|
|
Line 14: |
Line 14: |
| | page count = 6 | | | page count = 6 |
| }} | | }} |
| {{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No.: 6835IN 86-42UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENTWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555June 9, 1986IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-42: IMPROPER MAINTENANCE OF RADIATIONMONITORING SYSTEMS | | {{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-42 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY |
| | |
| | COMMISSION |
| | |
| | OFFICE OF INSPECTION |
| | |
| | ===AND ENFORCEMENT=== |
| | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 June 9, 1986 IE INFORMATION |
| | |
| | NOTICE NO. 86-42: IMPROPER MAINTENANCE |
| | |
| | OF RADIATION MONITORING |
| | |
| | SYSTEMS |
|
| |
|
| ==Addressees== | | ==Addressees== |
| :All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or aconstruction permit (CP). | | : |
| | All nuclear power reactor facilities |
| | |
| | holding an operating |
| | |
| | license (OL) or a construction |
| | |
| | permit (CP). |
|
| |
|
| ==Purpose== | | ==Purpose== |
| and Summary:This notice is issued to alert licensees to the potential for defeating thesafety function associated with radiation monitoring systems by not properlyadhering to established surveillance and maintenance procedures. A recentevent at a BWR, when an electrical jumper was inadvertently left in place aftera planned surveillance, led to failure to maintain secondary containmentintegrity during irradiated fuel movement.It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability totheir maintenance and surveillance program and consider actions, if appropriate,to preclude similar problems at their facility. However, suggestions containedin this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific actionor written response is required.Previous Related CorrespondenceIE Information Notice No. 83-23, "Inoperable Containment AtmosphereSensing Systems," April 25, 1983.INPO Significant Event Report, 35-83, "Compromise of Secondary ContainmentIntegrity," June 9, 1983.IE Information Notice No. 83-52, "Radioactive Waste Gas System Events,"August 9, 1983.IE Information Notice No. 84-37, "Use of Lifted Leads and Jumpers DuringMaintenance or Surveillance Testing," May 10, 1984. | | and Summary: This notice is issued to alert licensees |
| | |
| | to the potential |
| | |
| | for defeating |
| | |
| | the safety function associated |
| | |
| | with radiation |
| | |
| | monitoring |
| | |
| | systems by not properly adhering to established |
| | |
| | surveillance |
| | |
| | and maintenance |
| | |
| | procedures. |
| | |
| | A recent event at a BWR, when an electrical |
| | |
| | jumper was inadvertently |
| | |
| | left in place after a planned surveillance, led to failure to maintain secondary |
| | |
| | containment |
| | |
| | integrity |
| | |
| | during irradiated |
| | |
| | fuel movement.It is expected that recipients |
| | |
| | will review the information |
| | |
| | for applicability |
| | |
| | to their maintenance |
| | |
| | and surveillance |
| | |
| | program and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar problems at their facility. |
| | |
| | However, suggestions |
| | |
| | contained in this notice do not constitute |
| | |
| | NRC requirements; |
| | therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Previous Related Correspondence |
| | |
| | IE Information |
| | |
| | Notice No. 83-23, "Inoperable |
| | |
| | Containment |
| | |
| | Atmosphere |
| | |
| | Sensing Systems," April 25, 1983.INPO Significant |
| | |
| | Event Report, 35-83, "Compromise |
| | |
| | of Secondary |
| | |
| | Containment |
| | |
| | Integrity," June 9, 1983.IE Information |
| | |
| | Notice No. 83-52, "Radioactive |
| | |
| | Waste Gas System Events," August 9, 1983.IE Information |
| | |
| | Notice No. 84-37, "Use of Lifted Leads and Jumpers During Maintenance |
| | |
| | or Surveillance |
| | |
| | Testing," May 10, 1984.Description |
| | |
| | of Circumstances: |
| | On November 18, 1985 the Cooper Nuclear Station was in a shutdown condition (reactor coolant temperature |
| | |
| | less than 212 0 F and vented) with acceptance |
| | |
| | testing for a plant design change in progress. |
| | |
| | When this testing failed to provide for the required Group VI isolation (various containment |
| | |
| | isolation |
| | |
| | and Copies to: Withers, Yundt, Lentsch, Orser, Steele, E. Burton, E. Jordan, A. Holm, iLIS;.j. A. Olmstead, S. Hoag, S. Sautter, TNP:GOV REL F:NRC CHRONO, TNiPGOV REL F:NRC IE Information |
| | |
| | Notice 86-42 PGE OAR Action -M. H. Halmros (Due 8/12/86)NSRD Action -M. H. Malmros |
| | |
| | IN 86-42 June 9, 1986 engineered |
| | |
| | safety feature (ESF) initiations), the licensee investigated |
| | |
| | and discovered |
| | |
| | that electrical |
| | |
| | jumpers were installed |
| | |
| | in the reactor building (RB)ventilation |
| | |
| | radiation |
| | |
| | monitors (VRM) auxiliary |
| | |
| | trip units. These jumpers prohibited |
| | |
| | a Group VI isolation |
| | |
| | by a high radiation |
| | |
| | signal from the RB VRM.The jumpers were immediately |
| | |
| | removed and the NRC was promptly notified as required by 10 CFR 50.72.The licensee's |
| | |
| | subsequent |
| | |
| | investigation |
| | |
| | revealed that the electrical |
| | |
| | jumpers had been installed |
| | |
| | on November 13, 1985 by an instrument |
| | |
| | and control technician |
| | |
| | during a routine surveillance |
| | |
| | procedure |
| | |
| | to functionally |
| | |
| | test the VRM. These jumpers are used to prevent trip and equipment |
| | |
| | operations |
| | |
| | during the required functional/calibration |
| | |
| | testing. The technician |
| | |
| | had signed off the procedural |
| | |
| | step requiring |
| | |
| | jumper removal (before actually removing the electrical |
