Text

PRM-050-067 64FR03791 - Nuclear Information and Resource Service; Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking
	ML23156A067
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Issue date:	01/25/1999
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	PRM-050-067, 64FR03791
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ADAMS Template: SECY-067 DOCUMENT DATE: 01/25/1999 TITLE: PRM-050-067 - 64FR03791 - NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND RESOURCE SERVICE; RECEIPT OF PETITION FOR RULEMAKING CASE

REFERENCE:

PRM-050-067 64FR03791 KEYWORD: RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete

Docket No.: PRM-050-067 10/05/2000 FR Cite: 64FR03792 In the Matter of Nuclear Information and Resource Service; Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking Comment Comment Docket Document Miscellaneous Accession Number Submitted by Representing Date Date Description Number I ft Michael Mariotte Executive Director 12/11/1998 12/10/1998 Letter from Michael Mariotte, Executive Director, NIRS, submitting Petition for Rulemaking re assurance that nuclear facilities provide reliable back-up atomic reactor and other nuclear facility safety systems in the event of a Y2K incident 01/19/1999 01/15/1999 Federal Register Notice -

Petition for rulemaking; Notice of receipt John Tesmer Self

01/29/1999 01/27/1999 2 Christina K. Higgins Self 02/10/1999 02/07/1999 3 William R. Davis Self 02/11/1999 02/09/1999 I

Although PRM-50-67 appears on page 3791 of the Federal Register for January 25, 1999, I assigned page 3792 in Access since Access does not allow duplicate primary keys in the same table. PRM-50-66 has already been assigned page 3791.

Adria T. Byrdsong

Docket No.: PRM-050-067 10/05/2000 FR Cite: 64FR03792 In the Matter of Nuclear Information and Resource Service; Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking Comment Comment Docket Document Miscellaneous Accession Number Submitted by Representing Date Date Description Number

.4 Mike Wright Self 02/11/1999 02/09/1999 5 John B. Calhoun, Jr. Self 02/22/1999 02/15/1999 6 Gerald I. Lotton Self 02/22/1999 02/16/1999

7 Ray Marcouillier Se;f 02/22/1999 02/17/1999 8 Robert Self 02/22/1999 02/18/1999 2

Docket No.: PRM-050-067 10/05/2000 FR Cite: 64FR03792 In the Matter of Nuclear Information and Resource Service; Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking Comment Comment Docket Document Miscellaneous Accession Number Submitted by Representing Date Date Description Number

. 9 Kevin Rice Self 02/22/1999 02/15/1999 10 Kevin King Self 02/22/1999 . 02/16/1999 11 Pat S. Griffith Self 02/23/1999 02/19/1999

12 Corey J. Conn Self 02/23/1999 02/18/1999 13 Annalisa Haight Self 02/25/1999 02/23/1999 3

Docket No.: PRM-050-067 10/05/2000 FR Cite: 64FR03792 In the Matter of Nuclear Information and Resource Service; Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking Comment Comment Docket Document Miscellaneous

Accession Number Submitted by Representing Date Date Description Number 4 Paul Gunter Nuclear Information and 02/25/1999 02/24/1999 Director - Reactor Watchdog Resource Service (NIRS)

Project 15 Mrs. Worman Self 02/25/1999 02/25/1999 16 E. B. Hyde Self 03/01/1999 02/16/1999

17 C. Lance Terry Sr. Vice President and TU Electric 03/02/1999 02/23/1999 Principal Nuclear Officer 18 . L. J.. Maas Siemens Power 03/03/1999 02/23/1999 Manager - Regulatory Corporation Compliance 4

Docket No.: PRM-050-067 10/05/2000 FR Cite: 64FR03792 In the Matter of Nuclear Information and Resource Service; Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking Comment Comment Docket Document Miscellaneous Accession Number Submitted by Representing Date Date Description Number

08/18/1999 08/17/1999 Federal Register Notice -

Petition for rulemaking; Denial 5

Federal Register Cite No.: PR/PRM No.: Federal Register Publication Date: Issue No.

64FR3791 01/25/99 15 64FR3792 (In Microsoft Access) PRM-50-67 Comment Period Expires: 02/24/99 Comment Period Extended: Final Rule Date:

Contact Person(s): Mail Stop(s): Telephone Extension(s):

a) David L. Meyer T-6D59 301-415-7162 bl Carol Gallagher T-6D59 301-415-5905 c) Matthew Chiramal 0-9D4 301-415-2845 Comments Entered Comments Acknowledged in Database Distributed Index Printed Labels Printed (card; e-mail)

(No./Date/lnitials) (Date/Initials) (Date/Initials) (Date/Initials) (Date)

Ltr fm Michael Mariette Ltr fm Michael Mariette 01/27/99 ATB 01/27/99 ATB 01/27/99 ATB FRN - Petition for FRN - Petition for 01/27/99 ATB Rulemaking Rulemaking 01/27/99 ATB 01/27/99 ATB

1 01/29/99 ATB #1 01/29/99 ATB 01/29/99 ATB 02/04/99 ATB 02/04/99

2 02/10/99 ATB #2 02/10/99 ATB 02/10/99 ATB 02/11 /99 ATB 02/11/99

3-4 02/12/99 ATB #3-4 02/12/99 ATB 02/12/99 ATB 02/18/99 ATB 02/18/99

5-7 02/22/99 ATB #5-7 02/22/99 ATB 02/22/99 ATB 02/24/99 ATB 02/24/99

8 02/23/99 ATB #8 02/22/99 ATB 02/23/99 ATB 02/25/99 ATB 02/25/99

9-11 02/23/99 ATB #9-11 02/23/99 ATB 02/23/99 ATB 02/25/99 ATB 02/25/99

12 02/24/99 ATB #12 02/24/99 ATB 02/24/99 ATB 02/25/99 ATB 02/25/99

13 02/25/99 ATB #13 02/25/99 ATB 02/25/99 ATB 03/03/99 ATB 03/03/99

14-15 02/26/99 ATB #14-15 02/26/99 ATB 02/26/99 ATB 03/03/99 ATB 03/03/99

16 03/02/99 ATB #16 03/02/99 ATB 03/02/99 ATB 03/04/99 ATB 03/04/99

17 03/03/99 ATB #17 03/03/99 ATB 03/03/99 ATB 03/04/99 ATB 03/04/99

18 03/04/99 ATB #18 03/04/99 ATB 03/04/99 ATB 03/12/99 ATB 03/12/99 FRN - Petition for FRN - Petition for 08/25/99 ATB Rulemaking; Denial Rulemaking; Denial 08/25/99 ATB 08/25/99 ATB FOLDER_ _OF

DOCKET NUMBER PETITION RUlE PAM S'o- b 1 7~'1F/?3ffl)

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

99 AUG 18 Pl2 :10 10 CFR Parts 50 and 70

[Docket No. PRM-50-67] ' I F

Nuclear Information and Resource Service; Petition for Rulemaking Denial AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying a petition for rulemaking (PRM-50-67) from the Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS). The petitioner requested that the NRC amend its regulationsto require that nuclear facilities ensure the availability of backup power sources to power safety systems of reactors and other nuclear facilities in the event of a date-sensitive, computer-related incident resulting from a Year 2000 (Y2K) issue. The petitioner requested that NRC take this action to ensure that reliable backup sources of power are available in the event of a Y2K incident. The Commission agrees that maintaining reliable emergency power is important and has considered the petitioners request as part of its review of existing regulatory requirements and licensee actions to assure reliable emergency power during the Y2K transition. Based on this review, the Commission has determined that existing regulatory requirements, actions taken by the licensees to implement a fJ,u/,r- o.,., a/:;2a/e;9 Cf% G:,'IFR '{591 J

systematic and structured Y2K readiness program adequately address Y2K issues, and NRC's oversight of the licensees' implementation of these programs provide reasonable assurance of .

adequate protection to public health and safety. Because the Commission has concluded that existing programs already address the petitioner's concern regarding availability of emergency power, the petition is denied.

ADDRESSES: Copies of the petition for rulemaking, the public comments received, and NRC's letters to the petitioners are available for public inspection or copying in NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC, as well as on NRC's rulemaking web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Matthew Chiramal, Office qf Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, telephone 301-415-2845, E-mail address mxc@nrc.gov, or Gary W. Purdy, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, telephone 301-415-7897, E-mail address gwp1@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

NRC received three related petitions for rulemaking (PRM-50-65, PRM-50-66, PRM 67), each dated December 10, 1998, .submitted by the NIRS concerning various aspects of Y2K 2

issues and nuclear safety. This petition (PRM-50-67) requested that NRC adopt regulations that would require facilities licensed by NRC under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 70 to provide reliable source*s of backup power. The first petition (PRM-50-65) requested that NRC adopt regulations that would require facilities licensed by NRC under 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, 50, and 70 to be Y2K compliant. The second petition .(PRM-50-66) requested that NRC adopt regulations that would require facilities licensed by NRC under 10 CFR Part 50 to develop and implement adequate contingency and emergency plans to address potential system failures. Because of the nature of these petitions and the date-specific issues they address, the petitioner requested that the petitions be addressed on an expedited schedule.

On January 25, 1999, NRC published a notice of receipt of a petition for rulemaking in the Federal Register (64 FR 3789). It was available on NRC's rulemaking website and in the NRC Public Document Room. The notice of receipt of a petition for rulemaking invited interested persons to submit comments by February 24, 1999.

The Petition

The petitioner requested that NRC adopt the following text as a rule:

'The Nuclear Regulatory Commission *recognizes that date-sensitive computer programs, embedded chips, and other electronic systems that perform a major role in distributing, allocating, and ensuring electric power throughout the United States may be prone to failure beginning on January 1, 2000. Loss of all

.alternating current electricity from both the offsite power grid and onsite 3

emergency generators (commonly known as "station blackout") long has been identified by NRC as among the most prominent contributors_ to risk for atomic reactors .

. (1) For these reasons, NRC requires of Part 50 and 70 licensees as of December 1, 1999: (a) that all emergency diesel generators that provide backup power to nuclear licensees must be operational and remain operational; (b) that licensees that cannot demonstrate full operational capabilities of all emergency diesel generators must close until such time that full operational capabilities of emergency diesel generators are attained; (c) that all licensees must have a 60-day supply of fuel for emergency diesel generators.

(2) Further, to ensure adequate protection of public health and.safety, NRC requires that all licensees under these sections must provide alternate means of backup power sufficient to assure safety. These may include, but are not limited to: solar power panels, wind turbines, hydroelectric power, biomass power, and

other means of generating electricity. These additional backup systems must provide electricity directly to the licensee rather than to the broader electrical grid.

(3) Irradiated fuel pools are to be immediately classified as Class 1-E; backup power systems must be sufficient to provide cooling for such pools. Licensees which cannot demonstrate compliance with sections (1) and (2) must cease operations as of December 1, 1999, until compliance with these sections is attained."

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The petitioner acknowledged that NRC has recognized the potential safety and environmental problems that could result if date-sensitive electronic systems fail to operate or provide false information. The petitioner asserted that NRC has required its licensees of reactor and major fuel cycle facilities to report by July 1, 1999, on their programs to ensure compliance with Y2K issues.

The petitioner discussed the "availability of electricity to power atomic reactor and other nuclear facility safety systems." The petitioner explained that electricity is required to operate atomic reactor safety and cooling systems and that this electricity is provided by offsite sources (overall an electrica! grid). The petitioner commented that NRC has long recognized that the loss of all alternating current from both onsite and offsite systems, known generally as "station blackout," is the most important contributor to risk at most atomic reactors. The petitioner correctly noted that NRC has required licensees to have backup sources of onsite emergency power, normally multiple emergency diesel generators, capable of supplying the electricity necessary to operate essential safety systems .

The petitioner asserted that the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) used at atomic reactors have proven unreliable and are often out of service. The petitioner claimed that the unprecedented condition posed by the Y2K problem, coupled with the demonstrated and ongoing failures of EDGs, constitutes reasonable doubt that EDGs can be relied on. Therefore, the petitioner believes that NRC should *adopt regulations that require that licensees have all EDGs operational during the Y2K transition, that they have a 60-day supply of fuel as of December 1, 1999, and that licensed facilities that cannot meet these requirements be closed.

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The petitioner discussed the likelihood and the potential consequences of a failure of all or a portion of the electric power grid in the United States. The petitioner recognized that the failure of all or a portion of the electrical grid as a result of Y2K issue*s is well beyond the scope of NRC's authority. However, the petitioner stated that the extended failure of all or a portion of the electrical grid would place severe stress on the current EDG system of backup power supply and that the failure of EDGs at one or more reactor sites could result in extended station blackouts and nuclear catastrophes. The petitioner asserted that this possibility is well within the range of probabilities for which NRC. routinely requires action by its licensees. The petitioner further

- asserted that reliance on unreliable EDGs is insufficient under these conditions. Therefore, the petitioner believes that it is essential that NRC take the regulatory action suggested in this petition on an expedited basis.

Public Comments on the Petition In response to the petition, NRC received 73 comment letters, which included 1 letter signed by 25 citizens of the State of Michigan, 3 letters from nuclear associated industries, 10 letters from utilities, 14 letters from private organizations, and 45 letters from private citizens.

Fifty-six letters supported the petition, of which 41 were from private citizens, 14 were from private organizations, including 1 from the NIRS and 1 signed by 25 individuals. The comments supporting the petition addressed the concern that diesel generators are unreliable and that a reliable electric power grid is needed.

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In some of the letters supporting the petition, the authors included the following additional comments that provide information or requested ac~ion that was not contained in the petition.

These comments noted that -

1. Y2K may increase the possibility of local, regional or widespread blackouts.

Losing all electric power to the station is called station blackout. EDGs, each capable of powering the entire _plant, compensate for the loss of off-site electric power. Reliability of diesel generators is considerably lower than required and, moreover, one of two diesel generators is often out of service. Therefore, for Y2K, an additional source of backup power needs to be provided, ahd both EDGs should be operable with sufficient fuei on site to compensate for fuel delivery problems.

