ML18100B074: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
Line 16: | Line 16: | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:}} | {{#Wiki_filter:e e P.ublic Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 | ||
==Dear Sir:== | |||
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 94-006-00 May 11, 1994 This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Code of Federal Regulation 10CFR50.73(a) | |||
(2) (i) (B). Issuance of this report is required within thirty (30) days of event discovery. | |||
MJPJ:pc Distribution | |||
*.-: r-, { t* *:" ::" . .. '* \.i ...... ..J 9405190069 940511 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDR 1 ! *:. :'. : :: ;: ' \ l[i i-f>'J <J Sincerely yours, General Manager -Salem Operations . //'\-;f j .")t,,O L/ 95-2189 REV 7-92 NRC FORM 366 .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555*0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150*0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503. FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3) Salem Station -Unit 2 05000 311 1 OF 04 TITLE (4) Failure To Declare Pressurizer Relief Valves 2PR1 And 2PR2 Inoperable After Closure Of Pressurizer Block Valves 2PR6 and 2PR7. EVENT DATE 15\ LER NUMBER 16 REPORT NUMBER (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 18\ SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER ----05000 03 25 94 94 006 00 05 11 94 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more 111) MODE (9) 1 20.402(b) 20.405(c) | |||
: 50. 73(a) (2) (iv) 73.71(b) | |||
* powER 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c) (1) 50.73(a) (2)(v) 73.71(c) _ llill 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a) (2) (vii) OTHER 20.405(a) | |||
(1) (iii) x 50. 73(a)(2) (i) 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(A) (Specify in Abstract 20.405(a)(1) (iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) | |||
: 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(B) below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a) (2) (x) LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12) NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) M. J. Pastva. Jr. -LER Coordinator (609) 339-5165 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR I YES SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO DATE (15) x ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) Action "a." of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.5 should have been entered, at 0332 hours on March 25, 1994, when 2PR6 and 2PR7 (respective block valves for the power operated relief valves, 2PR1 and 2PR2) were closed per procedure. | |||
TS were not met until the block vaives were reopened, at 1045 hours on 3/25/94. While the block valves were closed, a Nuclear Control Operator was stationed to open them, if required. | |||
This event occurred because the procedure did not clarify the effect of block valve closure on PORV operability. | |||
Night Order Book entries were made on 3/25/94 and 3/31/94 to inform licensed operators of the requirement to enter TS 3.4.5 when the PORV block valve(s) are closed for leak determination. | |||
This event was reviewed with licensed Operations personnel. | |||
Procedures will be appropriately revised to require reference to TS, whenever PORV block valve(s) a:re closed. This event will be included in Licensed Operator re-qualification and initial License training. | |||
Appropriate TS interpretation(s) will be reviewed and revised, as necessary. | |||
NRC FORM 366 (5*92) | |||
BLOCK NUMBER 1 2 3 4 5 ' 6 7 8 9 -10 11 12 13 14 15 REQUIRED NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS FOR EACH BLOCK NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS TITLE UP TO 46 FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 DOCKET NUMBER VARIES PAGE NUMBER UP TO 76 TITLE 6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK EVENT DATE 7 TOTAL 2 FOR YEAR 3 FOR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER LER NUMBER 2 FOR REVISION NUMBER 6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK REPORT DATE UP TO 18 --FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL --DOCKET NUMBER OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 1 OPERATING MODE 3 POWER LEVEL 1 CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR UP TO 50 FOR NAME 14 FOR TELEPHONE LICENSEE CONTACT CAUSE VARIES 2 FOR SYSTEM 4 FOR COMPONENT EACH COMPONENT FAILURE 4 FOR MANUFACTURER NPRDS VARIES 1 CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION: | |||
Westinghouse | |||
-Pressurized Water Reactor LER NUMBER 94-006-00 PAGE 2 of 4 Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in | |||
* the text as {xx} IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: | |||
Failure To Declare Pressurizer Relief Valves 2PR1 and 2PR2 Inoperable After Closure Of Pressurizer Block Valves 2PR6 And 2PR7 Event Date: 3/25/94 Event Discovery Date: 4/12/94 Report Date: 5/11/94 This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 94-104. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE: | |||