| | |
| | jumper)and then started checking control room annunciator |
| | |
| | and trip signal status. The technician |
| | |
| | then became involved in other unrelated |
| | |
| | craft work and forgot to go back and remove the jumpers.On November 18, 1986, before discovery |
| | |
| | of the jumpers, 18 irradiated |
| | |
| | fuel bundles were loaded into a spent fuel shipping cask. Failure to properly implement |
| | |
| | the surveillance |
| | |
| | procedure |
| | |
| | for operability |
| | |
| | checks of radiation monitors rendered inoperable |
| | |
| | the automatic |
| | |
| | initiation |
| | |
| | of the standby gas treatment |
| | |
| | system (SBGTS) and automatic |
| | |
| | isolation |
| | |
| | of the reactor building upon receipt of a high radiation |
| | |
| | signal. This degraded condition |
| | |
| | lasted approxi-mately 5 days. However, control room annunciators |
| | |
| | and instrumentation |
| | |
| | that would provide warning to operators |
| | |
| | of any high radiation |
| | |
| | problems remained operational |
| | |
| | during the 5 days. Manual-start |
| | |
| | of the SBGTS and reactor building isolation |
| | |
| | capabilities |
| | |
| | from the control room remained available |
| | |
| | during the event.Discussion: |
| | This event clearly demonstrates |
| | |
| | that the level of attention |
| | |
| | given to the procedural |
| | |
| | controls for the maintenance |
| | |
| | of radioactive |
| | |
| | monitoring |
| | |
| | systems providing |
| | |
| | ESF actuation |
| | |
| | can be significantly |
| | |
| | improved. |
| | |
| | While there were no actual radiological |
| | |
| | consequences |
| | |
| | of this event, the NRC took escalated |
| | |
| | enforce-ment actions (issued civil penalty) to emphasize |
| | |
| | the importance |
| | |
| | of correctly performing |
| | |
| | surveillance |
| | |
| | procedures |
| | |
| | on systems designed to mitigate or prevent accidents. |
| | |
| | Attachment |
| | |
| | No. 1 contains 6 summaries |
| | |
| | of related events taken from the Licensee Event Report files. Further examples of how improper maintenance |
| | |
| | practices |
| | |
| | have degraded radiation |
| | |
| | monitoring |
| | |
| | systems are provided in the listed Previous Related Correspondence |
| | |
| | section.The Cooper Station initiated |
| | |
| | the following |
| | |
| | corrective |
| | |
| | actions to prevent recurrence: |
| | 1. All temporary |
| | |
| | modifications (e.g., electrical |
| | |
| | jumpering, fuse removal)performed |
| | |
| | by the involved technician |
| | |
| | since October 5, 1985 were indepen-dently verified.2. Site management |
| | |
| | stressed the importance |
| | |
| | of procedural |
| | |
| | adherence--sign |
| | |
| | off the procedural |
| | |
| | step after completing |
| | |
| | the required action. |
| | |
| | IN 86-42 June 9, 1986 3. All surveillance |
| | |
| | procedures |
| | |
| | requiring |
| | |
| | temporary |
| | |
| | modifications |
| | |
| | to system or plant components |
| | |
| | were reviewed for deficiencies, and these procedures |
| | |
| | will be modified to provide for independent |
| | |
| | verification |
| | |
| | to ensure that tempo-rary modifications |
| | |
| | are removed and the system/component |
| | |
| | is fully restored to operational |
| | |
| | status.No specific action or written response is required by this information |
| | |
| | notice.If you have any questions |
| | |
| | about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator |
| | |
| | of the appropriate |
| | |
| | regional office or this office.4'-CJ1ward |
| | |
| | L. Jord, Director Division of Edergency |
| | |
| | ===Preparedness=== |
| | and Engineering |
| | |
| | Response Office of Inspection |
| | |
| | and Enforcement |
| | |
| | Technical |
| | |
| | Contacts: |
| | James E. Wigginton, IE (301) 492-4967 Roger L. Pedersen, IE (301) 492-9425 Attachments: |
| | 1. Event Summaries 2. List of Recently Issued IE Information |
| | |
| | Notices |
| | |
| | Attachment |
| | |
| | 1 IN 86-42 June 9, 1986 EVENT SUMMARIES Unplanned |
| | |
| | Gaseous Release (Connecticut |
| | |
| | Yankee, PWR)LER 85-025 Event Date: 9/19/85 Cause: Personnel |
| | |
| | Maintenance |
| | |
| | Error Abstract: |
| | With the plant operating |
| | |
| | at 100 percent power, a main stack high radiation |
| | |
| | alarm was received during routine scheduled |
| | |
| | maintenance |
| | |
| | on a pressure actuated valve in the gaseous waste stream. The unplanned |
| | |
| | release occurred through an isolation |
| | |
| | valve inadvertently |
| | |
| | left open, allowing the on-line waste gas decay tank a release path.The maintenance |
| | |
| | tag-out procedure |
| | |
| | correctly |
| | |
| | required the isolation valve to be isolated, but the operator shut the wrong valve. The total noble gas release was approximately |
| | |
| | 20 curies (about 14 percent of technical |
| | |
| | specification |
| | |
| | limit). Licensee corrective |
| | |
| | action included clearly relabeling |
| | |
| | associated |
| | |
| | valves and discussion |
| | |
| | of the event with operation |
| | |
| | staff.Containment |
| | |
| | Radiation |
| | |
| | Monitor Isolated (Byron 1, PWR)LER 85-026 Event Date: 2/28/85 Cause: Improper Valve Position Abstract: |
| | With the reactor at zero percent power, a containment |
| | |
| | radiation monitor used for required reactor coolant leakage detection |
| | |
| | was inadvertently |
| | |
| | left isolated for 72 hours from containment |
| | |
| | after maintenance |
| | |
| | on an associated |
| | |
| | valve. Abnormal in-leakage |
| | |
| | at the monitor caused normal-range |
| | |
| | readings on RM-li console in the main control room (leakage was later repaired). |
| | |
| | ===Licensee corrective=== |
| | action included implementing |
| | |
