ML113480097: Difference between revisions

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| number = ML113480097
| number = ML113480097
| issue date = 09/26/2011
| issue date = 09/26/2011
| title = South Texas-2011-09-Draft Outlines
| title = 2011-09-Draft Outlines
| author name =  
| author name =  
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DNMS
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DNMS

Revision as of 14:44, 12 April 2019

2011-09-Draft Outlines
ML113480097
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 09/26/2011
From:
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety IV
To:
South Texas
References
50-498/11-301, 50-499/11-301
Download: ML113480097 (44)


Text

03/16/2011Printed: ES-401 Facility:South Texas ProjectPWR Examination OutlineForm ES-401-2333 33 3 2 2 1 2 2 0554553323 3 3 23323 1 1 1 0111 1111 1433443443423232 RO K/A Category PointsTierGroup TotalK1K2K3K4K5A1A2A3A4K6G*1.Emergency&Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1 1 2 2 Tier Totals Tier Totals 2.PlantSystems12343. Generic Knowledge And Abilities Categories2.The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.4.Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolutionin the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.3.Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.5.Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.Note:Date Of Exam:

09/22/2011 28 18 9 27 10 38 101.Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the ROand SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals"in each K/A category shall not be less than two).7.*The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 forthe applicable K/As.8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each systemand category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handlingequipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the leftside of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO andSRO-only exams.SRO-Only Points A2 G*00 00 00 00 00 000001234 0 0 0 0 0 0 09.For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions,IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3.Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to10 CFR 55.43.6.Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

N/A N/A Total 0 0 1 03/16/2011 1:36:25 pm 03/16/2011 K1 KA TopicImp.K2K3A1A2G PointsPrinted: ES - 401Facility:South Texas ProjectE/APE # / Name / Safety FunctionEmergency and Abnormal Plant E volutions - Tier 1 / Group 1 PWR RO Examination OutlineForm ES-401-22.1.30 - Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls.

4.4 1 X000007 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 AK2.01 - Valves 2.7*1 X000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident /

3EA2.08 - Letdown isolation valve position indication 2.9*1 X000009 Small Break LOCA / 32.1.19 - Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status.

3.9 1 X000011 Large Break LOCA / 3AK3.01 - Potential damage from high winding and/or bearing temperatures 2.5 1 X000015/000017 RCP Malfunctions / 4AK2.01 - RHR heat exchangers 2.9 1 X000025 Loss of RHR System / 4AK1.01 - Definition of saturation temperature 3.1 1 X000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 32.4.47 - Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.

4.2 1 X000029 ATWS / 1EK3.09 - Criteria for securing/throttling ECCS 4.1 1 X000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3AK1.07 - Effects of feedwater introduction on dry S/G 3.4 1 X000040 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4AK3.03 - Manual control of AFW flow control valves 3.8 1 X000054 Loss of Main Feedwater / 4EK1.02 - Natural circulation cooling 4.1 1 X000055 Station Blackout / 6AA1.02 - Manual control of PZR level 3.8 1 X000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6AA1.03 - Vital and battery bus components 3.1 1 X000058 Loss of DC Power / 6AA1.02 - Loads on the SWS in the control room 3.2 1 X000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4AA2.06 - When to trip reactor if instrument air pressure is decreasing 3.6*1 X000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8AA2.09 - Operational status of emergency diesel generators 3.9 1 X000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6EK2.1 - Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features 3.5 1 XW/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 18333333K/A Category Totals:Group Point Total:

103/16/2011 1:34:18 pm 03/16/2011 K1 KA TopicImp.K2K3A1A2G PointsPrinted: ES - 401Facility:South Texas ProjectE/APE # / Name / Safety FunctionEmergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 2 PWR RO Examination OutlineForm ES-401-2AK1.01 - Use of steam tables 2.9*1 X000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3AK2.01 - Radioactive-liquid monitors 2.7 1 X000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. /

9AA1.08 - Fire fighting equipment used on each class of fire 3.4 1 X000067 Plant Fire On-site / 9AA2.05 - Availability of heat sink 4.2 1 X000068 Control Room Evac. / 8AK3.01 - Guidance contained in EOP for loss of containment integrity 3.8*1 X000069 Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5EA2.2 - Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments 3.5 1 XW/E02 SI Termination / 3EK1.2 - Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization 3.6 1 XW/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4EA1.2 - Operating behavior characteristics of the facility 3.6 1 XW/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4EK2.1 - Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features 3.3 1 XW/E10 Natural Circ. / 4 9221220K/A Category Totals:Group Point Total:

103/16/2011 1:34:59 pm 03/16/2011K1KA TopicImp.K2K3A1A2GPointsPrinted: K4K5A3K6A4ES - 401Sys/Evol # / NameFacility: South Texas Project PWR RO Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1Form ES-401-2A2.05 - Effects of VCT pressure on RCP seal leakoff flows 2.5 1 X003 Reactor Coolant PumpK1.15 - ECCS 3.8 1 X004 Chemical and Volume ControlA4.11 - RCP seal injection 3.4 1 X004 Chemical and Volume ControlK6.03 - RHR heat exchanger 2.5 1 X005 Residual Heat RemovalK2.01 - RHR pumps 3.0 1 X005 Residual Heat RemovalA2.06 - Water hammer 3.3 1 X006 Emergency Core Cooling2.1.45 - Ability to identify and interpret diverse indications to validate the response of another indication.

4.3 1 X006 Emergency Core CoolingK4.01 - Quench tank cooling 2.6 1 X007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench TankK2.02 - CCW pump, including emergency backup 3.0*1 X008 Component Cooling WaterK3.01 - RCS 3.8 1 X010 Pressurizer Pressure Control K1.05 - ESFAS 3.8*1 X012 Reactor ProtectionA4.01 - ESFAS-initiated equipment which fails to actuate 4.5 1 X013 Engineered Safety Features ActuationK5.02 - Safety system logic and reliability 2.9 1 X013 Engineered Safety Features ActuationK4.04 - Cooling of control rod drive motors 2.8 1 X022 Containment CoolingK3.01 - CCS 3.9 1 X026 Containment SprayA3.02 - Isolation of the MRSS 3.1 1 X039 Main and Reheat SteamK5.08 - Effect of steam removal on reactivity 3.6 1 X039 Main and Reheat SteamK3.04 - RCS 3.6 1 X059 Main FeedwaterK5.03 - Pump head effects when control valve is shut 2.6 1 X061 Auxiliary/Emergency FeedwaterA2.05 - Automatic control malfunction 3.1*1 X061 Auxiliary/Emergency FeedwaterA1.03 - Effect on instrumentation and controls of switching power supplies 2.5 1 X062 AC Electrical DistributionA1.01 - Battery capacity as it is affected by discharge rate 2.5 1 X063 DC Electrical DistributionK6.07 - Air receivers 2.7 1 X064 Emergency Diesel GeneratorK4.01 - Release termination 4.0 1 X073 Process Radiation Monitoring 1 03/16/2011 1:35:28 pm 03/16/2011K1KA TopicImp.K2K3A1A2GPointsPrinted: K4K5A3K6A4ES - 401Sys/Evol # / NameFacility: South Texas Project PWR RO Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1Form ES-401-2 when radiation exceeds setpointA1.02 - Reactor and turbine building closed cooling water temperatures 2.6*1 X076 Service WaterK1.05 - MSIV air 3.4*1 X078 Instrument Air A3.01 - Air pressure 3.1 1 X078 Instrument AirA4.04 - Phase A and phase B resets 3.5*1 X103 Containment 28323331K/A Category Totals:33223 Group Point Total

