ML21201A182

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4 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Fire Protection Evaluation Report
ML21201A182
Person / Time
Site: Millstone  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 06/24/2021
From:
Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML21201A164 List:
References
21-211
Download: ML21201A182 (396)
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Text

Millstone Power Station Unit 3 Safety Analysis Report Fire Protection Evaluation Report

Table of Contents tion Title Page TION 1INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1-1 1.1 Purpose........................................................................................................... 1-1 1.2 Report Organization....................................................................................... 1-1 TION 2HISTORICAL BACKGROUND................................................................... 2-1 TION 3ADMINISTRATION ..................................................................................... 3-1 3.1 Fire Protection Program................................................................................. 3-1 3.2 Fire Protection Organization.......................................................................... 3-1 3.3 Fire Brigade and Training.............................................................................. 3-1 3.4 Quality Assurance.......................................................................................... 3-2 TION 4PLANT DESIGN FEATURES...................................................................... 4-1 4.1 Fire Protection................................................................................................ 4-1 4.1.1 Site Water Supply System ............................................................................. 4-1 4.1.2 Fixed Suppression Systems ........................................................................... 4-2 4.1.2.1 Sprinkler and Waterspray Systems ................................................................ 4-2 4.1.2.1.1 Automatic and Manual Operating, Wet Pipe Sprinkler Systems................... 4-2 4.1.2.1.2 Automatic and Manual Operating Water Spray Systems .............................. 4-3 4.1.2.1.3 Automatic Operating Preaction Sprinkler System......................................... 4-3 4.1.2.2 Carbon Dioxide Systems ............................................................................... 4-4 4.1.2.3 Halon Systems ............................................................................................... 4-7 4.1.3 Portable Suppression Capabilities ................................................................. 4-8 4.1.3.1 Hose Stream Coverage................................................................................... 4-8 4.1.3.2 Portable Extinguishers ................................................................................... 4-8 4.1.4 Fire Detection and Alarm Systems ................................................................ 4-8 4.2 Ventilation Capabilities for Smoke Removal ................................................ 4-9 4.2.1 Portable Smoke Removal............................................................................... 4-9 4.2.2 Fixed Ventilation Systems ............................................................................. 4-9 4.3 Access and Egress Routes.............................................................................. 4-9

tion Title Page 4.4 Emergency Lighting Systems ...................................................................... 4-10 4.5 Communication Systems ............................................................................. 4-11 4.5.1 Voice Paging System ................................................................................... 4-12 4.5.2 Maintenance Jack System ............................................................................ 4-12 4.5.3 Sound-Powered Phone ................................................................................. 4-12 4.5.4 UHF System................................................................................................. 4-12 4.5.5 Hardwire Intercom System .......................................................................... 4-13 CTION 5FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS (FHA)............................................................. 5-1 5.1 Evaluation Criteria ......................................................................................... 5-1 5.2 Fire Hazard Analysis Method ........................................................................ 5-2 5.3 Fire Hazard Analysis Assumptions................................................................ 5-4 5.4 Fire Areas and Zones ..................................................................................... 5-5 5.5 Fire Hazard Analyses..................................................................................... 5-6 Auxiliary Boiler Enclosure

1. Floor Area and Fuel Oil Pump Pit, Fire Area ABR-1, Zones A and B, Elevation 25 feet and 40 feet 6 inches ..................... 5-7 Auxiliary Building
2. North Floor Area, Fire Area AB-1, Zone A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches .................................................................................. 5-10
3. South Floor Area, Fire Area AB-1 Zone B, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches .................................................................................. 5-13
4. East Floor Area, Fire Area AB-1, Zone C, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches ................................................................................ 5-16
5. West Floor Area, Fire Area AB-1, Zone D, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches ................................................................................ 5-19
6. Floor Area, Fire Area AB-1, Zone E, Elevation 43 feet 6 inches ............................................................................................ 5-22
7. Floor Area, Fire Area AB-1, Zone F, Elevation 66 feet 6 inches ............................................................................................ 5-25
8. Fuel Building Filter Bank, Fire Area AB-2, Zone N/A, Elevation 66 feet 6 inches ................................................................ 5-28
9. Fuel Building Filter Bank, Fire Area AB-3, Zone N/A, Elevation 79 feet 8 inches ................................................................ 5-30

tion Title Page

10. Auxiliary Building Filter Bank, Fire Area AB-9, Zone N/A, Elevation 66 feet 6 inches ....................................................... 5-32
11. Auxiliary Building Filter Bank, Fire Area AB-10, Zone N/A, Elevation 79 feet 8 inches ....................................................... 5-34
12. Supplementary Leak Collection Filter Bank, Fire Area AB-11, Zone N/A, Elevation 66 feet 6 inches ................................. 5-36
13. Supplementary Leak Collection Filter Bank, Fire Area AB-12, Zone N/A, Elevation 78 feet 6 inches ................................. 5-38
14. East MCC and Rod Control Area, Fire Area AB-5, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches, 24 feet 6 inches, and 43 feet 6 inches ............................................................................................ 5-40
15. West MCC and Rod Control Area, Fire Area AB-6, Zone A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches, 24 feet 6 inches and 43 feet 6 inches ................................................................................ 5-43
16. West MCC/Rod Control Air Conditioning Unit Room, Fire Area AB-6, Zone B, Elevation 66 feet 6 inches .............................. 5-46
17. East MCC/Rod Control Air Conditioning Unit Room, Fire Area AB-8, Zone N/A, Elevation 66 feet 6 inches .......................... 5-48 Boron Recovery Tank Enclosure
18. Boron Recovery Tank Enclosure, Fire Area BRT-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches ....................................................... 5-50 Circulating and Service Water Pumphouse
19. North Floor Area, Sodium Hypochloride Room and Service Water Valve Access Enclosure, Fire Area CSW-1, Zones A, B, and C, Elevation 14 feet 6 inches ........................................... 5-52
20. South Floor Area, Fire Area CSW-2, Zone N/A, Elevation 14 feet 6 inches ................................................................................ 5-55
21. East Service Water Cubicle, Fire Area CSW-3, Zone N/A, Elevation 14 feet 6 inches ................................................................ 5-57
22. West Service Water Cubicle, Fire Area CSW-4, Zone N/A, Elevation 14 feet 6 inches ....................................................... 5-60 Containment Structure
23. Containment Structure, Fire Area RC-1, Zone N/A, Elevation (-)24 feet 6 inches through 51 feet 4 inches .................... 5-63

tion Title Page Control Building

24. West Switchgear Area, Fire Area CB-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches .................................................................. 5-66
25. East Switchgear Area, Fire Area CB-2, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches .................................................................. 5-69
26. Battery Room 1, Fire Area CB-3, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches .................................................................................. 5-72
27. Battery Room 2, Fire Area CB-4, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches .................................................................................. 5-74
28. Battery Room 3, Fire Area CB-5, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches .................................................................................. 5-76
29. Battery Room 4, Fire Area CB-6, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches .................................................................................. 5-78
30. Battery Room 5, Fire Area CB-7, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches .................................................................................. 5-80
31. Electrical Equipment Room, West Switchgear Area, Fire Area CB-16, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches .......................... 5-82
32. Electrical Equipment Room, East Switchgear Area, Fire Area CB-17, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches .......................... 5-84
33. Neutron Monitor - Junction Box Area, East Switchgear Area, Fire Area CB-18 (Deleted)..................................................... 5-86
34. Cable Spreading Area, Fire Area CB-8, Zone N/A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches ................................................................ 5-87
35. Control Room, Fire Area CB-9, Zone N/A, Elevation 47 feet 6 inches ................................................................................ 5-91
36. Computer Room and Underfloor Area, Fire Area CB-10, Zones A & B, Elevation 47 feet 6 inches ........................................ 5-95
37. Instrument Rack Room and Underfloor Area, Fire Area CB-11, Zones A and B, Elevation 47 feet 6 inches ......................... 5-98
38. Kitchen Area, Fire Area CB-12, Zone N/A, Elevation 47 feet 6 inches .............................................................................. 5-102
39. Chiller Room, Fire Area CB-13, Zone N/A, Elevation 64 feet 6 inches .............................................................................. 5-105
40. Mechanical Equipment Room, Fire Area CB-14, Zone N/A, Elevation 64 feet 6 inches .............................................................. 5-107

tion Title Page Emergency Generator Enclosure

41. East Fuel Oil Vault, Fire Area EG-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 14 feet 6 inches .............................................................. 5-109
42. West Fuel Oil Vault, Fire Area EG-2, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches ................................................................ 5-112
43. North Emergency Generator Enclosure, Fire Area EG-3, Zones A and B, Elevation 11 feet 6 inches, 24 feet 6 inches and 51 feet 0 inches ......................................................... 5-115
44. South Emergency Generator Enclosure, Fire Area EG-4, Zones A & B, Elevation 11 feet 6 inches, 24 feet 6 inches

& 51 feet 0 inches .......................................................................... 5-119 Engineered Safety Features Building

45. South Containment Recirculation Cooler Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-1, Zone N/A, Elevation (-)34 feet 9 inches through 36 feet 6 inches .............................................................................. 5-123
46. North Containment Recirculation Cooler Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-2, Zone N/A, Elevation (-)34 feet 9 inches through 36 feet 6 inches .............................................................................. 5-126
47. North Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-3, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches, 21 feet 6 inches, 36 feet 6 inches ................................................... 5-128
48. East Floor Area, Fire Area ESF-4, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches ................................................................................ 5-131
49. Southeast Floor Area/Auxiliary Feed Pump Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-5, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches and 24 feet 6 inches .............................................................................. 5-133
50. South Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-6, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches, 21 feet 6 inches, 36 feet 6 inches ................................................... 5-135
51. Refueling Water Recirculation Pumps Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-7, Zone N/A, Elevation 21 feet 6 inches and 36 feet 6 inches .......................................................................................... 5-138
52. North Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-8, Zones N/A, Elevation 21 feet 6 inches ..................... 5-141
53. South Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-9, Zone N/A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches and 36 feet 6 inches .............................................................................. 5-143

tion Title Page

54. North Air Conditioning Unit/Safety Injection Surge Tank Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-10, Zone N/A, Elevation 36 feet 6 inches .......................................................................................... 5-146
55. South Air Conditioning Unit Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-11, Zone N/A, Elevation 36 feet 6 inches............................................ 5-149 Fuel Building
56. Floor Areas, Fire Area FB-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 11 feet 0 inches, 24 feet 6 inches, 34 feet 0 inches, 52 feet 4 inches ............................................................................................. 5-151
57. Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps and Coolers, Fire Area FB-2, Zone N/A, Elevation 11 feet 0 inches 24 feet 6 inches, 42 feet 6 inches .............................................................................. 5-154 Hydrogen Recombiner Building
58. Floor Area, Fire Area HR-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches and 37 feet 6 inches ......................................................... 5-156 Machine Shop 59A. Crane Bay/Welding Shop/Mech. Work Area, Fire Area MS-1, Zone A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches ............................................... 5-159 59B. Oil and Grease Room, Fire Area MS-1, Zone B, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches ............................................................................. 5-161 59C. Electrical Shop Area, Fire Area MS-1, Zone C, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches ......................................................................................... 5-163 59D. Maintenance Office, Fire Area MS-1, Zone D, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches ......................................................................................... 5-165 59E. Tool Room, Fire Area MS-1, Zone E, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches 5-167 59F. Machinery Area/Hallway, Fire Area MS-1, Zone F, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches ............................................................................. 5-169 59G. QA Meter Storage Room, Fire Area MS-1, Zone G, Elevation 2 24 feet 6 inches ............................................................................. 5-171 59H. Maintenance Offices, Fire Area MS-1, Zone H, Elevation 35 feet 0 inches ......................................................................................... 5-173 59I. Meeting Room and Lunch Area, Fire Area MS-1, Zone I, Elevation 35 feet 0 inches ............................................................. 5-175
60. Deleted ........................................................................................... 5-177 Main Steam Valve Enclosure
61. Floor Areas, Fire Area MSV-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches through 70 feet 6 inches....................................... 5-178

tion Title Page Service Building

62. Normal Switchgear Room, Fire Area SB-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6inches ................................................................. 5-181
63. North Cable Tunnel, Fire Area SB-2, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches ................................................................................ 5-183
64. South Cable Tunnel, Fire Area SB-3, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches ................................................................................ 5-186
65. Floor Area, Fire Area SB-4, Zone A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches .......................................................................................... 5-189
66. Floor Area, Fire Area SB-4, Zone B, Elevation 38 feet 6 inches .......................................................................................... 5-191
67. Floor Area, Fire Area SB-4, Zone C, Elevation 49 feet 6 inches and 52 feet 6 inches ......................................................... 5-193
68. I&C Conference Room, Office and Lunch Area, Fire Area SB-4, Zone D, Elevation 38 feet 6 inches...................................... 5-195 Technical Support Center
69. Fire Area TS-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 13 feet 6 inches and 26 feet 8 inches .............................................................................. 5-197 Transformers
70. North Normal Station Service Transformer Fire Area XR-1, Zone N/A, Elevation Ground Level............................................... 5-200
71. South Normal Station Service Transformer Fire Area XR-2, Zone N/A, Elevation Ground Level............................................... 5-202
72. North Spare Normal Station Service Transformer, Fire Area XR-3, Zone N/A, Elevation Ground Level.................................... 5-204
73. South Spare Normal Station Service Transformer, Fire Area XR-4, Zone N/A, Elevation Ground Level.................................... 5-206
74. East Reserve Transformer, Fire Area XR-5, Zone N/A, Elevation Ground Level................................................................. 5-208
75. West Reserve Transformer, Fire Area XR-6, Zone N/A, Elevation Ground Level................................................................. 5-210 Turbine Building
76. Oil Storage Room, Fire Area TB-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 14 feet 6 inches .............................................................................. 5-212
77. Basement Floor Area, Fire Area TB-2, Zone A, Elevation 7 feet and 14 feet 6 inches ............................................................. 5-214

tion Title Page

78. Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit, Fire Area TB-2, Zone B, Elevation 14 feet 6 inches .............................................................. 5-217
79. Equipment Mezzanine, Fire Area TB-2, Zone C, Elevation 38 feet 6 inches .............................................................................. 5-219
80. Operating Floor, Fire Area TB-2, Zone D, Elevation 64 feet 6 inches .............................................................................. 5-222
81. Turbine Shaft Areas, Fire Area TB-2, Zone E, Elevation 64 feet 6 inches .............................................................................. 5-225
82. General Support Area, Fire Area TB-2, Zone F, Elevation 64 feet 6 inches .............................................................................. 5-227
83. Alternator/Exciter Enclosure, Fire Area TB-2, Zone G, Elevation 64 feet 6 inches .............................................................. 5-229
84. Battery Room Number 6, Fire Area TB-3, Zone N/A, Elevation 38 feet 6 inches .............................................................. 5-231
85. Lube Oil Reservoir and Conditioner, Fire Area TB-4, Zone N/A, Elevation 38 feet 6 inches............................................ 5-233 Vacuum Priming Pump House
86. General Area, Fire Area VP-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches .............................................................................. 5-235 Condensate Polishing Facility
87. Floor Areas, Fire Area CP-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches, 28 feet 6 inches, 50 feet 6 inches, and 66 feet 6 inches .......................................................................................... 5-237
88. Q.A. Records Storage Room, Fire Area CP-2, Zone N/A, Elevation 50 feet 6 inches .............................................................. 5-240 Waste Disposal Building
89. Floor Areas, Fire Area WDB-1, Zone A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches, 16 feet 6 inches, 24 feet 6 inches, 43 feet 6 inches, and 68 feet...................................................................................... 5-242
90. Solid Waste Area, Fire Area WDB-1, Zone B, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches .............................................................................. 5-244 Station Blackout Diesel Generator
91. Enclosure, Fire Area SBO-1, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches............... 5-246
92. Station Blackout Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank, Fire Area SBO-2, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches................................. 5-249

tion Title Page Fire Pump House Building

93. Fire Pump House, Fire Area FP-1, Elevation 14 feet 6 inches .......................................................................................... 5-251 Power Distribution Centers
94. Enclosure Fire Area Building 332A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches .......................................................................................... 5-254
95. Enclosure Fire Area Building 332B, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches .......................................................................................... 5-257
96. Enclosure Fire Area Building 332C, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches .......................................................................................... 5-260 Main GSU Transformers
97. Main GSU Transformer 3MTX-XMA, Fire Area XR-7, Zone N/A, Elevation pedestal slab 23 feet 6 inches. ..................... 5-263
98. Main GSU Transformer 3MTX-XMB, Fire Area XR-8, Zone N/A, Elevation pedestal slab 23 feet 6 inches. ..................... 5-265
99. Main GSU Transformer 3MTX-XMC, Fire Area XR-9, Zone N/A, Elevation pedestal slab 23 feet 6 inches. ..................... 5-267 100. Deluge Building Number 331, Fire Area XR-11, Zone N/A, Elevation (ground) approximately 17 feet 0 inches .............. 5-269 101. Diesel Instrument Air System - Diesel Generator, Fire Area CR3, Zone N/A, Elevation 20 feet 0 inches.......................... 5-271 TION 6SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION ........................................................... 6-1 6.1 Basis and Assumptions .................................................................................. 6-1 6.2 Systems Required For Safe Shutdown........................................................... 6-2 6.2.1 Each Function Required To Achieve and Maintain Safe Shutdown Was Evaluated By Fire Area.................................................................................. 6-2 6.2.1.1 Decay Heat Removal via Main Steam/RCS Instrumentation ........................ 6-3 6.2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System Letdown ................................................................. 6-3 6.2.1.3 Auxiliary Feedwater System.......................................................................... 6-3 6.2.1.4 Reactor Coolant Boration .............................................................................. 6-3 6.2.1.5 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Control..................................................... 6-3 6.2.1.6 Residual Heat Removal System..................................................................... 6-4 6.2.1.7 Component Cooling Water System ............................................................... 6-4

tion Title Page 6.2.1.8 Service Water System .................................................................................... 6-4 6.2.2 Reactor Coolant System High/Low Pressure Interface ................................. 6-4 6.2.3 Loss of Offsite Power .................................................................................... 6-4 6.3 Electrical Evaluation...................................................................................... 6-5 6.3.1 Fire-Induced Circuit Failure Analysis ........................................................... 6-5 6.3.2 Electrical Evaluation Methodology ............................................................... 6-5 6.3.2.1 Systems .......................................................................................................... 6-5 6.3.3 Electrical Evaluation of Safe Shutdown Functions ....................................... 6-5 CTION 7SUPPORT SYSTEMS ................................................................................... 7-1 7.1 Emergency AC and DC Distribution ............................................................. 7-1 7.2 Emergency Diesel Generators ....................................................................... 7-2 7.3 Ventilation ..................................................................................................... 7-2 7.4 Cooling to the Reactor Coolant Pump Seals.................................................. 7-2 7.5 Instrument Air System ................................................................................... 7-2 7.6 Emergency Lighting ...................................................................................... 7-3 7.7 Communication............................................................................................. 7-3 7.8 Process Variable Monitoring ......................................................................... 7-3 TION 8RESOLUTION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION PROBLEM AREAS ...................................................................................... 8-1 8.1 Alternative Shutdown Capability................................................................... 8-1 8.2 Long-Term Hot Shutdown............................................................................. 8-1 8.3 Control System Isolation for Control Room/spreading Room/IRR Fires...... 8-1 8.4 Fire Protection of Cable ................................................................................. 8-2 8.5 Auxiliary Building Elevation 24 Feet 6 Inches ............................................. 8-2 8.6 Reactor Containment ..................................................................................... 8-3 TION 9OPERATOR ACTIONS REQUIRED FOLLOWING A FIRE..................... 9-1 9.1 Operator Guidelines ....................................................................................... 9-1 9.2 Repair of Equipment ...................................................................................... 9-1

tion Title Page CTION 10CONCLUSIONS........................................................................................ 10-1 endix ASummary of Compliance With Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A (July 1, 1976) ........................................................................... A-1 endix B Comparison of Millstone 3 Plant Design to Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1 Guidelines (NUREG 0800, July 1981) ....................................B-1 endix C Summary of Comparison With 10 CFR 50, Appendix R ..............................C-1

List of Tables mber Title Sprinkler/Waterspray Protected Areas CO2 Protected Areas Plant Functions which Could be Affected by a Fire in Different Fire Areas and Options Available to Complete Function (Deleted)

List of Figures mber Title Fire Protection Organizational Chart (Deleted)

(Sheets 1-6) P&ID Fire Protection Fire Hazard Analysis Elevation 3 Feet 8 Inches Fire Hazard Analysis Elevation 24 Feet 6 inches Fire Hazard Analysis Elevation 38 Feet 6 inches Fire Hazard Analysis Elevation 52 Feet 6 inches Fire Hazard Analysis Elevation (Roof Plan)

Fire Hazard Analysis Elevation (Sections)

Process Control Transfer Scheme (Typical)

Process Instrumentation Transfer Scheme

PURPOSE s Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER) represents the operating license (OL) fire ection program submittal for the Northeast Nuclear Energy Companys Millstone Unit 3 llstone 3). This evaluation, originally submitted in June 1977, has been revised to be onsive to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter (D. G. Eisenhut to W. G. Counsil),

d October 21, 1981. This letter requested that the Millstone 3 OL fire protection program mittal provide a comparison with the provisions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, which became ctive on February 17, 1980, and applies to operating plants licensed before January 1, 1979.

C has also issued additional guidance to operating plants in Generic Letter 81-12 bruary 20, 1981). The information requested in Generic Letter 81-12 has been taken into ount in this report. Additional NRC guidance is addressed in the Millstone Unit 3 Branch hnical Position 9.5-1 Compliance Report.

REPORT ORGANIZATION FPER is organized as follows.

tion 2 provides the historical background for fire protection design of Millstone 3. The fire ection program, including administrative aspects, such as fire brigade organization and ning, is described in Section 3. Fire protection features are described in Section 4. The results he fire hazards analysis, including designation of fire zones, are presented in Section 5.

tions 6 through 10 present information responsive to fire protection guidelines, Branch hnical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-1 (NUREG-0800), Rev. 2-1981, Sections C.5.b. and C.5.c.,

er the headings of safe shutdown evaluation, support systems, resolution of safe shutdown luation problem areas, and operator actions available following a fire. Conclusions are ented in Section 10.

o appendixes are included in order to provide comparisons with certain regulatory documents.

endix A, which was included in the previous submittals to provide an item-by-item position ement on BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A, (NRC letter R. S. Boyd to D. C. Switzer, tember 30, 1976) has been deleted.

endix B identifies areas in which the Millstone 3 design does not fully conform to the most nt fire protection guidelines, BTP CMEB 9.5, Rev. 2-1981 and provides a justification for e deviations. The differences noted should in no way be necessarily construed as a variance m regulations; rather, they are a documentation of deviations from acceptance criteria as stated he NRCs internal review guide (Standard Review Plan) for the FSAR.

endix C provides a list of each item of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III, and indicates the tion within this report where each is addressed.

September 30, 1976 (NRC letter, R. S. Boyd to D. C. Switzer), Northeast Nuclear Energy mpany (NNECo) was requested by the NRC to reevaluate its fire protection program in ordance with Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear er Plants Docketed prior to July 1, 1976. On June 13, 1977, NNECo submitted to the NRC original issue of this report, Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3, Fire Protection luation, which documented the detailed analysis performed for all fire areas. The report cated the extent of compliance of the design with Appendix A to APCSB 9.5-1.

February 20, 1980 (letter, W. G. Counsil to O. D. Parr), NNECo identified to the NRC that th unit construction being approximately 33 percent complete, many fire protection design ures have already been incorporated. Furthermore, since no additional guidance applicable to docket has been forwarded, construction continues under the assumption that we comply with protection requirements satisfactorily. However, if compliance is not recognized, a timely onse is requested to prevent costly backfits and subsequent delays at later, more critical, struction stages.

October 21, 1981 (letter, D. G. Eisenhut to W. G. Counsil), NNECo was requested by the NRC rovide a comparison in the Fire Protection Evaluation with Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, Fire tection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979 e Appendix C).

January 31, 1983 (Letter, D.G. Eisenhut to W.G. Counsil), NNECO was requested by the NRC rovide a comparison in the Fire Protection Evaluation with BTP CMEB 9.5-1 (NUREG 0), July 1981, specifically identifying deviations. The fire protection design basis for lstone 3 is as stated in this report, which indicates the degree of compliance with this version TP CMEB 9.5-1.

FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM re protection program has been established at the Millstone 3 Nuclear Power Plant. This gram establishes the fire protection policy for the protection of structures, systems, and ponents important to the safety of the plant and the procedures, equipment, and personnel uired to implement the program.

fire protection program is under the direction of an individual who has been delegated ority commensurate with the responsibilities of the position, and who has available staff onnel with knowledge in both fire protection and nuclear safety.

fire protection program extends the concepts of defense-in-depth to fire protection in areas ortant to safety, with the following objectives:

to prevent fires from starting; to detect rapidly and control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur; and to provide protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.

FIRE PROTECTION ORGANIZATION organization and individual responsibilities for elements of the Millstone Unit 3 Fire tection Program are contained in the Fire Protection / Appendix R (Fire Safe Shutdown) gram Procedure. Refer to Figure 6-1 of the Fire Protection Program Manual to identify the vidual responsible for specific program elements and the appropriate implementing cedures.

FIRE BRIGADE AND TRAINING Millstone Power Station Fire Brigade consists of a site fire brigade. As a minimum, each fire ade per shift consists of five members, including the Shift Fire Brigade Leader, who is wledgeable in plant safety-related system operations for their assigned unit. When a specific does not have a Fire Brigade Shift Leader, a Fire Brigade Advisor from that unit is required in ition to the five member Fire Brigade. The five members of each shift fire brigade are trained re fighting techniques and are able to effectively fight and control all postulated plant fires.

plemental assistance is also available from local fire departments.

nt procedures regarding fires state that, if conditions warrant, the local public fire departments l be called. Within a 5 mile radius of the plant, there are numerous local volunteer fire panies. Letters of commitment to supply public fire department assistance have been obtained m these fire companies.

-fighting personnel. This program is responsive to the requirements of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, ition C.1, C.2, and C.3, and its development is guided by the appropriate codes and standards renced therein.

ce the local fire departments are included in the overall Fire Protection Evaluation, they will be uded in the training program. Periodic discussions held with them cover areas of access, ipment compatibility, and onsite direction. There is an ongoing training program to instruct local fire departments in subjects pertinent to the plant (e.g., radiation protection, plant layout,

) to enhance their effectiveness. Periodic fire drills are conducted with the participation of the l fire departments in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the training program.

QUALITY ASSURANCE the intent of Millstone Station to include in the Quality Assurance Program those areas of the Protection Evaluation that are identified in BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Position C.4.

Quality Assurance Program has been applied to the fire protection systems, components, and grams providing fire detection and suppression capabilities to those areas of the plant that are ortant to safety.

PER FIGURE: 3-1 FIRE PROTECTION ORGANIZATIONAL CHART (DELETED)

FIRE PROTECTION 1 SITE WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM er for fire protection is supplied by extending the fire protection piping system from Millstone d 2 to include Millstone 3, as shown on Figure 4-1.

underground fire protection water supply consists of 12 inch cement lined iron pipe in a loop ngement around Millstone Units 1, 2 and 3. Post-indicating type valves in the piping loop mit partial pipeline isolation without interrupting service to the entire system.

supply system services individually valved lines feeding fixed pipe water suppression ems (sprinklers, water spray, and standpipes) throughout the plant. Hydrants are located on an roximate 250 foot spacing arrangement or are otherwise strategically located for fire fighting poses. Hydrant hose houses, equipped for 2.5 and 1.5 inch hose stream service, are located r the hydrants.

Millstone Station Fire Water Loop is supplied from two 250,000 gallon ground level suction

s. The tanks are automatically filled through a domestic water line fed from the city water em. This line is a 12 inch city feed with a 10 inch meter, bypass line, and two backflow venters. The city supply is capable of refilling the fire water tanks in eight hours. Valves on the rconnected tank suction lines provide the capability to manually isolate each tank in the event ailure of a tank or its piping system. The fire protection water supply system is independent of ice and sanitary water piping systems.

o fire pump houses contain the stations three fire pumps, each rated at 2,000 gpm at 100 psi.

three pumps can take suction from either or both tanks and have individual connections to the erground supply system. All three fire pumps have separate control panels supplied from arate power supplies. Pump running and trouble signals for all pumps as well as fire water tank l monitoring indications are available in the Unit 3 Control Room.

Unit 3 (Building 123) Fire Pumphouse contains the electric fire pump (M7-8), the diesel en fire pump (M7-7), and the 50 gpm electric jockey pump (M7-11). The Unit 2 (Building

) Fire Pumphouse is a separate structure adjacent to Building 123 and contains the other tric fire pump (P-82). These pumphouses are adjacent and independent of each other with the eption of sharing a common barrier.

tem operation is such that the 50 gpm electric jockey pump (M7-11) maintains system sure by automatically starting when line pressure drops to approximately 105 psig and will until pressure reaches 120 psig as indicated by a line pressure switch. An electric interlock ween the jockey pump and the M7-7 and M7-8 pump exists which stops the jockey pump n either pump starts. A hydropneumatic tank is provided in the system to prevent short ling of the jockey pump. The electric driven fire pump (P-82) is driven by an AC motor from 480V load center MP2 Bus 22D. This pump is activated by a pressure switch set at 95 psig. In

motor powered from the MP3 480V Load Center Bus 32Q. In the event this switch or pump s to operate or system demand overwhelms this capacity and line pressure continues to drop, Diesel Driven Fire Pump (M7-7) is activated by a separate pressure switch set at 75 psig. The el driven fire pump is electrically independent with its own self contained redundant battery em for starting. A battery charger is provided for maintaining the batteries charged.

P-82 motor driven pump automatically stops after system pressure is maintained at 100 psi 5 minutes. Once started, the M7-7 and M7-8 fire pumps remain in operation until manually ped.

major fire in any location of Millstone Unit 3 should occur, the combined water tanks and eup water capacity would provide an adequate water supply for Millstone Unit 3. The essary pressure and flow would be maintained through the use of any two of the three station pumps.

2 FIXED SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS 2.1 Sprinkler and Waterspray Systems ed sprinkler and water spray systems, provided in various areas of the plant where in situ bustible loading warrants such protection, are designed in conformance with either National Protection Association (NFPA) Standard Number 13, Standard for the Installation of inkler Systems or NFPA Standard Number 15, Standard for Water spray Fixed Systems for Protection.

ed water systems are provided in the following design arrangements:

  • automatic and manual operating, wet pipe sprinkler;
  • automatic and manual operating water spray; and
  • automatic operating preaction sprinkler.

individual system types and general locations are indicated in Table 4-1. Figure 4-1 shows general layout of these systems.

2.1.1 Automatic and Manual Operating, Wet Pipe Sprinkler Systems omatic and manual closed head, wet pipe design sprinkler systems have an alarm check valve larm flow switch. All systems are provided with an outside screw and yoke (OS&Y) isolation e between the supply connections and system distribution piping.

nual closed head sprinkler systems utilized in the emergency generator enclosures are dry pipe ems to avoid the possibility of water damage to generator system components.

n spray head, deluge type water spray systems are of both automatic and manual operating gn. All systems have a deluge valve located between the supply header and the distribution ng. An OS&Y isolation valve is used on all systems. Upon actuation of the deluge valve, er flows into the distribution piping and discharges from all spray heads.

omatic operation is initiated by a single zone heat detection (rate compensated or line type) uit installed in the hazard area.

nual operation of the automatic systems is provided electrically via pull stations located at the ge valve control panel (main and normal transformers), turbine building under truck bay drogen seal oil unit), the valve pit (reserve transformers) or outside the enclosure (lube oil rvoir and conditioner). Each deluge valve can be mechanically actuated at the deluge valve lf.

water spray systems for the charcoal filter assemblies in the auxiliary building are ually-operated deluge type systems employing open spray nozzles located within the filter ng. A manually-operated, recyclable deluge valve is provided between the supply header and distribution piping. The manual deluge valve is operated by local manual electric pushbuttons.

n manually opening the OS&Y isolation valve and manually initiating deluge valve opening, er flows into the distribution piping and discharges from all spray heads for a controlled period ime followed by automatic closing of the deluge valve.

Technical Support Center charcoal filter assembly is fitted with an external connector wing the internal deluge piping and open spray nozzles to be supplied by manually connecting se from a hose rack in the vicinity.

eat detection system within the filter casings provides early warning detection of a fire. The ctors alarm locally at the Allison Panels, at the local building zone alarms panel and at the n fire protection panel in the control room.

2.1.3 Automatic Operating Preaction Sprinkler System osed head automatic preaction sprinkler system protects the turbine generator bearing losures and the oil supply piping in the immediate area of the bearings.

eluge valve is located between the supply header and the distribution piping. Upon actuation he deluge valve, water flows into the distribution piping and discharges only from the fused nkler heads. An OS&Y isolation valve is located upstream of the deluge valve.

e compensated heat detectors in the hazard areas automatically actuate the deluge valve.

nual valve operation capability is provided electrically via a pull station located at the deluge trol panel. The deluge valve can be mechanically operated at the valve itself.

m a valved connection to the service air supply in the building. An air maintenance device rcomes pressure loss from minor leaks. Upon loss of air pressure in the distribution piping em from an open sprinkler head or pipe leak, a low-air pressure signal is transmitted to the ge valve control panel and to the control room.

2.2 Carbon Dioxide Systems eral areas of the plant have low pressure carbon dioxide (CO2) suppression capability ection. This protection is used as the primary means of suppression in these areas.

ply for each zone is from a 45 ton, refrigerated bulk storage vessel south of the main steam e enclosure. This storage unit has sufficient volume to provide a two-shot, total flooding for largest protected area (control building, cable spreading area).

tribution of CO2 to each protected area is accomplished through a network of discharge ng, pneumatically operated master and area selector valves, zone control panels and nozzles.

ure 4-1 shows the general schematic layout of this equipment.

pressure CO2 suppression systems in the plant are of four basic designs:

  • automatic operation, total flood;
  • automatic operation, local application;
  • manual operation; total flood; and
  • manual operation, local application/total flood.

le 4-2 indicates each protected area, the type of system, and actuation methods.

total flood systems attain and maintain adequate CO2 concentrations as required by the nature he specific hazard based on the intent of NFPA Standard Number 12 guidelines. The minimum gn concentrations are obtained within 1 minute for surface fires and within 7 minutes for deep ed fires at a rate not less than that required to develop a concentration of 34 percent in 1 ute for the fuel oil tank vaults and 30 percent in 2 minutes for all other total flood areas. This harge is considered the Initial Discharge. To maintain the desired concentrations for a nty minute soak time and to compensate for normal agent leakage from the area, an Extended charge system is utilized.

design of the local application system for the fuel oil pump pit in the auxiliary boiler building been based on the rate by volume method. The duration was extended to allow for cooling of al parts in the pump pit area to prevent oil vapor re-ignition.

lication/total flood system. The external bearing areas of the alterex casing is a local lication system with the internal of the alterex casing a total flood system.

ll electrical cable hazard areas, the total flooding CO2 systems are manually actuated.

nual system actuation is accomplished by the actuation of both cross-zoned smoke detector ngs and opening of the predischarge timer lockout ball valve to initiate CO2 discharge. Both detection cross-zone signals together provide one of the two inputs necessary to discharge

2. The other input is provided by the manual opening of the predischarge timer lockout ball
e. Upon actuation of the first cross zone, an alarm signal is transmitted to the local alarm el and the Control Room. Upon actuation of the second cross zone, an alarm signal is smitted to the local alarm panel and to the Control Room, as well as generating an alarm dition within the local Chemetron panel. With both cross-zones in alarm or with the discharge timer lockout ball valve open, a horn actuates within the affected area and a strobe t actuates outside each of the access doors to the area. Upon discharge of CO2 in the protected

, ventilation damper closure and fan shutdown signals are initiated either from both zones in m in the Chemetron panel (cross zones in alarm and ball valve open) or CO2 discharge sure, a local pneumatic air horn sounds in the area, and an odorizer is released indicating CO2 harge.

he combustible liquid hazard areas, automatic system actuation is accomplished by the ration of a single zone, rate compensated heat detector circuit. Operation of a detector will ate transmission of a discharge alarm to the local Chemetron panel, building alarm panel, and main fire protection console in the Control Room, and will actuate predischarge alarms in the cted area. Following a time delay, CO2 discharge will then occur.

manual operating local application areas, as well as all other manual and automatic operating 2 suppression systems, are or can be actuated by manual key station devices located outside hazards areas or by the key switch at the Chemetron panel. Operation of the manual devices cause CO2 to discharge following a time delay when the lockout valve at the Chemetron el is in an open position. The key station actuation will immediately operate predischarge ms in the protected area and will initiate alarm signal transmission as described above. CO2 harge into the area sounds the local pneumatic discharge horns and initiates odorizer release.

eat CO2 discharges into any protected area can be accomplished by using the manual key ion for that area or the key switch at the Chemetron panel. This may be done without resetting control panel and may continue for as many cycles as there is available CO2 storage.

previously mentioned key-operated manual actuation stations also have an abort function provides authorized personnel the capability to stop an unwanted or inadvertent discharge for onnel or plant safety concerns.

sible, to limit the effects of direct impingement of CO2 on sensitive electrical equipment.

ckout of both automatic and manual discharge into any protected area is accomplished by rating a ball valve located at the Chemetron panel. Only by manually repositioning this valve he open position can CO2 discharge. During lockout, all detection systems continue to ction and transmit alarm signals. When an automatic system is in the locked-out mode, a ble signal is actuated at the Chemetron panel, the building alarm panel, and at the main fire ection console and color-graphics computer unit in the Control Room to provide continuous fication that the automatic CO2 system for the affected area is locked out. For a manual em, a trouble-signal is actuated at the Chemetron panel, the building alarm panel, and at the n fire protection console and color-graphics computer unit when the lockout ball valve is in a fully closed position, alerting the Control Room of the misaligned valve position. An trical lockout has been provided for all hazards which rely on cross-zone smoke detection one of the CO2 system discharge input signals.

electrical lockout consists of two key-locked control switches located in each hazards metron panel. For manual operation total flood CO2 systems, one of the key-locked control tches will isolate both fire detection system signals while the other will isolate the ball valve en discharge input signal. The electrical lockout is only used in conjunction with the hanical lock-out device, when required, to:

1. Prevent spurious CO2 predischarge alarms in hazards where personnel are working.
2. Prevent the Master Valve from opening due to work generated spurious detection signals assuming the ball valve is initially open.
3. Allow testing the CO2 system and fire detection system(s) without inadvertently actuating CO2 discharge.
4. Provide the capability to restart or reposition ventilation equipment previously secured by a CO2 release equipment shutdown signal to aid in purging CO2 from a hazard area to allow entry of personnel following fire extinguishment and/or completion of the CO2 discharge.

disarming of automatic CO2 systems will be regulated by an existing administrative control cedure. Relief venting for each CO2 protected area has been provided, as needed, in order to vent over-pressurization of the area in accordance with NFPA 12 guidelines.

kup power supply to the Chemetron panels is provided through the uninterrupted power ply (UPS) system (125 VDC supply).

rument rack room, the service building 4 feet 6 inches elevation of the northwest stairwell and east and west switchgear rooms. The equipment will measure local atmosphere concentrations will be used primarily following a cable spreading area CO2 system discharge.

2.3 Halon Systems omatic operating, total flooding Halon 1301 suppression systems are utilized in the control ding, elevation 47 feet 6 inches, to protect the computer room underfloor area and the rument rack room underfloor area, and also in the condensate polishing facility, elevation eet 6 inches, to protect the records storage area, and the MP3 Fire Pump House.

Halon supply, except for the Fire Pump House, consists of a manifolded, high pressure em with dedicated main and connected reserve cylinder banks. This main/reserve supply ngement provides two-shot discharge capability. Should the first discharge fail, a second harge is immediately available by operating a cylinder selector switch (one switch for each set ain/reserve cylinders for each hazard). This supply feeds a fixed piping distribution system h applicator nozzles located throughout the protected areas. Figure 4-1 shows the general ematic layout of the Halon system. The Fire Pump House is provided with one cylinder bank.

systems are designed to provide a minimum 7 percent by room air volume concentration hin a 10 second discharge time, except for the Fire Pump House system, which provides a imum 5 percent by room air volume concentration.

systems, except for the Fire Pump House, are automatically operated by single-zone, rate pensated type heat detectors located in the protected area. Along with discharging the pression system, operation of any single detector actuates a local alarm bell outside the area transmits a signal to the system zone control panel and the building alarm panel, and at the n fire protection panel in the control room. The Fire Pump House system is a cross-zoned em that consists of one smoke detector and one rate of rise heat detector.

nual operation of the system is achieved by a manual pull station (one main and one reserve) ted on the outside wall of the protected area. Actuation of the pull station immediately harges the system, actuates a horn and light which indicate manual discharge, transmits a em actuation signal to the local, building and control room fire protection panels, trips fans, closes ventilation dampers in the affected area. All systems can be mechanically actuated at cylinder bank as a final method.

nual operation of the Fire Pump House system is achieved by a manual pull station located hin the Fire Pump House. There is no reserve tank for this system.

h system is controlled by a zone panel, which provides power to operate detection circuits, ate alarm signals and electrically actuate the Halon system. All system components are trically supervised for circuit continuity and component status (open/closed, on/off, etc.).

ual and audible indication of system status is provided on the face of each panel. All signals

3 PORTABLE SUPPRESSION CAPABILITIES 3.1 Hose Stream Coverage all hose stream coverage (1.5 inch diameter hose) is provided to all fire areas of the plant from nections to fixed 1.5 inch hose stations or by use of 2.5 inch diameter (or larger) hose with d wye connections available from outside hose houses.

erally, hose stations are equipped with 100 feet (maximum) of rubber lined, synthetic woven, eted fire hose with an adjustable spray shut-off nozzle. In isolated cases an additional 50 foot th of 1.5 inch diameter hose may be used.

cable spreading area has 1.5 inch continuous flow hose reels equipped with 100 feet of rubber e, located throughout. These reels will be fed from a fire department connection located in the h outside wall. These reels will enhance the ability to fight cable tray fires.

3.2 Portable Extinguishers ction and placement of portable fire extinguishers are in accordance with the intent of the delines of NFPA Standard Number 10, Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers. All nguishers utilized are Underwriters Laboratory (UL) listed.

4 FIRE DETECTION AND ALARM SYSTEMS fire detection and alarm systems installed in the plant are designed in general compliance h NFPA Standard Number 72D, Standard for the Installation, Maintenance and Use of prietary Protective Signaling Systems.

detection systems are used for early warning detection and may have the capability to actuate d fire suppression systems.

ection devices consist of heat detectors, smoke detectors and flame detectors. In addition, a pling type incipient fire detection system (IFD) is installed in the cable spreading room.

heat detectors are rate compensated or line (Main Transformers only) type units. Smoke ctors are of the spot type, employing either the ionization or photoelectric principle. Flame ctors are of the ultra-violet type. Specific application of these detectors in each fire area is iled in Section 5.

eneral, the location of detector units is in accordance with the intent of the guidelines set forth FPA Standard Number 72E, Standard on Automatic Fire Detectors.

ices are arranged to transmit signals to a local building alarm panel and a fixed suppression em control panel, if applicable. With the exception of devices associated with actuation, als are then transmitted through the local alarm panels to the main fire protection panel in the trol room. Trouble signals for these devices are transmitted in a similar manner.

alarm system also monitors other miscellaneous fire protection system features such as main 2 tank pressure and level, CO2 system master valve positions, and preaction sprinkler system pressure.

main fire alarm system is designed on the multiplex/ethernet connectivity signaling concept.

central control and receiving equipment is located in the control room and consists of a tral processing computer unit (CPU), a monitor, a keyboard, and a printer. All fire alarm, ction and trouble signals for the entire plant are monitored by this unit.

central multiplex/processing units are powered by a reliable electrical supply and has an pendent standby battery supply.

VENTILATION CAPABILITIES FOR SMOKE REMOVAL 1 PORTABLE SMOKE REMOVAL table smoke removal equipment is strategically located in the plant for use by the fire brigade.

equipment consists of portable educator type fans, accordion style portable ducts, power nsion cords and door casing hangers for fans.