2. In order to ensure that sufficient electric power is available during an extended loss of offsite power to safely shut down a nuclear plant and cool the spent fuel pool, enough diesel fuel should be available at the site for periods extending from 60 days to 160 days to whatever t~e time period that offsite power is not available.

3. An additional power source or method should be available during power failure to provide makeup water to the spent fuel pool.

4. On at least one occasion, a nuclear power plant licensee falsified data relative to the reliability of EDGs. The concern is that othE:r nuclear utilities may not provide reliable data for their EDGs to NRC.

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i '

These comments are addressed specifically in the discussion of "Reasons for Denial."

Seventeen letters opposed the petition, including 4 from private citizens, 3 from nuclear associated industries, and 10 from utilities. Comments opposing the petition stated that onsite emergency electric power generators are already required to be maintained in a state of readiness and validated by periodic testing, fuel supplies are maintained at a level adequate to facilitate appropriate response/recovery actions, and the current regulations and license conditions are adequate to address the issue. One commenter used a specific facility as an example to demonstrate that in the highly unlikely event of a total loss of electrical power

. (meaning the loss of the electric grid .and backup power) the conditions at that facility would not

threaten public health and safety. Any potential adverse impacts*would be limited to work areas and equipment within the facility, and there would be no catastrophic or significant loss of control or containment of nucle.ar material. That commenter indicated that the provision of a tertiary (meaning a secondary backup) source of electric power to its fuel facility, which would be independent of the broader electric grid, as would be required under PRM-50-67, is an unreasonable requirement that would force shutdown of the facility on December 1, 1999, in the absence of any significant credible safety risk.

Reasons for Denial NRC is denying the petition because the Commission has determined that current NRC

. regulations and license conditions governing power systems at Part 50 and 70 facilities provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and safety, and licensees are taking appropriate actions to provide reasonable assurance that Y2K problems will not adversely 8

affect the functioning of these power systems. The NRC is reviewing the licensees' implementation of these Y2K activities and will have sufficient time to take appropriate regulatory

. action if licensees' Y2K activities and programs are not properly implemented in a timely fashion.

NIRS does not explain why the licensees' Y2K activities and programs, and NRC's oversight of the licensees' implementation of these activities and programs, are inadequate such that the rule proposed by NIRS is necessary to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection from Y2K-induced unavailability of onsite power systems.

NIRS' proposed rule contained three separate requirements for Part 50 and Part 70 licensees: (1) operational demonstration of EDGs and provision of a 60-day diesel fuel supply; (2) alternate means of backup power; and (3) classification of fuel pools as Class 1-E. Facilities that cannot demonstrate compliance with these requirements by December 1, 1999, would be required to shut down until they could demonstrate compliance. The proposed requirements are addressed below for Part 50 power reactors, Part 50 decommissioning reactors, Part 50 non-power reactors; and Part 70 licensees in Sections I, II, Ill, and IV, respectively.

I. Part 50 Nuclear Power Plants.

A. Diesel Generator Operational Capability and Sixty-Day Fuel Supply Nuclear power plants must be *protected against loss of offsite power (LOOP) by providing an onsite backup power system by either 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDCs) 17 and 18, or equivalent requirements in the plant's licensing basis. Most licensees rely

upon diesel generators to provide onsite backup power, although there is at least one licensee 9

-that relies upon hydroelectric power. All licensees have committed to provide an onsite supply of fuel to operate diesel generators; most commitments are for a 7-day supply. In addition, nuclear power plants are required by 10 CFR 50.63 to hav~ the capability to withstand loss of all ac power (generally referred to as "station blackout" (S8O]) for an established period of time. As indicated in Section I.A.2 there is no reason to believe that Y2K would significantly affect the probability or duration of a LOOP and/or a S8O from that otherwise assessed in a licensee's coping analysis required by 10 CFR 50.63. To demonstrate that their plants can cope with S8O, some licensees rely upon an alternate ac power source(s) (separate from the backup power system) that utilizes diesel generators or gas turbine generators.

1. EDG Reliability NIRS claims that EDGs have proven to be unreliable, such that licensees should be required to demonstrate "full operational capability" 1 of EDGs that provide backup power. As previously noted, backup onsite power is usually provided by diesel generators, which supply

'\

electric power to the plant safety systems upon a LOOP. NRC regulations require that onsite electric power supplies and the or:,site electric distribution system have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a single failure.

Furthermore, in accordance with their license conditions, all licensees are required to have backup electricity sources operational to supply safety-related equipment at all times independent of circumstances such as Y2K-induced LOOP. The operation and maintenance of 1

The NRC assumes that by "capability," NIRS actually means "reliability" because "capability" normaUy refers to the ability of the emergency power system to power safety related electrical loads at the plant; whereas reliability normally refers to the actual performance of the

. system in terms of availability, which is what NIRS addresses in its petition.

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diesel generators and other safety-related equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the reactor are controlled by the plant technical specifications (TSs). The TSs are intended to ensure that sufficient power will be available to supply safety-related equipment at all times regardless of key Y2K dates. Moreover, the plant TSs require that immediate action be taken to restore inoperable diesel generators to operable status. The plant TSs require the diesel generators to be tested routinely in order to demonstrate their operability and their ability to supply power as needed.*

NIRS did not present any information demonstrating that diesel generators are unreliable such that they should not be relied upon to provide backup power upon a LOOP. For each nuclear power plant, selected target diesel generator reliability values were established for plant-specific coping analysis in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.63, the SBO rule.

Availability and reliability values are tracked by each licensee in accordance with the "requirements of 10 CFR 50.65, the maintenance rule, and associated industry guidance.

In the resolution of Generic Safety Issue B-56, "Diesel Generator Reliability," one of the options recommended by NRC staff was to revise the SBO rule to include specific requirements for demonstrating diesel generator reliability. However, in SECY-93-044, "Resolution of Generic Safety Issue 8-56, Diesel Generator Reliability," dated March 25, 1993, the Commission disapproved the revision to the SBO rule on the basis of the real progress made by the nuclear industry in improving the reliability of the diesel generators. NRC requirements and industry activities have resulted in a very high dies~I generator reliability. In 1993, the industry-wide average reliability of diesel generators was in excess of 98 percent. An Idaho National Engineering Laboratory study (INEL-95-0035, "Emergency Diesel Generator Power System 11

Reliability: 1987-1993") of a number of nuclear power EOG reliability concluded that those plants with a 0.950 reliability target goal were actually demonstrating 0.987, and the plants with a 0.975 reliability target goal were actually demonstrating 0.985. The Commission stated that the industry should continue an aggressive program of maintenance as well as root cause analysis that will continue to offer assurance that diesel generator reliability will be maintained at a satisfactory level in the future.

All licensees have implemented a maintenance monitoring program consistent with the maintenance rule, which became effective on July 10, 1996. Licensees are required to monitor the performance of diesel generators against the established goals and to take appropriate corrective actions if the goals are not met. The maintenance rule requires that these goals be evaluated by the licensees at least every refueling cycle, not to exceed 2 years. To evaluate the process established by licensees to set goals and monitor them, and to verify that preventive maintenance has been effective for systems and components under the maintenance rule, NRC.

staff conducted baseline inspections of all nuclear plants during 1996 -1998. At several plants, diesel generators were among the systems and components reviewed to verify that goals were

established and monitoring and trending were being performed. For pilot plants, diesel generators continue to be inspected and evaluated using the risk-informed, performance-based inspection process, which is part of the NRC Oversight Baseline Inspection Program. NRC staff will continue to assess the reliability of diesel generators at nuclear power plants to ensure that the reliability of diesel generators is maintained at levels specified by each licensee when it performed its plant-specific coping analyses for S80.

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Additionally, the scope of licensees' Y2K programs, including contingency planning, covers the onsite power and other emergency power systems at the plant. NRC audits and reviews of licensee Y2K program activities to date have verified licensee consideration of these systems, and no associated Y2K issue relating to onsite power-systems have been identified.

The NRC does not believe, on the basis of current information from the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)2, that availability of offsite power from the electrical grid is likely to be significantly affected by Y2K-ir:iduced problems. In its most recent reports issued on January 11 and April 30, 1999, NERC states, "Transmission outages are expected to be minimal and outages that may occur are anticipated to be mitigated by reduced energy transfers established as part of the contingency planning process." Both reports indicate that the transition through critical Y2K rollover dates should have a minimal impact on electric systems operations in North America and that widespread, long-term loss of the grid as a result of Y2K-induced events is not a credible scenario. Therefore, there *is no reason to believe that Y2K would significantly affect the probability or duration of a LOOP and/or a S8O from that otherwise assessed in the licensee's coping analysis required by 10 CFR 50.63 .

As discussed above, the diesel generators and associated onsite power supply systems, being within the scope of licensees' Y2K readiness programs, will be Y2K ready prior to the Y2K transition, and no decrease in reliability of the diesel generators is expected. The information provided by NERC indicates that the likelihood of a LOOP is not expected to increase 2

NERC is an electric industry organization made up of 1O Regional Reliability Councils that account for nearly every bulk electric supply and delivery organization in the interconnections of North America.

NERC and its Regional Reliability Councils set operating and engineering standards for the reliability of electric systems in North America. In May 1998, U.S. Department of Energy requested NERC to facilitate the electric industry's Y2K effort.

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significantly during Y2K transition. Based on these considerations, plus the ability of the plants to cope with a station blackout, the likelihood of an event that wili jeopardize public health and safety is acceptably low.

One of the public comments received by NRC in response to the petition indicated a concern regarding falsification of EDG reliability data by licensees. This particular concern has been investigated and resolved as documented in an NRC memorandum dated December 20, 1993, from the Office of Investigations to the Region II Regional Administrator, "Vogtle Electric Generating Plant: Alleged False Statements Regarding Test Results on Emergency Diesel Generators (Case No. 2-90-020R)." Falsification of EDG failure data by licensees is not considered l:>y NRC as an industry-wide, generic occurrence. Such incidents, when identified, will continue to be treated by NRC on a case-by-case basis and appropriate actions will be taken in response.

. 2. Sixty-Day Fuel Supply

NIRS' proposed rule would require each nuclear power plant licensee to have a 60-day onsite supply of fuel for diesel generators, as opposed to a 7-day fuel supply to which most licensees have committed. However, NIRS provided no technical basis why offsite power from the grid would not be reestablished within the 7-day period accommodated by existing onsite fuel supplies. Nor did NIRS explain why, should a LOOP continue for longer than 7 days, a licensee would be unable to resupply diesel fuel for a period of 60 days so that a 60-day fuel supply must be maintained onsite. Commenters on the NIRS petition who suggested a requirement for a larger fuel supply (able to accommodate .160 days of operation without resupply) also did not 14

provide any technical bases for their recommendations. As stated previously, the likelihood or duration of a LOOP is not expected to be significantly affected by the Y2K issue.

Furthermore, the NRC licensees are taking appropriate actions to ensure that their plants will be able to cope with Y2K-induced LOOP durations longer than 7 days. As part of each plant's Y2K activities, each licensee is preparing a contingency plan, which includes obtaining diesel fuel and other necessary supplies to cope with Y2K-induced long-term LOOP events. As part of NRC's review of licensees' implementation of their Y2K programs, NRC will confirm that

- licensee Y2K programs address emergency power sources, arrangements for obtaining critical commodities (e.g., EDG fuel oil) and other considerations for contingency planning identified in Nuclear Energy Institute/Nuclear Utilities Software Management Group (NEI/NUSMG) 98-07, "Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning," dated August 1998.

The capability of diesel generators and the adequacy of existing fuel supplies have been demonstrated at numerous plants during weather-induced interruptions of the power grid and other cases of LOOP from the grid. An example is the Turkey Point nuclear plant LOOP event

during the August 1992 Hurricane Andrew when the diesel generators automatically picked up safety-related loads and maintained the plant for an extended period (over 6 days) during the recovery until site power was restored. NRC considers the current 7-day fuel capacity to be sufficient to operate diesel generators for longer than the time that it takes to replenish the onsite supply from outside sources. Accordingly, a rule requiring licensees to maintain sufficient fuel to operate their diesel generators for a 60-day period or longer is not necessary to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection against Y2K-induced LOOP events. The regulation requires nuclear power plants to withstand LOOP events regardless of whether the 15

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LOOP is due to Y2K or other causes. The petitioner has not demonstrated that Y2K would significantly affect the probability or d_uration of loss of all alternating .current power from that otherwise assumed in the licensee's coping analysis required by 10 CFR 50.63, and the licensees' coping analyses continue to be applicable during the period that NIRS claims would present an increased susceptibility to a LOOP.

8. Additional Alternate Means of Backup Power I .

NIRS' petition requests NRC to require all licensees to provide an alternate (second) means of backup power, such as solar power panels, wind turbines, hydroelectric power, and biomass power. The petition also requests NRC to require that the alternate backup power system provide electricity directly to the licensee rather than to the broader electrical grid.

1. Need for Additional Backup Power Source As discussed in Section I.A.1 above, not only must licensees provide a source of backup power upon a LOOP, some licensees have provided an alternate ac power source in order to demonstrate that they are able to cope with a LOOP concurrent with a loss of onsite backup power (an S8O) for a specified duration. Thus, these licensees have three sources of power: (1) offsite power from two independent circuits; (2) onsite backup power from independent, redundant power supplies; and (3) altemate ac power. The NRC does not believe that the NIRS' proposal for a fourth source of power ("alternative backup power," in the words of NIRS) is necessary to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection against Y2K-induced problems.

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The petitioner does not explain why Y2K would affect diesel generators as a source of .

backup and/or alternate ac power, such that a source of power in addition to diesel generators is necessary to address SBO. The scope of the licensees' Y2K program covers both the onsite backup and the alternate ac power systems at nuclear power plants. Since 1996, NRC has been working with the nuclear industry and licensees of operating nuclear power plants in order to achieve Y2K re~diness at all nuclear power plants. NRC has issued Information Notice (IN) 96-70, uYear 2000 Effect on Computer System Software," on December 24, 1996; Generic Letter (GL) 98-01, "Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," on May 11, 1998; and GL 98-01, Supplement 1, "Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," on January 14, 1999 .

