _pa *La-140 x//o6 pCi 6pa La-142 xtCi/6 I Ci 6_ _ Pr-144 x Ci, jo6 pai 5.10 Determine total activity release for each isotope by adding the total Curies released.

Enter the results in Table I.Page 17 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES -CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE TABLE I TOTAL ACTIVITY RELEASED (ATMOSPHERIC, RCS, AND SUMP)REFERENCE USE ISOTOPE TOTAL TOTAL REACTOR TOTAL SUMP TOTAL ATMOSPHERIC COOLANT SYSTEM ACTIVITY (Ci) ACTIVITY ACTIVITY ACTIVITY (Ci) RELEASED FROM CORE (Ci) (Ci) .. Kr-87 *Xe-131m *Xe-133m *Xe-133 *Xe-135 1-131 *1132 1-133 1-135 Rb-88 Cs-134 Cs-137 Te-129 Te-132 Ba-140 *La-140 La-142 Pr-144 Page 18 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSiNESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 5.11 Determine the fraction of total available core activity released.

NOTE: The total inventory values available for release, Curies, have been corrected for thermal output differences in the WOG Core Damage Methodology tables. The values in Table J below are based upon PBNP's 1518 MWT output versus the 1961 MWT core inventory referenced in the WOG tables. Calculate the fraction released by dividing the total activity released from the core (Table I) by the total activity (inventory) available for release. Multiply the results by 100 to obtain percentage of release. Enter the results in Table J. TABLE J FRACTION OF CORE RELEASED (ATMOSPHERE, RCS, AND SUMP) ISOTOPE TOTAL ACTIVITY TOTAL ACTIVITY FRACTION % AVAILABLE FOR RELEASED FROM RELEASED CORE RELEASE (Ci) TABLEI (PERCENTAGE)

DAMAGE (CLAD, OVERTEMP, OR MELT) Kr-87 1.70E7 *Xe-131m 2.71E5 *Xe-133m 1.24E7 *Xe-133 8.52E7 *Xe-135 1.63E7 1-131 4.18E7 "*-132 6.12E7 1-133 8.52E7 1-135 7.67E7 Rb-88 2.48E7 Cs-134 1.01E7 Cs-137 4.57E6 Te-129 1.39E7 Te-132 6.12E7 Ba-140 7.28E7 *La-140 7.67E7 La-142 6.50E7 Pr-144 5.34E7 REFERENCE USE Page 19 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 10.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION TOTAL REWRITE 5.12 For each isotope, on the appropriate figure (Figure 2-2 through 2-9 located on pages 15 -22, Figure 2-11 and 2-12 located on pages 40-42 and Figure 2-13 through Figure 2-15 located on pages 45-47 of the WOG Methodology Manual), find the Fraction Released (Percentage) value from Table J on the "Y" axis and read the percentage of core damage on the "X" axis where the value of core inventory released crosses the average bum-up line on the graph. 5.13 If power history was NOT steady state prior to the accident, power correction may be necessary for core inve-n'tories.

Reference page 4 of the WOG Methodology Section 2.3. 5.14 If iodine spiking is suspected, the amount of clad damage may be overestimated.

Reference page 25 of the WOG Methodology Section 2.4.3.2.

5.15 Evaluate the results for each isotope to determine which of the following seven categories best represents the condition of the core: o No Clad Damage 0 0-50% Clad Damage e 0-50% Fuel Pellet Overtemperature

0-50% Fuel Melt

50-100% Clad Damage .50-100% Fuel Pellet Overtemperature

50-100% Fuel Melt Best estimation of Core Damage (enter core damage category)REFERENCE USE Pertormed By: Perlormer (Print and Sign) Date / Timzie Reviewed By: Reviewer (Print and Sign) Date / Tiim Page 20 of 21 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION EPIP 10.2 NNSR Revision 18 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 EPIP 8.4. 1, Post-Accident Sampling And Analysis Of Potentially High Activity Reactor Coolant 6.2 EPIP 8.4.2, Post-Accident Sampling Of Containment Atmosphere 6.3 EPIP 8.4.3, Emergency Containment Sump "A" Sampling 6.4 Radioactive Decay Data Tables, Technical Information Center, Kocher, David. C., USDOE, 1981. DOE/TIC -11026. 7.0 BASES B-1 Westinghouse Owner's Group Post-Accident Core Damage Assessment Methodology REFERENCE USE Page 21 of 21 EPIP 11.2 MEDICAL EMERGENCY Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION:

REVISION:

EFFECTIVE DATE: PROCEDURE OWNER: Technical NNSR 12 November 30, 1999 Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS DELETED NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 11.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 MEDICAL EMERGENCY TOTAL REWRITE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE ...........................................................................................................

3 2.0. PREREQUISITES

...............................................................................................

3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS...............................................................

5 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

............................................................................................

5 5.0 PROCEDURE

......................................................................................................

6 5.1 Slight Personal Injury/Illness

................................................................................

6 5.2 Minor Personal Injury/Illness

.............................................................................

.6 5.3 Serious Injury/Illness

.............................................................................................

6 5.4 Individual Discovering the Injured/Ill Person(s)

Response ..................................

7 5.5 Duty Shift Superintendent Response ....................................................................

8 5.6 Radiation Protection Supervisor, Specialist, and/or Technologist Response ........ 8 5.6.1 Radiation Protection Actions -Onsite ..................................................................

8 5.6.2 Radiation Protection Actions -Offsite ..................................................................

9 5.7 Two Rivers Community Hospital Personnel Response .......................................

10 5.8 Gatehouse Security Officers Response ...............................................................

10 5.9- General Administrative Issues ..............................................................................

10

6.0 REFERENCES

....................................................................................................

10 7.0 BA SES .......................................................................................................................

11 ATTACHMENT A DUTY SHIFT SUPERINTENDENT ACTIONS ...........................................

12 ATTACHMENT B RADIATION PROTECTION ACTIONS -ONSITE ......................................

13 ATTACHMENT C RADIATION PROTECTION ACTIONS -OFFSITE ....................................

15 REFERENCE USE Page 2 of 18 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 11.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 MEDICAL EMERGENCY TOTAL REWRITE 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure is to provide Point Beach Nuclear Plant personnel with guidance for the immediate care of an injured/ill person(s) requiring onsite or offsite medical assistance.