2 03/16/2011 1:35:28 pm 03/16/2011K1KA TopicImp.K2K3A1A2GPointsPrinted: K4K5A3K6A4ES - 401Sys/Evol # / NameFacility: South Texas Project PWR RO Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 2Form ES-401-2K4.17 - Override (bypass) for rod bank motion when one rod is bottomed 2.9*1 X001 Control Rod DriveK1.01 - CVCS 3.6 1 X011 Pressurizer Level ControlA1.03 - NIS power indication 3.7 1 X015 Nuclear InstrumentationK6.01 - Sensors and detectors 2.7 1 X017 In-core Temperature Monitor K2.01 - Fans 3.1*1 X027 Containment Iodine RemovalA4.03 - Location and operation of hydrogen sampling and analysis of containment atmosphere, including alarms and indications 3.1 1 X028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge ControlA3.01 - S/G water level control 4.0 1 X035 Steam GeneratorA2.04 - Loss of condensate pumps 2.6 1 X056 CondensateK5.04 - Biological hazards of radiation and the resulting goal of ALARA 3.2 1 X068 Liquid Radwaste2.4.46 - Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.

4.2 1 X072 Area Radiation Monitoring 10110111K/A Category Totals:11111 Group Point Total

1 03/16/2011 1:35:49 pm Facility:South Texas ProjectGeneric Category KA KA Topic Imp.PointsGeneric Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)Form ES-401-303/16/2011Printed: PWR RO Examination Outline2.1.5Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.2.9*1Conduct of Operations2.1.14Knowledge of criteria or conditions that require plant-wide announcements, such as pump starts, reactor trips, mode changes, etc.3.112.1.18Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, records, status boards, and reports.3.61 3Category Total: 2.2.14Knowledge of the process for controlling equipment configuration or status.3.91 Equipment Control2.2.41Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings.3.51 2Category Total: 2.3.4Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.3.21 Radiation Control2.3.5Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personal monitoring equipment, etc.2.912.3.14Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.3.41 3Category Total: 2.4.9Knowledge of low power /shutdown implications in accident (e.g. LOCA or loss of RHR) mitigation strategies.3.81 Emergency Procedures/Plan2.4.26Knowledge of facility protection requirements, including fire brigade and portable fire fighting equipment usage.3.11 2Category Total:

10Generic Total:

1 03/16/2011 1:36:09 pm 03/16/2011Printed: ES-401 Facility:South Texas ProjectPWR Examination OutlineForm ES-401-2000 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000000000 0 0 00000 0 0 0 0000 0000 0000000000000000 RO K/A Category PointsTierGroup TotalK1K2K3K4K5A1A2A3A4K6G*1.Emergency&Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1 1 2 2 Tier Totals Tier Totals 2.PlantSystems12343. Generic Knowledge And Abilities Categories2.The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.4.Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolutionin the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.3.Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.5.Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.Note:Date Of Exam:

09/22/2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 01.Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the ROand SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals"in each K/A category shall not be less than two).7.*The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 forthe applicable K/As.8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each systemand category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handlingequipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the leftside of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO andSRO-only exams.SRO-Only Points A2 G*33 22 55 32 21 322121234 10 4 6 5 3 8 79.For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions,IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3.Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to10 CFR 55.43.6.Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

N/A N/A Total 0 5 1 03/16/2011 1:43:49 pm 03/16/2011 K1 KA TopicImp.K2K3A1A2G PointsPrinted: ES - 401Facility:South Texas ProjectE/APE # / Name / Safety FunctionEmergency and Abnormal Plant E volutions - Tier 1 / Group 1 PWR SRO Examination OutlineForm ES-401-2AA2.27 - Effects on indicated PZR pressure and/or level of sensing line

leakage 3.2 1 X000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident /

3AA2.09 - When to secure RCPs on high stator temperatures 3.5 1 X000015/000017 RCP Malfunctions / 42.1.25 - Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.4.2 1 X000029 ATWS / 12.4.1 - Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps.

4.8 1 X000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 62.1.39 - Knowledge of conservative decision making practices.

4.3 1 X000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8AA2.07 - Operational status of engineered safety features 4.0 1 X000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 6000033K/A Category Totals:Group Point Total:

103/16/2011 1:42:17 pm 03/16/2011 K1 KA TopicImp.K2K3A1A2G PointsPrinted: ES - 401Facility:South Texas ProjectE/APE # / Name / Safety FunctionEmergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 / Group 2 PWR SRO Examination OutlineForm ES-401-22.2.42 - Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications.

4.6 1 X000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1AA2.01 - Location or process point that is causing an alarm 3.2 1 X000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 92.1.7 - Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

4.7 1 XW/E06 Inad. Core Cooling / 4EA2.2 - Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments 3.4 1 XW/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 4000022K/A Category Totals:Group Point Total:

103/16/2011 1:42:46 pm 03/16/2011K1KA TopicImp.K2K3A1A2GPointsPrinted: K4K5A3K6A4ES - 401Sys/Evol # / NameFacility: South Texas Project PWR SRO Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 1Form ES-401-2A2.33 - Fact that isolating cation demineralizer stops boron dilution and enables restoration of normal boron concentration 3.3 1 X004 Chemical and Volume ControlA2.03 - System leakage 3.7 1 X006 Emergency Core CoolingA2.15 - Consequence of paralleling out-of-phase/mismatch in volts 3.2 1 X062 AC Electrical Distribution2.4.47 - Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.4.2 1 X064 Emergency Diesel Generator2.1.6 - Ability to manage the control room crew during plant transients.

4.8 1 X103 Containment 5000032K/A Category Totals:00000 Group Point Total

1 03/16/2011 1:43:04 pm 03/16/2011K1KA TopicImp.K2K3A1A2GPointsPrinted: K4K5A3K6A4ES - 401Sys/Evol # / NameFacility: South Texas Project PWR SRO Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 / Group 2Form ES-401-2A2.02 - Core damage 4.1 1 X017 In-core Temperature Monitor2.2.17 - Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during power operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, and coordination woth the transmission system operator.3.8 1 X068 Liquid RadwasteA2.01 - Cross-connection with IAS 3.2 1 X079 Station Air 3000021K/A Category Totals:00000 Group Point Total
1 03/16/2011 1:43:20 pm Facility:South Texas ProjectGeneric Category KA KA Topic Imp.PointsGeneric Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)Form ES-401-303/16/2011Printed: PWR SRO Examination Outline2.1.32Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.4.01Conduct of Operations2.1.34Knowledge of primary and secondary plant chemistry limits.3.51 2Category Total: 2.2.19Knowledge of maintenance work order requirements.3.41 Equipment Control2.2.20Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities.3.81 2Category Total: 2.3.11Ability to control radiation releases.4.31 Radiation Control 1Category Total: 2.4.9Knowledge of low power /shutdown implications in accident (e.g. LOCA or loss of RHR) mitigation strategies.4.21 Emergency Procedures/Plan2.4.27Knowledge of "fire in the plant" procedure.3.91 2Category Total:

7Generic Total:

1 03/16/2011 1:43:37 pm STP September 2011 Written Exam Outline Generation The South Texas Project used a so ftware product called "NRC KA Exam Generation Program (NKEG)" (version 1.1) to generate the Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator written exam outline. This software is authored by Westinghouse and is distribu ted through the PWR Owners Group. In discussion with Paul Hippley, the PWR Owners Group representative for this software, he confirmed the software does fulfill the criteria for randomly and systematically selecting KAs for the written exam outline in accordance with NUREG 1021, ES-401. For example, the program will:

o Ensure all systems are selected for use on the outline before selecting a system again. o Generate a replacement KA (if a KA is rejected) using the same systematic and random sampling process, thus ensuring all systems are selected at least once before a system is selected again. Refer to Form ES-401-4 for a summary of rejected KAs.