| | administrative |
| | |
| | controls to ensure system integrity/proper |
| | |
| | restoration |
| | |
| | after completion |
| | |
| | of maintenance |
| | |
| | activities. |
| | |
| | Liquid Radwaste Effluent Monitor Isolated (Cooper, BWR)LER 84-008 Event Date: 6/09/84 Cause: Monitor Discharge |
| | |
| | Valve Shut Abstract: |
| | A liquid discharge |
| | |
| | occurred without required continuous |
| | |
| | radiation |
| | |
| | monitoring |
| | |
| | because the liquid effluent radiation |
| | |
| | monitor was isolated. |
| | |
| | No discharge |
| | |
| | limits were exceeded. |
| | |
| | Two days before the event, a technician |
| | |
| | apparently |
| | |
| | shut the radiation |
| | |
| | monitor outlet valve during maintenance |
| | |
| | without permission |
| | |
| | or knowledge |
| | |
| | of operations |
| | |
| | personnel. |
| | |
| | As corrective |
| | |
| | actions, the licensee revised controlling |
| | |
| | procedures |
| | |
| | and informed all plant operators |
| | |
| | of the event. |
| | |
| | Attachment |
| | |
| | 1 IN 86-42 June 9, 1986 Off-Gas Stack Monitor Inoperable (Cooper, BWR)LER 84-006 Event Date: 4/18/84 Cause: Personnel |
| | |
| | Error Abstract: |
| | With the reactor at 70 percent power, the off-gas stack effluent sampler was found inoperable. |
| | |
| | The sampler was drawing air from the surrounding |
| | |
| | off-gas filter building ambient atmosphere |
| | |
| | instead of sampling the plant stack effluent. |
| | |
| | The event resulted from a chemistry |
| | |
| | technician |
| | |
| | failing to follow the approved procedure |
| | |
| | for changing the inline particulate |
| | |
| | filter/iodine |
| | |
| | cartridge (routine operation). |
| | |
| | In addition to making appropriate |
| | |
| | supervisors |
| | |
| | and all chemistry |
| | |
| | technicians |
| | |
| | aware of the event, the licensee revised and clarified |
| | |
| | the governing |
| | |
| | procedure |
| | |
| | to prevent recurrence. |
| | |
| | Liquid Radwaste Auto-Isolation |
| | |
| | Valve Inoperative (Hatch 1, BWR)LER 82-093 Event Date: 11/07/82 Cause: Jumper Installed Abstract: |
| | During a liquid radwaste discharge, the licensee discovered |
| | |
| | that the radiation |
| | |
| | monitor auto control (provides |
| | |
| | isolation |
| | |
| | signal upon high radiation) |
| | to the discharge |
| | |
| | isolation |
| | |
| | valve was inoperable. |
| | |
| | However, the monitor's |
| | |
| | alarm function remained operable. |
| | |
| | An electrical |
| | |
| | jumper used during corrective |
| | |
| | maintenance |
| | |
| | had not been removed after the work was completed. |
| | |
| | Containment |
| | |
| | Atmosphere |
| | |
| | Radiation |
| | |
| | Monitors Isolated (FitzPatrick |
| | |
| | 1, BWR)LER 81-061 (Rev 1 Event Date: 8/21/81 Cause: Containment |
| | |
| | Isolation |
| | |
| | Valve Isolated Abstract: |
| | The NRC resident inspector |
| | |
| | discovered |
| | |
| | that during normal 85 percent power operations |
| | |
| | the containment |
| | |
| | isolation |
| | |
| | valves for the containment |
| | |
| | atmosphere |
| | |
| | gaseous and particulate |
| | |
| | monitoring |
| | |
| | system had been shut for approximately |
| | |
| | 22 hours. With this loss of monitoring |
| | |
| | capability, the technical |
| | |
| | specifications |
| | |
| | require a reactor hot shutdown within 12 hours. The event occurred because a surveillance |
| | |
| | procedure |
| | |
| | did not direct the operator to re-open the isolation |
| | |
| | valves following' |
| | the surveillance |
| | |
| | activities. |
| | |
| | As a corrective |
| | |
| | action, the licensee corrected |
| | |
| | the subject procedure |
| | |
| | and reviewed all other surveillance |
| | |
| | procedures |
| | |
| | for similar deficiencies. |
| | |
| | 4'Attachment |
| | |
| | 2 IN 86-42 June 9, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION |
| | |
| | NOTICES Information |
| | |
| | Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 86-41 86-32 Sup. 1 86-40 86-39 86-38 86-37 86-36 86-35 86-34 Evaluation |
| | |
| | ===Of Questionable=== |
| | Exposure Readings Of Licensee Personnel |
| | |
| | Dosimeters |
| | |
| | Request For Collection |
| | |
| | ===Of Licensee Radioactivity=== |
| | Measurements |
| | |
| | Attributed |
| | |
| | To The Chernobyl |
| | |
| | Nuclear Plant Accident Degraded Ability To Isolate The Reactor Coolant System From Low-Pressure |
| | |
| | Coolant Systems in BWRS Failures Of RHR Pump Motors And Pump Internals Deficient |
| | |
| | Operator Actions Following |
| | |
| | Dual Function Valve Failures Degradation |
| | |
| | Of Station Batteries Change In NRC Practice Regarding |
| | |
| | Issuance Of Confirming |
| | |
| | Letters To Principal |
| | |
| | Contractors |
| | |
| | 6/9/86 6/6/86 6/5/86 5/20/86 5/20/86 5/16/86 5/16/86 All byproduct material licensees All power reactor facilities |
| | |
| | holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities |
| | |
| | holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities |
| | |
| | holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities |
| | |
| | holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities |
|
| |
|
| ==Description of Circumstances==
| | holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities |
| :On November 18, 1985 the Cooper Nuclear Station was in a shutdown condition(reactor coolant temperature less than 2120F and vented) with acceptancetesting for a plant design change in progress. When this testing failed toprovide for the required Group VI isolation (various containment isolation andCopies to: Withers, Yundt, Lentsch, Orser, Steele, E. Burton, E. Jordan, A. Holm,iLIS;.j. A. Olmstead, S. Hoag, S. Sautter, TNP:GOV REL F:NRC CHRONO,TNiPGOV REL F:NRC IE Information Notice 86-42PGE OAR Action -M. H. Halmros (Due 8/12/86)NSRD Action -M. H. Malmros