Both contaminated and non-contaminated events.are considered.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 The Duty Shift Superintendent (DSS) is responsible for the overall command and control of the event (OSC Coordinator or Reentry Team Coordinator if the OSC is activated).

2.1.2 Radiation

Protection personnel are responsible for providing radiation and contamination controls at the scene, during transport to the hospital, and at the hospital.

2.1.3 The individual discovering the medical emergency is responsible for notifying the Control Room, providing treatment if qualified, and remaining at the scene to assist. 2.1.4 Personnel trained in first aid and CPR shall be immediate responders to the scene and provide treatment as appropriate.

2.1.5 The PBNP nurse is responsible for determining the equipment for the first aid

room, maintaining the supply inventory, and responding to the event if onsite. 2.1.6 The DSS, Industrial Health & Safety Manager, and injured/ill person(s) supervisor, group manager, or contractor supervisor are responsible for ensuring the completion of NP 1.9.2, Accident And Personal Injury Reporting; OSHA Form 200 Requirements; Industrial Safety.REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 18 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES MEDICAL EMERGENCY EPIP 11.2 NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 2.2 Equipment 2.2.1 On-Site First Aid Provisions (EPMP 1.3) a. The plant is provided with emergency showers for use with a severely contaminated but less severely injured/ill person(s).

-.NOTE: ... IFIor-emergency.reasons, it-is necessary to transfer first aid supplies to the Radiation Control Area, THEN the unused supplies will be retained by Radiation Protection for release to the clean side. b. North and South Gatehouse

-First aid kit (both) and one long board stretcher (Southgate).

c. Turbine Building "* Control Room -First aid kit, bum kit, and trauma kit. "* South of Control Room -Stretcher, first aid kit, and bum kit.

El. 8', Unit 1 Truck Access -Stretcher, first aid kit, and bum kit. d. Switchyard

-First aid kit and bum kit. e. Facades, Unit 1 and Unit 2 -Stretcher, first aid kit, and bum kit; located on El. 66, and 26, outside each containment's personnel hatch. f. Site Boundary Control Center -First aid kits and bum kits. g. RCA Checkpoint

-First aid kits, bum kit, trauma kit, and stretcher.

h. Technical Support Center -First aid kit, bum kit, trauma kits, and stretcher.

i. Sewage Treatment Plant -First aid kit. j. RCA Maintenance Shop -First aid kit and trauma kit. k. Emergency Plan Vehicles -First Aid Kit (one per vehicle).

2.2.2 An onsite first aid room is located in the extension building on the first level. 2.2.3 Radiation Protection supplies and survey instrumentation.

REFERENCE USE Page 4 of 18 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 11.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 MEDICAL EMERGENCY TOTAL REWRITE 2.2.4 Portable FM Radios. 2.2.5 A fully equipped, controlled access emergency room will be used at Two Rivers Community Hospital, Two Rivers, Wisconsin. (R0fct EPMP-1.lb)

2.2.6 Letters

of agreement are in existence with ambulance services, Two Rivers Community Hospital, and trained physicians for treating contaminated, injured person(s).

3.0 PRECAUTIONS

AND LIMITATIONS

3.1 Employees

rendering medical assistance for serious injuries shall be first aid and/or CPR qualified.

3.2 To eliminate or minimize occupational exposure to blood and other potentially infectious body fluids, personal protective equipment shall be used. 3.3 IF the possibility exists that treatment and transportation of a patient from PBNP may be 'o-mplicated by radioactive contamination, THEN a fully equipped, controlled access emergency room shall be used at Two Rivers Uo tmmunity Hospital, Two Rivers, Wisconsin.

3.4 IF in doubt concerning the severity of an injury or illness, THEN seek the higher level of medical attention.

4.0 INITIAL

CONDITIONS An injured/ill person(s) needing medical assistance has been discovered at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.REFERENCE USE Page 5 of 18 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 11.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 MEDICAL EMERGENCY TOTAL REWRITE 5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 Slight

Personal Injury/Illness Not serious, but requiring onsite medical attention (i.e., Band-aid, small cuts where bleeding has stopped, splinters, bruises).

5.1.1 Report

the injury toyour supervisor.

5.1.2 Seek and receive appropriate first aid. .5.1.3 Ensure proper reporting is competed per Step 5.9. 5.2 Minor Personal Injury/Illness Not serious but requiring offsite professional medical attention (i.e., larger cuts possibly requiring stitches but bleeding stopped, sprains, strains).

5.2.1 Report

the injury to your supervisor.

5.2.2 IF contamination is not involved and it is between 0800 to 1700 Monday I-iough Friday, THEN after appropriate first aid, the injured/ill will be transported, by a supervisor from the injured/ill person's group, to a local physician's office, or hospital, for treatment.

5.2.3 IF contamination is involved, O'-R it is outside normal working hours, THEN the injured/ill person(s) will be treated and transported to the TwRivers Community Hospital per Step 5.4. 5.2.4 Ensure proper reporting is completed per Step 5.9. 5.3 Serious Injury/Illness Requiring offsite emergency medical transportation per Step 5A (i.e., trauma, heart attacks, heat stroke, unconsciousness, broken bones). The DSS shall ensure immediate care is provided and an ambulance is obtained for transport, radiological monitoring and control is implemented, and Security and Two Rivers Community Hospital are apprised of the event.REFERENCE USE Page 6 of 18 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES MEDICAL EMERGENCY EPIP 11.2 NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 5.4 Individual Discovering the Injured/Ill Person(s)

Response Immediately notify the Control Room at ext. 2911 and provide the following information:

a. Nature and extent of the injury or illness b. Specific location of person(s)

c. What is needed (i.e., ambulance, first aid supplies, CPR-qualified person, radiation protection personnel, etc.) d. Name of the person(s)

e. Other emergency conditions present (i.e., fire, steam, etc.) Perform necessary first aid to your level of training.Remain with the individual and keep them calm, if conditions permit. Brief more qualified personnel on the person(s) condition and actions taken upon their arrival.REFERENCE USE 5.4.1 5.4.2 5.4.3 5.4.4 CAUTION DO NOT MOVE THE INJURED/ILL PERSON(s), UNLESS: a. The injured/ill person(s) is in an extremely high radiation field. (Be aware that exposures of 100-200 rem may result in radiation sickness and exposures in excess of -300 rem may involve the risk of fatality to 50% of those exposed if medical treatment is not provided.)