KAs pre-screened prior to outline generation are attached Facility: RO/SRO03/10/2011South Texas ProjectPrinted IMPORTANCESuppressed K/As Basis037Steam Generator (S/G) Tube LeakAbility to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak:

A1AA1.02Condensate exhaust systemNA for STP as there are no actions required to monitor/operate the condensate exhaust system during a SGTR or leak.060Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release:

K3AK3.02Isolation of the auxiliary building ventilationSTP does not have a procedural or system provision for isolating Aux. Bldg. ventilation in response to gaseous releases.068Control Room EvacuationAbility to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation:

A1AA1.20Indicators for operation of startup transformer NA for STP because the Control Room Evac procedure does not address operation of a Startup Transformer.022Containment Cooling System (CCS)Knowledge of CCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

K4K4.02Correlation of fan speed and flowpath changes with containment pressureSTP does not have variable speed fans in the Containment Ventilation system 103/10/2011 3:27:59 pm Facility: RO/SRO03/10/2011South Texas ProjectPrinted IMPORTANCESuppressed K/As Basis025Ice Condenser SystemKnowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Ice Condenser System and the following systems:

K1K1.01Containment ventilationK1.02Refrigerant systems K1.03Containment sump system K2.01Containment ventilation fans and dampers K2.02Refrigerant systems K2.03Isolation valves K3.01Containment K4.01Glycol expansion tank levels and ice condenser system containment isolation valvesK4.02System control K5.01Relationships between pressure and temperature K5.02Heat transfer K5.03Gas laws K6.01Upper and lower doors of the ice condenser A1.01Temperature chart recorders A1.02Glycol expansion tank level A1.03Glycol flow to ice condenser air handling units A2.01Trip of glycol circulation pumps A2.02High/low floor cooling temperature A2.03Opening of ice condenser doors A2.04Containment isolation A2.05Abnormal glycol expansion tank level A2.06Decreasing ice condenser temperature A3.01Refrigerant system A3.02Isolation valves A4.01Ice condenser isolation valves A4.02Containment vent fans A4.03Glycol circulation pumps 2.1.1Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.2.1.13Knowledge of facility requirements for controlling vital / controlled access.

2.1.14Knowledge of criteria or conditions that require plant-wide announcements, such as pump starts, reactor trips, mode changes, etc.

2.1.15Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary management directives, such as standing orders, night orders, Operations memos, etc.2.1.17Ability to make accurate, cl ear, and concise verbal reports.2.1.18Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, records, status boards, and reports.2.1.19Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status.2.1.2Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation.2.1.20Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

2.1.21Ability to verify the controlled procedure copy.

203/10/2011 3:27:59 pm Facility: RO/SRO03/10/2011South Texas ProjectPrinted IMPORTANCESuppressed K/As Basis025Ice Condenser SystemConduct of Operations 2.1 2.1.23Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.2.1.25Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

2.1.26Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen).2.1.27Knowledge of system purpose and/or function.2.1.28Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls.

2.1.29Knowledge of how to conduct system lineups, such as valves, breakers, switches, etc.

2.1.3Knowledge of shift or short-term relief turnover practices.

2.1.30Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls.

2.1.31Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup.2.1.32Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.2.1.34Knowledge of primary and secondary plant chemistry limits.

2.1.35Knowledge of the fuel-handling responsibilities of SROs.

2.1.36Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved in core alterations.

2.1.37Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management.

2.1.38Knowledge of the station's requirements for verbal communications when implementing procedures.2.1.39Knowledge of conservative decision making practices.

2.1.4Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, "no-solo" operation, maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc.2.1.40Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements.2.1.41Knowledge of the refueling process.

2.1.42Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement procedures.

2.1.43Ability to use procedures to determine the effects on reactivity of plant changes, such as reactor coolant system temperature, secondary plant, fuel depletion, etc.

2.1.45Ability to identify and interpret diverse indications to validate the response of another indication.

2.1.5Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.2.1.6Ability to manage the control room crew during plant transients.

2.1.7Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.2.1.8Ability to coordinate personnel activities outside the control room.2.1.9Ability to direct personnel activities inside the control room.2.2.11Knowledge of the process for controlling temporary design changes.

2.2.12Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

2.2.13Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

2.2.14Knowledge of the process for controlling equipment configuration or status.

303/10/2011 3:27:59 pm Facility: RO/SRO03/10/2011South Texas ProjectPrinted IMPORTANCESuppressed K/As Basis025Ice Condenser System Equipment Control 2.2 2.2.15Ability to determine the expected plant configuration using design and configuration control documentation, such as drawings, line-ups, tagouts, etc.

2.2.17Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during power operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, and coordination woth the transmission system operator.

2.2.18Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, etc.2.2.19Knowledge of maintenance work order requirements.

2.2.2Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels.2.2.20Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities.2.2.21Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements.

2.2.22Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.2.2.23Ability to track Technical Specification limiting conditi ons for operations.

2.2.25Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.2.2.35Ability to determine Technical Specification Mode of Operation.

2.2.36Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.2.2.37Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.2.2.38Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.

2.2.39Knowledge of less than or equal to one hour Technical Specification action statements for systems.2.2.40Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system.2.2.41Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings.2.2.43Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms.

2.2.44Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.2.2.5Knowledge of the process for making design or operating changes to the facility.2.2.6Knowledge of the process for making changes to procedures.

2.2.7Knowledge of the process for conducting special or infrequent tests.

2.3.11Ability to control radiation releases.

2.3.12Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

2.3.13Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

2.3.14Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.

2.3.15Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.2.3.4Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

403/10/2011 3:27:59 pm Facility: RO/SRO03/10/2011South Texas ProjectPrinted IMPORTANCESuppressed K/As Basis025Ice Condenser System Radiation Control 2.3 2.3.5Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personal monitoring equipment, etc.2.3.6Ability to approve release permits.

2.3.7Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions.2.4.1Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps.2.4.11Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

2.4.12Knowledge of general operating crew responsibilities during emergency operations.2.4.13Knowledge of crew roles and responsibilities during EOP usage.

2.4.14Knowledge of general guidelines for EOP usage.

2.4.16Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures or guidelines such as, operating procedures, abnormal operating procedures, and severe accident management guidelines.2.4.17Knowledge of EOP terms and definitions.2.4.18Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

2.4.19Knowledge of EOP layout, symbols, and icons.

