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| number = ML16054A440 | | number = ML16054A440 | ||
| issue date = 01/26/2016 | | issue date = 01/26/2016 | ||
| title = | | title = Revision 33 to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Appendix I, Evaluation of High Energy Line Breaks Outside Containment | ||
| author name = | | author name = | ||
| author affiliation = Northern States Power Co, Xcel Energy | | author affiliation = Northern States Power Co, Xcel Energy | ||
Latest revision as of 04:58, 3 April 2019
| ML16054A440 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/2016 |
| From: | Northern States Power Co, Xcel Energy |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16054A376 | List:
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| References | |
| L-MT-16-004 | |
| Download: ML16054A440 (84) | |
Text
APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT
APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT I.1Evaluation Criteria
I.1.1Definition of Terms
I.1.2Assumptions
APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT I.2High Energy Systems and Piping
I.2.1
I.2.2
APPENDIX II.3
I.3.1
I.3.2
I.3.3
I.3.4
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 1 of 13APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINEBREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT I/kabI.4Safe Shutdown Requirements The systems, components, and structures used to mitigate the consequences of a postulated HELB and bring the unit to safe shutdown condition are the HELB targets of concern. Identification of these systems was required, so that evaluationof the effects of potential HELBs could be assessed. The basis for determining
these systems can be found by defining the safe shutdown performance goals andconservatively assuming a coincident loss of off-site power.
The Safe Shutdown performance goals, as identified in Reference 5 are:(1)Insert sufficient negative reactivity to maintain the reactor in a subcritical condition.(2)Restore and maintain reactor vessel water level above the active fuel level precluding fuel cladding failure.(3)Prevent over pressurization of the reactor vessel.(4)Remove decay heat generated in the core with sufficient capability toallow the reactor to be brought from hot to cold shutdown and maintain the cold shutdown condition.I.4.1Safe Shutdown Systems Based upon the information provided in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, the
previous HELB analysis (Reference 1), and the Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (Reference 5), the following list identifies those systems, forwhich credit can be taken to satisfy the performance goals above and thus effect a safe shutdown in the event of a postulated HELB.(1)Reactor Protection System (RPS), Control Rod Drive System (CRD) and Control Rods.(2)High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI).(3)Reactor Pressure Relief - Safety/Relief Valves (SRVs)(4)Residual Heat Removal (RHR) including:(a)Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Mode(b)Shutdown Cooling (SDC) Mode(c)Suppression Pool Cooling (SPC) Mode01196839 Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 2 of 13 I/kab(5)Core Spray (CS).(6)RHR Service Water (7)Shutdown Instrumentation (See Section I.4.1.1)(8)Auxiliary Support(a)On-site Power and Distribution System (b)Emergency Service Water (ESW)(c)Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliary Systems (d)DC Power Systems(e)Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) SystemsI.4.1.1Shutdown Instrumentation The minimum required process instrumentation to assure safe shutdown is as follows:(1)Reactor Vessel Level Indication (2)Reactor Pressure Indication(3)Suppression Pool Temperature Indication(4)Suppression Pool Level IndicationI.4.2Description of Safe Shutdown Paths The paths to safe shutdown for any postulated HELB coincident with a loss ofoff-site power and a single active failure can be described by identifying the shutdown priority using the performance goals previously described.
Safe shutdown can be described as reducing RPV pressure and temperature from the normal operating conditions of approximately 1015 psia and 545
°F to a RPV coolant temperature of less than 212
°F and the RPV vented with the reactor in a subcritical condition and no fuel damage or breach of Primary
Containment. The minimum equipment necessary for safe shutdown includes the following:(1)The Reactor Protection System and Control Rod Drive System (negative reactivity function)
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 3 of 13 I/kab(2)3 SRVs (RPV overpressure protection and decay heat removal functions)(3)1 RHR pump (LPCI Mode) or 1 Core Spray pump and 1 RHR pump in SPC Mode (reactor vessel level maintenance and decay heat removal functions)(4)1 RHR Service Water pump (decay heat removal function)(5)1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG), EDG auxiliaries, 1 EDGEmergency Service Water pump, 1 Emergency Service Water pump, and 1 Division of safety related power distribution (for all functions except negative reactivity)(6)Shutdown Instrumentation (from Reference 5)(a)Reactor Vessel Level(b)Reactor Pressure(c)Suppression Pool Temperature (d)Suppression Pool Level Evaluations performed to determine acceptable paths to safe shutdown utilized the above described minimum necessary equipment.
Additional safe shutdown paths can be described depending on the location of the postulated HELB and the single active failure taken. The HPCI system canbe used to maintain RPV water level and depressurize the RPV, so that the lowpressure high flow pumps (RHR or CS) can be used. Table I.4-1 identifies the systems available to support each shutdown performance goal.
For any postulated HELB with HPCI available, RCIC is not required, since HPCI could perform the same function. For any postulated HELB with HPCI not available due to a single active failure or HELB related damage, the unit is shutdown using the SRVs (RPV depressurization), Core Spray (RPV water level maintenance), and RHR (decay heat removal and RPV water levelmaintenance). No single active failure could affect more than 1 SRV, 1 CS
division, or 1 RHR division.
The RCIC System is not required for any postulated HELB in any of the identifiedcompartments. However, for most postulated HELBs RCIC is available to support
For any postulated HELB, at least one division of ESW is available to provide cooling to one division of RHR and CS systems. Hence, safe shutdown can be
accomplished for any postulated HELB without requiring the RCIC System to support the safe shutdown.0119683901196839 Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 4 of 13 I/kabI.4.3Safe Shutdown System Component LocationsFor each of the systems identified in Section I.4.1 of this report, the locations of the major components, main pipe routings, and power and control cable routings
are listed in this section. The information is provided by system and HELB analysis volume for reference.I.4.3.1Reactor Protection System The Reactor Protection System (RPS) consists of the motor generator set power supplies, the RPS power distribution panels, sensors and cabling. The
two motor-generator sets are located in the Reactor Building on the 935-footelevation in Volumes 14 and 17. The RPS power distribution panels are located in the Cable Spreading Room. There are sensors (i.e., high reactor pressure, etc.) included in the protection system that are located in a variety of sites throughout the plant.I.4.3.2Control Rod Drive System The Control Rod Drive System consists of the control rods and the associated
control rod drive hydraulic units. The electrical signals to the scram valves on the control rod drive hydraulic units are provided by the RPS. The control rods and Control Rod Drives are located inside of the Primary Containment. The control rod drive hydraulic units are located in two separate banks on either side of the Primary Containment on the 935 foot elevation of the Reactor Building in Volumes 14 and 18.I.4.3.3High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System The HPCI System consists of a pump with a steam driven turbine andassociated valving. It is located primarily in the HPCI room (Volume 8). The HPCI steam supply line and the HPCI injection line (PS18-8-ED and TW3-12-ED, respectively) are routed from main the steam chase (Volume 16)to the HPCI room (Volume 8). The valving for the HPCI System is located in
the above identified compartments. Power cabling for the HPCI System isrouted from the batteries in the EFT Building into the Turbine Building in theeast corridor on the 931-foot elevation (Volume 20). The cables are then routed into the condenser bay (Volume 15), from there into the CRD pump room(Volume 7), down to equipment and floor drain tank area (Volume 6), and finallyinto the HPCI Room (Volume 8).
