IR 05000334/2022011

Temporary Instruction 2515/194 Inspection Report 05000334/2022011 and 05000412/2022011

ML22180A228
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	06/29/2022
From:	Glenn Dentel Division of Operating Reactors
To:	Grabnar J Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp
Dentel G
References
IR 2022011
Download: ML22180A228 (8)

Text

June 29, 2022

SUBJECT:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/194 INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2022011 AND 05000412/2022011

Dear Mr. Grabnar:

On June 16, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. William Cothen, Director of Site Engineering and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000334 and 05000412 License Nos. DPR-66 and NPF-73

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000334 and 05000412

License Numbers:

DPR-66 and NPF-73

Report Numbers:

05000334/2022011 and 05000412/2022011

Licensee:

Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.

Facility:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2

Location:

Shippingport, PA 15077

Inspection Dates:

June 13, 2022 to June 16, 2022

Inspectors:

C. Hobbs, Reactor Inspector

D. Werkheiser, Senior Reactor Analyst

Approved By:

Glenn T. Dentel, Chief

Engineering Branch 2

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Temporary Instruction 2515/194 inspection at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

2515/194 - Inspection of the Licensees Implementation of Industry Initiative Associated With the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities In Electric Power Systems (NRC Bulletin 2012-01)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the Nuclear Energy Institute Voluntary Industry Initiative, (ADAMS Accession No. ML19163A176) dated June 6, 2019. This included reviewing how the licensee updated their licensing basis to reflect the need to protect against open phase conditions.

Inspection of the Licensees Implementation of Industry Initiative Associated With the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities In Electric Power Systems (NRC Bulletin 2012-01) (1 Sample)

(1) The switchyard power supply network for Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS)consists of two parts: a 345 kV section and a 138 kV section. Each section is supplied by multiple offsite power transmission lines. Six 345 kV transmission lines connect to four 345 kV buses in the BVPS switchyard. Two auto-transformers step down power from 345 kV to 138 kV to supply power to two 138 kV buses. In addition, seven separate 138 kV offsite transmission lines supply power to each 138 kV switchyard bus. The two 138 kV switchyard buses are cross-connected to each other through switchyard power circuit breakers 80 and 90, which are normally closed.

Each BVPS unit is powered from offsite power by two system station service transformers (SSSTs), each powered from a different bus of the 138 kV switchyard.

The two onsite SSSTs for each BVPS unit make up the two qualified General Design Criteria 17 (GDC 17) offsite power sources. Each SSST steps down power from 138 kV to 4 kV to supply power to four non-safety normal AC power buses for each BVPS unit. The onsite power distribution network is functionally the same for both BVPS units. For BVPS Unit 1, the 4 kV normal AC power buses are 1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D. For BVPS Unit 2, the 4 kV normal AC power buses are 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D.

For BVPS Unit 1, normal AC power buses 1A and 1D supply power to two redundant Class 1E 4 kV emergency buses, 1AE and 1DF. For BVPS Unit 2, normal AC power buses 2A and 2D supply power to two redundant Class 1E 4 kV emergency buses, 2AE and 2DF.

All four normal AC power buses at each BVPS unit are also fed from the main unit generator (MUG), when the unit reactor is online, through two unit station service transformers (USSTs). For BVPS Unit 1, USST 1C feeds 4 kV normal power buses 1A and 1B, while USST 1D feeds BVPS normal power buses 1C and 1D. For BVPS Unit 2, USST 2C feeds 4 kV normal power buses 2A and 2B, while USST 2D feeds BVPS normal power buses 2C and 2D. In the event of a reactor trip, the USST power supply to the 4kV normal power buses will de-energize, and a fast transfer of power to the SSST power supply will occur. The normal plant configuration for both BVPS units is operation with power supplied from the USSTs to the 4 kV normal AC power buses, with the SSSTs energized but unloaded. The alternate plant configuration of supplying power to the 4 kV normal AC power buses from the SSSTs is used much less frequently, during refueling outages when the reactor is tripped, and during emergent maintenance issues that occur while the reactor is online.

In addition, to being powered from the 4 kV normal AC bus power supply, the Class 1E 4 kV emergency bus power for all four emergency buses may also be supplied by an emergency diesel generator (EDG). In the event that all power is lost to the 4 kV emergency buses, the associated EDG will start and close its output breaker automatically. This will restore power to the emergency 4 kV bus, and any emergency safety feature loads powered from the 4 kV emergency bus.

