Information Notice 1992-09, Overloading and Subsequent Lock Out of Electrical Buses During Accident Conditions: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 3
| page count = 3
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULArORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555January 30, 1992NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-09: OVERLOADING AND SUBSEQUENT LOCK OUT OFELECTRICAL BUSES DURING ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULArORY
 
COMMISSION
 
===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 January 30, 1992 NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICE 92-09: OVERLOADING
 
AND SUBSEQUENT
 
LOCK OUT OF ELECTRICAL
 
===BUSES DURING ACCIDENT CONDITIONS===


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All holders of operating licenses 6toJMnstruett0n permits for nuclear powerreactors.92 FEa 13 A8:49
All holders of operating
 
licenses 6toJMnstruett0n
 
permits for nuclear power reactors.92 FEa 13 A8:49  


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission (NRC) is issuing this information noticeto alert addressees to a particular scenario identified by a licensee wherebyelectrical buses could be overloaded during accident conditions, deenergized,and prevented from being reenergized. It is expected that recipients willreview the Information for applicability to their facilities and consideractions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestionscontained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, nospecific action or written response is required.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Comnission (NRC) is issuing this information
 
notice to alert addressees
 
to a particular
 
scenario identified
 
by a licensee whereby electrical
 
buses could be overloaded
 
during accident conditions, deenergized, and prevented
 
from being reenergized.
 
It is expected that recipients
 
will review the Information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
 
===However, suggestions===
contained
 
in this information
 
notice are not NRC requirements;  
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
 
of Circumstances
 
On November 21, 1991, the Power Authority
 
for the State of New York, the licensee for Indian Point Nuclear Generating
 
Unit 3, reported that the vital buses could bWcome overloaded
 
during a loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) as a result of emergency
 
operating
 
procedures
 
directing
 
operators
 
to restore non-essential
 
loads to the buses if offsite power is not lost. The procedure
 
would result in both emergency
 
and non-emergency
 
loads being powered concurrently
 
from the same bus. The licensee's
 
recent calculations
 
reveal that performing
 
this procedure
 
could have overloaded
 
buses. The resulting
 
overcurrent
 
condition could lock out a bus (i.e., deenergize
 
the bus and prevent it from being reenergized
 
from any source including
 
the associated
 
emergency
 
diesel generator).
 
Discussion
 
A LOCA is generally
 
analyzed as the most limiting condition
 
in power demand for onsite electrical
 
systems. When non-essential
 
loads are added to the power system under this most demanding
 
condition, electrical
 
buses and breakers could be overloaded.
 
The electrical
 
protection
 
system recognizes
 
such an overloaded
 
condition
 
as an electrical
 
fault on a bus and locks out the bus. The dc-powered
 
breaker controls retain the faulted condition, and the emergency
 
diesel generator will not be able to energize the bus until protective
 
relays are manually reset. The scenario could result in disabling
 
redundant
 
trains of safety-related
 
equipment.
 
9201240235 p* WI''
IN 92-09 January 30, 1992 This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the technical
 
contact listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.o &Dbec Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
contact: Thomas Koshy (301) 504-1176 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices
 
------ ____-9 r Attachment
 
IN 92-09 January 30, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICES Information
 
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 92-08 92-07 92-06 42-05 92-04 92-03 92-02 92-01 91-87 Revised Protective
 
Action Guidance for Nuclear Inci-dents Rapid Flow-Induced
 
Erosion/Corrosion
 
of Feedwater
 
Piping Reliability
 
of ATWS Mitiga-tion System and Other NRC Required Equipment
 
Not Controlled
 
by Plant Tech-nical Specifications
 
Potential
 
===Coil Insulation===
Breakdcwn
 
in ABB RXMH2 Relays Potter & Brumfield
 
Model MDR Rotary Relay Failures Remote Trip Function Failures in General Electric F-Frame Molded-Case
 
Circuit Breakers RelapS/Mod3 Computer Code Error Associated
 
with the Conservation
 
of Energy Equation Cable Damage Caused by Inadequate
 
Cable Installa-tion Procedures
 
and Controls Hydrogen Etbrittlement
 
of Raychem Cryofit Couplings 01/23/92 01/09/92 01/15/92 01/08/92 01/06/92 01/06/92 01/03/92 01/03/92 12/27/91 All fuel cycle and materi-als licensees
 
authorized
 
to possess large quanti-ties of radioactive
 
materi-ial.All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized


==Description of Circumstances==
water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.L a Operating
On November 21, 1991, the Power Authority for the State of New York, thelicensee for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3, reported that the vitalbuses could bWcome overloaded during a loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) as aresult of emergency operating procedures directing operators to restore non-essential loads to the buses if offsite power is not lost. The procedure wouldresult in both emergency and non-emergency loads being powered concurrentlyfrom the same bus. The licensee's recent calculations reveal that performingthis procedure could have overloaded buses. The resulting overcurrent conditioncould lock out a bus (i.e., deenergize the bus and prevent it from beingreenergized from any source including the associated emergency diesel generator).DiscussionA LOCA is generally analyzed as the most limiting condition in power demand foronsite electrical systems. When non-essential loads are added to the powersystem under this most demanding condition, electrical buses and breakers couldbe overloaded. The electrical protection system recognizes such an overloadedcondition as an electrical fault on a bus and locks out the bus. The dc-poweredbreaker controls retain the faulted condition, and the emergency diesel generatorwill not be able to energize the bus until protective relays are manuallyreset. The scenario could result in disabling redundant trains of safety-relatedequipment.9201240235 p* WI''
IN 92-09January 30, 1992 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.o &DbecDivision of Operational Events Assessmentoffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contact: Thomas Koshy(301) 504-1176Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