Mode 1 Reactor Power 92% -Unit Load 1010 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: | |||
Action "a." of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.5 should have been entered, at 0332 hours on March 25, 1994, when 2PR6 and 2PR7 {AB} (respective block valves for the power operated relief valves, 2PR1 and 2PR2 {AB}) were closed in accordance with procedure. | |||
TS were not met until the block valves were reopened, at 1045 hours on March 25, 1994. ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: | |||
TS Action "a.11 requires, in part, that in MODES-1, 2, and 3, with one or more PORVs inoperable, within one hour either restore the PORVs to operable status or close the associated block valves and remove power to the block valves; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next six hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN with the following 30 hours. The PORV block valves were closed, in accordance with Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001(Q), Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction. | |||
This was done to support Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) {AB} inleakage determination by'measurement of PRT inleakage with and without the PORVs isolated. | |||
The interpretation of this action is that the PORVs are rendered inoperable by closure of the block valves. Therefore, power to the block valves should have been removed within ___ ___J LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER | |||
* 5000311 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) LER NUMBER 94-006-00 PAGE 3 of 4 one hour of closing the valves. TS 3.4.5 was reviewed along with TS Interpretation 2-Limiting Condition of Operation-3.4.5. | |||
Neither document addre-sses specifically the operability of the PORVs when manually isolated by closure of the block valves. Based upon the procedure guidance, Operations believed that the 2PR6 and 2PR7 closure did not affect PORV operability since the block valves were closed manually and were still capable of being opened by the NCO. In a pending.revision of the TS, power to the block valve will not be removed when the valve is closed i.n order to isolate a leaking PORV. NRC Generic Letter 90-06 confirms the desirability of keeping the PORV* block valves energized if a PORV is suspected to be the cause of excessive leakage. The source of the subject leakage was subsequently determined to be from the one or more of the Reactor Head Vent valves, 2RC40, 41, *42, and 43 {AB}. Event determination followed review of Technical Basis Document S2.0P-AB.PZR-001 and discussion with the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. | |||
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: | |||
The cause of this occurrence is "Defective Procedure", as classified in Appendix B of NUREG-1022, due to failure of the procedure to clarify the effect of block valve closure on PORV operability. | |||
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES: | |||
There are no previous documented occurrences of this event since closure of the Pressurizer block valves under administrative controls was not considered as rendering the PORV inoperable. | |||
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: | |||
This event is reportable pursuant to the requirements-of 10CFR50.73(a) | |||
(2) (i) (B), due to failure to comply with TS. This event did not affect the health and safety of the public as credit is not taken for PORV operation in the accident analyses of the Salem Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. CORRECTIVE ACTION: Night Order Book entries were made on March 25, 1994 and reemphasized on March Ji, 1994 to inform licensed operators of the requirement to enter TS 3.4.5 when the PORV block valve(s) are closed for leak | |||
" LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating station Unit 2-CORRECTIVE ACTION: (cont'd) determination. | |||
DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 LER NUMBER 94-006-00 This event was reviewed.with licensed Operations personnel. | |||
PAGE 4 of 4 Procedures for both Units will be appropriately revised to require reference to TS, whenever PORV block valve(s) are closed. This event will be included in Licensed Operator re-qualification and initial license training. | |||
Appropriate TS.interpretation(s) for both Units will be reviewed and revised, as necessary. | |||
The Reactor Head Vent valve(s) will be repaired during the next outage of sufficient length. MJPJ:pc . SORC Mtg. 94-042}} |
Revision as of 08:40, 13 December 2018
ML18100B074 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Salem |
Issue date: | 05/11/1994 |
From: | HAGAN J J, PASTVA M J Public Service Enterprise Group |
To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
References | |
LER-94-006-01, LER-94-6-1, NUDOCS 9405190069 | |
Download: ML18100B074 (6) | |
Text
e e P.ublic Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 94-006-00 May 11, 1994 This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Code of Federal Regulation 10CFR50.73(a)
(2) (i) (B). Issuance of this report is required within thirty (30) days of event discovery.