NRC issued IN 96-70 to alert nuclear power plant licensees of the Y2K problem. The information notice described the potential problems that nuclear power plant computer systems and software may. encounter during and following the transition into the year 2000 and how the Y2K issue may affect NRC licensees. IN 96-70 encouraged licensees to examine their uses of computer systems and software well before the year 2000 and suggested that licensees consider

appropriate actions for examining and evaluating their computer systems for Y2K vulnerabilities.

In GL 98-01, NRC endorsed the guidance in the inc;lustry document issued by the NEI/NUSMG 97-07, "Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness," when properly augmented in the area of risk management, contingency planning, and remediation of embedded systems, as one possible approach in implementing a plant-specific Y2K readiness program. In August 1998, NEI issued an industry document, NEI/NUSMG 98-07, which provided additional guidance in the area of internal and external risk management and contingency planning. External events that should 17

- - *-~ l ** ~ o. ! * * .* i. I. , . * . ~ * * .

be considered for facilitr-specific contingency planning include electric grid/transmission/

distribution system events (e.g., a LOOP, grid instability and voltage fluctuations, load fluctuations and loss of grid control systems), loss of emergency plan equipment and services, loss of essential services, and depletion of consumables. The NRC considers the guidance in NEI/NUSMG 98-07, when properly implemented, as an acceptable approach to mitigate and manage Y2K-induced events that could occur on Y2K-critical dates.

In GL 98-01, NRC requested that all operating nuclear power plant licensees submit written responses regarding their facility-specific Y2K readiness programs in order to obtain confirmation that licensees are addressing the Y2K problem effectively. All licensees have responded to GL 98-01, stating that they have adopt!3d plant-specific programs that are intended to make the plants Y2K ready by July 1, 1999. GL 98-01 also requests a written response, no later than July 1, 1999, confirming that these facilities are Y2K ready, including contin~ency planning. Licensees who are not Y2K ready by July 1, 1999, must provide a status report and schedule for the remaining work to ensure timely Y2K readiness .

As part of its oversight of licensee Y2K activities, the NRC staff conducted sample audits of 12 plant-specific Y2K readiness programs. The objectives of the audits were as follows:

1. To assess the effectiveness of licensee programs for achieving Y2K readiness and in addressing compliance with the terms and conditions of their license and NRC regulations and continued safe operation.

18

2. To evaluate program implementation activities to ensure that licensees are on schedule to achieve Y2K readiness in accordance with GL 98-01 guidelines.

3. To assess the licensee contingency planning for addressing risks associated with events resulting from Y2K problems.

NRC staff determined that this approach was an appropriate means of oversight of licensee Y2K readiness efforts because: (1) all licensees had committed to the nuclear power industry Y2K readiness guidance (NEI/NUSMG 97-07) in their first response to NRC GL 98-01; and (2) the audit would verify that licensees were effectively implementing the guidelines. The sample of 12 licensees included large utilities such as Commonwealth Edison and Tennessee Valley Authority, as well as small single-unit licensees such as North Atlantic Energy (Seabrook) and Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation. NRC staff selected a variety of types of plants of .

different ages and locations in this sample in order to obtain the necessary assurance that nuclear power industry Y2K readiness programs are being effectively implemented and that licensees are on schedule to meet the readiness target date of July 1, 1999, established in GL

98-01.

In late January 1999, NRC staff completed the 12 audits. On the basis of the audit observations, NRC staff has concluded that licensees are effectively addressing Y2K issues and are undertaking the actions necessary to achieve Y2K readiness in accordance with the GL 98-01 target date, although some plants will have some remediation, testing, and final certification scheduled for the fall 1999 outage. NRC staff did not identify any issues that would prevent these licensees from achieving readiness.

19

The NRC staff is not aware of any Y2K problems in nuclear power plant systems that directly affect actuation of safety functions, including the emergency onsite power systems.

Moreover, NRC audit results to date have not identified any associated residual Y2K problems with the emergency onsite power system and have confirmed the licensees' consideration of these systems. Also, the audits did not identify any Y2K problem in safety-related activation systems.

Additionally, the NRC's regional staff reviewed Y2K activities at all operating nuclear power plants to verify the status of licensee efforts to ensure that all plants will be able to function safely on January 1, 2000, and beyond. These reviews: (1) verified that all NRC licensees have I

implemented Y2K program activities; (2) evaluated the progress made to ensure that the licensees are on schedule to achieve Y2K readiness; and (3) assessed licensees' contingency plans for addressing Y2K-related issues. The reviews were completed by July 1999.

The NRC staff audited the contingency planning efforts of six licensee facilities. The audits at these facilities examined in detail backup measures the utilities have in place to deal

with possible Y2K problems, either on site or off site, that might affect plant operations. The audits were conducted in May and June 1999.

The reviews and audits will allow NRC staff to verify the progress of all licensees and determine whether any regulatory action is needed. Information from the reviews will be used in conjunction with the status reports that NRC has required its nuclear power plant licensees to provide by July 1, 1999. By July 1, 1999, all licensees responded to GL 98-01, Supplement 1.

20

The responses indicated that 68 plants are Y2K ready and 35 plants need to complete work on computer systems or devices after July 1, 1999.

NIRS presents no information or argument why these actions by the licensees, the nuclear industry, and NRC are not sufficient to ensure that onsite back up and alternate ac power systems will not be adversely affected by Y2K-induced problems.

2. Specific Backup Power Sources Proposed by NIRS

The petitioner's proposed alternative backup power sources, such as solar and wind, are not reliable backup power sources because of their undeperidability under unpredictable weather conditions or because they are limited by the amount of power they can generate. Additional comments received by the NRC in response to the petition also suggested the requirement for alternate power. The petitioner does not provide sufficient technical information to demonstrate that these additional alternative backup power sources would add more reliability than current backup power sources. Therefore, most of the sources of alternative backup power that are

included in NIRS' proposed rule would not constitute an acceptable alternative source of backup power with the same level of availability and capability as diesel generators.

C. Spent Fuel Pool Class 1E Classification and Backup Power The proposed rule would require all Part 50 licensees to immediately classify irradiated (spent) fuel pools as Class 1-E and provide sufficient backup power to provide cooling to these pools. Because Class 1-E is an electric system classification, the NRC assumes that the 21

petitioner intends the rule to require that the backup power supply for spent fuel pool cooling systems be classified as Class* 1-E.

The petitioner does not explain why classification of the electric power system for spent fuel pool cooling systems as Class 1-E is necessary to protect spent fuel pools against a Y2K-induced LOOP .. The Class 1-E classification addresses design and quality assurance (QA) requirements for manufacture and installation of electrical system components. Most of these systems are based upon analog controls and, therefore, are not subject to Y2K problems.

Furthermore, simple reclassification of the electrical power system by itse.lf would not appear to have any direct effect on minimizing Y2K-induced loss of power necessary for spent fuel cooling.

Rather, an evaluation of the power system for Y2K susceptibility is necessary, which is what licensees have committed to implement. Thus, itis unclear how the requested requirements in the NIRS petition Would provide assurance that Y2K problems will not prevent electrical power systems from performing their necessary safety functions. The NRC concludes that a rule change is not necessary since licensees are already directly addressing spent fuel pool cooling as part of their Y2K programs.

Furthermore, the NRC does not agree that a backup source of electrical power for spent fuel cooling is necessary at nuclear power plants in order to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection. At most operating nuclear power plants, the emergency onsite power system can directly supply electric power to its spent fuel pool cooling systems. At those plants at which the spent fuel cooling system is not directly connected to the emergency onsite power system, the capability exists of connecting the cooling system to the emergency onsite power system. Requiring a backup (tertiary) source of electrical power is not justified in view of the length of time between loss of spent fuel cooling and the point at which there is a ~ignificant 22

threat to integrity of the spent fuel rods. A licensee is required to keep the spent fuel pool filled to a level more than 23 feet above the top of the fuel rods and, generally, the water temperature in the pool is to be maintained below 140 Of. For a typical pool with a capacity of about 400,000 gallons and a worst case heat load causing 50 gpm of water loss as a result of evaporation, it would take about 3 days for the pool level to drop to the top of the fuel racks . .This estimate does not include the heat-up time of 3 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for the pool water to increase from 140 Of to 212 Of.

This scenario assumes a total loss of all ac electric power and that no corrective actions are taken for 3 days in response to the decreasing water level in the spent fuel pool. For a typical

- - heat load (non-refueling), the time to uncovering of the spent fuel pool would be around 2 weeks, again assuming that no make-up water is added to the pool. Upon loss- of water shielding, the radiation levels above the pool would increase. Assuming LOOP and failure of onsite emergency power sources, the only action necessary would be to provide make-up water to the spent fuel pool. The existing plant operating/emergency procedures provide for initiation of make-up water to the pool upon detection of low level. At many plants, the make-up water supply is provided by a plant safety system. Upon loss of all ac power, make-up water from any source, such as fire hoses supplied by diesel-driven fire pumps, can be used to maintain the required water level in

the pool. In light of the substantial period of time available for a licensee to take mitigative actions upon loss of spent fuel pool electrical power, the NRC concludes that providing an additional backup source of power is not warranted at any operating nuclear power plant.

II. Part 50 Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants.

There are 21 permanently shutdown nuclear power plants which have been shut down for more than a year. Six of these facilities have removed all spent fuel from the site. Therefore, 23

there are only 15 decommissioning power plants to which the proposed requirements in the petition would potentially apply.

Spent fuel pool cooling and support systems may be configured differently for decommissioning plants than for operating reactors due to the reduced need for decay heat removal at decommissioning plants. As decay heat loads drop, utilities are able under 10 CFR 50.59 to remove equipment from service once it no longer is needed to provide its safety function. At some plants there is no need for forced circulation to remove heat from the pool as adequate heat loss to ambient keeps the pool at an acceptable temperature. After a period of decay in the spent fuel pool, the heat load from spent fuel is significantly reduced as short-lived fission products decay. Consequently, the potential for boiling is reduced and the time available for the licensee to take mitigative action is greater. With the exception of Zion and Big Rock Point, more than three years has elapsed since any fuel was irradiated in the reactor at any o'f the nuclear power plants currently undergoing decommissioning.

The reasons discussed in Section I.C above regarding why electrical systems need not be classified Class 1-E for spent fuel pools at operating nuclear power plants also apply equally

to decommissioning nuclear power plants. As previously noted, requiring a backup source of electrical power is not justified in view of the length of time between loss of spent fuel cooling and the point where there is a significant threat to integrity of the spent fuel rods. Upon loss of all ac power, make-up water from any source, such as fire hoses supplied by diesel-driven fire pumps, can be used to maintain the required water level in the pool.

In view of the long time period available for the licensee to respond to loss of power to the spent fuel pool cooling system and the relative simplicity of mitigative actions, the requirements 24

proposed by NIRS with respect to spent fuel pool electrical system reclassification and the provision of alternative power are not justified.

Ill. Part 50 Non-Power Reactor Licensees.

Non-power reactors operate at power levels ranging from 250 KWt to 2 MWt, and they operate at low temperatures. Any non--power reactor in operation on January 1, 2000, can be readily shut down manually using emergency procedures and existing shutdown systems. These reactors have passive safety features and generally do not require power to shut down and dissipate decay heat. Accordingly, NRG regulations do not currently require Part 50 non-power reactors to provide a backup power source.-

NIRS did not present any information or rationale why Part 50 non-power reactors must provide an "alternate" source of backup power to address Y2K losses of power. In particular, NIRS did not address the fact that these facilities are not required to have a backup power source because power is not required to shut down and maintain these facilities in a safe-

shutdown condition. In the absence of any rationale in support of the proposed requirement, the Commission concludes that there is no basis for adopting the proposed requirement for Part 50 non-power reactor licensees.

IV. Part 70 Licensees To alert major Part 70 licensees of the Y2K problem, NRG issued Information Notice (IN) 96-70 in December 1996, and IN 98-30 in August 1998. In IN 96-70, NRG staff described the 25

potential Y2K problems, encouraged licensees to examine their uses of computer systems and software well before the year 2000, and suggested that licensees consider appropriate actions to

examine and evaluate their computer systems for Y2K vulnerabilities. In IN 98-30, NRC staff provided definitions of "Y2K ready" and "Y2K compliant," encouraged licensees to contact vendors and test their systems for Y2K problems, and described elements of a Y2K readiness program.

In order to gather Y2K information regarding materials and major fuel cycle facilities, NRC formed a Y2K Team within the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) in 1997. From September through December 1997, this NMSS Y2K Team visited a cross-section of materials licensees and fuel cycle facilities and conducted Y2K interviews. Each licensee or facility visited by the team indicated that it was aware of the Y2K issue and was in various stages of implementing its Y2K readiness* program.

On June 22, 1998, the NRC staff issued Generic Letter (GL) 98-03,- "NMSS Licensees' and Certificate Holders' Year 2000 Readiness Programs," requested major Part 70 licensees to inform NRC of the status of their Y2K readiness programs. In GL 98-03, the NRC staff requested all major Part 70 licensees to submit by September 20, 1998, written responses regarding ~heir facility-specific Y2K readiness program in order to confirm that they were addressing the Y2K problem effectively. All.licensees responded to GL 98-03 by stating that they had adopted a facility-specific Y2K readiness program, and the scope of the program included identifying and, where appropriate, remediating embedded systems, and provided for risk management and the develop]Tlent of contingency plans. GL 98-03 also requested a written response, no later than December 31, 1998, which confirmed that these facilities were Y2K ready or provided a status 26

report of work remaining to be done to become Y2Kready, including completion schedules. All licensees provided a second response to GL 98-03, which provided reports of work to be done, including completion schedules. Furthermore, following the second response, NRC requested a third written response, no later than July 1, 1999, which would confirm that these facilities were Y2K ready or would provide an updated status report .