BVPS selected the Open Phase Condition (OPC) detection system designed and manufactured by Power System Sentinel Technologies, LLC (PSSTech). The OPC protection system is designed to protect a SSST offsite power source from a single or double OPC by monitoring the transformer primary side neutral current with a single protection relay manufactured by Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. (SEL).

BVPS has elected to enable the alarm feature only of the OPC protection system and keep the automatic trip feature of the system disabled. Operator manual action will be used to separate a SSST with an OPC present, from the onsite electrical power distribution network.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment 2515/194 Based on discussions with Energy Harbor staff, review of design documentation, and simulator demonstration of Alarm Response Procedures, the inspectors assessed whether BVPS is implementing the guidance specified in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Voluntary Industry Initiative on Open Phase Condition. The inspectors verified the following criteria:

Section 03.01(a) - Detection, Alarms and General Criteria

The inspectors reviewed, assessed, and documented TI-194 Section 03.01(a) aspects in Beaver Valley Power Station Inspection Report 05000334/2021011 and 05000412/2021011, dated October 19, 2021 (ADAMS Accession Number ML21292A063).

The inspectors noted no exceptions to TI-194 Section 03.01(a).

Section 03.01(c) - Use of Risk-Informed Evaluation Method

The inspectors reviewed Energy Harbor's corrective actions documented in CR-2021-07105, CR-2021-07280, and other supporting corrective actions, to evaluate Section 03.01(c)aspects with the following results:

03.01(c)(1) - The plant configuration matched the changes made to the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model to address an OPC, and the logic of the PRA model is sound.

03.01(c)(2) - The procedures which validate an OPC exists, would identify the proper indication for an OPC at all possible plant locations. In addition, plant operators have received training on these procedures.

03.01(c)(3) - Operator actions specified in plant procedures required to respond to an OPC and potential equipment trip, are reasonable and consistent with the Human Reliability

Analysis.

(a) The execution time available to complete operator actions to respond to an OPC are reasonable.

(b) Plant operating conditions allow access to equipment where needed, and training has been conducted on BVPS revised plant operating procedures for responding to an OPC.

03.01(c)(4) - Assumptions listed in the BVPS NEI 19-02, Appendix A evaluation and the associated sensitivity analyses were reasonable.

03.01(c)(5) - Assumptions, procedures, operator actions, and the BVPS OPC analyses are consistent with the plant-specific design and licensing basis, including:

(a) Initiating events considered in the analysis.

(b) Boundary conditions specified in Attachment 1 of the NEI Voluntary Industry Initiative, Revision 3.

(c) Operating procedures for steps taken to recover equipment assumed tripped, locked out, or damaged due to an OPC.

(d) Analysis supporting recovery of potentially affected equipment (for worst-case dual-bus OPC impact). This includes the overall timing and strategy to support successful OPC mitigation for various plant power configurations, unit Mode of operation, and OPC location.

The inspectors noted no exceptions to TI-194 Section 03.01(c).

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On June 16, 2022, the inspectors presented the Temporary Instruction 2515/194 inspection results to Mr. William Cothen, Director of Site Engineering and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

2515/194

Calculations

10080-N0773

Unit 2 EDG Operating Time With Loss of SWS

Revision 0

8700-DMC-1352

Unit 1 EDG Operating Time With Loss of RW

Revision 0

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2021-06851

CR-2021-06891

CR-2021-08284

CR-2021-08741

CR-2022-01189

CR-2022-03670

CR-2022-04824

CR-2021-07105

NRC Open Phase Inspection Questions

09/22/2021

CR-2021-07280

NRC Open Phase Inspection: Evaluate Open Phase Alarm

Procedure

09/28/2021

CR-2021-08106

NRC Open Phase Condition (OPC) Inspection Report 2021-

011 - Exception

10/26/2021

Engineering

Evaluations

EER 601363958

Motor Protection and Recoverability from an Open Phase

Condition

06/09/2022

PRA-BV3-20-002-

R01

BVPS Open Phase Condition PRA Analysis

Revision 1

Procedures

1OM-36.4.AFY

ARP-System Station Service Trans 1B Open Phase Alarm

Revision 3

1OM-36.4.AFZ

ARP-System Station Service Trans 1A Open Phase Alarm

Revision 2

2OM-36.4.AFK

ARP-SS Serv Transformer 2A Open Phase Alarm

Revision 2

2OM-36.4.AFL

ARP-SS Serv Transformer 2B Open Phase Alarm

Revision 3

2OM-

53C.4.2.36.2

Unit 2 Loss of 4kV Emergency Bus

Revision 17

NOP-OP-1003

Grid Reliability Protocol

Revision 13