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On February 28, 2017 at 0930 (EST), a containment visual inspection was performed to identify the source of elevated RCS (Reactor Coolant System) leakage. A leak was identified between 13RC6 and 13SS661, 13 RCS hot leg sample isolation valves at 1000 (EST). These valves are manual isolation valves in the reactor coolant hot leg sample line. Leak isolation could not be initially verified and is considered RCS pressure boundary leakage. Salem Unit 1 entered Technical Specification 3.4.6.2a, RCS operational leakage, for the existence of pressure boundary leakage. This event is being reported under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) for 'The initiation of a plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications' and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) or 'Any event of condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers being seriously degraded.' The unit was placed in mode 3 at 1554 (EST) on 02/28/2017. This condition has no impact on public health and safety. Per Technical Specifications, the unit is proceeding to mode 5. The leak rate at the time of shutdown was 0.33 gpm. This event has no effect on Unit 2. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will be notifying the Lower Alloways Creek Township, the State of New Jersey and the State of Delaware.

• * * RETRACTION FROM MATT MOG TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1144 EDT ON 4/14/17 * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract event report number 52581 made on 2/28/2017 at 1624 (EST). Previously, PSEG notified the NRC that Salem Unit 1 initiated a shutdown required by Technical Specifications (TS) for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure Boundary Leakage. Subsequent to the initial report, PSEG has determined that the leak occurred in tubing downstream of the design specification break between Safety Related, Nuclear Class 1, Seismic Class1 and Non-Safety-Related, Nuclear Class 2, Seismic Class 2. Therefore, the observed leakage is not RCS pressure boundary leakage as defined in the Salem Unit 1 Technical Specifications and in the tubing design classification specification. At the time of the event, during initial entry into the containment, the volume of steam present and the height of the break above the floor made it difficult to ascertain the location of the steam source with certainty. The initial judgment of RCS Pressure Boundary Leakage was conservative under these circumstances. The plant was taken offline to minimize radiation exposure when personnel operated the isolation valves. Following the shutdown, the leak was isolated. Based on an observed reduction in RCS leak rate and visual verification of leakage isolation, the TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was exited and the unit remained in Mode 3, Hot Standby, to affect repairs. The condition did not meet the Technical Specification Pressure Boundary Leakage definition of leakage through a non-isolable fault in a RCS component body, pipe wall or vessel wall. The leakage did not impact the ability to shut down the unit and no TS limits were exceeded during this event. Therefore, the plant shutdown to investigate and correct leakage from flawed sample system tubing does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and PSEG is retracting the notifications made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Jackson).

This 4 hour notification is being made pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), for 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications'. Salem Unit 1 has initiated a unit shutdown at 1227 (EDT) in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.2.3, Action A, for inoperability of the 14 Containment Fan Cooler Unit. Technical Specification 3.6.2.3, Action A requires that with one or two Containment Fan Cooler Units inoperable, operability must be restored within 7 days, or be in at least Hot Standby (Mode 3) within the next 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) within the following 30 hours. The 14 Containment Fan Cooler Unit was declared inoperable on March 8, 2015, at 1158 EDT, following a trip of its low speed breaker on thermal overload during a scheduled surveillance test.

13 Chiller is tagged for scheduled maintenance. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 1 is proceeding to Mode 5. There is no effect on Unit 2. The licensee will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township, the State of New Jersey, and the State of Delaware.

Performing an I&C functional (test) caused an inadvertent Safety Injection signal resulting in a reactor trip/safety injection. All safety systems responded as designed for a safety injection. Electrical systems are aligned to normal offsite power sources. All fire alarms have been validated by the Fire Protection Department as invalid alarms and confirmed that no fire event in the protected area. The reactor trip was successful and all rods (fully) inserted. Decay heat removal is via auxiliary feedwater through the atmospheric (steam) dumps. Unknown at this time is the cause of the inadvertent safety injection signal. No injuries occurred as a result of this event. The licensee believes that the trip/safety injection may have caused piping to shake resulting in dust near the fire detection equipment resulting in the invalid fire indication. The instrument being tested was the high steam flow channel-1 bistable for PT505. The maximum pressurizer level during this event was 95%. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE AT 1400 EDT ON 4/30/2012 FROM JOHN KOKOVALCHICK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

At 1003 hours on April 30, 2012, Salem Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip and safety injection (SI) signal due to a high steam flow coincident with a low steam pressure signal. At the time of the safety injection signal, function testing of the 1PT505 turbine inlet pressure channel was in progress. This testing required the tripping of the high steam flow bistables. As a result of the reactor trip and safety injection signal, the Emergency Diesel Generators started but did not load, the ECCS system (high head safety injection pumps actuated and injected into the reactor vessel, intermediate head safety injection pumps and low head (RHR) safety injection pumps) actuated. All 4 main steam isolation valves closed along with feedwater isolation and start of the auxiliary feedwater pumps. All control rods fully inserted following the reactor trip. Following the main steam line isolation, the atmospheric relief valves opened along with the lifting of several main steam safety valves. The unit is currently in Mode 3 and will be cooling down to Mode 4. Train A SSPS (Solid State Protection System) is currently out of service and suspected of causing the safety injection signal. Train B SSPS has not been reset due to the standing safety injection signal. With Train A SSPS inoperable and Train B SSPS not reset, TS 3.0.3 was entered and a shutdown required by TS 3.0.3 was commenced at 1345 hours. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b )(2)(iv)(B), 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 50.72(b)(2)(i) and 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A). The licensee exited the Unusual Event at 1249 EDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Conte). The NRC Operations Center notified other Federal Agencies (DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, DHS NICC, and NuclearSSA via e-mail).