2 FIXED VENTILATION SYSTEMS tion 9.4 of the FSAR describes fixed ventilation systems provided in each plant building as of the basic design. These ventilation systems may be used for smoke or CO2 removal to litate fire fighting operation and to supplement fire brigade portable smoke removal efforts.

ed ventilation systems may not be available for use in any particular building or fire area ause of operating restrictions (airborne radiological contamination) or mechanical restrictions dampers closed in ventilation ductwork or HEPA filters clogged by products of combustion).

en these situations occur, plant operating procedures or fire brigade preplan actions govern the vities required to remove or control smoke.

ACCESS AND EGRESS ROUTES ergency access and egress routes are established and indicated accordingly throughout the

t. These routes provide personnel egress and access for fire fighting purposes and for vement through the plant for safe shutdown operations.

) Class B 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> fire rating.

ome normally unoccupied buildings and enclosures, open stairwells are used. Areas with open on-rated stairwells are the containment structure, engineered safety features building, main m valve enclosure, turbine building, auxiliary building central stairwell and fuel building hwest corner stairwell.

rwell locations are shown on the Fire Hazards Analysis Drawings (Figures 77A-77D).

EMERGENCY LIGHTING SYSTEMS ion lighting assures adequate lighting during all operating conditions, accident conditions, sients, fire, and the loss of offsite power. The systems provide, as a minimum, lighting nsities at levels recommended by the Illuminating Engineering Society Lighting Handbook.

mination is provided in accordance with OSHA requirements for all exit facilities and means gress. Exit signs are illuminated by normal AC and DC systems. Lighting is provided ediately outside any exit.

undant lighting systems, both AC and DC, are physically and electrically separated.

station lighting design is based on previously approved plants with satisfactory operating erience.

ion lighting contains three separate systems.

1. Normal AC lighting system is supplied from the normal (i.e., black) 480 VAC motor control centers (FSAR Section 8.3.1) through dry-type 480/208-120 VAC lighting transformers rated both one-and three-phase. This system provides general plant area lighting.
2. Essential AC lighting system is supplied from the emergency (i.e., orange or purple) 480 VAC motor control centers (FSAR Section 8.3.1) through 480/208-120 VAC, three-phase, dry-type voltage regulating transformers which are qualified as isolation devices. The output of the isolation transformers, although black, is run exclusively in conduit and does not share raceways with normal black power, emergency power, or with black power that originates from an isolation transformer supplied from the opposite emergency bus. The output of the isolation transformer is protected by a circuit breaker. This system provides lighting for the control room, the emergency switchgear rooms (including the auxiliary shutdown panel), and other safety-related and vital areas required to bring the plant to safe shutdown. In addition, access and egress paths for personnel evacuation throughout the station are provided with lighting from this system. The essential AC lighting operates continuously, with the exception of the lighting in

generator) as discussed in FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.3.

3. The DC lighting system consists of 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, self-contained, sealed battery packs.

Most battery packs are supplied with a trickle charge via the essential AC lighting system (FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2) which, in the event of a loss of off site power, is supplied automatically from the emergency generator (FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.3). In some areas of the plant, these battery packs are supplied with a trickle charge via the normal ac lighting system (FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.1). The DC lighting system operates upon the loss of the essential or normal AC lighting system (FSAR Sections 9.5.3.2(1) and 9.5.3.2(1)). Upon energization of the essential or normal AC lighting system (FSAR Sections 9.5.3.2(1)) and 9.5.3.2(1)), the DC Emergency lighting extinguishes. The DC lighting system is sufficient to provide emergency lighting to perform essential tasks to bring the plant to cold shutdown.

The DC lighting system provides lighting for the control room, emergency switchgear rooms (including the auxiliary shutdown panel), other safety-related and vital areas, and in access and egress paths for personnel evacuation throughout the station.

DC lighting with 8-hour self-contained sealed battery packs are also installed inside the MP3 SBO (AAC) diesel and switchgear enclosures for access/egress and operation of equipment from the control board. The MP3 SBO diesel generator is credited to supply MP2 with alternate AC power in the event of a fire in specifically identified Unit 2 Appendix R fire areas.

In addition, this lighting is supplemented with the Millstone Station Security Lighting for outdoor access/egress routes, and access to the Appendix R equipment cage in Warehouse Building Number 435. The security lighting system is also credited for MP3 operations personnel access/egress yard area routes to the MP3 SBO (AAC) diesel and switchgear enclosures. Access is required to start the diesel and energize the 4160 volt tie to MP2 in the event of a MP2 Appendix R fire in certain areas.

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS iable communication systems for intraplant and intrasite communication meet the uirements of operation and maintenance of the unit during fire emergency. Multiple munication systems ensure the capability to notify the necessary personnel of the presence of nsafe condition so that corrective measures can be taken.

se communication systems provide effective communications between plant personnel in key rating vital areas during the full spectrum of accident or incident conditions (including fire) er maximum equipment operating noise levels. Design of these systems is based on previously ewed plants with satisfactory operating experience.

multi-frequency UHF handheld radios, UHF radio pagers, and associated repeaters. The one munication system that remains effective for any Unit 3 fire scenario is the radio system.

nnels 1, 2 and 3 are utilized by the Site Fire Brigade.

1 VOICE PAGING SYSTEM intraplant voice paging system provides communications from the control room to all dings and control areas within the unit, and through interface with the Southern New England phone Company (SNETCO) switching network, from any one control area to any other. The aplant voice paging system is an independent system using separate amplifiers and speakers at h paging station. Public address units are provided in all buildings which comprise the unit and he outside areas surrounding the unit. Access to voice paging speakers is provided and ated by dialing a code number from any dial telephone. The control room has priority access he public address system. This access bypasses the switched network.

2 MAINTENANCE JACK SYSTEM maintenance jack system, used for calibration and maintenance, consists of amplifiers, dsets, handsets, and a network of plug-in jack type receptacles with five-party selector tches located throughout the unit.

3 SOUND-POWERED PHONE sound-powered phone system provides voice communication among the main control room the auxiliary shutdown panel and vital operating areas throughout the plant for purposes of fighting, and shutting the plant down.

4 UHF SYSTEM trunked 800 MHz radio system supports plant operations and fire fighting activities. The em uses a base station located in the CPF (Building 212). The trunking repeaters and one nna system along with the trunking central controllers are installed in Building 127. The UHF put of the base station is 35 watts and the UHF output of the repeating station is 75 watts. The vidual portable radios are also equipped with a small antenna (5 watts output) which provides dditional talk-around feature between portable radios. The radio console is able to access ugh the use of the control base station antenna similar but separate UHF radio repeater ems of the other units at Millstone, as well as site security, for emergency operations.

cables in the communication systems are independent from those of other systems and are lded or isolated from power cables and any other sources of line noise which could adversely ct the audibility of the systems. The communication systems use twisted, balanced audio pairs urther reduce the effect of longitudinally induced noise.

5 HARDWIRE INTERCOM SYSTEM ween the three control rooms there is a hardwire intercom system providing communication ability between any of the three control rooms.

ision 3406/30/21 Manual Dry Pipe Automatic Preaction Automatic Manual tomatic Wet Pipe Sprinkler Sprinkler System Waterspray Waterspray ary Boiler Enclosure Emergency Generator Turbine Building Station Transformers Auxiliary Building Enclosures (Elevation Generator Bearing (7) Filters (Elevation 24 feet 6 inches) Enclosures (Elevation 66 feet 6 inches and 64 feet 6 inches) 79 feet 8 inches)

Turbine Building

1. Lube Oil Reservoir and Conditioner (Elevation 38 feet 6 inches) ary Building (Water Curtain 2. Hydrogen Seal Oil Technical Support

) (Elevation 24 feet 6 inches) Unit (Elevation Center-Filter 14 feet 6 inches) (Elevation 28 feet 6 inches) nment Electrical Penetration 3. Main Feedwater ystem (Elevation 24 feet Pumps and Lube es and 45 feet 6 inches) Oil Piping (Elevation 64 feet MPS-3 FPER 6 inches) l Building General Support Area tion 64 feet 6 inches) nsate Polishing Facility tion 28 feet 6 inches and 50 feet es)

Disposal Building Solid Waste e Building (including the nsate Polishing Enclosure) l Areas Below Operating Floor 4-14

ision 3406/30/21 atic Operation / Total Automatic Operation / Manual Operation / Local Flood Manual Operation / Total Flood Local Application Application/Total Flood il Vaults - Adjacent to Control Building - East and West Auxiliary Boiler Enclosure Turbine Building - Alternator /

(below grade) Switchgear Areas (Elevation 4 feet Fuel Oil Pump Pit Exciter Bearings and Casing 6 inches) (Elevation 25 feet 0 inches) Enclosure (Elevation 64 feet 6 inches)

Service Building - North and South Cable Tunnels (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches)

Service Building - Normal Switchgear Area (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches)

Auxiliary Building - East and West MCC/Rod Control Areas (Elevations 4 feet 6 inches, 24 feet 6 inches and 45 feet 6 inches)

Control Building - Cable Spreading Room (Elevation 24 feet 6 inches)

MPS-3 FPER 4-15

figure indicated above represents an engineering controlled drawing that is Incorporated by erence in the MPS-3 FSAR. Refer to the List of Effective Figures for the related drawing ber and the controlled plant drawing for the latest revision.

EVALUATION CRITERIA evaluation of fire protection for Millstone 3 ascertains that it does provide reasonable rance that a fire will not cause an unacceptable risk to public health and safety, does not vent the performance of necessary safe shutdown functions, and does not significantly increase risk of radioactive release to the environment. Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-1 vides specific guidelines used to review the fire protection program for an operating plant and, never applicable, these guidelines have been addressed. However, though specific BTP EB 9.5-1 guidelines indicate particular provisions for fire protection, the adequacy of the fire ection program is based on the effects of potential fire hazards throughout the plant. To vide broader guidelines for the evaluation, additional criteria were selected to serve as the s for the overall evaluation. These criteria are described below.

1. General Design Criterion 3 (10 CFR 50, Appendix A) - Fire Protection:

Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions. Noncombustible and heat resistant materials shall be used wherever practical throughout the unit, particularly in locations such as the containment and control room. Fire detection and fighting systems of appropriate capacity and capability shall be provided and designed to minimize the adverse effects of fires on structures, systems, and components important to safety. Fire fighting systems shall be designed to assure that their rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly impair the safety capability of these structures, systems, and components.

2. Defense-in-Depth Criterion: For each fire hazard, a suitable combination of fire prevention, fire detection and suppression capability, and ability to withstand safely the effects of a fire is provided. Both equipment and procedural aspects of each are considered.
3. Single-Failure Criterion: No single active failure shall result in complete loss of protection of both the primary and backup fire suppression capability.
4. Fire Suppression System Capacity and Capability: Fire suppression capability is provided, with capacity adequate to extinguish any fire that can credibly occur and have adverse effects on equipment and components important to safety.
5. Backup Fire Suppression Capability: Total reliance for fire protection is not placed on a single automatic fire suppression system. Appropriate backup fire suppression capability is provided.
6. Acceptability of Manual Fire Suppression: If it can be shown that safe-shutdown capability is independent of any credible fire, manual fire fighting capability is sufficient to protect safety related systems.

different cable trays. There is complete separation, with either barrier or space, between trains and channels of redundant circuits, which agrees with Regulatory Guide 1.75, Rev. 1, dated January 1975. Electrical separation requirements between 1E cables and non-1E cables (either in a cable tray or free air) have been reduced from the distances specified in Regulatory Guide 1.75, Rev. 1, by means of a testing program. Fire barriers that include cable tray covers and cable wraps have been installed as required by Regulatory Guide 1.75 or where testing results demonstrated their adequacy for reduced separation requirements between 1E and non-1E cables. Any cable trays that are directly placed under a grating will have a cover on it. Suitable fire shields have been provided at common mode hazards to both safety systems. Some cable trays within the containment have noncombustible covers.

Fire stops are provided where cables pass through fire rated floors and walls.

Samples of all safety-related power cable (including 8-kV, 5-kV, and 1-kV cables),

1,000 volt control cable, 600 volt instrument cable, and triaxial cable have been tested and, as a minimum, meet IEEE Standard 383, Type Test of Class IE Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections to Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Non safety-related cable jackets are of flame retardant material, and fillers are flame retardant and non-wicking.

To the extent possible, cable construction that does not give off corrosive gases while burning is used; however, the fire retardant characteristics of the cables are accomplished by the addition of halogens.

FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS METHOD protection was evaluated by conducting a fire hazard analysis. If a deficiency with respect to requirements of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 was identified, its disposition was based on the fire hazard lysis and the criteria for the overall evaluation.

ore detailed description of the analysis method is given in the following summary:

1. Plant design features related to fire safety were determined. These include the overall plant layout, type, and location of combustible materials, type of construction and its fire resistant characteristics, fire detection and fire suppression systems, separation distance, etc.
2. Areas containing equipment and components important to safety were identified.

These areas and adjacent areas with fire hazard potential were subdivided into fire areas and zones within areas on the basis of existing boundary fire barriers and other logical physical divisions or equipment groupings. For each fire area/zone, the following were determined:

cable insulation, oil, charcoal, and other identifiable combustibles including transients.

Total heat potential is calculated by summing the heat potential contribution for each type of combustible within a fire area/zone. Heat potential is calculated by multiplying the quantity of a particular combustible by that combustibles heat of combustion and dividing by the fire area/zone floor area. A combustible that has its heat potential calculated by this method is considered an ordinary combustible.

b. Fire severity is determined by the material burned and its rate of burning.

To evaluate the fire resistance needed for any fire barrier, a fire severity (duration) is developed for each area. Severity is measured in terms of temperature and fire duration. Once the total heat potential (Btu/ft2) of an area or zone has been computed and has been corrected to be equivalent to wood, an equivalent fire severity may be determined.

To determine an equivalent fire severity, Table 6-6A, Estimated Fire Severity for Offices and Light Commercial Occupancies, National Fire Protection Association, Fire Protection Handbook, Seventeenth Edition, has been adopted for this analysis.

c. Safety related equipment and safe shutdown equipment and systems in the area.
d. Fire detection and suppression systems.
e. Fire barrier boundaries.
3. For each area/zone, the adequacy of existing fire detection and fire suppression systems was evaluated considering the combustibility of materials, potential ignition sources, and the concentration of combustible materials.
4. Plant features were evaluated that impact directly or indirectly on the plant fire brigades ability to reach and effectively fight credible fires.
5. Drainage for water from fire suppression was assessed for adequacy and operability of safety related and safe-shutdown related equipment.

specific analysis results for each fire area or zone are given in Section 5.5.

ANSI/ASTM E 119, Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials NFPA 251 Standard Time-Temperature Curves are representative of the severity of a fire pletely burning out a brick, wood-joisted building and its contents.

FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS fire hazard analysis was based on the following assumptions:

1. Fire areas were established as defined in Section 5.4.
2. Fire zones were established as defined in Section 5.4.
3. Floor area calculations assume that the entire floor area within the boundaries, as defined by exterior walls or other accepted divisions, is available for fire loading.

Obstructions within a given fire area, such as equipment or rooms that do not extend to the above floor elevation, are available for fire loading and, therefore, the surface area of these obstructions is included in the floor area calculation. The areas occupied by interior walls and columns (except in remote occurrences) are considered negligible. Stairwells and elevators are excluded from the floor area calculation.

4. Complete combustion of all the in-situ and transient combustible contents of a fire area was postulated.
5. All cable trays are assumed filled to the maximum allowable depth.
6. Transient combustibles are identified as those combustibles not normally considered in-situ but assumed to be within an area for maintenance purposes.

Normally, the quantity of transient combustibles is based on complete change out of lubricating/ hydraulic oil, charcoal, and resins. For areas containing replaceable resins and/or charcoal, one 55 gallon container of each, as applicable, is assumed to be in the area. For areas containing replaceable oils, quantity is determined by the amount of in situ oil and the logical container(s) in which the oil would be transported. Transient oils fire loading contribution are calculated as ordinary combustibles instead of by the rate of burning method (Sections 5.2 and 5.5).

7. Elimination of the fire hazard (or sufficient limitation of sphere of influence) is an acceptable method of providing fire protection.
8. The adequacy of fire doors and dampers or other protected penetrations of fire area boundaries is based on the design and rating of the door or damper compared to the rating of the penetrated boundary. A 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating has been used as a general guideline for the rating of barriers. Enclosures, especially shielding walls, without openings could have significantly higher ratings. Protection of openings is qualified to the required fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> or less.
9. Resins that are stored in steel tanks are not considered combustible.
11. 11.BTP CMEB 9.5-1 requires that interior finishes should be noncombustible or listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, such as Factory Mutual or Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., for flame spread, smoke, and fuel contribution of 25 or less in its use configuration (ASTM E-84 Test, Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials). Finishes in this context are not directed at paint or coating systems for walls and equipment since these items do not normally constitute an appreciable fire loading. Paint is considered in the fire hazard analysis as part of the negligible fire loading.
12. All motors are metal except for winding insulation and bearing lubricant. The winding insulation consists of mica and resins. The mica is nonflammable. The resins may burn if ignited, but they require high temperatures. The total amount of resin in a motor is about 2 percent by weight. The amount of bearing lubricant in a motor is small. On these bases, they are considered in the fire hazard analysis as part of the negligible fire loading.
13. All insulation and replaceable filter media are listed by the Underwriters Laboratories and has a flame spread rating of not more than 25. Flame spread rating is in accordance with ASTM E-84. For this reason insulation and filter media are considered in the fire hazard analysis as part of the negligible fire loading.
14. Office areas are assumed to have a fire loading of 6 psf (heat potential of 48,000 Btu/ft2).
15. The condensate polishing facility records storage area is assumed to have a fire loading of 17.9 psf (heat potential of 143,200 Btu/ft2).

FIRE AREAS AND ZONES plant arrangement is divided into fire areas and fire zones for purposes of conducting the fire ard analysis and the safe shutdown evaluation. Fire areas are defined as plant areas bounded ire-rated assemblies of either 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated construction or lesser fire resistance as specifically tified and justified in the fire hazards analysis. Fire zones are zones within fire areas that are d to more thoroughly describe the fire area. Fire zones may or may not be bounded by fire d construction. The safe shutdown evaluation relies only on fire areas to determine the effects ire on safe shutdown.

ures 77A through 77F show this division and serve as reference for the fire hazard analyses tained in Section 5.5.

s section presents the fire hazard analysis for each fire area.

er the heading, Combustible Loading, the following explanations are presented:

1. Oil fire calculations are based on depth of spill and burning rate of 6 inches per hour if the oil can be logically contained and can achieve an appreciable depth; otherwise, the oil is treated as an ordinary combustible.

Oils from pumps, motors, reducers, compressors, hydraulically operated valves, and motor operated dampers are examples that would be calculated as an ordinary combustible.

Oils from tanks, large reservoirs, and oil filled transformers would normally be calculated by the rate of burning method.

2. The fire load calculation documents the fire load and duration determined for each area and zone. Calculated Fire Loading (Btu/ft2) and Fire Duration (hours and minutes) values are relative terms and represent approximations of fires involving the actual combustibles present at the various locations compared to the standard fire described in Section 5.2. To reflect the comparative nature of these values, the specific quantities of combustibles and the exact time of Fire Duration is represented by the relative Severity Classification and limiting values for Fire Loading, as follows:

Severity Classification Fire Loading Value (Btu/ft2)

Insignificant < 6,500 Low < 80,000 Moderate < 160,000 Moderately Severe < 240,000 Severe 240,000 or above

ANALYSIS 1 - Floor Area and Fuel Oil Pump Pit, Fire Area ABR-1, Zones A and B, Elevation 25 feet and 40 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary boiler enclosure is located south of the turbine building, east of the condensate polishing building, and north of the MP-2 condensate polishing facility. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

Fire Area ABR-1 is divided into two communicating fire zones:

Zone A - Boiler building floor area and equipment mezzanine Zone B - Fuel oil pump pit (northeast corner of Elevation 25 feet of Zone A)

JOR EQUIPMENT:

Non Safety Related Zone A Auxiliary Boiler Auxiliary Boiler Deaerator Auxiliary Boiler Condensate Receiver Auxiliary Boiler Condensate Pump Auxiliary Boiler Condensate Makeup Pump Auxiliary Boiler Feedwater Pump Auxiliary Boiler Blowdown Tank Auxiliary Boiler Blowdown Vent Condenser Steam to Water Heat Exchanger Winter Water Circulating Pump Summer Water Circulating Pump Hot Water Expansion Tank Hot Water Heating Makeup Pump Hot Water Heating Chemical Feed Tank Air Separator Auxiliary Boiler Fuel Oil Electric Heaters Auxiliary Boiler Chemical Feed Tank Cables Zone B:

Auxiliary Boiler Fuel Oil Pumps Cables

E PROTECTION Zone A - General Floor Area Suppression - Wet pipe automatic sprinkler protection at ceiling level.

Control room receives water flow alarm and valve tamper signal/local alarm sounds at Zone Panel Number 6F located in the turbine building - west wall (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches) 1.5 inch hose stations provided in area.

2.5 inch hose connections at 1.5 inch hose stations.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone rate compensated heat detector for actuation of local CO2 system. Control room receives smoke alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 6F located in the turbine building -

west wall (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches)

Zone B - Fuel Oil Pump Pit Suppression - Wet pipe automatic sprinkler protection at ceiling level provides partial coverage of pit.

Automatic operating CO2 system (local application).

System actuation alarm transmits to control room/local horn in Zone A upon discharge.

All other portable/manual extinguishing equipment same as Zone A.

Control room receives detection alarm/local alarm sounds at Zone Panel Number 6F located in the turbine building - west wall (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches) and outside of Zone A near the east access door.

Detection - Single zone rate compensated heat detector for actuation of local CO2 system.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B and 77C for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains in Zones A and B to oil separation system; 4 inch concrete dike around oil pump pit.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Zone A - 3,478 ft2 Zone B - 66 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation 480 V MCC Control Panels Fuel Oil*

Pump Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil

  • Zone B combustible VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) vere
  • 240,000 or above
  • The Severity Classification is due to the fuel oil pump pit which has an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> fire duration.

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault, or the ignition of spilled oil from the auxiliary boilers or the fuel oil pump pit.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 2 - North Floor Area, Fire Area AB-1, Zone A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary building is located north of the containment structure, east of the service building and west of the fuel and waste disposal buildings.

Fire Area AB-1, Zone A, involves the north portion of the elevation 4 feet 6 inches floor area and pipe tunnel pit. Fire Zone AB-1A communicates laterally with Fire Area AB-1, Zone B, and vertically with Fire Area AB-1, Zones C, D, E, and F. There is safe shutdown equipment in this zone.

JOR EQUIPMENT e Shutdown RWST Valves Cables Charging Pump Cooler A ety Related Cables safety Related Primary Drains Transfer Tank and Pumps Auxiliary Condensate Receiver and Pumps Boron Evaporator Bottoms Pumps and Cooler Boron Bottoms Coolant Preheater and Pumps Boron Evaporator Degasifier Feed Preheater Boron Evaporator Reboiler and Reboiler Pump Degasifier, Degasifier Trim Cooler, Recirculating Pumps and Recovery Exchangers Reactor Plant Component Cooling Chemical Addition Tank Instrument Transmitter Racks Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections located throughout this area.

Portable fire extinguishers are provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection in all areas with appreciable combustible loading.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building - west corridor (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains located throughout all floor areas.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 9,971 ft2 Combustible Material Control Panels Pump/Compressor Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil Rubber SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This fire zone does not comply with the specific requirements of Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. An alternative means of compliance is provided in a deviation request

submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J.F. Opeka to B.J. Youngblood, Letter B11761, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.b.(2) - Separation of Cables and Equipment A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J.F. Opeka to B. J.

Youngblood, Letter B11761, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

At the request of the NRC, a revised deviation request has been submitted to the NRC (J.

F. Opeka to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11814, dated October 21, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

Additional information was requested in a telecon dated October 30, 1985, between D.

Kubicki (NRC) and R. Joshi (NUSCO) and submitted to the NRC via a revised deviation request on November 4, 1985. (J. F. Opeka letter to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11852, dated November 4, 1985).

ANALYSIS 3 - South Floor Area, Fire Area AB-1 Zone B, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary building is located north of the containment structure, east of the service building, and west of the fuel and waste disposal buildings.

Fire Area AB-1B involves the south portion of elevation 4 feet 6 inches. floor area and communicates laterally with Fire Area AB-1, Zone A, and vertically with Fire Area AB-1, Zones C, D, E, and F. There is safe shutdown equipment in this zone.

JOR EQUIPMENT e Shutdown Valves Air Compressors Cables ety Related Microprocessor Nuclear Instrumentation Junction Boxes Cables safety Related Instrument Transmitting Racks Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections located throughout this area.

Portable fire extinguishers are provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection in all areas where appreciable combustible loading is present.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building west corridor (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77A for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains located throughout all floor areas.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 4,024 ft2 Combustible Material Compressor Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) ignificant < 6,500 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This fire zone does not comply with the specific requirements of Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. An alternative means of compliance is provided in a deviation request submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J.F. Opeka to B.J. Youngblood, Letter B11761, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.b.(2) - Separation of Cables and Equipment A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J.F. Opeka to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11761, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

At the request of the NRC, a revised deviation request has been submitted to the NRC (J.F.

Opeka to B.J. Youngblood, Letter B11814, dated October 21, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

Additional information was requested in a telecon dated October 30, 1985, between D.

Kubicki (NRC) and R. Joshi (NUSCO) and was submitted to the NRC via a revised deviation request on November 4, 1985. (J. F. Opeka letter to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11852, dated November 4, 1985.)

ANALYSIS 4 - East Floor Area, Fire Area AB-1, Zone C, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary building is located north of the containment structure, east of the service building and west of the fuel and waste disposal buildings.

Fire Area AB-1, Zone C, involves the east portion of the elevation 24 feet 6 inches floor area and communicates laterally with Fire Area AB-1, Zone D, and vertically with Fire Area AB-1, Zones A, B, E, and F. Areas AB-1C and AB-1D are located north of Fire Areas AB-5 and AB-6A (MCC/ROD control areas). There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Seal Water Injection Filters Reactor Coolant Filters Letdown Filter Seal Water Heat Exchanger Letdown Heat Exchanger Cables Safety Related Boric Acid Filter Mixed Bed Demineralizers Seal Water Return Filter Cation Bed Demineralizers Thermal Regeneration Demineralizers Letdown Reheat Heat Exchanger Letdown Chiller Heat Exchanger Moderating Heat Exchanger Cables

Non Safety Related Boron Evaporator Bottoms Filters Cesium Removal Ion Exchangers Fuel Pool Demineralizers and Post Filter Boron Recovery Filter Radioactive Liquid Waste Effluent Filters Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression for general area Fixed water curtain provided at south stairwell from filter and heat exchanger cubicle area.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections located throughout this area. Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection in all areas with appreciable combustible loading.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building - west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Drainage - Floor drains throughout all floor areas.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 3,040 square feet Combustible Material Cable Insulation Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil Clothing (cotton)

Plastic Rubber Fiberglass box

VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) w < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This fire zone does not comply with the specific requirements of Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. An alternative means of compliance is provided in a deviation request submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11761, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.b.(2) - Separation of Cables and Equipment A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

Youngblood, Letter B11761, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

At the request of the NRC, a revised deviation request has been submitted to the NRC (J.

F. Opeka to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11814, dated October 21, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

Additional information was requested in a telecon dated October 30, 1985, between D.

Kubicki (NRC) and R. Joshi (NUSCO) and was submitted to the NRC via a revised deviation request on November 4, 1985. (J. F. Opeka letter to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11852, dated November 4, 1985.)

ANALYSIS 5 - West Floor Area, Fire Area AB-1, Zone D, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary building is located north of the containment structure, east of the service building and west of the fuel and waste disposal buildings.

Fire Area AB-1, Zone D, involves the west portion of elevation 24 feet 6 inches floor area and communicates laterally with Fire Area AB-1, Zone C, and vertically with Fire Area AB-1, Zones A, B, E, and F. Areas AB-1C and AB-1D are located north of Fire Areas AB-5 and AB-6A (MCC/ROD control areas). There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Reactor Plant Component Cooling Pumps Reactor Plant Component Cooling Heat Exchangers Charging Pumps Charging Pump Cooling Pumps Charging Pump Cooler B Transfer Switch Cables Safety Related Cables Non Safety Related Degasifier Recovery Exchanger Degasifier Degasifier, Condenser, Feed Preheater and Trim Cooler Boron Evaporator Boron Distillate Pump and Cooler Motor Control Centers Cables

E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression for general area.

Closed head, wet pipe sprinkler system for water curtain protection located between charging pump cubicles and RPCCW pumps. This system also protects cable trays serving these pumps via closed heads above trays and heads below bottom tray for protection against transient combustibles. Fire stops are provided for cable trays adjacent to water curtain.

Fixed water curtain provided for charging pump cubicle pipe openings, charging pump cubicle ventilation supply ducts, the Boron Evaporator &

Reboiler Cubicle and open stairwells from elevation 4 feet 6 inches.

Control room receives water flow alarm for water curtain system/local alarm sounds at Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building -

west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections located throughout this area.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection in all areas with appreciable combustible loading.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building - west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains located throughout all floor areas.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 6,408 ft2

Combustible Material Cable Insulation 480 V MCC Pump Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil Plastic VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a lubricating oil or cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This fire zone does not comply with the specific requirements of Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. An alternative means of compliance is provided in a deviation request submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11761, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.b.(2) - Separation of Cables and Equipment A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

Youngblood, Letter B11761, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

At the request of the NRC, a revised deviation request has been submitted to the NRC (J.

F. Opeka to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11814, dated October 21, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

Additional information was requested in a telecon dated October 30, 1985, between D.

Kubicki (NRC) and R. Joshi (NUSCO) and was submitted to the NRC via a revised deviation request on November 4, 1985. (J. F. Opeka letter to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11852, dated November 4, 1985.)

ANALYSIS 6 - Floor Area, Fire Area AB-1, Zone E, Elevation 43 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary building is located north of the containment structure, east of the service building, and west of the fuel and waste disposal buildings.

Fire Area AB-1, Zone E, involves the entire open floor area of the elevation 43 feet 6 inches north of Fire Areas AB-5 and AB-6A (MCC/rod control areas). Fire Area AB-1, Zone E, communicates vertically with Fire Area AB-1, Zones F, A, B, C, and D. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Boric Acid Tanks Charging Pump Cooling Surge Tank MCC/Rod Control Area Booster Pumps Cables Safety Related Boric Acid Transfer Pumps Volume Control Tank Cables Non Safety Related Containment Vacuum Pumps Thermal Regeneration Chiller Chiller Starter Cabinet Sample Panel PC Package Chiller Chemical Mixing Tank Boron Recovery Panel Boron Distillate Tank Boron Evaporator Condenser Process Gas Refrigeration Skid Motor Control Centers Process Gas Charcoal Bed Adsorber Cables

E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression for general area.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections located throughout this area. Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection in all areas with appreciable combustible loading.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building - west corridor elevation 4 feet 6 inches.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77C and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains located throughout all floor areas.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 10,031 ft2 Combustible Material Lube Oil Cable Insulation 480 V MCC Control Panels Transient Lube Oil Transient Charcoal Clothing (cotton)

Plastic Rubber VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or switchgear fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This fire zone does not comply with the specific requirements of Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. An alternative means of compliance is provided in a deviation request submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11761, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.b.(2) - Separation of Cables and Equipment A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

Youngblood, Letter B11761, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

At the request of the NRC, a revised deviation request has been submitted to the NRC (J.

F. Opeka to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11814, dated October 21, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

Additional information was requested in a telecon dated October 30, 1985, between D.

Kubicki (NRC) and R.Joshi (NUSCO) and was submitted to the NRC via a revised deviation request on November 4, 1985. (J. F. Opeka letter to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11852, dated November 4, 1985.)

ANALYSIS 7 - Floor Area, Fire Area AB-1, Zone F, Elevation 66 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary building is located north of the containment structure, east of the service building, and west of the fuel and waste disposal buildings.

Fire Area AB-1, Zone F, involves the general open floor area of the elevation 66 feet 6 inches, and communicates vertically with Fire Area AB-1, Zones E, A, B, C, and D.

There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Reactor Plant Component Cooling Surge Tank Charging Pump and Component Cooling Pump Exhaust Fans Charging Pump and Component Cooling Pump Supply Fans Cables Safety Related Auxiliary Building Filter System and Exhaust Fan Fuel Building Filter System and Exhaust Fan Cables Non Safety Related Waste Disposal Exhaust Fans Auxiliary Building Exhaust Ventilation Fans Auxiliary Building Sample Room Exhaust Fan Containment Purge Air Supply Ventilation Unit Containment Purge Exhaust Fans Chiller Surge Tank Boric Acid Batching Tank Electrical Tunnel Exhaust Fan Fuel Building Exhaust Fan Cables

E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections located throughout this area. Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection in all areas with appreciable combustible loading.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building - west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77D and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas with the exception of the Supplemental Leak Collection Rate System (SLCRS) ductwork, which is enclosed in a one hour fire rated duct wrap.

The SLCRS ductwork penetrates the west fire wall extending from the A SLCRS filter cubicle to the Enclosure Building.

Refer to Appendix B, Section C.5.a.(4) for further information.

Drainage - Floor drains throughout all floor areas.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 11,334 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation Control Panel Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil Clothing (cotton)

Plastic Rubber

VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Insignificant < 6,500 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a minor cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This fire zone does not comply with the specific requirements of Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. An alternative means of compliance is provided in a deviation request submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J.F. Opeka to B.J. Youngblood, Letter B11761, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.b.(2) - Separation of Cables and Equipment A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

Youngblood, Letter B11761, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

At the request of the NRC, a revised deviation request has been submitted to the NRC (J.

F. Opeka to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11814, dated October 21, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

Additional information was requested in a telecon dated October 30, 1985, between D.

Kubicki (NRC) and R. Joshi (NUSCO) and was submitted to the NRC via a revised deviation request on November 4, 1985. (J. F. Opeka letter to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11852, dated November 4, 1985.)

ANALYSIS 8 - Fuel Building Filter Bank, Fire Area AB-2, Zone N/A, Elevation 66 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary building is located north of the containment structure, east of the service building, and west of the fuel and waste disposal buildings.

Fire Area AB-2 is located within, but physically separated from auxiliary building Fire Area 1-F, the general floor area of elevation 66 feet 6 inches, and below Fire Area AB-3.

There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safety Related Fuel Building Filter Assembly Cables Non Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression system for the fire area cubicle.

Manually operated, timed cycle, deluge water spray system within the filter unit for protection of charcoal filtration material.

Water flow alarms and valve tamper supervision provided with signals to control room and local Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

1.5 inch hose stations and 2.5 inch hose connections available in Fire Area AB-1F.

Detection - Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Single smoke detector at ceiling of fire area cubicle.

Heat detection system within the filtration unit. Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77D for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - No drains for cubicle. Manual internal water spray system drains for filter MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 711 ft2 Combustible Material Charcoal Filter Transient Charcoal VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderately Severe < 240,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a charcoal fire resulting from a transient ignition source or adsorbent radioactive decay heat.

NSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains in the Filter Cubicles A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 9 - Fuel Building Filter Bank, Fire Area AB-3, Zone N/A, Elevation 79 feet 8 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary building is located north of the containment structure, east of the service building, and west of the fuel and waste disposal buildings.

Fire Area AB-3 is located adjacent to auxiliary building Fire Area 1-F, the general floor area of elevation 66 feet 6 inches, and above Fire Area AB-2. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safety Related Fuel Building Filter Assembly Cables Non Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression system for the fire area cubicle.

Manually operated, timed cycle, deluge water spray system within the filter unit for protection of charcoal filtration material.

Water flow alarms and valve tamper supervision provided with signals to control room and local Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

1.5 inch hose stations and 2.5 inch hose connections available in Fire Area AB-1F. Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single smoke detector at ceiling of fire area cubicle.

Heat detection system within the filtration unit.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77D for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - No drains for cubicle. Manual internal water spray system drains for filter.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 711 ft2 Combustible Material Charcoal Filter Transient Charcoal VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderately Severe < 240,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a charcoal fire resulting from a transient ignition source or adsorbent radioactive decay heat.

NSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CEMB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains in the Filter Cubicles A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 10 - Auxiliary Building Filter Bank, Fire Area AB-9, Zone N/A, Elevation 66 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary building is located north of the containment structure, east of the service building, and west of the fuel and waste disposal buildings.

Fire Area AB-9 is located within but physically separated from auxiliary building Fire Area 1-F, the general floor area of elevation 66 feet 6 inches, and below Fire Area AB-10.

There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safety Related Auxiliary Building Filter Assembly Cables Non Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression system for the fire area cubicle.

Manually operated, timed cycle, deluge water spray system within the filter unit for protection of charcoal filtration material.

Water flow alarms and valve tamper supervision provided with signals to control room and local Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

1.5 inch hose stations and 2.5 inch hose connections available in Fire Area AB-1F.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single smoke detector at ceiling of fire area cubicle.

Heat detection system within the filtration unit.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inch).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77D for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - No drains for cubicle.

Manual internal water spray system drains for filter.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 711 ft2 Combustible Material Charcoal Filter Transient Charcoal VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderately Severe < 240,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a charcoal fire resulting from a transient ignition source or adsorbent radioactive decay heat.

NSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains in the Filter Cubicles A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 11 - Auxiliary Building Filter Bank, Fire Area AB-10, Zone N/A, Elevation 79 feet 8 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary building is located north of the containment structure, east of the service building, and west of the fuel and waste disposal buildings.

Fire Area AB-10 is located adjacent to auxiliary building Fire Area 1-F, the general floor area of elevation 66 feet 6 inches, and above Fire Area AB-9. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safety Related Auxiliary Building Filter Assembly Cables Non Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression system for the fire area cubicle.

Manually operated, timed cycle, deluge water spray system within the filter unit for protection of charcoal filtration material.

Water flow alarms and valve tamper supervision provided with signals to control room and local Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building (elevation 4 feet inches).

1.5 inch hose stations and 2.5 inch hose connections available in Fire Area AB-1F.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single smoke detector at ceiling of fire area cubicle. Heat detection system within the filtration unit.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77D for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire -rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - No drains for cubicle.

Manual internal water spray system drains for filter.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 711 ft2 Combustible Material Charcoal Filter Transient Charcoal VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderately Severe < 240,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a charcoal fire resulting from a transient ignition source or adsorbent radioactive decay heat.

NSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains in the Filter Cubicles.

A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 12 - Supplementary Leak Collection Filter Bank, Fire Area AB-11, Zone N/A, Elevation 66 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary building is located north of the containment structure, east of the service building, and west of the fuel and waste disposal buildings.

Fire Area AB-11 is located adjacent to auxiliary building Fire Area 1-F; the general floor area of elevation 66 feet 6 inches, and below Fire Area AB-12. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safety Related Supplementary Leak Collection and Release Filter Assembly and Fan Cables Non Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression system for the fire area cubicle.

Manually operated, timed cycle, deluge water spray system within the filter unit for protection of charcoal filtration material.

Water flow alarms and valve tamper supervision provided with signals to control room and local Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

1.5 inch hose stations and 2.5 inch hose connections available in Fire Area AB-1F.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single smoke detector at ceiling of fire area cubicle. Heat detection system within the filtration unit.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77D for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - No drains for cubicle.

Manual internal water spray system drains for filter.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 683 ft2 Combustible Material Charcoal Filter Transient Charcoal VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a charcoal fire resulting from a transient ignition source or adsorbent radioactive decay heat.

NSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains in the Filter Cubicles.

A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 13 - Supplementary Leak Collection Filter Bank, Fire Area AB-12, Zone N/A, Elevation 78 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary building is located north of the containment structure, east of the service building, and west of the fuel and waste disposal buildings.

Fire Area AB-12 is located adjacent to auxiliary building Fire Area 1-F; the general floor area of elevation 66 feet 6 inches, and above Fire Area AB-11. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safety Related Supplementary Leak Collection and Release Filter Assembly and Fan Cables Non Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression system for the fire area cubicle.

Manually operated, timed cycle, deluge water spray system within the filter unit for protection of charcoal filtration material.

Water flow alarms and valve tamper supervision provided with signals to control room and local Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

1.5 inch hose stations and 2.5 inch hose connections available in Fire Area AB-1F and AB-8.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single smoke detector at ceiling of fire area cubicle. Heat detection system within the filtration unit.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77D for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent areas with the exception of the Supplemental Leak Collection Rate System (SLCRS) ductwork, which penetrates the east wall. The SLCRS ductwork is enclosed in a one hour fire rated wrap with a three hour fire rated damper, which is located away from the fire wall penetration. Refer to Appendix B, Section C.5.a(4) for further information.

Drainage - No drains for cubicle.

Manual internal water spray system drains for filter.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 683 ft2 Combustible Material Charcoal Filter Transient Charcoal VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a charcoal fire resulting from a transient ignition source or adsorbent radioactive decay heat.

NSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains in the Filter Cubicles.

A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 14 - East MCC and Rod Control Area, Fire Area AB-5, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches, 24 feet 6 inches, and 43 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary building is located north of the containment structure, east of the service building and west of the fuel and waste disposal buildings.

Fire Area AB-5 is south of Fire Area AB-1A on elevation 4 feet 6 inches, south of Fire Areas AB-1C and AB-1D on elevation 24 feet 6 inches and south of Fire Area AB-1E on elevation 43 feet 6 inches There is safe shutdown equipment in this area. Hose reel is provided near shaft to electrical tunnel at elevation 24 feet 6 inches and supplied by adjacent hose station.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Emergency Load Center Motor Control Center Distribution and Isolation Panels Cables Safety Related Distribution Panels Radiation Microprocessor and Monitors Cables Non Safety Related Motor Control Center Transformers Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - Manual actuation total flooding CO2 suppression system. CO2 can be actuated at the local Chemetron CO2 control panel located in the Auxiliary Building elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

1.5 inch hose stations and 2.5 inch hose connections available in Fire Areas AB-1C and AB-1E.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Cross zoned smoke detection is located in this area.

Manual pull stations that activate the CO2 system are located at the entrance to the area. Detection circuits are arranged to transmit a signal to the control room, to Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches) and to the Chemetron local control panel located in the auxiliary building (elevation 24 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A, 77B, and 77C for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent Fire Areas.

Drainage - None MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Elevation 4 feet 6 inches: 233 square feet Elevation 24 feet 6 inches: 1,678 square feet Elevation 45 feet 6 inches: 1,678 square feet Combustible Material Cable Insulation (1)

Cable Insulation (2) 480 V Load Centers (2) 480 V MCC (2)

Control Panels (2)

Cable Insulation (3) 480 V Load Centers (3) 480 V MCC (c) 4 feet 6 inches 24 feet 6 inches 45 feet 6 inches

VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Severe 240,000 or above Moderately Severe < 240,000 Moderately Severe < 240,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or switchgear fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains in the East MCC and Rod Control Area A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c.(4) - Hose Stations A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J.F. Opeka to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11769, dated October 7, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 15 - West MCC and Rod Control Area, Fire Area AB-6, Zone A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches, 24 feet 6 inches and 43 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary building is located north of the containment structure, east of the service building, and west of the fuel and waste disposal buildings.

Fire Area AB-6, Zone A, is located south and west of Fire Area AB-1A and north and west of Fire Area AB-1, Zone B on elevation 4 feet 6 inches; south and west of Fire Area AB-5 on elevation 24 feet 6 inches and elevation 45 feet 6 inches This zone communicates directly to Fire Area AB-6, Zone B, through an open shake space area.

There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Emergency Load Center Motor Control Center Distribution and Isolation Panels Reactor Trip Cabinets Cables Safety Related Distribution Panels Radiation Microprocessor and Monitors Cables Non Safety Related Motor Control Center E PROTECTION Suppression - Manual actuation total flooding CO2 suppression system.

CO2 can be actuated at the local Chemetron CO2 control panel located in the Auxiliary Building elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

Hose stream coverage for this zone is provided by 2.5 inch hose with gated wye connection and 100 feet of 1.5 inch hose located in the hose house south of the main steam valve enclosure. Hose reel is provided near shaft to

electrical tunnel at elevation 24 feet 6 inches and supplied by adjacent hose station.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Cross zoned smoke detection is located in this area.