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 5 of 13 I/kabI.4.3.4Reactor Pressure Relief SystemThe eight SRVs and associated piping are located inside of the Primary Containment on the main steam lines. There are four control panels and two instrument racks associated with the SRVs. The SRV control panel is locatedin the Cable Spreading Room. The SRV Low-Low Set control panel "A" is located in the cable spreading area. The "B" control panels are located in themain control room and on the third floor of the EFT Building. The SRV low-low set instrument rack "A" is located in the northeast corner of the torus area(Volume 9) and the "B" rack is located on the 935-foot elevation of the ReactorBuilding near the west side CRD hydraulic units (Volume 18).I.4.3.5Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System The RHR System is a two divisional system with two motor driven pumps in each division. The valving for the system consists of a series of suction and discharge valves, which allow the RHR System to be operated in various modes. Two of the RHR pumps are located in the southeast corner room of theReactor Building (Volume 1) and the other two in the southwest corner room ofthe Reactor Building (Volume 3). The suction valving is located in three separate compartments. Most of the RHR pump discharge valves are also located in the corner rooms with the following exceptions:(1)Division I suppression pool cooling (SPC) valves (MO-2006 and MO-2008) and the Division II SPC valve (MO-2009) are located in thetorus area (Volume 9-12).(2)Division II SPC mode outboard valve (MO-2007) is located on the westside of Reactor Building, at the 935-foot elevation in Volume 19.(3)The Division I LPCI injection and SDC containment isolation valves (MO-2014 and MO-2012) and the shutdown cooling line outboard isolation valve (MO-2030) are located in Volume 13 on the 935-foot elevation of the Reactor Building.(4)The Division II LPCI Injection and SDC containment isolation valves(MO-2013 and MO-2015) are located in Volume 20 on the 935-foot elevation of the Reactor Building.(5)The Division I containment spray isolation valves (MO-2020 andMO-2022) are located in Volume 14 on the 948-foot elevation of the
Reactor Building and the Division II valves (MO-2021 and MO-2023) arelocated on the 962-foot 6-inch elevation in Volumes 31 and 33.01196839 Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 6 of 13 I/kabThe power cabling for the RHR Pumps is routed from the respectivesafety-related switchgear room in the Turbine Building Volume 8 (Division I) andVolume 31 (Division II) underground to the Reactor Building. Division I cablesare then routed to RCIC room (Volume 5) and continue underground to thesoutheast corner room (Volume 1). The Division II cables are routed underground to the Reactor Building drain tank room (Volume 6) and thencontinue underground to the southwest corner room (Volume 3). The powercables to the valves are routed from the respective MCCs in the TurbineBuilding Volume 1 (Division I) and Volume 20 (Division II), to the CableSpreading Room, and into the Reactor Building via Volume 14 (Division I) and Volume 17 (Division II). From there the cables are routed to the respective valves. The control cables follow the routing of the valves' power cables. The power and control cables for Division II RHR valves MO-2007, MO-2009, andMO-2003 are routed from MCCs (Volume 24) to the third floor EFT Building.
They then go underground around the south side of the Reactor Building to the 935-foot elevation (Volume 18) of the Reactor Building and then to the respective valves.I.4.3.6Core Spray (CS) System The Core Spray System is a two divisional system capable of taking suppression pool water and spraying it over the top of the reactor core. Each division has a core spray pump, a valve on the suction line to the suppressionchamber, and inboard and outboard injection valves.
The Division I pump (P-208A) is located in the southeast corner room of theReactor Building (Volume 1) in the same room with the Division I RHR pumps.
Its suction line, (TW6-12-HE) is routed from the suppression chamber area(Volume 10) to the CS pump. The pool suction valve (MO-1741) is located inthe southeast corner room (Volume 1) with the CS pump. The discharge piping is routed from the southeast corner room, up through the east side of the935-foot elevation of the Reactor Building (Volume 14) and finally up to the962-foot 6-inch elevation of the Reactor Building on the east side (Volume 22).
The inboard and outboard injection valves (MO-1753 and MO-1751,respectively) are located in this area (Volume 22).
The Division II Core Spray System is located on the west side of the Reactor Building. The Division II core spray pump (P-208B) and the pool suction valve(MO-1742) are located in the southwest corner room (Volume 3). The CS pump suction piping is routed from the suppression chamber area (Volume 11) to the southwest corner room. The pump discharge piping is routed from the southwest corner room up through the 935-foot elevation of the ReactorBuilding (Volume 19), and up to the 962-foot 6-inch elevation of the ReactorBuilding (Volume 31). The inboard and outboard injection valves (MO-1754
and MO-1752, respectively) are located on the west side of the ReactorBuilding at the 962-foot 6-inch elevation in Volume 31.
The cabling for each division of the Core Spray System follows the same routing as the corresponding division of RHR.
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 7 of 13 I/kabI.4.3.7RHR Service Water SystemThe RHR Service Water (RHRSW) System supplies water from the ultimate heat sink (river) to the tube side of the RHR heat exchangers and back to the river. The system has 4 pumps with 2 dedicated to each division. The pumpsfor both divisions are located in the Intake Structure pump room (Volume 18).The discharge piping is routed from the Intake Structure (Volume 18) throughthe access tunnel (Volume 16) into the Turbine Building north corridor(Volume 5). From the Turbine Building north corridor they are routed above the931-foot elevation of the Turbine Building through Volumes 20 and 25, and intothe condenser bay area (Volume 15). The lines exit the Turbine Building from
the condenser bay and penetrate the Reactor Building in the TIP drive room,Volume 17. From the TIP drive room, the lines are routed to the torus area(Volumes 9-12) and then to the respective corner rooms.
Auxiliary air compressors are located on the 935-foot elevation of the ReactorBuilding, Division I in Volume 14 and Division II in Volume 19. Each divisions' heat exchanger discharge pressure control valves (CV-1728 and CV-1729) are also located in the respective corner rooms.Cabling for the system is routed entirely within the Turbine Building. The powercabling for the pumps is routed from the respective switchgear areas (Volumes8, and 31) to the Intake Structure (Volume 18). Control cabling is routed to the Control Room via the respective divisional routing in the Turbine Building. ForDivision I this would be from the cable spreading room to Volumes 21, 2, 22and 27. For Division II this would be from the cable spreading room to Volume 20 and then into the switchgear area.I.4.3.8Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System While not required for safe shutdown, the RCIC System may be used if
available. A description is included in this section for completeness.