0Refemuce step 6.10) OR b. Failure to move the injured/ill person(s) will result in even more serious injury.Page 7 of 18 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES MEDICAL EMERGENCY EPIP 11.2 NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 5.5 Duty Shift Superintendent Response Complete Attachment A, Duty Shift Superintendent Actions, to ensure: 5.5.1 Ensure injured/ill person(s) is(are) receiving medical treatment.

5.5.2 Assign

a scene leader (with radio) for command and control of the emergency.

5.5.3 Contact

onsite personnel and outside agencies that will provide support to the emergency.

5.5.4 Ensure

the person(s) family and supervisor are aware of the emergency.

5.5.5 Assess

the need for a four-hour report to the NRC. 5.5.6 Ensure documentation and follow-up are completed per Step 5.9. 5.6 Radiation Protection Supervisor, Specialist, and/or Technologist Response 5.6.1 Complete Attachment B, Radiation Protection Actions -Onsite, to ensure: NOTE: The medical care of the person(s) always takes priority over other actions (e.g., radiation protection, contamination control, area cleanup, etc.). a. Report to the scene with a frisker.

b. Administer first aid if qualified and not already in progress.

c. Determine the magnitude of the radiological hazard (if any) and if the person(s) is contaminated.

a IF undue radiation exposure is being received, the person's medical condition is minor, and he/she is conscious, THEN recommend that the person(s) be moved. 0 IF the injured/ill person(s) is receiving radiation exposure and Zannot be moved from the field, THEN consider use of shielding to reduce exposure.REFERENCE USE Page 8 of 18 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 11.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 MEDICAL EMERGENCY TOTAL REWRITE k)ý d. Report the following information to the Control Room (or Reentry Team Coordinator in OSC, if activated):

"* Injured/ill person(s) is(is not) contaminated. " IF contaminated, THEN provide the affected areas and highest appropriate value in cpm Dr mRihr. e. Evaluate need to issue protective clothing and dosimetry to emergency medical technicians, based upon severity of medical injuries and scene conditions.

f. Assist in radiological control aspects of handling the person(s) until they are safely within the ambulance.

"* Deconning if actions do not escalate medical condition.

"* Wrapping to prevent spread of contamination and escalation of medical condition.

g. Route several Radiation Protection personnel to the Two Rivers Community Hospital to assist with the radiological setup prior to the arrival of the person(s).

h. ]F requested by the Emergency Medical Technicians, TFHEN accompany the injured/ill person(s) in the ambulance, providing contamination control for the person(s) and ambulance personnel.

5.6.2 Complete

Attachment C, Radiation Protection Actions -Offsite, to ensure: a. Assist in the radiological setup of the hospital and personnel.

b. Assist in the ongoing radiological monitoring and contamination control.

NOTE: As soon as possible, assure that the triage area of the hospital, ambulance and equipment, plus facilities and equipment, have been decontaminated and released.

The various areas shall be done separately from the others to allow public access. c. Perform clean release surveys at the hospital and for the ambulance.

REFERENCE USE Page 9 of 18 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 11.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 MEDICAL EMERGENCY TOTAL REWRITE 5.7 Two Rivers Community Hospital Personnel Response 5.7.1 IF the injured/ill person(s) is not contaminated, ;THEN he/she will be handled by standard Two Rivers Community Hospital (TRCH) emergency procedures.

5.7.2 IF the injured/ill person(s) is contaminated by radioactive material, TH-EN the Two Rivers Community Hospital will implement their "Condition Black-Nuclear" procedure to treat him/her.

5.8 Gatehouse

Security Officers Response Upon being notified that medical response personnel (EMTs/Ambulance) will be arriving, the gatehouse security officers will: 5.8.1 Determine the desired location of the ambulance.

5.8.2 Escort

the ambulance to desired location and EMTs to scene of accident.

5.8.3 Expedite

ingress/egress of the ambulance and crew. 5.9 General Administrative Issues In case of injury, the DSS, Industrial Health & Safety Manager, injured/ill person(s) supervisor, group manager, or contractor supervisor shall perform administrative responsibilities in accordance with NP 1.9.2, Accident and Personal Injury Reporting; OSHA Form 200 Requirements; Industrial Safety, and NP 1.10.2, Accident, Injury and Illness Reporting.

.

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 DCS 2.1.1, Requirements and Guidance for Immediate Notification to NRC/EPA of "Significant Events" at PBNP 6.2 EP 6.0, Emergency Measures 6.3 EP 7.0, Emergency Facilities and Equipment 6.4 EPMP 1.3, Routine Inventory of TSC, EOF, AEOF, JPIC and OSC Emergency Preparedness Supplies 6.5 EPMP-1.1 b, Radiation Protection

-Specialized Emergency Preparedness Quarterly Checklist 6.6 HPIP 3.51, Contamination Surveys REFERENCE USE Page 10 of 18 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES MEDICAL EMERGENCY EPIP 11.2 NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE 6.7 NP 1.9.2, Accident and Personal Injury Reporting; OSHA Form 200 Requirements; Industrial Safety 6.8 NP 1.10.2, Accident, Injury and Illness Reporting 6.9 NP 4.2.25, Release of Material and Equipment from Radiologically Controlled Areas 6.10 Regulatory Guide 8.29, Instruction Concerning Risks From Occupational Exposure, February 1996, Revision 1 7.0 BASES B-1 10 CFR 50.47(b), Emergency Plans B-2 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix E.IV, Content of Emergency Plans REFERENCE USE Page I11 of 18 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES MEDICAL EMERGENCY EPIP 11.2 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 12 November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT A DUTY SHIFT SUPERINTENDENT ACTIONS Initials/Time

1.0 Ensure

injured/ill person(s) is(are) receiving first aid by two trained responders.

2.0 Assign

one person (with portable radio) to report as a scene leader for command and control of all personnel responding, and to keep you apprised of the event (recommend an SRO). NOTE: If the injured/ill person(s) is in a radiation or contaminated area where contamination cannot be evaluated and cannot be moved,-then assume-he/she is contaminated.