2.4.2Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.2.4.20Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

2.4.21Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, suchas reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.

2.4.22Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety functions during abnormal/emergency operations.

2.4.23Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency procedure implementation during emergency operations.2.4.25Knowledge of fire protection procedures.

2.4.26Knowledge of facility protection requirements, including fire brigade and portable fire fighting equipment usage.2.4.27Knowledge of "fire in the plant" procedure.2.4.28Knowledge of procedures relating to a security event (non-safeguards information).2.4.29Knowledge of the emergency plan.

2.4.3Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation.

2.4.30Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator.2.4.31Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures.2.4.32Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators.

2.4.34Knowledge of RO tasks performed outside the main control room during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

2.4.35Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.2.4.37Knowledge of the lines of authority during implementation of the emergency plan.

503/10/2011 3:27:59 pm Facility: RO/SRO03/10/2011South Texas ProjectPrinted IMPORTANCESuppressed K/As Basis025Ice Condenser System Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4 2.4.38Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator if required.2.4.39Knowledge of RO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation.

2.4.4Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.2.4.40Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation.2.4.41Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.2.4.42Knowledge of emergency response facilities.

2.4.43Knowledge of emergency communications systems and techniques.

2.4.44Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations.

2.4.45Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm.2.4.46Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.

2.4.47Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.

2.4.49Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls.

2.4.5Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions.

2.4.50Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.2.4.6Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.2.4.8Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.

2.4.9Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.033Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFPCS)Knowledge of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

K4K4.05Adequate SDM (boron concentration)At STP there are no design features associated with Spent Fuel Pool Cooling that

ensure adequate SDM (boron) is maintained.041Steam Dump System (SDS) and Turbine Bypass Control Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

K2K2.01ICS, normal and alternate power supplySTP does not have an ICS 603/10/2011 3:27:59 pm Facility: RO/SRO03/10/2011South Texas ProjectPrinted IMPORTANCESuppressed K/As Basis063D.C. Electrical Distribution SystemKnowledge of D.C. Electrical System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

K4K4.04Trips At STP there are no trips associated with the DC electrical distribution system or its components.103Containment SystemConduct of Operations 2.1 2.1.15Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary management directives, such as standing orders, night orders, Operations memos, etc.Suppressed per NUREG 1021, ES-401.D.1.b Generic Equipment Control 2.22.2.43Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms.STP does not have a specific method to track inoperable alarms other than the Corrective Action Program.

703/10/2011 3:27:59 pm Rev. 0 ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination: 9/26/2011

Examination Level (circle one): RO / SRO Operating Test Number: 1 (NRC)

Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Code* Describe activity to be performed:

A1-Conduct of Operations R, M Calculate RCS refill volume (without vacuum)

2.1.25 (3.9) Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

A2-Conduct of Operations R, D Determine Reactor Vessel water level

2.1.23 (4.3) Ability to perform specific system and

integrated plant procedures during all modes of

operation.

A3-Equipment Control R, N Verify Excore QPTR calculation

2.2.12 (3.7) Knowledge of surveillance procedures A4-Radiation Control R, P, D Stay time determination with entry requirements

2.3.4 (3.2) Knowledge of radiation exposure limits

under normal or emergency conditions.

Emergency Plan NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

  • Type Codes and Criteria: (C)ontrol Room; (S)imulator; Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; ( 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

Rev. 0 ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination: 9/26/2011

Examination Level (circle one): RO / SRO Operating Test Number: 1 (NRC)

Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Code* Describe activity to be performed:

A5-Conduct of Operations R, D Review SDM calculation

2.1.20 (4.6) Ability to interpret and execute procedure

steps. A6-Conduct of Operations R, M Review RCS Inventory and determine Technical Specification applicability

2.1.7 (4.7) Ability to evaluate plant performance and

make operational judgments based on operating

characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument

interpretation.

A7-Equipment Control R, M Determine Technical Specification action for abnormal RCS activity

2.2.22 (4.7) Knowledge of limiting conditions for

operation and safety limits.

A8-Radiation Control R, P, D Determine personnel exposure limits

2.3.4 (3.7) Knowledge of radiation exposure limits

under normal or emergency conditions.

A9-Emergency Plan R, N Determine appropriate Protective Action Recommendation

2.4.44 (4.4) Knowledge of emergency plan protective

action recommendations.

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

  • Type Codes and Criteria: (C)ontrol Room; (S)imulator; Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; ( 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

Rev. 0 ES-301-1

(A1) Determine the volume of water needed to fill the RCS from a mid-loop condition and the expected final RWST level. This task was modified to be performed using data with the RCS not under vacuum.

(A2) Verification of a Reactor Vessel water level determination made in accordance with 0POP02-II-0002, RVWL Monitoring System.

(A3) Perform an independent verification of a Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio surveillance in accordance with 0PSP010-NI-0002, Excore QPTR Determination.

(A4) Determine stay-time based on administrative limits for a job in a high radiation area. Entry requirements will also be incorporated into the task.

(A5) Review a completed shutdown margin calculation.

(A6) Review a completed RCS inventory surveillance and determine Tech Spec applicability based on the results. Task was modified such that the included error is changed and the end result is that once the error is corrected, acceptance criteria are now not met (the original

task was the opposite).

(A7) Determine required Tech Spec actions based on given RCS activity. This task is modified such that a different parameter in the activity spec is out of tolerance.

(A8) Determine personnel exposure margins during an emergency.

(A9) Determine the correct Protective Action Recommendation in accordance with the emergency plan procedures based on the given conditions.

Rev. 0 ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination:

Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: LOT 18 NRC Exam Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF) System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function a. (S1) Monthly Control Rod Operability KA: 001 A2.03 (3.5/4.2)

A,D,S 1 b. (S2) Respond to FHB Rad Monitor Alarm KA: 072 A3.01 (2.9*/3.1)

A,D,EN,S 7 c. (S3) Isolate SI Accumulators KA: 006 A4.02 (4.0*/3.8)

A,D,L,S 2 d. (S4) Roll 13.8KV Electrical Buses KA: 062 A4.07 (3.1*/3.1*)

D,L,S 6 e. (S5) Xfer MFW from MFRV to LPFRV KA: 059 A4.03 (2.9*/2.9)

N,S 4S f. (S6) Respond to ECW Low Disc. Press. KA: 008 A4.01 (3.3/3.1)

A,D,EN,S 8 g. (C1) Transfer to Hot Leg Recirc. KA: 006 A4.05 (3.9/3.8)

C,D,EN,P 3 h. (C2) Respond to RCB High Rad. KA: W/E16 EA2.1 (2.9/3.1)

C,D,L 9 In-Plant Systems

@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. (P1) Locally Trip the Reactor KA: 002 A2.04 (4.3/4.6)

A,D,E 4P j. (P2) Fill SFP from RWST KA: 033 A1.01 (2.7/3.3)

N,R 8 k. (P3) Perform 0POP05-EO-EC00 Add. #4 KA: 062 A4.04 (2.6/2.7)

E,L,N 6 All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SROU systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room. *Type Codes Criteria for RO/SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate Path (C)ontrol Room (D)irect from Bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN) gineered Safety Features (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)