The RCIC System, like the HPCI System, consists of a steam driventhe associated valves are located in RCIC room (Volume 5). The steam supplythe RCIC room through the torus area (Volume 9) and up into main steam chase (Volume 16). The valving for the RCIC System is located in either the RCIC room or main steam chase. The RCIC power cables are routed from the batteries in the Plant Administration Building through the Cable SpreadingRoom into TIP drive room (Volume 17) in the Reactor Building and down to theRCIC room (Volume 5).0119683901196839 Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 8 of 13 I/kabI.4.3.9Shutdown Instrumentation The Shutdown Instrumentation, like the other safety related equipment is divisionalized. The locations for the components for each division are given
below: Division Parameter Measured Equipment Designation Compartment IReactor Water LevelLT-2-3-112A East side of ReactorBldg. Elev. 935-foot I Suppression Pool LevelLT-7338ATorus Area I Reactor PressurePT-6-53A East side of Reactor Bldg. Elev. 962-foot
6-inch I Suppression Pool Temperature TE-4073A to 4080ATorus Area IIReactor Water LevelLT-2-3-112BWest side of Reactor Bldg. Elev. 935-foot II Suppression Pool LevelLT-7338BTorus Area II Reactor PressurePT-6-53BWest side of Reactor Bldg. Elev. 962-foot
6-inch II Suppression Pool Temperature TE-4073B to 4080BTorus Area The cabling from these instruments is routed through the same routing schemes back to the cable spreading area as are the other safety-related divisional separated cables. The only exceptions are the Division II suppression pool temperature cables and Alternate Shutdown System (ASDS) instruments. From the torus area they are routed into the condenser bay (Volume 15) and through Volume 20 on the 931-foot elevation of the Turbine Building and into the Emergency Filtration Building from there. ASDSinstruments that have been rerouted are reactor water level LT-2-3-112B andsuppression pool level LT-7338B. The routing is underground around the southside of the Reactor Building to the third floor, EFT.
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 9 of 13 I/kabI.4.3.10Emergency Service Water Systems The two emergency service water systems, consisting of the Emergency DieselGenerator Emergency Service Water (EDG-ESW) System and the EmergencyFiltration Train Emergency Service Water (EFT-ESW) System, are both two
divisional systems which collectively supply cooling water to the emergency diesel generators, the ECCS pump room coolers, the RHR & Core Spray pumps, and the EFT System. The systems, when combined, consist of 4pumps, P-111A, B, C & D, located in the Intake Structure (Volume 18). PumpsP-111A and P-111C are both Division I components, and pumps P-111B and P-111D are both Division II components.I.4.3.10.1Emergency Diesel Generator Emergency Service Water SystemPump P-111A and P-111B are used to supply cooling water to the Division I andDivision II emergency diesel generator, respectively. The discharge piping from each EDG-ESW pump tees in the intake structure with separate 4 inch lines
routed underground to the respective EDG. The other branch of the tee oneach line has a closed manual valve in the Intake Structure (ESW-61-1 andESW-61-2). The cooling water lines to the EDGs are cross-tied in the IntakeStructure. This allows cooling of either EDG from pump P-111A or P-111B.The power cable for Division I ESW pump P-111A is routed from MCC-134 inthe EFT Building, into the main feedpump area, (Volume 3), along the east corridor at the 911-foot elevation (Volume 3), along the north Turbine Buildingcorridor (Volume 5), through the access tunnel (Volume 16), and into the intakestructure. A control cable for P-111A is routed from the Control Room, throughthe Cable Spreading Room, through Volume 21, into the main feedpump area(Volume 3) and into the EFT Building. Another control cable for P-111A is
routed from C-03 in the Control Room, through the Cable Spreading Room,through Volume 21, into the main feedpump area (Volume 3), along the eastcorridor at the 911-foot elevation, along the north Turbine Building corridor(Volume 5), and into the Division I essential switchgear area (Volume 8) beforeentering the Division I EDG compartment (Volume 29).The power cable for Division II ESW pump P-111B is routed from MCC-143located in the southeast corner of the Turbine Building on elevation 931-foot(Volume 20), along the east corridor of the Turbine Building (Volume 20), alongthe north Turbine Building corridor (Volume 26), and into the Division IIessential switchgear area (Volume 31) before entering the Intake Structurethrough an underground duct bank. The control cables for P-111B originate in the EFT Building and are routed into the Turbine Building, southeast corner, at elevation 931-foot. From there, one of the control cables is routed directly intothe Control Room, one is routed to MCC-143 (which is located in Volume 20),and one is routed along the east Turbine Building corridor at the 931-footelevation (Volume 20), along the north Turbine Building corridor (Volume 26),
and into the Division II essential switchgear area (Volume 31) before enteringthe Division II Emergency Diesel Generator compartment (Volume 30).
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 10 of 13 I/kabI.4.3.10.2Emergency Filtration Train Emergency Service Water SystemPumps P-111C & D supply cooling water to the respective Division I and II ECCS pump room coolers, the RHR and Core Spray pumps, and the EFT System. The Division I ESW Line to ECCS room coolers and Division I RHR and Core Spray Pumps (ESW1-3-HF) is routed from the Intake Structure,through the access tunnel (Volume 16), into the Turbine Building north corridoron the 911-foot elevation (Volume 5). From there, it is routed in the northcorridor over into the reactor feed pump area (Volume 3). Within thiscompartment the lines tee again (Reference 18) with the piping line ESW1-3-HBD routed into the Emergency Filtration Building. The line to the ECCS pump room coolers and RHR and Core Spray Pumps SW30A-3-HF isrouted from the main feed pump area into the condenser bay area (Volume 15) on the 911-foot elevation. The pipe is routed along the east wall over to the south wall of the room. The piping line exits the condenser bay through the south wall and into the Reactor Building. This line enters the Reactor Buildingin the TIP drive room (Volume 17) and is routed from there into the torus area(Volume 9). Once in the torus area the line tees again with part of the flow routed to the southeast corner room (Volume 1) and the remainder to the HPCIroom (Volume 8) for the Division I HPCI room cooler.
The Division II ESW Line to the ECCS room coolers (ESW5-3-HF) follows a parallel route to its Division I counterpart to the north turbine corridor at the911-foot elevation (Volume 5). From there it is routed to Volume 20 on the931-foot elevation of the Turbine Building. In Volume 20 the line tees(Reference 19) with line SW30B-3-HF routed into Volume 21 and then into thecondenser bay (Volume 15). From the condenser bay, the line enters theReactor Building in the main steam chase (Volume 16) and from there is routedinto the torus area (Volume 12). After entering the torus area, the line teesagain with part of the flow going to the southwest corner room (Volume 3) andthe remainder to the Division II HPCI room cooler in the HPCI room (Volume 8).The cable for the other two ESW pumps (P-111C and P-111D) begins in theEFT Building. The power cable to P-111C is routed from MCC-134 in the EFTBuilding into the main feedpump area, Volume 3, along the east corridor at the911-foot elevation, and then along the north Turbine Building corridor Volume 5
into the access tunnel. One control cable is located entirely in the EFTBuilding. The other enters the Turbine Building in the main feedpump area,then is routed into Volume 21 and into the Cable Spreading Room, beforeentering the Control Room. For pump P-111D, the power cable is routed fromMCC-144 in the EFT Building into the Turbine Building southeast corner on the
931-foot elevation. It is then routed along the east corridor at that elevation intothe Division II cable way (Volume 35), and ending in Division II essentialswitchgear area, Volume 31. From there the cable is routed outside underground to the Intake Structure. Three control cables for this pump arelocated entirely within the EFT Building and the other enters the Turbine Building at the 931-foot elevation in Volume 20. From there it is routed up to the turbine operating floor before entering the Control Room.