3.0 Call the Manitowoc County Sheriffs Department (9-911) to request an ambulance, if needed. Provide the following information:

3.1 Number

of injured/ill persons: 3.2 Nature of the injuries:

3.3 Radiological

status (circle one) Clean -Contaminated

-Potentially contaminated 4.0 IF radiological concerns are present, ITHEN assign Radiation Protection personnel to implement Attachment B of this proc--ure and report to the scene. 5.0 Contact PBNP Nurse, if onsite, to report to the scene. Provide information of the event. 6.0 Notify security if an ambulance has been requested.

Provide radiological status of the injured/ill person. Advise them to escort the EMTs to the scene upon arrival.

7.0 Call the Two Rivers Community Hospital (793-1178) and provide the following information:

7.1 Number

of injured/ill person(s):

7.2 Condition

of injured/ill person(s):

7.3 Radiological

status (circle one) Clean -Contaminated

-Potentially contaminated

8.0 Notify

the Plant Manager (TSC Manager if the TSC has been activated), and advise that injured/ill person's family and supervisor be notified of the injury. 9.0 IF the injured person is contaminated, TIEN notify the Manitowoc County Sheriffs Department and request the ambulance remain at the hospital until Radiation Protection personnel release the vehicle and its equipment.

10.0 Recontact the Two Rivers Community Hospital with the estimated time of arrival, further medical information, and details of radiological concerns.

11.0 Assess the need for a four-hour event report per DCS 2.1.1, Requirements and Guidance for Immediate Notification to NRC/EPA of "Significant Events." 12.0 Ensure Step 5.9 of the procedure for completion of General Administrative Issues is assigned as appropriate.

ROUTE COMPLETED FORM TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REFERENCE USE/ / / // / / / / /Page 12 of 18 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 11.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 12 MEDICAL EMERGENCY November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT B RADIATION PROTECTION ACTIONS -ONSITE Page 1 of 2 NOTE: The medical care of the person(s) always takes priority over other actions (e.g., radiation protection, contamination control, area cleanup, etc.) InitialsfTime

1.0 Immediately

report to the scene with a frisker upon being contacted by the Control Room. / 2.0 Administer medical treatment if qualified and first aid is not already in progress.

/ 3.0 Survey the injured/ill person(s) for contamination, documenting the highest reading on the following page. 4.0 Survey the scene for radiological hazards, documenting the highest reading on the following page. 5.0 Contact the Control Room with the results of your surveys and affected areas of injured/ill person(s) and scene. 6.0 IF undue radiation exposure is being received, the person's medical condition is iim-mor, and he/she is conscious, THEN recommend that the person(s) be moved. 7.0 Evaluate need to issue dosimetry and protective clothing to offsite medical response personnel, based on severity of injury and scene conditions.

8.0 Assist

in radiological control aspects of handling the person(s) until they are safely within the ambulance.

8.1 Deconning

if actions do not escalate medical condition.

8.2 Wrapping

with sheet, blanket, or plastic to prevent spread of contamination if medical condition prevents deconning.

9.0 Route

several Radiation Protection personnel to the Two Rivers Community Hospital to implement Attachment C, assisting with the radiological setup prior to the arrival of the injured/ill person(s).

10.0 IF requested by the Emergency Medical Technicians, ThEN accompany the injured/ill person(s) in the ambulance, providing con ination control for the person(s) and ambulance personnel.

REFERENCE USE Page 13 of 18 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES MEDICAL EMERGENCY EPIP 11.2 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 12 November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT B RADIATION PROTECTION ACTIONS -ONSITE Page 2 of 2 NOTE: The medical care of the person(s) always takes priority over other actions (e.g., radiation protection, contamination control, area cleanup, etc.) 11.0 Injured/Ill Persons Name: Date/Time Employer:

Work Group: 12.0 Indicate wounds and/or contaminated areas in cpm or mR/hr: 13.0 14.0 Potential for internal contamination?

F1 Yes []No Comments:

Describe actions taken to minimize the spread of contamination (i.e., decon, wrap, etc.): 15.0 Results of radiological survey of scene in cpm or mR/hr: Comments:

ROUTE COMPLETED FORM TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Page 14 of IS REFERENCE USE NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES MEDICAL EMERGENCY EPIP 11.2 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 12 November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT C RADIATION PROTECTION ACTIONS -OFFSITE Page 1 of 4 NOTE 1: The attending physician's orders must be followed and ONLY the physician is in direct charge of the situation.

The medical care of the person(s) always takes priority over other actions (e.g., radiation protection, contamination control, area cleanup, etc.). NOTE 2: As soon as possible, assure that the triage area of the hospital, ambulance and equipment, plus facilities and-equipment have been decontaminated and released.

The various areas shall be done separately from the others to allow public access.1.0 Proceed to the Two Rivers Community Hospital.

If possible, arrive before the ambulance.

2.0 Upon arrival, identify yourself to hospital personnel and provide setup assistance with contamination boundaries, postings and controls for the ambulance receiving dock, triage area, and emergency room.CONTAMINATION BOUNDARY (1ay be a-rgod dom~f~tltdspefidenton bdmuey moe Initials/Time

/DOORS TO WEST PARKING LOT V/REFERENCE USE Page 1 5 of 18 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES MEDICAL EMERGENCY EPIP 11.2 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 12 November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT C RADIATION PROTECTION ACTIONS -OFFSITE Page 2 of 4 NOTE: PBNP personnel entering the emergency room should dress in the same protective equipment being worn by the hospital staff. Initials/Time

3.0 Issue

dosimetry for hospital and plant personnel and ensure they have appropriate protective clothing.

/ 4.0 Provide a radiological status of injured person to hospital personnel.

I 5.0 Assist in maintaining radiological and contamination controls for: 5.1 Hospital personnel and equipment leaving the restricted area. I 5.2 Injured/ill person(s) during treatment.

/ 6.0 Upon transfer of the injured contaminated person into the emergency room, monitor, survey, and clean release the following areas per Step 8.0. 6.1 Triage area and hallway / 6.2 Ambulance and ambulance personnel

/ 6.3 Restricted area of the ambulance dock / 7.0 Upon completion of medical treatment and transfer of the injured/ill person into another area, monitor, survey, and clean release the following areas per Step 8.0. 7.1 Medical personnel and equipment

/ 7.2 Emergency Room/Triaige Area / 7.3 Other locations and equipment set up as radiological restricted areas during the treatment of the person(s)

/ 8.0 Survey and Clean Release Guidelines

8.1 Masslinn

(treated cloth wipes) 8.1.1 For large flat surface areas, the affected area may be wiped with masslinn.