Manual pull stations that activate the CO2 system are located at the entrances to the area. Detection circuits are arranged to transmit a signal to the control room, to Zone Panel Number 2E located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches) and to the Chemetron local control panel located in the auxiliary building (elevation 24 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A, 77B, and 77C for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - None MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Elevation 4 feet 6 inches: 233 square feet Elevation 24 feet 6 inches: 2,411 square feet Elevation 45 feet 6 inches: 2,411 square feet Combustible Material Cable Insulation (1)

Cable Insulation (2) 480 V Load Centers (2) 480 V MCC (2)

Control Panels (2)

Cable Insulation (3) 480 V Load Centers (3)

Control Panel 3 (3) 480 V MCC (3) 4 feet 6 inches 24 feet 6 inches 45 feet 6 inches

VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Severe 240,000 or above Moderate < 160,000 Moderate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or switchgear fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains in the West MCC and Rod Control Area A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c.(4) - Hose Stations A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J.F. Opeka to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11769, dated October 7, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 16 - West MCC/Rod Control Air Conditioning Unit Room, Fire Area AB-6, Zone B, Elevation 66 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary building is located north of the containment structure, east of the service building, and west of the fuel and waste disposal buildings.

Fire Area AB-6, Zone B, involves air conditioning equipment associated with the west MCC/rod control room (Fire Area AB-6A). This area is located at elevation 66 feet 6 inches, and communicates via an open shake space to Fire Area AB-6, Zone A, below.

There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Air Conditioning Unit Cables Non Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression system.

1.5 inch hose station and 2.5 inch hose connection available in this area.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection provides general area coverage. Detection alarm transmits to the control room. Local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 2E located in the Service Building west corridor, elevation 4 feet 6 inches.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77D for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains provided.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 499 ft2 VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Insignificant < 6,500 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is ignition of fan motor or electrical cable from an electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 17 - East MCC/Rod Control Air Conditioning Unit Room, Fire Area AB-8, Zone N/A, Elevation 66 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The auxiliary building is located north of the containment structure, east of the service building, and west of the fuel and waste disposal buildings.

Fire Area AB-8 involves air conditioning equipment associated with the east MCC/rod control room (Fire Area AB-5). This area located on elevation 66 feet 6 inches, adjacent to Fire Area AB-1, Zone F, and Fire Area AB-6, Zone B. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Air Conditioning Unit Cables Non Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression system.

1.5 inch hose station and 2.5 inch hose connections available in Fire Area AB-6B.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection provides general area coverage. Detection alarm transmits to the control room. Local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 2E located in the Service Building west corridor, elevation 4 feet 6 inches.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77D for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains provided.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 444 ft2 VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Insignificant < 6,500 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is ignition of fan motor or electrical cable from an electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 18 - Boron Recovery Tank Enclosure, Fire Area BRT-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The boron recovery tank enclosure is located 20 feet south of the reserve transformers and approximately 200 feet east of the waste disposal building. This area is located adjacent to the pipe tunnel leading to the waste disposal building Fire Area WDB-1A (elevation 4 feet 6 inches). There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Boron Recovery Tanks E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression system.

2.5 inch hose streams available from outside hose houses approximately 150 feet distant.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - None SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77B for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

The 18 foot high concrete wall surrounding the boron recovery tanks provides a degree of protection from a fire originating outside to BRT-1.

Drainage - An 18 foot high concrete wall surrounds BRT-1 on all sides and is designed to contain the inventory of the boron recovery tanks in the event of tank rupture.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 2,555 ft2

VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Insignificant < 6,500 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an exposure fire from the oil-filled reserve station transformers (Fire Areas XR-5 and XR-6) or the SBO Diesel Enclosure, both adjacent to BRT-1.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 19 - North Floor Area, Sodium Hypochloride Room and Service Water Valve Access Enclosure, Fire Area CSW-1, Zones A, B, and C, Elevation 14 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The circulating and service water pumphouse is located on the southwest corner of the site, approximately 350 feet to the west of the condensate polishing facility.

Fire Area CSW-1 involves three distinct zones:

Zone A - North Floor Area; Zone B - Sodium Hypochloride Room; Zone C - Service Water Valve Access Enclosure.

There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety Related Zone A - Circulating Water Pumps Circulating Service Water Pumphouse Fans Screen Wash Strainers and Pumps Cables Zone B - Chlorinator and Eductor Evaporator Residual Chlorine Analyzer Chlorination Water Booster Pump Zone C - Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - All Zones - No fixed suppression systems.

1.5 inch and 2.5 inch hoses provided from outside hose house located against outside north wall of Zone A.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Zone A - Single zone smoke detectors provided for all areas with appreciable combustible loading.

Alarms transmitted to control room/local alarms to Zone Panel Number 7A located in the control building elevation 4 feet 6 inches.

Zone B - No detection Zone C - No detection.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains discharge to ocean.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Zone A - 3,023 square feet Zone B - 275 square feet Zone C - 248 square feet Combustible Material Cable Insulation Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil Control Panel (1)

VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Zone A - Low < 80,000 Zone B - Insignificant < 6,500 Zone C - Insignificant < 6,500 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire in Zone A is a cable insulation or switchgear fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault. There is no postulated fire in Zones B and C due to the negligible combustible loading.

Zone B combustible.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c.(4) - Hose Sections A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

Youngblood, Letter B11769, dated October 7, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.b.(2) - Separation of Cables and Equipment A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W. G. Counsil to B. J.

Youngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423). (Revised March 10, 1986, to reflect present plant conditions.)

ANALYSIS 20 - South Floor Area, Fire Area CSW-2, Zone N/A, Elevation 14 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The circulating and service water pumphouse is located on the southwest corner of the site approximately 350 feet to the west of the condensate polishing facility.

Fire Area CSW-2 involves the entire south floor area and houses screens for filtering incoming seawater for service and circulating pumps. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety Related Fish Troughs Traveling Water Screens Trash Cart Traversing Trash Rake Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch and 2.5 inch hoses available from hydrant, hose house, and hose cart located at a yard hydrant adjacent to the condensate polishing facility.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors located in areas above cable trays only.

Alarms transmit to the control room/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 7A located in the control building elevation 4 feet 6 inches.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains discharge to ocean.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 4,037 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or switchgear fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c.(4) - Hose Stations A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

Youngblood, Letter B11769, dated October 7, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423). (Revised to reflect present plant conditions (March 10, 1986).)

ANALYSIS 21 - East Service Water Cubicle, Fire Area CSW-3, Zone N/A, Elevation 14 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The circulating and service water pumphouse is located on the southwest corner of the site, approximately 350 feet to the west of the condensate polishing facility.

Fire Area CSW-3 involves the east service water pump cubicle only. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Service Water Pumps Service Water Pumphouse Fans Motor Control Center - Emergency Cables Safety Related Service Water Self Cleaning Strainer Service Water Pump Strainer Cables Non Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch and 2.5 inch hoses provided from hose house located outside the north floor area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors cover entire area.

Alarms transmitted to control room/local alarms to Zone Panel Number 7A located in the control building elevation 4 feet 6 inches.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains discharge to ocean.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 923 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation 480 Volt MCC Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or switchgear fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area does not comply with the specific requirements of Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. An alternative means of compliance is provided in a deviation request submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W. G. Counsil to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c.(4) - Hose Stations A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

Youngblood, Letter B11769, dated October 7, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423). (Revised March 10, 1986, to reflect present plant conditions.)

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.b.(2) - Separation of Cables and Equipment A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 22 - West Service Water Cubicle, Fire Area CSW-4, Zone N/A, Elevation 14 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The circulating and service water pumphouse is located on the southwest corner of the site, approximately 350 feet to the west of the condensate polishing facility.

Fire Area CSW-4 involves the west service water pump cubicle only. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Service Water Pumps Service Water Pumphouse Ventilation Fans Motor Control Center - Emergency Cables Safety Related Service Water Self Cleaning Strainer Service Water Pump Strainer Cables Non Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch and 2.5 inch hoses provided from hose house located outside the north floor area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors cover entire area.

Alarms transmitted to control room/local alarms to Zone Panel Number 7A located in the control building elevation 4 feet 6 inches.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains discharge to ocean.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 923 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation 480 Volt MCC Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or switchgear fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area does not comply with the specific requirements of Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. An alternative means of compliance is provided in a deviation request submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W. G. Counsil to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c.(4) - Hose Stations A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

Youngblood, Letter B11769, dated October 7, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423). (Revised March 10, 1986, to reflect present plant conditions.)

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.b.(2) - Separation of Cables and Equipment A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 23 - Containment Structure, Fire Area RC-1, Zone N/A, Elevation

(-)24 feet 6 inches through 51 feet 4 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The containment structure is located south of the auxiliary building and fuel building, east of the engineering safety features building, and west of the main steam valve enclosure.

Fire Area RC-1 involves the entire containment area. elevation 51 feet 4 inches is the highest floor level in this structure. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Reactor Steam Generators Pressurizer Regenerative Heat Exchanger Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Safety Injection Accumulator Tank Process Instrumentation Cables Safety Related Cables Non Safety Related Reactor Coolant Pumps Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic closed head wet pipe sprinkler system for the containment electrical penetrations area. This is the only fixed sprinkler system in containment.

Water flow alarm provided with signal transmission to the control room/local alarm sounds at Zone Panel Number 1-B located in the auxiliary building elevation 45 feet 6 inches within Fire Area AB-6A.

Isolation valves on fire water line to the electrical penetrations area are monitored at the control room main fire protection panel and main control

board. The containment isolation valves are monitored at the main control board, and the sprinkler OS&Y isolation is monitored on the main fire protection panel.

1.5 inch hose stations and 2.5 inch hose connections provided on all floor elevations in the annulus area.

Portable fire extinguishers provided at entrance to containment structure in auxiliary building elevation 24 feet 6 inches when plant is operating.

During shutdown/refueling periods, portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 guidelines.

Detection - Single zone heat detectors located in the lowest level of containment and in reactor coolant pump cubicles.

Single zone smoke detection located in electrical penetrations area as well as the upper elevation of reactor containment in the annulus area except elevation 51 feet 4 inches.

Detection alarms transmit as described above in the suppression section SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A, 77B, 77C, 77D and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains provided at elevation 3 feet 8 inches and (-) 24 feet 6 inches.

Oil Collection System - The reactor coolant pumps are provided with a seismically designed oil collection system to contain the entire lube oil inventory for each pump.

Cable Trays - Silicone foam or metal bottoms are installed in selected trays for fire control in the annulus, elevation 3 feet 8 inches.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 15,394 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation Lube Oil Charcoal Transient Lube Oil Transient Charcoal Transient Resin

VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or lubricating oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area does not comply with the specific requirements of Section C.7.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. An alternative means of compliance is provided in a deviation request submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J.F. Opeka to B.J. Youngblood, Letter B11761, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

VIATIONS BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.a.(1)(b) - Separation of Cables and Equipment A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J.F. Opeka to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11761, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423). Approval documented in SSER4, December 9, 1985. The deviation is further clarified and defined in a letter to the NRC, B16607, from M. H. Brothers, dated November 13, 1997. Docket Number 50-423.

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(3) - Electrical Penetrations in Containment A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(5) - Containment Access Hatch A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.f. - Portable Fire Extinguishers in Containment A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 24 - West Switchgear Area, Fire Area CB-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The control building is located south of the emergency generator enclosure, west of the service building and north of the turbine building.

Fire Area CB-1 is located on the west half of the control building elevation 4 feet 6 inches and is adjacent to the redundant east switchgear area. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown 4.16 kV Switchgear 480 V Emergency Unit Substation Bus Emergency MCC Panel Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Air Conditioner (Main & Backup)

Transfer Panel Battery Charger Vital Bus Isolation Transformer Isolation Panel (Emergency)

Cables Safety Related Manual Bypass Switch Static Inverter Line Regulators Cables Non Safety Related 4.16 kV Switchgear Auxiliary Communication/Emergency Lighting Panel Cables 120 Volt Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)

E PROTECTION Suppression - Manual actuation total flooding CO2 suppression system. CO2 can be actuated at the local Chemetron CO2 panel located in the Service Building, East Corridor, elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

1.5 inch hose stations available in area.

2.5 inch hose connection available in technical support center elevation 26 feet 8 inches.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Cross zoned smoke detection is located in this area.

Detection circuits are arranged to transmit a signal to the control room, to the local Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches), and to the Chemetron panel located in the service building east corridor (elevation 24 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 5,395 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation 4160 Volt Switchgear 480 Volt Load Center 480 Volt MCC Control Panels Miscellaneous plastic Fiberglass box Batteries for 120 Volt UPS VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderately Severe < 240,000

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or switchgear fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A detailed deviation request package dealing with the absence of floor drains in the control building and the east and west emergency switchgear areas has been previously transmitted (W. G. Council to B. J. Youngblood letter dated March 23, 1984; FP-20, Switchgear Room Floor Drains). This deviation has been granted by the NRC.

An additional deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G.

Counsil to B.J. Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

LICENSE AMENDMENT License Amendment Number 227, issued September 22, 2005, approved a change to the Approved Fire Protection Program allowing the CSA CO2 system to be modified from automatic to manual actuation. Fire protection features in the switchgear rooms have been enhanced to provide additional assurance to Operations personnel that Fire Safe Shutdown activities can be accomplished safely in the event the CSA CO2 system is discharged.

These enhancements include a fixed air breathing system for use in a CO2 environment and CO2/O2 concentration monitoring equipment installed in the switchgear rooms.

ANALYSIS 25 - East Switchgear Area, Fire Area CB-2, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The control building is located south of the emergency generator enclosure, west of the service building and north of the turbine building.

Fire Area CB-2 is located on the east half of the control building elevation 4 feet 6 inches and is adjacent to the redundant west switchgear area. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown 4.16 kV Switchgear 480 Volt Emergency Unit Substation Bus Emergency MCC Panel Air Conditioner (main & backup)

Transfer Panel Battery Charger Vital Bus Isolation Transformer Isolation Panel (Emergency)

Cables Safety Related Manual Bypass Switch Static Inverter Line Regulators Cables Non Safety Related 4.16 kV Switchgear Static Inverter Battery Charger Transformers Electrical Panels Cables

E PROTECTION Suppression - Manual actuation total flooding CO2 suppression system. CO2 can be actuated at the local Chemetron CO2 control panel located in the Service Building, East Corridor, elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

1.5 inch hose stations and 2.5 inch hose connections available in the service building (elevation 4 feet 6 inches) hallway between the Normal Swgr and East Swgr Areas and at Service Building (elevation 24 feet 6 inches).

2.5 inch hose lines available from yard hydrants northwest and southwest of the control building (approximately 200 foot distance).

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Cross zoned smoke detection is located in this area.

Detection circuits are arranged to transmit signals to the control room, to the local Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches) and to the Chemetron local control panel located in the service building east corridor (elevation 24 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - None MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 5,191 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation 4160 Volt Switchgear 480 Volt Load Center 480 Volt MCC Control Panels

VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or switchgear fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A detailed deviation request package dealing with the absence of floor drains in the control building and the east and west emergency switchgear areas has been previously transmitted (W. G. Council to B. J. Youngblood letter dated March 23, 1984; FP-20, Switchgear Room Floor Drains). This deviation has been granted by the NRC.

An additional deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G.

Counsil to B.J. Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

LICENSE AMENDMENT License Amendment Number 227, issued September 22, 2005, approved a change to the Approved Fire Protection Program allowing the CSA CO2 system to be modified from automatic to manual actuation. Fire protection features in the switchgear rooms have been enhanced to provide additional assurance to Operations personnel that Fire Safe Shutdown activities can be accomplished safely in the event the CSA CO2 system is discharged.

These enhancements include a fixed air breathing system for use in a CO2 environment and CO2/O2 concentration monitoring equipment installed in the switchgear rooms.

ANALYSIS 26 - Battery Room 1, Fire Area CB-3, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The control building is located south of the emergency generator enclosure, west of the service building and north of the turbine building. Battery Room Number 1 is located in the east switchgear room.

Fire Area CB-3 is located within Fire Area CB-2 (east switchgear room) along the east wall. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Battery Bank Cables Safety Related Battery Room Exhaust Fan E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hoses and 2.5 inch hose connections available in the Service Building, elevation 4 feet 6 inches hallway between the Normal Switchgear and East Switchgear Areas and at Service Building, elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

2.5 inch hose lines available from yard hydrants northwest and southwest of the control building (approximately 200 foot distance).

Portable extinguishers provided in vicinity based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77A for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas Drainage - None.

Ventilation - System provided to maintain hydrogen concentration below 2 percent.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 211 ft2 Combustible Material Batteries VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a battery casing fire resulting from a transient ignition source or an electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 27 - Battery Room 2, Fire Area CB-4, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The control building is located south of the emergency generator enclosure, west of the service building and north of the turbine building. Battery Room Number 2 is located in the west switchgear room.

Fire Area CB-4 is located within Fire Area CB-1 (west switchgear room) along the west wall. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Battery Bank Cables Safety Related Battery Room Exhaust Fan E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hoses available in Fire Area CB-1.

2.5 inch hose connections available in CB-1 and in the technical support center.

2.5 inch hose lines available from yard hydrants northwest and southwest of the control building (approximately 150 foot distant)

Portable extinguishers provided in vicinity based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77A and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - None.

Ventilation - System maintains hydrogen concentration below 2 percent.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 243 ft2 Combustible Material Batteries VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a battery casing fire resulting from a transient ignition source or an electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 28 - Battery Room 3, Fire Area CB-5, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The control building is located south of the emergency generator enclosure, west of the service building and north of the turbine building. Battery Room Number 3 is located in the east switchgear room.

Fire Area CB-5 is located within Fire Area CB-2 (east switchgear room) along the east wall. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Battery Bank Cables Safety Related Battery Room Exhaust Fan E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hoses and 2.5 inch hose connections available in the Service Building elevation 4 feet 6 inches hallway between the Normal Switchgear and East Switchgear areas and at the Service Building elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

2.5 inch hose lines available from yard hydrants northwest and southwest of the control building (approximately 200 foot distance).

Portable extinguishers provided in vicinity based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building west corridor elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77A for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - None.

Ventilation - System maintains the hydrogen concentration below 2 percent.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 166 ft2 Combustible Material Batteries VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a battery casing fire resulting from a transient ignition source or an electric fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 29 - Battery Room 4, Fire Area CB-6, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The control building is located south of the emergency generator enclosure, west of the service building and north of the turbine building. Battery Room Number 4 is located in the west switchgear room.

Fire Area CB-6 is located within Fire Area CB-1 (west switchgear room) along the west wall. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Battery Bank Cables Safety Related Battery Room Exhaust Fan E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hoses available in Fire Area CB-1 2.5 inch hose connections available in CB-1 and the technical support center.

2.5 inch hose lines available from yard hydrants northwest and southwest of the control building (approximately 150 foot distant).

Portable extinguishers provided in vicinity based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77A and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - None.

Ventilation - System maintains hydrogen concentration below 2 percent.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 165 ft2 Combustible Material Batteries VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a battery casing fire resulting from a transient ignition source or an electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 30 - Battery Room 5, Fire Area CB-7, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The control building is located south of the emergency generator enclosure, west of the service building and north of the turbine building. Battery Room Number 5 is located in the east switchgear room.

Fire Area CB-7 is located within Fire Area CB-2 (east switchgear room) along the east wall. There is safety-related safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safety Related Battery Bank Cables Non Safety Related Battery Room Exhaust Fan E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hoses and 2.5 inch hose connections available in the Service Building elevation 4 feet 6 inches hallway between the Normal Switchgear and East Switchgear areas and at the Service Building elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

2.5 inch hose lines available from yard hydrants northwest and southwest of the control building (approximately 200 foot distance).

Portable extinguishers provided in vicinity based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building west corridor elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77A for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - None.

Ventilation - System maintains the hydrogen concentration below 2 percent.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 270 ft2 Combustible Material Batteries VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a battery casing fire resulting from a transient ignition source or an electric fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 31 - Electrical Equipment Room, West Switchgear Area, Fire Area CB-16, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The control building is located south of the emergency generator enclosure, west of the service building and north of the turbine building.

Fire Area CB-16 is located in the west switchgear area adjacent to Fire Area CB-6 (Battery room 4). There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Battery Chargers Distribution Panels Regulating Transformer Cables Safety Related Static Inverter Vital Bus Isolation Transformer Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hoses available in Fire Area CB-1.

2.5 inch hose connections available in CB-1 and in the technical support center.

2.5 inch hose lines available from yard hydrants northwest and southwest of the control building (approximately 150 foot distance).

Portable extinguishers provided in vicinity based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77A for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 229 ft2 Combustible Material Control Panels VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Insignificant < 6,500 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire in a distribution panel resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A deviation request has been previously transmitted (W.G. Council to B.J. Youngblood letter dated March 23, 1984; FP-20, Switchgear Room Floor Drain). This deviation has been granted by the NRC.

An additional deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G.

Counsil to B.J. Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 32 - Electrical Equipment Room, East Switchgear Area, Fire Area CB-17, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The control building is located south of the emergency generator enclosure, west of the service building and north of the turbine building.

Fire Area CB-17 is located within the east switchgear area adjacent to Fire Areas CB-5 and CB-7 (battery rooms 3 and 5, respectively). There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Battery Chargers Distribution Panels Regulating Transformer Cables Safety Related Static Inverter Vital Bus Isolation Transformer Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hoses and 2.5 inch hose connections available in the Service Building elevation 4 feet 6 inches hallway between the Normal Switchgear and East Switchgear areas and at the Service Building elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

2.5 inch hose lines available from yard hydrants northwest and southwest of the control building (approximately 200 foot distance).

Portable extinguishers provided in vicinity based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77A for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 183 ft2 Combustible Material Control Panels VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Insignificant < 6,500 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire in a distribution panel resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A deviation request has been previously transmitted (W.G. Counsil to B.J. Youngblood letter dated March 23, 1984; FP-20, Switchgear Room Floor Drains). This deviation has been granted by the NRC.

An additional deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G.

Counsil to B.J. Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 33 - Neutron Monitor - Junction Box Area, East Switchgear Area, Fire Area CB-18 (Deleted)

This page intentionally blank - analysis deleted.

ANALYSIS 34 - Cable Spreading Area, Fire Area CB-8, Zone N/A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The control building is located south of the emergency generator enclosure, west of the service building and north of the turbine building.

Fire Area CB-8 involves the entire elevation 24 feet 6 inches of the control building.

There is safe shutdown equipment and cable in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Isolation Panels (2)

Cables Safety Related Cables Non Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - Manual actuation total flooding CO2 suppression system. CO2 can be actuated at the local Chemetron CO2 control panel located in the Service Building, East Corridor, elevation 24 feet 6inches.

1.5 inch dry hose stations available in area. 1.5 inch dry continuous flow hose reels located throughout area.

2.5 inch hose connections available in the control building stairwell on this elevation, the technical support center (elevation 11 feet 6 inches) and the service building (elevation 24 feet 6 inches). 2.5 inch fire department connection located in north wall.

Portable extinguishers provided in vicinity based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Cross zoned smoke detection is located in this area. In addition, a sampling type incipient fire detection system (IFD) is installed in the cable spreading room.

The smoke detection circuits transmit a signal to the control room, to the local Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches) and to the Chemetron local control panel located in the service building east corridor (elevation 24 feet 6 inches).

The IFD transmits signals to the control room and local Zone Panel Number 4E.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77B and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 11,284 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation Control Panels VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderately Severe < 240,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as approved by the NRC in SSER 4, and documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. Alternative shutdown capability is provided utilizing the auxiliary shutdown and transfer switch panels, located in the west and east switchgear rooms (Fire Areas CB-1and 2), respectively. This area

does not comply with the specific requirements of Sections C.7.c. An alternative means of compliance with C.7.c was provided for in a deviation request submitted to the NRC (in Letter B1194, dated April 30, 1985), and approved in SSER 2. The CO2 suppression system was modified from automatic to manual actuation, evaluated and found acceptable (86-10 evaluation FP-EV-01-002, MP3 CSA CO2 System with IFD System and Manual Fire Fighting Capabilities). License Amendment Number 227, issued September 22, 2005, provides NRC approval of the conversion from automatic to manual actuation. The IFD system and manual fire fighting features provide the primary fire protection capability for this area. The manual CO2 system provides fixed backup suppression capability for the area.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A deviation request was submitted to the NRC, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985, and approved in SSER 4.

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.c - Cable Spreading Room Protection A deviation request was submitted to the NRC, Letter B11494, dated April 30, 1985, and approved in SSER 2. This deviation was superseded by License Amendment Number 227, issued September 22, 2005, which approved a change to the fixed CO2 system from automatic to manual actuation.

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(1) - Fire Proofing of Structural Steel A deviation request was submitted to the NRC, Letter B11669, dated August 29, 1985, and approved in SSER 4.

LICENSE AMENDMENT License Amendment Number 227, and the included NRC Safety Evaluation, issued September 22, 2005, approved a change to the Approved Fire Protection Program allowing the CSA CO2 system to be modified from automatic to manual actuation. Fire protection features in this fire area have been enhanced to provide additional fire detection and suppression capabilities. The enhancements include an IFD system and additional manual fire fighting features (continuous flow hose reels, fire extinguishers, etc.), and provide the primary fire protection capability for this area. The manual CO2 system provides fixed backup suppression capability for the area.

86-10 EVALUATION FP-EV-01-0002, MPS CSA CO2 System with IFD System and Manual Fire Fighting Capabilities, evaluated and found acceptable the fire protection capabilities provided for the CSA. The IFD system and manual fire fighting features provide the primary fire protection capability, while the manual CO2 system provides fixed backup suppression.

ANALYSIS 35 - Control Room, Fire Area CB-9, Zone N/A, Elevation 47 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The control building is located south of the emergency generator enclosure, west of the service building and north of the turbine building.

Fire Area CB-9 involves the open control room floor area on elevation 47 feet 6 inches of the control building. There is safe shutdown equipment and cable in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Main Control Board and Associated Panels Main Heating and Ventilation Panel Nuclear Instrumentation Panels Cables Safety Related Radwaste Monitor Instrumentation Panel Cables Non Safety Related Operators Consoles Main Fire Protection Panel Seismic Panel Primary Protective Relay Panel Turbine Supervisory Instrument Cabinet Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose stations and 2.5 inch hose connections located in the service building (elevation 49 feet 6 inches) and the control building stairwell (elevation 24 feet 6 inches and 47 feet 6 inches).

2.5 inch outlets in areas noted above.

Portable extinguishers provided in vicinity based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors located on the underside of the concrete ceiling.

Ceiling mounted smoke detectors located within the main control board cabinet and in selected areas.

Detection transmits to local Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building (elevation 4 feet 6 inches) and to the main fire protection panel located within this area.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77C and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Eggcrate style suspended ceiling installed throughout the area. Armstrong high performance fiberglass ceiling panels located above suspended ceiling for sound/noise control.

Radiant energy heat shield (Carborundum Duraboard) provides fire separation for atmospheric relief bypass valve (ARBV, 3MSS*MOV74) lockout switches A through D from the remainder of Main Board Number 5.

Floor - Approved flame resistant carpet on concrete floor.

Drainage - None.

Ventilation - Portable fans will be utilized for removal of smoke, CO2 and/or Halon. This area is considered part of a habitability envelope MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 5,357 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation Control Panels Office Materials Miscellaneous plastic Fiberglass box

VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire in a control panel resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as approved by the NRC in SSER 4, and documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. Alternative shutdown capability is provided, utilizing the auxiliary shutdown and transfer switch panels, located in the west and east switchgear rooms, respectively.

A radiant energy heat shield provides fire separation between ARBV lockout switches and a fire occurring in MB5, per FP-EV-04-0001.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(1) - Fire Proofing of Structural Steel A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (E.J. Mroczka to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11669, dated August 29, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.b - Control Room Complex Peripheral Room Guidelines; Offices, Training Room Viewing Gallery A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.b - Smoke Detection in Control Room, Cabinets, and Consoles A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

86-10 EVALUATION FP-EV-04-001 - Technical Evaluation for 3MSS*MOV74A, B, C and D Control Circuit Hot Short Modification (DCR M3-04002), addresses the adequacy of the installation of control circuit lockout switches protected by a radiant energy heat shield located in the back of Main Board 5 to prevent a fire induced hot short from resulting in spurious opening of the valves.

ANALYSIS 36 - Computer Room and Underfloor Area, Fire Area CB-10, Zones A &

B, Elevation 47 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The control building is located south of the emergency generator enclosure, west of the service building and north of the turbine building.

Fire Area CB-10 is located along the east wall of the control room floor (elevation 47 feet 6 inches). There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area. The area is divided into two zones:

Zone A - Computer Room Underfloor Zone B - Computer Room JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Zone A - Cables Zone B - Computer Equipment Cables E PROTECTION Zone A Suppression - Automatic operating, total flooding Halon 1301 extinguishing system protecting the entire underfloor area.

1.5 inch hose station and 2.5 inch hose connection available in the service building.

Portable extinguishers provided in Zone B based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone rate compensated heat detection system arranged to actuate the Halon suppression system.

Smoke detection system available to provide early warning prior to halon system discharge. Alarms transmit to the local Halon control panel, to Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building (elevation 4 feet 6 inches), and to the control room main fire protection panel.

Zone B Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose station and 2.5 inch hose connection available in service building.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection below the solid noncombustible suspended ceiling.

Alarms transmit to Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building (elevation 4 feet 6 inch) and to the main fire protection panel in the control room.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77C for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Zone B has a solid type noncombustible suspended ceiling throughout.

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Zone A - 897 ft2 Zone B - 960 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation (1)

Control Panels Paper Transient Paper one A combustibles only.

VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Zone A - Moderate < 160,000 Zone B < 80,000 STULATED FIRE Zone A: The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or an electric fault.

Zone B: The postulated fire occurs in the computer equipment or containers resulting from a transient ignition source or an electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(1) - Fire Proofing of Structural Steel A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (E.J. Mroczka to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11669, dated August 29, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.d - Maintenance/Testing of Halon Suppression Systems Presently performed every 18 months. COTRAP File Number A05549, dated January 31, 1986; Issuance of Facility Operating License NPF-49-Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Number 3; Technical Specifications 3.7.12.4, The Instrument Rack Room Under Floor Area Halon System Surveillance Requirements identifies the 18 month test frequency.

ANALYSIS 37 - Instrument Rack Room and Underfloor Area, Fire Area CB-11, Zones A and B, Elevation 47 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The control building is located south of the emergency generator enclosure, west of the service building and north of the turbine building.

Fire Area CB-11 involves the instrument rack room and its underfloor area located along the south and west sides of the control building (elevation 47 feet 6 inches). There is safe shutdown equipment in this area. The area is divided into two zones:

Zone A - Instrument Rack Room Underfloor Zone B - Instrument Rack Room JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Zone A - Cables Zone B - Main Control Board Termination Cabinets Solid State Protection Cabinets Auxiliary Relay Racks Stop Valve Logic Cabinets SWEC Instrument Panels Protection Set Panels Engineered Safeguards Sequence Panels Cables Safety Related Zone A - Cables Zone B - Cables Non Safety Related Zone A - Cables

Zone B -

Main Control Board Termination Cabinet Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Computer Demultiplexer Computer Terminal Cabinets Vibration and Loose Parts Monitor Cables E PROTECTION Zone A - Instrument Rack Room Underfloor Suppression - Automatic operating, total flooding Halon 1301 extinguishing system protecting the entire underfloor area.

Portable extinguishers provided in Zone B based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone rate compensated heat detection system arranged to actuate the halon suppression system.

Smoke detection system available to provide early warning prior to halon system discharge. Alarms transmit to the local halon control panel, to Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building (elevation 4 feet 6 inches) and to the control room main fire protection panel.

Zone B - Instrument Rack Room Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose stations and 2.5 inch hose connections available in service building and the control building stairwell (elevation 24 feet 6 inches and 47 feet 6 inches).

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection at the ceiling.

Alarms transmit to Zone Panel Number 4E and to the control room main fire protection panel.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77C and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Zone B has a solid noncombustible type suspended ceiling throughout Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Zone A - 3,916 ft2 Zone B - 3,916 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation (1)

Cable Insulation Control Panels VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Zone A - Moderate < 160,000 Zone B - Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE Zones A and B: The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as approved by the NRC in SSER 4, and documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. Alternative shutdown capability is provided, utilizing the auxiliary shutdown and transfer switch panels, located in the west and east switchgear rooms, respectively.

one A combustibles only.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(1) - Fire Proofing of Structural Steel A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (E.J. Mroczka to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11669, dated August 29, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 38 - Kitchen Area, Fire Area CB-12, Zone N/A, Elevation 47 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The control building is located south of the emergency generator enclosure, west of the service building, and north of the turbine building.

Fire Area CB-12 involves a small kitchen area located west of the main control room floor area on elevation 47 feet 6 inches There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Cable Non Safety Related Kitchen appliances Furniture E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose station and 2.5 inch hose connection in the control building stairwell (elevation 24 feet 6 inches and 47 feet 6 inches).

Portable extinguishers are provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection above suspended ceiling/heat detection below the suspended ceiling.

Alarms transmit to Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building (elevation 4 feet 6 inches) and to the control room main fire protection panel.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77D and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

A solid type noncombustible suspended ceiling exists in this area.

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 279 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation Cooking Oil Transient Cooking Oil Paper VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or an electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(1) - Fire Proofing of Structural Steel A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (E.J. Mroczka to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11669, dated August 29, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(11) - Concealed Spaces with Combustibles A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (E.J. Mroczka to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11669, dated August 29, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 39 - Chiller Room, Fire Area CB-13, Zone N/A, Elevation 64 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The control building is located south of the emergency generator enclosure, west of the service building and north of the turbine building.

Fire Area CB-13 is located along the north wall of the west half of the control building elevation 64 feet 6 inches and is adjacent to Fire Area CB-14 (mechanical equipment room) and Fire Area CB-15 (general support area). There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Supply and Exhaust Fans Chiller Units Chilled Water Pumps Chilled Lube Oil Pumps Expansion Tanks Air Conditioner Booster Pumps Cables Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections available in the general support area (Fire Area CB-15) and the service building.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors.

Control room receives alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77D and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

A solid type noncombustible suspended ceiling exists in this area.

Drainage - Provided in area of the pumps.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 976 ft2 Combustible Material Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Insignificant < 6,500 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a minor panel fire initiated from a transient ignition source or an electric fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 40 - Mechanical Equipment Room, Fire Area CB-14, Zone N/A, Elevation 64 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The control building is located south of the emergency generator enclosure, west of the service building, and north of the turbine building.

Fire Area CB-14 involves the west half of elevation 64 feet 6 inches of the control building. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Control Room Air-Conditioning Units Instrument Rack and Computer Room Air-Conditioning Units Control Room Emergency Vent Filters and Fans Control Room Air Storage Tank Control Room Pressurization System Cables Non Safety Related Control Building Purge Fans Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression system.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections in the adjacent Fire Area TB-2F.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection provided at elevation 64 feet 6 inches.

Heat Detection system within the Charcoal Filter Units Control room receives alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 4E located in the service building (west corridor - elevation 4 feet 6 inches), except for the

Control Building Charcoal Filter Units. Detection for the Charcoal Filter Units alarms directly to VP 1 in the Control Room.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77D and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

A solid type noncombustible suspended ceiling exists in this area.

Drainage - Floor drains are provided.

4 inch curbs provided for equipment and at vertical ventilation ducts running through the area.

4 inch flood level protection is provided.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 4,544 ft2 Combustible Material Charcoal Transient Charcoal Plastic VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a charcoal fire initiated from a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 41 - East Fuel Oil Vault, Fire Area EG-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 14 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The east fuel oil vault is located below grade on the east side of the emergency generator enclosures, north of the control building, and west of the maintenance shop. This vault is located parallel and adjacent to the west fuel oil vault.

Within the vault is a 35,340 gallon cylindrical steel tank holding Number 2 diesel fuel dedicated as supply for the north emergency diesel generator unit. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank Fuel Oil Transfer Pump - Normal Cables Safety Related Fuel Oil Transfer Pump - Swing Cables Non Safety Related Cable E PROTECTION Suppression - Fixed automatic operating total flooding CO2 system actuation alarm transmitted to the control room, local Chemetron panel in the machine shop, and Zone Panel Number 5C located in the cable spreading room.

1.5 inch hose stations available in buildings adjacent to vaults.

2.5 inch hose stations available from two yard hydrants.

Detection - Ceiling mounted smoke detectors arranged on a single zone principle for early warning.

Control room receives smoke detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 5C located in the cable spreading room.

Ceiling mounted heat detectors arranged on a single zone principle for actuation of the CO2 suppression system.

Control room receives heat detection alarm/local alarms sound above and within vault, at the local Chemetron panel in the machine shop and at Zone Panel Number 5C located in the cable spreading room.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77A for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 840 ft2 Combustible Material Diesel Fuel Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Severe 240,000 or above STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an oil fire resulting from a leaking tank and a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 42 - West Fuel Oil Vault, Fire Area EG-2, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The west fuel oil vault is located below grade on the east side of the emergency generator enclosures, north of the control building, and west of the maintenance shop. This vault is located parallel and adjacent to the east fuel oil vault.

Within the vault is a 35,340 gallon cylindrical steel tank holding Number 2 diesel fuel dedicated as supply for the south emergency diesel generator unit. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank Fuel Oil Transfer Pump - Normal Cables Safety Related Fuel Oil Transfer Pump - Swing Cables Non Safety-Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - Fixed automatic operating total flooding CO2 system/actuation alarm transmitted to the control room, local Chemetron panel in the machine shop, and Zone Panel Number 5C located in the cable spreading room.

1.5 inch hose stations available in buildings adjacent to vaults.

2.5 inch hose stations available from two yard hydrants.

Detection - Ceiling mounted smoke detectors arranged on a single zone principle for early warning.

Control room receives smoke detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 5C located in the cable spreading room.

Ceiling mounted heat detectors arranged on a single zone principle for actuation of the CO2 suppression system.

Control room receives heat detection alarm/local alarms sound above and within vault, at the local Chemetron panel in the machine shop and at Zone Panel Number 5C located in the cable spreading room.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77A for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 840 ft2 Combustible Material Diesel Fuel Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Severe 240,000 or above STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an oil fire resulting from a leaking tank and a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 43 - North Emergency Generator Enclosure, Fire Area EG-3, Zones A and B, Elevation 11 feet 6 inches, 24 feet 6 inches and 51 feet 0 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION Fire Area EG-3 involves the north emergency generator enclosure located north of the control building and west of the machine shop. This enclosure is adjacent to the redundant south generator enclosure. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

The area is divided into two zones:

Zone A - Diesel Generator Unit (Elevation 24 feet 6 inches) and Cable Vault (Elevation 11 feet 6 inches)

Zone B - Muffler Enclosure (51 feet 0 inches)

JOR EQUIPMENT Zone A - Safe Shutdown Emergency Diesel Generator:

Fuel Oil Day Tank Starting Air Tanks Motor Control Center-Emergency Cables Motor Operated Dampers Fresh Water Expansion Tan Emergency Diesel Generator Control Panel and Gage Panel Emergency Diesel Generator Jacket and Intercooling Water Heaters Diesel Building Isolation Panel Supply Fans Safety Related Oil Separator Crankcase Vacuum Pump Cables

Non Safety Related Starting Air Compressor Cables Electric Unit Heater Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start Compressor Zone B - Safe Shutdown Muffler Cables E PROTECTION e A - Diesel Generator and Cable Vault Suppression - Manually-operated, closed head sprinkler system covers all areas/local water flow alarm and valve tamper supervision transmit to Zone Panel Number 5C located in the cable spreading room and to the control room.

1.5 inch hose station located within the area.

2.5 inch standpipe outlet with 1.5 inch hose available in the west entry vestibule.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Ultra Violet flame detectors covering the diesel generator.

Ceiling mounted (Elevation 50 feet 6 inches) rate compensated heat detectors covering diesel generator area.

Rate compensated heat detectors and smoke detectors covering the cable vault.

Control room receives all detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 5C located in the cable spreading room.

e B - Muffler Enclosure Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose station available in Zone A.

2.5 inch hose connection and 1.5 inch hose station available outside Zone A in entry vestibule.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection None.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B, 77C, and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas Drainage Zone A - Floor drains to oils separator/sump pump in cable vault with discharge to floor drains.

Zone B - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Zone A - 1,819 ft2 Zone B - 1,952 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation 480 Volt MCC Control Panels Fuel Oil Lube Oil Paper Transient Lube Oil Plastic VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) ne A Moderately Severe 240,000 ne B Insignificant < 6,500

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an oil or cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.i - Lack of Diking Around the Tank A deviation request has been granted (W. G. Counsil to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11090, dated March 23, 1984, Attachment C - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.i - Automatic Fire Suppression and Drainage A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 44 - South Emergency Generator Enclosure, Fire Area EG-4, Zones A &

B, Elevation 11 feet 6 inches, 24 feet 6 inches & 51 feet 0 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION Fire Area EG-4 involves the south emergency generator enclosure located north of the control building and west of the machine shop. This enclosure is adjacent to the redundant north generator enclosure.

The area is divided into two zones:

Zone A - Diesel Generator Unit (Elevation 24 feet 6 inches) and Cable Vault (Elevation 11 feet 6 inches)

Zone B - Muffler Enclosure (Elevation 51 feet 0 inches)

There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Zone A - Safe Shutdown Emergency Diesel Generator:

Fuel Oil Day Tank Starting Air Tanks Motor Control Center - Emergency Cables Control Panel and Gage Panel Jacket and Intercooling Water Heaters Diesel Building Isolation Panel Supply Fans Safety-Related Oil Separator Crankcase Vacuum Pump Cables Non Safety-Related Starting Air Compressor Cables Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start Compressor

Zone B - Safe Shutdown Muffler Cables E PROTECTION e A - Diesel Generator and Cable Vault Suppression - Manually operated, closed head sprinkler system covers all areas/local water flow alarm and valve tamper supervision transmit to Zone Panel Number 5 located in the cable spreading room and to the control room.

1.5 inch hose station located within the area.

2.5 inch standpipe outlet with 1.5 inch hose available in the west entry vestibule.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Ultra Violet flame detectors covering the diesel generator.

Ceiling mounted (Elevation 50 feet 6 inches) rate compensated heat detectors covering diesel generator area.

Rate compensated heat detectors and smoke detectors covering the cable vault.

Control Room receives all detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 5C located in the cable spreading room.

e B - Muffler Enclosure Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose station available in Zone A.

2.5 inch hose connection and 1.5 inch hose station available outside Zone A in entry vestibule.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - None SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B, 77C, and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Zone A - Floor drains to oils separator/sump pump in cable vault with discharge to floor drains.

Zone B - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Zone A - 1,819 ft2 Zone B - 1,952 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation 480 V MCC Control Panels Fuel Oil Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil Plastic VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) ne A Moderately Severe < 240,000 ne B Insignificant < 6,500 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an oil or cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.i - Lack of Diking Around the Tank A deviation request has been granted (W. G. Counsil to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11090, dated March 23, 1984, Attachment C - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.i - Automatic Fire Suppression and Drainage A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 45 - South Containment Recirculation Cooler Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-1, Zone N/A, Elevation (-)34 feet 9 inches through 36 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The engineered safety features building is located east of the containment structure and northeast of the hydrogen recombiner building.

Fire Area ESF-1 involves containment recirculation pumps and coolers. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safety Related Containment Recirculation Pumps and Coolers Radiation Monitors Cables Non Safety Related Containment Recirculation Sump Pumps Recirculation Cubicle Sump Pump Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inches hose stations with 2.5 inches hose connections located in Fire Areas ESF-3 and -9 (Elevation 21 feet 6 inches).

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors located in all areas (elevations) where appreciable combustible loading is present.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 3B located in the fuel building (Elevation 11 feet 0 inches)

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A, 77B, and 77C for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas with the exception of the Supplemental Leak Collection Rate System (SLCRS) ductwork, which is not protected. The penetration of the fire barriers by the duct occurs at the east wall and the ceiling of this area. Refer to Appendix B, Section C.5.a.(4) for further information.