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTPage 11 of 13 I/kabI.4.3.11Emergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliaries There is one Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) for each essential division atMonticello. The EDGs are located in adjacent compartments with EDG-11located in Volume 29 and EDG-12 located in Volume 30. The local control panels and air start systems are also located in the respective compartmentwith the EDG. The oil day tanks are located next to Volume 29 in separate day tank rooms. Cabling for power to the local control and electrical cabinets is
routed in the same manner as the control cables for RHRSW pumps. The EDG power cabling is routed to the respective essential switchgear which are inadjacent compartments in the Turbine Building.I.4.3.12Auxiliary Power Distribution SystemsThe Auxiliary Power Distribution System consists of the 4KV switchgear, the 480Vac load center, motor control centers and the transformers between them.
The system is capable of distributing the electrical power generated by theEDGs under a loss of off-site power condition. For Division I, both the 4KVswitchgear and 480Vac distribution equipment are located in Volume 8 on the911-foot elevation of the Turbine Building in the northwest corner. The Division II load centers are located directly above the Division I load centers on the next floor (931-foot elevation) in Volume 31. Essential MCCs - 133A, 142A and143A are located in the southeast corner of the Turbine Building with Division IMCC-133A located on the 911-foot elevation in Volume 1 and Division II MCCs- 142A and 143A located on the 931-foot elevation in Volume 20. EssentialMCCs - 134 and 144 are located in the EFT. The EFT is not assigned a volume number because there are no high energy lines within the building.
Cabling from load centers to the MCCs is routed in separate compartments.Cables from Division I load centers are routed from Volume 8 through Volumes35 and 26 terminating in Volume 20. Other Division I cables not terminating at the MCC are routed up into Volume 21 and into the cable spreading area. TheDivision II cables are routed from the load centers Volume 31 through Volumes32, 35 and 26 and terminating in Volume 20. Cables going to the cablespreading area are routed through Volume 20.I.4.3.13DC Power Systems With the exception of the 125 Vdc distribution panels located in the 4 KV switchgear rooms, the major DC power components required for safe shutdown are located in the battery rooms of the Administration or Emergency Filtration Buildings. The cabling is routed from Cable Spreading Room to the respectivecomponents along the divisional routings described previously. The only exception is the HPCI power cables, which are routed in a similar route to the Division II SPOTMOS cables. However, once routed into the Reactor Building,the HPCI cables are then routed to the HPCI area (Volume 8).
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 12 of 13 I/kabI.4.3.14HVAC SystemsThe only HVAC Equipment required for safe shutdown are the ECCS RoomCoolers, V-AC-5 (Division I) and V-AC-4 (Division II), located in respective
Reactor Building corner rooms on the 920-foot elevation and the EDG supplyfan, V-SF-9 for EDG No. 12 and V-SF-10 for EDG No. 11. The cooling water for the ECCS room coolers is supplied from the respective Emergency ServiceWater System pump with V-AC-5 supplied by P-111C, and V-AC-4 by P-111D.Power cabling for the V-AC-4 and V-AC-5 is routed into the Reactor Building from the cable spreading area in the same manner as the other divisional cables.The power and control cables for Division I EDG supply fan (V-SF-10) are routed from MCC-134 in the EFT Building, into the main feedpump area,(Volume 2), along the east corridor at the 911-foot elevation (Volume 3), alongthe north Turbine Building corridor (Volume 27) and into Division I switchgeararea (Volume 7) before entering the Division I EDG compartment (Volume 29).The power and control cables for Division II EDG supply fan (V-SF-9) arerouted from MCC-143 located in the southeast corner of the Turbine Building atthe 931-foot elevation, along the east corridor of the Turbine Building at the931-foot elevation, along the north Turbine Building corridor, and into theDivision II essential switchgear area (Volume 31) before entering the Division II EDG compartment (Volume 30).
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 13 of 13 I/kabTable I.4-1 Safe Shutdown Components AvailableSAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS AVAILABLE FOR EACH PERFORMANCE GOAL (1)Division Equipment Required to Achieve and Maintain Subcriticality Equipment Required to Maintain RPV Inventory (4)Equipment Required for RPV Depressurization Equipment Required to Remove Decay Heat I Reactor Protection System and Control Rods and Control
Rod Drives 1CS Pump and 2 RHR Pumps Available(5)*1 CS Pump or 1 RHR
Pump (LPCI Mode) (2)4 SRVs Available(5)*2 SRVs Needed for LPCI
RPV Inventory Recovery
Pump RPV Inventory
Recovery4 SRVs, 2 RHR Pumps, 1 CS Pump, 1 RHR Heat Exchanger, and 2 RHRSW Pumps Available
Pump Needed II Reactor Protection System
and Control Rods and Control
Rod Drives HPCI, 1 CS Pump, and 2 RHR Pumps Available
Needed or;
Pump RPV Inventory Recovery4 SRVs, 2 RHR Pump, 1 CS Pump, 1 RHRHeat Exchanger, and 2 RHRSW Pumps Available*1 RHR Pump (SDC Mode), RHR HeatExchanger, and 1 RHRSW Pump Needed or;
Needed 1 Required Auxiliary Support Systems (i.e., EDG, EDG Auxiliaries, Essential Power Dist. Sys., ESW System, Shutdown Instrumentatio n) always required.2Following RPV depressurization by SRVs and RCIC not available.
3Following RPV depressurization by SRVs and HPCI not available.
4RHR pump used for RPV Inventory Control cannot be same RHR pump used for Decay Heat Removal, except for the final path described for either
division under decay heat removal of this table.
5 Though not required safe shutdown equipment, RCIC if available, could be used.0119683901196839 APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT I.5HELB and Safe Shutdown Evaluation I.5.1
I.5.2HELB Evaluations by System
I.5.3Table of System Effects
1 1
APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT I.6References
Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage1of11APPENDIXIEVALUATIONOFHIGHENERGYLINEBREAKSOUTSIDECONTAINMENT I/arbFIGURES Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage2of11 I/arbFigureI.1-1ReactorBldgEl.896-0 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage3of11 I/arbFigureI.1-2ReactorBldg(Approx923)TopofTorus-UpperLevelsofRHRRooms,HPCI,RCIC Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage4of11 I/arbFigureI.1-3ReactorBldg-El.935-0 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage5of11 I/arbFigureI.1-4ReactorBldg-El.962-0 24 25 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage6of11 I/arbFigureI.1-5ReactorBldg-985(DW-983,Vessel-989)
Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage7of11 I/arbFigureI.1-6ReactorBldg-1001 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage8of11 I/arbFigureI.1-7ReactorBldg-1027 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage9of11 I/arbFigureI.1-8TurbineBldg.El.911-0 19 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage10of11 I/arbFigureI.1-9TurbineBldg.El.931-0 01279956 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage11of11 I/arbFigureI.1-10TurbineBldg.El.951-0 37 APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT
APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT I.1Evaluation Criteria
I.1.1Definition of Terms
I.1.2Assumptions
APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT I.2High Energy Systems and Piping
I.2.1
I.2.2
APPENDIX II.3
I.3.1
I.3.2
I.3.3
I.3.4
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 1 of 13APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINEBREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT I/kabI.4Safe Shutdown Requirements The systems, components, and structures used to mitigate the consequences of a postulated HELB and bring the unit to safe shutdown condition are the HELB targets of concern. Identification of these systems was required, so that evaluationof the effects of potential HELBs could be assessed. The basis for determining
these systems can be found by defining the safe shutdown performance goals andconservatively assuming a coincident loss of off-site power.