All areas where there is the potential for contamination must be wiped. 8.1.2 The masslinn should be laid flat with the dirty side up for the survey.REFERENCE USE Page 16 of I&g NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 11.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 12 MEDICAL EMERGENCY November 30, 1999 ATT'ACHMENT C K> RADIATION PROTECTION ACTIONS -OFFSITE Page 3 of 4 8.1.3 Count the masslinn using an open-window, pancake type probe sensitive to beta and gamma radiation.

The measurement shall be made at a distance of approximately 1/2 inch and at a scan rate of less than 4 inches per second. -8.1.4 The area may-be-released as clean iftheo count rate-from-the masslinn is less than or equal to the background count rate + 3( ]Bkgcountrate

). Example: If the background

= 50 cpm then any count -50 + 21 cpm would be considered non-detectable and released as clean. 8.1.5 Fixed contamination levels must be 100 ncpm. (Refernce NP 4.225) 8.2 Direct Frisk 8.2.1 Any surface area may be surveyed directly with a hand-held K)frisker which is sensitive to beta and gamma radiation.

8.2.2 The area may be released as clean if the count rate is less than or equal to the background count rate +3( /Bkgcounrate).

8.2.3 Fixed

contamination levels must be <100 ncpm. (Reference NP 42.25) 8.3 Smear Survey 8.3.1 Any surface area may be surveyed indirectly using smears and a counting instrument.

8.3.2 The standard method described in HPIP 3.51, Contamination Surveys, for obtaining, documenting, and counting smears will be followed.REFERENCE USE Page i17 of 18 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES MEDICAL EMERGENCY EPIP 11.2 NNSR -TOTAL REWRITE Revision 12 November 30, 1999 ATTACHMENT C RADIATION PROTECTION ACTIONS -OFFSITE Page 4 of 4 NOTE: Hospital staff will work with plant personnel to eliminate the biological hazard of the radioactive waste generated prior to disposal of the material as radioactive waste.9.0 Collect any protective clothing and dosimetry that may have been issued to the ambulance EMTs and complete appropriate paperwork.

10.0 Bag and properly label all disposable and non-disposable contaminated items. Place sealed and labeled plastic bags in the old nuclear first aid room for temporary storage (lower level near elevator).

11.0 Notify the Rad Waste Supervisor of waste location and quantity.

He/she will arrange for transport and disposal of contaminated materials.

12.0 Identify hospital and ambulance equipment which may require replacement below. 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 13.0 Comments Initials/Time

/// /I ROUTE COMPLETED FORM TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REFERENCE USE Page I18 of i18 EPIP 12.1 EMERGENCY-EVENT DE-ESCALATION, TERMINATION, OR RECOVERY OPERATIONS Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION:

REVISION:

EFFECTIVE DATE: PROCEDURE OWNER: Technical NNSR 7 November 30, 1999 Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS DELETED NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 12.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 7 EMERGENCY EVENT DE-ESCALATION, TERMINATION, November 30, 1999 OR RECOVERY OPERATIONS TOTAL REWRITE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PU RPO SE ......................................................................................................................

3 2.0 PREREQUISITES

.....................................................................................................

3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

...................................................................

3 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

..........................................................................................

4 5.0 PROCEDURE

............................................................................................................

4 5.1 Review of Classified Event Status ...........................................................................

4 5.2 Event De-Escalation

..................................................................................................

5 5.3 Event Termination

....................................................................................................

6

6.0 REFERENCES

..........................................................................................................................

7 7.0 BA SES .......................................................................................................................................

7 ATTACHMENT A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TERMINATION CRITERIA ............

8 REFERENCE USE Page 2 of 8 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 12.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 7 EMERGENCY EVENT DE-ESCALATION, TERMINATION, November 30,1999 OR RECOVERY OPERATIONS TOTAL REWRITE 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure is to specify the conditions which warrant event de-escalation, event termination, or recovery implementation.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 The Emergency Director is responsible for determining whether it is appropriate to de-escalate an event, terminate an event, or implement recovery operations.

2.1.2 The Duty Shift Superintendent (DSS), TSC Manager, EOF Manager and Operations Coordinator will provide input to the decision to de-escalate an event, terminate an event, or implement recovery operations.

2.2 Equipment

None 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 3.1 This procedure should be used based on the highest classification of the event. Site Emergencies and General Emergencies will usually require a recovery phase, whereas Unusual Events or Alerts may go directly from classification to termination, if appropriate.

3.2 Major

repairs and/or decontamination may be necessary to return the plant to an operating condition.

REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 8 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 12.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 7 EMERGENCY EVENT DE-ESCALATION, TERMINATIONs November 30,1999 OR RECOVERY OPERATIONS TOTAL REWRITE 3.3 Terminating an Emergency WHEN conditions have improved where an EAL is no longer met, and it is believed that the plant is stable, i.e., the EAL is NOT anticipated to be exceeded again, THEN the emergency may be terminated WITH THE FOLLOWING CAVEATS: 3.3.1 IF Emergency Response Facilities have been activated, or personnel have been called to activate these facilities, ... THEN the event shall NOT be terminated until the TSC and EOF have been activated, and the TSC Manager concurs with the assessment of plant conditions.

3.3.2 IF any General Emergency has been declared, or any Protective Action Recommendation made to or by off-site authorities, THEN the emergency shall NOT be terminated until the NRC (for any General Emergency) and/or off-site authorities (for Protective Action Recommendations) concur. 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS 4.1 The emergency conditions at the plant have improved and the possibility exists that the event can be de-escalated or terminated.

4.2 The emergency condition no longer exists and the plant is considered in a stable, shutdown, safe condition with no possibility of conditions degrading further.

5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 Review

of Classified Event Status Review Attachment A, Emergency Classification Termination Criteria, with the DSS, TSC Manager, EOF Manager, and Operations Coordinator to determine whether de-escalation, termination, or recovery operations is appropriate. (Check one of the following.)

__De-escalation to lower classification. (Go to Step 5.2.) __Terminate emergency classification. (No recovery operations are necessary.