.Between September 1997 and October 1998, the major fuel cycle facilities were also asked Y2K questions during other inspections. On the basis of these Y2K inspections, the licensees were aware of the Y2K problem and were adequately addressing Y2K issues. There

have been no identified risk-significant Y2K concerns for major Part 70 licensees.

NIRS presents no information or argument why these above-mentioned actions by the licensees and NRC are not sufficient to address Y2K problems and provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection <furing the transition from 1999 to 2000.

EOG Reliability and Fuel Supply The requirements proposed in the NIRS petition would require that: (1) all EDGs that provide backup power be operational and (2) licensees have a 60-day supply of fuel for EDGs or the facility would be shut down. The petitioner indicated these requirements are necessary to protect public health and safety. However, there are no Part 70 licensees required to have EDGs in order to provide backup power to protect public health and safety. In the event of the loss of electric power in Part 70 facilities, processing stops and there is no need for electric power to maintain a safe condition. There are some Part 70 licensees who have independent power 27

sources in order to meet physical protection (PP) requirements. These licensees are also required to have contingency plans for PP{e.g., augmented guard force) in the event of loss of independent power. Based on the.above discussion, the 60-day fuel supply requirement is also not needed for Part 70 licensees to provide-reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and safety.

The petitioner does not provide sufficient technical information to demonstrate that Part 70 licensees must shut down if they do not have EDGs providing backup power or must have a 60-day fuel supply for EDGs.

Additional Alternate Means of Backup Power NIRS asserted that NRC must require licensees to provide alternate means of backup power (e.g., solar power panels, wind turbines, hydroelectric power, biomass power). As stated above, it is not necessary for Part 70 licensees to have backup power in order to shutdown to a safe condition. Also, Part 70 licensees who are required to have independent power sources to meet PP requirements have contingency plans to meet the loss of the back-up power. Further, the petitioner does not provide sufficient technical information to demonstrate that these alternative back-up power sources are needed to t9 provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and safety:

28

'*- ~* ** * ~ .l._ ... .;_ _t-_,._ .. *.. -~, . . . J J,; ** :..

Back-up Power Supply for Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System The proposed rule in the NIRS petition requests NRG to require that all licensees immediately classify irradiated fuel pools as Class 1-E, and provide sufficient back-up power to provide cooling to these pools. Because Class 1-E is an electric system classification, the NRC staff assumes that the petitioner intends the rule to apply to the back-up power supply for spent fuel pool cooling systems. Although some Part 70 licensees have irradiated fuel at their facilities, these facilities do not store large quantities of irradiated fuel. The irradiated fuel is used for research and development or educational purposes. If the irradiated fuel is stored in a pool, the heat generated from the fuel would be minimal and would not require a pool cooling system .

The petitioner provides no technical justification to support the proposal that spent fuel pools be immediately classified as Class 1-E. The regulatory action requested by NIRS is not required for Part 70 licensees.

Conclusion Existing NRC requirements, licensee commitments, and licensee activities and programs are sufficient to cope with losses of power, including those losses of offsite power that could be caused by Y2K problems. NIRS has not presented any information either that existing requirements and licensee commitments are inadequate to address losses of power due to Y2K problems, such that the requirements proposed in NIRS' petition are necessary to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and safety. Accordingly, the Commissi,on denies the petition.

29

~

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this f7 day of ~ 4 , 1999.

FDr the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

f&L L.rsc.k-Andrew L. Bates Acting Secretary of the Commission.

30

SIEMENS 0nr: i< :. - , ;: i;

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February 23, 1999 '99 MAR -3 P3 *27 LJM:99:019 Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attn: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff DOCKET NUMOt-.R PETinON RlJLE PRM 50-U', 5o-t, 7

(~'I F(?37qo) (~'IFR37't1)

Gentlemen :

Subject:

Comments on Petitions for Rulemaking; Docket Nos. PRM-50-65 and PRM-50-67 Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) is a nuclear fuel fabricator located in Richland, Washington and is licensed by the NRC under 10 CFR Part 70 (License No. SNM-1227). We are providing these comments in response to the subject petitions for rulemaking submitted on December 10, 1998 by the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, as applicable to Part 70 licensees.

SPC recommends that the NRC reject each of the subject petitions for rulemaking submitted by Nuclear Information and Resource Service. While recognizing the importance of properly addressing Y2K issues at Part 70-licensed nuclear fuel fabrication plants, we do not believe that additional regulations are necessary to assure this is accomplished. Instead these issues can be, and are being, effectively addressed under existing regulations, existing Part 70 license conditions, and specific NRC Y2K initiatives already underway.

With respect to PRM-50-65 and its proposed requirements relative to computer systems examination, remediation, and followup testing, Part 70 uranium fuel fabrication plants are already responding to the requirements of NRC Generic Letter 98-03: NMSS Licensees' and Certificate Holders' Year 2000 Readiness Programs (June 22, 1998). That letter required licensees to provide, for the NRC's evaluation, a description of their Y2K Readiness Programs, including scope, assessment processes, corrective action plans, and testing/validation schedules. A confirmation of Y2K Readiness or alternatively, a status report of work remaining to be done, was required on or before December 31, 1998. For facilities that did not confirm Y2K Readiness on or before December 31, 1998, a similar status report is required by July 1, 1999. Both status reports require the identification of contingency plans for systems that may affect safety and safeguards. Requirements imposed under Generic Letter 98-03, under current Part 70 regulations, are sufficient to move fuel fabricators to Y2K Readiness in a manner that is open to, and auditable by, the NRC.

With respect to PRM-50-67 and its backup electrical power requirements, Part 70 fuel fabricators are once again already effectively regulated under current regulations. Requirements Siemens Power Corporation 2101 Horn Rapids Road Tel : (509) 375-8100 Richland , WA 99352 Fax : (509) 375-8402

U.S. NRC LJM:99:019 February 23, 1999 Page 2 to have onsite emergency electrical power generators are imposed as license conditions.

Furthermore, these generators are required to be maintained in a state of readiness, validated by periodic testing. Fuel supplies are maintained at a level adequate to facilitate appropriate response/recovery actions. It should be stated that in the highly unlikely event of a total loss of electrical power (grid plus backup), conditions at SPC's plant would not threaten public health and safety. Potential adverse impacts would be limited to work areas and equipment within the plant; no catastrophic or significant loss of control or containment of special nuclear material would occur. And lastly, the provision of a tertiary (i.e. secondary backup) source of electrical power to the plant independent of the broader electrical grid, as would be required under PRM-50-67, is an unreasonable requirement that would force shutdown of SPC's plant on December 1, 1999, in the absence of any significant credible safety risk .

We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on these petitions for rulemaking . For the reasons stated above, we urge the NRC to deny both petitions. If you have questions regarding SPC's position, please contact me on 509-375-8537.

L. J. Maas, Manager Regulatory Compliance

/pg SIEMENS Siemens Power Corporation - Nuclear Division PO Box 130, 2101 Horn Rapids Road, Richland, WA 99352-0130

Log # TXX-99058 TUELECTRIC

99 Mf..R -z FpE!j~~ 2 Of- February 23, 1999 C. Lance 'Jerry Senior Vice President

& Principal Nuclear Officer DOCKET !'JUM8FR Secretary PETITION RUlf .;..;?R....t\lr;;,;.,ai::;..O_*-.,:;b~-0:....-..IE...l.-

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ~ t/ Fl? 31'10 (t,'f ~R 31, 1 ATTN.: Rulemakings and Adjudication Staff

SUBJECT:

Gentlemen:

COMMENTS ON PETITION FOR RULEMAKING RELATED TO YEAR 2000 COMPUTER (64 FR 3789, 3792 and 3793- January 25, 1999)

As requested in the referenced federal register notice, TU Electric submits comments to the proposed three related petitions [3789, 3792, 3793] for rulemaking, each dated December 10, 1998, submitted by the Nuclear Information Resource Service concerning various aspects of Y2K issues and nuclear safety. This petition requests that the NRC amend its regulations to require that nuclear facilities be shut down if they are not compliant with Y2K issues. The two related petitions would require nuclear power plant and major fuel cycle facilities to develop and implement adequate contingency and emergency plans to address potential system failures (PRM-50-66) and to provide reliable back-up sources of power for nuclear facilities (PRM-50-67) .

We recommend that the Commission deny this petition related to year 2000 computer issues.

Current regulations are adequate to address potential issues that may arise from potential Y2K computer issues. NRC Generic Letter 98-01 summarizes some of the applicable regulatory requirements. NRC staff oversight of the industry's year 2000 remediation is providing the technical information needed by the Commission to make informed decisions and ensure public health and safety.

(A)

TU Electric endorses comments developed by NEI and NUBARG addressing the Petition for Rulemaking filed by the Nuclear Information and Resource Service (64 Fed. Reg 3789-1/25/99).

Concurrently, to date, CPSES has responded to GL-98-01 and has evaluated Supplement 1 to the GL. In July of 1999, CPSES will respond to the second half of GL-98-01 via the requirements as noted in Supplement 1. The second response will confirm Y2K readiness of the facility with regard to those systems within the scope of the license and NRC regulations, and those systems required for continued operation of the facility after January 1, 2000. For COMANCHE PEAK SI ~AM ELECTRIC ST A TION P.O. Box 1002 Glen Rose, Texas 76043-1002 MAR 4 1SI ieag

TXX-99058 Page 2 of 4 those systems which are not Y2K ready as of July 1, 1999, the TU Electric will provide a status and completion schedule for achieving readiness by the year 2000.

CPSES has already completed the initial assessment of what systems/components fall within the Y2K scope as identified in the GL. CPSES has had two separate outside organizational evaluations/audits performed. One performed by a consultant group and the other by a joint utility evaluation group. Concurrently, two different in-house evaluations have occurred as well.

CPSES contingency plans are developed to reduce the risks associated with Y2K induced events to assure safe and continued operations of CPSES during Y2K transition points and beyond . Contingency plans are three fold to identify processes associated with internal risks, external risks and the development of an integrated contingency plan which will marry with the Corporate Y2K plan to assure utility viability during the Y2K transition dates and beyond.

All Y2K contingency plans for CPSES are routed through a Continency Plan Steering Committee composed of system and planning experts to review the plans for consistency, thoroughness, assess justifications and evaluate the body of plans to assess the integration of all identified plans into the final integrated plan. Contingency Plans are based on NEI/NUSMG 98-07 and facility specific documents related to Y2K activities.

(B)

TU Electric endorses comments developed by NEI and NUBARG addressing the Petition for Rulemaking filed by the Nuclear Information and Resource Service (64 Fed. Reg 3792 and 3793- 1/25/99) (PRM-50-67) and further submits the following comments.

Offsite Power TUE has generated a corporate wide Y2K plan which encompass reviews of equipment, plans and procedures necessary to assure continuing power and utility operation. The plan assures and confirms that offsite power will be available to CPSES not only on 1/1/2000 but beyond.

CPSES has six different sources of offsite power that is available. Of the six, two are dedicated as the preferred or alternate incoming power sources for CPSES. Loss of offsite power or undervoltage and/or degraded grid voltage problems are handled by redundant systems at CPSES. Preferred, alternate and standby power sources are available to assure reliable continuing operation of CPSES, or, in the event of a condition which leads to a reactor trip, sufficient power and load management is available. All systems were analyzed, built and tested to meet General Design Criteria and Design Basis Accident scenarios for nuclear power plants.

TXX-99058 Page 3 of 4 Abnormal Conditions and Contingencies CPSES has taken the position that plans and procedures which have been reviewed and approved by the NRC for conditions which may occur that would be considered an 'abnormal',

'alarm', or 'emergency' condition, will be used to assess, control and mitigate any condition which may occur. If contingencies are noted specific to potential Y2K related problems, remediation actions have been generated to eliminate the problem or contingencies have been or are being developed to minimize any potential adverse condition. The contingencies are being incorporated into existing facility plans and procedures to assure (a) there is ample time to train appropriate personnel on procedural/plan changes, (b) consistency in methodology in identification and mitigation within current procedures to reduce personnel transition and human factors engineering problems, and ( c) reduce the overall number of new procedures necessary to control the facility, specifically during a potential abnormal condition.

Standby Electrical Power The following Y2K engineering assessments have been performed associated with the EDG's at CPSES. Each of theses assessments have reviewed the EDG and its auxiliaries to include the;

Generator load sensor magnetic pickup selector switch

digital speed controller modular electronic control

dew point transmitter tachometer

static voltage regulator, and setpoint programmer The Chemistry Organization has also performed assessments on their instruments and equipment used to assure diesel fuel quality used at CPSES.

The nuclear industry has committed to a systematic program to find and remediate potential Y2K issues. Any safety related systems for which needed remediation has not been completed will be reported to the Commission by July 1, 1999. Quality assurance procedures and documentation of testing and remediation has been consistent with regulatory requirements.

Additional regulations are not required to ensure safe plant operation.

Licensees and the NRC are conducting contingency planning for key Y2K rollover dates. These contingency plans evaluate specific risk factors and where appropriate providing mitigation strategies. This effort provides a rational review and systematic approach to issues that could impact the continued safe operation of a plant within the conditions of its license. This is a more effective approach to ensuring plants can continue to operate and meet commitments.

TXX-99058 Page 4 of 4 Summary The Commission has acted responsibly to address potential computer issues related to the year 2000 date rollover. The staff began its technical review early and has taken advantage of many opportunities to oversee and evaluate the industry's effort. We do not believe that additional regulations are needed to maintain the current high standards for public health and safety.

If you have any questions please contact Mr. Neil S. Harris at (254)-897-5449.

Sincerely,

<3, -s. ~ h *- -

C. L. Terry - - -..-o B~~a~.~~

Regulatory Affairs Manager NSH/nsh

c. Mr. E.W. Merschoff, Region IV Resident Inspectors, CPSES (2)

Mr. T. Polich, NRR Mr. J. I. Tapia, Region IV

DO KET NUMBER DOCKETED I RC p 50-lo 7 v'IPR31'i!}

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February 16, 1999 Secretary US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing in support of Docket No. PRM-50-67. I believe the admendments requested are essential to ensure safety in our future .

