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MONTHYEARML22216A2392022-08-0404 August 2022 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF 577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections (LDCN 21-0013) Project stage: Request ML22216A2412022-08-0404 August 2022 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF 577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections (LDCN 21-0013) - Description and Assessment Project stage: Request ML22216A2402022-08-0404 August 2022 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF 577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections (LDCN 21-0013) Project stage: Request ML22244A1692022-09-0101 September 2022 Updated Response to RAT HFE-l Project stage: Request ULNRC-06763, Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF 577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspection (LDCN 21-0013)2022-09-0101 September 2022 Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF 577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspection (LDCN 21-0013) Project stage: Supplement ML22251A0122022-09-0707 September 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Callaway Plant, Unit 1 - LIC-109 Acceptance of License Amendment Request for Application to Revise TS to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections - EPID L-2022-LLA-0110 Project stage: Acceptance Review ULNRC-06771, Correction to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF 577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections (LDCN 21-0013)2022-10-25025 October 2022 Correction to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF 577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections (LDCN 21-0013) Project stage: Request ML23019A1752023-01-30030 January 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 230 to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revision 1, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections Project stage: Approval 2022-09-01
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Category:Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARULNRC-06824, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Operating Quality Assurance Manual (Oqam) Revision 36A2023-08-17017 August 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Operating Quality Assurance Manual (Oqam) Revision 36A ULNRC-06821, Post-Audit Follow-Up Information in Support of Callaway'S License Amendment Request and Proposed Exemption to Allow Use of Framatome Gaia Fuel (LDCN 22-0002) (EPID L-2022-LLA-0150 and EPID L-2022-LLE-00301)2023-06-21021 June 2023 Post-Audit Follow-Up Information in Support of Callaway'S License Amendment Request and Proposed Exemption to Allow Use of Framatome Gaia Fuel (LDCN 22-0002) (EPID L-2022-LLA-0150 and EPID L-2022-LLE-00301) ML23156A6372023-06-0505 June 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Permanent Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies ML23129A7972023-05-0909 May 2023 Response to Audit Questions ML23088A1322023-03-29029 March 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Results of Steam Generator Tube In-Service Inspection ML23052A0442023-02-21021 February 2023 Enclosure 2 - Supplement to License Amendment Request ML23052A0422023-02-21021 February 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information and Supplement to License Amendment Request Regarding Spent Fuel Storage (LDCN 22-0015) ML23052A0432023-02-21021 February 2023 Enclosure 1 - Response to Request for Additional Information ML22342B2662022-12-0808 December 2022 Enclosure - Ameren Missouri Response to NRC RAIs ML22335A4992022-11-16016 November 2022 Enclosure 1: Responses to Requested Information ML22244A1692022-09-0101 September 2022 Updated Response to RAT HFE-l ML22194A8032022-07-13013 July 2022 Enclosure 2: Ameren Missouri Verification Ofagreement Letters with State and EPZ Counties for Proposed Revision to Radiological Emergency Response Plan Regarding Response and Notification Goals ML22194A8022022-07-13013 July 2022 Enclosure 1: Ameren Missouri Response to NRC Requests for Additional Information ULNRC-06754, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Licensee Amendment Request for Adoption of Alternate Source Term and Revision of Technical Specifications2022-07-0505 July 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Licensee Amendment Request for Adoption of Alternate Source Term and Revision of Technical Specifications ML22186A1052022-07-0505 July 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Licensee Amendment Request for Adoption of Alternate Source Term and Revision of Technical Specifications ML22146A3392022-05-26026 May 2022 Enclosure 1: Ameren