Drainage - Floor drains provided in area.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Elevation (-)34 feet 9 inches: 477 ft2 Elevation 4 feet 6 inches:

  • ft2 Elevation 21 feet 6 inches:
  • ft2 Elevation 36 feet 6 inches:
  • ft2 Combustible Material Lube Oil ((-) 34 feet 9 inches)

Transient Lube Oil ((-) 34 feet 9 inches)

Cable Insulation (4 feet 6 inches)

Cable Insulation (21 feet 6 inches)

Cable Insulation (36 feet 6 inches)

VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) w a < 80,000 The Severity Classification is based upon using the floor area of the (-) 34 feet 9 inches ation as all elevations indicated have grated floors.

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

10 EVALUATION FP-EV-00-0008 - Technical Evaluation for the Acceptability of Removing Fire Damper 3HVR*DMPF-64 from the Fire Protection Program, Millstone Unit 3, addresses the inaccessibility of the damper for test purposes, and the acceptability of the duct penetration remaining unsealed in a fire.

ANALYSIS 46 - North Containment Recirculation Cooler Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-2, Zone N/A, Elevation (-)34 feet 9 inches through 36 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The engineered safety features building is located east of the containment structure and northeast of the hydrogen recombiner building. Fire Area ESF-2 involves containment recirculation pumps and coolers. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safety Related Containment Recirculation Pumps and Coolers Radiation Monitors Cables Non Safety Related Recirculation Cubicle Sump Pump Containment Recirculation Sump Pumps Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections located in Fire Areas ESF-3 and 9 (Elevation 21 feet 6 inches).

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors located in all areas (elevations) where appreciable combustible loading is present.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 3B located in the fuel building (Elevation 11 feet 0 inches)

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A, 77B, 77C, and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains provided in area.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Elevation (-)34 feet 9 inches: 570 ft2 Elevation 4 feet 6 inches:

Elevation 21 feet 6 inches:

Elevation 36 feet 6 inches:

Combustible Material Lube Oil (1) - (2)

Transient Lube Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) w (a) < 80,000 The Severity Classification is based upon using the floor area of the (-) 34 feet 9 inches ation as all elevations indicated have grated floors.

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas Elevation (-) 34 feet 9 inches Elevation 36 feet 6 inches

ANALYSIS 47 - North Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-3, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches, 21 feet 6 inches, 36 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The engineered safety features building is located east of the containment structure, and northeast of the hydrogen recombiner building.

Fire Area ESF-3 involves a three-elevation cubicle housing the safety injection and quench spray pumps and associated equipment as well as components of a core residual heat removal system. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Residual Heat Removal Pump and Heat Exchanger Safety Injection Pump Safety Injection Pump Cooler Safety Injection Pump Cooling Pump Cables Safety Related Quench Spray Pump Radiation Monitor Cables Non Safety Related Residual Heat Removal Cubicle Sump Pump Radiation Monitor ESF Building Sump Pump Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose station with a 2.5 inch hose connection located in this area (Elevation 21 feet 6 inches) and ESF-7 (Elevation 38 feet 6 inches).

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors located in this area.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 3B located in the fuel building (Elevation 11 feet 0 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A, 77B, and 77C for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains provided in area.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Elevation 4 feet 6 inches: 1,903 ft2 Elevation 21 feet 6 inches: 1,410 ft2 Elevation 36 feet 6 inches: 591 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation (1)

Cable Insulation (2)

Clothing Cotton Pump Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) w (a) < 80,000 The Severity Classification is the average of the BTU/FT2 of all elevations.

Elevation 4 feet 6 inches combustible Elevation 21 feet 6 inches combustibles

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or lubricating oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 48 - East Floor Area, Fire Area ESF-4, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The engineered safety features building is located east of the containment structure and northeast of the hydrogen recombiner building.

Fire Area ESF-4 involves a single-elevation cubicle used for cable routing. There is safe shutdown cable in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Cables Non Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections located in Fire Areas ESF-3 and -5 (Elevation 21 feet 6 inches).

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors located in this area.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 3B located in the fuel building (Elevation 11 feet 0 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains provided in area.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 980 ft2

Combustible Material Cable Insulation VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) w < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 49 - Southeast Floor Area/Auxiliary Feed Pump Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-5, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches and 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The engineered safety features building is located east of the containment structure and northeast of the hydrogen recombiner building.

Fire Area ESF-5 involves a two-elevation cubicle accessible through the south wall door on elevation 24 feet 6 inches and through the north wall door on elevation 4 feet 6 inches.

There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Turbine Driven Steam Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Cables Non Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose station with a 2.5 inch hose connection located within this area (Elevation 21 feet 6 inches).

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection =- Single zone smoke detectors located in this area.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 3B located in the fuel building (Elevation 11 feet 0 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A and 77B for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas with the exception of the Supplemental leak Collection Rate System (SLCRS) ductwork, which is not protected. The penetration of the barriers by the duct occurs at the unrated south wall and the rated ceiling of this area. Refer to Appendix B, Section C.5.a.(4) for further information.

Drainage - Floor drains provided in area.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Elevation 4 feet 6 inches: 1,358 ft2 Elevation 21 feet 6 inches: 907 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil Control Panels VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) w(a) < 80,000 The Severity Classification is the average of the BTU/FT2 of all elevations.

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or lubricating oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

10 EVALUATION FP-EV-00-0008 - Technical Evaluation for the Acceptability of Removing Fire Damper 3HVR*DMPF-64 from the Fire Protection Program, Millstone Unit 3, addresses the inaccessibility of the damper for test purposes, and the acceptability of the duct penetration remaining unsealed in a fire.

ANALYSIS 50 - South Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-6, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches, 21 feet 6 inches, 36 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The engineered safety features building is located east of the containment structure, and northeast of the hydrogen recombiner building.

Fire Area ESF-6 involves a three elevation cubicle housing the safety injection and quench spray pumps and associated equipment as well as components of a core residual heat removal system. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Residual Heat Removal Pump and Heat Exchanger Safety Injection Pump Safety Injection Pump Cooler Safety Injection Pump Cooling Pump Cables Safety Related Quench Spray Pump Radiation Monitor Cables Non Safety Related Residual Heat Removal Cubicle Sump Pump Radiation Monitor Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose stations with a 2.5 inch hose connection located in Fire Areas ESF-3 (Elevation 21 feet 6 inches) and ESF-7 (Elevation 38 feet 6 inches).

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors located in this area.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 3B located in the fuel building (Elevation 11 feet 0 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A, 77B, and 77C for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains provided in area.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Elevation 4 feet 6 inches: 577 ft2 Elevation 21 feet 6 inches: 1,066 ft2 Elevation 36 feet 6 inches: 576 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) ignificant (a) < 6,500 The Severity Classification is the average of the BTU/FT2 of all elevations.

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or lubricating oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 51 - Refueling Water Recirculation Pumps Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-7, Zone N/A, Elevation 21 feet 6 inches and 36 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The engineered safety features building is located east of the containment structure and northeast of the hydrogen recombiner building.

Fire Area ESF-7 involves a two elevation cubicle housing pumps, electrical equipment, and building air conditioning equipment. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Motor Control Center Cables Safety Related ESF Building Self-Contained Air Conditioning Unit Cables Non Safety Related Refuel Water Recirculating Pump Motor Control Centers ESF Building Fan Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

Automatic wet-pipe sprinklers with directional spray heads protect the fiberglass piping penetration to Fire Area ESF-9 (see Deviation in Licensing Letter B11658-Docket Number 50-423.

Water flow alarm and valve tamper signal transmit to the Control Room/Local alarms sound at the alarm check valve and Zone Panel ZP.9B located in the Auxiliary Building Elevation 24 feet 6 inches Column

52.3/F7. One-half inch hose stations with a 2.5 inch hose connection located in this area and Fire Area ESF-3.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors located in this area.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 3B located in the fuel building (Elevation 11 feet 0 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B, 77C, and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas except for the fiberglass pipe penetrations to Fire Areas ESF-11 and ESF-9.

Drainage - Floor drains provided in area.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Elevation 21 feet 6 inches: 536 ft2 Elevation 36 feet 6 inches: 981 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation 480 V MCC Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) w (a) < 80,000 The Severity Classification is the average of the BTU/FT2 of all elevations.

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or lubricating oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(1)(b) - Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic Pipe Used for Building Roof Drain System A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 52 - North Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-8, Zones N/A, Elevation 21 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The engineered safety features building is located east of the containment structure, and northeast of the hydrogen recombiner building.

Fire Area ESF-8 involves a single elevation cubicle housing one of two motor-driven steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Motor-Driven Steam Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Cables Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose station with a 2.5 inch hose connection located in fire area ESF-3 (Elevation 21 feet 6 inches).

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors located in this area.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 3B located in the fuel building (Elevation 11 feet 0 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains provided in area.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 403 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) derate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or lubricating oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 53 - South Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-9, Zone N/A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches and 36 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The engineered safety features building is located east of the containment structure and northeast of the hydrogen recombiner building.

Fire Area ESF-9 involves a two elevation cubicle housing one of two motor-driven steam generator feedwater pumps, electrical equipment, and ESF building air conditioning equipment. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Motor-Driven Steam Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Cables Motor Control Center ESF Building Fans Cables Safety Related ESF Building Self Contained Air Conditioning Unit Radiation Monitors Cables Non Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

Automatic wet-pipe sprinklers with directional spray heads protect the fiberglass piping penetration to Fire Area ESF-7 (see Deviation in Licensing Letter B11658-Docket Number 50-423).

Water flow alarm and valve tamper signal transmit to the Control Room/Local alarms sound at the alarm check valve and Zone Panel ZP-9B located in the Auxiliary Building Elevation 24 feet 6 inches at Column 52.3/F7. 1.5 inch hose stations with a 2.5 inch hose connection located in this area and Fire Area ESF-3 (Elevation 21 feet 6 inches).

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors located in this area.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 3 located in the fuel building (Elevation 11 feet 0 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B and 77C for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas with the exception of the Supplemental Leak Collection Rate System (SLCRS) ductwork and the fiberglass pipe penetration to Fire Area ESF-7.

The penetration of fire barriers by the duct occurs at the east wall and floor of this area. The SLCRS ductwork is enclosed in a one-hour fire-rated duct wrap. Refer to Appendix B, Section C.5.a.(4) for further information. The fiberglass piping penetration is protected by an automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system with directional spray heads.

Drainage - Floor drains provided in area.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Elevation 21 feet 6 inches: 539 ft2 Elevation 36 feet 6 inches: 1,333 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation 480 V MCC Control Panel Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) w (a) < 80,000 The Severity Classification is the average of the BTU/FT2 of both elevations.

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or lubricating oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(1)(b) - Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic Pipe Used for Building Roof Drain System A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B1 1658, dated August 16, 1985-Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 54 - North Air Conditioning Unit/Safety Injection Surge Tank Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-10, Zone N/A, Elevation 36 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The engineered safety features building is located east of the containment structure and northeast of the hydrogen recombiner building.

Fire Area ESF-10 involves a single elevation cubicle housing air conditioning equipment, safety injection system components, and an isolation pan elevation There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Safety Injection Pump Cooling Surge Tank Isolation Panel ESF Building Self-Contained Air Conditioning Unit Cables Non Safety Related ESF Building Fans Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed area suppression.

Automatic wet-pipe sprinkles with directional sprayer heads protect the fiberglass piping penetration to Fire Area ESF-11 (see Deviation in Licensing Letter B11658, Docket Number 50-423).

Water flow alarm and valve tamper signal transmit to the Control Room/Local alarms sound at the alarm check valve and Zone Panel ZP-9B located in the Auxiliary Building Elevation 24 feet 6 inches at Column 52.3/F7. 1.5 inch hose station with a 2.5 inch hose connection located in Fire Area ESF-7 (Elevation 38 feet 6 inches).

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors located in this area.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 3B located in the fuel building (Elevation 11 feet 0 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77C for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas except for the fiberglass pipe penetration to Fire Area ESF-11.

Drainage - Floor drains provided in area.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 788 ft2 Combustible Material 480 V MCC Cable Insulation Control Panel Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) w < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or lubricating oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(1)(b) - Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic Pipe Used for Building Roof Drain System A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 55 - South Air Conditioning Unit Cubicle, Fire Area ESF-11, Zone N/A, Elevation 36 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The engineered safety features building is located east of the containment structure and northeast of the hydrogen recombiner building.

Fire Area ESF-11 involves a single elevation cubicle housing ESF building air conditioning equipment and isolation panels. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown ESF Building Self-Contained Air Conditioning Unit Isolation Panel Cables Non Safety Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed area suppression.

Automatic wet-pipe sprinklers with directional spray heads protects the fiberglass piping penetration to Fire Area ESF-10 (see Deviation in Licensing Letter B11658, Docket Number 50-423).

Water flow alarm and valve tamper signal transmit to the Control Room/Local alarms sound at the alarm check valve and Zone Panel ZP-9B located in the Auxiliary Building Elevation 24 feet 6 inches at Column 52.3/F7. 1.5 inch hose station with a 2.5 inch hose connection located in Fire Area ESF-7 (Elevation 38 feet 6 inches).

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors located in this area.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 3B located in the fuel building (Elevation 11 feet 0 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77C for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas except for the fiberglass pipe penetration to Fire Area ESF-10.

Drainage - Floor drains provided in area.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 441 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation Control Panel Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) w < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or lubricating oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(1)(b) - Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic Pipe Used for Building Roof Drain System A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 56 - Floor Areas, Fire Area FB-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 11 feet 0 inches, 24 feet 6 inches, 34 feet 0 inches, 52 feet 4 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The fuel building is located north of the engineered safety features building, south of the waste disposal building and east of the auxiliary building.

Fire Area FB-1 involves the open floor areas on the above noted elevations. Periodically, the area will be utilized to transfer spent fuel from the SFP to the ISFSI, using a Dry Storage Canister (DSC). Area FB-1 surrounds Area FB-2 at Elevation 11 feet 0 inches, 24 feet 6 inches, and 42 feet 6 inches There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safety Related Service Water Rad Monitor Microprocessor Fuel Transfer Tube Area Monitor Heat Tracing Transformer Fuel Building Transfer Canal Monitor Cables Non Safety Related Spent Fuel Shipping Cask Crane New Fuel Handling Crane New Fuel Receiving Crane Decontamination Area Crane Control Panels Motor Control Centers Fuel Pool Purification Pumps Cables Vacuum Drying Skid (VDS)

VDS Booster Pump Cask Washdown Area Work Platform Winch Assembly Automatic Welding System (Periodically)

E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose stations (Elevation 11 feet 0 inches, 24 feet 6 inches, and 52 feet 4 inches).

2.5 inch hose connections at each hose station.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors located in areas with appreciable combustible loading.

Control room receives all detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 9B located in the auxiliary building Elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77B, 77C and 77D for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains on 11 feet and 24 feet 6 inch elevation only. All other areas drain through stairwells to Elevation 11 feet 0 inches and 24 feet 6 inches.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Elevation 52 feet 4 inches: 7,859 ft2 Elevation 24 feet 6 inches: 4,636 ft2 Elevation 11 feet 0 inches: 4,718 ft2 mbustible Material Cable Insulation (1) 480 V MCC (1)

Control Panels (1)

Plastic Hose (1)

Rubber Hose (1)

Plastic (1)

Cable Insulation (2)

Control Panels (2)

Lube Oil (2)

Cable Insulation (3)

Plastic Hose (2)

Elevation 52 feet 4 inches Elevation 24 feet 6 inches Elevation 11 feet 0 inches VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) w (a) < 80,000 The Severity Classification is the average of the BTU/FT2 off all elevations.

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or an electrical fault in a motor or control cabinet, or the periodic use of an automatic welding system.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 57 - Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps and Coolers, Fire Area FB-2, Zone N/A, Elevation 11 feet 0 inches 24 feet 6 inches, 42 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The fuel building is located north of the engineered safety features building south of the waste disposal building and east of the auxiliary building.

Fire Area FB-2 involves the fuel pool cooling pump cubicle and sump (Elevation 24 feet and 11 feet 6 inches, respectively) and the fuel pool coolers (platform Elevation 42 feet 6 inches). There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

MAJOR EQUIPMENT Safety Related Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps Fuel Pool Coolers Cables Non Safety Related Cables FIRE PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose stations available in adjacent fire area FB-1 on the 11 feet and 24 feet 6 inches elevations.

2.5 inch hose connections available at the 1.5 inch hose stations noted above.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors located in areas with appreciable combustible loading.

Control room receives all detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 9B located in the auxiliary building Elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A, 77B, and 77C for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains on Elevation 11 feet and 24 feet 6 inches. Open grating on Elevation 42 feet 6 inches provides drainage to Elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 648 ft2 mbustible Material Cable Insulation Lube Oils Transient Lube Oils Plastic Rubber Control Panels VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) w < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or an electrical fault in a motor or control cabinet.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 58 - Floor Area, Fire Area HR-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches and 37 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The hydrogen recombiner building is located adjacent to the containment structure at the southwest corner of the engineered safety features building.

Fire Area HR-1 involves the entire recombiner facility. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safety-Related Hydrogen Recombiners and Control Panels Radiation Monitors Cables Non Safety-Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression systems.

1.5 inch and 2.5 inch hose lines available from yard hydrant and hose house located approximately 80 feet south of the building.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors located in areas with appreciable combustible load.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 3B located in the fuel building (Elevation 11 feet 0 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B and 77C for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Manual, normally closed floor drains provided; hydrogen recombiner cubicles and sample room Elevation 24 feet 6 inches MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Elevation 24 feet 6 inches: 1,305 ft2 Elevation 37 feet 6 inches: 703 ft2 Combustible Material Control Panels*

Lube Oil*

Transient Lube Oil*

Lube Oil**

Transient Lube Oil**

Rubber

  • Elevation 24 feet 6 inches
    • Elevation 37 feet 6 inches SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Insignificant < 6,500 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire or a fire in any single motor resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c.(4) - Hose Stations A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J.F. Opeka to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11769, dated October 7, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 59A - Crane Bay/Welding Shop/Mech. Work Area, Fire Area MS-1, Zone A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The machine shop is located adjacent to the north wall of the service building. Zone MS-1A involves the crane bay, welding shop, and mechanical work area. Outdoor combustible material storage areas/enclosures located both east, west and north of Zone MS-1A. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Overhead Crane Welding Equipment Arc Cutting Equipment E PROTECTION Suppression - Ceiling level wet-pipe automatic sprinkler system protects the entire zone.

Water flow alarms and valve tamper supervision provided with signals to control room and Zone Panel Number 8C located in the service building west corridor (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

1.5 inch hose station with 2.5 inch hose connection located in area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - None.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B and 77F for a physical description of this area.

South Wall - Solid 8 inch concrete block forms the portion of the wall which separates the Welding and Crane Bay from the Oil and Grease Room (three hour rated); Hollow 8 inch concrete block separates the Welding Shop from the Electrical Shop, and the Mechanical Work Area from the Maintenance Supervisors Office and Electrical Shop (two hour rated).

East & West Walls - Metal Siding with steel cross-bracing.

Ceiling - Open framing (two stories high)

Note: Within the Crane Bay floor is a closed 6 feet by 6 feet by 15 feet deep pit, designed for pump repairs. The pit is provided with composite concrete and steel cap covers.

Drainage - Floor drains provided.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 5,105 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation Flammable Liquid Transient Lube Oil Lube Oil Paper Plastic Rubber Wood SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Insignificant < 6,500 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 59B - Oil and Grease Room, Fire Area MS-1, Zone B, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The machine shop is located adjacent to the north wall of the service building. Zone MS-1B, oil and grease room, is centrally located within Fire Area MS-1 below the new mezzanine maintenance office which is located on Elevation 35 feet 0 inches. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT None.

E PROTECTION Suppression - An automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system extends from the machine shop system.

Water flow alarms and valve tamper supervision provided with signals to control room and Zone Panel Number 8C located in the service building west corridor (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

1.5 inch hose station with 2.5 inch hose connection located in area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - None.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Walls are 8 in. solid concrete block construction (three hour rated);

Ceiling is constructed of steel decking with reinforced concrete slab (three hour rated); Support beams are protected with gypsum wallboard (three hour rated); 6 inches concrete curb around entrance to area.

Door/Frame - Double swing Class A door assembly - three hour rated.

Drainage - Plugged Floor drains.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 386 ft2 Combustible Material Lube Oil Cleaning Fluid Flammable Liquid SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Severe 240,000 or above STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is lubricating oil, hydraulic oil, or cleaning fluid fire resulting from an accident or a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 59C - Electrical Shop Area, Fire Area MS-1, Zone C, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The machine shop is located adjacent to the north wall of the service building. Zone MS-1C, electrical shop area, is centrally located within Fire Area MS-1. The area includes the assistant electrical maintenance supervisors office, work shop, and electricians office cubicles. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Office Equipment Electrical Testing Equipment E PROTECTION Suppression - Ceiling level automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system provides complete coverage for the area.

Water flow alarms and valve tamper supervision provided with signals to control room and Zone Panel Number 8C located in the service building west corridor (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

1.5 inch hose station with 2.5 inch hose connection located in area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - None.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B and 77F for a physical description of this area.

North wall is hollow 8 inch concrete block (two hour rated) except at the Oil & Grease Room where it is Solid 8 inch concrete block (three hour rated); South and East walls are hollow 8 inch concrete block (two hour rated); West wall is Metal Siding; Ceiling is metal decking with reinforced concrete (three hour rated).

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 1,177 ft2 Combustible Material Flammable Light Plastic Wood Paper SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 59D - Maintenance Office, Fire Area MS-1, Zone D, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The machine shop is located adjacent to the north wall of the service building. Zone MS-1D is located in the southeast section of the area. The zone involves the mechanical assistance maintenance supervisor offices. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety Related Office Equipment E PROTECTION Suppression - An automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system provides complete coverage for the area.

Water flow alarms and valve tamper supervision provided with signals to control room and Zone Panel Number 8C located in the service building west corridor (Elevation 4 feet 6 inch).

1.5 inch hose station with 2.5 inch hose connection located in area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - None.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B and 77F for a physical description of this area.

South Wall - Combination 8 inch concrete block (portion of office adjacent to Machine Shop) and metal siding with steel cross bracing (portion of office adjacent to yard); East wall constructed of metal siding with steel cross bracing; North wall constructed of hollow 8 in. concrete block two hour rated); West wall constructed of hollow 8 inch concrete block with glass panels (non-rated); Ceiling consists of concrete slab with fire retardant ceiling panels.

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 896 ft2 Combustible Material Paper SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 59E - Tool Room, Fire Area MS-1, Zone E, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The machine shop is located adjacent to the north wall of the service building. Zone MS-1E involves the tool room located in the southwest section of the fire area. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Flammable Storage Cabinet Drawer Cabinet Open Rack Storage E PROTECTION Suppression - Ceiling level wet-pipe automatic sprinkler system provides complete coverage for the area.

Water flow alarms and valve tamper supervision provided with signals to control room and Zone Panel Number 8C located in the service building west corridor (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

1.5 inch hose station with 2.5 inch hose connection located in area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - None.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Walls are hollow 8 inch concrete block construction (two hour rated); Ceiling is metal decking with reinforced concrete (three hour rated).

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 2,017 ft2 Combustible Material Cardboard Flammable Liquid Plastic Rubber Wood SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is the ignition of stored combustible materials by a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 59F - Machinery Area/Hallway, Fire Area MS-1, Zone F, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The machine shop is located adjacent to the north wall of the service building. Zone MS-1F involves the machinery area and hallway located in the southern section of the maintenance shop. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Five Ton Overhead Crane Vertical Milling Machines Horizontal Lathes Band Saws E PROTECTION Suppression - Ceiling level automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system provides complete coverage for the area.

Water flow alarms and valve tamper supervision provided with signals to control room and Zone Panel Number 8C located in the service building west corridor (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

1.5 inch hose station with 2.5 inch hose connection located in area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - None.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B and 77F for a physical description of this area.

North Wall - Hollow 8 inch block wall (two hour rated) abutting the Maintenance Supervisors Office and Tool Room, with open hallway into Zone MS-1A; South Wall - Hollow 8 inch block wall (two hour rated); East and West Walls - Metal siding with steel cross-bracing; Ceiling - Two Story open framing.

Drainage - Floor drains provided throughout the area.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 3,403 ft2 Combustible Material Cardboard Flammable Liquid Office Materials Wood Lube Oil Rags Plastic SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Insignificant < 6.500 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 59G - QA Meter Storage Room, Fire Area MS-1, Zone G, Elevation 2 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The machine shop is located adjacent to the north wall of the service building. Zone MS-1G involves the high-current testing room located at the south end of the machine shop. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Test Equipment (Meters)

E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose station with 2.5 inch hose connection located in area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - None.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Walls are hollow 8 inch concrete block, except at the west wall which is a combination of hollow 8 inch concrete block and sheet rock (all two hour rated); Ceiling consists of a concrete slab with fire retardant ceiling panels.

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 213 ft2

Combustible Material Cardboard Paper Plastic Cable Insulation SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 59H - Maintenance Offices, Fire Area MS-1, Zone H, Elevation 35 feet 0 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The machine shop is located adjacent to the north wall of the service building. Zone MS-1H involves the second floor maintenance offices located above the first floor maintenance office and tool room. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related General Office Equipment Computers and Printers E PROTECTION Suppression - Ceiling level automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system provided throughout the area.

Water flow alarms and valve tamper supervision provided with signals to control room and Zone Panel Number 8C located in the service building west corridor (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

1.5 inch hose station with 2.5 inch hose connection located in area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - None.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B and 77F for a physical description of this area.

North Wall - North perimeter wall overlooking the mechanical work area is constructed at 3 5/8 inch metal studs with two layers of 5/8 inch gypsum board (two hour rated). The remaining part of the north wall is constructed of 3 5/8 inch metal studs with one layer of one-half inch gypsum board (non-rated). South, East and West Walls

- Constructed of 3 5/8 inch metal studs with two layers of 5/8 inch gypsum board (two hour rated).

Ceiling - Constructed of suspended drop out ceiling with fire retardant ceiling tiles from metal decking with built-up roofing material.

Floor - Constructed of metal decking with 6 inch reinforced concrete (three hour rated).

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 3,663 ft2 Combustible Material Paper Plastic Wood SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 59I - Meeting Room and Lunch Area, Fire Area MS-1, Zone I, Elevation 35 feet 0 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The machine shop is located adjacent to the north wall of the service building. Zone MS-1I involves the second floor meeting room and lunch area located above the oil and grease room and electrical shop. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Electric Range Refrigerator Range Hood E PROTECTION Suppression - Ceiling level automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system provided throughout out area.

Water flow alarms and valve tamper supervision provided with signals to control room and Zone Panel Number 8C located in the service building west corridor (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

1.5 inch hose station with 2.5 inch hose connection located in area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - None.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B and 77F for a physical description of this area.

North, East and West Walls - constructed of 3 5/8 inch metal studs with two layers of 5/8 inch gypsum board (2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> rated), except at the lunch preparation area west wall bordering the Mechanical Equipment room, which is constructed of 3 5/8 inch metal studs with one layer of 1/2 inch gypsum board (non-rated).

South Wall - constructed of 3 5/8 inch metal studs with one layer of one-half inch gypsum board (non-rated).

Floor - constructed of metal decking with 6 in. reinforced concrete (three hour rated).

Ceiling - constructed of suspended drop-out ceiling with fire retardant ceiling tiles from metal decking with built-up roofing material.

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 2,056 ft2 Combustible Material Cardboard Plastic Wood SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Insignificant < 6,500 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 60 - Deleted This page intentionally blank - analysis deleted.

ANALYSIS 61 - Floor Areas, Fire Area MSV-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches through 70 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The main steam valve enclosure is located adjacent to the west side of the containment structure and east of the turbine building.

Fire Area MSV-1 involves the entire enclosure with multiple open steel grated elevations.

There are safe shutdown equipment and cables in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Main Steam Safety Valves Main Steam Isolation Trip and Bypass Valves Main Steam Isolation Trip and Bypass Valves Safety-Related Radiation Monitors Feedwater Flow Control Valves Feedwater Low Flow Control Valves Feedwater Isolation Trip Valves Feedwater Isolation Valve Bonnet Relief Non Safety-Related Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve Silencer E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

Manual hose streams available from yard hydrant and hose house located approximately 80 feet south of the enclosure and from HR-60 located in Fire Area AB-8.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Fixed temperature heat detection alarms transmit to the control room. Local alarm sounds at Zone Panel 1B located in the auxiliary building, Elevation 52 feet 0 inches.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B, 77C, 77D, 77E, and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains on Elevation 24 feet 6 inches and 41 feet 0 inches.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Elevation 24 feet 6 inches: 1,562 ft2 Elevation 41 feet 0 inches: 3,560 ft2 Elevation 70 feet 6 inches 2,534 ft2 Combustible Material Transient Lube Oil

  • Plastic
  • Rubber
  • Clothing (Cotton)*

Cable Insulation **

Transient Lube Oil **

Lube Oil **

Rubber **

Transient Lube Oil ***

Lube Oil ***

Plastic Hose ***

evation 24 feet 6 inches Elevation 41 feet 0 inches Elevation 70 feet 6 inches

SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low * < 80,000

  • The Severity Classification is the average of the BTU/FT2 of all elevations.

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a hydraulic oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.a.(1) - No Smoke Detection A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c.(4) - Hose Stations A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J.F. Opeka to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11769, dated October 7, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 62 - Normal Switchgear Room, Fire Area SB-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The service building is located north of the turbine building, east of the control building and west of the auxiliary building.

Fire Area SB-1 involves the entire elevation 4 feet 6inches of the service building. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related 6.9 kV Normal Switchgear 480 V Normal Unit Substations 480 V MCC Cables 480V Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)

E PROTECTION Suppression - Manually actuated total flooding CO2 suppression system.

1.5 inch hose stations available in area and service building Elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

2.5 inch hose connections available in area and service building Elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Cross-zoned smoke detection arranged to transmit alarm.

CO2 suppression system is in manual mode. Detection circuits arranged to transmit a signal to the control room, to the local Zone Panel Number 8C located in the service building west corridor (elevation 4 feet 6 inches), and to the Chemetron local control panel located in the service building east corridor (elevation 24 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 6,050 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation 4160 V Switchgear 480 V Load Center 480 V MCC Batteries SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or switchgear fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 63 - North Cable Tunnel, Fire Area SB-2, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The service building is located north of the turbine building, east of the control building, and west of the auxiliary building.

Fire Area SB-2 involves the cable tunnel in the service building (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches) connecting the east switchgear room in the control building (Fire Area CB-2) and the east MCC and rod drive area in the auxiliary building (Fire Area AB-5). This area is located south of Fire Area SB-1 (normal switchgear room) and north of Fire Area SB-3 (south cable tunnel). There is safe shutdown cable in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Cables Safety-Related Cables Non Safety-Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - Manual actuation total flooding CO2 suppression system. CO2 can be actuated at the local Chemetron CO2 control panel located in the Service Building, East Corridor, elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

1.5 inch hose stations available in the elevation 4 feet 6 inches Service Building West Corridor and at Auxiliary Building, elevation 24 feet 6 inches (Fire Area AB-5).

Note: Manual firefighting efforts will require the extension of a hose from the Auxiliary Building East Floor Area elevation 24 feet 6 inches Connection will be made to the dry hose reel located in the East MCC Rod and Control Area, elevation 24 feet 6 inches The connected hose lengths will then be extended to the North Cable Tunnel and charged at the hose station located in the Auxiliary Building East Floor Area, elevation 24 feet 6 inches Entrance to the hose stations in the Service Building West Corridor is not easily accessible as a result of the tornado doors in the area.

Security assistance will be required to gain access through the tornado doors.

2.5 inch hose connections available in the elevation 4 feet 6 inches Service Building West Corridor.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Cross-zoned, smoke detection is located in this area.

Detection circuits are arranged to transmit a signal to the local Zone Panel Number 8C located in the service building west corridor (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches), to the Chemetron local control panel located in the service building east corridor (Elevation 24 feet 6 inches) and to the control room.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77A for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 1,079 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation

SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Severe 240,000 or above STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c.(4) - Hose Stations A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J.F. Opeka to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11769, dated October 7, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 64 - South Cable Tunnel, Fire Area SB-3, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The service building is located north of the turbine building, east of the control building, and west of the auxiliary building.

Fire Area SB-3 involves the cable tunnel in the service building (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches) connecting the west switchgear room in the control building (Fire Area CB-1) and the West MCC and Rod Drive Area in the auxiliary building (Fire Area AB-6A). This area is located south of Fire Area SB-1 (normal switchgear room) and Fire Area SB-2 (north cable tunnel). There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Cables Safety-Related Cables Non Safety-Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - Manual actuation total flooding CO2 suppression system. CO2 can be actuated at the local Chemetron CO2 control panel located in the Service Building, East Corridor, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

1.5 inch hose stations available in the control building Fire Area CB-1 and in the Auxiliary Building Elevation 24 feet 6 inches (Fire Area AB-6, Zone A).

Note: A dry standpipe is provided in the Control Building OS&Y control valves must be manually opened to provide water to the standpipe system. Control Valves are located in the Turbine Building northwest corner and in the Service Building west corridor adjacent to the Cable Spreading Room. Additional dry hose reel is provided in the West MCC and Rod Control area, elevation 24 feet 6 inches. Manual fire fighting efforts will require the extension of hose from the yard hydrant and hose house located approximately 80 feet south of the Main Steam Valve Building, requiring approximately 150 foot length of hose from the hydrant to the hose reel in the West MCC and Rod Control area.

2.5 inch hose connections available in control building Fire Area CB-1 (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches)

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Cross-zoned smoke detection is located in this area.

Detection circuits are arranged to transmit a signal to the local Zone Panel Number 8C located in the service building west corridor (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches), to the Chemetron local control panel located in the service building east corridor (Elevation 24 feet 6 inches), and to the control room.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77A for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 1,072 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation

SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Severe 240,000 or above STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(14) - Floor Drains A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W.G. Counsil to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c.(4) - Hose Stations A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J.F. Opeka to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11769, dated October 7, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

ANALYSIS 65 - Floor Area, Fire Area SB-4, Zone A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The service building is located north of the turbine building, east of the control building, and west of the auxiliary building.

Fire Area SB-4 involves all service building floors above Elevation 4 feet 6 inches Zone A involves the entire floor area of the elevation 24 feet 6 inches in the service building and the vertical ventilation ductwork up to the 52 feet 6 inches floor elevation. The area houses radiation protection offices, RCA access point, laboratories, and locker room facilities. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Nonsafety-Related Laboratory Equipment Furniture (Office and Lab)

Chemetron CO2 Control Panels Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose stations and 2.5 inch hose connections provided in the area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection provided in areas where applicable combustible loading exists.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms transmit to Zone Panel Number 8C located in the service building - west corridor (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77B and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas with two exceptions:

1. North wall abutting machine shop (Fire Area MS-1 Zone F) machinery area/hallway area which is two hour fire rated construction, and
2. South wall in the area of the door leading to the turbine building (Fire Zone TB-2A) which is two hour fire-rated construction.

Drainage - Shower rooms, chemistry lab, and count room only.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 7,657 ft2 Combustible Material Paper Wood Plastic Clothing (cotton) Control Panels Rubber SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is ignition of materials by a transient source of a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 66 - Floor Area, Fire Area SB-4, Zone B, Elevation 38 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The service building is located north of the turbine building, east of the control building, and west of the auxiliary building.

Fire Area SB-4 involves all service building floors above elevation 4 feet 6 inches Zone B involves the entire floor area of elevation 38 feet 6 inches, with the exception of the lunch room area. The area houses instrument repair shop, engineering offices, and washroom/shower room areas. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose stations and 2.5 inch hose connections provided in the area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection provided in areas where applicable combustible loading exists.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms transmit to Zone Panel Number 8C located in the service building - west corridor (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77C and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas, with one exception: The north wall abutting the machine shop machinery area/hallway (Fire Area MS-1, Zone F) which is two hour rated construction.

Drainage - Washrooms and shower rooms only.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 6,120 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation Wood Paper Acetone Clothing (cotton)

SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is ignition of materials by a transient source or a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 67 - Floor Area, Fire Area SB-4, Zone C, Elevation 49 feet 6 inches and 52 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The service building is located north of the turbine building, east of the control building and west of the auxiliary building.

Fire Area SB-4 involves all service building floors above Elevation 4 feet 6 inches Zone C involves the entire floor area of Elevation 49 feet 6 inches and Elevation 52 feet 6 inches There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related HVAC Equipment Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression.

1.5 inch hose stations and 2.5 inch hose connections provided in the area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection provided in the mechanical equipment area.

No detection in office areas.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms transmit to Zone Panel Number 8C located in the service building-west corridor (Elevation 4 feet 6 inches).

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77D and 77F for a physical description of this area, with two exceptions: An 8 inch diameter fiberglass pipe and a partially sealed beam pocket in the south wall separating Fire Area SB-4, Zone C from Fire Area TB-2, Zone C.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Provided throughout SB-4C.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 7,947 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation 480 V MCC Paper SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is ignition of materials by a transient source or cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a.(11) - Concealed Spaces A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (E.J. Mroczka to B.J.

Youngblood, Letter B11669, dated August 29, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423).

Engineering Evaluation Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation Number 174, Service Building Mechanical Equipment Room (elevation 52 feet 6 inches) South Wall, addresses the partially sealed beam pocket in the north wall separating Fire Area SB-4, Zone C from Fire Area TB-2, Zone C.

ANALYSIS 68 - I&C Conference Room, Office and Lunch Area, Fire Area SB-4, Zone D, Elevation 38 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The service building is located north of the turbine building, east of the control building and west of the auxiliary building.

Fire Area SB-4 involves all service building floors above elevation 4 feet 6 inches Zone D involves the lunch room and kitchen area in the northeast corner of the elevation 38 feet 6 inches floor area. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Electronic Data Processing Equipment QA and Meteorology Equipment Office Product Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression in lunchroom.

1.5 inch hose stations and 2.5 inch hose connections provided in the area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection provided in areas where appreciable combustible loading exists.

Control room receives detection alarms/local alarms transmit to Zone Panel Number 8C located in the service building - west corridor elevation 4 feet 6 inches SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77C and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 1,424 ft2 Combustible Material Wood Paper Clothing (cotton)

Plastic SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is ignition of materials by a transient source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 69 - Fire Area TS-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 13 feet 6 inches and 26 feet 8 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The technical support center is located adjacent to the west wall of the control building.

Fire Area TS-1 involves a two story enclosure which is used as an office/service area in support of supplemental control room activities. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Air Conditioner Unit (fan coil section only)

Charcoal Filtration Unit Motor Control Center E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression systems for general area.

1.5 inch hose station with a 2.5 inch hose connection provided in this area.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

1.5 inch connection and manually operated water spray system provided for the filtration unit charcoal section.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection provided.

Control room receives alarms/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number ZP-5C located in the control building west wall (Elevation 24 feet 6 inches).

Heat detection system provided for the charcoal filtration unit.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A, 77B, and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - No floor drains.

Charcoal filtration unit housing withstands 24 inch water depth to contain deluge spray water.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - Elevation 26 feet 8 inches: 1,387 ft2 Elevation 13 feet 6 inches: 1,941 ft2 Combustible Material 480 V MCC Charcoal Transient Charcoal Paper

  • Wood Rubber Styrofoam Plastic *
  • Denotes Elevation 13 ft-6 in. combustibles (on this level only).

SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low * < 80,000

  • The Severity Classification is the average of the BTU/FT2 of all elevations.

STULATED FIRE Filtration Unit - The postulated fire is a contained fire resulting from a combustible ignition source (charcoal) within the filtration unit.

Technical Support Center excluding Filtration Unit - The postulated fire is a minor cable insulation fire or electrical cabinet fire resulting from a transient ignition source or an electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 70 - North Normal Station Service Transformer Fire Area XR-1, Zone N/A, Elevation Ground Level NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The north normal station service transformer is located approximately 75 feet east of the auxiliary boiler building, 75 feet southeast of the turbine building, and 150 feet south of the containment structure. This unit is adjacent to the south normal station service transformer and both Spare Normal Station Service Transformers. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Normal Station Transformer Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic operating deluge water spray system/Line-Type heat detection system actuates suppression system.

Manual actuation capability via a pull station at the control panel located adjacent to the transformer area and from the deluge valve located in the valve pit.

Detection alarm, water flow alarm, and valve tamper signal transmit to the local deluge control panel, Zone Panel Number 12 located in the Deluge Building and to the control room main fire protection panel.

Manual hose streams available from yard hose houses and hydrants.

Detection - Line-type heat detection system provided as described above for suppression system actuation.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77B for a physical description of this area.

Fire barrier wall used to separate adjacent transformers.

Drainage - Drains to oil separation system; diked area with trap rock cover utilized for spilled oil retention and spill fire control.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 3618 ft2 Combustible Material Transformer Oil SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 71 - South Normal Station Service Transformer Fire Area XR-2, Zone N/A, Elevation Ground Level NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The south normal station service transformer is located approximately 75 feet east of the auxiliary boiler building, 75 feet southeast of the turbine building, and 150 feet south of the containment structure. This unit is adjacent to the north normal station service transformer and both Spare Normal Station Service Transformers. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Normal Station Transformer Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic operating deluge water spray system/Line-Type heat detection system actuates suppression system.

Manual actuation capability via a pull station at the control panel located adjacent to the transformer area and from the deluge valve located in the valve pit.

Detection alarm, water flow alarm, and valve tamper signal transmit to the local deluge control panel, Zone Panel Number 12 located in the Deluge Building and to the control room main fire protection panel.

Manual hose streams available from yard hose houses and hydrants.

Detection - Line-type heat detection system provided as described above for suppression system actuation.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77B for a physical description of this area.

Fire barrier wall used to separate adjacent transformers.

Drainage - Drains to oil separation system; diked area with trap rock cover utilized for spilled oil retention and spill fire control.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 2,663 ft2 Combustible Material Transformer Oil SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 72 - North Spare Normal Station Service Transformer, Fire Area XR-3, Zone N/A, Elevation Ground Level tection and suppression systems removed, see Note 1.)

NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION north Spare Normal Station Service Transformer area is located approximately 50 feet east of auxiliary boiler building, 75 feet southeast of the turbine building, and 150 feet south of the tainment structure. This area is adjacent to both normal station service transformers and west he Normal Station Service Transformers. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Spare Normal Station Service Transformer E PROTECTION Suppression - Manual hose streams available from yard hose houses and hydrants.

Detection - None (See Note 1)

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77B for a physical description of this area.

Fire barrier wall used to separate fire areas.

Drainage - Drains to oil separation system; diked area with trap rock cover utilized for spilled oil retention and spill fire control.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 719 ft2 Combustible Material Transformer Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate <160,000

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is ignition of transient combustibles from a transient ignition source.

Ignition of transformer oil is not credible for the de-energized spare transformer.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE None TE The suppression/detection systems for the North and South Spare Normal Station Service Transformers and their associated alarms installed during initial plant startup (Fire Areas XR-3 and XR-4) have been removed from the plant per DC MP3-16-01121. See Fire Hazards Analysis 70 and 71 for new Normal Station Service Transformers.

ANALYSIS 73 - South Spare Normal Station Service Transformer, Fire Area XR-4, Zone N/A, Elevation Ground Level tection and suppression systems removed, see Note 1.)

NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The south spare normal station service transformer area is located approximately 50 feet east of the auxiliary boiler building, 75 feet southeast of the turbine building, and 150 feet south of the containment structure. This area is adjacent to both normal station service transformers and west of the Normal Station Service Transformers. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Spare Normal Station Service Transformers E PROTECTION Suppression - Manual hose streams available from yard hose houses and hydrants.

Detection - None, (See Note 1)

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77B for a physical description of this area.

Fire barrier wall used to separate fire areas.

Drainage - Drains to oil separation system; diked area with trap rock cover utilized for spilled oil retention and spill fire control.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 762 ft2 Combustible Material Transformer Oil VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate <160,000

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is ignition of transient combustibles resulting from a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE None TE The Suppression/detection systems for the North and South Spare Normal Station Service Transformers and their associated alarms installed during initial plant startup (Fire Areas XR-3 and XR-4) have been removed from the plant per DC MP3-16-01121. See Fire Hazards Analysis 70 and 71 for new Normal Station Service Transformers.