| |
|
| |
|
| IN 86-42June 9, 1986 engineered safety feature (ESF) initiations), the licensee investigated anddiscovered that electrical jumpers were installed in the reactor building (RB)ventilation radiation monitors (VRM) auxiliary trip units. These jumpersprohibited a Group VI isolation by a high radiation signal from the RB VRM.The jumpers were immediately removed and the NRC was promptly notified asrequired by 10 CFR 50.72.The licensee's subsequent investigation revealed that the electrical jumpershad been installed on November 13, 1985 by an instrument and control technicianduring a routine surveillance procedure to functionally test the VRM. Thesejumpers are used to prevent trip and equipment operations during the requiredfunctional/calibration testing. The technician had signed off the proceduralstep requiring jumper removal (before actually removing the electrical jumper)and then started checking control room annunciator and trip signal status. Thetechnician then became involved in other unrelated craft work and forgot to goback and remove the jumpers.On November 18, 1986, before discovery of the jumpers, 18 irradiated fuelbundles were loaded into a spent fuel shipping cask. Failure to properlyimplement the surveillance procedure for operability checks of radiationmonitors rendered inoperable the automatic initiation of the standby gastreatment system (SBGTS) and automatic isolation of the reactor building uponreceipt of a high radiation signal. This degraded condition lasted approxi-mately 5 days. However, control room annunciators and instrumentation thatwould provide warning to operators of any high radiation problems remainedoperational during the 5 days. Manual-start of the SBGTS and reactor buildingisolation capabilities from the control room remained available during theevent.Discussion:This event clearly demonstrates that the level of attention given to theprocedural controls for the maintenance of radioactive monitoring systemsproviding ESF actuation can be significantly improved. While there were noactual radiological consequences of this event, the NRC took escalated enforce-ment actions (issued civil penalty) to emphasize the importance of correctlyperforming surveillance procedures on systems designed to mitigate or preventaccidents. Attachment No. 1 contains 6 summaries of related events taken fromthe Licensee Event Report files. Further examples of how improper maintenancepractices have degraded radiation monitoring systems are provided in the listedPrevious Related Correspondence section.The Cooper Station initiated the following corrective actions to preventrecurrence:1. All temporary modifications (e.g., electrical jumpering, fuse removal)performed by the involved technician since October 5, 1985 were indepen-dently verified.2. Site management stressed the importance of procedural adherence--sign offthe procedural step after completing the required action.
| | holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities |
|
| |
|
| IN 86-42June 9, 1986 . All surveillance procedures requiring temporary modifications to system orplant components were reviewed for deficiencies, and these procedures willbe modified to provide for independent verification to ensure that tempo-rary modifications are removed and the system/component is fully restoredto operational status.No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the RegionalAdministrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.4'-CJ1ward L. Jord, DirectorDivision of Edergency Preparednessand Engineering ResponseOffice of Inspection and EnforcementTechnical Contacts: James E. Wigginton, IE(301) 492-4967Roger L. Pedersen, IE(301) 492-9425Attachments:1. Event Summaries2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
| | holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities |
|
| |
|
| Attachment 1IN 86-42June 9, 1986 EVENT SUMMARIESUnplanned Gaseous Release (Connecticut Yankee, PWR)LER 85-025Event Date: 9/19/85Cause: Personnel Maintenance ErrorAbstract: With the plant operating at 100 percent power, a main stack highradiation alarm was received during routine scheduled maintenanceon a pressure actuated valve in the gaseous waste stream. Theunplanned release occurred through an isolation valve inadvertentlyleft open, allowing the on-line waste gas decay tank a release path.The maintenance tag-out procedure correctly required the isolationvalve to be isolated, but the operator shut the wrong valve. Thetotal noble gas release was approximately 20 curies (about 14 percentof technical specification limit). Licensee corrective actionincluded clearly relabeling associated valves and discussion of theevent with operation staff.Containment Radiation Monitor Isolated (Byron 1, PWR)LER 85-026Event Date: 2/28/85Cause: Improper Valve PositionAbstract: With the reactor at zero percent power, a containment radiationmonitor used for required reactor coolant leakage detection wasinadvertently left isolated for 72 hours from containment aftermaintenance on an associated valve. Abnormal in-leakage at themonitor caused normal-range readings on RM-li console in the maincontrol room (leakage was later repaired). Licensee correctiveaction included implementing administrative controls to ensuresystem integrity/proper restoration after completion of maintenanceactivities.Liquid Radwaste Effluent Monitor Isolated (Cooper, BWR)LER 84-008Event Date: 6/09/84Cause: Monitor Discharge Valve ShutAbstract: A liquid discharge occurred without required continuousradiation monitoring because the liquid effluent radiation monitorwas isolated. No discharge limits were exceeded. Two days beforethe event, a technician apparently shut the radiation monitor outletvalve during maintenance without permission or knowledge ofoperations personnel. As corrective actions, the licensee revisedcontrolling procedures and informed all plant operators of theevent.