(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3

9 / 8 / 4 1 / 1 / 1 - / - / 1 (control room system) 1 / 1 / 1 2 / 2 / 1 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected) 1 / 1 / 1 Rev. 0 ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination:

Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: LOT 18 NRC Exam Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF) System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function a. (S1) Monthly Control Rod Operability KA: 001 A2.03 (3.5/4.2)

A,D,S 1 b. (S2) Respond to FHB Rad Monitor Alarm KA: 072 A3.01 (2.9*/3.1)

A,D,EN,S 7 c. (S3) Isolate SI Accumulators KA: 006 A4.02 (4.0*/3.8)

A,D,L,S 2 d. e. (S5) Xfer MFW from MFRV to LPFRV KA: 059 A4.03 (2.9*/2.9)

N,S 4S f. (S6) Respond to ECW Low Disc. Press. KA: 008 A4.01 (3.3/3.1)

A,D,EN,S 8 g. (C1) Transfer to Hot Leg Recirc. KA: 006 A4.05 (3.9/3.8)

C,D,EN,P 3 h. (C2) Respond to RCB High Rad. KA: W/E16 EA2.1 (2.9/3.1)

C,D,L 9 In-Plant Systems

@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. (P1) Locally Trip the Reactor KA: 002 A2.04 (4.3/4.6)

A,D,E 4P j. (P2) Fill SFP from RWST KA: 033 A1.01 (2.7/3.3)

N,R 8 k. (P3) Perform 0POP05-EO-EC00 Add. #4 KA: 062 A4.04 (2.6/2.7)

E,L,N 6 All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SROU systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room. *Type Codes Criteria for RO/SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate Path (C)ontrol Room (D)irect from Bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN) gineered Safety Features (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)

(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3

9 / 8 / 4 1 / 1 / 1 - / - / 1 (control room system) 1 / 1 / 1 2 / 2 / 1 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected) 1 / 1 / 1 Rev. 0 ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination:

Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: LOT 18 NRC Exam Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF) System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function a. (S1) Monthly Control Rod Operability KA: 001 A2.03 (3.5/4.2)

A,D,S 1 b. (S2) Respond to FHB Rad Monitor Alarm KA: 072 A3.01 (2.9*/3.1)

A,D,EN,S 7 c.

d. e. f.
g. h.

In-Plant Systems

@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. (P1) Locally Trip the Reactor KA: 002 A2.04 (4.3/4.6)

A,D,E 4P j. (P2) Fill SFP from RWST KA: 033 A1.01 (2.7/3.3)

N,R 8 k. (P3) Perform 0POP05-EO-EC00 Add. #4 KA: 062 A4.04 (2.6/2.7)

E,L,N 6 All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SROU systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room. *Type Codes Criteria for RO/SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate Path (C)ontrol Room (D)irect from Bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN) gineered Safety Features (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)

(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3

9 / 8 / 4 1 / 1 / 1 - / - / 1 (control room system) 1 / 1 / 1 2 / 2 / 1 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected) 1 / 1 / 1 Rev. 0 S1 and S2 Simulator Setup (IC-215) - 100% Power with all systems in a normal alignment. RT-8035 is in alarm (RM11) (ACKNOWLEDGE the AUDIBLE Alarm but DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE the flashing light for RT-8035). No other RM-11 alarms are in.

S1 - Perform 0PSP03-RS-0001, Monthly Control Rod Operability, on Control Bank (C) following the corrective maintenance. Determine that Control Bank Rod K-6 dr ops and performs the Immediate Actions of 0POP04-RS-0001, Control Rod Malfunction. This is an Alternate Path JPM.

S2 - Respond to FHB Rad Monitor Alarm per 0POP04-RA

-0001, Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Response, and take appropriate action. Determine that FHB HVAC has not properly actuated and manually align FHB HVAC.

This is an Alternate Path JPM.

S3 and S4 Simulator Setup (IC-216) - Mode 3 with RCS Temperature between 440ºF and 450ºF. RCS Pressure is between 900 and 1000 psig.

S3 - CLOSE Safety Injection Accumulator Dischar ge Valves in accordance with 0POP03-ZG-0007, Plant Cooldown. SI Accumulator Discharge Valves for 'A' and

'B' Accumulators will close Accumulator 'C' has to be vented. This is an Alternate Path JPM.

S4 - Roll Electrical Buses in preparation for de-energizing the 13.8KV Main and Aux Transformers.

S5 and S6 Simulator Setup (IC-217) - About 18% Power with Main Turbine still on line. Start-Up SGFP 14 Running. All SGFPTs on turning gear. 'A' and 'C' ECW in service. ESF D/G #11 is running at the 25% load hold point for a Surveillance Test.

S5 - Transfer Main Feedwater from MFRVs to LP FRVs per Step 5.21 and Addendum 8 of 0POP03-ZG-0006, Plant Shutdown from 100% to Hot Standby.

S6 - Start ECW Pump 'B' in preparation to secure 'C' fo r maintenance. While starting ECW Pump 'B', ECW Pump

'A' develops a sheared shaft. Perform actions of 0P OP09-AN-02M3, Window D-7, 'ECW PUMP 1A DISCH PRESS LO' and secure ESF D/G #11. This is an Alternate Path JPM.

C1 - Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation on SI Train 'A' and then Train 'B' in accordance with 0POP05-EO-ES14, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation.

C2 - Respond to an RCB High Rad condition using 0POP05-EO-FRZ3, Response to High Containment Radiation Level, verifies Containment is isolated and places Containment Carbon Filter Units in service.

P1 - Perform the remainder of Immediate Action Step 1.0 of 0POP05-EO-FRS1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation - ATWS, and SIMULATE opening the Reactor Tr ip Breakers. This is an Alternate Path JPM.

P2 - Perform a fill of the SFP per 0POP02-FC-0001, SFP Cooling and Cleanup System, using the RWST.

P3 - Perform 0POP05-EO-EC00, Loss of all AC Power, Addendum #4, Vital DC Bus Monitoring.

Page 1 of 6 ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT DATE OF EXAM: 09/2011 OPERATING TEST NO.:

1 A P P L I C A N T Crew A E V E N T T Y P

E Scenarios 1 2 3 4 T O T A L M I N I M U M(*) CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION R I U S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 2,3 4,6 4 4 4 2 MAJ 5 1 2 2 1 TS 2,4 2 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 2,4,6 2,3 4,6 7 4 4 2 MAJ 5 5 2 2 2 1 TS 1,3 2 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 3,6 3,4 4 4 4 2 MAJ 5 5 2 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions: 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two inst rument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transien t, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument o r component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable action s that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.

Page 2 of 6 ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT DATE OF EXAM: 09/2011 OPERATING TEST NO.: 1 A P P L I C A N T Crew B E V E N T T Y P

E Scenarios 1 2 3 4 T O T A L M I N I M U M(*) CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION R I U S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 2,3 4,6 4 4 4 2 MAJ 5 1 2 2 1 TS 2,4 2 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 2,4,6 2,3,4 5,7 8 4 4 2 MAJ 5 6 2 2 2 1 TS 2,3 2 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 I/C 3,6 2,3 4,5 6 4 4 2 MAJ 5 6 2 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions: 3. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two inst rument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transien t, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

4. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument o r component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable action s that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.