Missouri Response to NRC RAIs ML22068A0292022-03-0808 March 2022 Response to Audit Question/Item 23 in NRC Letter Dated September 14, 2021 ML21286A6822021-10-13013 October 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors ULNRC-06629, Response to Request for Additional Information Pertaining to Additional Request for Exemption from Specific Requirements of 10 CFR Part 26, Fitness for Duty Programs2021-01-0707 January 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Pertaining to Additional Request for Exemption from Specific Requirements of 10 CFR Part 26, Fitness for Duty Programs ULNRC-06602, Response to Request for Addition Information Pertaining to Revision to Technical Specification (TS) 5.3.1 and Deletion of TS 5.3.1.1 and TS 5.3.1.2 -2020-09-0202 September 2020 Response to Request for Addition Information Pertaining to Revision to Technical Specification (TS) 5.3.1 and Deletion of TS 5.3.1.1 and TS 5.3.1.2 - ML20238C1072020-08-25025 August 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information (Redacted) ULNRC-06591, Supplemental Information for Response to March, 2012 Information Request, Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Recommendation 2.12020-07-10010 July 2020 Supplemental Information for Response to March, 2012 Information Request, Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Recommendation 2.1 ML19325D6732019-11-21021 November 2019 Attachment 2 - Callaway Energy Center Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Response to 50.54(F) Letter with Regard to NTTF 2.1 Seismic - Supplemental Information ML19051A1372019-02-20020 February 2019 Attachment 1: Response to Request for Additional Information ULNRC-06482, Response to Request for Additional Information Pertaining to License Amendment Request for Addition of New Technical Specification 3.7.20, Class 1E Electrical Equipment Air Conditioning (A/C) System.2019-02-0808 February 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information Pertaining to License Amendment Request for Addition of New Technical Specification 3.7.20, Class 1E Electrical Equipment Air Conditioning (A/C) System. ML19039A3542019-02-0808 February 2019 RAI Questions and Responses ML19025A0712019-01-25025 January 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information Pertaining to Relief Request 14R-05 for Relief from Requirements of ASME Code Case N-770-2 Regarding Inspection Intervals for Reactor Vessel Nozzle Dissimilar Metal Welds ULNRC-06479, Attachment a - Mitsubishi Responses to NRC Wjp RAIs2019-01-25025 January 2019 Attachment a - Mitsubishi Responses to NRC Wjp RAIs ULNRC-06440, Response to Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools - Request for Supplemental Information2018-05-31031 May 2018 Response to Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools - Request for Supplemental Information ULNRC-06410, Callaway Plant, Unit 1 - Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning Proposed Revision of FSAR-Described Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 Regarding MOV Thermal Overload Protection (Ldcn 16-0001)2018-02-0505 February 2018 Callaway Plant, Unit 1 - Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning Proposed Revision of FSAR-Described Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 Regarding MOV Thermal Overload Protection (Ldcn 16-0001) ML18036A6762018-02-0505 February 2018 Enclosure 6: Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) 1.d (MOV Performance Indicator Report for Cycle 21) ML18036A6742018-02-0505 February 2018 Enclosure 5: Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) 1.d (MOV Performance Indicator Report for Cycle 20) ML18036A6732018-02-0505 February 2018 Enclosure 4: Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) 1.d (MOV Performance Indicator Report for Cycle 19) ML18036A6722018-02-0505 February 2018 Enclosure 3: Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) 1.c ULNRC-06410, Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning Proposed Revision of FSAR-Described Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 Regarding MOV Thermal Overload Protection (LDCN 16-0001)2018-02-0505 February 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning Proposed Revision of FSAR-Described Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 Regarding MOV Thermal Overload Protection (LDCN 16-0001) ML18036A6692018-02-0505 February 2018 Enclosure 1: Responses to Requests for Additional Information ML18036A6712018-02-0505 February 2018 Enclosure 2: Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Item 1.a ULNRC-06381, Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2017-10-0303 October 2017 Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML17138A2132017-05-18018 