ANALYSIS 74 - East Reserve Transformer, Fire Area XR-5, Zone N/A, Elevation Ground Level NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The east reserve transformer is located 20 feet north of the boron recovery tank enclosure and 200 feet east of the waste disposal building. This unit is adjacent to the west reserve transformer. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Nonsafety-Related Reserve Station Transformer Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic operating deluge water spray system/line-type heat detection system actuates suppression system.

Manual actuation from the deluge valve located in the valve pit.

Detection alarm, water flow alarm, and valve tamper signal transmit to the local deluge control panel, Zone Panel Number 9B located in the auxiliary building (Elevation 24 feet 6 inches) and to the control room main fire protection panel.

Manual hose streams available from yard hose houses and hydrants.

Detection - Line-type heat detection system provided as described above for suppression system actuation.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77B for a physical description of this area.

Fire barrier wall used to separate adjacent transformers.

Drainage - Drains to oil separation system; diked area with trap rock cover utilized for spilled oil retention and spill fire control.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 1,777 ft2 Combustible Material Transformer Oil SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 75 - West Reserve Transformer, Fire Area XR-6, Zone N/A, Elevation Ground Level NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The west reserve transformer is located 20 feet north of the boron recovery tank enclosure and 200 feet east of the waste disposal building. This unit is adjacent to the east reserve transformer. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Reserve Station Transformer Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic operating deluge water spray system/line-type heat detection system actuates suppression system.

Manual actuation from the deluge valve located in the valve pit.

Detection alarm, water flow alarm, and valve tamper signal transmit to the local deluge control panel, Zone Panel Number 9B located in the auxiliary building (Elevation 24 feet 6 inches) and to the control room main fire protection panel.

Manual hose streams available from yard hose houses and hydrants.

Detection - Line-type heat detection system provided as described above for suppression system actuation.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77B for a physical description of this area.

Fire barrier wall used to separate adjacent transformers.

Drainage - Drains to oil separation system; diked area with trap rock cover utilized for spilled oil retention and spill fire control.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 1,875 ft2 Combustible Material Transformer Oil SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 76 - Oil Storage Room, Fire Area TB-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 14 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The turbine building is located south of the control building and service building, west of the main steam valve enclosure, and north of the auxiliary boiler enclosure and Warehouse Number 5/condensate polishing facility.

Fire Area TB-1 involves a small enclosure located in the northeast corner of Fire Area TB-2A. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Lube Oil Storage Tanks (Clean and Dirty)

Lube Oil Transfer Pump E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic wet pipe sprinkler system at ceiling level.

Water flow alarm transmits to the control room/local alarms sound at the alarm check valve and the Zone Panel Number 6F located in the turbine building-west wall (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches).

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections are located in Fire Area TB-2A Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - There is no detection provided in this area.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A and 77B for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Six foot poured concrete walls serve as oil containment structure.

Drainage - Floor drains to oil separation system.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 797 ft2 Combustible Material Lubricating Oil SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Severe 240,000 or above STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a lubricating oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 77 - Basement Floor Area, Fire Area TB-2, Zone A, Elevation 7 feet and 14 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The turbine building is located south of the control building and service building, west of the main steam valve enclosure, and north of the auxiliary boiler enclosure and Warehouse Number 5/condensate polishing facility.

Fire Area TB-2, Zone A, involves the turbine building open floor areas and turbine condenser floor areas on Elevation 7 feet and Elevation 14 feet 6 inches, and the area below Elevation 38 feet 6 inches mezzanine in the condensate polishing enclosure. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Condensers Condensate Pumps Turbine Plant Component Cooling Heat Exchangers and Pumps Condensate Polishing Demineralizers Acid and Caustic Transfer Pumps, Heaters, and Tanks Water Treating System Pumps and Tanks Instrument Air Compressors, Dryers, Coolers, and Receivers Service Air Compressors, Coolers, and Receivers Feedwater Heaters Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - In both the turbine building and condensate polishing enclosure, automatic wet pipe sprinkler protection is provided below the 38 feet 6 inches mezzanine level and all obstructions over 4 feet wide.

Water flow alarms and valve tamper signals transmit to the control room/local alarms sound at the alarm check valve and Zone Panel Number ZP-6F located in the turbine building (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches).

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections are located in this area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - There is no area detection in this area, except for smoke detectors located in the ceiling of the condensate polishing enclosure area.

Detector alarms transmit to Zone Panel ZP-6F located in the Turbine Building (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches) and to the Control Room main Fire Protection Console and color-graphics CPUs.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction between adjacent fire areas with the exception of the north wall in the vicinity of the door leading to the service building (Fire Zone SB-4A) which is two hour fire rated construction.

Non-fire rated construction of outdoor walls.

Drainage - Floor drains provided throughout the area.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 49,408 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation Lube Oils 480 V Load Center 480 V MCC Control Panels Transient Lube Oils Flammable Liquids Hydrazine Office Materials Rubber Wood Plastic Fiberglass

SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a lubricating oil or cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 78 - Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit, Fire Area TB-2, Zone B, Elevation 14 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The turbine building is located south of the control building and service building, west of the main steam valve enclosure and north of the auxiliary boiler enclosure and Warehouse Number 5/condensate polishing facility.

Fire Area TB-2, Zone B, involves an open fire area within Fire Area TB-2A. This area is south of the turbine generator condensers on Elevation 14 feet 6 inches There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit Tank Main Seal Oil Pump Emergency Seal Oil Pump Recirculating Seal Oil Vacuum Pump Recirculating Seal Oil Pump E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic operating deluge spray system.

Rate compensated heat detection system initiates water spray automatically.

Manual system actuation capability provided via a pull station adjacent to the deluge control panel and at the deluge valve.

Water flow alarm, valve tamper signal, and heat detection signal transmit to the local deluge control panel, to Zone Panel Number 6F located in the turbine building (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches), and to the control room main fire protection panel.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections are located in Fire Area TB-2A.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Rate compensated heat detection system provided for suppression system actuation as described above.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77A for a physical description of this area.

Open area/no construction features.

Drainage - Single floor drain to oil separation system.

4-in. concrete dike around perimeter of seal oil unit for oil containment.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 226 ft2 Combustible Material Seal Oil SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a seal oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 79 - Equipment Mezzanine, Fire Area TB-2, Zone C, Elevation 38 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The turbine building is located south of the control building and service building, west of the main steam valve enclosure and north of the auxiliary boiler enclosure and Warehouse Number 5/condensate polishing facility.

Fire Area TB-2, Zone C, involves the Elevation 38 feet 6 inches mezzanine area of the entire turbine building and the condensate polishing enclosure. There is safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown Motor Control Center Cables Non Safety-Related Feedwater Heaters Moisture Separator Drain Tank Condensate Polishing Equipment Motor Control Centers Control Cabinets Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - In both the turbine building and condensate polishing enclosure, automatic wet pipe sprinkler protection provided below Elevation 64 feet 6 inches and below all obstructions over 4 feet wide.

Water flow alarm and valve tamper signal transmits to the control room/local alarms sound at the alarm check valve and Zone Panel Number ZP-6F located in the turbine building Elevation 14 feet 6 inches.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections are located throughout the area.

Portable extinguishers are provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - There is no area detection in this area, except for the smoke detectors located in the ceiling of the condensate polishing enclosure area. Detector alarms transmit to Zone Panel ZP-6F located in the turbine building (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches) and to the control room Main Fire protection console and color-graphics CPUs.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77C and 77F for a physical description of this area.

3-hour fire-rated construction between adjacent fire areas with two exceptions: an 8 inch diameter fiberglass pipe and a partially sealed beam pocket in the north wall separating Fire Area TB-2, Zone C from Fire Area SB-4, Zone C.

Drainage - Open grating provides drainage to Elevation 14 feet 6 inches Floor drains are located in the condensate polishing enclosure area.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 43,945 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation 480 V Load Centers 480 V MCC Control Panels Lube Oils Transient Lube Oils Resin Flammable Liquids 6.9/4.16 kV Switchgear Plastic Rubber Wood Fiberglass

SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or switchgear fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ineering Evaluation Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation Number 174, Service Building Mechanical Equipment Room (Elevation 52 feet 6 inches) South Wall addresses the partially sealed beam pocket in the North Wall separating Fire Area TB-2, Zone C from Fire Area SB-4, Zone C.

ANALYSIS 80 - Operating Floor, Fire Area TB-2, Zone D, Elevation 64 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The turbine building is located south of the control building and service building, west of the main steam valve enclosure and north of the auxiliary boiler enclosure and Warehouse Number 5/condensate polishing facility.

Fire Area TB-2, Zone D, involves the entire operating floor area exclusive of the alternator/exciter enclosure and the turbine shaft bearing areas. A fully sprinkled two-story modular building, known as the IMF Building is located at the north end of this Fire Area Zone. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Turbine Generator Unit Feedwater Pumps Hydrogen Coolers E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression systems for general area. Automatic operating deluge water spray system for feedwater pumps/rate compensated heat detection system actuates suppression system. Automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system protecting the IMF Building is directly tied-in to the Sprinkler System protecting the turbine building Lube Oil Reservoir and conditioner area.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections are located throughout the area.

Portable extinguishers are provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection alarm, water flow alarm and valve tamper signal for feedwater pump area deluge system transmit to the local deluge control panel, Zone Panel Number 6F located in the turbine building (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches) and to the control room main fire protection panel. Water flow alarm for the TB Lube Oil Reservoir/IMF sprinkler systems transmit back to the Zone Panel ZP-6F and the Control Room main fire protection console/color-graphics. Flow switch transmit signal to separate local alarm at IMF Bldg.

Detection - There is no detection system in the general area.

Rate compensated heat detection system provided in the feedwater pump area for suppression system actuation as described above.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77D and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction except at the hollow core 8 inch block wall separating Fire Area TB-2, Zone D from Fire Area TB-2, Zone F (the turbine building general support area).

Drainage - Open stairwells/floor openings allow drainage to area below.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 37,937 ft2 Combustible Material 480 V Load Center Control Panels Clothing (cotton)

Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil Plastic Rubber Fiberglass SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Insignificant < 6,500

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a lubricating oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source, electrical fault or mechanical heat source in one of the pump units.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 81 - Turbine Shaft Areas, Fire Area TB-2, Zone E, Elevation 64 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The turbine building is located south of the control building and service building, west of the main steam valve enclosure, and north of the auxiliary boiler enclosure and Warehouse Number 5/condensate polishing facility.

Fire Area TB-2, Zone E, involves four exposed sections of the turbine shaft and the oil supply piping in the immediate area of the turbine bearings. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related High Pressure Oil Lift Pumps High Pressure Turbine Low Pressure Turbines E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic operating preaction sprinkler system.

Single zone, rate compensated heat detection system is used to automatically actuate the deluge valve.

Manual actuation of deluge valve via a pull station located adjacent to the deluge valve control panel and at the deluge valve.

Water flow alarm and detection alarm transmits to the deluge valve control panel, the building alarm Zone Panel Number 6F and to the control room main fire protection panel. Supervisory air pressure is monitored to the deluge valve control panel and to the control room.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections are located throughout Fire Area TB-2D.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing requirements.

Detection - Heat detection system provided to automatically actuate the suppression system as described above.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77D and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Standard turbine generator equipment housing-steel construction.

Drainage - Through open floor areas around turbine unit to areas below.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 5,197 ft2 Combustible Material Lube Oil SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 82 - General Support Area, Fire Area TB-2, Zone F, Elevation 64 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The turbine building is located south of the control building and service building, west of the main steam valve enclosure, and north of the auxiliary boiler enclosure and Warehouse Number 5/condensate polishing facility.

Fire Area TB-2, Zone F, is an extension of the turbine building operating floor (Elevation 64 feet 6 inches) and communicates directly with TB-2D through an open 4 inch shake space area. This area is adjacent to Fire Areas CB-13 and CB-14. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Domestic Water Hot Water Heater Office Furniture General Storage E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic wet pipe sprinkler system below the suspended ceiling in the office areas and the wall between the office area and the high-bay/two-level maintenance crib.

Control room receives water flow alarms/local alarm sounds at Zone Panel Number 6F located in the turbine building (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches).

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections available in this area.

Portable extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - None.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77D and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas/zones except at the hollow core 8 inch block wall separating Fire Area TB-2, Zone F from Fire Area TB-2, Zone D (i.e., the turbine building operating floor).

Drainage - Floor drain in high bay area. Fire protection water will drain via this drain to turbine deck and service building northwest stairwell through open doors.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 6,221 ft2 Combustible Material Paper Rubber SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is ignition of stored combustible materials by a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 83 - Alternator/Exciter Enclosure, Fire Area TB-2, Zone G, Elevation 64 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The turbine building is located south of the control building and service building, west of the main steam valve enclosure and north of the auxiliary boiler enclosure and Warehouse Number 5/condensate polishing facility.

Fire Area TB-2, Zone G, involves the alternator/exciter enclosure located on the turbine operating floor south of the generator unit. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Turbine Generator Alternator/Exciter E PROTECTION Suppression - Manually operated local application CO2 system for the exciter bearings and casing.

Actuation via a pull station located outside the enclosure.

Local alarm upon discharge of CO2.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections are located throughout Fire Area TB-2D.

Portable extinguishers are provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone, rate compensated heat detection within the enclosure with one detector located over each exciter bearing.

Detection alarms transmit to the CO2 control panel, Zone Panel Number 6F located in the turbine building (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches) and to the control room main fire protection panel.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77D and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Standard alternator/exciter enclosure construction.

Drainage - Open floor to areas below.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 281 ft2 Combustible Material Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 84 - Battery Room Number 6, Fire Area TB-3, Zone N/A, Elevation 38 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The turbine building is located south of the control building and service building, west of the main steam valve enclosure and north of the auxiliary boiler enclosure and Warehouse Number 5/condensate polishing facility.

Fire Area TB-3 involves a small area in the north end of Fire Area TB-2C adjacent to the lube oil reservoir and conditioner (Fire Area TB-4). There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Battery Bank Battery Room Exhaust Fan E PROTECTION Suppression - None.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections are located in Fire Area TB-2C.

Portable extinguishers are provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection provided.

Detection alarms transmit to the control room/local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 6F located in the turbine building (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches)

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77C for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - None.

Ventilation - System provided to maintain hydrogen concentration well below 2 percent.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 210 ft2 Combustible Material Batteries SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a battery casing fire resulting from a transient ignition source or an electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 85 - Lube Oil Reservoir and Conditioner, Fire Area TB-4, Zone N/A, Elevation 38 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The turbine building is located south of the control building and service building, west of the main steam valve enclosure and north of the auxiliary boiler enclosure and Warehouse Number 5/condensate polishing facility.

Fire Area TB-4 involves a one-story area with a mezzanine and is located at the northwest corner of Fire Area TB-2C. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Turbine Lube Oil Cooler and Reservoir Lube Oil Conditioner and Conditioner Recirculation Pump Emergency Bearings Oil Pump Turning Gear Oil Pump Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor Suction Pump E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic operating wet pipe sprinkler system at the ceiling. Refer to Fire Area TB-2C analysis for details of this system.

Automatic operating water spray system for the lube oil reservoir and conditioner unit.

Rate compensated heat detection system used to actuate the spray system.

Manual actuation capability provided via a pull station located outside the two entryways to the area and at the deluge valve.

Water flow alarm, valve tamper signal, and detection alarm transmit to the deluge valve control panel, Zone Panel Number 6F located in the turbine building (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches) and to the control room main fire protection panel.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections are located in Fire Area TB-2C.

Portable extinguishers are provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Detection system provided as described above for suppression system actuation.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77C and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains connected to oil separation system.

Ventilation - Five foot high poured concrete walls provide containment for spilled oil.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 1,103 ft2 Combustible Material Lubricating Oil SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Severe 240,000 or above STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a lubricating oil fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 86 - General Area, Fire Area VP-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The vacuum priming pump house is located at the end of the circulating water discharge tunnel at the edge of the quarry. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Yard Vacuum Priming Tank Yard Vacuum Priming Pumps Yard Vacuum Priming Seal Water Recirculating Pumps Yard Vacuum Priming Tank Seal Water Heat Exchangers Yard Vacuum Priming Separator Silencers Motor Control Centers E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression systems Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - None.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77B for a physical description of this area.

Non fire-rated construction provided. Fire Area VP-2 is not adjacent to other fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains discharge into quarry.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 1,254 ft2

Combustible Material Cable Insulation 480 V MCC Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or switchgear fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 87 - Floor Areas, Fire Area CP-1, Zone N/A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches, 28 feet 6 inches, 50 feet 6 inches, and 66 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The Warehouse Number 5/condensate polishing facility is located south of the MP 3 turbine building and auxiliary boiler enclosure and north of the MP 2 turbine building.

This facility is shared between Millstone Units 2 and 3.

Fire Area CP-1 involves the condensate polishing equipment (various elevations) warehouse area on Elevation 28 fee 6 inches and miscellaneous office and general use areas on Elevation 50 feet 6 inches An equipment penthouse exists on Elevation 66 feet 6 inches There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Condensate Demineralizer Liquid/Solid Waste System and Related Equipment Condensate Polishing System and Related Equipment Cables Diesel Instrument Air Compressor, Air Dryer, Receiver and Controls E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic wet pipe sprinkler protection provided in selected areas on Elevation 28 feet 6 inches and 50 feet 6 inches Alarms transmitted to panel 3FPM-ANN01 located in this facility (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches - southeast corner) to Zone Panel 6E located in the turbine building (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches, west wall) and to the control room main fire protection panel.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections are provided throughout all elevations.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detection provided in areas with appreciable combustible loading where automatic sprinkler protection does not exist.

Alarms transmitted to panel 3FPM-ANN01 located in this facility (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches southeast corner), to Zone Panel 6E located in the turbine building (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches, west wall) and to the control room main fire protection panel.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A, 77B, 77C, 77D and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Non fire-rated construction provided. Fire Area VP-2 is not adjacent to other fire areas.

Drainage - Floor drains discharge into quarry.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area -

  • Elevation 4 feet-6 inches: 17,229 ft2
    • Elevation 28 feet-6 inches: 17,780 ft2
      • Elevation 50 feet-6 inches: 11,965 ft2
        • Elevation 66 feet-6 inches: 1,880 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation
  • Control Panel
  • Lube Oil*

Transient Lube Oil

  • Cardboard
  • Paper
  • Plastic
  • Rubber
  • Wood
  • Cable Insulation **

Combustible Material 480 V Load Center **

480 V MCC **

Control Panel **

Lube Oil **

Transient Lube Oil **

Transient Resin **

Cardboard**

Charcoal**

Paper**

Plastic**

Rubber**

Wood**

Cable Insulation***

Paper***

Batteries***

Cardboard***

Clothing (cotton)***

Flammable Liquid***

Plastic***

Rubber***

Wood***

Cable Insulation****

VERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2) vation 4 feet 6 inches Low < 80,000 vation 28 feet 6 inches Low < 80,000 vation 50 feet 6 inches Low < 80,000 vation 66 feet 0 inches Insignificant < 6,500

ANALYSIS 88 - Q.A. Records Storage Room, Fire Area CP-2, Zone N/A, Elevation 50 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The Warehouse Number 5/condensate polishing facility is located south of the MP 3 turbine building and auxiliary boiler enclosure and north of the MP 2 turbine building.

This facility is shared between Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3.

Fire Area CP-2 involves the records storage area only. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT None.

E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic operating, total flooding Halon 1301 suppression system actuated by heat detectors.

Alarms transmitted to Panel 3FPM-ANN01 located in Fire Area CP-1 (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches); to Zone Panel ZP-6E located in the Turbine Building (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches, west wall) and to the control room main fire protection console.

1.5 inch hose stations with a 2.5 inches hose connection available on this floor elevation.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single-zone smoke detectors for early warning. Alarms transmitted to Panel 3FPM-ANN01 located in Fire Area CP-1 (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches); to Zone Panel ZP-6E located in the Turbine Building (Elevation 14 feet 6 inches, west wall) and to the control room main fire protection console. Single-zone, rate-compensated heat detection system arranged to actuate the Halon 1301 system.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77C and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Floor is three hour fire rated construction; walls are two hour fire rated construction with three hour fire door; and roof deck underside and supporting steel is fireproofed with pyrocrete to a two hour fire rating.

Drainage - None.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 1,122 ft2 Combustible Material Paper SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a paper fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 89 - Floor Areas, Fire Area WDB-1, Zone A, Elevation 4 feet 6 inches, 16 feet 6 inches, 24 feet 6 inches, 43 feet 6 inches, and 68 feet NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The waste disposal building is located north of the fuel building and east of the auxiliary building.

Fire Area WDB-1, Zone A, involves all floor areas of the liquid waste portion of the facility and the pipe tunnel serving the boron recovery system. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety-Related Boron Recovery System Demineralizer, Test Tank Pumps, and Evaporator Feed Pump Liquid Waste System Evaporator Components Spent Resin Facility Components 120 Volt Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) (Elevation 24 feet 6 inches)

E PROTECTION Suppression - No fixed suppression systems.

1.5inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections provided.

(Elevation 4 feet 6 inches, 24 feet 6 inches, 43 feet 6 inches, and 68 feet). Hose stations also available from northeast corner of auxiliary building on Elevation 4 feet 6 inches and 43 feet 6 inches.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Single zone smoke detectors located at all elevations in areas with appreciable combustible loading. Control room receives all detection alarms. Local alarms sound at Zone Panel Number 9B located in the auxiliary building Elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figures 77A, 77B, 77C, 77D and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

Drainage - Various locations at all elevations; 4-in. concrete dikes at doorway of most pump/tank cubicles.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 6,130 ft2 - Elevation 4 feet 6 inches*

4,803 ft2 - Elevation 24 feet 6 inches 4,803 ft2 - Elevation 43 feet 6 inches 2,580 ft2 - Elevation 68 feet 0 inches Combustible Material Cable Insulation Control Panel Lube Oil Transient Lube Oil 480 V MCC Batteries for 120 Volt UPS (Elevation 24 feet 6 inches)

SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation or switchgear fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 90 - Solid Waste Area, Fire Area WDB-1, Zone B, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The waste disposal building is located north of the fuel building and east of the auxiliary building.

Fire Area WDB-1, Zone B, involves the open solid waste storage and handling area located north of and communicating directly with Fire Area WDB-1A. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT safety-Related Liquid Radwaste Processing System Self Engaging Dewatering System High Integrity Container (HIC)

E PROTECTION pression - Automatic wet pipe sprinkler system covers the entire area.

Waterflow alarms transmit to the main fire protection panel in the control room.

Local alarm transmit to Zone Panel Number 9B located in the auxiliary building Elevation 24 feet 6 inches.

Valve tamper switch transmits to control room and local Zone Panel Number 9B.

1.5 inch hose stations with 2.5 inch hose connections provided in area.

2.5 inch hose connection at 1.5 inch hose racks.

Portable fire extinguishers provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

ection - None.

SIGN FEATURES struction - Refer to Figures 77A, 77B, 77C, 77D and 77F for a physical description of this area.

Three hour fire rated construction provided between adjacent fire areas.

inage - Provided via outside doors.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING or Area - 4,803 ft2 mbustible Material Cardboard Paper Transient Plastic Cable Insulation Lube Oil Rubber Transient Consumables Resin Plastic Control Panels Transient Resin Transient Activated Carbon SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

ANALYSIS 91 - Enclosure, Fire Area SBO-1, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The station blackout diesel generator enclosure is a separate building located directly south of the Boron Recovery Tanks enclosure and approximately 100 feet east of the Fuel Building Railroad Track Bay east roll-up door.

Fire Area SBO-1 involves the SBO Diesel Generator and Switchgear Enclosures, interconnecting corridor and the 3000-gallon Fuel Oil Tank Enclosure located directly west of the Switchgear and south of the Diesel Generator enclosure.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown None Safety-Related None Non Safety-Related SBO Diesel Generator, SWGR equipment and Control Panels (MP2 shutdown equipment, credited for MP2 Appendix R fires in Areas R-1, R-11, R-16).

E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic closed head preaction sprinkler protection is provided for the entire area. Local water flow alarm and valve tamper supervision are transmitted to the local Fire Protection Panel 3FPA-PNL ZP10 located in the west end of the SBO D/G Enclosure. The preaction valve (3FPW-FV84) and SBO fire protection water cutout valve (3FPW-V457) are located in the RSST deluge valve pit. A second in-line isolation valve (3FPW-V452) is added between the sprinkler heads and the preaction valve. It is located along the south wall of the Boron Tanks Recovery Enclosure for manual isolation of the sprinkler heads, if necessary. The cutout valve is normally open (with tamper switch) and the in-line isolation valve is normally locked open.

Portable CO2 and dry chemical fire extinguishers are provided throughout the area.

Detection - Two (2) ceiling mounted rate-of-rise heat detectors located in the SBO D/G Enclosure for suppression system actuation. Smoke detectors are mounted at the ceiling of the SBO Switchgear enclosure and corridor for early warning.

SBO fire detectors alarm at local fire panel 3FPA-PNL ZP10. A trouble alarm for position cation of the SBO deluge isolation valve 3FPW-V457 and the alarm for fire protection water are received at local fire panel 3FPA-PNL ZP10, zone panel 3FPA-PNL ZP4 (zones 21 and and the Control Room main fire protection console and color graphics CPU units.

SIGN FEATURES struction - SBO Emergency Diesel Generator and Switchgear Enclosure Walls and Ceiling - Acoustic Insulation with composite perforated aluminum lining interior and sheet aluminum exterior for the SBO D/G Enclosure and fiberglass insulation with 0.032 mill finish stucco aluminum interior and sheet aluminum exterior for the Switchgear enclosure area. Aluminum framing.

Floor - Steel framing and plating on concrete slab. Doors/Frames - Non-Rated (to outside) Fire Dampers - None.

SBO Fuel Oil Vault Walls & Floor - 12 inch thick reinforced concrete Ceiling - three-quarter inch thick steel plating.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING or Area - 916 ft2 mbustible Material Lube Oil Fuel Oil Cable Insulation Control Panels 480 V MCC 6.9/4.16 kV Switchgear Batteries

SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a pool fire in the SBO D/G enclosure area due to the rupturing of an oil transfer line or cable insulation/switchgear fire resulting from a transient ignition source of electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE A fire in this area would possibly involve electrical cables, lube oil and/or fuel for the SBO Diesel Generator. As a result, damage to the diesel generator/components would be expected. Because the area is fully protected by an automatic preaction sprinkler system which alarms back to the continually manned Control Room when actuated, a fire would be quickly detected and controlled/extinguished. Excessive oil and water would drain from the enclosure back to the Fuel Oil Vault via (2) two inch diameter spare lines running from the bottom of the enclosure to the Vault. The fire would also be detected by the rate-of-rise heat detectors in the SBO D/G Enclosure or by smoke detectors located in the SBO Switchgear Enclosure and connecting corridor. These detector systems alarm at the local fire panel 3FPA-PNL ZP10. In addition to the automatic preaction sprinkler system, portable CO2 and dry chemical fire extinguishers are provided external and internal of the SBO D/G and Switchgear Enclosure areas for fire brigade use. Any damage is expected to be restricted to the immediate area/equipment/component involved. However, in the event that these cables and equipment sustain damage, plant safe shutdown can be achieved without this equipment.

VIATIONS None 10 EVALUATIONS None

ANALYSIS 92 - Station Blackout Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank, Fire Area SBO-2, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The station blackout diesel fuel oil storage tank is a separate above ground fuel storage tank with an integral containment dike located directly south of the station blackout diesel generator enclosure. The tank is approximately 100 feet east of the Fuel Building and directly south of the Boron Recovery tanks.

Fire Area SBO-2 involves the SBO diesel fuel oil storage tank and its auxiliaries including its integral containment dike.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown None Safety-Related None Non Safety-Related SBO Fuel Oil Storage Tank 3BGF-TK2 (MP2 shutdown equipment, credited for MP2 Appendix R fires in Fire Areas R-1, R-11 and R-16).

E PROTECTION Suppression - Fire fighting foam supplies and portable CO2 and dry chemical fire extinguishers are provided for the area.

Detection - None SIGN FEATURES Construction - SBO Fuel Oil Storage Tank Containment - The containment dike is constructed of one-quarter inch thick carbon steel and sized to hold the contents of the tank.

Floor - Tank is mounted on a reinforced concrete slab.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 372 ft2 Combustible Material - Fuel Oil SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Severe 240,000 or above STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a pool fire in the SBO Fuel Oil Storage Tank containment dike due to the rupturing of the tank and/or the fuel transfer line, and a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE A fire in this area would possibly involve the MP3 SBO diesel generator and its components. The fire is expected to be contained in the containment dike around the tank.

However, the fire could produce radiant heat that may ignite a fire in the adjacent SBO-1 fire area. As a result, damage to the MP3 SBO diesel generator/components would be expected. Fire area SBO-1 has an automatic fire suppression system which would quickly extinguish the fire. Fire fighting foam, portable CO2 fire extinguishers and dry chemical fire extinguishers are provided for the area (SBO-2) for fire brigade use to quickly extinguish the fire. MP3 safe shutdown can be achieved without this equipment.

In the event that the fuel oil storage tank sustains damage, safe shutdown can still be achieved for MP2 since a fire in MP2 Appendix R Fire Areas R-1, R-11 and R-16 is not assumed to occur coincident with an MP2 SBO event, an MP3 SBO event or a fire in the MP3 SBO area. There is no MP2 or MP3 safety related equipment within 50 feet of the above ground SBO fuel oil storage tank.

VIATIONS None 10 EVALUATIONS FP-EV-00-0002 BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.j - Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas 86-10 evaluation FP-EV-00-0002 has been performed to justify that automatic fire suppression and detection is not provided on the SBO Fuel Oil Storage Tank 3BGF-TK2.

ANALYSIS 93 - Fire Pump House, Fire Area FP-1, Elevation 14 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION This area/zone consists of the Fire Pump House Building located on the 14 feet 6 inches elevation south of the Unit 2 Fire Pump House and east of the Fire Water Storage Tanks.

This area does not contain safe shutdown equipment.

The Unit 3 Fire Pumps remain in service as part of the Millstone Site Fire Water System.

This is a non-contaminated/non-radiological area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown None Safety Related None Non Safety Related Diesel Fire Pump (M7-7), Electric Fire Pump (M7-8), Jockey Pump (M7-11), and MCC-CD6.

e: The two main fire pumps are TRM controlled components that support the Millstone ion Fire Water Supply System. The pumps also support MP2 for Appendix R requirements.

E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic operation, total flooding Halon 1301 suppression system actuated by a cross-zoned smoke detector and rate of rise heat detector.

Detection alarms transmitted to local panel FCP (2462), to zone panels 3FPA-PNLZP6A and 3FPA-PNLZP11 located in the Turbine Building (Elevation 14 ft-6 in), and to the control room main fire protection console.

Manual actuation capability via a pull station located within the Fire Pump House.

Portable extinguisher located in the fire pump house is provided based on NFPA Standard Number 10 location and spacing guidelines.

Detection - Cross-zoned smoke detector and rate of rise heat detector are provided as described above for suppression system actuation.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77A for a physical description of this area.

Walls are 8 inch RC, floor is concrete, and roof is comprised of built up roof on steel deck.

Drainage - Floor drain provided within the pump house.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 375 ft2 Combustible Material Fuel Oil Lube Oil Cable Insulation Paper Plastic Flammable Liquid Clothing (cotton)

Rubber SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Moderate < 160,000 STULATED FIRE Ignition of combustible liquids associated with the diesel fire pump operation or electrical fire associated with the motor driven fire pump.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as there is no Unit 3 Safe Shutdown Equipment in this area.

VIATION A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W. G. Counsil to B. J.

Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket Number 50-423) regarding the separation and capacity of fire pumps.

Power Distribution Center - 1 (PDC-1)

Variable Frequency Drives (3CWS-VFD1A & 3CWS-VFD1D)

ANALYSIS 94 - Enclosure Fire Area Building 332A, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION A Variable Frequency Drive (VFD) is an in-line power supply to control the operating speed of the Circulating Water Pump. There are two VFDs installed in a single Power Distribution Center (PDC). There are three PDCs installed on the west side of the Turbine Building.

Each of the PDCs have been given their own fire zone identification. Each PDC contains two VFDs comprised of a transformer cabinet, a relay cabinet and a power cell cabinet as well as associated cables, cable trays, distribution panels and HVAC units.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown None Safety Related None Non Safety Related Transformer cabinets (2), relay cabinets (2), power cell cabinets (2), cooling fan/blowers (12), 480V AC distribution panels (2), 120V AC distribution panels (2), HVAC units (4), UPSs (2) and no credit taken for MP3 Appendix R fires.

E PROTECTION Suppression - There is no automatic suppression system within the PDC. Two portable (10 pound CO2) fire extinguishers are located internal to the PDC. Fire hydrant and hose stations are located immediately north and south of the PDC location.

Detection - Each PDC contains a fire detection system which consists of two thermal detectors, two photoelectric detectors, two pull stations, a two zone fire alarm control panel and an external horn/strobe unit.

The detectors alarm at Simplex Panel 3FPA-PNLZP6F. Three spare zones (Zones 42, 45 and 34) within the panel are used to provide trouble/alarm inputs into the fire detection system for each of the three PDCs.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - VFD Switchgear Enclosure Walls and ceiling - 18 gauge galvanized steel Floor - 0.25 rolled steel plate on a concrete foundation pad Doors/Frames - Not rated (to outside)

Fire dampers - None MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 632 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation Control Panels / Switchgear Power Cells (integral to control panels)

HVAC Units (mounted external to PDC)

Fiberglass insulation in walls and ceiling (encased in metal walls, no heat loading considered)

Thermax insulation board in floors (encased in metal floor, no heat loading considered)

UPSs SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an electrical fire due to an electrical fault either phase to phase, phase to ground or other type of overload condition.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE Any fire damage would be confined to the PDC. Fire detection in the area would alarm locally with both a horn and a strobe external to the structure as well as an alarm on 3FPA-PNLZP6F located on the west wall of the Turbine Building 14 feet 6 inches and the MP3 Fire Status Display 3CES-PNLFPS in the Control Room. Though the PDCs have no automatic fire suppression, timely response to the local and remote alarms will mitigate any damage with the use of local fire extinguishers or other manual suppression devices.

In the event that these cables and equipment sustain damage, plant safe shutdown can be achieved without this equipment.

VIATION None 0 1EVALUATIONS None

Power Distribution Center - 2 (PDC-2)

Variable Frequency Drives (3CWS-VFD1B & 3CWS-VFD1E)

ANALYSIS 95 - Enclosure Fire Area Building 332B, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION A Variable Frequency Drive (VFD) is an in-line power supply to control the operating speed of the Circulating Water Pump. There are two VFDs installed in a single Power Distribution Center (PDC). There are three PDCs installed on the west side of the Turbine Building.

Each of the PDCs have been given their own fire zone identification. Each PDC contains two VFDs comprised of a transformer cabinet, a relay cabinet and a power cell cabinet as well as associated cables, cable trays, distribution panels and HVAC units.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown None Safety Related None Non Safety Related Transformer cabinets (2), relay cabinets (2), power cell cabinets (2), cooling fan/blowers (12), 480V AC distribution panels (2), 120V AC distribution panels (2), HVAC units (4), UPSs (2) and no credit taken for MP3 Appendix R fires.

E PROTECTION Suppression - There is no automatic suppression system within the PDC. Two portable (10 pound CO2) fire extinguishers are located internal to the PDC. Fire hydrant and hose stations are located immediately north and south of the PDC location.

Detection - Each PDC contains a fire detection system which consists of two thermal detectors, two photoelectric detectors, two pull stations, a two zone fire alarm control panel and an external horn/strobe unit.

The detectors alarm at Simplex Panel 3FPA-PNLZP6F. Three spare zones (Zones 42, 45 and 34) within the panel are used to provide trouble/alarm inputs into the fire detection system for each of the three PDCs.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - VFD Switchgear Enclosure Walls and ceiling - 18 gauge galvanized steel Floor - 0.25 rolled steel plate on a concrete foundation pad Doors/Frames - Not rated (to outside)

Fire dampers - None MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 632 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation Control Panels / Switchgear Power Cells (integral to control panels)

HVAC Units (mounted external to PDC)

Fiberglass insulation in walls and ceiling (encased in metal walls, no heat loading considered)

Thermax insulation board in floors (encased in metal floor, no heat loading considered)

UPSs SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an electrical fire due to an electrical fault either phase to phase, phase to ground or other type of overload condition.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE Any fire damage would be confined to the PDC. Fire detection in the area would alarm locally with both a horn and a strobe external to the structure as well as an alarm on 3FPA-PNLZP6F located on the west wall of the Turbine Building 14 feet 6 inches and the MP3 Fire Status Display 3CES-PNLFPS in the Control Room. Though the PDCs have no automatic fire suppression, timely response to the local and remote alarms will mitigate any damage with the use of local fire extinguishers or other manual suppression devices.

In the event that these cables and equipment sustain damage, plant safe shutdown can be achieved without this equipment.

VIATION None 10EVALUATIONS None

Power Distribution Center - 3 (PDC-3)

Variable Frequency Drives (3CWS-VFD1C & 3CWS-VFD1F)

ANALYSIS 96 - Enclosure Fire Area Building 332C, Elevation 24 feet 6 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION A Variable Frequency Drive (VFD) is an in-line power supply to control the operating speed of the Circulating Water Pump. There are two VFDs installed in a single Power Distribution Center (PDC). There are three PDCs installed on the west side of the Turbine Building.

Each of the PDCs have been given their own fire zone identification. Each PDC contains two VFDs comprised of a transformer cabinet, a relay cabinet and a power cell cabinet as well as associated cables, cable trays, distribution panels and HVAC units.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown None Safety Related None Non Safety Related Transformer cabinets (2), relay cabinets (2), power cell cabinets (2), cooling fan/blowers (12), 480V AC distribution panels (2), 120V AC distribution panels (2), HVAC units (4), UPSs (2) and no credit taken for MP3 Appendix R fires.

E PROTECTION Suppression - There is no automatic suppression system within the PDC. Two portable (10 pound CO2) fire extinguishers are located internal to the PDC. Fire hydrant and hose stations are located immediately north and south of the PDC location.

Detection - Each PDC contains a fire detection system which consists of two thermal detectors, two photoelectric detectors, two pull stations, a two zone fire alarm control panel and an external horn/strobe unit.

The detectors alarm at Simplex Panel 3FPA-PNLZP6F. Three spare zones (Zones 42, 45 and 34) within the panel are used to provide trouble/alarm inputs into the fire detection system for each of the three PDCs.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - VFD Switchgear Enclosure Walls and ceiling - 18 gauge galvanized steel Floor - 0.25 rolled steel plate on a concrete foundation pad Doors/Frames - Not rated (to outside)

Fire dampers - None MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 632 ft2 Combustible Material Cable Insulation Control Panels / Switchgear Power Cells (integral to control panels)

HVAC Units (mounted external to PDC)

Fiberglass insulation in walls and ceiling (encased in metal walls, no heat loading considered)

Thermax insulation board in floors (encased in metal floor, no heat loading considered)

UPSs SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an electrical fire due to an electrical fault either phase to phase, phase to ground or other type of overload condition.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE Any fire damage would be confined to the PDC. Fire detection in the area would alarm locally with both a horn and a strobe external to the structure as well as an alarm on 3FPA-PNLZP6F located on the west wall of the Turbine Building 14 feet 6 inches and the MP3 Fire Status Display 3CES-PNLFPS in the Control Room. Though the PDCs have no automatic fire suppression, timely response to the local and remote alarms will mitigate any damage with the use of local fire extinguishers or other manual suppression devices.

In the event that these cables and equipment sustain damage, plant safe shutdown can be achieved without this equipment.

VIATION None 10 EVALUATIONS None

ANALYSIS 97 - Main GSU Transformer 3MTX-XMA, Fire Area XR-7, Zone N/A, Elevation pedestal slab 23 feet 6 inches.

NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The Main GSU Transformer 3MTX-XMA is located outside at pedestal slab elevation 23 feet 6 inches approximately 316 feet east of the Turbine Building and 308 feet south of the Containment Building centerline. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety Related Main GSU Transformer 3MTX-XMA Main GSU Transformer 3MTX-XMA Coolers Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic operating deluge water spray system protects transformer / open pit protected by open nozzle sprinklers / line-type heat detection system actuates suppression system.

Manual actuation capability via pull station at control panel located adjacent to the Normal transformer area and from the deluge valve inside the Deluge Building Number 331 located just southeast of the Main GSU Transformer Bank.

Detection alarm, water flow alarm, and valve tamper signal transmit to the local deluge panel 3FPW-PNL11 located in Deluge Building Number 331, to Zone Panel 3FPA-PNLZP11 located in the turbine building (elevation 14 feet 6 inches) and to the control room main fire detection panel.

Manual hose streams available from yard hose houses and hydrants.

Detection - Line-type heat detection system provided as described above for suppression system actuation.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77B for a physical description of the area. Two hour fire barrier wall panels used to separate adjacent transformers.

Drainage - Drains to oil water separation system. Pit area utilized for spill oil retention and spill fire control, covered by open nozzle sprinkler system.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 1,697 ft2 Combustible Material Transformer Oil Cable insulation SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Severe 240,000 or above STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an oil fire from a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION None 10 EVALUATIONS None

ANALYSIS 98 - Main GSU Transformer 3MTX-XMB, Fire Area XR-8, Zone N/A, Elevation pedestal slab 23 feet 6 inches.

NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The Main GSU Transformer 3MTX-XMB is located outside at pedestal slab elevation 23 feet 6 inches approximately 283 feet east of the Turbine Building and 278 feet south of the Containment Building centerline. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety Related Main GSU Transformer 3MTX-XMB Main GSU Transformer 3MTX-XMB Coolers Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic operating deluge water spray system protects transformer / open pit protected by open nozzle sprinklers / line-type heat detection system actuates suppression system.

Manual actuation capability via pull station at control panel located adjacent to the Normal transformer area and from the deluge valve inside the Deluge Building Number 331 located just southeast of the Main GSU Transformer Bank.

Detection alarm, water flow alarm, and valve tamper signal transmit to the local deluge panel 3FPW-PNL11 located in Deluge Building Number 331, to Zone Panel 3FPA-PNLZP11 located in the turbine building (elevation 14 feet 6 inches) and to the control room main fire detection panel.

Manual hose streams available from yard hose houses and hydrants.

Detection - Line-type heat detection system provided as described above for suppression system actuation.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77B for a physical description of the area. Two hour fire barrier wall panels used to separate adjacent transformers.

Drainage - Drains to oil water separation system. Pit area utilized for spill oil retention and spill fire control, covered by open nozzle sprinkler system.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 1,753 ft2 Combustible Material Transformer Oil Cable insulation SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Severe 240,000 or above STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an oil fire from a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION None 10 EVALUATIONS None

ANALYSIS 99 - Main GSU Transformer 3MTX-XMC, Fire Area XR-9, Zone N/A, Elevation pedestal slab 23 feet 6 inches.

NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The Main GSU Transformer 3MTX-XMC is located outside at pedestal slab elevation 23 feet 6 inches approximately 251 feet east of the Turbine Building and 247 feet south of the Containment Building centerline. There is no safe shutdown equipment in this area.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety Related Main GSU Transformer 3MTX-XMC Main GSU Transformer 3MTX-XMC Coolers Cables E PROTECTION Suppression - Automatic operating deluge water spray system protects transformer / open pit protected by open nozzle sprinklers / line-type heat detection system actuates suppression system.

Manual actuation capability via pull station at control panel located adjacent to the Normal transformer area and from the deluge valve inside the Deluge Building Number 331 located just southeast of the Main GSU Transformer Bank.

Detection alarm, water flow alarm, and valve tamper signal transmit to the local deluge panel 3FPW-PNL11 located in Deluge Building Number 331, to Zone Panel 3FPA-PNLZP11 located in the turbine building (elevation 14 feet 6 inches) and to the control room main fire detection panel.

Manual hose streams available from yard hose houses and hydrants.

Detection - Line-type heat detection system provided as described above for suppression system actuation.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77B for a physical description of the area. Two hour fire barrier wall panels used to separate adjacent transformers.