Page 3 of 6 ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT DATE OF EXAM: 09/2011 OPERATING TEST NO.: 1 A P P L I C A N T Crew C E V E N T T Y P

E Scenarios 1 2 3 4 T O T A L M I N I M U M(*) CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION R I U S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 2,3 4,6 2,3,4 5,7 9 4 4 2 MAJ 5 6 2 2 2 1 TS 2,4 2,3 4 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 I/C 3,6 2,3 4,5 6 4 4 2 MAJ 5 6 2 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 2,4,6 3,5,7 6 4 4 2 MAJ 5 6 2 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions: 5. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two inst rument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transien t, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

6. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument o r component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable action s that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.

Page 4 of 6 ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT DATE OF EXAM: 09/2011 OPERATING TEST NO.: 1 A P P L I C A N T Crew D E V E N T T Y P

E Scenarios 1 2 3 4 T O T A L M I N I M U M(*) CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION R I U S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 2,3 4,6 2,3 4,5 8 4 4 2 MAJ 5 6 2 2 2 1 TS 2,4 2 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 2,4, 6 3,5,7 6 4 4 2 MAJ 5 6 2 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Crew G RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 3,4 2,3,6 5 4 4 2 MAJ 5 4 2 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 I/C 2,4,6 1,3 5,6 7 4 4 2 MAJ 5 4 2 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions: 7. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two inst rument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transien t, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

8. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument o r component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable action s that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.

Page 5 of 6 ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT DATE OF EXAM: 09/2011 OPERATING TEST NO.: 1 A P P L I C A N T Crew E E V E N T T Y P

E Scenarios 1 2 3 4 T O T A L M I N I M U M(*) CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION R I U S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 2,3 4,6 3,4 1,2, 3 5,6 11 4 4 2 MAJ 5 5 4 3 2 2 1 TS 2,4 1,2 4 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 2,4,6 2,3 4,6 2,3, 6 10 4 4 2 MAJ 5 5 4 3 2 2 1 TS 1,3 2 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 I/C 3,6 2,4,6 1,3 5,6 9 4 4 2 MAJ 5 5 4 3 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions: 9. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two inst rument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transien t, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

10. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument o r component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable action s that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.

Page 6 of 6 ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT DATE OF EXAM: 09/2011 OPERATING TEST NO.: 1 A P P L I C A N T Crew F E V E N T T Y P

E Scenarios 1 2 3 4 T O T A L M I N I M U M(*) CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION R I U S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 2,3 4,6 2,3 4,5 1,2,3 5,6 13 4 4 2 MAJ 5 6 4 3 2 2 1 TS 1,3 1,2 4 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 3,4 3,5, 7 2,3,6 8 4 4 2 MAJ 5 6 4 3 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 I/C 2,4,6 1,3 5,6 7 4 4 2 MAJ 5 4 2 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions: 11. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two inst rument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transien t, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

12. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument o r component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable action s that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: LOT18 NRC

Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: 75% Power and Stable.

Turnover: At step 7.44 of 0POP03-ZG-0005. Commence raising power to 88-90% at 10%/hr.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 (0 min) N/A RO (R)

BOP (R)

SRO (N) Raise power from 75% to 88-90%

2 (10 min) 02-20-01 (1) RO (I) SRO (I, TS) PRZ Level Channel LT-465 fails high 3 (25 min) 05-14-01 (0.65) BOP (C) SRO (C) Feedwater Header Pressure PT-557 fails to an intermediate position 4 (45 min) 02-13-01 (0.6) RO (C) SRO (C, TS)

PRZ PORV leakage (isolable) after SG levels stabilize.

5 (55 min) 05-03-02 (0.25) ALL (M) SGTR on B Steam Generator (~250 gpm) after PORV isolated/Tech Specs addressed (CT) 6 (N/A) 10-02-02 (1) 10-09-02 (1) RO (C) BOP (C)

SRO (C) Loss of 13.8KV Standby Bus 1G and Train B Sequencer failure (loss of standby bus occurs on RX Trip - integral) (CT) * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Target Quantitative Attributes (P er Scenario; See Section D.5.d)

Actual Attributes 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 5 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 1 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 3

4. Major transients (1-2) 1
5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2

STP LOT-18 NRC Scenario #1 Description Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 75% power. The crew is at step 7.44 of POP03-ZG-0005, Plant Startup to 100%, with instructions to raise power to 88-90% at 10%/hr.

Event 1: The crew is to raise power to 88-90% using POP03-ZG-0005. This is a normal evolution with no malfunctions.

Event 2: Controlling PZR level Channel LT-0465 fails high. The crew will respond using POP04-RP-0002, Loss Of Automatic Pressurizer Level Control, to select an alternate channel and stabilize the plant. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.

Event 3: Feedwater header pressure PT-0557 fails to an intermediate position causing all Turbine Driven Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps to slow down. The crew will respond and stabilize the plant using POP04-FW-0002, Steam Generator Feed Pump Trip.

Event 4: After the crew has stabilized steam generator levels, PZR PORV seat leakage will occur. The crew will respond using POP04-RC-0003, Excessive RCS Leakage, to isolate the leaking PORV and stabilize the plant. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.

Event 5: After the crew has addressed PZR PORV Seat Leakage Tech Spec, a 250 gpm SGTR will develop on SG 1B. The crew may initially respond using POP04-RC-0004, Steam Generator Tube Leakage, however, since the tube rupture is greater than 200 gpm, the crew may go right to

POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or SI, and then to POP05-EO-EO30, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Event 6: When the Reactor is Tripped, 13.8KV Standby BUS 1G will LOCKOUT with a failure of the Train B Sequencer. Standby DG #12 will automatically start but the crew will have to manually start ESF equipment on Train B. This will be performed using Addendum #5 of

POP05-EO-EO00.

Termination: The scenario will terminate after the crew performs a RCS depressurization in POP05-EO-EO30.

Critical Tasks:

  • Manually starts ECW Pump 1B prior to completing Addendum #5 of POP05-EO-EO00 and prior to ESF DG #12 tripping.
  • Correctly determine target CET temperature and maintain CET temperatures less than the target CET temperature established for the RCS cooldown in POP05-EO-EO30.

Source: New Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: LOT18 NRC

Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: 48% power and stable. Condensate Pump #13 OOS for Maintenance.

Turnover: Tornado Watch is in effect. 0POP04-ZO-0002, Addendum 1 has been completed to step 10. Management has made the decision to hold reactor power at 48% until a current line of thunderstorms moves through the area. Start Train A and

secure Train C Control Room HVAC for surveillance testing later in the shift.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 (0 min) RP08433 TCC (0) RO (N) SRO (N, TS) Swap running CRE HVAC trains. Train A Supply fan will develop a sheared shaft after starting.

2 (10 min) 08-12-05 (1) BOP (C) SRO (C) SGFPT #12 trips and SU SGFP #14 fails to auto start.

3 (20 min) 04-01-01 (1) RO (C) SRO (C, TS) CCW Pump 1A Trips and CCW Pump 1C fails to Auto Start.