MJPJ:pc Distribution
- .-: r-, { t* *:" ::" . .. '* \.i ...... ..J 9405190069 940511 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDR 1 ! *:. :'. : :: ;: ' \ l[i i-f>'J <J Sincerely yours, General Manager -Salem Operations . //'\-;f j .")t,,O L/ 95-2189 REV 7-92 NRC FORM 366 .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555*0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150*0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503. FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3) Salem Station -Unit 2 05000 311 1 OF 04 TITLE (4) Failure To Declare Pressurizer Relief Valves 2PR1 And 2PR2 Inoperable After Closure Of Pressurizer Block Valves 2PR6 and 2PR7. EVENT DATE 15\ LER NUMBER 16 REPORT NUMBER (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 18\ SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER ----05000 03 25 94 94 006 00 05 11 94 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more 111) MODE (9) 1 20.402(b) 20.405(c)
- 50. 73(a) (2) (iv) 73.71(b)
- powER 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c) (1) 50.73(a) (2)(v) 73.71(c) _ llill 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a) (2) (vii) OTHER 20.405(a)
(1) (iii) x 50. 73(a)(2) (i) 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(A) (Specify in Abstract 20.405(a)(1) (iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(B) below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a) (2) (x) LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12) NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) M. J. Pastva. Jr. -LER Coordinator (609) 339-5165 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR I YES SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO DATE (15) x ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) Action "a." of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.5 should have been entered, at 0332 hours0.00384 days <br />0.0922 hours <br />5.489418e-4 weeks <br />1.26326e-4 months <br /> on March 25, 1994, when 2PR6 and 2PR7 (respective block valves for the power operated relief valves, 2PR1 and 2PR2) were closed per procedure.
TS were not met until the block vaives were reopened, at 1045 hours0.0121 days <br />0.29 hours <br />0.00173 weeks <br />3.976225e-4 months <br /> on 3/25/94. While the block valves were closed, a Nuclear Control Operator was stationed to open them, if required.
This event occurred because the procedure did not clarify the effect of block valve closure on PORV operability.
Night Order Book entries were made on 3/25/94 and 3/31/94 to inform licensed operators of the requirement to enter TS 3.4.5 when the PORV block valve(s) are closed for leak determination.
This event was reviewed with licensed Operations personnel.
Procedures will be appropriately revised to require reference to TS, whenever PORV block valve(s) a:re closed. This event will be included in Licensed Operator re-qualification and initial License training.
Appropriate TS interpretation(s) will be reviewed and revised, as necessary.
NRC FORM 366 (5*92)
BLOCK NUMBER 1 2 3 4 5 ' 6 7 8 9 -10 11 12 13 14 15 REQUIRED NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS FOR EACH BLOCK NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS TITLE UP TO 46 FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 DOCKET NUMBER VARIES PAGE NUMBER UP TO 76 TITLE 6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK EVENT DATE 7 TOTAL 2 FOR YEAR 3 FOR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER LER NUMBER 2 FOR REVISION NUMBER 6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK REPORT DATE UP TO 18 --FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL --DOCKET NUMBER OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 1 OPERATING MODE 3 POWER LEVEL 1 CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR UP TO 50 FOR NAME 14 FOR TELEPHONE LICENSEE CONTACT CAUSE VARIES 2 FOR SYSTEM 4 FOR COMPONENT EACH COMPONENT FAILURE 4 FOR MANUFACTURER NPRDS VARIES 1 CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:
Westinghouse
-Pressurized Water Reactor LER NUMBER 94-006-00 PAGE 2 of 4 Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in
- the text as {xx} IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Failure To Declare Pressurizer Relief Valves 2PR1 and 2PR2 Inoperable After Closure Of Pressurizer Block Valves 2PR6 And 2PR7 Event Date: 3/25/94 Event Discovery Date: 4/12/94 Report Date: 5/11/94 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.94-104. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
Mode 1 Reactor Power 92% -Unit Load 1010 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
Action "a." of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.5 should have been entered, at 0332 hours0.00384 days <br />0.0922 hours <br />5.489418e-4 weeks <br />1.26326e-4 months <br /> on March 25, 1994, when 2PR6 and 2PR7 {AB} (respective block valves for the power operated relief valves, 2PR1 and 2PR2 {AB}) were closed in accordance with procedure.