The Safe Shutdown performance goals, as identified in Reference 5 are:(1)Insert sufficient negative reactivity to maintain the reactor in a subcritical condition.(2)Restore and maintain reactor vessel water level above the active fuel level precluding fuel cladding failure.(3)Prevent over pressurization of the reactor vessel.(4)Remove decay heat generated in the core with sufficient capability toallow the reactor to be brought from hot to cold shutdown and maintain the cold shutdown condition.I.4.1Safe Shutdown Systems Based upon the information provided in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, the
previous HELB analysis (Reference 1), and the Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (Reference 5), the following list identifies those systems, forwhich credit can be taken to satisfy the performance goals above and thus effect a safe shutdown in the event of a postulated HELB.(1)Reactor Protection System (RPS), Control Rod Drive System (CRD) and Control Rods.(2)High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI).(3)Reactor Pressure Relief - Safety/Relief Valves (SRVs)(4)Residual Heat Removal (RHR) including:(a)Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Mode(b)Shutdown Cooling (SDC) Mode(c)Suppression Pool Cooling (SPC) Mode01196839 Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 2 of 13 I/kab(5)Core Spray (CS).(6)RHR Service Water (7)Shutdown Instrumentation (See Section I.4.1.1)(8)Auxiliary Support(a)On-site Power and Distribution System (b)Emergency Service Water (ESW)(c)Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliary Systems (d)DC Power Systems(e)Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) SystemsI.4.1.1Shutdown Instrumentation The minimum required process instrumentation to assure safe shutdown is as follows:(1)Reactor Vessel Level Indication (2)Reactor Pressure Indication(3)Suppression Pool Temperature Indication(4)Suppression Pool Level IndicationI.4.2Description of Safe Shutdown Paths The paths to safe shutdown for any postulated HELB coincident with a loss ofoff-site power and a single active failure can be described by identifying the shutdown priority using the performance goals previously described.
Safe shutdown can be described as reducing RPV pressure and temperature from the normal operating conditions of approximately 1015 psia and 545
°F to a RPV coolant temperature of less than 212
°F and the RPV vented with the reactor in a subcritical condition and no fuel damage or breach of Primary
Containment. The minimum equipment necessary for safe shutdown includes the following:(1)The Reactor Protection System and Control Rod Drive System (negative reactivity function)
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 3 of 13 I/kab(2)3 SRVs (RPV overpressure protection and decay heat removal functions)(3)1 RHR pump (LPCI Mode) or 1 Core Spray pump and 1 RHR pump in SPC Mode (reactor vessel level maintenance and decay heat removal functions)(4)1 RHR Service Water pump (decay heat removal function)(5)1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG), EDG auxiliaries, 1 EDGEmergency Service Water pump, 1 Emergency Service Water pump, and 1 Division of safety related power distribution (for all functions except negative reactivity)(6)Shutdown Instrumentation (from Reference 5)(a)Reactor Vessel Level(b)Reactor Pressure(c)Suppression Pool Temperature (d)Suppression Pool Level Evaluations performed to determine acceptable paths to safe shutdown utilized the above described minimum necessary equipment.
Additional safe shutdown paths can be described depending on the location of the postulated HELB and the single active failure taken. The HPCI system canbe used to maintain RPV water level and depressurize the RPV, so that the lowpressure high flow pumps (RHR or CS) can be used. Table I.4-1 identifies the systems available to support each shutdown performance goal.
For any postulated HELB with HPCI available, RCIC is not required, since HPCI could perform the same function. For any postulated HELB with HPCI not available due to a single active failure or HELB related damage, the unit is shutdown using the SRVs (RPV depressurization), Core Spray (RPV water level maintenance), and RHR (decay heat removal and RPV water levelmaintenance). No single active failure could affect more than 1 SRV, 1 CS
division, or 1 RHR division.
The RCIC System is not required for any postulated HELB in any of the identifiedcompartments. However, for most postulated HELBs RCIC is available to support
For any postulated HELB, at least one division of ESW is available to provide cooling to one division of RHR and CS systems. Hence, safe shutdown can be
accomplished for any postulated HELB without requiring the RCIC System to support the safe shutdown.0119683901196839 Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 4 of 13 I/kabI.4.3Safe Shutdown System Component LocationsFor each of the systems identified in Section I.4.1 of this report, the locations of the major components, main pipe routings, and power and control cable routings
are listed in this section. The information is provided by system and HELB analysis volume for reference.I.4.3.1Reactor Protection System The Reactor Protection System (RPS) consists of the motor generator set power supplies, the RPS power distribution panels, sensors and cabling. The
two motor-generator sets are located in the Reactor Building on the 935-footelevation in Volumes 14 and 17. The RPS power distribution panels are located in the Cable Spreading Room. There are sensors (i.e., high reactor pressure, etc.) included in the protection system that are located in a variety of sites throughout the plant.I.4.3.2Control Rod Drive System The Control Rod Drive System consists of the control rods and the associated
control rod drive hydraulic units. The electrical signals to the scram valves on the control rod drive hydraulic units are provided by the RPS. The control rods and Control Rod Drives are located inside of the Primary Containment. The control rod drive hydraulic units are located in two separate banks on either side of the Primary Containment on the 935 foot elevation of the Reactor Building in Volumes 14 and 18.I.4.3.3High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System The HPCI System consists of a pump with a steam driven turbine andassociated valving. It is located primarily in the HPCI room (Volume 8). The HPCI steam supply line and the HPCI injection line (PS18-8-ED and TW3-12-ED, respectively) are routed from main the steam chase (Volume 16)to the HPCI room (Volume 8). The valving for the HPCI System is located in
the above identified compartments. Power cabling for the HPCI System isrouted from the batteries in the EFT Building into the Turbine Building in theeast corridor on the 931-foot elevation (Volume 20). The cables are then routed into the condenser bay (Volume 15), from there into the CRD pump room(Volume 7), down to equipment and floor drain tank area (Volume 6), and finallyinto the HPCI Room (Volume 8).
