ML22230B851
| ML22230B851 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/18/2022 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Pitter S | |
| References | |
| 10 CFR Part 53, NRC-2019-0062, RIN 3150-AK31 | |
| Download: ML22230B851 (46) | |
Text
Advanced Reactor Stakeholder Public Meeting
August 18, 2022
Microsoft Teams Meeting Bridgeline: 301-576-2978 Conference ID: 951 216 02#
1 Time Agenda Speaker 10:00 - 10:15 am Opening Remarks/ Adv. Rx Integrated Schedule NRC (Shelley Pitter - Logistics, Steve Lynch) 10:15 - 10:30 am Population-Related Siting Considerations for Advanced Reactors (next NRC Par t 53 Rulemaking Process steps, including NRC path forward, role(s) for stakeholders)
(Steve Lynch)(Steve Lynch) 10:30 - 11:00 am Part 53 Update: Status and Path Forward NRC (Steve Lynch) 11:00 am - 12:00 Part 53 - Stakeholder Perspectives Stakeholders pm (TBD) 12:00 - 1:00 pm Lunch Break All 1:00 - 1:45 pm IAEA Safeguards, the Additional Protocol, and its reporting NRC requirements (Eduardo Sastre Fuente) 1:45 - 2:30 pm Technology Inclusive Risk Informed Change Evaluation Southern (TIRICE) Guidance Company (Michael Tschiltz) 2:30 - 2:35 pm Future Meeting Planning and Concluding Remarks All
2 https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/advanced/integrated-r ev i ew-schedule.html 3
Population-Related Siting Considerations for Advanced Reactors (next steps, including NRC path for ward, role(s) for stakeholders)
4 Population-Related Siting Considerations
Steven Lynch, Chief Advanced Reactor Policy Branch Commission Direction
- In Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM)-SECY 0045, the Commission approved the staff s recommendation to revise the guidance in Regulatory Guide (RG) 4.7, General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power Stations related to implementation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 100, Section 100.21(h).
o The SRM also states: With respect to the traditional dose assessment approach, the staff should provide appropriate guidance on assessing defense-in-depth adequacy and establishing hypothetical major accidents to evaluate.
6 Proposed Path For ward
- The NRC staff are working on an update to RG 4.7 to include guidance fo r :
- assessing population density out to a distance equal to twice the distance at which a hypothetical individual could receive a calculated dose of 1 rem over a period of 1 month from the release of radionuclides following postulated accidents, and
- design approaches using the Licensing Modernization Project approach, as well as others following more traditional analysis approaches
- The NRC staff are planning to complete the updated guidance by February 2024
7 Par t 53 Update: Status and Path For ward (Steven Lynch)
8 Part 53 Rulemaking Status and Consideration of Feedback
Steven Lynch, Chief Advanced Reactor Policy Branch RULEMAKING STATUS
Rule Language Stakeholder Engagement o 2021: definitions (A), safety criteria (B), design and o 21 public meetings, 2 Commission Meetings, and 18 analyses (C), siting (D), construction/manufacturing ACRS meetings (E), operations and programs (F), decommissioning o Recent: 5/25 public meeting on Framework A, 6/11 (G), licensing processes (H), maintenance of the public meeting on Framework B, 6/30 stakeholder licensing basis (I), reporting (J), security, access meeting on stakeholder feedback and Subpart F, 7/28 authorization, FFD, traditional alternatives. public meeting on Framework B and key technical topics o 2022: consolidated rule package (Feb.), 2nd iteration o Future: October ACRS Subcommittee Meeting on Framework A (May, June), 1st iteration Framework B integrated rulemaking, November ACRS Full Committee (June), updated consolidated rule package with Meeting statements of consideration (September)
Focus Areas Industry Input o Finalize rule language o Over 1500 public comments received o Develop rule package (SOCs, regulatory analysis, etc.)
o Develop guidance CURRENT PART 53 TIMELINE
Oct 2020-Aug 2022 Feb 2023 Jun 2023 Oct 2023 Public Outreach, ACRS Draft Proposed Rule to Publish Proposed Rule and Public Comment Period -
Interactions and Generation Commission Draft Key Guidance 60 days of Proposed Rule Package
Nov 2023-Nov 2024Dec 2024 Apr 2025-Jun 2025Jul 2025 Public Outreach and Draft Final Rule to Office of Management and Publish Final Rule and Key Generation of Final Rule Commission Budget and Office of the Guidance Package Federal Register Processing 11 Continued Consideration of Stakeholder Feedback on Part 53 Framework B
Safety functions from Framework A should be employed in Framework B.
Framework B should have its own set of siting requirements and should not rely on Part 100 Framework B should incorporate a RIPB alternative for seismic design requirements.
