ML22271A802
| ML22271A802 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Orano USA |
| Issue date: | 12/19/2007 |
| From: | Boyle R AREVA |
| To: | Division of Fuel Management |
| Garcia-Santos N | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML22271A128 | List:
|
| References | |
| A33010, EPID L-2022-DOT-0007 | |
| Download: ML22271A802 (7) | |
Text
A Type of document: Note d'etude FUEL SECTOR Design and Sales t-----~-------------t Division Class Pages: 5 AREVA N Appendices: 0 AREVA NP 10, Rue Juliette Recamier 69456 LYON CED EX 06 Document Title I 7 SAFETY/CRITICALITY STUDY FOR FCC4 PACKAGES &
17x17XL ASSEMBLIES JUSTIFICATION FOR AN INCREASED CAVITY CROSS SECTION NON-PROPRIETARY VERSION L _J KEY-WORDS: CRITICITE - CONTENEUR-TRANSPORT- 17X17 - UO2 Distribution Purpose of distribution Number Prise en compte demande D-FDE B 19/12/2007 BPE 04041 rev 1 A 03/12/2007 BPE REV DATE AUTHOR VERIFIED BY MODIFICATIONS - COMMENTS STATUS APPROVED BY INTERNAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER I ~~ASSIFICATIO U.D.:
No REV. B PAGE 1/1 AREVA REVISIONS DATE VERSION OBSERVATIONS 03/12/2007 A First issue 19/12/2007 B AREVA NP, an AREVA and Siemens joint venture - Fuel Sector- Design and Sales Division FF 018 Rev. 3
No REV. B PAGE 1/5 AREVA Table of contents REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................ 2
- 1. OBJECTIVE .................................................................................................................................... 3
- 2. CODES AND QUALIFICATION ...................................................................................................... 3
- 3. HYPOTHESES AND MODELLING ................................................................................................ 3 3.1 Transporting fuel assemblies .......................................................................................................... 3 3.2 Transporting fuel rods ..................................................................................................................... 4
- 4. RESULTS ....................................................................................................................................... 4 4.1 Transporting fuel assemblies .......................................................................................................... 4 4.2 Transporting fuel rods ..................................................................................................................... 5
- 5. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 5 AREVA NP, an AREVA and Siemens joint venture - Fuel Sector- Design and Sales Division FF 018 Rev. 3
No REV. B PAGE 2/5 AREVA REFERENCES
[1] FDE-07-04041 rev 1: FCC packages - non-conformities in the cavity cross section - request for enquiry.
[2] FFDC 00817 rev A: Safety-criticality study - FCC3 & 4 packages - 17x1 ?XL, 16x16 & 18x18 assemblies.
[3] Plan 229 K 0402: Container for 2 x UO2 fuel assemblies - 14 foot model - 17x17 (Type XL &
XLR) - Package Assembly - Characteristics relating to Safety
[4] FFRN/03/0268: CRISTAL V0.2 - Introduction into service
[5] FF DC 00561: Transport packages for fresh UO2 fuels. Determination of uncertainty factors to be applied to criticality studies performed with CRISTAL.
[6] FFDC 01046 rev A: Safety-criticality analysis of FCC3 and FCC4 containers - Transport of fuel rods in boxes AREVA NP, an AREVA and Siemens joint venture - Fuel Sector- Design and Sales Division FF 018 Rev. 3
No REV. B PAGE 3/5 AREVA
- 1. OBJECTIVE The aim of this note is to determine the impact of non-conformities in the cross-section of FCC4 packages as required by note [1].
The packages concerned are FCC4v1 loaded with 17x1 ?XL assemblies enriched to 5% U235 , covered by the criticality study [2] and FCC4v1 packages loaded with fuel rod boxes, which in turn are covered by criticality study [6].
- 2. CODES AND QUALIFICATION Calculations are carried out using the same version of the code as used in the initial studies [2] & [6]:
- CIGALES version v2.0
- APOLLO 2 version 2.4.3
- MORET 4 version 4.A.6 These three codes are part of the CRISTAL V0.2 formula and their use has been validated [4].
A brief description of these codes can be found in [4].
The use of the CRISTAL formula is qualified for this study by applying an incertitude value o f -
to the calculated Kett, as per note [5].
- 3. HYPOTHESES AND MODELLING 3.1 Transporting fuel assemblies For this impact study we use, as a reference, the realistic accident conditions defined in Note [2], that is:
- Rectangular shell - - mm,
- Resin under ACT (Accident Conditions of Transport):
- Assembly under ACT (Accident Conditions of Transport):
- The cross section of the assembly has expanded the section of the neutron absorbing cavity across one third of its height, with the remaining two thirds remaining intact.
- The fissile section of the assembly is centred axially within the neutron cavity.
- Package grid 1Ox16x1 (N=80),
Package with differential drainage.
AREVA NP, an AREVA and Siemens joint venture - Fuel Sector- Design and Sales Division FF 018 Rev. 3
No REV. B PAGE 4/5 AREVA The handling of the downgraded situation with a cavity of greater than - is modelled by increasing the cross section of the cavity throughout its full length, and, using a cavity section which has been increased over a third of its height, with other dimensional parameters (plate thickness and resin, lengths, shells, etc.) unchanged.
3.2 Transporting fuel rods For this impact study we use, as a reference, the realistic accident conditions defined in Note [6], that is:
- Rectangular shell - - mm,
- Resin under ACT (Accident Conditions of Transport):
- Box under ACT (Accident Conditions of Transport):
- The minimum thickness of the spacers is -
- The fuel rods fill the available space minus the spacers - or, - mm for a cavity cross section o f _ ,
- The fuel rods are under optimum moderation conditions,
- An infinite grid of packages (N infinite),
- Package with differential drainage.
- 4. RESULTS 4.1 Transporting fuel assemblies For the calculation conditions defined in section 3.1, the increase in the reactivit of the packa taking into account the increased cavity cross section over a third of its height, is in the order o f - a s shown in the following figure.
AREVA NP, an AREVA and Siemens joint venture - Fuel Sector- Design and Sales Division FF 018 Rev. 3
No REV. B PAGE 5/5 AREVA PROPRIETARY TABLE 4.2 Transporting fuel rods For the calculation conditions defined in section 3.2, the increase in the reactivity of the infinite grid of packages, taking into account the increased cavity cross section (to - m m ) and with fuel rods at optimal moderation within a section o f - m m (an increase o f - ) , is in the order of _ _
- 5. CONCLUSION There is no reason to question respect for the safety-criticality criteria of FCC4v1 packages loaded with 17x1 ?XL assemblies or fuel rod boxes enriched to 5% U235 , as shown in notes [2] & [6] when there is a dimensional non-conformity of the cavity cross section of up to - mm under ACT with an expansion of the fuel assembly over just a third of its height or with rods within a maximum of
- m m (min. - spacing.
AREVA NP, an AREVA and Siemens joint venture - Fuel Sector- Design and Sales Division FF 018 Rev. 3