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 5 of 13 I/kabI.4.3.4Reactor Pressure Relief SystemThe eight SRVs and associated piping are located inside of the Primary Containment on the main steam lines. There are four control panels and two instrument racks associated with the SRVs. The SRV control panel is locatedin the Cable Spreading Room. The SRV Low-Low Set control panel "A" is located in the cable spreading area. The "B" control panels are located in themain control room and on the third floor of the EFT Building. The SRV low-low set instrument rack "A" is located in the northeast corner of the torus area(Volume 9) and the "B" rack is located on the 935-foot elevation of the ReactorBuilding near the west side CRD hydraulic units (Volume 18).I.4.3.5Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System The RHR System is a two divisional system with two motor driven pumps in each division. The valving for the system consists of a series of suction and discharge valves, which allow the RHR System to be operated in various modes. Two of the RHR pumps are located in the southeast corner room of theReactor Building (Volume 1) and the other two in the southwest corner room ofthe Reactor Building (Volume 3). The suction valving is located in three separate compartments. Most of the RHR pump discharge valves are also located in the corner rooms with the following exceptions:(1)Division I suppression pool cooling (SPC) valves (MO-2006 and MO-2008) and the Division II SPC valve (MO-2009) are located in thetorus area (Volume 9-12).(2)Division II SPC mode outboard valve (MO-2007) is located on the westside of Reactor Building, at the 935-foot elevation in Volume 19.(3)The Division I LPCI injection and SDC containment isolation valves (MO-2014 and MO-2012) and the shutdown cooling line outboard isolation valve (MO-2030) are located in Volume 13 on the 935-foot elevation of the Reactor Building.(4)The Division II LPCI Injection and SDC containment isolation valves(MO-2013 and MO-2015) are located in Volume 20 on the 935-foot elevation of the Reactor Building.(5)The Division I containment spray isolation valves (MO-2020 andMO-2022) are located in Volume 14 on the 948-foot elevation of the
Reactor Building and the Division II valves (MO-2021 and MO-2023) arelocated on the 962-foot 6-inch elevation in Volumes 31 and 33.01196839 Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 6 of 13 I/kabThe power cabling for the RHR Pumps is routed from the respectivesafety-related switchgear room in the Turbine Building Volume 8 (Division I) andVolume 31 (Division II) underground to the Reactor Building. Division I cablesare then routed to RCIC room (Volume 5) and continue underground to thesoutheast corner room (Volume 1). The Division II cables are routed underground to the Reactor Building drain tank room (Volume 6) and thencontinue underground to the southwest corner room (Volume 3). The powercables to the valves are routed from the respective MCCs in the TurbineBuilding Volume 1 (Division I) and Volume 20 (Division II), to the CableSpreading Room, and into the Reactor Building via Volume 14 (Division I) and Volume 17 (Division II). From there the cables are routed to the respective valves. The control cables follow the routing of the valves' power cables. The power and control cables for Division II RHR valves MO-2007, MO-2009, andMO-2003 are routed from MCCs (Volume 24) to the third floor EFT Building.
They then go underground around the south side of the Reactor Building to the 935-foot elevation (Volume 18) of the Reactor Building and then to the respective valves.I.4.3.6Core Spray (CS) System The Core Spray System is a two divisional system capable of taking suppression pool water and spraying it over the top of the reactor core. Each division has a core spray pump, a valve on the suction line to the suppressionchamber, and inboard and outboard injection valves.
The Division I pump (P-208A) is located in the southeast corner room of theReactor Building (Volume 1) in the same room with the Division I RHR pumps.
Its suction line, (TW6-12-HE) is routed from the suppression chamber area(Volume 10) to the CS pump. The pool suction valve (MO-1741) is located inthe southeast corner room (Volume 1) with the CS pump. The discharge piping is routed from the southeast corner room, up through the east side of the935-foot elevation of the Reactor Building (Volume 14) and finally up to the962-foot 6-inch elevation of the Reactor Building on the east side (Volume 22).
The inboard and outboard injection valves (MO-1753 and MO-1751,respectively) are located in this area (Volume 22).
The Division II Core Spray System is located on the west side of the Reactor Building. The Division II core spray pump (P-208B) and the pool suction valve(MO-1742) are located in the southwest corner room (Volume 3). The CS pump suction piping is routed from the suppression chamber area (Volume 11) to the southwest corner room. The pump discharge piping is routed from the southwest corner room up through the 935-foot elevation of the ReactorBuilding (Volume 19), and up to the 962-foot 6-inch elevation of the ReactorBuilding (Volume 31). The inboard and outboard injection valves (MO-1754
and MO-1752, respectively) are located on the west side of the ReactorBuilding at the 962-foot 6-inch elevation in Volume 31.
The cabling for each division of the Core Spray System follows the same routing as the corresponding division of RHR.
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 7 of 13 I/kabI.4.3.7RHR Service Water SystemThe RHR Service Water (RHRSW) System supplies water from the ultimate heat sink (river) to the tube side of the RHR heat exchangers and back to the river. The system has 4 pumps with 2 dedicated to each division. The pumpsfor both divisions are located in the Intake Structure pump room (Volume 18).The discharge piping is routed from the Intake Structure (Volume 18) throughthe access tunnel (Volume 16) into the Turbine Building north corridor(Volume 5). From the Turbine Building north corridor they are routed above the931-foot elevation of the Turbine Building through Volumes 20 and 25, and intothe condenser bay area (Volume 15). The lines exit the Turbine Building from
the condenser bay and penetrate the Reactor Building in the TIP drive room,Volume 17. From the TIP drive room, the lines are routed to the torus area(Volumes 9-12) and then to the respective corner rooms.
Auxiliary air compressors are located on the 935-foot elevation of the ReactorBuilding, Division I in Volume 14 and Division II in Volume 19. Each divisions' heat exchanger discharge pressure control valves (CV-1728 and CV-1729) are also located in the respective corner rooms.Cabling for the system is routed entirely within the Turbine Building. The powercabling for the pumps is routed from the respective switchgear areas (Volumes8, and 31) to the Intake Structure (Volume 18). Control cabling is routed to the Control Room via the respective divisional routing in the Turbine Building. ForDivision I this would be from the cable spreading room to Volumes 21, 2, 22and 27. For Division II this would be from the cable spreading room to Volume 20 and then into the switchgear area.I.4.3.8Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System While not required for safe shutdown, the RCIC System may be used if
available. A description is included in this section for completeness.