Go to Step 5.3.) Implement recovery operations. (Go to EPIP 12.2, Recovery Implementation)

Continue current classification. (Monitor EPIP 1.2, Emergency Classification)

REFERENCE USE Page 4 of 8 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 12.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 7 EMERGENCY EVENT DE-ESCALATION, TERMINATION, November 30, 1999 OR RECOVERY OPERATIONS TOTAL REWRITE 5.2 Event De-Escalation

5.2.1 Review

EPIP 1.2, Emergency Classification, with the DSS, TSC Manager, EOF Manager and Operations Coordinator.

Evaluate plant and release conditions to ensure the event may be reclassified to a lower emergency classification.

Current Classification New Classification Time NOTE: No PARs should be required if the release is terminated or below Tech Specs. 5.2.2 Complete EPIP 2.1, Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form. 5.2.3 Direct the offsite communicator to complete EPIP 2.1, Section 5.2, Notifications to State and Counties (within 15 minutes of declaration).

5.2.4 Ensure

personnel in all Emergency Response Facilities are aware of new classification.

5.2.5 Direct

the DSS to notify on-site personnel per EPIP 1.1, Course of Actions, Attachment A. 5.2.6 Ensure EPIP 2.1, Section 5.4, Notifications to the NRC, have been completed (immediately following offsite notifications, NOT to exceed 60 minutes from declaration).

5.2.7 Ensure

follow-up communications, as necessary, are being completed:

a. EPIP 2.1, Section 5.5, Status Updates to the State and Counties b. EPIP 2.1, Section 5.6, Status Updates to the NRC 5.2.8 Continue to review this procedure until event termination or recovery operations are implemented.

REFERENCE USE Page 5 of 8 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 12.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 7 EMERGENCY EVENT DE-ESCALATION, TERMINATION, November 30, 1999 OR RECOVERY OPERATIONS TOTAL REWRITE 5.3 Event Termination

5.3.1 Discuss

the following with the DSS, TSC Manager, EOF Manager, and Operations Coordinator:

a. The need for long-term cleanup or recovery operations is NOT necessary.

b. Current conditions do NOT meet any of the emergency action levels listed in EPIP 1.2, Emergency Classifications.

Current Classification Terminated at: 5.3.2 Complete EPIP 2.1, Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form. 5.3.3 Direct the offsite communicator to complete EPIP 2.1, Section 5.2, Notifications to State and Counties (within 15 minutes of declaration).

5.3.4 Ensure

personnel in all Emergency Response Facilities are aware of termination.

5.3.5 Direct

the DSS to notify on-site personnel per EPIP 1.1, Course of Actions, Attachment A. 5.3.6 Ensure EPIP 2.1, Section 5.4, Notifications to the NRC, have been completed (immediate following offsite notifications, NOT to exceed 60 minutes from declaration).

5.3.7 Direct

all Emergency Response Facility personnel to complete the termination section of their Position Instruction Manuals.REFERENCE USE Page 6 of 8 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY EVENT DE-ESCALATION, TERMINATION, OR RECOVERY OPERATIONS EPIP 12.1 NNSR Revision 7 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 EP 4.0, Emergency Conditions 6.2 EP 9.0, Recovery 6.3 EPIP 1.1, Course of Actions 6.4 EPIP 1.2, Emergency Classification 6.5 EPIP 2.1, Notifications

-ERO, State & Counties, and NRC 6.6 EPIP 12.2, Recovery Implementation 6.7 RCM 96, NRC Response Coordination Manual 6.8 RTM 96, NRC Response Technical Manual 7.0 BASES B-I 10 CFR 50.47(b), Emergency Plans B-2 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix E.IV, Content of Emergency Plans REFERENCE USE Page 7 of 8 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 12.1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 7 EMERGENCY EVENT DE-ESCALATION, TERMINATION, November 30, 1999 OR RECOVERY OPERATIONS TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TERMINATION CRITERIA start Occured? f Tale 1Operations Saifid (EPIP 12.2) No ,No LogTr Continue Current Cleanup or Classification (Until Table I Recovery Can Be ticipated?

Declared)

The reactor and associated systems are in a safe, stable, and shutdown condition, with no likelihood that the initial emergency situation will recur or that further plant degradation will develop.

for current Y Continue Current -Long-term core cooling has been Classification Still Classification established.

Exist? ( o No further potential exists for uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials to NO the environmenL Release of radioactive materials has o or De-Escalate to Lower ceased or is within TS limits. (EPsPfnClassification Containment pressure is steady or Exist? (EPIP 12.1 Step 5.2) decreasing as expected.

No Any fire, flooding, earthquake, or similar emergency condition is controlled or has ceased. equirements ye Terminate Emergency All initial or previous emergency of Table I Classification notifications have been completed.

-Full activation of the Emergency Response Organization or Emergency Response No Facilities is no longer required.

Continue Current NRC concurs with the decision to Classification (Monitor terminate (G.E.) (EPIP 1.2). Table I and/or EPIP 1.2 as State & Counties concur with the Appropriate) decision to terminate (any PARs implemented) (EPIP 1.2). If necessary, Reference EP 4.0, Table 4-1 REFERENCE USE Page 8 of 8 EPIP 12.2 RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION Wisconsin Electric Power Company DOCUMENT TYPE: Technical CLASSIFICATION:

NNSR REVISION:

12 EFFECTIVE DATE: November 30, 1999 PROCEDURE OWNER: Emergency Preparedness NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS DELETED NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 12.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION TOTAL REWRITE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PU RPO SE ......................................................................................................................

3 2.0 PREREQUISITES

.....................................................................................................

3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

................................................................

3 4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

..........................................................................................

3 5.0 PROCEDURE

.......................................................................................................

4 5.1 Terminate Event Classification

.................................................................................

4 5.2 Implement Recovery Operations

...............................................................................

4 5.3 Recovery Termination

..............................................................................................

6

6.0 REFERENCES

......................................................................................................

6 7.0 B A SES ...........................................................................................................................

6 K. > ATTACHMENT A PROPOSED RECOVERY ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

...................................................................................

7 ATTACHMENT B RECOVERY PLAN ACTION ITEMS ........................................................

10 ATTACHMENT C RECOVERY PLAN ACTION ITEM ASSIGNMENTS

...............................

12 REFERENCE USE Page 2 of 12 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 12.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION TOTAL REWRITE 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides guidance for entering the recovery phase, establishing a recovery plan, restoring the plant to a normal operating status, and terminating recovery efforts.

