RS-20-115, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-582, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) Enhancements

From kanterella
(Redirected from ML20323A248)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-582, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) Enhancements
ML20323A248
Person / Time
Site: Dresden, Clinton, Quad Cities, LaSalle  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/18/2020
From: Simpson P
Exelon Generation Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20324A090 List:
References
RS-20-115, TSTF-582
Download: ML20323A248 (85)


Text

4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 Exelon Generation RS-20-115 November 18, 2020 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 NRC Docket No. 50-461 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 630 65 7 2000 Office Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 NRC Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249 LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265 10 CFR 50.90

Subject:

Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-582, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) Enhancements"

References:

1. Letter from Victor G. Cusumano (U.S. NRC) to Technical Specifications Task Force, "Final Safety Evaluation of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-582, Revision 0, 'RPV WIC Enhancements' Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (EPID L-2019-PMP-0199)," dated August 13, 2020
2. Letter from Victor G. Cusumano (U.S. NRC) to Technical Specifications Task Force, "Model Safety Evaluation of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-582, Revision 0, 'RPV WIC Enhancements' and TSTF-583-T, Revision 0, 'TSTF-582 Diesel Generator Variation,' Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process," dated October 9, 2020

November 18, 2020 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC), requests an amendment to Facility Operating License (FOL) No. NPF-62 for Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, Renewed FOL Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Renewed FOL Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, and Renewed FOL Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The proposed amendment is consistent with previously NRG-approved Industry/Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler 582 (TSTF-582), Revision 0, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) Enhancements," (Reference 1 ), and also incorporates the variation described in Reference 2. provides a description and assessment of the proposed change. Attachment 2 provides the existing TS pages marked up to show the proposed change. Attachment 3 provides TS Bases pages marked up to show the associated TS Bases changes and is provided for information only.

The proposed change has been reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committees at each station in accordance with the requirements of the EGC Quality Assurance Program.

EGC requests that the amendment be reviewed under the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLllP). Approval of the proposed amendment is requested within six months of completion of the NRC's acceptance review. Once approved, the amendment shall be implemented within 60 days.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, "Notice for public comment; State consultation,"

paragraph (b), EGC is notifying the State of Illinois of this application for license amendment by transmitting a copy of this letter and its attachments to the designated State Officials.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mrs. Linda M. Palutsis at (630) 657-2821.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 18th day of November 2020.

Respectfully, Pa+/-tR~

Patrick R. Simpson Sr. Manager Licensing Attachments:

1. Description and Assessment
2. Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications Pages
3. Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications Bases Pages (For Information Only)

November 18, 2020 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 cc:

NRC Regional Administrator, Region Ill NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Clinton Power Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Dresden Nuclear Power Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector - LaSalle County Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (Dan Tesar)

Illinois Emergency Management Agency - Division of Nuclear Safety

1.0 DESCRIPTION

ATTACHMENT 1 Description and Assessment Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC), requests adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler 582 (TSTF-582), Revision 0, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) Enhancements," which is an approved change to the Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS), into Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS). The Technical Specifications (TS) related to RPV WIC are revised to incorporate operating experience and to correct errors and omissions in TSTF-542, Revision 2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control." The proposed changes also include the variation described in TSTF-583 and discussed in Reference 3.

2.0 ASSESSMENT

2.1 Applicability of Safety Evaluation EGC has reviewed the safety evaluation for TSTF-582 provided to the Technical Specifications Task Force in a letter dated August 13, 2020 (Reference 2). This review included a review of the NRC evaluation, as well as the information provided in TSTF-582 (Reference 1 ). As described below, EGC has concluded that the justifications presented in TSTF-582 and the safety evaluation prepared by the NRG are applicable to Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to these plants TS.

EGC verified that the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be aligned and the pump started using relatively simple evolutions involving the manipulation of a small number of components. These actions can be performed in a short time (less than the minimum Drain Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) from the control room following plant procedures.