| | holding an OL or CP -Fire In Compressible |
|
| |
|
| Attachment 1IN 86-42June 9, 1986 Off-Gas Stack Monitor Inoperable (Cooper, BWR)LER 84-006Event Date: 4/18/84Cause: Personnel ErrorAbstract: With the reactor at 70 percent power, the off-gas stack effluentsampler was found inoperable. The sampler was drawing air fromthe surrounding off-gas filter building ambient atmosphere insteadof sampling the plant stack effluent. The event resulted from achemistry technician failing to follow the approved procedure forchanging the inline particulate filter/iodine cartridge (routineoperation). In addition to making appropriate supervisors and allchemistry technicians aware of the event, the licensee revised andclarified the governing procedure to prevent recurrence.Liquid Radwaste Auto-Isolation Valve Inoperative (Hatch 1, BWR)LER 82-093Event Date: 11/07/82Cause: Jumper InstalledAbstract: During a liquid radwaste discharge, the licensee discovered thatthe radiation monitor auto control (provides isolation signal uponhigh radiation) to the discharge isolation valve was inoperable.However, the monitor's alarm function remained operable. Anelectrical jumper used during corrective maintenance had not beenremoved after the work was completed.Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitors Isolated (FitzPatrick 1, BWR)LER 81-061 (Rev 1Event Date: 8/21/81Cause: Containment Isolation Valve IsolatedAbstract: The NRC resident inspector discovered that during normal 85 percentpower operations the containment isolation valves for the containmentatmosphere gaseous and particulate monitoring system had been shutfor approximately 22 hours. With this loss of monitoring capability,the technical specifications require a reactor hot shutdown within12 hours. The event occurred because a surveillance procedure didnot direct the operator to re-open the isolation valves following'the surveillance activities. As a corrective action, the licenseecorrected the subject procedure and reviewed all other surveillanceprocedures for similar deficiencies.
| | Material 5/15/86 At Dresden Unit 3 Improper Assembly, Material 5/13/86 Selection, And Test Of Valves And Their Actuators OL = Operating |
|
| |
|
| 4'Attachment 2IN 86-42June 9, 1986LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDIE INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issue Issued to86-4186-32Sup. 186-4086-3986-3886-3786-3686-3586-34Evaluation Of QuestionableExposure Readings Of LicenseePersonnel DosimetersRequest For Collection OfLicensee RadioactivityMeasurements Attributed ToThe Chernobyl Nuclear PlantAccidentDegraded Ability To IsolateThe Reactor Coolant SystemFrom Low-Pressure CoolantSystems in BWRSFailures Of RHR Pump MotorsAnd Pump InternalsDeficient Operator ActionsFollowing Dual Function ValveFailuresDegradation Of StationBatteriesChange In NRC PracticeRegarding Issuance OfConfirming Letters ToPrincipal Contractors6/9/866/6/866/5/865/20/865/20/865/16/865/16/86All byproductmaterial licenseesAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CP -Fire In Compressible Material 5/15/86At Dresden Unit 3Improper Assembly, Material 5/13/86Selection, And Test Of ValvesAnd Their ActuatorsOL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
| | License CP = Construction |
|
| |
|
| }} | | Permit}} |
|
| |
|
| {{Information notice-Nav}} | | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Improper Maintenance of Radiation Monitoring SystemsML031250045 |
Person / Time |
---|
Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, University of Lowell, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill |
---|
Issue date: |
06/09/1986 |
---|
From: |
Jordan E L NRC/IE |
---|
To: |
|
---|
References |
---|
IN-86-042, NUDOCS 8606040007 |
Download: ML031250045 (6) |
|
Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, University of Lowell, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill |
---|
Category:NRC Information Notice
MONTHYEARInformation Notice 2020-02, Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges2020-09-15015 September 2020 Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges ML20225A0322020-09-0303 September 2020 NRC Choice Letter to NAC International with Attached Safety Inspection Report, IR 0721015/2020201, February 24-27, 2020 and July 22, 2020, Inspection of NAC International in Norcross, Georgia Information Notice 2012-09, PWROG-16043-NP-A, Revision 2, PWROG Program to Address NRC Information Notice 2012-09: Irradiation Effects on Fuel Assembly Spacer Grid Crush Strength for Westinghouse and CE PWR Fuel Designs.2019-11-30030 November 2019 PWROG-16043-NP-A, Revision 2, PWROG Program to Address NRC Information Notice 2012-09: Irradiation Effects on Fuel Assembly Spacer Grid Crush Strength for Westinghouse and CE PWR Fuel Designs. Information Notice 2011-20, NRC060 - NRC Information Notice 2011-20: Concrete Degradation by Alkali-Silica Reaction (Nov. 18, 2011)2019-07-24024 July 2019 NRC060 - NRC Information Notice 2011-20: Concrete Degradation by Alkali-Silica Reaction (Nov. 18, 2011) ML19196A2452019-07-15015 July 2019 Public Notice - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 - Exigent Amendment to Facility Operating License Information Notice 2019-01, Inadequate Evaluation of Temporary Alterations2019-03-12012 March 2019 Inadequate Evaluation of Temporary Alterations ML16028A3082016-04-27027 April 2016 NRC Information Notice; IN 2016-05: Operating Experience Regarding Complications From a Loss of Instrumentation Air Information Notice 2015-05, Inoperability of Auxiliary and Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits on Loss of Main Feedwater Pumps2015-05-12012 May 2015 Inoperability of Auxiliary and Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits on Loss of Main Feedwater Pumps Information Notice 2015-05, Inoperability Of Auxiliary And Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits On Loss Of Main Feedwater Pumps2015-05-12012 May 2015 Inoperability Of Auxiliary And Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits On Loss Of Main Feedwater Pumps Information Notice 2013-20, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143)2013-10-0303 October 2013 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143) Information Notice 2013-20, Official Exhibit - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143)2013-10-0303 October 2013 Official Exhibit - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143) Information Notice 2013-11, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013)2013-07-0303 July 2013 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013) Information Notice 2013-11, Official Exhibit - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013)2013-07-0303 July 2013 Official Exhibit - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013) Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Contain2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Con2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notic2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-11, Age Related Capacitor Degradation2012-07-23023 July 2012 Age Related Capacitor Degradation ML12031A0132012-02-0606 February 2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Investigation Report No. 2-2010-058, Cpn International, Inc Information Notice 2011-19, Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components2011-09-26026 September 2011 Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components Information Notice 