The goals of the recovery effort are to assess the in-plant consequences of the emergency, assist the State of Wisconsin with the intermediate and ingestion phase radiological operations, and initiate plant cleanup and repair operations.

2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.1.1 The Emergency Director is responsible for the oversight of the recovery organization and recovery operations.

2.1.2 The TSC Manager, Rad/Chem Coordinator, Dose/PAR Coordinator, Operations Coordinator, Engineering Coordinator, EOF Manager, JPIC Manager, and Resource Coordinator have various responsibilities for the recovery operations per Attachment A, Proposed Recovery Organization and Responsibilities.

2.2 Equipment

None 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS Recovery operations may NOT be terminated until the PBNP Recovery Organization, under the direction of the Emergency Director, and the NRC agree that the plant can be maintained within Technical Specifications.

4.0 INITIAL

CONDITIONS Completion of EPIP 12.1, Emergency Event De-Escalation, Termination, or Recovery Operations, indicates that implementing recovery operations is appropriate.

REFERENCE USE Page 3 of 12 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 12.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION TOTAL REWRITE 5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 Terminate

Event Classification

5.1.1 Current

Classification Terminated at: 5.1.2 Complete EPIP 2.1, Attachment B, Nuclear Accident Reporting Form, indicating on the form that we will be "implementing recovery actions.

5.1.3 Direct

the offsite communicator to complete EPIP 2.1, Section 5.2, Notifications to State and Counties (within 15 minutes of declaration).

5.1.4 Ensure

personnel in all Emergency Response Facilities are aware of termination.

5.1.5 Direct

the DSS to notify on-site personnel per EPIP 1.1, Course of Actions, Attachment A. 5.1.6 Ensure EPIP 2.1, Section 5.4, Notifications to the NRC, have been completed (immediately following offsite notifications, NOT to exceed 60 minutes from declaration).

5.2 Implement

Recovery Operations

5.2.1 Ensure

personnel in all Emergency Response Facilities are aware that the event has been de-escalated and/or recovery operations are being implemented.

5.2.2 Review

EP 9.0, Recovery.

NOTE: Some of the following steps may have been completed as part of the emergency response phase. 5.2.3 Establish a recovery organization, per Attachment A, appropriate for the existing onsite and offsite conditions.

The recovery organization should consist of personnel capable of ensuring:

a. Assessment of onsite and offsite radiological conditions.

b. Assessment of plant operating conditions (affected and non-affected unit). c. Development of reentry and recovery work plans and schedules.

d. Communications with offsite agencies.REFERENCE USE Page 4 of 12 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 12.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION TOTAL REWRITE 5.2.4 Establish an Incident Investigation Team (TSC Manager).

This team will: a. Gather available evidence on contributing factors.

b. Identify all causal factors.

c. Ensure all abnormal conditions are corrected or neutralized.

5.2.5 Complete

the following prior to developing recovery reentry plans: NOTE: Reference EPIP 10.1, Emergency Reentry, for guidance in preparing and deploying recovery reentry teams. a. Conduct comprehensive survey of site facilities and define all radiological problem areas. b. Isolate and post all radiation or contamination areas using appropriate Radiation Protection guidelines.

c. Perform visual inspection of site areas and equipment noting any areas/equipment requiring cleanup or repair. 5.2.6 Assemble recovery managers (or designees) to develop initial Recovery Plans. NOTE: Following an emergency, all failed equipment NOT necessary for safe shutdown and all records are to be quarantined pending an NRC investigation.

a. Review Attachment B, Recovery Plan Action Items. b. Assign action items to the appropriate group(s) for completion, completing*

Attachment C, Recovery Plan Action Item Assignments.

c. Ensure the group(s) review EPIP 10.1, Emergency Reentry, for items to consider for inclusion in work plans or procedures for recovery operations.

REFERENCE USE Page 5 of 12 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 12.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION TOTAL REWRITE NOTE: The recovery plan may be similar to an outage work plan; consider using the outage planning group to support recovery planning.

5.2.7 Ensure

the development of a comprehensive recovery plan which includes all work orders, modifications, etc., that need to be completed.

5.2.8 Implement

the comprehensive recovery plan action items determined in Step 5.2.6 and Step 5.2.7. 5.2.9 Reconvene the recovery managers (or designees) to review and revise the recovery plan as appropriate until the recovery phase is complete.

5.3 Recovery

Termination

5.3.1 Recovery

operations may be terminated when the PBNP Recovery Organization, under the direction of the Emergency Director, and the NRC agree that the plant can be maintained within Technical Specifications.

5.3.2 Verify

all Emergency Response Facilities are restored to a state of readiness prior to leaving facilities.

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 EP 9.0, Recovery 6.2 EPIP 1.1, Course of Actions 6.3 EPIP 2.1, Notifications

-ERO, State & Counties, and NRC 6.4 EPIP 10.1, Emergency.

Reentry 6.5 EPIP 12.1, Emergency Event De-Escalation, Termination, or Recovery Operations 6.6 RCM 96, NRC Response Coordination Manual 6.7 RTM 96, NRC Response Technical Manual 7.0 BASES B-1 10 CFR 50.47(b), Emergency Plans B-2 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix E.IV, Content of Emergency Plans REFERENCE USE Page 6 of 12 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION EPIP 12.2 NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT A PROPOSED RECOVERY ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES Page 1 of 3 W.E. Executive Spokesperson W.E. Executive Spokesperson

"* Provides the necessary management, technical and financial support for the recovery organization.

"* Coordinates recovery activities with other company departments and company officers as necessary.

Emergency Director "* Ensures completion of this procedure.

"* Determines positions and assigns personnel necessary for recovery organization.

"* Determines which facilities will be required for recovery operations (TSC, OSC, EOF, etc.). "* Ensures facilities NOT required for recovery operations are closed and returned to a ready state. "* Manages interface with NRC Site Team. TSC Manager "* Oversees implementation of site recovery operations.

"* Establishes an onsite personnel schedule sufficient to meet the immediate needs of the recovery organization.

"* Ensures all activities, proposed courses of action, and contingency plans receive proper analysis and coordination.