The draft requirements for fire protection in Framework B need to be more performance-based.
Referencing 10 CFR 50.155 (mitigation of beyond design-basis events (BDBE)) could be a challenge in Framework B because these requirements are not technology-inclusive.
Use of Generally Licensed Reactor Operators (GLROs) should be permitted in Framework B.
Linked probabilistic risk assessment requirements in 10 CFR 50.44 (combustible gas control) could be a challenge for an Alternative Evaluation of Risk Insights (AERI).
The proposed requirements in 10 CFR 53.4730(a)(12) [from the Three Mile Island requirements in 10 CFR 50.34(f )] are not technology-inclusive.
IAEA Safeguards, the Additional Protocol, and its repor ting requirements (Eduardo Sastre Fuente)
13 Implementation of IAEA Safeguards within the United States
Material Control and Accounting Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
14 History
- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) requires non-nuclear weapon states to accept IAEA safeguards on all source and special nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities
- The United States, as one of five nuclear-weapon states, or P5, was not obligated to NPT Signing, 1968 conclude a safeguards agreement with the IA EA
- Since the early 1960s the U.S. has permitted the application of IAEA safeguards on a variety of nuclear facilities
NPT RevCon, 2010 15 Over view of U.S.-IAEA Agreements
- U.S. - IAEA Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/288)
- The U.S. Voluntary Offer Agreement
- Entry Into Force 1980
- Protocol to the U.S. - IAEA Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/288)
- The Reporting Protocol
- Entry Into Force 1980
- Protocol Additional to the U.S. - IAEA Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/288 Add.1)
- The Additional Protocol
- Entry Into Force 2009
- U.S.- IAEA Caribbean Territories Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/366)
- Includes a Small Quantities Protocol
- Entry Into Force 1989
- Modified Small Quantities Protocol - Entry Into Force 2018
16 Applicable U.S. Laws and Regulations
- Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
- Primary U. S. law on nuclear energy to... promote world peace, improve the general welfare, increase the standard of living and strengthen free competition in private enterprise.
- Established the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Energy Research and Development Administration (eventually the Department of Energy)
- Nuclear Nonproliferation Action of 1978
- Establish a more effective framework for international cooperation on peaceful nuclear activities
- Codifies support to the IAEA
- Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 75
- Requires NRC licensees to comply with U.S. obligations to the IAEA
17 U.S. Government Oversight
Defined in Federal Register
Subgroup on Subcommittee IAEA Sub-IPC IAEA on International Steering *Chaired by the Safeguards in Safeguards and Committee National Security the U.S. Monitoring (ISC) Council (NSC)
(SISUS) (SISM)
Nonproliferation Interagency Policy Committee (IPC)
- Chaired by the NSC
Implementation Policy 18 Who Implements in the U.S.?
Who are the Players?
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- chair
Department Department of Energy of SISUS Commerce Committee
Department Department of Defense of State
19 U.S. Voluntary Offer Agreement
- Based on INFCIRC/153
- Selection-based approach to safeguards
- Eligible Facilities List (EFL)
- National Security Exclusion
- Includes all typical safeguards activities including inspections, completion of Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ ) and Design Information Verification (DIV), sampling,
technical visits, etc
- Allows for the application of safeguards in a manner similar to that of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS)
20 U.S. Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) -
Reporting Protocol
- Allows for limited safeguards activities to be performed at facilities with minimal cost to the IAEA
- Unique to the United States
- Includes activities such as completion of DIQs and DIVs
- Monthly and annual material accountancy reports (e.g.,
Physical Inventory Listing (PIL), Inventory Change Report (ICR), etc)
- 4 sites (all NRC licensees) currently selected under this Protocol
- NO INSPECTIONS
21 U.S. VOA or Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA)
U.S. VOA Comprehensive Safeguards
Selection-based approach based on the Eligible Safeguards are applied on all nuclear material in the Facilities List territory (all facilities)
Completion of Design Information Questionnaire Completion of Design Information Questionnaire and Design Information Verification and Design Information Verification Monthly and annual material Monthly and annual material accountancy reports (e.g., Physical accountancy reports (e.g., Physical Inventory Listing (PIL), Inventory Inventory Listing (PIL), Inventory Change Report (ICR), etc.) Change Report (ICR), etc.)
Inspections at selected facilities under full scope Inspections at all facilities safeguards (one in the U.S.)
National Security Exclusion No Exclusions
22 Eligible Facilities List (EFL)
- Two portions of the U.S. EFLSISUS Committee Since 1981,
- DOE facilities (non-public) the IAEA has
- NRC facilities (public) selected 21
- ~300 facilities on EFL from the EFL
- Facility is formally defined by the IAEA
- Facilities removed when decommissioned (per IAEAs definition)
- Locations Outside Facilities (LOFs) not included on EFL
- Updated annually
- Updates are vetted through the U.S.