U.8. NUCLEAR AIBUlAT(JW COMMISSION

DOCKET NUMBER PETITION RULE PRM ~O-ft, 7 IPl/FR31'lt)

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,. -PETITION OOiiiii EB,.....25 Nuclear Information and Re ice 1424 16th St. NW, Suite 404, Washington,. DC 20036; 202-328-0002; fax:202-462-2183; e-mail:nirsnet@igc.apc.er-efweb:www.nirs.org February 24, 1999 John Hoyle, Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 By FAX Transmission 301-415-1672

Dear Mt_- Hoyle,

On behalf of Nuclear Infprmation and Resource Service (NIRS), I am submitting supplemental comments for the Petitions for Rulemaking on the Y2K preparedness regarding operability of emergency diesel generators and additional backup power as appeared in the Federal Register dated January 25, 1999 Volume 64, Number 15, Page 3791-3793.

Emergency Diesel Powered Generators 1and Their Reliability The Y2K issue raises a broad range of uncertainty for electrical power grid reliability.

In the event of a grid failure, nuclear power stations attached to disrupted grid systems will SCRAM, or automatically shutdown. Once SCRAMMED, a nuclear power station is not a passive system. Emergency shutdown requires th8;t alternating current (AC) be generated onsite so that the reactor core maintains stability through the removal of residual heat via a system of circulating coolant pumps and motor operated components.

Additional safety-related monitoring and control systems require electrical power stored and generated on-site. Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) are qesigned to provide back-up AC electrical power for the duration of any grid instability.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has recognized that the combination of loss of offsite power coupled with the loss of onsite emergency backup power is postulated to be the largest contributor to reactor core fuel damage. This condition, known as "station blackout," results in the unavailability of the high pressure injection system, the containment spray system, the inside and outside containment spray recirculation systems and motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. A long duration of station blackout (in excess of approximately four hours) leads to battery depletion and subsequent loss of vital instrumentation. The uncovering of the reactor core and its associated hazards will 19g9 (i) printed on recytled paper dedicated to a sound non-nuclear energy policy.

U . UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMlssfoN RULEMAKfNGS &A0JUOK:A11CNI STAFF OFFICE Of llie SEaE'ARY OF 0oculnent Slear.b

occur within a range 3 to 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months beyond the time of battery depletion without restoration of AC power in Pressurized Water Reactors and Boiling Water Reactors, respectively. Furthermore,"Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-1150) states that with the combination of grid failure, battery failure and EDG failure "core damage results in approximately one hour as the result of coolant boiloff for some reactors.

The importance of redundant onsite emergency power cannot be disputed. NRC and industry currently taut a 95% reliability factor for emergency start-up and electrical loading of safety equipment. In the event of widespread grid disruptions, even this official figure allows a 5% margin for EDG failure. However, a NIRS review of EDG reliability as evidenced through NRC Daily Event Reports continues to indicate that the margin of failure maybe larger.

The petition for rulemaking relevant to emergency diesel generator operability has an attached Appendix A providing a compilation of US NRC Daily Event Reports for every month of 1997 and 1998 indicating a wide range of new and recurring problems potentially affecting emergency diesel generator operability. Since the beginning of 1999, NIRS has continued to monitor Daily Event Reports for diesel generator problems and continues to evidence a range of potential operability issues including unresolved Part 21 filings, diesel generators found to be outside of technical specifications, and equipment component degradation.

Additional NIRS review ofNRC documents indicates that industry reporting of emergency diesel generator start-up reliability may not be as accurate as reported to NRC.

It is of concern to public health and safety that nuclear utilities may not be reporting reliable restart data for their emergency diesel generators. NIRS is aware that on at least one occasion a nuclear utility falsified data relative to the reliability of emergency diesel generators. This is documented by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission memorandum dated December 20, 1993 to Stewart Ebneter, Region II Administrator from Ben Hayes, U.S. NRC Office oflnvestigations entitled "Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP):

Alleged False Statements Regarding Test Results On Emergency diesel Generators (Case No. 2-90-020R).

On March 20, 1990 Vogtle Unit 1 declared a Site Area Emergency due to a loss of offsite power when a truck hit a tower in the switchyard and the concurrent loss of onsite emergency diesel generator capability when the one operable diesel generator tripped after starting. As a result the unit went into station blackout and an associated heat up of Reactor Coolant System before the emergency diesel generator was successfully started and restored emergency power. As a result, Georgia Power Company (GPC) was required to demonstrate successful restart of their emergency diesel generators before restart of the Units.

2

The report documents deliberate violations by Georgia Power Company ofNRC regulation and license conditions in falsification of material statements made to NRC .

by senior company officials regarding the reliability of the emergency diesel generators.

The Office of Investigation substantiated that on April 19, 1990, the general manager deliberately presented incomplete and inaccurate information to NRC regarding testing of the Unit 1 diesel generators conducted subsequent to the site emergency. The 01 also substantiated that the Vice President of Nuclear Operations deliberately and repeatedly presented misleading, incomplete, and inaccurate statements of diesel test results with at a minimum careless disregard. The 01 investigation concluded "there was evidence of a closed, deceptive, adversarial attitude toward NRC on the part of GPC senior management."

This particular investigation was unique in that the alleger provided NRC with tape recordings of internal telephone conversations of various levels of Georgia Power Company; from employees within the power station up to the Senior Vice President of Nuclear Operations. The 01 report states that the tape recordings show "evidence of closed deceptive adversarial attitude toward NRC on the part of GPC senior management." The alleger subsequently was fired from Georgia Power and was granted relief through a settlement agreed upon by both the NRC and the utility.

It is of concern to the petitioner that conclusive evidence indicating an "closed deceptive adversarial attitude toward NRC" on the part of utility senior management may not in fact have been nor currently is unique to Georgia Power Company. It is the concern of the petitioner that "a deceptive adversial attitude toward NRC" could exist within other nuclear utilities and potentially impact reliability data pertaining to emergency diesel generator start-ups and failures.

The lack of reliable testing data for emergency diesel generators constitutes an increase in the risk to the public's health and safety.

Other actions taken on the part of electric to avoid Y2K disruptions can impact emergency diesel generator reliability in terms of duration of reliance on emergency power at a nuclear power station.

At least one known utility and potentially more utilities plan to separate their various power pools from regional and national grid systems to avoid widespread power outages come Y2K rollover dates. This preventive action may constitute an added burden on emergency onsite power generators should grid failures occur. The New London Day reported on January 5, 1999 in an article entitled "Millstone Official Says Y2K Problems Won't Have Any Effect On Nuclear Station" comments made by Mr. M. Phillip DeCaprio, Y2K program manager for Northeast Utilities. Mr. DeCaprio stated the NU had undertaken plans to "island" the New England Power Pool. The petitioner contends that in the event of a grid disturbance either within the island power pool or a neighboring power pool, a delay or potentially failure in the transfer of power can result without the interconnections providing power to the blackout area. This could be further 3

compounded by telecommunication problems between utilities systems necessary to initiate and monitor power transfers normally available through automated systems.

Consequently, NIRS submits this information in support of its petition for rulemaking requesting that the agency require that all EDGs to be operable with a 60-day supply of fuel oil onsite and that additional emergency AC power generators be added at each reactor site to provide a broader margin of reliability for the protection of the public health and safety.

Paul Gunter, Director Reactor Watchdog Project 4

DOCKET NUMBER PETITION RULE PR 5I)- ~ 7

&'/FR371!) DOCK:TEO Tuesday, February 23, 1999 U'"' RC To the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 2Q5555 Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff 99 FEB 25 P1 :Q2 Sense it takes 5 months for Spent Fuel Rods to cool ( http://www.uilondq!}.OJg/nfc.htm),

I believe instead of 60 days worth of diesil emergency fuel, the Mandatory ~(Daunt should be raised to 160 days worth of diesil per Spent Fuel Rods; in all ri,8e1at power F plants. Living as close as 60 miles to a nuclear power plant has made thier safty during the Year 2000 rollover & after a major factor of to relocate or not relocate.

Thank you for careful consideration for our wellfare, Aliasjoey@aol.com Annalisa Haight 483 Drury lane Banning, Ca.

92220

\jjftfl 3 199

lJ S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RULEMAKJNGS & ADJUDICATIONS STAFF OFACE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document S1atlsta

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February 24, 1999 NOTE TO: Emile Julian Chief, Docketing and Services Branch FROM: Carol Gallagher /1 _ . n ,A A ; 1,,,._,J~

ADM, DAS ~ ~ - - - /}

SUBJECT:

DOCKETING OF COMMENT ON PRM-50-67, "ASSURANCE OF RELIABLE BACK-UP SOURCES OF POWER FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES" Attached for docketing is a comment letter related to the subject petition for rulemaking .

This comment was received via e-mail on February 23, 1999. The submitter's name is Annalisa Haight, 483 Drury Lane, Banning, CA 92220. Please send a copy of the docketed comment to Matthew Chiramal (mail stop O9D-4) for his records.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/o attachment:

M. Chiramal

DOCKET NUMBER PETITION RULE PAM 5 o ~ t. 7 February 18, 1999 ( /,l/FR 37&11)

Corey J. Conn *99 FEB 23 P2 :53 1354 N. Greenview, 2R Chicago, IL 60622 Of r RU

ADJU';

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, DC 20555 Docket No. PRM 50-67 Commissioners:

I strongly urge the Commission to take the most precautionary position possible regarding the contingency of extended loss of offsite power. The well understood implications of this generic safety issue (LOOP) will be greatly intensified by simultaneous operational impairments which are anticipated to accompany certain year 2000 computing problems within the power, telecommunication, and other industries.

The petition for Rulemaking filed December 10, 1998 by Nuclear Information Resource Service suggests specific remedies which would reduce both the probability and severity of disruptions to agriculture, the environment, human health, and the economy were any extended loss of offsite power to deteriorate into an extended station blackout. In no other industrial sector are comparably severe adverse impacts both foreseen and preventable.

With respect to Docket No. PRM 50-67, I fully support the implementation of the petitioner's proposed remedies and ask the Commission to adopt and Sin~,/

implement thes,e requirements without delay.

1 ;~

4.cknowledged by card-----------*

f 25 1999

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS~lvN RULEMAKINGS &ADJUOICATIONS STAFF OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Docllnent Statistics Postmafk Date _ ..,,_......,_,.__.__..____ _

CopiesRacMed _ _ __.;..._ __

Add'I

DOCKET NUMBER 50 * ~ <, .;

PETITION RULE PAM So* r,-,

[(,'{r:R31'11)

-~ f EB 23 Ff~b()t).ry 19, 1999 Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington D.C. 20555 *0 \ii_. _. .

AO}' *.

Attn: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff Re: Development of emergency plans to address major systems failure that may be caused by a Y2K problem I feel that it would be wise to conduct a full-scale emergency planning exercise. You see, I live within 5 miles of a nuclear power plant. When any complete testing is done, I, as a neighbor, would like to be informed as to when it is going to happen. I would leave my home at the time and visit relatives until the testing was over. I feel a real threat because so many things could go wrong.

Re: Back-up power It is a good idea to have a 60 day supply of fuel for emergency diesel generators.

However, if the generators cannot be proven to be operational, or if all or a portion of the power grid fails, I would rather have NO POWER than to have an unsafe condition.

Our family is preparing for a NO PO\VER situation anyway. (We are campers from way back.)

Sincerely, Pat S. Griffith

5836 Country Lane Stanley N.C. 28164

~ l8 25 1999 6-cknowleaged by carct-:IXDl&m.-ldl...-..

DOCKET NUMBER PETITION RULE PAM SD- t,7

( {,tfFf?37"1I) DOC ETE O From: <Kvnking@aol.com> US, Rt..

To: WND2 . LSP1 (PDR)

Date: Tue, Feb 16, 1999 12:49 AM

Subject:

re: back-up generators *99 FEB 22 P4 :36 To whom it may concern : or r 'I RU I was reading the NRC was considering making on-site back up generaM:i,slwith 60 days of fuel reserve mandatory in consideration of possible y2k disruptions.

Absolutely, please make this rule!!!

Sincerely, Kevin King 901 0 seneca Lane Bethesda, MD 20817 F8 25 1999

~edged by cmd - 11 V I 90&--.UJ:J.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM&SStON RULEMAKINGS &ADJUDICATK)NS STAFF OFFICE Of 'THE SECRETARY Of THE COINSS10N DoclllmSldal:e Postmark oate ei,b.:i/49 t{µ 1el-:fom-, ~ 4~~

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February 16, 1999 NOTE TO: Emile Julian Chief, Docketing and Services Branch FROM: Carol Gallagher ADM,DAS

SUBJECT:

DOCKETING OF COMMENT ON PRM-50-67, "ASSURANCE OF RELIABLE BACK-UP SOURCES OF POWER FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES" Attached for docketing is a comment letter related to the subject petition for rulemaking.

This comment was received via e-mail on February 16, 1999. The submitter's name is Kevin King, 9010 Seneca Lane, Bethesda, MD 20817. Please send a copy of the docketed comment to Matthew Chiramal (mail stop O9D-4) for his records.

Attachment:

As stated cc wIo attachment:

M. Chiramal

DOCKET NUMBER 0)

PETITION RULE PAM 50- '- 7

( f?</FR37'1t) DOCKE TE D From: <krice25@hotmail.com> USHRC To: TWFN_DO. twf4_po(CAG)

Date: Mon, Feb 15, 1999 11 :44 PM

Subject:

NRC RuleForum Form Submission: Docket No. PRM-50-67'99 FEB 22 P4 :36 Who: Kevin J. Rice Of-+

Organization: None (private individual) HL I Email: krice25@hotmail.com ADJU.3 *rF Re : Docket No. PRM-50-67 Comments:

Dear Sirs:

I would like to request approval of the Y2K petitions. I am a programmer and have a strong view that this is not a mild or transitory issue to be cast about as a trifling point.

Please approve this petition. I can cope with economic disruptions; my eventual children's lives and good health depend on your response .