Drainage - Drains to oil water separation system. Pit area utilized for spill oil retention and spill fire control, covered by open nozzle sprinkler system.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 1,697 ft2 Combustible Material Transformer Oil Cable insulation SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Severe 240,000 or above STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is an oil fire from a transient ignition source.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION None 10 EVALUATIONS None

ANALYSIS 100 - Deluge Building Number 331, Fire Area XR-11, Zone N/A, Elevation (ground) approximately 17 feet 0 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION Deluge Building Number 331 is a prefabricated concrete building located east of the power block at ground elevation approximately 343 feet east of the Turbine Building and 340 feet south of the Containment Building centerline (just southeast of Main GSU Transformer Number 3MTX-XMA). There is no safe shutdown equipment in this building or within 50 feet of it.

JOR EQUIPMENT Non Safety Related Fire Deluge Piping, Valves and associated trim Fire Control Panel Building Distribution and Lighting Panel Transformers (dry)

E PROTECTION Suppression - 10 pound A/B/C Dry Chemical Fire Extinguisher (hand held).

Manual hose streams available from yard hose houses and hydrants.

Manual actuation capability for transformers at control panel located in building Number 331 located southeast of the Main GSU Transformer Bank.

Detection - Smoke detection and signal.

Building Smoke Detection alarm signal transmits to the local deluge panel 3FPW-PNL11 located in Deluge Building Number 331, to Zone Panel 3FPA-PNLZP11 located in the turbine building (elevation 14 feet 6 inches) and to the control room fire detection panel.

SIGN FEATURES Construction - Refer to Figure 77B for a physical description of the area. Transformer fire barrier wall separates adjacent transformers.

Drainage - Drain piping provided inside building, drains to outside.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area - 288 ft2 Combustible Material Styrofoam Celluloses Fiberglass Printed Circuit Boards SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Low < 80,000 STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a Class A fire from a transient ignition source or electrical fault.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE This area complies with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as documented in the Millstone 3 safe shutdown analysis. In the event of a fire in this area, the plant can be safely shutdown using equipment located in separate fire areas.

VIATION None 10 EVALUATIONS None

ANALYSIS 101 - Diesel Instrument Air System - Diesel Generator, Fire Area CR3, Zone N/A, Elevation 20 feet 0 inches NERAL FIRE AREA DESCRIPTION The MP3 Diesel Instrument Air System diesel generator is a separate self-contained unit located outdoors, on the west side of the CPF building. The diesel generator is located approximately 16 feet from the CPF building.

JOR EQUIPMENT Safe Shutdown None Safety-Related None Non Safety-Related Self-contained diesel generator (ID Number 3IAS-DG1) with integral 450 gallon, fuel oil storage tank E PROTECTION Suppression - Fire hydrants, and firefighting foam supplies are provided for the area. A BlitzFire hose nozzle will be staged in the adjacent hose house for utilization in the event of a diesel generator fire.

Detection - None SIGN FEATURES The diesel generator is a factory manufactured, self-contained unit, with a carbon steel, self-contained leak containment system with a 110% capacity for all fluids in the diesel unit including the fuel storage tank.

MBUSTIBLE LOADING Floor Area 56 FT2 (diesel generator unit area)

Combustible Material Fuel Oil Lubricating Oil Rubber/Plastic SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION FIRE LOADING VALUE (BTU/FT2)

Severe* > 240,000

  • The Severity Classification is due to the 450 gallons of fuel oil contained in the diesel generator unit.

STULATED FIRE The postulated fire is a fire internal to the diesel generator that ignites the associated (on-board) lubricating and fuel oil.

NSEQUENCES OF POSTULATED FIRE A fire in this area would involve the MP3 Diesel Instrument Air System's diesel generator.

The fire is expected to be contained to/within the integral diesel generator unit. The diesel generator has a 110% capacity containment designed to contain 110% of the fluids used in the diesel generator. However flames could reach beyond the diesel generator unit. To preclude the fire from interacting with the CPF, the diesel generator unit has been located more than 15 feet from the building. The CPF is the only building located in close proximity to the diesel generator unit.

In the event that the MP3 Diesel Instrument Air System's diesel generator sustains damage, safe shutdown can be achieved for MP3 without instrument air.

VIATION None

BASIS AND ASSUMPTIONS atastrophic fire at Millstone 3, which could include damage to a fire area or impact the plants ity to achieve or maintain safe shutdown conditions, was the basis for this evaluation. Specific ils of the evaluation are contained in the MP3 Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 Compliance ort.

or assumptions in addressing safe shutdown capabilities are as follows:

1. While operating at power, the unit develops a fire in any one fire area or zone which could affect safe shutdown equipment or systems.
2. The unit is brought to hot standby immediately by tripping the reactor/turbine and is capable of remaining at hot shutdown status and then achieving cold shutdown conditions in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
3. Loss of off site power is assumed coincident with the fire. For the hot short portion of the circuit failure analysis, off site power is assumed to be available as it represents the worst case with respect to spurious operation of the equipment.
4. Safe shutdown is achieved using only on site powered equipment. Both QA and non-QA equipment can be used to achieve safe shutdown.
5. No additional, single, or multiple failures or events are considered, other than those generated by the fire.
6. All equipment required for hot standby either fail in a safe position or is protected to the extent that at least one method of shutdown will be undamaged by the postulated fire.
7. Mechanical equipment (e.g., pipe, heat exchangers, pumps, valves with manual operators/overrides) are assumed to be operable after the fire. The system pressure boundary is unaffected.
8. Systems required for cold shutdown are protected to the extent that any required fire damaged components can be repaired and cold shutdown achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> using on site resources. Materials required for repairs are from a dedicated supply on the site. Procedures are available documenting the method of intended repairs. Repair crews will not utilize members of the fire brigade.
9. Systems not required for immediate use will be protected to the extent that safe shutdown can be accomplished with only minor operator actions (e.g., local manual control of valves). Adequate operations personnel are available to

SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN 1 EACH FUNCTION REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN SAFE SHUTDOWN WAS EVALUATED BY FIRE AREA se functions are as follows:

Reactivity Control (Reactor trip, scram and boration capability)

Reactor Coolant Makeup Reactor Coolant System Pressure Control Decay Heat Removal Process Monitoring Support (The systems required to support the above functions) systems to perform these functions are as follows: (Figures referenced in this section are R figures.)

Figures 5.1-1 and 5.1 Reactor Coolant System Figure 9.3 Chemical and Volume Control System Figure 10.4 Auxiliary Feedwater System Figure 6.3 Residual Heat Removal System Figure 9.2 Component Cooling Water System Figure 9.2 Service Water System ddition to the above functions, the systems required to support these functions were also luated. A general description of each system to fulfill each function is provided in the sections ch follow.

erent in the design of Millstone 3 is the system flexibility to allow accomplishment of tdown functions by more than one method. This flexibility is such that, in most cases, if ipment in one area is damaged by fire, equipment located within another area can accomplish shutdown function. The system flexibility, forms the fundamental philosophy for achieving shutdown following fires. Refer to the MP3 BTP-9.5-1 Compliance Report for specific ils of the safe shutdown analysis and Section 3.2 of the MP3 BTP CR for simplified flow rams of the safe shutdown systems.

owing a postulated transient exposure fire, the plant could reject decay heat either by dumping m to the atmosphere via main steam safety valves and/or power operated relief valves, if ilable. If the fire is located within the main steam valve building and all electrical controls on es were lost, heat will be rejected by releasing steam to the atmosphere through the main m safety valves. Cold shutdown may be achieved via manual local operation of the ospheric Dump Bypass Valves depressurizing to RHR entry conditions.

ential primary and secondary instrumentation indication is available for all postulated fires at h the main control room and the auxiliary shutdown panel (refer to Figure 6-1.2).

1.2 Reactor Coolant System Letdown ctor coolant letdown can be accomplished by Method A, the normal letdown path through the mical volume control system (CHS), or Method B, through the reactor vessel head vent em to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT). Method B is used when a fire could affect the ability he valves in Method A to be properly positioned. Because of redundant safety grade paths in hod B, control of reactor coolant letdown is always available to achieve safe shutdown.

1.3 Auxiliary Feedwater System auxiliary feedwater system supplies water to the secondary side of the steam generator, thus ntaining a secondary heat sink for decay heat removal. Method A consists of two Class 1E or-driven pumps and redundant valves and piping. One motor-driven pump is capable of plying the required feedwater flow to two steam generators. Method B consists of one ine-driven feed pump and associated piping and valves to each steam generator. In most of the tulated fires, Method B is available to provide two or more steam generators with auxiliary water. When Method B becomes unavailable, Method A can provide auxiliary feedwater ction to two or more steam generators. The auxiliary feedwater pumps take suction from the ineralized water storage tank (DWST). Additional auxiliary feedwater is available from the densate storage tank (CST).

1.4 Reactor Coolant Boration owing a fire, the charging pump suction would be diverted from the volume control tank T) to the boric acid tank (BAT) or the refueling water storage tank (RWST). Boric acid would be provided through gravity feed lines to the charging pumps. If the three charging pumps e lost due to a fire, boration could be accomplished by using the safety injection pumps and ated water from the RWST. This must be accomplished in conjunction with RCS ressurization because of the high pressure safety injection pump head capabilities.

1.5 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Control aid in achieving safe shutdown, the reactor coolant system (RCS) must be depressurized by of two methods. The charging pumps provide borated water to the pressurizer via the

ef tank (PRT) via the power operated relief valves (PORV). This method provides a safety de method ensuring the plants safe shutdown capabilities.

1.6 Residual Heat Removal System Millstone 3 plant is designed so that one method of RHR is always available in the event of a tulated fire. RHR is required only for cold shutdown, which provides a sufficient time interval manual valve operations, if required.

1.7 Component Cooling Water System s function provides cooling water to the RHR heat exchangers to remove decay heat from the S. If all three component cooling water pump motors were damaged due to fire, the plant is to safely remain at hot shutdown until the system is repaired (Section 9.2).

1.8 Service Water System service water system provides the ultimate heat sink for the CCP system and the emergency el generators. Method A provides cooling water for the orange diesel generator, while Method rovides cooling water for the purple diesel generator. This design assures the availability of method of service water.

2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HIGH/LOW PRESSURE INTERFACE view was conducted to identify low-pressure system interfaces with the RCS. Interface points ch consist of passive pressure boundary barriers (reactor coolant pump thermal barriers and s, manually operated normally closed valves), were not considered; such boundaries are gned with sufficient margin to ensure that the design conditions of the reactor coolant sure boundary are not exceeded during any condition of normal operation, and are not subject purious actuations. The remaining interface points were examined from a fire protection wpoint to determine whether spurious valve actuations due to a fire could result in loss of RCS sure or inventory control. Refer to the MP3 BTP 9.5-1 Compliance Report for specific details.

3 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER P CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.c.(3) states in part:

the alternative shutdown capability shall be independent of the specific fire area(s) and shall accommodate postfire conditions where offsite power is available and where offsite power is not available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

re event coincident with a loss of offsite power is the limiting scenario and it represents a rst case approach. For this reason safe shutdown capability is maintained in the event of a occurring in any one fire area coincident with a loss of offsite power. This position is more

ems unaffected by the fire which could be used to reach safe shutdown conditions. Refer to MP3 BTP 9.5-1 Compliance Report for specific details.

ELECTRICAL EVALUATION 1 FIRE-INDUCED CIRCUIT FAILURE ANALYSIS details related to the fire induced circuit failure analysis, including associated circuit concerns

, breaker coordination, multiple high impedance faults, spurious actuations and common losures), refer to the MP3 BTP 9.5-1 Compliance Report.

2 ELECTRICAL EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 2.1 Systems tem functions required for safe shutdown are identified in Section 6.2. System functions, uding supporting systems, were evaluated by developing the system function availability rix. By using this matrix, justification is demonstrated that the ability for Millstone 3 to ieve safe shutdown conditions is maintained in the event of a postulated fire. For specific ils, refer to the MP3 BTP 9.5-1 Compliance Report.

3 ELECTRICAL EVALUATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS review of the appropriate cable routing documents, the electrical evaluation was performed for safe shutdown functions identified in Section 6.2. Refer to the MP3 BTP 9.5-1 Compliance ort for specific details.

active support systems required for safe shutdown (Section 6.2) are shown as follows. Refer he MP3 BTP 9.5-1 Compliance Report, Sections 3.2 and 3.3 for simplified diagrams of these ems.

1. Emergency AC and DC Distribution
2. Diesel generators (includes EDG Air Start, Jacket Cooling Water, Lube Oil and Fuel Oil System)
3. Emergency Switchgear/Battery Room HVAC - Control Building Ventilation (includes Chilled Water System, Control Room, Instrument Rack Room and Computer Rooms)

Emergency Diesel Generator Room Ventilation ESF/Auxiliary Building Ventilation (includes AFW Pump Cubicles, SIH and RHR/MCC Area and CHS - CCP Cooling HVAC)

Circulating/Service Water Pumphouse Ventilation Containment Ventilation

4. Reactor coolant pump seal cooling
5. Instrument air
6. Emergency lighting
7. Communications
8. Process Monitoring EMERGENCY AC AND DC DISTRIBUTION 125 VDC and 120 VAC vital systems supply uninterrupted power to safety-related ponents necessary for safe shutdown and to maintain a safe shutdown condition.

mally, 125 VDC power is supplied to the DC buses through a battery charger. With a loss of site power, batteries supply 125 VDC to the DC buses and to the vital buses through the rters for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or until an on site AC supply reestablishes the normal AC powered charger rectifier inputs.

Class 1E 125 V batteries are located in the control building in physically separate battery ms. The loss of any battery room by fire does not affect safe shutdown capability.

emergency diesel generator is required for safe shutdown subsequent to a fire in any fire area.

sel engine cooling water is provided by service water which has been demonstrated, to be ilable. The ventilation fans and dampers for both diesel generator rooms are controlled from ventilation panel (VP-1) in the main control room. To mitigate the potential consequences of a n control room disabling fire, the control circuits are de-energized in the respective emergency tchgear room to remove power from the dampers, causing them to fail open.

VENTILATION ergency switchgear room ventilation fans are controlled from the VP-1 panel in the main trol room. Control of fans 3HVC*ACU4A, B and 3HVC*ACU3A and B are operational from r power source in the switchgear room independent of the main control room, instrument rack m, and cable spreading room.

nual alignment of service water to the east (orange) switchgear ventilation units cooling coils ntains space temperatures within allowable limits to support equipment and personnel.

COOLING TO THE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS prevent the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals from failure due to overheating, cooling water is plied from either the component cooling water system (CCP) and/or the chemical and volume trol system (CHS). Normally, both of these systems supply cooling water to the RCP seals, ough only one source is needed when the reactor coolant pumps are not in operation. Both the P pump and the CHS pumps are located in the same fire area AB-1, auxiliary building ation 24 feet 6 inches. The charging pumps are located within individual cubicles with a rinth access way. The CCP pumps are located at the other end of the auxiliary building ater than 50 feet apart). In addition, the area is provided with automatic fire suppression and ction. Failure of the three charging pumps coincident with the failure of the three component ling water pumps due to fire is considered an incredible event. Therefore, the loss of either the rging pumps or the component cooling water pumps does not affect the safe shutdown ability of Millstone 3.

INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM mally, the instrument air system supplies air to the valves required to operate for safe tdown (e.g., letdown, depressurization).

s air is supplied by two safety powered air compressors. In the event that both of these pressors are damaged due to the fire, Millstone 3 is designed so that the required function of letdown and depressurization is accomplished by other safety grade methods (i.e., reactor d vent system, venting to the PRT). Therefore, the loss of the instrument air system due to fire s not affect the plant's ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions.

endix R, Paragraph IIIJ of 10 CFR 50, requires emergency lighting with at least an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ery power supply for all areas needed for the operation of safe shutdown equipment and in ess and egress routes to these areas. The present design of Millstone 3 provides 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />

-contained battery packs for all areas identified in Position C.5.g of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. For ain event specific tasks, portable lighting is relied upon to supplement the emergency lighting gn basis. In addition, emergency lighting is supplemented with the Millstone Station Security hting for outdoor access/egress routes, and access to the Appendix R equipment cage in ehouse Building number 435. For additional details with respect to emergency lighting, refer he BTP 9.5-1 Compliance Report.

lighting with eight hour self-contained sealed battery packs are also installed inside the MP3 O (AAC) diesel and switchgear enclosures for access/egress and operation of equipment from control board. The MP3 SBO diesel generator is credited to supply MP2 with alternate AC er in the event of a fire in specifically identified Unit 2 Appendix R fire areas.

security lighting system is also credited for MP3 operations personnel access/egress yard area es to the MP3 SBO (AAC) diesel and switchgear enclosures. Access is required to start the el and energize the 4160 volt tie to MP2 in the event of a MP2 Appendix R fire in certain s.

COMMUNICATION mmunication systems are described in FPER Section 4.5.

PROCESS VARIABLE MONITORING orange channel of the required instrumentation is available at the main control board for fires ll areas of the plant except for the orange switchgear room, orange cable tunnel, orange MCC rod control area, orange service water cubicle, orange diesel generator room, and areas of the building where service water is lost to the orange EDG. For fires in each of these areas, the ple train indicators are available in the main control room.

re in the instrument rack room, main control room, cable spreading room or supporting ipment rooms may disable both trains of indication at the auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP) ugh the loss of their supporting electronics and power supplies in the instrument rack room.

this event, additional safety/non-safety related instrumentation is located in the orange tchgear room to replace those components lost by fire.

additional safety/non-safety related instrumentation is located on the instrument process el located in the orange emergency switchgear room. All replacement instrumentation is ered from safety-related sources to ensure its operability during a fire with the assumed loss ff site power.

em cold leg temperature indication is available following fires in the IRR, CR, or CSR ugh umbilical transfer to an orange power supply at the ASP.

rce and intermediate range neutron detectors have primary electronics located in the control m with indicators in the main control board and on the ASP. Two additional detectors are ered from associated electronics located in each of the orange and purple switchgear rooms.

er is provided from a safety-related bus. The new indicators for these detectors are mounted he NIS cabinets in the main control room and also near the ASP.

existing indicators on the ASP to be used for the following:

Pressurizer pressure Pressurizer level Reactor coolant hot leg temperature Reactor coolant cold leg temperature Steam generator level Steam generator pressure Reactor coolant pressure Neutron source range er to the MP3 BTP9.5-1 Compliance Report for additional process variables details.

ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY rder to assess compliance with the requirements of Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1, imum credit was taken for alternative shutdown capability with the functional flexibility of lstone 3 system design. The alternative shutdown methods are summarized below:

Function Alternative Method A Alternative Method B actor Coolant Letdown Normal Letdown Path Reactor Head Vent xiliary Feedwater Injection Motor-Driven Pump(s) Turbine-Driven Pump am Release (Decay Heat Atmospheric Dump Valves Code Safety Valves moval) ration Charging Pumps from Boric High-Head Safety Injection Acid Tank or RWST Pump from RWST actor Coolant System Auxiliary Spray Line Pressurizer Power Operated ssure Control Relief Valves methods are described in Section 6.2 and in more detail in the MP3 BTP 9.5-1 Compliance ort.

LONG-TERM HOT SHUTDOWN maintain secondary heat sink, the auxiliary feedwater system supplies water to the steam erators. This allows removal of heat from the reactor coolant system. Refer to the MP3 BTP 1 Compliance Report for Details.

CONTROL SYSTEM ISOLATION FOR CONTROL ROOM/SPREADING ROOM/IRR FIRES valuating the consequences of fires in the control room, instrument rack room, and cable ading room, it was determined to be necessary to add a controls system to transfer signals m the affected areas to the switchgear rooms. The control system, along with certain manual ons, allows the plant to be brought to cold shutdown without the use of the control room, rument rack room, or cable spreading room. A summary of these additions follows:

1. A new fire transfer panel, located in the orange emergency switchgear room, is provided. This panel contains the required number of control transfer switches, power supplies, and signal conditioning electronics required for safe shutdown of

The transfer switch function is to disassociate the ASP controls and indicators from their normal support components, which may be lost by fire, and replace those signals with signals from the new transmitters. Block diagrams of transfer schemes are provided on Figures 8-1 and 8-2.

2. Additional instrumentation for monitoring plant process variables is provided.

These include six pressure transmitters, five level transmitters, four flow transmitters, two neutron sensors, neutron flux processing racks, and four temperature transmitters.

Two environmentally qualified neutron detectors are installed in the spare wells in the neutron shield tank. Two qualified electronic channels are installed and powered from a vital instrument bus.

3. Key lock control switches at the local motor control centers are added for the following: 3HVC*ACU3A,B and 4A,B. These are provided for local administrative controls at the MCCs in the event of fire in the main control room.

Parallel control power fuses are provided.

4. Diesel generator control circuits have been modified to provide adequate isolation and control from the local control panel. Parallel control power fuses are required.
5. Adequate isolation and control has been provided at the switchgear area for all 4,160 V loads.
6. Local manual breaker control is available for all major distribution breakers.

FIRE PROTECTION OF CABLE he safe shutdown functions were evaluated, cabling which supplied power to all required ponents was also considered (e.g., motor valves and equipment). The cables routed inside tainment for 3FPW*CTV49 are protected by the use of fire rated cable.

AUXILIARY BUILDING ELEVATION 24 FEET 6 INCHES or components of the two systems considered in the safe shutdown evaluation are located at iliary building elevation 24 feet 6 inches. These are the three charging pumps (CHS) and the e component cooling pumps (CCP).

mally, both of these systems supply cooling water to the reactor coolant pump seals during the shutdown period. However, only one source of cooling is needed when the pumps are not in ration. In addition, CCP is required for cold shutdown to remove heat from the residual heat

CCP pumps are approximately 60 feet from the charging pump cubicle. In addition to this aration, manual hose stations are located throughout the area at elevation 24 feet 6 inches. If f the component cooling water pumps were damaged, Millstone 3 has the on site capability to ir a train of component cooling within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. These precautions and modifications ngthen the position that both the charging pumps and the component cooling pumps are not ultaneously damaged by a fire. Portable ventilation will be provided to cool the CCP pumps uld all auxiliary building ventilation be lost.

REACTOR CONTAINMENT hough the design of Millstone 3 containment does not meet the guidelines of BTP CMEB 1, sufficient design features exist to support a request for a deviation in the area, based upon following consideration:

The Millstone containment structure is normally unmanned, and equipped with both fire detection and automatic water suppression. The automatic water suppression system provides protection and separation for the electrical penetration area. The reactor coolant pumps are equipped with a seismic oil collection system which is capable of collecting the entire reactor coolant pump motor lubrication system oil volume. Additional suppression is provided by fire hose stations and portable fire extinguishers. All electrical cables are fire resistant and pass the vertical flame test as prescribed by IEEE-383. Safety-related cables are train designated, with the redundant cables routed separately either in covered tray and/or enclosed conduit except at the below listed locations:

1. In-core thermocouple cable raceways above the Refueling Cavity.
2. The cable raceways at the Outer Annulus Electrical Penetration area.
3. The cable trays located in the Pressurizer Cubicle below the 51 foot elevation floor area.

Strategically located cable tray fire breaks are provided to prevent horizontal fire spread along cable trays. Separation of redundant tray and conduit is maintained throughout containment in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75, except as noted by deviation in Section 7.1.2.2.1 of the MPS-3 FSAR for the In-Core thermocouple raceways.

as been concluded that the above described protection features meet the guidelines of BTP EB 9.5-1.

ision 3406/30/21 (MCB)

LOADING STATION INSTRUMENT RACK ROOM WESTINGHOUSE INST. CARDS (LOCAL/REMOTE)

(ASP)

ISOLATION R LOADING SWITCH S

STATION (FTSP)

SWGR L SWGR MPS-3 FPER (ASP)

LOCAL INST.

LOADING CARDS STATION I22 PANEL SWGR SWGR 8-4

ision 3406/30/21 SAFETY RELATED POWER SUPPLY MCB L

PRESS PT WESTINGHOUSE (EXISTING) INDICATOR PROCESS NOTE NOTE 2 3 SWGR 1

(F/T)

SWGR L (ASP)

POWER SUPPLY (NEW)

PRESS PT &

(NEW) INDICATOR SIGNAL CARD (EXISTING) 5 SAFETY RELATED POWER SUPPLY NOTES:

MPS-3 FPER

1. NEW NONSAFETY, SEISMIC TRANSMITTER.
2. NEW NONSAFETY, SEISMIC LOOP POWER SUPPLY AND SIGNAL CONDITIONING CARDS.
3. PLUG CONNECTION TO SELECT SIGNAL FROM WESTINGHOUSE RACK OR NEW TRANSMITTER LOOP.
4. NEW INSTRUMENTATION WILL BE EQUIVALANT TO EXISTING PARALLEL INSTRUMENTATION BUT WITHOUT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION.
5. SAFETY RELATED POWER SUPPLY IS USED FOR THE NONSAFETY PATH BECAUSE OF A LACK OF PHYSICAL SEPARATION IN THE TRANSFER SWITCH AND OPERABLE WITHOUT OFFSITE POWER.

8-5

OPERATOR GUIDELINES owing a fire, equipment normally used to bring the plant down to cold shutdown conditions be inoperable. All manual actions required by the fire are addressed in the station emergency tdown procedures.

REPAIR OF EQUIPMENT er a fire, some equipment may have to be repaired before achieving and maintaining cold tdown. The safe shutdown evaluation concluded that there is only one area of the Millstone 3 t where any major repairs could be required. This would occur if all three of the component lant water pumps were damaged by fire in Area AB-1, Auxiliary Building, elevation 24 feet ches.

Millstone 3 plant has the capability to repair or replace one pump motor in either train of ponent cooling water using on site material (e.g., spare motor and cables) and still achieve shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of reactor trip using only on site power. This capability ws Millstone 3 to fully comply with Position C.5.b.(1)(b) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. Other minor irs can be accomplished well within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> requirement. No repairs are necessary to ieve hot standby or hot shutdown.

er to MP3 BTP 9.5-1 for specific details.

FIRE IN DIFFERENT FIRE AREAS AND OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO COMPLETE FUNCTION (DELETED)

This table has been deleted.

Fire Hazards Analysis (Section 5) has been updated to reflect design modifications.

endix B of this report demonstrates that the Applicant complies with Branch Technical ition CMEB 9.5-1.

FPER/FSAR section describes the methods of compliance with the provisions of BTP CMEB

1. Appendix C of this report indicates the section of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 in which each item of CFR 50, Appendix R is addressed. Various modifications have been made as a result of BTP EB 9.5-1 as stated in Section 8.

o, Section 8 describes how the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 relating to fires inside tainment are met.

s appendix has been deleted.

review of all positions previously addressed in Appendix A is included in Appendix B.

endix B provides a comparison of the Millstone 3 plant design with Branch Technical ition CMEB 9.5-1 (NUREG-0800, July 1981).

. FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS

.a. Fire Protection Program SITION C.1.a re protection program should be established at each nuclear power plant. The program should blish the fire protection policy for the protection of structures, systems, and components ortant to safety at each plant and the procedures, equipment, and personnel required to lement the program at the plant site.

The fire protection program should be under the direction of an individual who has been delegated authority commensurate with the responsibilities of the position and who has available staff personnel knowledgeable in both fire protection and nuclear safety.

The fire protection program should extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in fire areas important to safety, with the following objectives:

  • to prevent fires from starting;
  • to detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur;
  • to provide protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities does not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.

Responsibility for the overall fire protection program should be assigned to a person who has management control over all organizations involved in fire protection activities.

Formulation and assurance of program implementation may be delegated to a staff composed of personnel prepared by training and experience in fire protection and personnel prepared by training and experience in nuclear plant safety to provide a balanced approach in directing the fire protection program for the nuclear power plant.

The staff should be responsible for:

(a) Fire protection program requirements, including consideration of potential hazards associated with postulated fires, with knowledge of building layout and systems design.

(b) Post-fire shutdown capability.

penetration seals, and fire brigade equipment).

(d) Fire prevention activities (administrative controls and training).

(e) Fire brigade organization and training.

(f) Prefire planning.

The organizational responsibilities and lines of communication pertaining to fire protection should be defined between the various positions through the use of organizational charts and functional descriptions of each position's responsibilities. The following positions/organizations should be designated:

(a) The upper level off site management position which has management responsibility for the formulation, implementation, and assessment of the effectiveness of the nuclear plant fire protection program.

(b) The off site management position(s) directly responsible for formulating, implementing, and periodically assessing the effectiveness of the fire protection program for the licensees nuclear power plant including fire drills and training conducted by the fire brigade and plant personnel. The results of these assessments should be reported to the upper level management position responsible for fire protection with recommendations for improvements or corrective actions as deemed necessary.

(c) The on site management position responsible for the overall administration of the plant operations and emergency plans which include the fire protection and prevention program and which provide a single point of control and contact for all contingencies.

(d) The on site position(s) which:

i. Implements periodic inspections to: minimize the amount of combustibles in safety-related areas; determine the effectiveness of housekeeping practices; assure the availability and acceptable condition of all fire protection systems/equipment, emergency breathing apparatus, emergency lighting, communication equipment, fire stops, penetration seals, and fire retardant coatings; and assures the prompt and effective corrective actions are taken to correct conditions adverse to fire protection and preclude their recurrence.

ii. Is responsible for the fire fighting training for operating plant personnel and the plants fire brigade; design and selection of equipment; periodic inspection and testing of fire protection systems and equipment in

iii. Assists in the critique of all fire drills to determine how well the training objectives have been met.

iv. Reviews and evaluates proposed work activities to identify potential transient fire loads.

v. Implements a program for indoctrination of all plant contractor personnel in appropriate administrative procedures which implement the fire protection program, and the emergency procedures relative to fire protection.

vi. Implements a program for instruction of personnel on the proper handling of accidental events such as leaks or spills of flammable materials that are related to fire protection.

(e) The on site position responsible for fire protection quality assurance. This position should be responsible for assuring the effective implementation of the fire protection program by planned inspections, scheduled audits, and verification that the results of these inspections of audits are promptly reported to cognizant management personnel.

(f) The positions which are part of the plant fire brigade:

i. The plant fire brigade positions should be responsible for fighting fires.

The authority and responsibility of each fire brigade position relative to fire protection should be clearly defined.

ii. The responsibilities of each fire brigade position should correspond with the actions required by the fire fighting procedures.

iii. The responsibilities of the fire brigade members under normal plant conditions should not conflict with their responsibilities during a fire emergency.

iv. The minimum number of trained fire brigade members available on site for each operating shift should be consistent with the activities required to combat the most significant fire. The size of the fire brigade should be based upon the functions required to fight fires with adequate allowance for injuries.

v. The recommendations for organization, training, and equipment of Private Fire Brigades as specified in NFPA No. 27-1975, including the applicable NFPA publications listed in the appendix to NFPA No. 27, are considered

Personnel Qualifications (a) The position responsible for formulation and implementation of the fire protection program (FPP) should have within his organization or as a consultant a fire protection engineer who is a graduate of an engineering curriculum of accepted standing and shall have completed not less than 6 years of engineering attainment indicative of growth in engineering competency and achievement, 3 years of which shall have been in responsible charge of fire protection engineering work.

These requirements are the eligibility requirements as a Member in the Society of Fire Protection Engineers.

(b) The fire brigade members qualifications should include satisfactory completion of a physical examination for performing strenuous activity, and of the fire brigade training described in Position C.3.d.

(c) The personnel responsible for the maintenance and testing of the fire protection systems should be qualified by training and experience for such work.

(d) The personnel responsible for the training of the fire brigade should be qualified by training and experience for such work.

The following NFPA publications should be used for guidance to develop the fire protection program:

No. 4 - Organization for Fire Services No. 4A - Organization of a Fire Department No. 6 - Industrial Fire Loss Prevention No. 7 - Management of Fire Emergencies No. 8 - Management Responsibilities for Effects of Fire on Operations No. 27 - Private Fire Brigades On sites where there is an operating reactor and construction or modification of other units is underway, the superintendent of the operating plant should have the lead responsibility for site fire protection.

SPONSE C.1.a FPP is based on the guidelines of this position.

.b. Fire Hazards Analysis

fire hazards analysis demonstrates that the plant can maintain the ability to perform safe tdown functions and minimize radioactive releases to the environment in the event of a fire.

fire hazards analysis should be performed by qualified fire protection and reactor systems ineers to (1) consider potential in situ and transient fire hazards; (2) determine the sequences of fire in any location in the plant on the ability to safely shut down the reactor or he ability to minimize and control the release of radioactivity to the environment; and (3) cify measures for fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, and fire containment and rnative shutdown capability as required for each fire area containing structures, systems, and ponents important to safety that are in conformance with NRC guidelines and regulations.

orst case fires need not be postulated to be simultaneous with non fire-related failures in ty systems, plant accidents, or the most severe natural phenomena.

multiple-reactor sites, unrelated fires in two or more units need not be postulated to occur ultaneously. Fires involving facilities shared between units and fires due to man-made site-ted events that have a reasonable probability of occurring and affecting more than one reactor (such as an aircraft crash) should be considered.

ause fire may affect safe shutdown systems and because the loss of function of systems used itigate the consequences of design basis accidents under post-fire conditions does not per se act public safety, the need to limit fire damage to systems required to achieve and maintain shutdown conditions is greater than the need to limit fire damage to those systems required to gate the consequences of design basis accidents. Three levels of fire damage limits are blished according to the safety function of the structure, system, or component:

Safety Function Fire Damage Limits Hot shutdown One train of equipment necessary to achieve hot shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station(s) must be maintained free of fire damage by a single fire, including an exposure fire.

Cold shutdown Both trains of equipment necessary to achieve cold shutdown may be damaged by a single fire, including an exposure fire, but damage must be limited so that at least one train can be repaired or made operable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> using on site capability.

Design basis accidents Both trains of equipment necessary for mitigation of consequences following design basis accidents may be damaged by a single exposure fire.

not necessary for safe shutdown may be lost to a single exposure fire. However, protection is vided so that a fire within only one such system does not damage the redundant system.

fire hazards analysis should separately identify hazards and provide appropriate protection in tions where safety-related losses can occur as a result of:

Concentrations of combustible contents, including transient fire loads due to combustibles expected to be used in normal operations such as refueling, maintenance, and modifications; Continuity of combustible contents, furnishings, building materials, or combinations thereof in configurations conducive to fire spread; Exposure fire, heat, smoke, or water exposure, including those that may necessitate evacuation from areas that are required to be attended for safe shutdown; Fire in control rooms or other locations having critical safety-related functions; Lack of adequate access or smoke removal facilities that impede fire extinguishment in safety-related areas; Lack of explosion-prevent measures; Loss of electric power or control circuits; Inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems.

fire hazards analysis should verify that the NRC fire protection program guidelines have been

. The analysis should list applicable elements of the program, with explanatory statements as ded to identify location, type of system, and design criteria. The analysis should identify and ify any deviations from the regulatory guidelines. Justification for deviations from the ulatory guidelines shows that an equivalent level of protection can be achieved. Deletion of a ective feature without compensating alternative protection measures is not acceptable, unless clearly demonstrated that the protective measure is not needed because of the design and ngement of the particular plant.

SPONSE C.1.b vised fire hazards analysis which addresses the issues noted in Position C.1.b is presented in tion 5 of this report.

.c. Fire Suppression System Design Basis

Total reliance should not be placed on a single fire suppression system. Appropriate backup fire suppression capability should be provided.

A single active failure or a crack in a moderate-energy line (pipe) in the fire suppression system should not impair both the primary and backup fire suppression capability. For example, neither the failure of a fire pump, its power supply or controls, nor a crack in a moderate-energy line in the fire suppression system, should result in loss of function of both sprinkler and hose standpipe systems in an area protected by such primary and backup systems.

SPONSE C.1.c.(1) and (2)

In every safe shutdown fire area or other areas which expose safe shutdown areas, there is not a total reliance on a single suppression system or method. As a minimum, two suppression methods are available in the form of either fixed suppression system or fire brigade suppression using manual hose streams or portable extinguishers.

The loss of any fire protection system does not affect the function of the back-up manual suppression systems.

SITION C.1.c.(3) a minimum, the fire suppression system should be capable of delivering water to manual hose ions located within hose reach of areas containing equipment required for safe plant shutdown owing the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). In areas of high seismic activity, the staff will sider on a case-by-case basis the need to design the fire detection and suppression systems to unctional following the SSE.

SPONSE C.1.c.(3) safe shutdown areas of the plant are provided with hose stream coverage for use by the plant brigade. Refer to the Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER), Section 5, for specific rmation for any fire area. Millstone 3 is not required to provide seismically designed hose ion/standpipe systems. A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J.

peka to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11769, dated October 7, 1985-Docket No. 50-423) rding plant location that could not be reached a maximum of 100 feet of fire hose from dpipe system(s), and provides anticipated required hose length and supporting calculations to firm that no significant hydraulic degradation will occur. A deviation request has been mitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11760, dated ober 1, 1985-Docket No. 50-423) regarding design of combined standpipe/suppression ems.

fire protection systems should retain their original design capability for (a) natural nomena of less severity and greater frequency than the most severe natural phenomena proximately once in 10 years) such as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, ice storms, or ll-intensity earthquakes that are characteristic of the geographic region, and (b) potential

-made site-related events such as oil barge collisions or aircraft crashes that have a reasonable bability of occurring at a specific plant site. The effects of lightning strikes should be included he overall plant fire protection program.

SPONSE C.1.c.(4) fire protection systems at Millstone 3 comply with this position, except as noted in response osition C.1.c(3).

SITION C.1.c.(5) consequences of inadvertent operation of or a crack in a moderate energy line in the fire pression system should meet the guidelines specified for moderate-energy systems outside tainment in SRP Section 3.6.1.

SPONSE C.1.c.(5) inadvertent operation evaluation is being conducted at this time.

SITION C.1.d rnative or dedicated shutdown capability should be provided where the protection of systems se functions are required for safe shutdown is not provided by established fire suppression hods or by Position C.5.b.

SPONSE C.1.d rnative shutdown capability is provided.

SITION C.1.e.(1) (2) and (3)

The fire protection program (plans, personnel, and equipment) for buildings storing new reactor fuel and for adjacent fire areas that could affect the fuel storage area should be fully operational before fuel is received at the site. Such adjacent areas include those whose flames, hot gases, and fire-generated toxic and corrosive products may jeopardize safety and surveillance of the stored fuel.

The fire protection program for an entire reactor unit should be fully operational prior to initial fuel loading in that reactor unit.

evaluation of fire hazards. Additional fire barriers, fire protection capability, and administrative controls should be provided as necessary to protect the operating unit from construction fire hazards.

SPONSE C.1.e.(1) (2) and (3) fire protection program has been developed and is implemented in accordance with the uirements of Position C.1.e.(1) (2) and (3).

. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS SITION C.2.

ministrative controls should be used to maintain the performance of the fire protective system personnel. These controls should establish procedures to:

Prohibit bulk storage of combustible materials inside or adjacent to safety-related buildings or systems during operation or maintenance periods. Regulatory Guide 1.39 provides guidance on housekeeping, including the disposal or combustible materials.

Govern the handling and limitation of the use of ordinary combustible materials, combustible and flammable gases and liquids, high efficiency particulate air and charcoal filters, dry ion exchange resins, or other combustible supplies in safety-related areas.

Govern the handling of and limit transient fire loads such as combustible and flammable liquids, wood and plastic products, or other combustible materials in buildings containing safety-related systems or equipment during all phases of operating, and especially during maintenance, modification, or refueling operations.

Designate the on site staff member responsible for the in-plant fire protection review of proposed work activities to identify potential transient fire hazards and specify required additional fire protection in the work activity procedure.

Govern the use of ignition sources by use of a flame permit system to control welding, flame cutting, brazing, or soldering operations. A separate permit should be issued for each area where work is to be done. If work continues over more than one shift, the permit should be valid for not more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the plant is operating or for the duration of a particular job during plant shutdown.

Control the removal from the area of all waste, debris, scrap, oil spills, or other combustibles resulting from the work activity immediately following completion of the activity, or at the end of each work shift, whichever comes first.

should not be permitted.

Maintain the periodic housekeeping inspections to ensure continued compliance with these administrative controls.

Control the use of specific combustibles in safety-related areas. All wood used in safety-related areas during maintenance, modification, or refueling operation (such as lay-down blocks or scaffolding) should be treated with a flame retardant. Equipment or supplies (such as new fuel) shipped in untreated combustible packing containers may be unpacked in safety-related areas if required for valid operating reasons. However, all combustible materials should be removed from the area immediately following unpacking. Such transient combustible material, unless stored in approved containers, should not be left unattended during lunch breaks, shift changes, or other similar periods.

Loose combustible packing material such as wood or paper excelsior, or polyethylene sheeting should be placed in metal containers with tight-fitting self-closing metal covers.

Disarming of fire detection or fire suppression systems should be controlled by a permit system. Fire watches should be established in areas where systems are so disarmed.

Successful fire protection requires testing and maintenance of the fire protection equipment and the emergency lighting and communication. A test plan that lists the individuals and their responsibilities in connection with routine tests and inspections of the fire detection and protection systems should be developed. The test plan should contain the types, frequency, and detailed procedures for testing. Procedures should also contain instructions on maintaining fire protection during those periods when the fire protection system is impaired or during periods of plant maintenance, e.g., fire watches or temporary hose connections to water systems.

Control actions to be taken by an individual discovering a fire, for example, notification of control room, attempt to extinguish fire, and actuation of local fire suppression systems.

Control actions to be taken by the control room operator to determine the need for brigade assistance upon report of a fire or receipt of alarm on control room annunciator panel, for example, announcing location of fire over PA system, sounding fire alarms, and notifying the shift supervisor and the fire brigade leader of the type, size, and location of the fire.

Control actions to be taken by the fire brigade after notification by the control room operator of a fire, for example, assembling in a designated location, receiving directions from the fire brigade leader, and discharging specific fire fighting responsibilities, including selection and transportation of fire fighting equipment to fire location, selection of protective equipment, operating instructions for use of fire suppression systems, and use of preplanned strategies for fighting fires in specific areas.

(1) Fire hazards in each area covered by the specific prefire plans.

(2) Fire extinguishants best suited for controlling the fires associated with the fire hazards in that area and the nearest location of these extinguishants.

(3) Most favorable direction from which to attack a fire in each area in view of the ventilation direction, access hallways, stairs, and doors that are most likely to be free of fire, and the best station or elevation for fighting the fire. All access and egress routes that involve locked doors should be specifically identified in the procedure with the appropriate precautions and methods for access specified.

(4) Plant systems that should be managed to reduce the damage potential during a local fire and the location of local and remote controls for such management (e.g.,

any hydraulic or electrical systems in the zone covered by the specific fire fighting procedures that could increase the hazards in the area because of overpressurization or electrical hazards).

(5) Vital heat-sensitive system components that need to be kept cool while fighting a local fire. Particularly hazardous combustibles that need cooling should be designated.

(6) Organization of fire fighting brigades and the assignment of special duties according to job titles so that all fire fighting functions are covered by any complete shift personnel complement. These duties include command control of the brigade, transporting fire suppression and support equipment to the fire scenes, applying the suppressant to the fire, communication with the control room, and coordination with outside fire departments.

(7) Potential radiological and toxic hazards in fire zones.

(8) Ventilation system operation that ensures desired plant air distribution when the ventilation flow is modified for fire containment or smoke clearing operation.

(9) Operations requiring control room and shift engineer coordination or authorization.

(10) Instructions for plant operators and general plant personnel during fire.

SPONSE C.2.

ministrative control procedures exist for Millstone Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2.

.d and e part of the work control process, Millstone Station uses a permit system in concert with ntenance requests/work orders. All maintenance requests/work orders are reviewed and roved by responsible foremen, supervisors, or designees, which have received indoctrination ire protection/prevention during plant staff training. The Site Fire Marshal reviews and cesses ignition source and combustible and flammable material permits, as needed, to support ntenance and work activities.

.o.

egards to fire fighting procedures as outlined in Section C.2, Millstone Station believes that development of specific fire fighting procedures is not realistic because various combinations ire situations could develop and specific procedures would actually restrict fire fighting by ucing flexibility.

fighting strategies for safety-related areas are presented to the fire brigade members during classroom portion of the Fire Brigade Training Program. This includes an active discussion ween fire brigade leaders, fire brigade members, and classroom instructor on the best possible roaches and methods for fighting various types of fires in specific safety-related areas.