The RCIC System, like the HPCI System, consists of a steam driventhe associated valves are located in RCIC room (Volume 5). The steam supplythe RCIC room through the torus area (Volume 9) and up into main steam chase (Volume 16). The valving for the RCIC System is located in either the RCIC room or main steam chase. The RCIC power cables are routed from the batteries in the Plant Administration Building through the Cable SpreadingRoom into TIP drive room (Volume 17) in the Reactor Building and down to theRCIC room (Volume 5).0119683901196839 Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 8 of 13 I/kabI.4.3.9Shutdown Instrumentation The Shutdown Instrumentation, like the other safety related equipment is divisionalized. The locations for the components for each division are given
below: Division Parameter Measured Equipment Designation Compartment IReactor Water LevelLT-2-3-112A East side of ReactorBldg. Elev. 935-foot I Suppression Pool LevelLT-7338ATorus Area I Reactor PressurePT-6-53A East side of Reactor Bldg. Elev. 962-foot
6-inch I Suppression Pool Temperature TE-4073A to 4080ATorus Area IIReactor Water LevelLT-2-3-112BWest side of Reactor Bldg. Elev. 935-foot II Suppression Pool LevelLT-7338BTorus Area II Reactor PressurePT-6-53BWest side of Reactor Bldg. Elev. 962-foot
6-inch II Suppression Pool Temperature TE-4073B to 4080BTorus Area The cabling from these instruments is routed through the same routing schemes back to the cable spreading area as are the other safety-related divisional separated cables. The only exceptions are the Division II suppression pool temperature cables and Alternate Shutdown System (ASDS) instruments. From the torus area they are routed into the condenser bay (Volume 15) and through Volume 20 on the 931-foot elevation of the Turbine Building and into the Emergency Filtration Building from there. ASDSinstruments that have been rerouted are reactor water level LT-2-3-112B andsuppression pool level LT-7338B. The routing is underground around the southside of the Reactor Building to the third floor, EFT.
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 9 of 13 I/kabI.4.3.10Emergency Service Water Systems The two emergency service water systems, consisting of the Emergency DieselGenerator Emergency Service Water (EDG-ESW) System and the EmergencyFiltration Train Emergency Service Water (EFT-ESW) System, are both two
divisional systems which collectively supply cooling water to the emergency diesel generators, the ECCS pump room coolers, the RHR & Core Spray pumps, and the EFT System. The systems, when combined, consist of 4pumps, P-111A, B, C & D, located in the Intake Structure (Volume 18). PumpsP-111A and P-111C are both Division I components, and pumps P-111B and P-111D are both Division II components.I.4.3.10.1Emergency Diesel Generator Emergency Service Water SystemPump P-111A and P-111B are used to supply cooling water to the Division I andDivision II emergency diesel generator, respectively. The discharge piping from each EDG-ESW pump tees in the intake structure with separate 4 inch lines
routed underground to the respective EDG. The other branch of the tee oneach line has a closed manual valve in the Intake Structure (ESW-61-1 andESW-61-2). The cooling water lines to the EDGs are cross-tied in the IntakeStructure. This allows cooling of either EDG from pump P-111A or P-111B.The power cable for Division I ESW pump P-111A is routed from MCC-134 inthe EFT Building, into the main feedpump area, (Volume 3), along the east corridor at the 911-foot elevation (Volume 3), along the north Turbine Buildingcorridor (Volume 5), through the access tunnel (Volume 16), and into the intakestructure. A control cable for P-111A is routed from the Control Room, throughthe Cable Spreading Room, through Volume 21, into the main feedpump area(Volume 3) and into the EFT Building. Another control cable for P-111A is
routed from C-03 in the Control Room, through the Cable Spreading Room,through Volume 21, into the main feedpump area (Volume 3), along the eastcorridor at the 911-foot elevation, along the north Turbine Building corridor(Volume 5), and into the Division I essential switchgear area (Volume 8) beforeentering the Division I EDG compartment (Volume 29).The power cable for Division II ESW pump P-111B is routed from MCC-143located in the southeast corner of the Turbine Building on elevation 931-foot(Volume 20), along the east corridor of the Turbine Building (Volume 20), alongthe north Turbine Building corridor (Volume 26), and into the Division IIessential switchgear area (Volume 31) before entering the Intake Structurethrough an underground duct bank. The control cables for P-111B originate in the EFT Building and are routed into the Turbine Building, southeast corner, at elevation 931-foot. From there, one of the control cables is routed directly intothe Control Room, one is routed to MCC-143 (which is located in Volume 20),and one is routed along the east Turbine Building corridor at the 931-footelevation (Volume 20), along the north Turbine Building corridor (Volume 26),
and into the Division II essential switchgear area (Volume 31) before enteringthe Division II Emergency Diesel Generator compartment (Volume 30).
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 10 of 13 I/kabI.4.3.10.2Emergency Filtration Train Emergency Service Water SystemPumps P-111C & D supply cooling water to the respective Division I and II ECCS pump room coolers, the RHR and Core Spray pumps, and the EFT System. The Division I ESW Line to ECCS room coolers and Division I RHR and Core Spray Pumps (ESW1-3-HF) is routed from the Intake Structure,through the access tunnel (Volume 16), into the Turbine Building north corridoron the 911-foot elevation (Volume 5). From there, it is routed in the northcorridor over into the reactor feed pump area (Volume 3). Within thiscompartment the lines tee again (Reference 18) with the piping line ESW1-3-HBD routed into the Emergency Filtration Building. The line to the ECCS pump room coolers and RHR and Core Spray Pumps SW30A-3-HF isrouted from the main feed pump area into the condenser bay area (Volume 15) on the 911-foot elevation. The pipe is routed along the east wall over to the south wall of the room. The piping line exits the condenser bay through the south wall and into the Reactor Building. This line enters the Reactor Buildingin the TIP drive room (Volume 17) and is routed from there into the torus area(Volume 9). Once in the torus area the line tees again with part of the flow routed to the southeast corner room (Volume 1) and the remainder to the HPCIroom (Volume 8) for the Division I HPCI room cooler.
The Division II ESW Line to the ECCS room coolers (ESW5-3-HF) follows a parallel route to its Division I counterpart to the north turbine corridor at the911-foot elevation (Volume 5). From there it is routed to Volume 20 on the931-foot elevation of the Turbine Building. In Volume 20 the line tees(Reference 19) with line SW30B-3-HF routed into Volume 21 and then into thecondenser bay (Volume 15). From the condenser bay, the line enters theReactor Building in the main steam chase (Volume 16) and from there is routedinto the torus area (Volume 12). After entering the torus area, the line teesagain with part of the flow going to the southwest corner room (Volume 3) andthe remainder to the Division II HPCI room cooler in the HPCI room (Volume 8).The cable for the other two ESW pumps (P-111C and P-111D) begins in theEFT Building. The power cable to P-111C is routed from MCC-134 in the EFTBuilding into the main feedpump area, Volume 3, along the east corridor at the911-foot elevation, and then along the north Turbine Building corridor Volume 5
into the access tunnel. One control cable is located entirely in the EFTBuilding. The other enters the Turbine Building in the main feedpump area,then is routed into Volume 21 and into the Cable Spreading Room, beforeentering the Control Room. For pump P-111D, the power cable is routed fromMCC-144 in the EFT Building into the Turbine Building southeast corner on the
931-foot elevation. It is then routed along the east corridor at that elevation intothe Division II cable way (Volume 35), and ending in Division II essentialswitchgear area, Volume 31. From there the cable is routed outside underground to the Intake Structure. Three control cables for this pump arelocated entirely within the EFT Building and the other enters the Turbine Building at the 931-foot elevation in Volume 20. From there it is routed up to the turbine operating floor before entering the Control Room.