I feel nuclear power is safe, and have no problem with it in general. I do, however, understand the nature of complex systems (prone to failure due to chaotic natural influences) and this nation's power grid is one of the most complex infrastructure systems in the world.

Thank you for your time.

Most Cordially Yours,

-- Kevin Rice f ,maif HS 25 1999

~owledged by

lJ ..:, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FIULEMAKINGS &ADJUDICATIONS STAFF OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics r stmarkDate .:J/,;J:i/99 ~:I ~ t:~ / o f " ~

Copies Received ~ ,. L Special D i ~

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February 16, 1999 NOTE TO: Emile Julian Chief, Docketing and Services Branch FROM: Carol Gallagher /7 . 11 A .L () tJ .. 1 ,,-../

A ADM, DAS ~ .r-~{'~

SUBJECT:

DOCKETING OF COMMENT ON PRM-50-67, "ASSURANCE OF RELIABLE BACK-UP SOURCES OF POWER FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES" Attached for docketing is a comment letter related to the subject petition for rulemaking .

This comment was received via e-mail on February 15, 1999. The submitter's name is Kevin Rice. Please send a copy of the docketed comment to Matthew Chiramal (mail stop O9D-4) for his records.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/o attachment:

M. Chiramal

DOCKET NUMBER PETITION RULE PRM S~-~7

(_ (,(/~ 3 7'!I)

DOC KETE D U, C

Subject:

Public Comment regarding Docket No.PRM-50-67

99 FEB 22 Al 1 :22 I have read the above mentioned petition and these are not unreasoncble requests and I fully support them with two concerns or considerations. ~-~I AOJL I st - Is it possible or feasible to store a 60 day supply of fuel to these generators. I can't believe a 16 cylinder diesel w/12-inch pistons will get the best gas mileage. Can this request be met?

2nd - (3) Irradiated fuel pools are to be immediately classified as Class 1-E; back-up power systems must be sufficient to provide cooling for such pools.

Nuke plants keep the life time supply of Uranium Rods on sight (Spent or Not).

Given a total power outage (Y2K?) to the plant (even during a shutdown period) I have two concerns,

I st - How many days before the water evaporates from the pool?

2nd - What happens if the pool goes empty? <No need to answer>

The current generators are adequate to bring the plant down, the real issue is "Fuel Pool Makeup Water". An addition power source or method should be available (besides the Diesels) to provide makeup water to the fuel Pool & it should be mandatory! I'm not so sure windmills & solar panels are the answer, but Shutdown or Not (at all Cost) Make Sure That Fuel Pool Can Be Kept Full!" <Even ifwe need to fill buckets>

No one really knows what is in front ofus but God himself. You people will have to make sound decisions for the coming event. I just don't have enough data to know, I hope you do! Prayerfully seek council through our champion Jesus Christ.

PS; I live 3 Miles from RG & E's Nuker in Ontario, I don't think the alarms will be working this night.

Robert 7232 Furnace Road Ontario, NY 14519

~knowledged by card F B z5 1999

IJ.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM ISSION RULEMAKINGS &AOJUOtCATIONS STAFF OFFICE OFTME SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION DocumertSl!dilticl PostmarkDate ~#~MrJ ~~ ~ ~

CopiesRec&IINd _ _ _.......___

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Add'! Raploduced _ __ s:______

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February 19, 1999 NOTE TO: Emile Julian Chief, Docketing and Services Branch FROM: Carol Gallagher /1 _.. /J . ~

ADM, DAS U)J1'""--'

SUBJECT:

DOCKETING OF COMMENT ON PRM-50-67, "ASSURANCE OF RELIABLE BACK-UP SOURCES OF POWER FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES" Attached for docketing is a comment letter related to the subject petition for rulemaking.

This comment was received via the rulemaking website on February 18, 1999. The submitter' s name is Robert, 7232 Furnace Road, Ontario, NY 14519. Please send a copy of the docketed comment to Matthew Chiramal (mail stop O9D-4) for his records.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/o attachment:

M. Chiramal

DOCKET NUMBER DOCKETED PETITION RULE PAM 5 a~ C. 7 us ~c (i) 7{,</FR37'1i )

From: <Fewnickles@aol.com>

To: TWFN_DO.twf2_po(NRCWEB) *99 FEB 22 A7 :S 3 Date: Wed, Feb 17, 1999 12:45 PM

Subject:

Regulation change: re: Nuclear Reactor Operations OF.

Hl I As a concerned citizen and small busines operator, I have to wholeha~ diy a'gree with the pending rule change making it manditory for operators of Nuclear Facilities to have reliable back-up electrical generators and an adequate supply of diesel fuel. Considering the alternative (losing 20% of our nations power due to safety shutdowns or the inability to re-start because of a lack of reliable power) it only makes sense to require operators of these facilities to have internal power backup and the fuel to support it. Thank you. Ray Marcouillier Denver, CO. fewnickles@aol.com f-/nlJil FfB 2 4 1999

'1cknowledged by ..,.,o,_ _ _ ..,n,.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMtSSION RULEMAKINGS &ADJUOICA110NS STAFF OFFICE Of 11-IE SB&TARV OF THE COMt8tON Docanat8mllaln PostRtark Coples~ _ _ _ _

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February 17, 1999 NOTE TO: Emile Julian Chief, Docketing and Services Branch FROM: Carol Gallagher ADM, DAS

/) . . 0 A~ I I JJ.AJ..u-'

(_,.,{L,nt'V ~ - (/.. .

SUBJECT:

DOCKETING OF COMMENT ON PRM-50-67, "ASSURANCE OF RELIABLE BACK-UP SOURCES OF POWER FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES" Attached for docketing is a comment letter related to the subject petition for rulemaking.

This comment was received via e-mail on February 17, 1999. The submitter's name is Ray Marcouillier. Please send a copy of the docketed comment to Matthew Chiramal (mail stop O9D-

4) for his records.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/o attachment:

M. Chiramal

DOCKET NUMBER P TION RULE PRM 5o-t, 1

[&'l~R 31t:t1)

DOCKETED From: Gerry Lotton <dakota@ideasign .com> USl C To: TWFN_DO.twf4_po(CAG)

Date: Tue, Feb 16, 1999 6:24 PM

Subject:

Proposed Rule Comments Docket No. PRM-50-67 *99 FEB 22 A7 :S 2 February 16, 1999 Olt \

R' ,I

Subject:

Public Comment regarding Docket No.PRM-50-67 ADJUL)

Attention : Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington , DC 20555. Attention :

Rulemakings and Adjudication*s Staff It is my understanding, that it takes FIVE months to cool the nuclear reactor rods once they are pulled from the core, and that electrical power provided by outside sources must be available to run the cooling pumps. It is also my understanding, that in groups of the nuclear reactors that only one standby or backup generator is provided. This backup generator has capacity to serve only one plant shutting down at a time, and then , only in emergencies. The stand by generator capacity designed only to provide emergency power (for one plant) until outside electrical service could be obtained, or switched over. In situations like these, adequate backup power service must be available, to protect people from the danger of insufficient backup or outside electrical energy. It is likely, that y2k problems, that affect one reactor will affect all. Consequently, all reactors could experience problems at the same time, causing the backup generator to fail, due to inadequate electrical capacity.

I believe it would be more prudent to require all y2k noncompliant and not adequately backed up nuclear plants to shut down on July 1, 1999; thereby, allowing a contingency factor of safety, of one month prior to January 1, 2000 and avoiding possible risk to human life.

Reliable outside electrical power must be available, to guarantee security and public safety.

The security and public risk from y2k related problems that may affect both generating plants and the distribution grid are too great after January 1, 2000.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit these comments.

Sincerely, Gerald I. Lotton 2202 West Madison Street Sioux Falls, SD 57104 dakota@ideasign.com

~ FtB 2 4 1999 owledged by cara u..... .. . . ,,,. _,.

t.J.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f!ULEMAKINGS &ADJUOICATION8 STAFF OFFICE OFMSB&'TARV Of THE OOMMIS8ION Docunm.Wcl

~It ,,/4 9 (f?u 1j ~-- ( ! ~ AfJI/_ ~~- L .

Copies ' rrr} ~ l /

Add'l Copie6 ~ ____,S_____ - _

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February 17, 1999 NOTE TO: Emile Julian Chief, Docketing and Services Branch FROM: Carol Gallagher /l " )__,, J _pAJ~

ADM, DAS ~ ,r---71 *-

SUBJECT:

DOCKETING OF COMMENT ON PRM-50-67, "ASSURANCE OF RELIABLE BACK-UP SOURCES OF POWER FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES" Attached for docketing is a comment letter related to the subject petition for rulemaking .

This comment was received via e-mail on February 15, 1999. The submitter's name is Gerry I.

Lotton, 2202 West Madison Street, Sioux Falls, SD 57104. Please send a copy of the docketed comment to Matthew Chiramal (mail stop O9D-4) for his records.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/o attachment:

M. Chiramal

DOCKETED From: John Calhoun <jcalhoun@frii.com> USNRC To: TWFN_DO. twf2_po(N RCWEB)

Date: Mon, Feb 15, 1999 8:19 PM

Subject:

Petitioner's Request *99 FEB 22 A7 :53 15 February 1999 Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff DOCKET NUMBER Re: Public Comment PETITION RULE ~RM 50 -to7 T,ct~R3 791)

Dear sir:

In reference to a recent petitioner's request that emergency diesel generators in good working condition and adequate fuel supplies to operate them for 60 days be kept in reserve at all U.S.

nuclear power plants against the contingency that the Year 2000 computer problem could cause disruptions in the national electrical power grid, I am in complete agreement. I believe this mandate should be approved and implemented.

I would add only this amendment: ensure that enough generators and fuel are on hand to supply electricity to safely shut down the reactors if that becomes necessary -- whatever that period of time may be. Hopefully none of these steps will prove necessary, but it is only prudent to take such precautions given the critical electrical supply and safety issues surrounding nuclear energy.

Thank you for your attention.

Respectfully, John B. Calhoun, Jr.

19 Old Town Square Fort Collins, CO 80524 970-482-4511 jcalhoun@frii.com

.t.cknowfedged by card FE 8 2 4 1999 _

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AULEMAKINGS &AOJU01CAT10NS Sl'AFF OFFICE OF"AiE SSCAEl'ARY OF THE COMMIS8ION Doclan 8lz Isl a Postmark Dace e?/4f/9 'f Coples Received /

Add'I Copies Reproduced_~ --- --

February 17, 1999 NOTE TO: Emile Julian Chief, Docketing and Services Branch FROM: Carol Gallagher /1 , A. 0 ()-' ,.J ~,_.,1 ADM, DAS ~ ~*--v

SUBJECT:

DOCKETING OF COMMENT ON PRM-50-67, "ASSURANCE OF RELIABLE BACK-UP SOURCES OF POWER FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES" Attached for docketing is a comment letter related to the subject petition for rulemaking.

This comment was received via e-mail on February 15, 1999. The submitter's name is John B.

Calhoun, Jr., 19 Old Town Square, Fort Collins, CO 80524. Please send a copy of the docketed comment to Matthew Chiramal (mail stop O9D-4) for his records.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/o attachment:

M. Chiramal

DOCKET NU BER February 9, 1999 RULE PR 50- ~ 7

(~ifFR37q1) OOCKE1E C oncernmg . t he petition . B ac kup P ower P rov1*d ed to N ucIear US. RC

. . fior aIternatlve Powerplants on Dec. 1, 1999

99 fEB 11 P2 :15 I would mostly agree with the Petition to Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants.

Offi, RU-I have always been, and will always be, a proponent of Nuclear Energy, but as 'hiputer FF programmer that has been dealing with the Y2K issue from a programming perspective, I believe it is in the publics best interest to have alternative means of electricity in case of problems for Year 2000.

I would also have to say that I believe that there should be enough Diesel Power for Dec.

'99 - March 2000 so I would strengthen the petition on this part. I also, fear that the Diesel power Backup may be inferior and this needs to be addressed .

In this instance, it is better to be safe then sorry.

Mike Wright 8641 Creston Street Pinckney, MI 48169 FfB l 8 1999

~bycmd _ _ __

tJ.o. Ct.EAR REGULATORY COMMfSS40N

~ &ADJUOICA110N8 STAFF E TffE SECRErARV FTHE WMIWSSl!QN

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____J

February 10, 1999 NOTE TO: Emile Julian Chief, Docketing and Services Branch FROM: Carol Gallagher fl n ,A.A tJ I,,,. J .. J ADM, DAS ~ ~vv-

SUBJECT:

DOCKETING OF COMMENT ON PRM-50-67, "ASSURANCE OF RELIABLE BACK-UP SOURCES OF POWER FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES" Attached for docketing is a comment letter related to the subject petition for rulemaking .

This comment was received via the rulemaking website on February 9, 1999. The submitter's name is Mike Wright, 8641 Creston Street, Pinckney, MI 48169. Please send a copy of the docketed comment to Matthew Chiramal (mail stop O9D-4) for his records.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/o attachment:

M. Chiramal

North Carolina State University is a land- Department of Physics grant university and a constituent institution Box 8202 Raleigh, NC 27695-8202 of The Unive5 i~ ~ ~ 'l_!l~~rpjina NC STATE UNIVERSITY www.physics.ncsu.edu 919.515.2521 (phone)

99 FEB 11 p 3 :1" mruary 9, 1999 OFri * "

Secretary, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission A5jlll ,f Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff CK NUM EA PETITI RULE 5t>-r, 7 RE: Rule Making on Nuclear Power and Y2K Complience Issues R 37'/lj

Dear Sir:

As you must know, this is an extremely important problem which represents very

serious potential public danger and economic risk.

I support the NIRS petitions (Docket# PRM 50-65,66,67) for rules and Y2K complience. I am particularly concerned about the reliability of the emergency back-up diesel generators and diesel fuel supplies at the nuclear power plants and the adiquate power to provide for the cooling of the spent fuel pools at these sites. Aside from other safety issues, adequate stable regulated emergency power must be assured for "cold" shutdowns and for the series of transients or transient periods that might be expected.