2.2 Variations 2.2.1 Proposed TS Changes to Adopt TSTF-583-T, "TSTF-582 Diesel Generator Variation" TSTF-582, "RPV WIC Enhancements," states:

The ECCS injection/spray subsystem required to be operable by LCO 3.5.2 must be capable of being manually started as defense-in-depth against an unexpected draining event. The changes in TSTF-542 did not assume automatic actuation of the ECCS subsystem. TS 3.5.2, Required Action D.1 requires an additional method of water injection and that the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem or additional method of water injection shall be capable of operating without offsite electrical power. However, LCO 3.5.2 does not assume that the onsite electrical power source will start automatically on an ECCS or loss of power signal.

Page 1

ATTACHMENT 1 Description and Assessment LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown," requires one offsite circuit and one diesel generator to be operable in Modes 4 and 5. SR 3.8.2.1 lists the TS 3.8.1, "AC Sources -

Operating," SRs that are applicable in Modes 4 and 5. In an oversight in TSTF-542, the TS 3.8.1 SRs that test automatic start and loading of a diesel generator on an ECCS or loss of offsite power signal were not excluded from SR 3.8.2.1.

TSTF-582 revises Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown," Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.2.1, to exclude SRs that verify the ability of the diesel generators to automatically start and load on an ECCS initiation signal or loss of offsite power signal.

The NRC Safety Evaluation for TSTF-582 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20223AOOO, dated, August 13, 2020), Section 3.6, "Alternating Current Sources - Shutdown, STS 3.8.2," states:

STS 3.5.2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC)," does not require automatic ECCS initiation to mitigate a draining event in Modes 4 and 5, and the ECCS initiation signal related to the automatic ECCS initiation is removed from the STS.

Because the automatic ECCS initiation and related ECCS initial signal in Modes 4 and 5 are eliminated, the automatic start of the DG on an ECCS initiation signal is not required in Modes 4 and 5.... [T]he NRC staff finds that STS 3.5.2 provides enough time from the onset of the [loss of offsite power] LOOP event for the operator to manually start the DG required to supply power to the water injection equipment to mitigate the draining event in Modes 4 and 5. In addition, STS 3.5.2 does not require the automatic initiation of the ECCS injection/spray subsystem or the additional method of water injection. Therefore, since STS 3.5.2 allows enough time to manually start the DG and the equipment for water injection, the NRC staff finds that the automatic start and loading of the DG are not necessary on a LOOP signal or LOOP concurrent with an ECCS initiation signal to mitigate a draining event in Modes 4 and 5.

Furthermore, the NRC staff notes that other events postulated in Modes 4 and 5 (e.g.,

FHA, waste gas tank rupture) and during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies in the [primary and secondary containment] do not assume a LOOP event or an automatic ECCS initiation.

TSTF-582 did not include all of the TS changes needed to reflect that TS 3.8.2 should not require automatic start and loading of a diesel generator within 12 to 13 seconds (12 seconds for Clinton, and 13 seconds for Dresden, LaSalle, and Quad Cities) on an ECCS initiation signal or a loss of offsite power signal.

TS 3.3.8.1, "Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation," is applicable in Modes 1, 2, and 3, and when the associated diesel generator is required to be operable by TS 3.8.2. TSTF-582 revised TS 3.8.2 to no longer require automatic start and loading of a diesel generator on a loss of offsite power signal. Consequently, the LOP instrumentation that generates the loss of offsite power signal should not be required to be operable when the diesel generator is required to be operable by TS 3.8.2. The Applicability of LCO 3.3.8.1 is revised to not include the specified condition "When the associated diesel generator is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.2, 'AC Sources - Shutdown'."

Page 2

ATTACHMENT 1 Description and Assessment TS SR 3.8.1.7 and SR 3.8.1.15 (for Clinton and LaSalle), and SR 3.8.1.8 and SR 3.8.1.16 (for Dresden and Quad Cities), require that the DG starts from standby or hot conditions, respectively, and achieve required voltage and frequency within 12 to 13 seconds (12 seconds for Clinton, and 13 seconds for Dresden, LaSalle, and Quad Cities). The 12 to 13 second start requirement supports the assumptions in the design basis LOCA analysis.