4 (40 min) AST1 & AST3 (1) RO (C) BOP (C)

SRO (C) Main Turbine trip below P-9 5 (N/A) 02-01-02 (.0007) (.4) ALL (M) 308 gpm SBLOCA on Loop B when Steam Dumps are placed in Steam Pressure Mode in POP04-TM-0003. (CT). Leak rate rises after IA OCIV opened in POP05-EO-EO10. (CT) 6 (N/A) 01-12-16,17,18, 19,22,23, (1) BOP (C) SRO (C) Automatic Feedwater Isolation fails following the SI ac tuation (Integral) * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Target Quantitative Attributes (P er Scenario; See Section D.5.d)

Actual Attributes 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 6 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 1 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 3

4. Major transients (1-2) 1
5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2

STP LOT-18 NRC Scenario #2 Description Initial Conditions: 48% power and stable. Condensate Pump #13 OOS for Maintenance. Tornado Watch is in effect. 0POP04-ZO-0002, Addendum 1 has been completed to step 10.

Management has made the decision to hold reactor power at 48% until a current line of thunderstorms moves through the area. Start Train A and secure Train C Control Room HVAC for surveillance testing later in the shift.

Event 1: Train A CRE HVAC Supply Fan will develop a sheared shaft after starting. The crew will respond to the POP09 for the associated trouble alarm. The POP09 will have the crew secure Train A CRE HVAC. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.

Event 2: SGFPT #12 trips with the SU SGFP #14 failing to start. The crew will respond and stabilize the plant using POP04-FW-0002, Steam Generator Feed Pump Trip.

Event 3: CCW Pump 1A trips and CCW Pump 1C fails to auto start. The POP09 for CCW Pump 1A trip will have the crew ensure that CCW Pump 1C has started. Depending on the CCW pressure perturbation, the crew may have to also respond to a loss of CCW to the RCP Thermal Barriers. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.

Event 4: After the crew has addressed CCW Pump Tech Spec, a Main Turbine trip will occur.

The crew will respond and stabilize the plant using POP04-TM-0003, Main Turbine Trip Below

P-9.

Event 5: When the crew places Steam Dumps in the Steam Pressure Mode per POP04-TM-0003, Main Turbine Trip Below P-9, a 300 gpm SBLOCA will develop on LOOP B.

The crew may initially respond using POP04-RC-0003, Excessive RCS Leakage, however, since the leak is greater than 200 gpm, the crew may go right to POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or SI, and then to POP05-EO-EO10, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. The leak will rise to a LBLOCA after the crew opens the instrument air OCIV in POP05-EO-EO10, requiring the crew to enter and perform the actions of POP05-EO-FRZ1, Response to High Containment Pressure.

Event 6: Feedwater Isolation will fail to automatically actuate after receiving the SI signal. The operator will have to manually align feedwater using Addendum #5 of POP05-EO-EO00.

Termination: The scenario will be terminated after the crew manually starts 2 CS Pumps per POP05-EO-FRZ1, Response to High Containment Pressure.

Critical Tasks:

  • Depressurize intact SGs to less than 1000 psig within 45 minutes of the initiation of the SBLOCA.
  • Manually start CS Pumps to address RCB pressure prior to exiting POP05-EO-FRZ1.

Source: New Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: LOT18 NRC

Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% Power and Stable. LPHD Pump #13 and RCFC 12C are OOS.

Turnover: LPHD Pump #13 has been repaired and is ready to be placed back in

service. When LPHD Pump #13 is in service, secure Condensate Pump #13.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 (0 min) (N/A) BOP (N)

SRO (N) Return a Low Pressure Heater Drip Pump to service.

2 (15 min) 09-02-01 (true) RO (C) SRO (C, TS) RCFC Fan 11A trips 3 minutes after the Heater Drip Pump level control valve is plac ed in auto (integral).

3 (25 min) 06-16-02 (0) RO (I) BOP (I)

SRO (I, TS) PT-505 (Turbine Impulse Pressure) fails low. (CT) 4 (35 min) 03-10-01 (0.1) RO (C) SRO (C) Charging line leak in Containment.

5 (50 min) 10-06-01 (1) RO (C) BOP (C)

SRO (C) Loss of load (Generator output br eaker opens) 2 minutes after the charging line isolation valv e is closed (integral).

6 (N/A) 05-04-01 (1) ALL (M) Steam Generator 1A Safety Valve fails open 10 seconds after the reactor trips. (Integral) (CT) 7 (N/A) 01-12-04A (1) BOP (I) SRO (I) Phase 'A', Train 'A' fails to actuate. (auto and manual) * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Target Quantitative Attributes (P er Scenario; See Section D.5.d)

Actual Attributes 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 6 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 1 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 3

4. Major transients (1-2) 1
5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2

STP LOT-18 NRC Scenario #3 Description Initial Conditions: 100% Power and Stable. LPHD Pump #13 and RCFC 12C are OOS. LPHD Pump #13 has been repaired and is ready to be placed back in service.

Event 1: The crew will start LPHD Pump #13 and place in service. The crew will then proceed to secure Condensate Pump #13 as it is no longer needed. This is a normal evolution with no malfunctions.

Event 2: 3 minutes after LPHD Pump #13 is placed in auto, RCFC Fan 11A will have a sheared shaft. A Low Fan DP Alarm will have the crew secure RCFC Fan 11A and evaluate starting the only other available RCFC Fan 11C. Containment Pressure will rise and may bring in an RCB Pressure High Alarm if RCFC Fan 11C is not started. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.

Event 3: After addressing RCFC Fan Tech Specs, PT-0505, a Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel, will fail low. The crew will respond using 0POP04-TM-0004, Failure of Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter (PT-505/506). The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.

Event 4: After addressing Tech Specs for PT-0505 failure, a CVCS charging line leak will develop in Containment. The crew will respond using 0POP04-RC-0003, Excessive RCS Leakage, and will be able to identify and isolate the leak.

Event 5: 2 minutes after the charging line is isolated, the main generator output breaker will open causing a total loss of load. An automatic reactor trip will likely occur since steam dumps are in steam pressure mode due to the PT-505 failure. The crew will respond using

POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Event 6: 10 seconds after the reactor trip, a safety valve on SG 1A will fail open (due to pressure spike caused by loss of load), resulting in a faulted steam generator. The crew will respond using POP05-EO-EO20, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Event 7: On the SI, Phase A on Train A will fail to actuate and can not be manually actuated. The crew will respond using Addendums 1 and 5 of 0POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or SI, which will require manually isolating any penetrations that are normally isolated by the Phase A

signal.

Termination: The scenario will be terminated when POP05-EO-EO20 is exited.

Critical tasks:

  • Isolate feed and steam lines to steam ge nerator 1A prior to exiting POP05-EO-EO20.

Source: New Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: LOT18 NRC

Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% Power and Stable. Train B work week with ECW, D/G, CCW, SI, and AFW inoperable. SG 1B LT-0528 (CH 3) is in the Tripped condition.

Turnover: All Tech Spec actions are complete with the ESF Power Availability

surveillance (PSP03-EA-0002) being due in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Continuing Train 'B' Work Week.