~~]~

Professor of Physics Emeritus FEB I 8 1999

\cknowledged by card

rm nm,

U. c- . ~UCLEAR REGULATORY COMtMSSION RULEMAKINGS&ADJUDICATION8STAFF OFFICE a:THESl!CRIEl'ARY OF THE COMMIS8ION DoaumaSmtlallcs PostmelkOMa t:;2/9/49 ~13" Copies~ ' / /

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DOCKET NUMBER PETITION RULE PRM So-t 7 OOChETED

( ~'lt=R 3791) 11 IRC From: "M . Higgins" <mhiggin1@columbus.rr.com>

To: TWFN_DO.twf2_po(N RCWEB) *99 fEB 10 A8 :43 Date: Sun, Feb 7, 1999 5:53 PM

Subject:

Y2K and Availability of Back-Up Power o-r TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN, RU AO*.,l

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received and requests public comment on a petition for rulemaking filed by the Nuclear Information and Resource Service. The petition has been docketed by the Commission and has been assigned Docket No. PRM-5067. The petitioner requests that the NRC amend its regulations to require that nuclear facilities ensure the availability of electricity to power atomic reactor and other nuclear facility safety systems in the event of a date-sensitive, computer-related incident resulting from a Year 2000 issue (Y2K) . The petitioner requests that the NRC take this action to ensure that reliable back-up sources of power are available in the event of a Y2K incident.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission received three related petitions for rulemaking, each dated December 10, 1998, submitted by the Nuclear Information Resource Service concerning various aspects of Y2K issues and nuclear safety. This petition requests that the NRC amend its regulations to provide reliable back-up sources of power for nuclear facilities.

The two related petitions would require that nuclear power plant and major fuel cycle facilities be shutdown if they are not compliant with Y2K issues (PRM-50-65) and require that nuclear facilities develop and implement adequate contingency and emergency plans to address potential system failures (PRM-50-66).

Because of the nature of these petitions and the date-specific issues they address, the petitioner requests that the petitions be filed expeditiously and that public comment on the actions be limited to 30 days.

The Petitioner's Suggested Amendment

The petitioner requests that the NRC adopt the following text as a rule:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission recognizes that date-sensitive computer programs, embedded chips, and other electronic systems that perform a major role in distributing, allocating, and ensuring electric power throughout the United States may be prone to failure beginning on January 1, 2000. Loss of all alternating current electricity from both the offsite power grid and onsite emergency generators (commonly known as "station blackout,") long has been identified by the NRC as among the most prominent contributors to risk for atomic reactors.

(1) For these reasons, the NRC requires of Part 50 and 70 licensees as of December 1, 1999: (a) that all emergency diesel generators that provide back-up power to nuclear licensees must be operational and remain operational; (b) that licensees that cannot demonstrate full operational capabilities of all emergency diesel generators must close until such time that full operational capabilities of emergency diesel generators are attained ; (c) that all licensees must have a 60-day supply of fuel for emergency diesel generators.

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(2) Further, to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, the NRC requires that all licensees under these sections must provide alternate means of back-up power sufficient to ensure safety. These may include, but are not limited to:

solar power panels, wind turbines, hydroelectric power, biomass power, and other means of generating electricity. These additional back-up systems must provide electricity directly to the licensee rather than to the broader electrical grid.

(3) Irradiated fuel pools are to be immediately classified as Class 1-E; back-up power systems must be sufficient to provide cooling for such pools.

Licensees which cannot demonstrate compliance with sections (1) and (2) must cease operations as of December 1, 1999, until compliance with these sections is attained.

The petitioner acknowledges that the NRC has recognized the potential safety and environmental problems that could result if date-sensitive electronic systems fail to operate or provide false information. The petitioner also notes that NRC has required its reactor and major fuel cycle facilities to report on their programs to ensure compliance with Y2K issues by July 1, 1999.

The petitioner is addressing a related problem concerning the availability of electricity to power atomic reactor and other safety systems. Electricity is required to operate atomic reactor safety and cooling systems. This electricity is provided by offsite sources, referred to by the petitioner as the overall electrical grid. The petitioner states that the NRC has long recognized that the loss of all alternating current from both onsite and offsite systems, known generally as "station blackout", is the most important contributor to risk at most atomic reactors.

The petitioner notes that the NRC has required licensees to have back-up sources of onsite emergency power, normally multiple emergency diesel generators, capable of supplying the electricity necessary to operate essential safety systems.

The petitioner asserts that the emergency diesel generators used at atomic reactors have proven unreliable and are often out of service. The petitioner asserts that the

unprecedented condition posed by the Y2K problem, coupled with the demonstrated and ongoing failures of emergency diesel generators, constitutes reasonable doubt that emergency fuel generators can be relied on. Therefore, the petitioner believes that the NRC should require all emergency diesel generators be operational, have a 60-day supply of fuel as of December 1, 1999, and that licensed facilities that cannot meet these requirements be closed.

The petitioner discusses the likelihood and potential consequences of a failure of all or a portion of the electric power grid in the United States. The petitioner recognizes that the failure of all or a portion of the electrical grid due to Y2K issues is well beyond the scope of NRC's authority. However, the petitioner states that the extended failure of all or a portion of the electrical grid would place severe stress on the current emergency diesel generator system of back-up power supply and that the failure of emergency diesel generators at one or more reactor sites could result in extended station blackouts and nuclear catastrophes. The petitioner asserts that this possibility is well within the range of probabilities for which the NRC routinely requires action by its licensees. The petitioner further asserts that reliance on unreliable emergency diesel generators is insufficient under these conditions.

Therefore, the petitioner believes it is essential that the NRC take the type of regulatory action suggested in this petition on an expedited basis.

Thank you!

Christina K. Higgins 2464 Buckley Road Columbus, OH 43220 614-628-6286 email: mhiggin1@columbus.rr.com

February 8, 1999 NOTE TO: Emile Julian Chief, Docketing and Services Branch FROM: Carol Gallagher /l 11 A A tJ #/, ~J., ,..-/

ADM, DAS ~ ~ .-

SUBJECT:

DOCKETING OF COMMENT ON PRM-50-67 "ASSURANCE OF RELIABLE BACK-UP SOURCES OF POWER FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES" Attached for docketing is a comment letter related to the subject petition for rulemaking.

This comment was received via e-mail on February 8, 1999. The submitter's name is Christina K.

Higgins, 2464 Buckley Road, Columbus, OH 43220. Please send a copy of the docketed comment to Matthew Chiramal (mail stop O9D-4) for his records.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/o attachment:

M. Chiramal

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OOCKETfD LS f:C John Tesmer 264 Persimmon Lane Elizabethtown PA 17022

99 JAN 29 A.1 1 :29 Jan. 27th 1999 DOCKET NUMBER I I ( PRM 6o-t:,1 1i,t{Ma 11 I)

U .S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555 Public comment: Petition for Proposed Rulemaking, assurance of reliable backup power for nuclear facilities.

Dear Sir or Madam:

I make the following comments in response to the proposed rulemaking as a private citizen, and not in my role as a Senior Electrical System Engineer at the Three Mile Island nuclear facility.

Diesel Generators are highly reliable. At TMl-1, there has not been a failure to start and run for more than five years. Diesel Generator unavailability is strictly controlled through the Technical Specifications, Maintenance Rule and Online Maintenance Risk programs.

Even accounting for the Technical Specification required annual overhaul, Diesel generators are available 98% of the time on a per train basis.

The diesels power safety related electrical switchgear. The proposed rulemaking suggests that non-safety related sources such as "solar power panels, wind turbines, hydroelectric power, biomass power, and other means of generating electricity", would somehow improve the reliability of the 1-E electrical system. Connecting the system to these sources would likely have just the opposite affect.

But for fun, I give you the following scenario :

It's two minutes to midnight on December 31, 1999. At midnight the doomsayers are proven right and the electrical grid fails. Neither plant 1-E diesel generator starts. We attempt to start our Station blackout diesel, and it too fails. So we flip the switch and connect to the 'alternate back-up means' specified in this proposed rulemaking. It fails too.

It's midnight.

We chose solar panels.

fEB 4 1999

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The current existing rules are adequate without modification to ensure the health and safety of the public.

January 28, 1999 NOTE TO: Emile Julian Chief, Docketing and Services Branch FROM: Carol Gallagher ADM, DAS

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SUBJECT:

DOCKETING OF COMMENT ON PRM-50-67 "ASSURANCE OF RELIABLE BACK-UP SOURCES OF POWER FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES" Attached for docketing is a comment letter related to the subject petition for rulemaking.

This comment was received via the rulemaking website on January 27, 1999. The submitter's name is John Tesmer, 264 Persimmon Lane, Elizabethtown, PA 17022 . Please send a copy of the docketed comment to Matthew Chiramal (mail stop O9D-4) for his records.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/o attachment:

M. Chiramal

DOCKET NUMBER PETITION RULE PR 5 o - C:> 1

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[7590-01-P]

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION *99 JAN 19 Pl2 :12 10 CFR Parts 50 and 70 OF

[Docket No. PRM-50-67] 1*L AC '

Nuclear Information and Resource Seivice; Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; Notice of receipt.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received and requests public comment on a petition for rulemaking filed by the Nuclear Information and Resource Service.

The petition has been docketed by the Commission and has been assigned Docket No.

PRM-50-67. The petitioner requests that the NRC amend its regulations to require that nuclear facilities ensure the availability of electricity to power atomic reactor and other nuclear facility safety systems in the event of a date-sensitive, computer-related incident resulting from a Year 2000 issue (Y2K). The petitioner requests that the NRC take this action to ensure that reliable back-up sources of power are available in the event of a Y2K incident.

_ g ~. ~¥, 1 CJr;q DATE: Submit comments by (se-E!-eys followi11g patlllcstlon Ir, d,e ?ederal Register).

Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given except as to comments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.

2 Deliver comments to 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.

For a copy of the petition, write: Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

You may also provide comments via the NRC's interactive rulemaking website through the NRC home page (http://www.nrc.gov). This site provides the capability to upload comments as files (any format), if your web browser supports that function. For information about the

interactive rulemaking website, contact Ms. Carol Gallagher, (301) 415-5905 (e-mail:

CAG@nrc.gov).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David L. Meyer, Office of Administration, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Telephone: 301-415-7162 or Toll-Free: 1-800-368-5642 or E-mail: DLM1@NRC.GOV.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission received three related petitions for rulemaking, each dated December 10, 1998, submitted by the Nuclear Information Resource Service concerning various aspects of Y2K issues and nuclear safety. This petition requests that the NRC amend its regulations to provide reliable back-up sources of power for nuclear facilities.

The two related petitions would require that nuclear power plant and major fuel cycle facilities be shutdown if they are not compliant with Y2K issues (PRM-50-65) and require that nuclear facilities develop and implement adequate contingency and emergency plans to address potential system failures (PRM-50-66).

3 Because of the nature of these petitions and the date-specific issues they address, the petitioner requests that the petitions be filed expeditiously and that public comment on the actions be limited to 30 days.

The Petitioner's Suggested Amendment The petitioner requests that the NRC adopt the following text as a rule:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission recognizes that date-sensitive computer programs, embedded chips, and other

electronic systems that perform a major role in distributing, allocating, and ensuring electric power throughout the United States may be prone to failure beginning o"' January 1, 2000.

Loss of all alternating current electricity from both the offsite power grid and onsite emergency generators (commonly known as "station blackout,") long has been identified by the NRC as among the most prominent contributors to risk for atomic reactors.

(1) For these reasons, the NRC requires of Part 50 and 70 licensees as of December 1, 1999: (a) that all emergency diesel generators that provide back-up power to nuclear licensees must be operational and remain operational; (b) that licensees that cannot demonstrate full operational capabilities of all emergency diesel generators must close until such time that full operational capabilities of emergency diesel generators are attained; (c) that all licensees must have a 60-day supply of fuel for emergency diesel generators.

(2) Further, to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, the NRC requires that all licensees under these sections must provide alternate means of back-up power sufficient to ensure safety. These may include, but are not limited to: solar power panels, wind turbines, hydroelectric power, biomass power, and other means of generating electricity. These additional back-

4 up systems must provide electricity directly to the licensee rather than to the broader electrical grid.

(3) Irradiated fuel pools are to be immediately classified as Class 1-E; back-up power systems must be sufficient to provide cooling for such pools.

Licensees which cannot demonstrate compliance with sections (1) and (2) must cease operations as of December 1, 1999, until compliance with these sections is attained.

Discussion

The petitioner acknowledges that the NRC has recognized the potential safety and environmental problems that could result if date-sensitive electronic systems fail to operate or provide false information. The petitioner also notes that NRC has required its reactor and major fuel cycle facilities to report on their programs to ensure compliance with Y2K issues by July 1, 1999.

The petitioner is addressing a related problem concerning the availability of electricity to power atomic reactor and other safety systems. Electricity is required to operate atomic reactor

safety and cooling systems. This electricity is provided by offsite sources, referred to by the petitioner as the overall electrical grid. The petitioner states that the NRC has long recognized that the loss of all alternating current from both onsite and offsite systems, known generally as "station blackout", is the most important contributor to risk at most atomic reactors. The petitioner notes that the NRC has required licensees to have back-up sources of onsite emergency power, normally multiple emergency diesel generators, capable of supplying the electricity necessary to operate essential safety systems.

The petitioner asserts that the e'mergency diesel generators used at atomic reactors have proven unreliable and are often out of service. The petitioner asserts that the unprecedented condition posed by the Y2K problem, coupled with the demonstrated and

5 ongoing failures of emergency diesel generators, constitutes reasonable doubt that emergency fuel generators can be relied on. Therefore, the petitioner believes that the NRC should require all emergency diesel generators be operational, have a 60-day supply of fuel as of December 1, 1999, and that licensed facilities that cannot meet these requirements be closed.