. FIRE BRIGADE SITION C.3.

The need for good organization, training, and equipping of fire brigades at nuclear power plant sites requires that effective measures be implemented to ensure proper discharge of these functions. The guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.101, Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants, should be followed as applicable.

A site fire brigade trained and equipped for fire fighting should be established to ensure adequate manual fire fighting capability for all areas of the plant containing structures, systems, or components important to safety. The fire brigade should be at least five members on each shift. The brigade leader and at least two brigade members should have sufficient training in or knowledge of plant safety-related systems to understand the effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe shutdown capability. The qualification of fire brigade members should include an annual physical examination to determine their ability to perform strenuous fire fighting activities. The shift supervisor should not be a member of the fire brigade. The brigade leader shall be competent to assess the potential safety consequences of a fire and advise control room personnel. Such competence by the brigade leader may be evidenced by possession of an operators license or equivalent knowledge of plant safety-related systems.

equipment, portable lights, portable ventilation equipment, and portable extinguishers.

Self-contained breathing apparatus using full-face positive-pressure masks approved by NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health - approval formerly given by the U.S. Bureau of Mines) should be provided for fire brigade, damage control, and control room personnel. At least 10 masks shall be available for fire brigade personnel.

Control room personnel may be furnished breathing air by a manifold system piped from a storage reservoir if practical. Service or rated operating life shall be a minimum of one-half hour for the self-contained units.

At least two extra air bottles should be located on site for each self-contained breathing unit. In addition, an on site six hour supply of reserve air should be provided and arranged to permit quick and complete replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned. If compressors are used as a source of breathing air, only units approved for breathing air shall be used; compressors shall be operable assuming a loss of off site power. Special care must be taken to locate the compressor in areas free of dust and contaminants.

The fire brigade training program shall ensure that the capability to fight potential fires is established and maintained. The program shall consist of an initial classroom instruction program followed by periodic classroom instruction, fire fighting practice, and fire drills.

(1) The initial classroom instruction should include:

(a) Indoctrination of the plant fire fighting plan with specific identification of each individual's responsibilities.

(b) Identification of the type and location of fire hazards and associated types of fires that could occur in the plant.

(c) The toxic and corrosive characteristics of expected products of combustion.

(d) Identification of the location of fire fighting equipment for each fire area and familiarization with the layout of the plant, including access and egress routes to each area.

(e) The proper use of available fire fighting equipment and the corrective method of fighting each type of fire. The types of fires covered should include fires in energized electrical equipment, fires in cables and cable trays, hydrogen fires, fires involving flammable and combustible liquids or hazardous process chemicals, fires resulting from construction or modification (welding), and record file fires.

(g) The proper method for fighting fires inside buildings and confined spaces.

(h) The direction and coordination of the fire fighting activities (fire brigade leaders only).

(i) Detailed review of fire fighting strategies and procedures.

(j) Review of the latest plant modifications and corresponding changes in fire fighting plans.

(k) Training of the plant fire brigade should be coordinated with the local fire department so that responsibilities and duties are delineated in advance.

This coordination should be part of the training course and should be included in the training of the local fire department staff.

(l) Local fire departments should be provided training in operational precautions when fighting fires on nuclear power plant sites and should be made aware of the need for radiological protection of personnel and the special hazards associated with a nuclear power plant site.

Note: Items (i) and (j) may be deleted from the training of no more than two of the non operations personnel who may be assigned to the fire brigade.

(2) The instruction should be provided by qualified individuals who are knowledgeable, experienced, and suitably trained in fighting the types of fires that could occur in the plant and in using the types of equipment available in the nuclear power plant.

(3) Instruction should be provided to all fire brigade members and fire brigade leaders.

(4) Regular planned meetings should be held at least every 3 months for all brigade members to review changes in the fire protection program and other subjects as necessary.

(5) Periodic refresher training sessions shall be held to repeat the classroom instruction program for all brigade members over a two year period. These sessions may be concurrent with the regular planned meetings.

(6) Practice (a) Practice sessions should be held for each shift fire brigade on the proper method of fighting the various types of fires that could occur in a nuclear

breathing apparatus under strenuous conditions encountered in fire fighting.

(b) These practice sessions should be provided at least once per year for each fire brigade member.

(7) Drills (a) Fire brigade drills should be performed in the plant so that the fire brigade can practice as a team.

(b) Drills should be performed at regular intervals not to exceed 3 months for each shift fire brigade. Each fire brigade member should participate in each drill, but must participate in at least two drills per year.

A sufficient number of these drills, but not less than one for each shift, fire brigade per year, should be unannounced to determine the fire fighting readiness of the plant fire brigade, brigade leader, and fire protection systems and equipment. Persons planning and authorizing an unannounced drill should ensure that the responding shift fire brigade members are not aware that a drill is being planned until it is begun. Unannounced drills should not be scheduled closer than 4 weeks.

At least one drill per year should be performed on a back shift for each shift fire brigade.

(c) The drills should be preplanned to establish the training objectives of the drill and should be critiqued to determine how well the training objectives have been met. Unannounced drills should be planned and critiqued by members of the management staff responsible for plant safety and fire protection. Performance deficiencies of a fire brigade or of individual fire brigade members should be remedied by scheduling additional training for the brigade or members.

Unsatisfactory drill performance should be followed by a repeat drill within 30 days.

(d) These drills should provide for local fire department participation periodically (at least annually).

(e) At three year intervals, a randomly selected unannounced drill should be critiqued by qualified individuals independent of the licensees staff. A copy of the written report from such individuals should be available for NRC review.

i. Assessment of fire alarm effectiveness, time required to notify and assemble fire brigade, and selection, placement, and use of equipment and fire fighting strategies.

ii. Assessment of each brigade members knowledge of his or her role in the fire fighting strategy for the area assumed to contain the fire.

Assessment of the brigade members conformance with established plant fire fighting procedures and use of fire fighting equipment, including self-contained emergency breathing apparatus, communication equipment, and ventilation equipment, to the extent practicable.

iii. The simulated use of fire fighting equipment required to cope with the situation and type of fire selected for the drill. The area and type of fire chosen for the drill should differ from those used in the previous drills so that brigade members are trained in fighting fires in various plant areas. The situation selected should simulate the size and arrangement of a fire that could reasonably occur in the area selected, allowing for fire development due to the time required to respond, to obtain equipment, and organize for the fire, assuming loss of automatic suppression capability.

iv. Assessment of brigade leader's direction of the fire fighting effort as to thoroughness, accuracy, and effectiveness.

(8) Records Individual records of training provided to each fire brigade member, including drill critiques, should be maintained for at least 3 years to ensure that each member receives training in all parts of the training program. These records of training should be available for NRC review. Retraining or broadened training for fire fighting within buildings should be scheduled for all those brigade members whose performance records show deficiencies.

(9) Guidance Documents NFPA 27, Private Fire Brigade, should be followed in organization, training, and fire drills. This standard also is applicable for the inspection and maintenance of fire fighting equipment. Among the standards referenced in this document, NFPA 197, Training Standard on Initial Fire Attacks, should be utilized as applicable.

NFPA booklets and pamphlets listed in NFPA 27 may be used as applicable for training references. In addition, courses in fire prevention and fire suppression that are recognized or sponsored by the fire protection industry should be utilized.

te fire brigade is established for Millstone Station. A minimum five man brigade is available ll times.

3 has a minimum of 12 sets of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and a minimum of SCBA spare cylinders for Fire Brigade Use (not including those for Control Room use).

itional SCBA and spare cylinders are available at Units 1 and 2 for makeup of the 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> k-up air supply. Additional off-site air supplies can be expected from the Town Fire artments. Recharge capability is available via the Town Fire Department or the Millstone Fire ning facility on-site air compressor or both.

. QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM SITION C.4.

quality assurance (QA) programs of applicants and contractors should ensure that the delines for design, procurement, installation, and testing and the administrative controls for the protection systems for safety-related areas are satisfied. The QA program should be under the agement control of the QA organization. This control consists of (1) formulating a fire ection QA program that incorporates suitable requirements and is acceptable to the agement responsible for fire protection or verifying that the program incorporates suitable uirements and is acceptable to the management responsible for fire protection, and (2) fying the effectiveness of the QA program for fire protection through review, surveillance, audits. Performance of other QA program functions for meeting the fire protection program uirements may be performed by personnel outside of the QA organization. The QA program fire protection should be part of the overall plant QA program. It should satisfy the specific eria listed below.

.a. Design And Procurement Document Control SITION C.4.a.

asures should be established to ensure that the guidelines of the regulatory position of this de are included in design and procurement documents and that deviations therefrom are trolled.

.b. Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings SITION C.4.b.

ections, tests, administrative controls, fire drills, and training that govern the fire protection gram should be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings and should be omplished in accordance with these documents.

.c. Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services

asures should be established to ensure that purchased material, equipment, and services form to the procurement documents.

.d. Inspection SITION C.4.d.

rogram for independent inspection of activities affecting fire protection should be established executed by or for the organization performing the activity to verify conformance with umented installation drawings and test procedures for accomplishing the activities.

.e. Test and Test Control SITION C.4.e.

st program should be established and implemented to ensure that testing is performed and fied by inspection and audit to demonstrate conformance with design and system readiness uirements. The tests should be performed in accordance with written test procedures; test lts should be properly evaluated and acted on.

.f. Inspection, Test, and Operating Status SITION C.4.f.

asures should be established to provide for the identification of items that have satisfactorily sed required tests and inspections.

.g Nonconforming Items SITION C.4.g.

asures should be established to control items that do not conform to specified requirements to vent inadvertent use or installation.

.h. Corrective Action SITION C.4.h.

asures should be established to ensure that conditions adverse to fire protection, such as ures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective components, uncontrolled combustible erial and non-conformances, are promptly identified, reported, and corrected.

.i. Records

ords should be prepared and maintained to furnish evidence that the criteria enumerated above being met for activities affecting the fire protection program.

.j. Audits SITION C.4.j.

its should be conducted and documented to verify compliance with the fire protection gram, including design and procurement documents, instructions, procedures and drawings, inspection and test activities.

SPONSE C.4.a through C.4.j esponse to the above positions, Northeast Utilities (NU) has established a fire protection gram which ensures positive attention in all aspects of nuclear power plant fire protection.

porate policies, established within NU's fire protection program, are responsive to BTP EB 9.5-1, establishing the fire prevention and protection requirements for all NU nuclear er plants. Included in the fire protection program is a Quality Assurance (QA) Program which resses BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.4 criteria. The QA program is under the management trol of the QA organization.

NU QAP Topical Report Quality Assurance Program, establishes the quality assurance uirements for NNECo. It is applicable to the design, procurement, installation, testing, and inistrative controls for the Fire Protection Quality Assurance Program for safety-related s, and is responsive to 10 criteria of 10CFR50, Appendix B, which are included in BTP EB 9.5-1, Section C.4.

onclusion, it is NNECos position that the criteria of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.4 have been through an established fire protection program and applicable administrative control cedures.

. GENERAL PLANT GUIDELINES

.a. Building Design SITION C.5.a.(1) barriers with a minimum fire resistance rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> should be provided to:

Separate safety-related systems from any potential fires in non safety-related areas that could affect their ability to perform their safety function; Separate redundant divisions or trains of safety-related systems from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire;

SPONSE C.5.a.(1) esponse to Sections a and b (Section c is not applicable), NNECo has verified that those our fire-rated barriers provided to assure compliance with the above criteria have been structed in accordance with designs qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASTM 9, Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials, (NFPA-251).

er to FP-3, Qualification of Fire Barriers Deviation Request submittal, Docket No. 50-423, 090, W. G. Counsil to B. J. Youngblood dated March 23, 1984, for further details.

ee-hour fire-rated barriers are provided to separate safe shutdown areas from potential fires in h safety- and nonsafety-related areas. All fire areas of the plant have been evaluated to rmine if exposures exist to alternate shutdown method equipment and components within a le area. (For methodology, refer to MNPS-3 FPER, Section 6.) It has been determined that e are two areas within the plant where alternate shutdown redundant trains could be affected single fire. They are:

Containment Structure - electrical penetration area Auxiliary Building - RPCCWP and charging pump area, elevation 24 feet-6 inches.

h of the above areas have been formally identified to the NRC staff in the form of a deviation uest (refer to Responses C.5.b.(2) and C.7.a.).

eviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (E. J. Mroczka to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11669, dated August 29, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding fireproofing tructural steel in Fire Areas CB-8, CB-9, CB-10, CB-11, and CB-12.

eviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W. G. Counsil to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding fiberglass n lines penetrating walls in Fire Areas ESF-7, ESF-9, ESF-10, and ESF-11.

SITION C.5.a.(2) ropriate fire barriers should be provided within a single safety division to separate ponents that present a fire hazard to other safety-related components or high concentrations afety-related cables within that division.

SPONSE C.5.a.(2) riers and/or automatic suppression systems have been provided to satisfy the above guideline.

r methodology, refer to Sections 5.1 through 5.5.)

nings through fire barriers for pipe, conduit, and cable trays which separate fire areas should ealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that required of the barrier lf. Openings inside conduit larger than 4 inches in diameter should be sealed at the fire barrier etration. Openings inside conduit 4 inches or less in diameter should be sealed at the fire ier unless the conduit extends at least 5 feet on each side of the fire barrier and is sealed either oth ends or at the fire barrier with noncombustible material to prevent the passage of smoke hot gases. Fire barrier penetrations that must maintain environmental isolation or pressure erentials should be qualified by test to maintain the barrier integrity under such conditions.

etration designs should utilize only noncombustible materials and should be qualified by tests.

penetration qualification tests should use the time-temperature exposure curve specified by TM E- 119, Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials. The acceptance criteria for the should require that:

The fire barrier penetration has withstood the fire endurance test without passage of flame or ignition of cables on the unexposed side for a period of time equivalent to the fire resistance rating required of the barrier.

The temperature levels recorded for the unexposed side are analyzed and demonstrate that the maximum temperature does not exceed 325°F.

The fire barrier penetration remains intact and does not allow projection of water beyond the unexposed surface during the hose stream test. The stream shall be delivered through a 1.5 inch nozzle set at a discharge angle of 30 percent with a nozzle pressure of 75 psi and a minimum discharge of 75 gpm with the tip of the nozzle a maximum of 5 ft from the exposed face; or the stream shall be delivered through a 1.5 inch nozzle set at a discharge angle of 15 percent with a nozzle pressure of 75 psi and a minimum discharge of 75 gpm with the tip of the nozzle a maximum of 10 ft from the exposed face; or the stream shall be delivered through a 2.5 inch National Standard playpipe equipped with 1 1/8-inch tip, nozzle pressure of 30 psi, located 20 feet from the exposed face.

SPONSE C.5.a.(3) etrations through fire area barriers are protected in accordance with the guidelines set forth in position. A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC J. Mroczka to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11669, dated August 29, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) rding penetration seals testing and internal sealing of conduit.

eviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W. G. Counsil to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding nonfire-tested trical penetration assemblies in Fire Area RC-1.

in 3-hour fire barriers for Fire Areas CSW-3 and CSW-4.

eviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 6, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding a 12 inch meter fiberglass reinforced pipe in three hour fire barriers for Fire Areas ESF-7, ESF-9,

-10, and ESF-12.

SITION C.5.a.(4) etration openings for ventilation systems should be protected by fire dampers having a rating ivalent to that required of the barrier (see NFPA-90A, Air Conditioning and Ventilating tems). Flexible air duct coupling in ventilation and filter systems should be noncombustible.

SPONSE C.5.a.(4)

ECo has verified that all ventilation systems penetrating fire barriers at Millstone 3 meet the delines of this section, except as follows:

The Supplemental Leak Collection Rate System (SLCRS) ductwork, which is routed through the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Building and the Auxiliary Building, has two three-hour fire dampers and is enclosed in a one-hour fire-rated duct wrap, except for ESF-1 and ESF-5. Due to physical constraints, fire damper 44 (DMPF 44) is located away from the fire barrier. However, to ensure that the fire areas are segregated, all of the SLCRS ductwork between DMPF 44 and the fire barrier is wrapped with a one-hour fire-rated duct wrap. All of the SLCRS duct supports are coated with a cementitious fire-resistive material, which has an equivalent fire rating to the SLCRS duct wrap. For further information, refer to NCR 387-085, Disposition dated July 9, 1987.

Fire Damper 3HVR*DMPF-64 is located in the western-most portion of the north wall of ESF-5 (Terry Turbine Valve Room), and the south wall of ESF-1. 86-10 type evaluation FP-EV-00-0008, Technical Evaluation for the Acceptability of Removing Fire Damper 3HVR*DMPF-64 from the Fire Protection Program, Millstone Unit 3, addresses the damper inaccessibility (size of damper opening, 1 x 2, is too small) for test purposes, and the acceptability of the duct penetration remaining unsealed in a fire.

SITION C.5.a.(5) r openings in fire barriers should be protected with equivalently rated doors, frames, and dware that have been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory. Such doors uld be self-closing or provided with closing mechanisms and should be inspected iannually to verify that automatic hold-open, release, and closing mechanisms and latches are rable. (See NFPA 80, Fire Doors and Windows.)

Fire doors should be kept closed and electrically supervised at a continuously manned location; Fire doors should be locked closed and inspected weekly to verify that the doors are in the closed position; Fire doors should be provided with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms and inspected daily to verify that doorways are free of obstructions; or Fire doors should be kept closed and inspected daily to verify that they are in the closed position.

fire brigade leader should have ready access to keys for any locked fire doors.

as protected by automatic total flooding gas suppression systems should have electrically ervised self-closing fire doors or should satisfy option (a) above.

SPONSE C.5.a.(5) r openings in safe shutdown fire area barriers are provided with fire-rated doors, frames, and dware which have been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory.

eviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11760, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding fire door mblies. This provides additional information on the construction/arrangement of plant fire rs to supplement previous deviation request submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W. C.

nsil to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11478, dated April 2, 1985 - Docket No. 50-243) regarding door qualification.

rs are electrically monitored, locked, or administratively controlled to ensure they protect the ning in the event of a fire.

ation surveillance procedure has been developed to govern an operability test of the automatic ing mechanisms and door catches.

doors leading to vital CO2 protected areas are normally closed and electrically supervised, h the exception of the two doors from the East and West switchgear rooms to the North and th electrical cable tunnels. These doors are key locked closed.

eviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W. G. Counsil to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding the non

-tested containment access hatch in Fire Area RC-1.

Personnel access routes and escape routes should be provided for each fire area. Stairwells outside primary containment serving as escape routes, access routes for firefighting, or access routes to areas containing equipment necessary for safe shutdown should be enclosed in masonry or concrete towers with a minimum fire rating of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and self-closing Class B fire doors.

Fire exit routes should be clearly marked.

SPONSE C.5.a.(6) and (7) ess and escape routes are provided for each fire area. Stairwells outside primary containment ing as access and egress routes are enclosed with fire barriers having two hour fire-ratings h 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> UL-labeled fire door assemblies at all openings into the stairwell. Fire exit routes clearly marked with directional signs through interior areas and exit signs at egress doors.

SITION C.5.a.(8) h cable spreading room should contain only one redundant safety division. Cable spreading ms should not be shared between reactors. Cable spreading rooms should be separated from h other and from other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum fire resistance of 3 rs.

SPONSE C.5.a.(8)

Millstone 3 cable spreading room contains both trains of safe shutdown/safety-related cable.

area is protected by a manually actuated total flood CO2 suppression system. The single cable ading room was utilized since alternate shutdown capabilities exist in a separate fire area. A er has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J. Youngblood, Licensing er A04615, dated July 1, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding post-fire operator action and pliance with the concerns identified in IE Information Notice 85-09, Isolation Transfer tches and Post-Fire Shutdown Capability, and provisions of alternate fusing and reactor lant cold leg temperature indication at the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel. A subsequent letter has n submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J. Youngblood, Licensing Letter 759, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) which identifies that the cold leg perature indication at the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel is installed.

SITION C.5.a.(9) rior wall and structural components, thermal insulation materials, radiation shielding erials, and soundproofing should be noncombustible. Interior finishes should be combustible.

erials that are acceptable for use as interior finish without evidence of test and listing by a onally recognized laboratory are the following:

Ceramic tile, ceramic panels Glass, glass blocks; Brick, stone, concrete blocks, plain or painted; Steel and aluminum panels, plain, painted, or enameled; Vinyl tile, vinyl-asbestos tile, linoleum, or asphalt tile on concrete floors.

SPONSE C.5.a.(9) rior wall and structural components are noncombustible. All thermal insulation therproofing is UL-listed and has a flame spread and smoke developed rating of not more than Flame spread ratings is established in accordance with ASTM E-84 Test.

SITION C.5.a.(10) al deck roof construction should be noncombustible and listed as acceptable for fire in the Building Materials Directory, or listed as Class I in the Factory Mutual System Approval de.

SPONSE C.5.a.(10) iation request granted on this position. Refer to FP-6, Qualifications of Metal Roof Deck and tents of Concealed Spaces, Docket No. 50-423, B11059, W. G. Counsil to B. J. Youngblood details on this position.

SITION C.5.a.(11) pended ceiling and their supports should be of noncombustible construction. Concealed ces should be devoid of combustibles except as noted in Position C.6.b.

SPONSE C.5.a.(11) pended ceilings have a flame spread rating of no more than 25 as defined by Federal cification SS-5-118A and carry a UL label in accordance with ASTM E-84.

only safety-related area of the plant where cable trays (combustible materials) are located ve a false ceiling is in the Control Room immediately behind the Main Control Board. A iation request for this area has been granted. Refer to FP-6, Qualification of Metal Roof Deck Contents of Concealed Spaces Deviation Request submittal, Docket No. 50-423, B11059, W.

Counsil to B. J. Youngblood dated March 9, 1984, for further details. A deviation request has

Area SB-4, Zone A.

SITION C.5.a.(12) nsformers installed inside fire areas containing safety-related systems should be of the dry or insulated and cooled with noncombustible liquid. Transformers filled with combustible d that are located indoors should be enclosed in a transformer vault (see Section 450(c) of PA 70, National Electrical Code).

SPONSE C.5.a.(12) transformers installed inside of buildings are of the dry type.

SITION C.5.a.(13) door oil-filled transformers should have oil spill confinement features or drainage away from buildings. Such transformers should be located at least 50 feet distant from the building, or by uring that such building walls within 50 feet of oil-filled transformers are without openings have a fire resistance rating of at least 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.

SPONSE C.5.a.(13) filled transformers are located more than 50 feet from buildings and are provided with at-type construction to prevent the spread of oil or fire, except for the boron recovery tank losure located adjacent to the reserve station transformers. The boron tank enclosure is arated from the reserve station transformers by a reinforced concrete wall of 3-hour rated struction.

main, normal, and reserve transformers are protected by automatic operating water spray ems.

SITION C.5.a.(14) or drains sized to remove expected firefighting water flow without flooding safety-related ipment should be provided in those areas where fixed water fire suppression systems are alled. Floor drains should also be provided in other areas where hand hose lines may be used if h firefighting water could cause unacceptable damage to safety-related equipment in the area NFPA-92, Waterproofing and Draining of Floors). Where gas suppression systems are alled, the drains should be provided with adequate seals or the gas suppression system should ized to compensate for the loss of the suppression agent through the drains. Drains in areas taining combustible liquids should have provisions for preventing the backflow of bustible liquids to safety-related areas through the interconnected drain systems. Water nage from areas that may contain radioactivity should be collected, sampled, and analyzed ore discharge to the environment.

safety-related areas of the plant are provided with floor drains or other protection (dikes, ed pads for equipment, etc.) to control water used for fire fighting, except as noted by iation request. All other drain arrangements noted in this position are provided. A deviation uest has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W. G. Counsil to B. J. Youngblood, Letter 658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding lack of floor drainage in Fire as AB-2, AB-3, AB-9, AB-10, AB-11, AB-12, AB-5, AB-6, CB-1, CB-2, CB-3, CB-4, CB-5, 6, CB-7, CB-16, CB-17, CB-8, CB-9, CB-10, CB-11, CB-12, EG-1, EG-2, SB-2, and SB-3.

.b. Safe Shutdown Capability SITION C.5.b.

Fire protection features should be provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown. These features should be capable of limiting fire damage so that:

(a) One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control station(s) is free of fire damage; and (b) Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station(s) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

To meet the guidelines of Position C5.b.1, one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage should be provided:

(a) Separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a three hour rating. Structural steel forming a part of or supporting such fire barriers should be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier; (b) Separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system should be installed in the fire area; or (c) Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a one hour rating. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system should be installed in the fire area.

If the guidelines of Positions C5.b.1 and C5.b.2 cannot be met, then alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables, systems or components in the area, room, or zone under consideration should be provided.

e shutdown capability is maintained throughout the plant, except Fire Areas AB-1 and RC-1, ugh a combination of redundant train protection as specified in Section (2) a, b, and c, and ugh alternate shutdown capability or through deviation request.

eviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11761, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding separation of les and equipment in Fire Area AB-1, Zones A, B, C, D, E, and F. Refer to the response to ition C.7.a for a description of the protection provided in Fire Area RC-1.

eviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W. G. Counsil to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding fiberglass drain in 3-hour fire barriers for Fire Areas CSW-3 and CSW-4.

eviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11760, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding fire door mblies.

.c. Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown Capability SITION C.5.c.

Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability provided for a specific fire area should be able to achieve and maintain subcritical reactivity conditions in the reactor, maintain reactor coolant inventory, achieve and maintain hot standby* conditions for a PWR (hot shutdown* for a BWR) and achieve cold shutdown* conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter. During the postfire shutdown, the reactor coolant system process variables is maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal AC power, and the fission product boundary integrity is not affected; i.e., there is no fuel clad damage, rupture, or any primary coolant boundary, or rupture of the containment boundary.

fined in the Standard Technical Specifications The performance goals for the shutdown functions should be:

(a) The reactivity control function should be capable of achieving and maintaining cold shutdown reactivity conditions.

(b) The reactor coolant makeup function should be capable of maintaining the reactor coolant level above the top of the core for BWRs and be within the level indication in the pressurizer for PWRs.

(c) The reactor heat removal function should be capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal.

(e) The supporting functions should be capable of providing the process cooling, lubrication, etc., necessary to permit the operation of the equipment used for safe shutdown functions.

The shutdown capability for specific fire areas may be unique for each such area, or it may be one unique combination of systems for all such areas. In either case, the alternative shutdown capability shall be independent of the specific fire area(s) and shall accommodate postfire conditions where off site power is available and where off site power is not available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Procedures shall be in effect to implement this capability.

If the capability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown will not be available because of fire damage, the equipment and systems comprising the means to achieve and maintain the hot standby or hot shutdown condition shall be capable of maintaining such conditions until cold shutdown can be achieved. If such equipment and systems will not be capable of being powered by both on site and off site electric power systems because of fire damage, an independent on site power system shall be provided. The number of operating shift personnel, exclusive of fire brigade members, required to operate such equipment and systems shall be on site at all times.

Equipment and systems comprising the means to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions should not be damaged by fire; or the fire damage to such equipment and systems should be limited so that the systems can be made operable and cold shutdown achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Materials for such repairs shall be readily available on site and procedures shall be in effect to implement such repairs. If such equipment and systems used prior to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the fire will not be capable of being powered by both on site and off site electric power systems because of fire damage, an independent on site power system should be provided. Equipment and systems used after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> may be powered by off site power only.

Shutdown systems installed to ensure postfire shutdown capability need not be designed to meet seismic Category I criteria, single failure criteria, or other design basis accident criteria, except where required for other reasons, e.g., because of interface with or impact on existing safety systems, or because of adverse valve actions due to fire damage.

The safe shutdown equipment and systems for each fire area should be known to be isolated from associated circuits in the fire area so that hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground in the associated circuits will not prevent operation of the safe shutdown equipment. The separation and barriers between trays and conduits containing associated circuits of one safe shutdown division and trays and conduits containing associated circuits or safe shutdown cables from the redundant division, or the isolation of these associated circuits from the safe shutdown equipment, should be such that a postulated fire involving associated circuits will not prevent safe shutdown.

rnative shutdown capability is provided for Fire Areas CB-8, CB-9, and CB-11. Refer to R Sections 6 through 9 for details.

part of the Stretch Power Uprate (SPU) project, a deviation to positions C.5.c(3) and (5) was roved by the NRC in a letter dated August 12, 2008 (Amendment No. 242), for the fire tdown and long term steam generator makeup required to support the decay heat removal gn function. In lieu of service water system (seawater) providing the long-term AFW pump ion source, an alternate defense-in-depth fire protection design approach which relied upon hwater makeup sources was approved. The design approach considered multiple mineralized Water Storage Tank (DWST) or Condensate Storage Tank (CST) longer-term enishment options that included refill from the water treating system (WTS), fire water em (FPW), and the domestic water system (DWS).

10 EVALUATION EV-04-001 - Technical Evaluation for 3MSS*MOV74A, B, C and D Control Circuit Hot rt Modification (DCR M3-04002), addresses the adequacy of the installation of control circuit out switches protected by a radiant energy heat shield located in the back of Main Board 5 to vent a fire induced hot short from resulting in spurious opening of the valves.

.d. Control of Combustibles SITION C.5.d.(1) ety-related systems should be isolated or separated from combustible materials. When this is possible because of the nature of the safety system or the combustible material, special ection should be provided to prevent a fire from defeating the safety system function. Such ection may involve a combination of automatic fire suppression, and construction capable of hstanding and containing a fire that consumes all combustibles present. Examples of such bustible materials that may not be separable from the remainder of its system are:

Emergency diesel generator fuel oil day tanks.

Turbine-generator oil and hydraulic control fluid systems.

Reactor coolant pump lube oil system.

SPONSE C.5.d.(1)

Emergency diesel generator fuel-oil day tanks are protected by a manually operated, wet type sprinkler system. Heat detection is used for early warning fire detection. The tank is of ASME III, Class 3 construction.

Reactor coolant pump lube oil systems are provided with a seismic oil collection system.

Heat detection is provided for alarm and annunciation.

SITION C.5.d.(2) k gas storage (either compressed or cryogenic) should not be permitted inside structures sing safety-related equipment. Storage of flammable gas such as hydrogen should be located doors or in separate detached buildings so that a fire or explosion will not adversely affect any ty-related systems or equipment. (Refer to NFPA 50A, Gaseous Hydrogen Systems.) Care uld be taken to locate high pressure gas storage containers with the long axis parallel to ding walls. This will minimize the possibility of wall penetration in the event of a container ure. Use of compressed gases (especially flammable and fuel gases) inside buildings should be trolled. (Refer to NFPA 6, Industrial Fire Loss Prevention.)

SPONSE C.5.d.(2) ept for the hydrogen seal oil unit in the turbine building, all flammable gas storage is outside vital buildings. The hydrogen seal oil unit is protected by a water spray system.

bulk hydrogen storage for the generator coolant system is located outside, south of the tainment structure.

SITION C.5.d.(3) use of plastic materials should be minimized. In particular, halogenated plastics such as yvinyl chloride (PVC) and neoprene should be used only when substitute noncombustible erials are not available. All plastic materials, including flame and fire retardant materials, will n with an intensity and Btu production in a range similar to that of ordinary hydrocarbons.

en burning, they produce heavy smoke that obscures visibility and can plug air filters, ecially charcoal and HEPA. The halogenated plastics also release free chlorine and hydrogen ride when burning which are toxic to humans and corrosive to equipment.

SPONSE C.5.d.(3) use of halogenated plastics is minimized. Plastic reinforced fiberglass roof drain pipe is alled through many areas of the plant. A fire retardant coating will be applied to the pipe to uce the burning characteristics to an acceptable level. A deviation request has been submitted transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 5 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding separation of pumps within the ESF Building due to a 12 diameter fiberglass reinforced pipe which passes through the 3-hour fire barriers separating pumps and associated. A closed head water curtain with directional spray heads is provided to ntain separation by protecting the fiberglass pipe. A deviation request has been submitted and smitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 1985 -

our fire barriers separating redundant pumps/trains.

SITION C.5.d.(4) age of flammable liquids should, as a minimum, comply with the requirements of NFPA 30, mmable and Combustible Liquids Code.

SPONSE C.5.d.(4) age of flammable liquids follows the guidance of NFPA 30.

SITION C.5.d.(5) rogen lines in safety-related areas should be either designed to seismic Class I requirements, leeved such that the water pipe is directly vented to the outside, or should be equipped with ess flow valves so that in case of a line break, the hydrogen concentration in the affected areas not exceed 2 percent.

SPONSE C.5.d.(5) hydrogen gas supply piping located inside buildings is either enclosed in steel guard piping ich is vented to the atmosphere), or designed to Seismic Category I, both provisions being in ordance with BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.5.d.(5).

.e. Electrical Cable Construction, Cable Trays, and Cable Penetrations SITION C.5.e.(1) y metal should be used for cable trays. Only metallic tubing should be used for conduit.

n-wall metallic tubing should not be used. Flexible metallic tubing should only be used in rt lengths to connect components to equipment. Other raceways should be made of combustible material.

SPONSE C.5.e.(1) combustible materials (aluminum and steel) are used for cable trays and cable conduit.

xible metallic tubing is used only in short lengths to connect components to equipment.

eways are of noncombustible material.

SITION C.5.e.(2) undant safety-related cable systems outside the cable spreading room should be separated m each other and from potential fire exposure hazards in non safety-related areas by fire iers with a minimum fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. These cable trays should be provided with

nual hose stations and portable hand extinguishers should be provided.

ety-related cable trays of a single division that are separated from redundant divisions by a fire ier with a minimum rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and are normally accessible for manual firefighting uld be protected from the effects of a potential exposure fire by providing automatic water pression in the area where such a fire could occur. Automatic area protection, where provided, uld consider cable tray arrangements and possible transient combustibles to ensure adequate er coverage for areas that could present an exposure hazard to the cable system. Manual hose dpipe systems may be relied upon to provide the primary fire suppression (in lieu of matic water suppression systems) for safety-related cable trays of a single division that are arated from redundant safety divisions by a fire barrier with a minimum rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and normally accessible for manual firefighting if all of the following conditions are met:

The number of equivalent* standard 24-inch-wide cable trays (both safety-related and non safety-related) in a given fire area is six or less; The cabling does not provide instrumentation, control or power to systems required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown; and Smoke detectors are provided in the area of these cable routings, and continuous line-type heat detectors are provided in the cable trays.

ety-related cable trays that are not accessible for manual fire fighting should be protected by a ed automatic water system with open-head deluge or open directional spray nozzles arranged hat adequate water coverage is provided for each cable tray. Such cable trays should also be ected from the effects of a potential exposure fire by providing automatic water suppression in area where such a fire could occur.

ther areas where it may not be possible because of other overriding design features necessary reasons of nuclear safety to separate redundant safety-related cable systems by 3-hour-rated barriers, cable trays should be protected by an automatic water system with open-head deluge pen directional spray nozzles arranged so that adequate water coverage is provided for each le tray. Such cable trays should also be protected from the effects of a potential exposure fire roviding automatic water suppression in the area where such could occur. The capability to ieve and maintain safe shutdown considering the effects of a fire involving fixed and potential sient combustibles should be evaluated with and without actuation of the automatic pression system and should be justified on a suitably defined basis.

ays exceeding 24 inches should be counted as two trays; trays exceeding 48 inches should be nted as three trays, regardless of tray fill.

SPONSE C.5.e.(2)

tained within the boundaries of the fire area following a complete burnout of all in situ and sient combustibles in that area. It was further assumed that in areas where redundant trains are osed, the alternate shutdown capability would prevail.

e-type heat detectors are not utilized in cable trays containing safety-related cables as area fire ction exists and it has been determined that there is an alternate means of bringing the plant to shutdown on loss of any fire area.

he following areas, cable for redundant trains or alternate methods was found in the same fire Building/Area Fire Area (Zone)

Control Buildings - Cable Spreading Room CB-8 Control Buildings - Control Room CB-9 Control Buildings - Instrument Rack Room CB-11 Auxiliary Buildings - Elevation 24 feet 6 inches floor AB-1(D)

Containment Structure - Electrical Penetration Area RC-1 hod of assuring safe shutdown capability:

8, 9, 11 Alternate shutdown method.

-1(D) Fixed automatic sprinkler installation in trays and between charging pump and RPCCW pump areas, manual fire suppression with hose streams, and portable extinguishers/area smoke detection provided, plus deviation (see Response C.5.b).

-1 Fixed automatic sprinkler system installed over the electrical penetration area along with area smoke detection, plus deviation (see Response C.5.b).

SITION C.5.e.(3), (4) and (5)

Electrical cable construction should, as a minimum, pass the flame test in the current IEEE Std 383. (This does not imply that cables passing this test will not require protection.)

Cable raceways should be used only for cables.

Miscellaneous storage and piping for flammable or combustible liquids or gases should not create a potential exposure hazard to safety-related systems.

SPONSE C.5.e.(3), (4) and (5) lstone 3 design addresses these conditions.

SITION C.5.f.

The products of combustion and the means by which they will be removed from each fire area should be established during the initial stages of plant design. Consideration should be given to the installation of automatic suppression systems as a means of limiting smoke and end heat generation. Smoke and corrosive gases should generally be discharged directly outside to an area that will not affect safety-related plant areas. The normal plant ventilation system may be used for this purpose if capable and available. To facilitate manual firefighting, separate smoke and heat vents should be provided in specific areas such as cable spreading rooms, diesel fuel oil storage areas, switchgear rooms, and other areas where the potential exists for heavy smoke conditions (see NFPA 204 for additional guidance on smoke control).

Release of smoke and gases containing radioactive materials to the environment should be monitored in accordance with emergency plans as described in the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.101, Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants. Any ventilation system designed to exhaust potentially radioactive smoke or gases should be evaluated to ensure that inadvertent operation or single failures will not violate the radiologically controlled areas of the plant design. This requirement includes containment functions for protecting the public and maintaining habitability for operations personnel.

Special protection for ventilation power and control cables may be required. The power supply and controls for mechanical ventilation systems should be run outside the fire area served by the system where practical.

Engineered safety feature filters should be protected in accordance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Any filter that includes combustible materials and is a potential exposure fire hazard that may affect safety-related components should be protected as determined by the fire hazards analysis.

The fresh air supply intakes to areas containing safety-related equipment or systems should be located remote from the exhaust air outlets and smoke vents of other fire areas to minimize the possibility of contaminating the intake air with the products of combustion.

Stairwells should be designed to minimize smoke infiltration during a fire.

Where total flooding gas extinguishing systems are used, area intake and exhaust ventilation dampers should be controlled in accordance with NFPA 12, Carbon Dioxide Systems, and NFPA 12A, Halon 1301 Systems, to maintain the necessary gas concentration.

SPONSE C.5.f.

cifically to exhaust smoke, other products of combustion or fire suppression gases using ual controls. Portable ventilation equipment is available within the cable spreading area for ke and CO2 removal. The control room will be purged manually by portable fans. Normal t ventilation systems will be used in other areas of the plant for this purpose. Portable smoke tors will be provided to assist in removal of the products of combustion should the normal tilation systems be unavailable because of damper closures or other failures.

ere total flooding gas extinguishing systems are used, air intake and exhaust ventilation pers are provided with mechanisms that will close them on initiation of gas flow (as needed).

barrier ventilation openings are provided with fire dampers that will close if a fire should se room temperature to exceed a set value.

sh air supply intakes to areas containing safety-related equipment or systems are remote from aust air outlets of other fire areas. Stairwells are designed to minimize smoke infiltration ng a fire.

rwell and elevator shafts, excluding the turbine building and containment, have been fire rated two hours, with Class B fire rated doors in compliance with NEPIA Specification for Basic Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, NEPIA File No. 124B, 1974. Escape and access routes be established and indicated accordingly.

.g. Lighting and Communication SITION C.5.g hting and two-way voice communication are vital to safe shutdown and emergency response he event of fire. Suitable fixed and portable emergency lighting and communication device uld be provided as follows:

Fixed self-contained lighting consisting of fluorescent or sealed-beam units with individual eight hour minimum battery power supplies should be provided in areas that must be manned for safe shutdown and for access and egress routes to and from all fire areas. Safe shutdown areas include those required to be manned if the control room must be evacuated.

Suitable sealed-beam battery-powered portable hand lights should be provided for emergency use by the fire brigade and other operations personnel required to achieve safe plant shutdown.

Fixed emergency communications independent of the normal plant communication system should be installed at preselected stations.

A portable radio communications system should be provided for use by the fire brigade and other operations personnel required to achieve safe plant shutdown. This system

protected from exposure fire damage. Preoperational and periodic testing should demonstrate that the frequencies used for portable radio communication will not affect the actuation of protective relays.

SPONSE C.5.g.

ergency lighting will be installed in all areas of the plant that may have to be manned for safe tdown operations and in access and egress routes to and from all areas. The emergency ting consists of fixed, self-contained fluorescent or sealed-beam units with individual 8-hour imum battery power supplies. The emergency lighting system provides illumination of the ess and egress pathways. In addition, this lighting is supplemented with the Millstone Station urity Lighting for outdoor access/egress routes, and access to the Appendix R equipment cage arehouse Building number 435.

lighting with 8-hour self-contained sealed battery packs are also installed inside the MP3 O (AAC) diesel and switchgear enclosures for access/egress and operation of equipment from control board. The MP3 SBO diesel generator is credited to supply MP2 with alternate AC er in the event of a fire in specifically identified Unit 2 Appendix R fire areas.

security lighting system is also credited for MP3 operations personnel access/egress yard area es to the MP3 SBO (AAC) diesel and switchgear enclosures. Access is required to start the el and energize the 4160 volt tie to MP2 in the event of a MP2 Appendix R fire in certain s.

xed emergency communication system is provided which is independent of the normal plant munication system at preselected stations. A portable radio communications system has been vided for use by the fire brigade. Fixed repeaters have been installed for portable radio munication. If a fire should damage the Millstone 3 fixed repeater station, the plants portable os have been equipped with multiband frequency capability. This multiband frequency ability will allow plant personnel to continue communications using the base station as backup munication center or the capability to change frequency bands and operate through either cent plants fixed repeater system.

. FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION

.a. Fire Detection SITION C.6.a.

Detection systems should be provided for all areas that contain or present a fire exposure to safety-related equipment.

Fire detection systems should comply with the requirements of Class A systems as defined in NFPA 72D, Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Proprietary

Fire detectors should be selected and installed in accordance with NFPA 72E, Automatic Fire Detectors. Preoperational and periodic testing of pulsed line-type heat detectors should demonstrate that the frequencies used will not affect the actuation of protective relays in other plant systems.

Fire detection systems should give audible and visual alarm and annunciation in the control room. Where zoned detection systems are used in a given fire area, local means should be provided to identify which detector zone has actuated. Local audible alarms should sound in the fire area.

Fire alarms should be distinctive and unique so they will not be confused with any other plant system alarms.

Primary and secondary power supplies should be provided for the fire detection system and for electrically operated control valves for automatic suppression systems. Such primary and secondary power supplies should satisfy provisions of Section 2220 of NFPA 72D. This can be accomplished by using normal off site power as the primary supply with a four hour battery supply as secondary supply; and by providing capability for manual connection to the Class 1E emergency power bus within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of loss of off site power.

Such connection should follow the applicable guidelines in Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.32, and 1.75.

SPONSE C.6.a.

fire detection and alarm systems installed in all areas of the plant have been designed in ordance with the intent of NFPA 72D, Standard for the Installation, Maintenance and Use of prietary Protective Signaling Systems. The initiating circuits of the fire alarm systems in the t utilize a Class A circuit with the exception of Warehouse No. 5/condensate polishing facility F), and the MP3 Fire Pump House.

lass A circuit uses a 4-wire loop design which will allow the transmission of an alarm signal ng a single break or a single ground fault of the circuit.

ehouse No. 5/CPF and Fire Pump House have a Class B circuit design. This design rporates a 2-wire loop and will not allow the transmission of an alarm during a single break t of the circuit. Warehouse No. 5/CPF does not contain any safe shutdown components ipment, and is separated from safe shutdown areas by three hour fire barriers. The MP3 Fire p House contains equipment credited for MP2 Appendix R requirements.

signaling circuits between the zone panels and the main fire protection board meet the intent Class A circuit by using two sets of 2-wire communication lines between them. This system will allow the transmission of an alarm signal during a single break or ground fault in the

detectors transmit alarms to a local alarm panel which sounds distinct audible alarms while laying a visual signal in the vicinity of the panel, generally overhead. All alarm and trouble als transmit to the main fire alarm console in the control room.

detection zone panels operate with 24 V DC battery backup power. The main fire alarm panel owered by a reliable electrical supply and has an independent standby battery supply. These trical power supply arrangements meet the intent of the provisions of Section 2220 of NFPA eviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W. G. Counsil to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding no fire ction provided in Fire Area MSV-1. A subsequent deviation request has been submitted and smitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11852, dated November 4, 1985 ocket No. 50-423) in regards to NNECO redefining its design criteria and providing detection ire Area MSV-1 as well as the Hydrogen Recombiner Building and the Auxiliary Building.