TS were not met until the block valves were reopened, at 1045 hours0.0121 days <br />0.29 hours <br />0.00173 weeks <br />3.976225e-4 months <br /> on March 25, 1994. ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
TS Action "a.11 requires, in part, that in MODES-1, 2, and 3, with one or more PORVs inoperable, within one hour either restore the PORVs to operable status or close the associated block valves and remove power to the block valves; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next six hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN with the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. The PORV block valves were closed, in accordance with Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001(Q), Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction.
This was done to support Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) {AB} inleakage determination by'measurement of PRT inleakage with and without the PORVs isolated.
The interpretation of this action is that the PORVs are rendered inoperable by closure of the block valves. Therefore, power to the block valves should have been removed within ___ ___J LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER
- 5000311 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) LER NUMBER 94-006-00 PAGE 3 of 4 one hour of closing the valves. TS 3.4.5 was reviewed along with TS Interpretation 2-Limiting Condition of Operation-3.4.5.
Neither document addre-sses specifically the operability of the PORVs when manually isolated by closure of the block valves. Based upon the procedure guidance, Operations believed that the 2PR6 and 2PR7 closure did not affect PORV operability since the block valves were closed manually and were still capable of being opened by the NCO. In a pending.revision of the TS, power to the block valve will not be removed when the valve is closed i.n order to isolate a leaking PORV. NRC Generic Letter 90-06 confirms the desirability of keeping the PORV* block valves energized if a PORV is suspected to be the cause of excessive leakage. The source of the subject leakage was subsequently determined to be from the one or more of the Reactor Head Vent valves, 2RC40, 41, *42, and 43 {AB}. Event determination followed review of Technical Basis Document S2.0P-AB.PZR-001 and discussion with the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
The cause of this occurrence is "Defective Procedure", as classified in Appendix B of NUREG-1022, due to failure of the procedure to clarify the effect of block valve closure on PORV operability.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:
There are no previous documented occurrences of this event since closure of the Pressurizer block valves under administrative controls was not considered as rendering the PORV inoperable.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:
This event is reportable pursuant to the requirements-of 10CFR50.73(a)
(2) (i) (B), due to failure to comply with TS. This event did not affect the health and safety of the public as credit is not taken for PORV operation in the accident analyses of the Salem Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. CORRECTIVE ACTION: Night Order Book entries were made on March 25, 1994 and reemphasized on March Ji, 1994 to inform licensed operators of the requirement to enter TS 3.4.5 when the PORV block valve(s) are closed for leak
" LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating station Unit 2-CORRECTIVE ACTION: (cont'd) determination.
DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 LER NUMBER 94-006-00 This event was reviewed.with licensed Operations personnel.
PAGE 4 of 4 Procedures for both Units will be appropriately revised to require reference to TS, whenever PORV block valve(s) are closed. This event will be included in Licensed Operator re-qualification and initial license training.
Appropriate TS.interpretation(s) for both Units will be reviewed and revised, as necessary.
The Reactor Head Vent valve(s) will be repaired during the next outage of sufficient length. MJPJ:pc . SORC Mtg.94-042