May 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning Revision of TS 5.6.5, Core Operating Limits Report (Colr), to Allow the Use of the Paragon and Nexus Core Design Methods (LDCN 16-0011) ULNRC-06357, Response to Request for Additional Information, 2016 Steam Generator Tube Inspections2017-03-23023 March 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information, 2016 Steam Generator Tube Inspections ULNRC-06321, Response to Request for Additional Information, Third 10-Year Interval Inservice Inspection Request for Relief No. I3R-082016-07-0707 July 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information, Third 10-Year Interval Inservice Inspection Request for Relief No. I3R-08 ULNRC-06275, Response to Request for Additional Information (RA) Related to Operating Quality Assurance Manual (Oqam), Revision 31, Oqam Change Notice 15-0022016-01-12012 January 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information (RA) Related to Operating Quality Assurance Manual (Oqam), Revision 31, Oqam Change Notice 15-002 ULNRC-06266, Response to Request for Additional Information, Third 10-Year Interval Inservice Inspection, Request for Relief No. 13R-112015-11-24024 November 2015 Response to Request for Additional Information, Third 10-Year Interval Inservice Inspection, Request for Relief No. 13R-11 ULNRC-06238, Response to Supplemental Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to License Amendment Request for Emergency Action Level (EAL) Upgrade Adopting NRC-Endorsed NEI 99-01, Revision 62015-08-31031 August 2015 Response to Supplemental Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to License Amendment Request for Emergency Action Level (EAL) Upgrade Adopting NRC-Endorsed NEI 99-01, Revision 6 ULNRC-06230, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to License Amendment Request for Emergency Action Level (EAL) Upgrade Adopting NRC-Endorsed NEI 99-01, Revision 62015-07-16016 July 2015 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to License Amendment Request for Emergency Action Level (EAL) Upgrade Adopting NRC-Endorsed NEI 99-01, Revision 6 ULNRC-06233, Submittal of Requested Information on FSAR Section 3.1.2., Per July 9, 2015 Telephone Call2015-07-13013 July 2015 Submittal of Requested Information on FSAR Section 3.1.2., Per July 9, 2015 Telephone Call ULNRC-06227, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request for Emergency Action Level Upgrade Adopting NRC-Endorsed NEI 99-01, Rev 62015-07-0606 July 2015 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request for Emergency Action Level Upgrade Adopting NRC-Endorsed NEI 99-01, Rev 6 2023-08-17
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Enclosure to ULNRC-06764 September 1, 2022 Updated Response to RAI lifE-i 2 pages
Enclosure to ULNRC-06764 September 1, 2022 Page 1 of 2 On June 2, 2022, an NRC request for information (RAI) letter was transmitted to Ameren Missouri in regard to its license amendment request (LAR) for incorporating the alternative source term (AST) dose analysis methodology into the Callaway licensing basis. Ameren Missouri provided its response to the Ri\I letter via letter ULNRC-06754, dated July 5, 2022. The response included, in particular, Ameren Missouris response to RAT No. 3 (RAT HFE-1) from the NRCs letter. That response discussed credit for a timed manual operator action to actuate the Emergency Exhaust system (EES) following a fuel handling accident in the containment building. The complete response wording is copied below.
Ameren Response. Fuel Handling Accident in the reactor containment building Table 3-58 of ULNRC-06636 Enclosure I documents creditfor operator action to initiate the Emergency Exhaust system within 10 minutes ofaccident initiation. Manual actuation of the Emergency Exhaust system is performedfrom the Control Room as directed by the currentfuel handling accident response procedure, OTO-KE-00001.
This action waspreviously implemented in theprocedure although it has not been previously credited in Callaway s radiological dose analysis ofthe fuel Handling Accident. The 1 0-minute requirementfor completion ofthe action will be added to Callaway s SignJIcant Operator Response Timingprogram as a Time Critical Action (TCA) upon implementation ofthe AST License Amendment. Inclusion as a TCA ensures that the action and action timing are trained on by the operators andperiodically validated.
All other operator actions credited to mitigate a radiological dose event are consistent with the Analyses ofRecordfor allaway. No other changes to operator actions, timing requirements, or emergency operatingprocedures are required as part ofAST implementation.