"* Ensures plant security and plant access is maintained in accordance with Security Plan. "* Establishes an Incident Investigation Team.REFERENCE USE Page 7 of 12 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 12.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT A PROPOSED RECOVERY ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES Page 2 of 3 Radiological Assessment (Dose/PAR Coordinator for Offsite- and Rad/Chem Coordinator for Onsite) "* Coordinates post-accident offsite sampling and analysis program in support of onsite and offsite recovery activities.

"" Maintains contact with federal, state, and local agencies regarding environmental sample results and coordinates additional sampling.

"* Calculates population dose, if applicable.

"* Provides recommendations regarding public protective actions.

"* Coordinates dose management and radiation protection for WE employees involved in recovery activities.

"* Develops plans and procedures to process and control liquid, gaseous and solid wastes generates as a result of the emergency and/or recovery activities.

Operational Assessment (Operations Coordinator)

"* Continues to manage plant operations.

"* Determines priorities for repair work. "* Conducts assessment of plant equipment and systems.

"* Ensures procedures and work plans are written for all required recovery activities.

Engineering Assessment (Engineering Coordinator)

"* Develops engineering plans and schedules for performance of recovery activities.

"* Directs and coordinates engineering, design, and construction activities required for recovery operations.

"* Ensures appropriate administrative controls are completed, i.e., 50.59s, MRs, WOs, etc. "* Coordinates engineering functions with the Quality Assurance section.

"* Coordinates activities of the NSS Supplier, the architect-engineer, various contractor forces, and other individuals and/or consultants.

EOF Manager "* Coordinates release of information with local, state, and federal agencies.

"* Establishes and maintains communications with offsite agencies.

"* Acts as liaison between WE and offsite agencies.

"* Acts as liaison between WE and NRC Site Team and/or Augmented Inspection Team. "* Ensures appropriate personnel are interfacing with NRC Site Team.REFERENCE USE Page 8 of 12 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 12.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT A PROPOSED RECOVERY ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES Page 3 of 3 Offsite Communications (JPIC Manager) 9 .Manages all public information activities relative to recovery operations.

Determines equipment and facility needs for.the JPIC. Coordinates acquisition with Resource Coordinator.

Administrative and Resources (Resource Coordinator)

"* Implements the personnel schedules developed for all facilities based upon the anticipated duration of recovery operations.

"* Provides for acquisition of materials and services as necessary for recovery operations.

"* Provides for personnel necessities onsite, i.e., food and refreshments.

"* Provides for personnel necessities for offsite and government agencies, i.e., communications, office supplies, office space, etc.REFERENCE USE Page 9 of 12 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 12.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B RECOVERY PLAN ACTION ITEMS Page 1 of 2 NOTE: Following an emergency, all failed equipment NOT necessary for safe shutdown and all records are to be quarantined pending an NRC investigation.

Perform assessments in the following areas and identify-potential short-term and long-term recovery action items. 1. Current operational status of plant systems and equipment involved in the emergency.

2. Current operational status of the unaffected unit and its effect on the affected unit. 3. Identification of all systems, components, or equipment damaged or made inoperable.

4. Estimate of necessary repairs, parts and special tools to restore all affected systems and equipment back to fully-operational state. 5. Estimate of additional personnel resources that may be required during the restoration period and any specialized training that may be necessary.

6. Identification of 50.59 reviews necessary for unaffected unit. 7. Identification of applicable plant surveillance tests and procedures to restore plant systems to normal operational or shutdown configuration.

8. Identification of applicable system operability tests and procedures to restore plant systems to normal operational or shutdown configuration.

9. Estimate of liquid and solid radioactive waste generated during the event and recommendations on management and disposal.

10. Identification of special radiological considerations for personnel entry into affected areas with elevated dose rates or contamination levels (i.e., temporary shielding, engineering evaluations, robotics, etc.) 11. Estimate of the decontamination and monitoring activities necessary to restore affected areas inside and outside the plant site to pre-accident levels. 12. Identification of continued offsite radiological sampling and potential assistance to state or local agencies in the area of sampling, monitoring, and decontamination.

REFERENCE USE Page 10 of 12 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EPIP 12.2 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT B RECOVERY PLAN ACTION ITEMS Page 2 of 2 13. Identification of methodology for continuing coordination with government agencies and media. 14. Identification of incident investigation team. 15. Evaluation of controlled releases that may result from recovery operations.

16. Assessment of long-term Security requirements.

REFERENCE USE Page I11 of 12 NUCLEAR POWER BUSINESS UNIT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION EPIP 12.2 NNSR Revision 12 November 30, 1999 TOTAL REWRITE ATTACHMENT C RECOVERY PLAN ACTION ITEM ASSIGNMENTS Page _ of iM I to) NO Emergency Director Approval: Date I I I A A L A -4 4 .4 4 .4.i I.*1* 4.+ 4 4 Time Return this completed Attachment to Emergency Preparedness.

REFERENCE USE Page 12 of 12

@@ Line 2: / Line 2: @@
 | number = ML993630482
 | issue date = 12/23/1999
-| title = Revised Epips, Including Revision 25 to EPIP 1.3, Revision 18 to EPIP 2.1, Revision 29 to EPIP 4.1, Revision 14 to EPIP 4.2, Revision 22 to EPIP 4.3, Revision 0 to EPIP 4.7, Revision 12 to EPIP 5.1and Revision 11 to EPIP 5.2. with 12/23/99
+| title = REVISED Epips, Including REVISION 25 to EPIP 1.3, REVISION 18 to EPIP 2.1, REVISION 29 to EPIP 4.1, REVISION 14 to EPIP 4.2, REVISION 22 to EPIP 4.3, REVISION 0 to EPIP 4.7, REVISION 12 to EPIP 5.1and REVISION 11 to EPIP 5.2. with 12/23/99
 | author name = Cayia A J
 | author affiliation = Wisconsin Electric Power Co

ML993630482: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 20:29, 18 April 2019

Text

6.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.2 Equipment

5.2 Verify

5.5 Complete

5.7.2 State

6.0 REFERENCES

6.0 REFERENCES

2.0 PREREQUISITES

2.1 Responsibilities

2.2 Equipment

3.1 Notifications

3.2 Category

3.3 Certain

3.4 Continuously

5.1 Classifying

5.1.1 Record

5.1.4 Reference

6.0 REFERENCES

6.1 Technical

6.2 Final

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