2011-15, Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues2011-08-0101 August 2011 Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues Information Notice 2011-17, Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping2011-07-26026 July 2011 Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-04, IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-262010-12-21021 December 2010 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 ML13066A1872009-12-16016 December 2009 Draft NRC Information Notice 2009-xx - Underestimate of Dam Failure Frequency Used in Probabilistic Risk Assessments ML1007804482009-11-23023 November 2009 Email from Peter Bamford, NRR to Pamela Cowan, Exelon on TMI Contamination Control Event Information Notice 2009-11, NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-112009-07-0707 July 2009 NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-11 Information Notice 2009-10, Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10)2009-07-0707 July 2009 Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10) Information Notice 2009-09, Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify2009-06-19019 June 2009 Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify Information Notice 2008-12, Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation2008-07-0707 July 2008 Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation Information Notice 2008-11, Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 12008-06-18018 June 2008 Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 1 Information Notice 2008-04, Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants2008-04-0707 April 2008 Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants Information Notice 1991-09, Counterfeiting of Crane Valves2007-09-25025 September 2007 Counterfeiting of Crane Valves Information Notice 2007-28, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls2007-09-19019 September 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls Information Notice 2007-29, Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment2007-09-17017 September 2007 Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment Information Notice 2007-14, Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station2007-03-30030 March 2007 Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station Information Notice 2007-06, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems2007-02-0909 February 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Information Notice 2007-05, Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures2007-02-0909 February 2007 Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures Information Notice 2006-31, Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers2006-12-26026 December 2006 Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-13, E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination2006-07-13013 July 2006 E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:University of Lowell]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] OR [[:Skagit]] OR [[:Marble Hill]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:University of Lowell]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] OR [[:Skagit]] OR [[:Marble Hill]] </code>. |
SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-42 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION
AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 June 9, 1986 IE INFORMATION
NOTICE NO. 86-42: IMPROPER MAINTENANCE
OF RADIATION MONITORING
SYSTEMS
Addressees
All nuclear power reactor facilities
holding an operating
license (OL) or a construction
permit (CP).
Purpose
and Summary: This notice is issued to alert licensees
to the potential
for defeating
the safety function associated
with radiation
monitoring
systems by not properly adhering to established
surveillance
and maintenance
procedures.
A recent event at a BWR, when an electrical
jumper was inadvertently
left in place after a planned surveillance, led to failure to maintain secondary
containment
integrity
during irradiated
fuel movement.It is expected that recipients
will review the information
for applicability
to their maintenance
and surveillance
program and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar problems at their facility.
However, suggestions
contained in this notice do not constitute
NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Previous Related Correspondence
IE Information
Notice No. 83-23, "Inoperable
Containment
Atmosphere
Sensing Systems," April 25, 1983.INPO Significant
Event Report, 35-83, "Compromise
of Secondary
Containment
Integrity," June 9, 1983.IE Information
Notice No. 83-52, "Radioactive
Waste Gas System Events," August 9, 1983.IE Information
Notice No. 84-37, "Use of Lifted Leads and Jumpers During Maintenance
or Surveillance
Testing," May 10, 1984.Description
of Circumstances:
On November 18, 1985 the Cooper Nuclear Station was in a shutdown condition (reactor coolant temperature
less than 212 0 F and vented) with acceptance
testing for a plant design change in progress.
When this testing failed to provide for the required Group VI isolation (various containment
isolation
and Copies to: Withers, Yundt, Lentsch, Orser, Steele, E. Burton, E. Jordan, A. Holm, iLIS;.j. A. Olmstead, S. Hoag, S. Sautter, TNP:GOV REL F:NRC CHRONO, TNiPGOV REL F:NRC IE Information
Notice 86-42 PGE OAR Action -M. H. Halmros (Due 8/12/86)NSRD Action -M. H. Malmros
IN 86-42 June 9, 1986 engineered
safety feature (ESF) initiations), the licensee investigated
and discovered
that electrical
jumpers were installed
in the reactor building (RB)ventilation
radiation
monitors (VRM) auxiliary
trip units. These jumpers prohibited
a Group VI isolation
by a high radiation
signal from the RB VRM.The jumpers were immediately
removed and the NRC was promptly notified as required by 10 CFR 50.72.The licensee's
subsequent
investigation
revealed that the electrical
jumpers had been installed
on November 13, 1985 by an instrument
and control technician
during a routine surveillance
procedure
to functionally
test the VRM. These jumpers are used to prevent trip and equipment
operations
during the required functional/calibration
testing. The technician
had signed off the procedural
step requiring
jumper removal (before actually removing the electrical
jumper)and then started checking control room annunciator
and trip signal status. The technician
then became involved in other unrelated
craft work and forgot to go back and remove the jumpers.On November 18, 1986, before discovery
of the jumpers, 18 irradiated
fuel bundles were loaded into a spent fuel shipping cask. Failure to properly implement
the surveillance
procedure
for operability
checks of radiation monitors rendered inoperable
the automatic
initiation
of the standby gas treatment
system (SBGTS) and automatic
isolation
of the reactor building upon receipt of a high radiation
signal. This degraded condition
lasted approxi-mately 5 days. However, control room annunciators
and instrumentation
that would provide warning to operators
of any high radiation
problems remained operational
during the 5 days. Manual-start
of the SBGTS and reactor building isolation
capabilities
from the control room remained available
during the event.Discussion:
This event clearly demonstrates
that the level of attention
given to the procedural
controls for the maintenance
of radioactive
monitoring
systems providing
ESF actuation
can be significantly
improved.