The petitioner discusses the likelihood and potential consequences of a failure of all or a portion of the electric power grid in the United States. The petitioner recognizes that the failure of all or a portion of the electrical grid due to Y2K issues is well beyond the scope of NRC's authority. However, the petitioner states that the extended failure of all or a portion of the electrical grid would place severe stress on the current emergency diesel generator system of back-up power supply and that the failure of emergency diesel generators at one or more reactor sites could result in extended station blackouts and nuclear catastrophes. The petitioner asserts that this possibility is well within the range of probabilities for which the NRC routinely requires action by its licensees. The petitioner further asserts that reliance on unreliable emergency diesel generators is insufficient under these conditions.

Therefore, the petitioner believes it is essential that the NRC take the type of regulatory

action suggested in this petition on an expedited basis.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this \~fb. day of January, 1999.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ti~ Vi ~-lm-J Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary of the Commission.

OOOkif&,

DEC 1 1 1998

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~IWF DOCKET BER December 10, 1998 PETITION Rl1.E PRU S'D--1, 7 (t,qFR379t}

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attn: Chief, Docketing and Service Branch

Petition for Rulemaking re: assurance ofreliable back-up sources of power for nuclear facilities The Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS) submits the following petition for rulemaking as provided under 10 CFR 2.802.

Although NIRS normally believes in and advocates ample public comment periods, the nature of this petition and the date-specific issue it addresses require that this petition be placed on an expedited schedule. Therefore, we respectfully request that the NRC file this petition immediately and that public comment be limited to 30 days.

The purpose of this petition is to provide reasonable assurance that date-sensitive computer-related issues (popularly known as Y2K) that may disrupt or cause failure of electrical power and the electrical power grid will not overcome nuclear safety systems and cause environmental damage and destruction and will not pose a threat to the public's health and safety.

NIRS requests that the NRC adopt the following text as a rule:

"The Nuclear Regulatory Commission reco~zes that date-sensitive computer programs, embedded chips and other electronic systems that perform a major role in distributing, allocating and ensuring electric power throughout the United States may be prone to failure beginning on January 1, 2000.

Loss of all alternating current electricity from both the offsite power grid and onsite emergency generators (commonly known as "station blackout,") kmg h en identified by the NRC as among the most prominent contributors to risk for atomic reactors.

(1) For these reasons, the NRC requires of Part 50 and 70 lie ns es fDecember 1, 1999: a) that all emergency diesel generators that provide back-up po . to nuc.1ear:rmie:

must be operational and remain operational; b) that licensees that c ot demo operational capabilities of all emergency diesel generators must close until such time that full operational capabilities of emergency diesel generators are attained; c) that all licensees must have a 60-day supply of fuel for emergency diesel generators.

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(2) Further, to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety, the NRC requires that all licensees under these sections must provide alternate means of back-up power sufficient to assure safety. These may include, but are not limited to: solar power panels, wind turbines, hydroelectric power, biomass power, and other means of generating electricity. These additional back-up systems must provide electricity directly to the licensee rather than to the broader electrical grid.

(3) Irradiated fuel pools are to be immediately classified as Class 1-E; back-up power systems must be sufficient to provide cooling for such pools.

Licensees which cannot demonstrate compliance with sections (1) and (2) must cease operations as of December 1, 1999 until compliance with these sections is attained."

Discussion The NRC has recognized the potential severe safety and environmental problems that could be caused by date-sensitive electronic systems suddenly failing to operate or providing false information to nuclear facility operators, or to other electronic systems. These potential problems run the*gamut from inaccurate operations logs to full reactor core meltdowns. For these reasons, the NRC has required that atomic reactor and major fuel cycle facilities report to the NRC by July 1, 1999 on their programs to ensure compliance with Y2K issues.

NIRS has submitted a separate petition for rulemaking to address the issue of nuclear facilities that cannot prove compliance with Y2K issues.

This petition addresses a subtler, but more pervasive and equally dangerous problem: the availability of electricity to power atomic reactor and other nuclear facility safety systems.

Necessity of Electricity Atomic reactors require electricity for the operation of all of their numerous safety and cooling systems (note, this discussion will focus on atomic reactors, but applies, to varying degrees, to all nuclear facilities). Under normal circumstances, this electricity is provided by offsite sources-the overall electrical grid--as it would be foolhardy to rely upon the reactor itself to provide the power to run its own safety systems. If the reactor shut down, so would the power to run its safety systems at the very moment it is needed the most.

The NRC long has recognized that loss of all alternating current from both onsite and offsite power systems (or "station blackout") is the most important contributor to risk at most atomic reactors. The NRC looked at the risk significance of station blackout in its study entitled "Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment of Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-1150, October, 1990). The study states that station blackout accidents contribute a very high percentage of the overall frequency of core damage accidents for both boiling water reactors and pressurized water reactors. Risk, as defined by the NRC, is the combination of probability times consequences.

Thus, a low probability event (under normal circumstances, an extended station blackout) but with high consequences to public health and safety (a core meltdown caused by lack of cooling due to lack of alternating current electricity to operate safety systems) is defined as a high risk event.

For exactly this reason, the NRC long has required licensees to have back-up sources of onsite emergency electrical power-normally emergency diesel generators capable of supplying the several megawatts of electricity necessary to operate essential safety systems at the nuclear reactor.

The emergency diesel generators are complex systems with integrated diesel and generator control systems with electrical load sequencing systems that re-energize designated emergency safety and station protection systems (Class 1-E) in the event of a loss of offsite power and a reactor SCRAM.

Maintaining the operational readiness of nuclear service emergency diesel generators has been an increasingly significant issue facing the nuclear industry and regulator. This is due in large part to the fact that there are nine major engine manufacturers, several jobbing contractors, numerous variations of engine installation designs, ongoing design changes, and various engine models all contributing to the complexity of these emergency power stations.

In addition, recognizing the severe risk posed by the possibility that offsite power failure can be coupled with an emergency diesel generator failure, the NRC requires licensees to install multiple emergency diesel generators onsite as well. This is considered an essential component of the NRC's "defense in depth" approach to nuclear safety.

Under normal circumstances, this approach so far has worked adequately, although occasionally with little margin to spare. Electrical blackouts are relatively rare, usually geographically confined and of relatively short duration.

Unfortunately, the emergency diesel generators used at atomic reactors often have proven unreliable, and often are out-of-service as the result of component failures and industry non-compliance with the emergency power operational parameters or repairs and maintenance under routine conditions (see Appendix A). These failures and non-compliance are regular challenges to the industry at every level of emergency diesel generator experience ranging from equipment design, manufacture, performance, maintenance, repair, replacement and service. Of additional concern is evidence of simultaneous multiple emergency diesel generator failures due to common-cause failures at nuclear power stations.

For the reasons detailed below, we contend that we are about to enter a period that is decidedly not "under normal circumstances." This unprecedented condition in conjunction with the demonstrated and ongoing failures constitutes a reasonable doubt that emergency diesel generators can be relied upon for the public health and safety. Thus, this petition for rulemaking requires that all emergency diesel generators be operational and have a 60-day supply of fuel as of December 1, 1999. Licensees that cannot meet this requirement will be forced to close until they can meet this requirement.

While the current NRC emergency power requirements so far have worked despite the frequent failures of emergency diesel generators, this is largely due to the fact that these requirements (and the generators) have not been tested on either a large scale, nor under prolonged or adverse circumstances.

The Y2K problems may result in widespread, prolonged and adverse circumstances; thus, further efforts to ensure availability of electrical power to atomic reactors are necessary.

Likelihood of Grid Failure The NRC's actions to address Y2K issues, together with adoption ofNIRS' non-controversial petition for rulemaking (also submitted today) requiring shutdown ofreactors that cannot demonstrate compliance with Y2K issues, should prove sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that atomic reactors themselves will not cause severe public health and safety risks due to Y2K issues.

However, failure of all or portions of the electrical grid due to Y2K issues is beyond the scope of NRC authority and ability to effectively monitor and repair. Failure of the grid, whether nationally, regionally or locally, likely would cause station blackouts in one or many atomic reactors at the same time. Extended failure of all or a portion of the grid would place severe stress on the current emergency diesel generator system of back-up power supply. Failure of emergency diesel generators at a single reactor site could result in unacceptable damage to the reactor and pose a risk to public health and safety. Multiple failures of emergency diesel generators at multiple reactor sites, under extended station blackout conditions, would result in widespread deaths and calamitous environmental destruction. It must be made clear that not only reactors are at risk, but so are the irradiated fuel pools at every reactor site, which contain millions of curies of radiation but are even more vulnerable to loss of power. Under current NRC regulation, the electrical support systems to the irradiated fuel storage pools are classified non-safety related systems or non-Class 1-E. The petitioner believes that both the reactors and their attendant irradiated fuel pools must be kept cooled at all costs.

Unfortunately, failure of portions--or even a total collapse--ofthe electrical grid on January 1, 2000 cannot be ruled out. The probability of this occurrence, even iflow, is certainly within the probability of other events for which the NRC promulgates its rules.

The electric power industry has been relatively slow at evaluating, repairing and testing its systems to ensure Y2K compliance. For example, on June 12, 1998, the Senate Committee on the Year 2000 released the results of a survey of the nation's ten largest utilities. The Committee concluded, " . .. while these utilities are proceeding in the right direction, the pace of remedial efforts is too slow and the associated milestone dates are so distant that there is significant cause for concerns ... .since the firms tested are among the largest utilities in their fields with the most available resources, we are pessimistic about the implications for the rest of the utility sector." At least one well-known computer consultant and commentator has noted that while electric utilities are virtually assured of overhauling their billing systems in time for the millenium, their assurance that the U.S. will have electric power is much less confident. Writing in PC Magazine (October 6, 1998) Jim Seymour said flatly, " ... the electric power industry has an enormous amount of work to do, and it's doing a terrible job of getting ready for Y2K.

Undoubtedly there are electric utilities that are well in advance of the curve, and that are taking all necessary steps to assure uninterrupted electric supplies regardless of the date. But there are well over 1,000 private utilities, non-utility generators, public utilities, rural electric

cooperatives, etc, operating more than 15,000 generating units, in the U.S and Canada. All are potentially affected by the Y2K problem and it is becoming increasingly unlikely that all of them will reach the millenium with all Y2K issues effectively resolved.

The electric power grid in the U.S. is relatively fragile. For example, in 1996, two electrical grid disturbances within a five week period on the western grid caused 190 electrical generating stations to trip off line, including several nuclear power stations. The most significant event occurred on August 10, 1996, when an electrical line sagged into a tree in Oregon causing the line to trip and a series of cascading failures eventually extending into Southern California, Arizona and New Mexico. The transient resulted in the loss of over 30,000 megawatts of load and 25,000 megawatts of generation.

This may be a small harbinger of what is to come. Even failures of relatively small utilities to provide power to the grid can be enough to cause local and regional collapses, and perhaps even lead to a full failure of the national grid. Clearly, this could and would cause problems for anywhere from one to every nuclear reactor. Further, widespread noncompliance of nuclear reactors with Y2K issues (which should and must lead to their shutdown) could actually exacerbate grid instability.

Failure of all or a portion of the electrical grid, coupled with severe winter storms such as the one that paralyzed much of New England and Canada in the winter of 1997, could lead to extended station blackouts and resultant nuclear catastrophes.

NIRS does not believe that it is necessary to predict a full collapse of the nation's electrical power supply for the NRC to adopt this petition for rulemaking. Indeed, we believe such a collapse is unlikely-the electric utilities are certainly aware that the nation relies upon them for virtually every public service and private enterprise.

We do believe, however, that localized, and even large regional failures of the grid at the turn of the millenium have a probability far greater than that of a nuclear meltdown at any given reactor on any given day.

Moreover, the NRC long has recognized the absolute essential nature of preparing for unlikely nuclear disaster: this is at the heart of the NRC's emergency preparedness and emergency evacuation requirements. The NRC does not require utilities to prepare and test emergency plans for the commonplace; these requirements exist precisely for the unforeseen and the unlikely.

Thus, it is exactly within the NRC's realm of responsibility and the NRC's existing principles for protection of the public health and safety from unlikely events for the Agency to make new requirements to cope with the possible-and far more likely-troubles that may result from the failure of all or portions of the electrical grid on January 1, 2000.

t Remedies This NIRS petition for rulemaking seeks to address the potential problems for atomic reactors, irradiated fuel pools and other nuclear facilities that may result from a loss of electrical power due to grid instability and other factors arising from the Y2K problem.

These problems are predictable, and while on a massive scale are unlikely, are well within the range of probabilities for which the NRC routinely requires action by its licensees.

As discussed above, this petition would require shutdown of any nuclear licensee that cannot demonstrate that all of its emergency diesel generators are operable and requires licensees to have a 60-day supply of fuel onsite. This is to address the unlikely, but conceivable, occurrence of an extended blackout or other problems that could also disrupt transportation and re-supply of many materials.

Reliance on unreliable emergency diesel generators is insufficient under these conditions. Thus, this petition for rulemaking would require atomic reactors to provide other sources of offsite power to ensure that the reactors and fuel pools receive sufficient electricity to assure their necessary constant cooling. The petition does not require any particular source of additional back-up power, but recommends renewable sources of energy not tied into the grid, but wired directly to the nuclear sites. When the Y2K crisis finally ends, these new sources can then be hooked into the larger grid, for the benefit of all Americans. Because installation of these new sources of back-up power will take some time, we request that the NRC implement this petition on a greatly expedited schedule.

It may be ironic that as we enter the new millenium, it will require renewable sources of energy to assure the safest possible operation of non-renewable nuclear reactors, but the public health and safety and, in this particular instance, peace of mind, require no less.

Respectfully submitted, Michael Mariotte

/:~----<

'1 Executive Director

Although January 1, 2000 is the date most often associated with Y2K problems, other dates may also prove problematic. For example, one reactor in Sweden, under testing, was found to be non-compliant as of January 1, 1999. Other dates frequently mentioned as possible problem dates are attached. We encourage the NRC to take every action necessary to assure that all nuclear facilities are compliant with every potential problem date.

ML23156A067

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