------ ____-9 rAttachmentIN 92-09January 30, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to92-0892-0792-0642-0592-0492-0392-0292-0191-87Revised Protective ActionGuidance for Nuclear Inci-dentsRapid Flow-Induced Erosion/Corrosion of Feedwater PipingReliability of ATWS Mitiga-tion System and Other NRCRequired Equipment NotControlled by Plant Tech-nical SpecificationsPotential Coil InsulationBreakdcwn in ABB RXMH2 RelaysPotter & Brumfield ModelMDR Rotary Relay FailuresRemote Trip FunctionFailures in General ElectricF-Frame Molded-Case CircuitBreakersRelapS/Mod3 Computer CodeError Associated with theConservation of EnergyEquationCable Damage Caused byInadequate Cable Installa-tion Procedures and ControlsHydrogen Etbrittlement ofRaychem Cryofit Couplings01/23/9201/09/9201/15/9201/08/9201/06/9201/06/9201/03/9201/03/9212/27/91All fuel cycle and materi-als licensees authorizedto possess large quanti-ties of radioactive materi-ial.All holders of OLs or CPsfor pressurized waterreactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.L a Operating LicenseP a Construction Permit
License P a Construction


}}
Permit}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Revision as of 13:06, 31 August 2018

Overloading and Subsequent Lock Out of Electrical Buses During Accident Conditions
ML031200714
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 01/30/1992
From: Rossi C E
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-92-009, NUDOCS 9201240235
Download: ML031200714 (3)


UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULArORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 January 30, 1992 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE 92-09: OVERLOADING

AND SUBSEQUENT

LOCK OUT OF ELECTRICAL

BUSES DURING ACCIDENT CONDITIONS

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses 6toJMnstruett0n

permits for nuclear power reactors.92 FEa 13 A8:49

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Comnission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees

to a particular

scenario identified

by a licensee whereby electrical

buses could be overloaded

during accident conditions, deenergized, and prevented

from being reenergized.

It is expected that recipients

will review the Information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description

of Circumstances

On November 21, 1991, the Power Authority

for the State of New York, the licensee for Indian Point Nuclear Generating

Unit 3, reported that the vital buses could bWcome overloaded

during a loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) as a result of emergency

operating

procedures

directing

operators

to restore non-essential

loads to the buses if offsite power is not lost. The procedure

would result in both emergency

and non-emergency

loads being powered concurrently

from the same bus. The licensee's

recent calculations

reveal that performing

this procedure

could have overloaded

buses. The resulting

overcurrent

condition could lock out a bus (i.e., deenergize

the bus and prevent it from being reenergized

from any source including

the associated

emergency

diesel generator).

Discussion

A LOCA is generally

analyzed as the most limiting condition

in power demand for onsite electrical

systems. When non-essential

loads are added to the power system under this most demanding

condition, electrical

buses and breakers could be overloaded.

The electrical

protection

system recognizes

such an overloaded

condition

as an electrical

fault on a bus and locks out the bus. The dc-powered

breaker controls retain the faulted condition, and the emergency

diesel generator will not be able to energize the bus until protective

relays are manually reset. The scenario could result in disabling

redundant

trains of safety-related

equipment.

9201240235 p* WI

IN 92-09 January 30, 1992 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.o &Dbec Division of Operational

Events Assessment

office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Thomas Koshy (301) 504-1176 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices


____-9 r Attachment

IN 92-09 January 30, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 92-08 92-07 92-06 42-05 92-04 92-03 92-02 92-01 91-87 Revised Protective

Action Guidance for Nuclear Inci-dents Rapid Flow-Induced

Erosion/Corrosion

of Feedwater

Piping Reliability

of ATWS Mitiga-tion System and Other NRC Required Equipment

Not Controlled

by Plant Tech-nical Specifications

Potential

Coil Insulation

Breakdcwn

in ABB RXMH2 Relays Potter & Brumfield

Model MDR Rotary Relay Failures Remote Trip Function Failures in General Electric F-Frame Molded-Case

Circuit Breakers RelapS/Mod3 Computer Code Error Associated

with the Conservation

of Energy Equation Cable Damage Caused by Inadequate

Cable Installa-tion Procedures

and Controls Hydrogen Etbrittlement

of Raychem Cryofit Couplings 01/23/92 01/09/92 01/15/92 01/08/92 01/06/92 01/06/92 01/03/92 01/03/92 12/27/91 All fuel cycle and materi-als licensees

authorized

to possess large quanti-ties of radioactive

materi-ial.All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized

water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.L a Operating

License P a Construction

Permit