While there were no actual radiological
consequences
of this event, the NRC took escalated
enforce-ment actions (issued civil penalty) to emphasize
the importance
of correctly performing
surveillance
procedures
on systems designed to mitigate or prevent accidents.
Attachment
No. 1 contains 6 summaries
of related events taken from the Licensee Event Report files. Further examples of how improper maintenance
practices
have degraded radiation
monitoring
systems are provided in the listed Previous Related Correspondence
section.The Cooper Station initiated
the following
corrective
actions to prevent recurrence:
1. All temporary
modifications (e.g., electrical
jumpering, fuse removal)performed
by the involved technician
since October 5, 1985 were indepen-dently verified.2. Site management
stressed the importance
of procedural
adherence--sign
off the procedural
step after completing
the required action.
IN 86-42 June 9, 1986 3. All surveillance
procedures
requiring
temporary
modifications
to system or plant components
were reviewed for deficiencies, and these procedures
will be modified to provide for independent
verification
to ensure that tempo-rary modifications
are removed and the system/component
is fully restored to operational
status.No specific action or written response is required by this information
notice.If you have any questions
about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator
of the appropriate
regional office or this office.4'-CJ1ward
L. Jord, Director Division of Edergency
Preparedness
and Engineering
Response Office of Inspection
and Enforcement
Technical
Contacts:
James E. Wigginton, IE (301) 492-4967 Roger L. Pedersen, IE (301) 492-9425 Attachments:
1. Event Summaries 2. List of Recently Issued IE Information
Notices
Attachment
1 IN 86-42 June 9, 1986 EVENT SUMMARIES Unplanned
Gaseous Release (Connecticut
Yankee, PWR)LER 85-025 Event Date: 9/19/85 Cause: Personnel
Maintenance
Error Abstract:
With the plant operating
at 100 percent power, a main stack high radiation
alarm was received during routine scheduled
maintenance
on a pressure actuated valve in the gaseous waste stream. The unplanned
release occurred through an isolation
valve inadvertently
left open, allowing the on-line waste gas decay tank a release path.The maintenance
tag-out procedure
correctly
required the isolation valve to be isolated, but the operator shut the wrong valve. The total noble gas release was approximately
20 curies (about 14 percent of technical
specification
limit). Licensee corrective
action included clearly relabeling
associated
valves and discussion
of the event with operation
staff.Containment
Radiation
Monitor Isolated (Byron 1, PWR)LER 85-026 Event Date: 2/28/85 Cause: Improper Valve Position Abstract:
With the reactor at zero percent power, a containment
radiation monitor used for required reactor coolant leakage detection
was inadvertently
left isolated for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from containment
after maintenance
on an associated
valve. Abnormal in-leakage
at the monitor caused normal-range
readings on RM-li console in the main control room (leakage was later repaired).
Licensee corrective
action included implementing
administrative
controls to ensure system integrity/proper
restoration
after completion
of maintenance
activities.
Liquid Radwaste Effluent Monitor Isolated (Cooper, BWR)LER 84-008 Event Date: 6/09/84 Cause: Monitor Discharge
Valve Shut Abstract:
A liquid discharge
occurred without required continuous
radiation
monitoring
because the liquid effluent radiation
monitor was isolated.
No discharge
limits were exceeded.
Two days before the event, a technician
apparently
shut the radiation
monitor outlet valve during maintenance
without permission
or knowledge
of operations
personnel.
As corrective
actions, the licensee revised controlling
procedures
and informed all plant operators
of the event.
Attachment
1 IN 86-42 June 9, 1986 Off-Gas Stack Monitor Inoperable (Cooper, BWR)LER 84-006 Event Date: 4/18/84 Cause: Personnel
Error Abstract:
With the reactor at 70 percent power, the off-gas stack effluent sampler was found inoperable.
The sampler was drawing air from the surrounding
off-gas filter building ambient atmosphere
instead of sampling the plant stack effluent.
The event resulted from a chemistry
technician
failing to follow the approved procedure
for changing the inline particulate
filter/iodine
cartridge (routine operation).
In addition to making appropriate
supervisors
and all chemistry
technicians
aware of the event, the licensee revised and clarified
the governing
procedure
to prevent recurrence.
Liquid Radwaste Auto-Isolation
Valve Inoperative (Hatch 1, BWR)LER 82-093 Event Date: 11/07/82 Cause: Jumper Installed Abstract:
During a liquid radwaste discharge, the licensee discovered
that the radiation
monitor auto control (provides
isolation
signal upon high radiation)
to the discharge
isolation
valve was inoperable.
However, the monitor's
alarm function remained operable.
An electrical
jumper used during corrective
maintenance
had not been removed after the work was completed.
Containment
Atmosphere
Radiation
Monitors Isolated (FitzPatrick
1, BWR)LER 81-061 (Rev 1 Event Date: 8/21/81 Cause: Containment
Isolation
Valve Isolated Abstract:
The NRC resident inspector
discovered
that during normal 85 percent power operations
the containment
isolation
valves for the containment
atmosphere
gaseous and particulate
monitoring
system had been shut for approximately
22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />. With this loss of monitoring
capability, the technical
specifications
require a reactor hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The event occurred because a surveillance
procedure
did not direct the operator to re-open the isolation
valves following'
the surveillance
activities.
As a corrective
action, the licensee corrected
the subject procedure
and reviewed all other surveillance
procedures
for similar deficiencies.