I/C is continuing to trouble shoot SG 1B LT-0528. The level transmitter has been inoperable for the last 4 days and is currently in the Tripped condition per Tech.

Specs.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 (1 min) 02-19-03 (0) RO (I) SRO (I, TS) PRZ Pressure Channel PT0457 fails low 2 (15 min) 05-22-01 (1) BOP (I) SRO (I, TS) SG 1A Steam Pressure PT-0514 fails high.

3 (30 min) 10-11-01 (1) ALL (C) Lockout of 4.16KV Bus E1A 4 (N/A) 05-20-08 (0) ALL (M) Inadvertent FWI when SG 1B CH 4 HI-Hi Bistable comes in. (8 minutes after DG 11 is placed in PTS - integral) 5 (N/A) 06-02-01 (1) RO (C) SRO (C) Main Turbine fails to auto trip. (integral) (CT) 6 (N/A) 08-03-03 (1) 08-02-01 (1) ALL (C) AFW Pump C trips 3 minutes after start and AFW Pump D overspeeds upon starting creating a Loss of H eat Sink condition. (integral) (CT) * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Target Quantitative Attributes (P er Scenario; See Section D.5.d)

Actual Attributes 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 6 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 3

4. Major transients (1-2) 1
5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2

STP LOT-18 NRC Scenario #4 Description Initial Conditions:

The plant is at 100% power. A Train 'B' work week is in progress with Train 'B' ECW, D/G, CCW, SI and AFW inoperable for maintenance. All Tech Spec actions are complete with the ESF Power Availability surveillance (PSP03-EA-0002) being due in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SG 1B LT-0528 (CH 3) has been inoperable for the past 4 days and is in the tripped condition as

required by Tech Specs.

Event 1: Controlling PZR Pressure Channel PT-0457 fails low. Operators will take action in accordance with POP04-RP-0001, Loss of Automatic Pressurizer Pressure Control, to stabilize the plant and select an alternate channel. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.

Event 2: SG 1A Steam Pressure for the controlling steam flow channel, PT-0514, fails high.

Operators will stabilize the plant and select an alternate channel in accordance with POP04-FW-0001, Loss of Steam Generator Level Control. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.

Event 3: Lockout of 4.16KV bus E1A. The crew will stabilize the plant and take action in accordance with POP04-AE-0001, First Response To Loss Of Any Or All 13.8KV Or 4.16KV Bus. The next event will automatically occur 8 minutes after ESF DG #11 is placed in Pull-To-

Stop.

Event 4/5:

Inadvertent Feedwater Isolation occurs when a 2 nd Hi-Hi level bistable trips on SG 1B. A reactor trip occurs, however the main turbine fails to automatically trip. The crew will perform the actions of POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, trip the main turbine and stabilize the plant.

Event 6: Upon start, AFW Pump #14 trips on overspeed. AFW Pump #13 trips on overcurrent 3 minutes after start. This creates a loss of Heat Sink condition. When directed by the EOP to implement Functional Restoration Procedures, the crew will transition to POP05-EO-FRH1, Response to Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink, to address the loss of heat sink condition.

Termination: The scenario will terminate after feed and bleed is established in POP05-EO-FRH1 (completion of step 13).

Critical Tasks:

  • Manually trips the main turbine prior to transition out of POP05-EO-EO00.
  • Establishes feed and bleed of the RCS pr ior to transition out of POP05-EO-FRH1.

Source: New Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: BU Op-Test No.: LOT18 NRC

Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: 75% power and holding for completion of FWBP work to correct a common mode motor problem. Circulating Water Pump #11 and Containment Spray

Pump 'A' are out of service for maintenance.

Turnover: Start FWBP #13 and secure FWBP #11 to allow maintenance on the last

FWBP motor.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 (0 min) N/A SRO (N)

BOP (N) Swap Feedwater Booster Pumps 2 (15 min) 14-08-01 (true) SRO (C, TS)

RO (C) Essential Cooling Water Pump "'A' trips without auto start of the standby train.

3 (25 min) 05-12-03 (0) SRO (I, TS)

BOP (I) SG C controlling level channel (LT-0539) fails low (CT) 4 (35 min) Thermal OL (true) SRO (C) RO (R)

BOP (C) Loss of Iso-phase cooling results in down power 5 (50 min) 02-07-02 (true) All (M) RCP 'B' sheared shaft after plant stabilized following down power 6 (N/A) 52-LI-37 (18) 52-LI-57 (96) SRO (C) RO (C) 2 control rods stuck partially out of the core following reactor trip (Integral) (CT) 7 (N/A) 10-08-01 10-11-02 (true) SRO (C) RO (C) Loss of offsite power and all ESF di esel generators (Loss of All AC) after boration start ed in ES01 (Integral) (CT) * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Target Quantitative Attributes (P er Scenario; See Section D.5.d)

Actual Attributes 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 6 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 3

4. Major transients (1-2) 1
5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 3

STP LOT-18 NRC Scenario BU Description Initial Conditions: 75% power and holding for completion of FWBP work to correct a common mode motor problem. Circulating Water Pump #11 and Containment Spray Pump 'A' are out of service for maintenance. The crew is directed to start FWBP #13 and secure FWBP #11 to allow maintenance on the last FWBP motor.

Event 1: The crew will start FWBP #13 and secure FWBP #11 in accordance with POP02-FW-0001, Main Feedwater. This is a normal evolution with no malfunctions.

Event 2: After FWBP #11 is secured, ECW Pump 'A' trips and the standby train does not automatically start. The crew will use the annunciator response and normal operating procedures

to place the standby train in service and properly remove the tripped train from service. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.

Event 3: After ECW Tech Specs have been addressed, the controlling level channel on SG 'C' will fail low. The crew will perform the actions of POP04-FW-0001, Loss of Steam Generator Level Control, to stabilize the plant and place an alternate channel in service. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.

Event 4: After Tech Specs have been addressed for the SG level channel failure, the Iso-phase cooling trouble alarm will be received. Use of the annunciator response and investigation by the

local operator will reveal failure of both fans requiring a fast load reduction in accordance with

POP04-TM-0005, Fast Load Reduction.

Event 5: After the crew has stabilized the plant following the fast load reduction, a sheared shaft on RCP 'B' will occur causing an automatic reactor trip. The crew will respond using POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or Safety Injec tion and transition to POP05-EO-ES01, Reactor Trip Response.

Event 6: Following the reactor trip, the operators will notice 2 rods stuck partially out of the core. The determination will be made that the reactor is tripped in E0, however, ES01 will required initiation of emergency boration to account for the loss of negative reactivity.

Event 7: 3 minutes after the emergency borate valve is opened, a loss of offsite power will occur that results in a Loss of All AC Power and requiring entry into POP05-EO-EC00, Loss of All AC Power. EC00 has instructions for energizing one 4KV ESF bus from the Emergency Transformer which will be successful.

Termination: The scenario will be terminated after the crew energizes a 4KV bus from the emergency transformer in EC00.

Critical tasks:

  • Manually control SG 'C' level such that a manual or auto reactor trip does not occur.
  • Following the reactor trip, initiate emergency boration prior to exiting ES01.
  • Energize a 4KV ESF bus from the Emergency Transformer prior to exiting EC00.

Source: New