Government
- Security evaluation to remove anything of Selection direct national security significance
23 Implementation Contd.
Selection
- After the facility has been notified of selection, the following documents are completed:
- Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ )
- Facility Attachment
- U.S. and IAEA negotiate terms of implementation
24 Present
- K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) at Savannah River Site (SRS)
- Only facility currently under routine Reporting AND inspections by the IAEA
- Incorporates remote monitoring Inspections
- Allow for installation of IAEA equipment
- Reporting
- Westinghouse Fuel Fab. Facility (Columbia, SC)
- Framatome Fuel Fab. Facility (Richland, WA) Reporting ONLY,
- Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas Fuel NO INSPECTIONS Fab. Facility (Wilmington, NC)
- URENCO USA Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (Eunice, NM)
25 Flow of Information through NMMSS (Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards System)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
U.S. U.S.
Department Department of o f S tate Energy
U.S.
Department of Commerce
26 U.S. Additional Protocol (AP) 2009 - Present
- Signed in 1998, entry into force 2009
- Provides the IAEA with additional information and access rights on nuclear fuel cycle related activities
- Contains a national security exclusion
- Locations and Sites must submit:
- Annual updates
- Quarterly export reports
- The U.S. AP applies to everyone within the U.S.
- Excluding anything of national security significance
- No selection is required www.AP. gov
27 Reporting Requirements
- Annual reporting requirements (10 CFR 75.6)
- (2.a.i) Nuclear fuel cycle research and development (15 CFR 781)
- Approximately 75% of the total number of U.S. declarations are 2.a.i. declarations
- (2.a.iii) Site declaration including description of activities
- Only relevant for facilities that are currently or have previously been selected for IAEA safeguards
- Not applicable to a vast majority of the industry
- (2.a.iv) Nuclear fuel cycle related manufacturing and assembly (15 CFR 781)
- Annex I items from the U.S. Additional Protocol
- (2.a.v) Uranium and thorium mines, mills, and concentration plants
- (2.a.vi) Possession of large quantities of impure source material (15 CFR 781)
- Source material that is not yet suitable for fuel fabrication or enrichment
- (2.a.x) Ten year plan
- Input is not requested from the industry
- Quarterly reporting requirements [10 CFR 110.54(a)(1)]
- (2.a.ix) Exports of Annex II items Nuclear Fuel Cycle Research and Development
- The R&D activities captured by AP are those are funded either by the U.S. Government or privately. (15 CFR 783. 1(a)(1 ))
- Reportable privately funded R&D activities:
- Enrichment,
- Reprocessing of nuclear fuel or
- Processing of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233
- Reportable U.S. Government funded R&D specifically related to:
- Conversion of nuclear material
- Enrichment of nuclear material
- Nuclear fuel fabrication
- Reactors
- Critical facilities
- Reprocessing of nuclear fuel
- Processing of intermediate or high level waste containing plutonium and/or high enriched uranium.
Snapshot of Licensees Who Report Under the U.S. APand many more!
Additional Protocol
30 Quarterly Export Reports Explained (2.a.ix)
- For licensees using NRC general or specific license authorizations for exports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material as listed in Annex II of the Additional Protocol
- This reporting requirement is also reflected in 10 CFR Part 110.54(a)(1) for Agreement State licensees.
- Most NRC licensees should report as a location using AP-13 found on www.AP.gov, to report directly to Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) every quarter (forms are joint DOC/NRC forms).
- Quarterly deadlines to BIS are: January 15, April 15, July 15, and October 15 of each year
- Exporters shall follow 10 CFR 110.54(c) for reporting items exported under Part 110.26 (General License)
Additional Protocol Reporting Process
- Information is sent to DOC by Jan 31st
- Can be sent via facsimile, mail, or email
- NRC receives licensees forms from DOC and performs a review
- NRC compiles data and submits a report to DOC for inclusion in the overall U.S.
Government declaration
- U.S. declaration must sit before Congress for a 60 day review period (for annual report only)
32 Additional Protocol Webpage
- The Department of Commerce manages a webpage that contains the handbooks and forms for the U.S. Additional Protocol
- Handbooks and forms are joint use for both DOC and NRC
- The majority of companies use the Report Handbook for Locations.
- Assistance in determining your obligations (15 CFR 782.4)
- apdr@bis.doc.gov
- Santiago.Aguilar@nrc.gov
33 Additional Protocol Webpage
34 Additional Protocol Webpage
35 Complementary Access (CA)
- Complementary access is an essential aspect of the IAEAs expanded authorities
- Complementary access allows the IAEA to:
- Verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities
- Resolve a question or inconsistency
- Access for IAEA with 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> advance notice
- 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> if IAEA is already onsite
- CAs are rare in the U.S.