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTPage 11 of 13 I/kabI.4.3.11Emergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliaries There is one Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) for each essential division atMonticello. The EDGs are located in adjacent compartments with EDG-11located in Volume 29 and EDG-12 located in Volume 30. The local control panels and air start systems are also located in the respective compartmentwith the EDG. The oil day tanks are located next to Volume 29 in separate day tank rooms. Cabling for power to the local control and electrical cabinets is
routed in the same manner as the control cables for RHRSW pumps. The EDG power cabling is routed to the respective essential switchgear which are inadjacent compartments in the Turbine Building.I.4.3.12Auxiliary Power Distribution SystemsThe Auxiliary Power Distribution System consists of the 4KV switchgear, the 480Vac load center, motor control centers and the transformers between them.
The system is capable of distributing the electrical power generated by theEDGs under a loss of off-site power condition. For Division I, both the 4KVswitchgear and 480Vac distribution equipment are located in Volume 8 on the911-foot elevation of the Turbine Building in the northwest corner. The Division II load centers are located directly above the Division I load centers on the next floor (931-foot elevation) in Volume 31. Essential MCCs - 133A, 142A and143A are located in the southeast corner of the Turbine Building with Division IMCC-133A located on the 911-foot elevation in Volume 1 and Division II MCCs- 142A and 143A located on the 931-foot elevation in Volume 20. EssentialMCCs - 134 and 144 are located in the EFT. The EFT is not assigned a volume number because there are no high energy lines within the building.
Cabling from load centers to the MCCs is routed in separate compartments.Cables from Division I load centers are routed from Volume 8 through Volumes35 and 26 terminating in Volume 20. Other Division I cables not terminating at the MCC are routed up into Volume 21 and into the cable spreading area. TheDivision II cables are routed from the load centers Volume 31 through Volumes32, 35 and 26 and terminating in Volume 20. Cables going to the cablespreading area are routed through Volume 20.I.4.3.13DC Power Systems With the exception of the 125 Vdc distribution panels located in the 4 KV switchgear rooms, the major DC power components required for safe shutdown are located in the battery rooms of the Administration or Emergency Filtration Buildings. The cabling is routed from Cable Spreading Room to the respectivecomponents along the divisional routings described previously. The only exception is the HPCI power cables, which are routed in a similar route to the Division II SPOTMOS cables. However, once routed into the Reactor Building,the HPCI cables are then routed to the HPCI area (Volume 8).
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 12 of 13 I/kabI.4.3.14HVAC SystemsThe only HVAC Equipment required for safe shutdown are the ECCS RoomCoolers, V-AC-5 (Division I) and V-AC-4 (Division II), located in respective
Reactor Building corner rooms on the 920-foot elevation and the EDG supplyfan, V-SF-9 for EDG No. 12 and V-SF-10 for EDG No. 11. The cooling water for the ECCS room coolers is supplied from the respective Emergency ServiceWater System pump with V-AC-5 supplied by P-111C, and V-AC-4 by P-111D.Power cabling for the V-AC-4 and V-AC-5 is routed into the Reactor Building from the cable spreading area in the same manner as the other divisional cables.The power and control cables for Division I EDG supply fan (V-SF-10) are routed from MCC-134 in the EFT Building, into the main feedpump area,(Volume 2), along the east corridor at the 911-foot elevation (Volume 3), alongthe north Turbine Building corridor (Volume 27) and into Division I switchgeararea (Volume 7) before entering the Division I EDG compartment (Volume 29).The power and control cables for Division II EDG supply fan (V-SF-9) arerouted from MCC-143 located in the southeast corner of the Turbine Building atthe 931-foot elevation, along the east corridor of the Turbine Building at the931-foot elevation, along the north Turbine Building corridor, and into theDivision II essential switchgear area (Volume 31) before entering the Division II EDG compartment (Volume 30).
Revision 26 USAR I.4MONTICELLO UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Page 13 of 13 I/kabTable I.4-1 Safe Shutdown Components AvailableSAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS AVAILABLE FOR EACH PERFORMANCE GOAL (1)Division Equipment Required to Achieve and Maintain Subcriticality Equipment Required to Maintain RPV Inventory (4)Equipment Required for RPV Depressurization Equipment Required to Remove Decay Heat I Reactor Protection System and Control Rods and Control
Rod Drives 1CS Pump and 2 RHR Pumps Available(5)*1 CS Pump or 1 RHR
Pump (LPCI Mode) (2)4 SRVs Available(5)*2 SRVs Needed for LPCI
RPV Inventory Recovery
Pump RPV Inventory
Recovery4 SRVs, 2 RHR Pumps, 1 CS Pump, 1 RHR Heat Exchanger, and 2 RHRSW Pumps Available
Pump Needed II Reactor Protection System
and Control Rods and Control
Rod Drives HPCI, 1 CS Pump, and 2 RHR Pumps Available
Needed or;
Pump RPV Inventory Recovery4 SRVs, 2 RHR Pump, 1 CS Pump, 1 RHRHeat Exchanger, and 2 RHRSW Pumps Available*1 RHR Pump (SDC Mode), RHR HeatExchanger, and 1 RHRSW Pump Needed or;
Needed 1 Required Auxiliary Support Systems (i.e., EDG, EDG Auxiliaries, Essential Power Dist. Sys., ESW System, Shutdown Instrumentatio n) always required.2Following RPV depressurization by SRVs and RCIC not available.
3Following RPV depressurization by SRVs and HPCI not available.
4RHR pump used for RPV Inventory Control cannot be same RHR pump used for Decay Heat Removal, except for the final path described for either
division under decay heat removal of this table.
5 Though not required safe shutdown equipment, RCIC if available, could be used.0119683901196839 APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT I.5HELB and Safe Shutdown Evaluation I.5.1
I.5.2HELB Evaluations by System
I.5.3Table of System Effects
1 1
APPENDIX IEVALUATION OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT I.6References
Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage1of11APPENDIXIEVALUATIONOFHIGHENERGYLINEBREAKSOUTSIDECONTAINMENT I/arbFIGURES Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage2of11 I/arbFigureI.1-1ReactorBldgEl.896-0 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage3of11 I/arbFigureI.1-2ReactorBldg(Approx923)TopofTorus-UpperLevelsofRHRRooms,HPCI,RCIC Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage4of11 I/arbFigureI.1-3ReactorBldg-El.935-0 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage5of11 I/arbFigureI.1-4ReactorBldg-El.962-0 24 25 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage6of11 I/arbFigureI.1-5ReactorBldg-985(DW-983,Vessel-989)
Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage7of11 I/arbFigureI.1-6ReactorBldg-1001 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage8of11 I/arbFigureI.1-7ReactorBldg-1027 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage9of11 I/arbFigureI.1-8TurbineBldg.El.911-0 19 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage10of11 I/arbFigureI.1-9TurbineBldg.El.931-0 01279956 Revision30USAR-I.FIGMONTICELLOUPDATEDSAFETYANALYSISREPORTPage11of11 I/arbFigureI.1-10TurbineBldg.El.951-0 37