4'Attachment
2 IN 86-42 June 9, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION
NOTICES Information
Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 86-41 86-32 Sup. 1 86-40 86-39 86-38 86-37 86-36 86-35 86-34 Evaluation
Of Questionable
Exposure Readings Of Licensee Personnel
Dosimeters
Request For Collection
Of Licensee Radioactivity
Measurements
Attributed
To The Chernobyl
Nuclear Plant Accident Degraded Ability To Isolate The Reactor Coolant System From Low-Pressure
Coolant Systems in BWRS Failures Of RHR Pump Motors And Pump Internals Deficient
Operator Actions Following
Dual Function Valve Failures Degradation
Of Station Batteries Change In NRC Practice Regarding
Issuance Of Confirming
Letters To Principal
Contractors
6/9/86 6/6/86 6/5/86 5/20/86 5/20/86 5/16/86 5/16/86 All byproduct material licensees All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP -Fire In Compressible
Material 5/15/86 At Dresden Unit 3 Improper Assembly, Material 5/13/86 Selection, And Test Of Valves And Their Actuators OL = Operating
License CP = Construction
Permit
|
---|
|
list | - Information Notice 1986-01, Failure of Main Feedwater Check Valves Causes Loss of Feedwater System Integrity and Water-Hammer Damage (6 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-02, Failure of Valve Operator Motor During Environmental Qualification Testing (6 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-03, Potential Deficiencies in Enviromental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring (14 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-04, Transient Due to Loss of Power to Intergrated Control System at a Pressurized Water Reactor Designed by Babcock & Wilcox (31 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-05, Main Steam Safety Valve Test Failures and Ring Setting Adjustments (31 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-06, Failure of Lifting Rig Attachment, While Lifting Upper Guide Structure at St. Lucie Unit 1 (3 February 1986, Topic: Control of Heavy Loads)
- Information Notice 1986-06, Failure of Lifting Rig Attachment, while Lifting Upper Guide Structure at St. Lucie Unit 1 (3 February 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-07, Lack of Detailed Instruction & Inadequate Observance of Precautions During Maintenance & Testing of Diesel Generator Woodward Governors (3 February 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-08, Licensee Event Report (LER) Format Modification (3 February 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-09, Failure of Check & Stop Check Valves Subjected to Low Flow Conditions (3 February 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-10, Degradation of Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Resulting From Boric Acid Corrosion. (5 January 1995, Topic: Boric Acid)
- Information Notice 1986-10, Feedwater Line Break (10 November 1988, Topic: Coatings, Anchor Darling)
- Information Notice 1986-10, Degradation of Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Resulting from Boric Acid Corrosion. (5 January 1995, Topic: Boric Acid)
- Information Notice 1986-11, Anomalous Behavior of Recirculation Loop Flow in Jet Pump BWR Plants (31 December 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-13, Standby Liquid Control System Squib Valves Failure to Fire (21 February 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-13, Standby Liquid Control Squib Valves Failure to Fire (5 August 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-14, Overspeed Trips of AFW, HPCI & RCIC Turbines (26 August 1991, Topic: Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1986-14, Overspeed Trips of Afw, HPCI & RCIC Turbines (26 August 1991)
- Information Notice 1986-15, Loss of Offsite Power Caused by Problems in Fiber Optics Systems (10 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-16, Failures to Identify Containment Leakage Due to Inadequate Local Testing of BWR Vacuum Relief System Valves (11 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-17, Update of Failure of Automatic Sprinkler System Valves to Operate (24 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-18, NRC On-Scene Response During a Major Emergency (26 March 1986, Topic: Squib, Backfit)
- Information Notice 1986-19, Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Failure at Crystal River (21 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-20, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Scaling Factors, 10 CFR Part 61 (28 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-21, Recognition of American Society of Mechanical Engineers Accreditation Program for N Stamp Holders (31 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-22, Underresponse of Radiation Survey Instrument to High Radiation Fields (31 March 1986, Topic: High Radiation Area, Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-23, Excessive Skin Exposures Due to Contamination with Hot Particles (9 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-23, Excessive Skin Exposures due to Contamination with Hot Particles (9 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-24, Respirator Users Notice: Increased Inspection Frequency for Certain Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Air Cylinders (11 April 1986, Topic: Hydrostatic)
- Information Notice 1986-25, Traceability and Material Control of Material and Equipment, Particularly Fasteners (11 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-26, Potential Problems in Generators Manufactured by Electrical Products Incorporated (17 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-27, Access Control at Nuclear Facilities (21 April 1986, Topic: Contraband)
- Information Notice 1986-28, Telephone Numbers to the NRC Operations Center and Regional Offices (24 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-29, Effects of Changing Valve Moter-Operator Switch Settings (25 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-30, Design Limitations of Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Systems (29 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-31, Unauthorized Transfer and Loss of Control of Industrial Nuclear Gauges (14 July 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-32, Request for Collection of Licensee Radioactivity Measurements Attributed to Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident (2 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-33, Information for Licensee Regarding the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident (6 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-34, Improper Assembly, Material Selection, & Test of Valves & Their Actuators (13 May 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-34, Improper Assembly, Material Selection, & Test of Valves & their Actuators (13 May 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-35, Fire in Compressible Material at Dresden Unit 3 (15 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-36, Change in NRC Practice Regarding Issuance of Confirming Letters to Principal Contractors (16 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-37, Degradation of Station Batteries (16 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-38, Deficient Operator Actions Following Dual Function Valve Failures (20 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-39, Failures of RHR Pump Motors and Pump Internals (20 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-40, Degraded Ability to Isolate the Reactor Coolant System from Low-Pressure Coolant Systems in Bwrs (5 June 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-40, Degraded Ability to Isolate the Reactor Coolant System from Low-Pressure Coolant Systems in BWRs (5 June 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-41, Evaluation of Questionable Exposure Readings of Licensee Personnel Dosimeters (9 June 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-42, Improper Maintenance of Radiation Monitoring Systems (9 June 1986, Topic: Temporary Modification, Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-43, Problems with Silver Zeolite Sampling of Airborne Radioiodine (10 June 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
... further results |
---|