- Only 2 CAs have been conducted in the U.S. (2010)
- AREVA Inc., Fuel Fabrication Facility (Lynchburg, VA )
- Global Advanced Metals (Boyertown, PA)
36 NRC Points of Contact
- Please ask questions early and often!
- NRC - Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS); Material Control and Accounting Branch (MCAB)
- Eduardo Sastre Eduardo.Sastre@nrc. gov
- Santiago Aguilar Santiago.Aguilar@nrc.gov
- Oleg Bukharin Oleg.Bukharin@nrc.gov
- James Rubenstone James.Rubenstone@nrc.gov
- Department of Commerce, Treaty Compliance Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce
- Hung Ly Hung.Ly@bis.doc. gov
- Additional resource:
- http://www.nrc. gov/about-nrc/ip/intl-safeguards.html 37 Questions?
38 Technology Inclusive Risk Informed Change Evaluation (TIRICE) Guidance (Michael Tschiltz)
39 Technology-Inclusive Risk-Informed Change Evaluation (TIRICE) for Facilities Utilizing NEI 18- 04 (Methodology) and NEI 21- 07 (Content of Application) guidance
NRC Advanced Reactor Stakeholder Meeting
August 18, 2022
Mike Tschiltz Consultant to Southern Company
40 Topics
- Project Overview
- Objectives
- Schedule
- Questions
4141 Project Overview, Objectives and Schedule
The TIRICE project builds upon the work accomplished by LMP(NEI 18-04) and TICAP (NEI 21 -
- 07) to create guidance for evaluating changes to the facility as described in the UFSAR for those licensees that have used these guidance documents.
Advanced non-LWRs may elect to follow NEI 18-04 for selection of licensing basis events; safety classification of structures, systems, and components and associated special treatments; and determination of Defense-in-Depth (DID) adequacy.
The resulting LMP-based affirmative safety case is substantially different from the traditional deterministic, compliance-based safety cases in place for LWRs licensed by the NRC.
During development of TICAP guidance it became clear that there is a need to develop technology -
inclusive, risk-informed, performance-based guidance for evaluating changes to a facility as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (10 CFR 50.59).
The attributes of the LMP-based affirmative safety case require additional guidance for efficient application of an alternative change evaluation process.
The proposed change evaluation process would be invoked through a license condition in combination with an exemption to 10 CFR 50.59.
4242 Project Overview, Objectives and Schedule
The project will develop guidance for a change evaluation process for reactors that are licensed under 10 CFR Part 50 or 52 that utilize NEI 18- 04 to develop safety case and NEI 21- 07 guidance to determine application content.
The objectives of the guidance are to:
- Establish a process and criteria for evaluating changes to the facility as described in the final safety analysis report and determine which changes can be implemented without prior NRC approval
- Ensure that the changes that require NRC prior approval are properly identified
- Minimize the unnecessary burden to the regulator and operators
4343 Project Overview, Objectives and Schedule
- Overall project schedule
- Develop Draft Guidance document to be provided for the NRC for review in August 22
- NRC review and endorsement FY23
- Develop Project Planand establish Project Team (Dec 21-Jan 22) complete
- Develop Scope and Process papers (Feb-Mar 22) complete
- Utilized as inputs to white paper
- Develop White Paper(Apr-July 22) complete
- Identify specific steps to be performed during the change evaluation process
- Summarize efforts to date and obtain ARRTF feedback
- Provide draft white paper to NRC for review
- Meeting with NRC to obtain staff feedback
- Revise white paper in support of Table Top exercises
- Utilize white paper in performing Table Top exercises
- Develop Table Top Guidelines and Objectives (Apr-June 22) complete
- To improve the efficacy of the proposed process, some elements of the recommended guidance will be subjected to trial use tests.
4444 Project Overview, Objectives and Schedule
- Develop Annotated Outline for Guidance(Apr - Jul) complete
- Conduct Tabletop Exercises(Jun - Jul) complete
- Conduct Table Tops with 2 Advanced Reactor Developers
- Obtain NRC observations from Table Tops
- Develop Lessons Learned and incorporate into Draft Guidance document
- Develop Southern Co. Draft Guidance document(Jul - Aug) ongoing
- ARRTF review of Draft Guidance
- Address ARRTF comments provide revised Draft Guidance to ARRTF
- NRC review of Draft Guidance
- Revise Draft Guidance to address NRC comments and provide to ARRTF and NRC
- Convert to NEI document and submit for NRC review/endorsement (Sep 22-FY23)
- ARRTF review of draft NEI guidance
- Address ARRTF comments and finalize for formal submittal for NRC review/endorsement
4545 Questions
Thank you for your time and attention
46