.b. Fire Protection Water Supply Systems SITION C.6.b.

An underground yard fire main loop should be installed to furnish anticipated water requirements. NFPA 24, Standard for Outside Protection, gives necessary guidance for such installation. It references other design codes and standards developed by such organizations as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Water Works Association (AWWA). Type of pipe and water treatment should be design considerations with tuberculation as one of the parameters. Means for inspecting and flushing the systems should be provided.

Approved visually indicating sectional control valves such as post-indicator valves should be provided to isolate portions of the main for maintenance or repair without shutting off the supply to primary and backup fire suppression systems serving areas that contain or expose safety-related equipment.

Valves should be installed to permit isolation of outside hydrants from the fire main for maintenance or repair without interrupting the water supply to automatic or manual fire suppression systems in any area containing or presenting a fire hazard to safety-related or safe shutdown equipment.

The fire main system piping should be separate from service or sanitary water system piping, except as described in Position C.5.c.(4).

A common yard fire main loop may serve multi-unit nuclear power plant sites if cross-connected between units. Sectional control valves should permit maintaining

(approaching 1 mile or more), separate yard fire main loops should be used.

If pumps are required to meet system pressure or flow requirements, a sufficient number of pumps should be provided to ensure that 100 percent capacity will be available assuming failure of the largest pump or loss of off site power (e.g., three 50 percent pumps or two 100 percent pumps). This can be accomplished, for example, by providing either:

(a) Electric motor-driven fire pump(s) and diesel-driven fire pump(s); or (b) Two or more seismic Category I Class 1E electric motor-driven fire pumps connected to redundant Class 1E emergency power buses (see Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.32, and 1.75).

Individual fire pump connections to the yard fire main loop should be separated with sectionalizing valves between connections. Each pump and its driver and controls should be located in a room separated from the remaining fire pumps by a fire wall with a minimum rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The fuel for the diesel fire pump(s) should be separated so that it does not provide a fire source exposing safety-related equipment. Alarms indicating pump running, driver availability, failure to start, and low fire-main pressure should be provided in the control room.

The fire pump installation should conform to NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps.

Outside manual hose installation should be sufficient to provide an effective hose stream to any on site location where fixed or transient combustibles could jeopardize safety-related equipment. Hydrants should be installed approximately every 250 ft. on the yard main system. A hose house equipped with hose and combination nozzle and other auxiliary equipment recommended in NFPA 24, Outside Protection, should be provided as needed, but at least every 1,000 ft. Alternatively, mobile means of providing hose and associated equipment, such as hose carts or trucks, may be used. When provided, such mobile equipment should be equivalent to the equipment supplied by three hose houses.

Threads compatible with those used by local fire departments should be provided on all hydrants, hose couplings, and standpipe risers.

Two separate, reliable freshwater supplies should be provided. Saltwater or brackish water should not be used unless all freshwater supplies have been exhausted. If tanks are used, two 100 percent (minimum of 300,000 gallons each) system capacity tanks should be installed. They should be so interconnected that pumps can take suction from either or both. However, a failure in one tank or its piping should not cause both tanks to drain.

Water supply capacity should be capable of refilling either tank in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or less.

Common tanks are permitted for fire and sanitary or service water storage. When this is done, however, minimum fire water storage requirements should be dedicated by passive

ensure minimum water volume.

The fire water supply should be calculated on the basis of the largest expected flow rate for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, but not less than 300,000 gallons. This flow rate should be based (conservatively) on 500 gpm for manual hose streams plus the largest design demand of any sprinkler or deluge system as determined in accordance with NFPA 13 or NFPA 15.

The fire water supply should be capable of delivering this design demand over the longest route of the water supply system.

Freshwater lakes or ponds of sufficient size may qualify as sole source of water for fire protection but require separate redundant suctions in one or more intake structures. These supplies should be separated so that a failure of one supply will not result in a failure of the other supply.

When a common water supply is permitted for fire protection and the ultimate heat sink, the following conditions should also be satisfied:

(a) The additional fire protection water requirements are designed into the total storage capacity, and (b) Failure of the fire protection system should not degrade the function of the ultimate heat sink.

Other water systems that may be used as one of the two fire water supplies should be permanently connected to the fire main system and should be capable of automatic alignment to the fire main system. Pumps, controls, and power supplies in these systems should satisfy the requirements for the main fire pumps. The use of other water systems for fire protection should not be incompatible with their functions required for safe plant shutdown. Failure of the other system should not degrade the fire main system.

SPONSE C.6.b.

Millstone 3 water supply system is provided from the existing fire protection water supply em for Units 1 and 2. This supply system, as designed, is in compliance with the requirements his position with the exception of the 300,000-gallon minimum tank size. The NRC has ewed this exception and found the arrangement acceptable. A deviation request has been mitted and transmitted to the NRC (W. G. Counsil to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11534, dated 25, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding the capacity of the fire protection freshwater age tanks.

eviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W. G. Counsil to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding the aration and capacity of fire pumps.

NFPA 20 standard were evaluated and found acceptable to the Fire Protection Program.

.c. Water Sprinkler and Hose Standpipe Systems SITION C.6.c.(1) inkler systems and manual hose station standpipes should have connections to the plant erground water main so that a single active failure or a crack in a moderate-energy line cannot air both the primary and backup fire suppression systems. Alternatively, headers fed from h end are permitted inside buildings to supply both sprinkler and standpipe systems, provided l piping and fittings meeting the requirements of ANSI B31.1, Power Piping, are used for headers up to and including the first valve supplying the sprinkler systems where such headers part of the seismically analyzed hose standpipe system. When provided, such headers are sidered an extension of the yard main system. Each sprinkler and standpipe system should be ipped with OS&Y (outside screw and yoke) gate valve or other approved shutoff valve and erflow alarm. Safety-related equipment that does not itself require sprinkler water fire ection but is subject to unacceptable damage if wet by sprinkler water discharge should be ected by water shields or baffles.

SPONSE C.6.c.(1) sprinkler and hose station standpipe systems have independent yard fire main connections ept for the emergency generator enclosure, the auxiliary building standpipe/water curtain em, the machine shop and service building, the containment structure, the waste disposal ding, engineered safeguards building standpipe, and the auxiliary boiler building.

hese buildings noted, only the following contain safe shutdown related equipment:

Engineered Safeguards Features Building (ESF)

Emergency Generator Enclosures (EGE)

Auxiliary Building, elevation 24 feet 6 inches (Water Curtain)

Containment Structure all buildings without independent feeds, except the containment structure, NNECo proposes tilize handled hose lines from outside hydrants or 2.5 inch hose station cross-connections from cent unaffected systems as a backup (independent) supply source.

containment structure has a standpipe/hose station system throughout, as well as fixed wet e sprinklers for the electrical penetration area. Both systems are fed from the same single ply line. Redundancy is not necessary, however, as hose stations will only be utilized during tdowns when containment is accessible. At this time, the protection of the electrical

additional information, refer to the NNECo response to Open SER Item 14-7, Independent inkler and Hose Station Connections, Docket No. 50-423, B11478, W. G. Council to B. J.

ngblood which discusses, in detail, NNECos deviation request regarding independent feed nections.

sprinkler systems and standpipe/hose station systems are equipped with an approved control e (OS&Y).

dvertent operation is addressed in the Inadvertent Operational Rupture of Fire Protection ipment-Millstone Unit 3 Report, dated June 1985.

SITION C.6.c.(2) trol and sectionalizing valves in the fire water systems should be electrically supervised or inistratively controlled. The electrical supervision signal should indicate in the control room.

valves in the fire protection system should be periodically checked to verify position (see PA 26, Supervision of Valves).

SPONSE C.6.c.(2) fire protection control and sectionalizing valves are electronically supervised or locked open.

ctronic supervision indicates at local alarm panels as a trouble signal and at the main fire ection panel in the control room. Keys for all locked valves are readily available to the ade members for emergency use.

SITION C.6.c.(3) ed water extinguishing systems should conform to requirements of appropriate standards such FPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, and NFPA 15, Standard for er Spray Fixed Systems.

SPONSE C.6.c.(3) water suppression systems were designed to satisfy the intent of the guidelines of NFPA 13, ndard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, and NFPA 15, Standard for Water Spray Fixed tems for Fire Protection. The areas equipped with water suppression systems are listed in tion 4 of the FPER.

SITION C.6.c.(4), (5), (6) and (7)

Interior manual hose installation should be able to reach any location that contains, or could present a fire exposure hazard to, safety-related equipment with at least one effective hose stream. To accomplish this, standpipes with hose connections equipped

least 4 inches in diameter for multiple hose connections and 2.5 inches in diameter for single hose connections. These systems should follow the requirements of NFPA 14, Standpipe and Hose Systems, for sizing, spacing, and pipe support requirements.

Hose stations should be located as dictated by the fire hazard analysis to facilitate access and use for firefighting operations. Alternative hose stations should be provided for an area if the fire hazard could block access to a single hose station serving that area.

Provisions should be made to supply water at least to standpipes and hose connections for manual firefighting in areas containing equipment required for safe plant shutdown in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake. The piping system serving such hose stations should be analyzed for SSE loading and should be provided with supports to ensure system pressure integrity. The piping and valves for the portion of hose standpipe system affected by this functional requirement should, as a minimum, satisfy ANSI B31.1, Power Piping. The water supply for this condition may be obtained by manual operator actuation of valves in a connection to the hose standpipe header from a normal seismic Category I water system such as the essential service water system. The cross connection should be (a) capable of providing flow to at least two hose stations (approximately 75 gpm per hose station), and (b) designed to the same standards as the seismic Category I water system; it should not degrade the performance of the seismic Category I water system.

The proper type of hose nozzle to be supplied to each area should be based on the fire hazard analysis. The usual combination spray/straight-stream nozzle should not be used in areas where the straight-stream can cause unacceptable mechanical damage. Fixed fog nozzles should be provided at locations where high-voltage shock hazards exist. All hose nozzles should have shutoff capability. (Guidance on safe distances for water application to live electrical equipment may be found in the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook.)

Fire hose should be hydrostatically tested in accordance with the recommendations of NFPA 1962, Fire Hose - Care, Use, Maintenance. Hose stored in outside hose houses should be tested annually. Interior standpipe hose should be tested every three years.

Certain fires, such as those involving flammable liquids, respond well to foam suppression. Consideration should be given to use of mechanical low-expansion foam systems, low-expansion foam generators, or aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) systems, including the AFFF deluge system. These systems should comply with the requirements of NFPA 11, NFPA 11A, NFPA 11B, and NFPA 16, as applicable.

SPONSE C.6.c.(4), (5), (6) and (7) standpipe systems are provided as noted in each fire area in Section 5. The piping systems for dpipes are not seismically designed.

hose and includes a 30 foot nozzle reach from any adjustable spray shut-off nozzle. All hose be hydrostatically tested following administrative control procedures.

e station locations are shown on plant Fire Protection Water layout drawings and are listed for h fire area in the individual fire hazard analyses. Hose stations are also shown on the Fire tection Water Piping and Instrumentation Diagram drawings.

eviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11769, dated October 7, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding lack of hose ions in Fire Areas AB-5; AB-6, Zone A; CSW-1, CSW-2, CSW-3, CSW-4, HR-1, MSV-1, 2, and SB-3.

hydrogen recombiner building is adequately covered by 1.5 inch hoses placed within the hose se located approximately 80 feet south of the building. The circulating and service water phouse, east and west service water cubicles are covered by a single dry hose house located ide of the north floor area of the building.

table foam suppression equipment will be provided for fire brigade use. A deviation request ressing hose station design was discussed with the NRC staff during a December 1984 ting. A deviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11769, dated October 7, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding hose station gn.

.d. Halon Suppression Systems SITION C.6.d.

on fire extinguishing systems should comply with the requirements of NFPA 12A and NFPA

, Halogenated Fire Extinguishing Agent Systems - Halon 1301 and Halon 1211. Only listed or FM-approved agents should be used. Provisions for locally disarming automatic on systems should be key locked and under strict administrative control. Automatic Halon nguishing systems should not be disarmed unless controls as described in Position C.2.j. are vided.

ddition to the guidelines of NFPA 12A and 12B, preventive maintenance and testing of the ems, including check-weighing of the Halon cylinders, should be done at least quarterly.

icular consideration should also be given to:

Minimum required Halon concentration, distribution, soak time, and ventilation control; Toxicity of Halon;

Location and selection of the activating detectors.

SPONSE C.6.d.

lstone 3 has four Halon 1301 fire-suppression systems. These automatic operating, total flood gn systems are used in the computer room and instrument rack room underfloor areas, the rds file room of the warehouse, and Fire Pump House.

se systems, except for the Fire Pump House, were designed to NFPA 12A-1975 edition. Refer PER Section 4 for details of the installations. The Fire Pump House was designed earlier than 5, as it was originally the MP1 Fire Pump House. The Fire Pump House was evaluated to ply with NFPA 12A-1980 Ed.

systems are designed to provide a minimum 7 percent by room air volume concentration hin a 10 second discharge time.

h system, except for the Fire Pump House, is automatically actuated by the operation of a le rate-compensated type heat detector located in the protected area. Detectors were located in protected areas based on guidelines of NFPA 72E and NFPA 12A. The Fire Pump House is a s-zoned system consisting of a smoke detector and a rate of rise heat detector.

sting administrative control procedures will address the requirements for disarming of these ems, and existing station surveillance procedures will cover periodic system testing, ection, and maintenance.

icity of thermal decomposition products of Halon are not a concern since the underfloor areas inaccessible and personnel will be instructed to leave the above floor areas prior to discharge.

uld there be any corrosion to electrical components in the instrument rack room, as a result of omposed products of Halon, there will be no impact on safe shutdown since alternate tdown capacity exists in a separate fire area.

.e. Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems SITION C.6.e.

bon dioxide extinguishing systems should comply with the requirements of NFPA 12, rbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems. Where automatic carbon dioxide systems are used, should be equipped with a predischarge alarm system and a discharge delay to permit onnel egress. Provisions for locally disarming automatic carbon dioxide systems should be locked and under strict administrative control. Automatic carbon dioxide extinguishing ems should not be disarmed unless controls as described in Position C.2.j. are provided.

Minimum required CO2 concentration, distribution, soak time, and ventilation control; Anoxia and toxicity of CO2; Possibility of secondary thermal shock (cooling) damage; Conflicting requirements for venting during CO2 injection to prevent overpressurization versus sealing to prevent loss of agent; and Location and selection of the activating detectors.

SPONSE C.6.e.

al flooding CO2 systems have been designed to attain and maintain adequate CO2 centrations as required by the nature of the specific hazard based on NFPA No. 12 guidelines.

n actuation, the minimum design concentrations are obtained within 1 minute for surface fires within 7 minutes for deep-seated fires at a rate not less than that required to develop a centration of 34 percent in 1 minute for the fuel oil tank vaults and 30 percent in 2 minutes for ther total flooding areas. This discharge is considered the Initial Discharge. To maintain the red concentrations for a 20 minute soak time and compensate for normal agent leakage from area, an Extended Discharge system is used.

local application system in the auxiliary boiler building fuel oil pit has been designed based he rate by volume method. The duration was extended to allow for cooling of metal parts in pump pit area to prevent oil vapor re-ignition.

ll electrical cable hazard areas, the total flooding CO2 systems are manually actuated.

nual system actuation is accomplished by the actuation of both cross-zoned smoke detector ngs and opening of the predischarge timer lockout ball valve to initiate CO2 discharge. Both detection cross-zone signals together provide one of the two inputs necessary to discharge

2. The other input is provided by the opening of the predischarge timer lockout ball valve.

n actuation of the first cross zone, an alarm signal is transmitted to the local alarm panel and Control Room. Upon actuation of the second cross zone, an alarm signal is transmitted to the l alarm panel and to the Control Room, as well as generating an alarm condition within the l Chemetron panel. With both cross-zones in alarm or with the predischarge timer lockout valve open, a horn actuates within the affected area and a strobe light actuates outside each of access doors to the area. Upon discharge of CO2 in the protected area, ventilation damper ure and fan shutdown signals are initiated either from both zones in alarm in the Chemetron trol panel (cross zones in alarm and ball valve open) or CO2 discharge pressure, a local umatic air horn sounds in the area, and an odorizer is released indicating CO2 discharge.

ate transmission of a discharge alarm to the local Chemetron panel, building alarm panel, and main fire protection console in the Control Room, and will actuate predischarge alarms in the cted area. Following a time delay, CO2 discharge will then occur.

manual operating local application areas, as well as all other manual and automatic operating 2 suppression systems, are or can be actuated by manual key station devices located outside hazards areas or by the key switch at the Chemetron panel. Operation of the manual devices cause CO2 to discharge following a time delay when the lockout valve at the Chemetron el is in an open position. The key station actuation will immediately operate predischarge ms in the protected area and will initiate alarm signal transmission as described above. CO2 harge into the area sounds the local pneumatic discharge horns and initiates odorizer release.

eat CO2 discharges into any protected area can be accomplished by using the manual key ion for that area or the key switch at the Chemetron panel. This may be done without resetting control panel and may continue for as many cycles as there is available CO2 storage.

avoid the concern of thermal shock, all CO2 discharge nozzles have been positioned, where sible, to limit the effects of direct impingement of CO2 on sensitive electrical equipment.

ckout of both automatic and manual discharge into any protected area is accomplished by rating a ball valve located at the Chemetron control panel. Only by manually repositioning this e to the open position can CO2 discharge. During lockout, all detection systems continue to ction and transmit alarm signals. When an automatic system is in the locked-out mode, a ble signal is actuated at the Chemetron panel, the building alarm panel, and at the main fire ection console and color-graphics computer unit in the Control Room to provide continuous fication that the automatic CO2 system for the affected area is locked out. For a manual em, a trouble-signal is actuated at the Chemetron panel, the building alarm panel, and at the n fire protection console and color-graphics computer unit when the lockout ball valve is in t fully closed position, alerting the Control Room of the misaligned valve position. The rming of automatic CO2 systems will be regulated by an existing administrative control cedure. Relief venting for each CO2 protected area has been provided, as needed, in order to vent over-pressurization of the area in accordance with NFPA 12 guidelines.

.f. Portable Extinguishers SITION C.6.f.

extinguishers should be provided in areas that contain, or could present a fire exposure ard to, safety-related equipment in accordance with guidelines of NFPA 10, Portable Fire inguishers, Installation, Maintenance and Use. Dry chemical extinguishers should be alled with due consideration given to possible adverse effects on safety-related equipment alled in the area.

areas of the plant will be provided with portable extinguishers in accordance with guidelines FPA 10 with the exception of inside containment. A deviation request to provide nguishers inside containment was discussed with the NRC staff in December 1984. A iation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W. G. Counsil to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding lack of portable extinguishers in Fire Area RC-1 when the reactor is at power.

. GUIDELINES FOR SPECIFIC PLANT AREAS

.a. Primary and Secondary Containment SITION C.7.a.

Normal Operation - Fire protection requirements for the primary and secondary containment areas should be provided for hazards identified by the fire hazards analysis.

Examples of such hazards include lubricating oil or hydraulic fluid system for the primary coolant pumps, cable tray arrangements and cable penetrations, and charcoal filters.

Because of the general inaccessibility of primary containment during normal plant operation, protection should be provided by automatic fixed systems. The effects of postulated fires within the primary containment should be evaluated to ensure that the integrity of the primary coolant system and the containment is not jeopardized assuming no action is taken to fight the fire.

(a) Operation of the fire protection systems should not compromise the integrity of the containment or other safety-related systems. Fire protection activities in the containment areas should function in conjunction with total containment requirements such as ventilation and control of contaminated liquid and gaseous release.

(b) Inside noninerted containment one of the fire protection means stated in Positions C.5.b.1 and C.5.b.2 or the following fire protection means should be provided:

separation of cables and equipment and associated non safety circuits of redundant trains by a noncombustible radiant energy shield having a minimum fire rating of one-half hour.

(c) In primary containment, fire detection systems should be provided for each fire hazard. The type of detection used and the location or the detectors should be the most suitable for the particular type of fire hazard identified by the fire hazard analysis.

A general area fire detection capability should be provided in the primary containment as backup for the above described hazard detection. To accomplish

(d) Standpipe and hose stations should be inside PWR containments and BWR containments that are not inerted. Standpipe and hose stations inside containment may be connected to a high quality water supply of sufficient quantity and pressure other than the fire main loop if plant-specific features prevent extending the fire main supply inside containment. For BWR drywells, standpipe and hose stations should be placed outside the drywell with adequate lengths of hose, no longer than 100 ft., to reach any location inside the drywell with an effective hose stream.

The containment penetration of the standpipe system should meet the isolation requirements of General Design Criterion 56 and should be seismic Category I and Quality Group B.

(e) The reactor coolant pumps should be equipped with an oil collection system if the containment is not inerted during normal operation. The oil collection system should be so designed, engineered, and installed that failure will not lead to fire during normal or design basis accident conditions and that there is reasonable assurance that the system will withstand the safe shutdown earthquake.

Such collection systems should be capable of collecting lube oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems. Leakage should be collected and drained to a vented closed container that can hold the entire lube oil system inventory. A flame arrester in the vent if the flash point characteristics of the oil present the hazard of fire flashback. Leakage points to be protected should include lift pump and piping overflow lines, lube oil cooler, oil fill and drain lines and plugs, flanged connections on oil lines, and lube oil reservoirs where such features exist on the reactor coolant pumps. The drain line should be large enough to accommodate the largest potential oil leak.

(f) For secondary containment areas, cable fire hazards that could affect safety should be protected as described in Position C.5.e.(2). The type of detection system for other fire hazards identified by the fire hazards analysis should be the most suitable for the particular type of fire hazard.

Refueling and Maintenance - Refueling and maintenance operations in containment may introduce additional hazards such as contamination control materials, decontamination supplies, wood planking, temporary wiring, welding, and flame cutting (with portable compressed gas fuel supply). Possible fires would not necessarily be in the vicinity of fixed detection and suppression systems. Management procedures and controls necessary to ensure adequate fire protection for transient fire loads are discussed in Position C.1.

quate self-contained breathing apparatus should be provided near the containment entrances firefighting and damage control personnel. These units should be independent of any

SPONSE C.7.a.

.a. Containment eismic oil collection system has been provided for each reactor coolant pump lube oil system.

t detectors are installed in the vicinity of each lube oil pump with annunciation to the control m and to a local alarm panel.

ctrical penetrations inside containment are protected by an automatic operating wet pipe nkler system. Smoke detection is installed along with the sprinkler protection. Refer to tion 8 of the FPER for details of the conditions within containment providing equivalent ection in lieu of providing fire barriers.

nual hose stream coverage is provided inside containment so that all accessible areas of the cture are covered by at least one stream. Supply for the hoses is from a valved connection to plant fire water loop.

sting administrative controls address the control of combustibles and sources of ignition at all es in the plant. These controls also will be used during refueling and maintenance activities.

quate self-contained breathing apparatus will be located outside of containment for use in tainment firefighting.

eviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11761, dated October 1, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding separation of les and equipment in Fire Area RC-1.

.b. Control Room Complex SITION C.7.b.

control room complex (including galleys, office spaces, etc.) should be protected against bling fire damage and should be separated from other areas of the plant by floors, walls, and having minimum fire resistance ratings of three hours. Peripheral rooms in the control room plex should have automatic water suppression and should be separated from the control room oncombustible construction with a fire resistance rating of one hour. Ventilation system nings between the control room and peripheral rooms should have automatic smoke dampers close on operation of the fire detection or suppression system. If a Halon flooding system is d for fire suppression, these dampers should be strong enough to support the pressure rise ompanying Halon discharge and seal tightly against infiltration of Halon into the control room.

bon dioxide flooding systems are not acceptable for these areas.

nual firefighting capability should be provided for both:

Exposure fires involving combustibles in the general area.

table Class A and Class C fire extinguishers should be located in the control room. A hose ion should be installed immediately outside the control room.

zles that are compatible with the hazards and equipment in the control room should be vided for the manual hose station. The nozzles chosen should satisfy actual firefighting needs, sfy electrical safety, and minimize physical damage to electrical equipment from hose stream ingement.

oke detectors should be provided in the control room, cabinets, and consoles. If redundant safe tdown equipment is located in the same control room cabinet or console, additional fire ection measures should be provided. Alarm and local indication should be provided in the trol room.

athing apparatus for control room operators should be readily available.

outside air intake(s) for the control room ventilation system should be provided with smoke ction capability to alarm in the control room to enable manual isolation of the control room tilation system and thus prevent smoke from entering the control room.

ting of smoke produced by fire in the control room by means of the normal ventilation system cceptable; however, provision should be made to permit isolation of the recirculating portion he normal ventilation system. Manually operated venting of the control room should be ilable to the operators.

cables that enter the control room should terminate in the control room. That is, no cabling uld be routed through the control room from one area to another. Cables in underfloor and ing spaces should meet the separation criteria necessary for fire protection.

handling functions should be ducted separately from cable runs in such spaces; i.e., if cables routed in underfloor or ceiling spaces, these spaces should not be used as air plenums for tilation of the control room. Fully enclosed electrical raceways located in such underfloor and ing spaces, if over 1 square foot in cross-sectional area, should have automatic fire pression inside. Area automatic fire suppression should be provided for underfloor and ceiling ces if used for cable runs unless all cable is run in 4-inch or smaller steel conduit or the cables in fully enclosed raceways internally protected by automatic fire suppression.

re should be no carpeting in the control room.

SPONSE C.7.b.

.b. Control Room

table fire fighting capability is provided with portable fire extinguishers within the control

m. Manual hose streams can be brought into the control room from the adjacent service ding and the control building stairwell if needed.

athing apparatus for the operators is provided in the control room.

oke detection is provided within the main control board cabinets and in selected areas.

roved flame-resistant carpet is installed on the concrete floor.

iant energy heat shield (Carborundum Duraboard) provides fire separation for atmospheric ef bypass valve (ARBV, 3MSS*MOV74) lockout switches A through D from the remainder of n Board No. 5.

outside air intakes for the ventilation system have smoke detection capability with unciation in the control room. The control room would be vented by portable fans.

cable entering the control room terminates in the control room. The cable in the control room s not meet required separation criteria; however, alternate shutdown capability has been vided.

eviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (W. G. Counsil to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding partial fire ction coverage for Fire Area CB-9, and the lack of automatic water suppression and the lack entilation duct protection for peripheral rooms in Fire Area CB-9.

.c. Cable Spreading Room SITION C.7.c.

primary fire suppression in the cable spreading room should be an automatic water system h as closed-head sprinklers, open-head deluge system, or open directional water spray system.

uge and open spray systems should have provisions for manual operation at a remote station; ever, there should be provisions to preclude inadvertent operation. Location of sprinkler ds or spray nozzles should consider cable tray arrangements and possible transient bustibles to ensure adequate water coverage for areas that could present exposure hazards to cable system. Cables should be designed to allow wetting down with water supplied by the suppression system without electrical faulting.

n-head deluge and open directional spray systems should be zoned.

use of foam is acceptable.

le spreading rooms should have:

An aisle separation between tray stacks at least 3 feet wide and 8 feet high; Hose stations and portable extinguishers installed immediately outside the room; Area smoke detection; and Continuous line-type heat detectors for cable trays inside the cable spreading room.

ins to remove firefighting water should be provided. When gas systems are installed drains uld have adequate seals or the gas extinguishing systems should be sized to compensate for es through the drains.

eparate cable spreading room should be provided for each redundant division. Cable spreading ms should not be shared between reactors. Each cable spreading room should be separated m the others and from other areas of the plant by barriers with a minimum fire rating of three rs. If this is not possible, a dedicated system should be provided.

ventilation system to each cable spreading room should be designed to isolate the area upon ation of any gas extinguishing system in the area. Separate manually actuated smoke venting is operable from outside the room should be provided for the cable spreading room.

SPONSE C.7.c.

cable spreading room is separated from the balance of the plant by 3-hour fire-rated barriers.

h safe shutdown divisions are installed in the room. The alternative shutdown system has been vided in a remote fire area.

re are two remote and separate entrances to the room for fire fighting access. Continuous

-type heat detectors for cable trays are not utilized, as area detection is provided and alternate tdown capability exists to bring the plant to cold shutdown if the cable spreading room is lost.

oke detectors have been installed to provide early-warning fire detection and to provide one of discharge input signals for the CO2 Suppression System. A sampling-type incipient fire ction system (IFD) is installed throughout the area for precombustion stage early warning.

e stations from the control building stairwell and the adjacent service building areas provide ual fire fighting capability. Normally dry, continuous flow hose reels are installed throughout area. Portable fire extinguishers, consisting of hand held and wheeled CO2, and water mist, located in the room.

table blowers will be used to manually remove the smoke, and CO2.

w water to drain into the switchgear areas below.

eviation from the BTP guidelines for a fixed water suppression system in this area was uested, in B11243, dated October 9, 1984 and B11494, dated April 30, 1985, and granted in plement No. 2 to NUREG 1031, SER, dated September 1985. License Amendment No. 227, the included NRC Safety Evaluation, issued September 22, 2005, approved a change to the roved Fire Protection Program allowing the CSA CO2 system to be modified from automatic anual actuation. Fire protection features in this fire area have been enhanced to provide itional fire detection and suppression capabilities. The enhancements include an IFD system additional manual fire fighting features (continuous flow hose reels, fire extinguishers, etc.),

provide the primary fire protection capability for this area. The manual CO2 system provides d backup suppression capability for the area.

.d. Plant Computer Rooms SITION C.7.d.

mputer rooms for computers performing safety-related functions that are not part of the control m complex should be separated from other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum resistance rating of three hours and should be protected by automatic detection and fixed matic suppression. Computers that are part of the control room complex but not in the control m should be separated and protected as described in Position C.7.b. Computer cabinets located he control room should be protected as other control room equipment and cable runs therein.

-safety related computers outside the control room complex should be separated from safety-ted areas by fire barriers with a minimum rating of three hours and should be protected as ded to prevent fire and smoke damage to safety-related equipment.

SPONSE C.7.d.

computer room located adjacent to the control room complex is not a safety-related system.

s room (Fire Area 10A and B) is separated from all areas of the control room by fire-rated struction. The underfloor area of the computer room is protected by a total flooding Halon pression system. Smoke detection installed below the noncombustible suspended ceiling in the puter room provides early warning fire detection for this area.

.e. Switchgear Rooms SITION C.7.e.

tchgear rooms containing safety-related equipment should be separated from the remainder of plant by barriers with a minimum fire rating of three hours. Redundant switchgear safety sions should be separated from each other by barriers with a 3-hour fire rating. Automatic fire ctors should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Cables entering the tchgear room that do not terminate or perform a function there should be kept at a minimum to

ipment should be located to facilitate access for manual firefighting. Drains should be vided to prevent water accumulation from damaging safety-related equipment (see NFPA

, Waterproofing and Draining of Floors). Remote manually actuated ventilation should be vided for venting smoke when manual fire suppression effort is needed (see Position C.5.f.).

SPONSE C.7.e.

tchgear rooms are separated from the remainder of the plant by 3-hour fire-rated barriers. A ual low pressure CO2 fire extinguishing system is provided. Fire detection systems alarm and unciate in the control room and locally. Manual hose stations are located in the normal and t switchgear areas and portable fire extinguishers provide manual fire suppression capability.

ote manually actuated ventilation is provided for venting smoke to facilitate fire fighting.

s is accomplished via the control building purge ventilation system with manual actuation ated at the ventilation panel in the control room.

or drains are not installed but a deviation request has been granted on the requirement. Refer to 20, Switchgear Room Floor Drains Deviation Request submittal, Docket No. 50-423, B11090, G. Counsil to B. J. Youngblood, dated March 23, 1984 for further details.

.f. Remote Safety-Related Panels SITION C.7.f.

undant safety-related panels remote from the control room complex should be separated from h other by barriers having a minimum fire rating of three hours. Panels providing remote tdown capability should be separated from the control room complex by barriers having a imum fire rating of three hours. Panels providing remote shutdown capability should be trically isolated from the control room complex so that a fire in either area will not affect tdown capability from the other area. The general area housing remote safety-related panels uld be provided with automatic fire detectors that alarm locally and alarm and annunciate in control room. Combustible materials should be controlled and limited to those required for ration. Portable extinguishers and manual hose stations should be readily available in the eral area.

SPONSE C.7.f.

alternate shutdown panel is located in the west switchgear room of the control building.

fire transfer panel is located in the east switchgear room of the control building.

er to Response C.7.e. for details of construction and protection in this area.

.g. Safety-Related Battery Rooms SITION C.7.g.

ety-related battery rooms should be protected against fires and explosions. Battery rooms uld be separated from each other and other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum rating of three hours inclusive of all penetrations and openings. DC switchgear and inverters uld not be located in these battery rooms. Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Ventilation systems in the battery rooms uld be capable of maintaining the hydrogen concentration well below 2 volume percent. Loss entilation should be alarmed in the control room. Standpipe and hose and portable nguishers should be readily available outside the room.

SPONSE C.7.g.

battery rooms are separated from each other and from the balance of the plant by 3-hour

-related barriers. DC switchgear and inverters are located outside of the battery rooms. Smoke ction systems are provided in each battery room. Hose stations and portable fire extinguishers available in the areas for manual fire suppression. The ventilation system is designed to ntain the hydrogen levels below 2 percent by volume. Air flow monitors that alarm in the trol room to detect the loss of ventilation have been provided in each battery room ventilation em.

.h. Turbine Building SITION C.7.h.

turbine building should be separated from adjacent structures containing safety-related ipment by a fire barrier with a minimum rating of three hours. The fire barriers should be gned so as to maintain structural integrity even in the event of a complete collapse of the ine structure. Openings and penetrations in the fire barrier should be minimized and should be located where the turbine oil system or generator hydrogen cooling system creates a direct exposure hazard to the barrier. Considering the severity of the fire hazards, defense in depth dictate additional protection to ensure barrier integrity.

SPONSE C.7.h.

protection for the turbine building satisfies the guidelines of this position.

.i. Diesel Generator Areas SITION C.7.i.

omatic fire suppression should be installed to combat any diesel generator or lubricating oil s; such systems should be designed for operation when the diesel is running without affecting diesel. Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control m and alarm locally. Hose stations and portable extinguishers should be readily available ide the area. Drainage for firefighting water and means for local manual venting of smoke uld be provided.

tanks with total capacity up to 1100 gallons are permitted in the diesel generator area under following conditions:

The day tank is located in a separate enclosure with a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours, including doors or penetrations. These enclosures should be capable of containing the entire contents of the day tanks and should be protected by an automatic fire suppression system, or The day tank is located inside the diesel generator room in a diked enclosure that has sufficient capacity to hold 110 percent of the contents of the day tank or is drained to a safe location.

SPONSE C.7.i.

eviation request has been discussed with the NRC staff regarding the EGE sprinkler design de of operation) as well as other guideline differences. A deviation request has been submitted transmitted to the NRC (W. G. Counsil to B. J. Youngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 5 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding the lack of automatic suppression and the lack of drainage ire Areas EG-3 and EG-4.

iation request granted on the day tank arrangement. Refer to FP- 21, Emergency Diesel erator Day Tanks Deviation Request submittal, Docket No. 50-423, B11090, W. G. Counsil to

. Youngblood dated March 23, 1984 for further details.

h diesel generator is located in a different fire area separated by 3-hour fire-rated barriers. All le and piping penetrations through the fire-rated barriers are to be fitted with 3-hour fire-rated etration seals.

er to the Suppression System Deviation request for other construction/protection features in area.

.j. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas SITION C.7.j.

ted at least 50 feet from any building containing safety-related equipment or, if located within eet, they should be housed in a separate building with construction having a minimum fire stance rating of three hours. Potential oil spills should be confined or directed away from dings containing safety-related equipment. Totally buried tanks are acceptable outside or er buildings (see NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, for additional dance).

ve-ground tanks should be protected by an automatic fire suppression system.

SPONSE C.7.j.

sel oil tanks for the emergency generators are located below ground in separate three hour fire d resistance rated vaults. These vaults are provided with automatic total flooding CO2 pression.

l oil tanks for the auxiliary boilers are buried in the yard adjacent to the auxiliary boiler room.

SBO diesel fuel oil tank is a separate above ground tank with an integral containment dike ted directly south of the SBO diesel generator enclosure. There is no safety-related equipment hin 50 feet of the tank. The above ground SBO fuel oil storage tank has no automatic fire pression system. Fire fighting foam, portable CO2 fire extinguishers and dry chemical fire nguishers are provided for fire brigade use to quickly extinguish a fire. MP2 credits the MP3 O diesel generator including its fuel system for fires in MP2 Appendix R Fire Areas R-1, R-11 R-16. Safe shutdown would not be affected since a fire in these MP2 areas is not assumed to ur coincident with a fire in the MP3 SBO area.

.k.Safety-Related Pumps SITION C.7.k.

p houses and rooms housing redundant safety-related pump trains should be separated form h other and from other areas of the plant by fire barriers having at least three hour ratings.

se rooms should be protected by automatic fire detection and suppression unless a fire hazards lysis can demonstrate that a fire will not endanger other safety-related equipment required for plant shutdown. Fire detection should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm lly. Hose stations and portable extinguishers should be readily accessible.

or drains should be provided to prevent water accumulation from damaging safety-related ipment (see Position C.5.a.(14)).

visions should be made for manual control of the ventilation system to facilitate smoke oval if required for manual firefighting operation (see Position C.5.f.).

SPONSE C.7.k.

eviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11658, dated August 16, 1985 - Docket No. 50-423) regarding separation of ps within the ESF Building due to a 12 inch diameter fiberglass reinforced pipe which passes ugh the 3-hour fire barriers separating the pumps and associated. A closed head water curtain h directional spray heads is provided to maintain separation by protecting the fiberglass pipe.

eviation request has been submitted and transmitted to the NRC (J. F. Opeka to B. J.

ngblood, Letter B11534, dated July 25, 1985 -Docket No. 50-423) regarding separation of ps and equipment with the Circulating and Service Water Pump House due to 1.5 inch meter fiberglass drain lines which pass through 3-hour fire barriers separating redundant ps/trains.

.l. New Fuel Area

.m. Spent Fuel Pool Area SITION C.7.l. and m.

d portable extinguishers should be located within this area. Also, hose stations should be ted outside but within hose reach of this area. Automatic fire detection should alarm and unciate in the control room and alarm locally. Combustibles should be limited to a minimum he new fuel area. The storage area should be provided with a drainage system to preclude umulation of water.

storage configuration of new fuel should always be so maintained as to preclude critically for water density that might occur during fire water application.

tection for the spent fuel pool area should be provided by local hose stations and portable nguishers. Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control m and to alarm locally.

SPONSE C.7.l. and m.

table fire extinguishers and hose stations are located throughout the building. Smoke detection drainage is provided as noted in the fire hazard analysis.

.n. Radwaste and Decontamination Areas SITION C.7.n.

barriers, automatic fire suppression and detection, and ventilation controls should be vided.

SPONSE C.7.n.

m and annunciation locally and in the control room is provided in portions of the liquid waste

. Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers are strategically located in the entire waste osal building. The ventilation systems can be isolated from the mechanical equipment room.

protection water will drain to the contaminated drain system.

decontamination areas located in the service building have been provided with HEPA trolled ventilation equipment.

.o. Safety-Related Water Tanks SITION C.7.o.

rage tanks that supply water for safe shutdown should be protected from the effects of an osure fire. Combustible materials should not be stored next to outdoor tanks.

SPONSE C.7.o.

age of combustibles on site will be controlled by an existing administrative control procedure.

inside storage tanks are protected by passive means against exposure fires.

.p. Records Storage Areas SITION C.7.p.

ords storage areas should be so located and protected that a fire in these areas does not expose ty-related systems or equipment (see Regulatory Guide 1.88, Collection, Storage, and ntenance of Nuclear Power Quality Assurance Records).

SPONSE C.7.p.

ords storage areas at Millstone 3 are arranged so as to not expose safety-related systems or ipment.

SITION C.7.q.

ling towers should be of noncombustible construction or so located and protected that a fire not adversely affect any safety- related systems or equipment. Cooling towers should be of combustible construction when the basins are used for the ultimate heat sink or for the fire ection water supply.

SPONSE C.7.q.

lstone 3 does not have cooling towers.

SITION C.7.r.

cellaneous areas such as shops, warehouses, auxiliary boiler rooms, fuel oil tanks, and mable and combustible liquid storage tanks should be so located and protected that a fire or cts of afire, including smoke, will not adversely affect any safety-related systems or ipment.

SPONSE C.7.r.

sideration was given to the location and protection of these areas to avoid or control fire osure to safety-related systems and equipment.

. SPECIAL PROTECTION GUIDELINES

.a. Storage of Acetylene-Oxygen Fuel Gases SITION C.8.a.

cylinder storage locations should not be in areas that contain or expose safety-related ipment or the fire protection systems that serve those safety-related areas. A permit system uld be required to use this equipment in safety-related areas of the plant (also see Position

.).

.b. Storage Areas for Ion Exchange Resins SITION C.8.b.

sed ion exchange resins should not be stored in areas that contain or expose safety-related ipment.

.c. Hazardous Chemicals SITION C.8.c.

ardous chemicals should not be stored in areas that contain or expose safety-related ipment.

.d. Materials Containing Radioactivity SITION C.8.d.

erials that collect and contain radioactivity such as spent ion exchange resins, charcoal filters, HEPA filters should be stored in closed metal tanks or containers that are located in areas free m ignition sources or combustibles. These materials should be protected from exposure to fires

SPONSE C.8.

re are no permanent gas cylinder storage arrangements within the plant which expose ty-related equipment or fire protection systems which serve these safety-related areas.

sting administrative control procedures address storage, handling, and use of ion exchange ns, hazardous chemicals, and other materials within the plant.

A. Fire Protection Program Refer to Section 3 or Appendix B, Position C.1.a, of the FPER.

B. Fire Hazards Analysis Refer to Section 5 or Appendix B, Position C.1.b, of the FPER.

C. Fire Prevention Features Refer to Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the FPER.

D. Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown Capability Refer to Sections 6 through 9 of the FPER.

A. Water Supplies for Fire Suppression System Refer to Section 4 or Appendix B, Position C.6.b., of the FPER.

B.Section Isolation Valves Refer to Section 4 or Appendix B, Position C.6.b(2), of the FPER.

C. Hydrant Isolation Valves Refer to Section 4 or Appendix B, Position C.6.b(3), of the FPER.

D. Manual Fire Suppression Refer to Appendix B, Position C.6.c(4) through (7), of the FPER.

E. Hydrostatic Hose Test Hoses are tested and purchased in accordance with Appendix B, Position C.6.c(6),

of the FPER.

F. Automatic Fire Detection Refer to Appendix B, Position C.6.a, of the FPER.

Refer to Appendix B, Position C.5.b, of the FPER.

H. Fire Brigade Refer to Appendix B, Position C.3, of the FPER.

I. Fire Brigade Training Refer to Appendix B, Position C.3, of the FPER.

J. Emergency Lighting Refer to Appendix B, Position C.5.g, of the FPER.

K. Administrative Controls Refer to Appendix B, Position C.2, of the FPER.

L. Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capability Refer to Appendix B, Position C.5.c, of the FPER.

M. Fire Barrier Cable Penetration Seal Qualification Refer to Appendix B, Position C.5.a(3), of the FPER.

N. Fire Doors Refer to Appendix B, Position C.5.a(5), of the FPER.

O. Oil Collection System for the Reactor Coolant Pumps Refer to Appendix B, Position C.7.e, of the FPER.

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