Ameren Missouri has given further consideration to the above response. Specifically, upon further review of the supporting calculation performed for the fuel handling accident in the reactor containment building (FHA-RCB), it has been determined that operation ofthe Emergency Exhaust system (EES) is not required to mitigate the consequences of the limiting accident scenario, and therefore, there is no need to credit any operator action to actuate the EES. Discussion of EE$ actuation should not have been included in the response to RAT HFE-l, nor in Enclosure 1, Table 3-58 ofthe initial AST License Amendment Request (LAR) submitted under ULNRC-06636.
Credit for EES actuation was initially considered in order to reduce the potential for unfiltered inleakage into the control room equipment rooms from the auxiliary building (AB) in the unlikely event that high wind conditions pressurize the control building through the open equipment hatch and transport activity from the damaged fuel through the open containment personnel hatch, into the auxiliary building hallways, and then into the control room equipment room envelope boundary. EES operation in this scenario would provide a defense-in-depth mechanism to lower AB pressure and transfer any activity entering the AB to the atmosphere. However, as described below, this postulated scenario is neither credible nor limiting with respect to dose received by the control room operators.
Enclosure to ULNRC-06764 September 1, 2022 Page 2 of 2 It is neither credible nor is it required in Regulatory Guide 1 1 83 to postulate sustained high winds in the precise orientation required to pressurize containment for any significant duration. Further, and despite that understanding, administrative procedures are in place to close the containment equipment hatch and/or suspend fuel movement if severe weather conditions are present or predicted by the National Weather Service, as indicated by a High Wind Warning, Thunderstorm Watch or Thunderstorm Warning.
Besides the above, it may also be noted that per the plants fuel handling accident analysis, there is no overpressure in containment directly resulting from the accident. However, if some degree of containment pressurization were to be postulated, it would not represent a limiting scenario for the FHA-RCB analysis. With the normal, non-safety, AB ventilation system in service, its exhaust is directed up the plant stack and thus would direct activity to the atmosphere. With the normal ventilation not operating, conditions are relatively stagnant in the AB, surrounding containment, on elevation 2047-6 from the Personnel Hatch Area at 207 degrees, and in the control room equipment rooms 1 501 and 1512 at approximately 300 degrees. Activity entering the AB from containment would diffuse throughout the AB before reaching the control room equipment room boundary.
In contrast, the equipment rooms and control room will be pressurized within two minutes of event initiation. A control room ventilation isolation signal (CRVIS) is generated from high radiation detected by monitors at the normal ventilation inlet/intake. Since the analysis assumes no delay in the release of activity and no delays in the transport of activity through the primary and secondary systems or in the transport from the release point to the air intake, the activity concentration at the control room ventilation detector immediately following event initiation (i.e., at 3 seconds) is 9.65E-2 tCi/cc Xe-i 33. The analysis models a detector setpoint of 2.2E-3 iCi/cc Xe-133, which is an order of magnitude lower than the calculated activity concentration. Therefore, an instantaneous generation of the high radiation signal could be assumed. For conservatism, control room isolation is assumed to occur 120 seconds after event initiation; a 60-second delay is allowed for the detector to reach its setpoint, and an additional 60 seconds is allowed for control room isolation once the setpoint has been reached. Control room isolation and pressurization effectively eliminate any meaningful leakage from the AB into the control roomlequipment room envelope.
In summary, with doors and a long winding leakage pathway through the AB to the control roomlequipment room envelope, direct (indoor) diffusion over the first two minutes, prior to control room isolation, is not limiting relative to the competing case of unfiltered inleakage to the control room from the outside atmosphere. Activity transported through the containment personnel hatch, into the AB, does not represent a credible or limiting analysis scenario. While EES operation is a potentially appropriate defense-in-depth consideration, it is not credited or required to mitigate the consequences of a design basis fuel handling accident in contaimnent. Therefore, there is no need to credit any operator action to actuate the EES.