This capability is not required during a manual diesel generator start to respond to a draining event, which has a minimum Drain Time of one hour. Therefore, SR 3.8.1.7 and SR 3.8.1.15 (for Clinton and LaSalle), and SR 3.8.1.8 and SR 3.8.1.16 (for Dresden and Quad Cities), are added to the list of TS 3.8.1 SRs that are not applicable under SR 3.8.2.1.

These SRs are not included under SR 3.8.2.1.

Clinton, Dresden, and Quad Cities TS SR 3.8.1.18 state "Verify interval between each sequenced load block is ~ 90% of the design interval for each load sequence time delay relay." TSTF-582 retained SR 3.8.1.18 as a test that must be met but not performed. The relay logic schemes that perform a function equivalent to a load sequencer are only used for the automatic start and loading of the diesel generator and are not used during a manual diesel generator start. Therefore, SR 3.8.1.18 is added to the list of TS 3.8.1 SRs that are not applicable under SR 3.8.2.1. This SR is not included under SR 3.8.2.1 LaSalle TS SR 3.8.1.18 state "Verify interval between each sequenced load block, for Division 1 and 2 DGs only, is ~ 90% of the design interval for each load sequence time delay relay." TSTF-582 retained SR 3.8.1.18 as a test that must be met but not performed. The relay logic schemes that perform a function equivalent to a load sequencer are only used for the automatic start and loading of the diesel generator and are not used during a manual diesel generator start. Therefore, SR 3.8.1.18 is added to the list of TS 3.8.1 SRs that are not applicable under SR 3.8.2.1. This SR is not included under SR 3.8.2.1 The TS 3.8.2 LCO Bases were not updated by TSTF-542 or TSTF-582 to reflect that automatic start and loading of a diesel generator is not required. The LCO 3.8.2 and SR 3.8.2.1 Bases are revised to reflect the TS requirements.

This variation provides consistency within the TS after incorporating the TSTF-582 changes to SR 3.8.2.1.

As an editorial improvement, SR 3.8.2.1 is revised to list the TS 3.8.1 SRs that are applicable instead of listing the TS 3.8.1 SRs that are not applicable. The SR 3.8.2.1 Bases are not affected and explain why the omitted TS 3.8.1 SRs are not applicable to TS 3.8.2.

Page 3

2.2.2 Editorial Variations ATTACHMENT 1 Description and Assessment The Clinton, Dresden, LaSalle, and Quad Cities TS utilize different numbering and titles than the Standard Technical Specifications on which TSTF-582 and TSTF-583-T were based. Table 1 describes the differences between the plant-specific TS numbering and titles and the TSTF-582 and TSTF-583T numbering and titles. These differences are administrative and do not affect the applicability of TSTF-582 to these plant's TS.

Table 1. TSTF-582 and TSTF-583-T BWR4 and BWRG Numbering and Title Variations TSTF-582 (BWR4)

Dresden Quad Cities Table 3.3.5.2-1 Table 3.3.5.2 System Table 3.3.5.2 System RHR System Isolation nomenclature difference nomenclature difference Shutdown Cooling RHR Shutdown Cooling System (SOC) Isolation System (SOC) Isolation SR 3.5.2.5 Numbering difference Numbering difference SR 3.5.2.4 SR 3.5.2.4 -

SR 3.5.2.7 Numbering difference Numbering difference SR 3.5.2.6 -

SR 3.5.2.6 TS 3.6.1.3 Condition F Numbering difference Numbering difference TS 3.6.1.3 Condition E -

TS 3.6.1.3 Condition E TSTF-583-T (BWR4)

Dresden Quad Cities SR 3.8.1.9 Numbering difference Numbering difference SR3.8.1.10 SR 3.8.1.10 SR3.8.1.10 Numbering difference Numbering difference SR 3.8.1.11 SR 3.8.1.11 SR3.8.1.14 Numbering difference Numbering difference SR3.8.1.15 SR 3.8.1.15 SR3.8.1.16 Numbering difference Numbering difference SR3.8.1.17 SR 3.8.1.17 TSTF-582 (BWR6)

Clinton LaSalle Table 3.3.5.2-1 N/A System nomenclature RHR System Isolation difference RHR Shutdown Cooling System Isolation TS 3.3.6.1 Required Action Numbering difference N/A J.2 TS 3.3.6.1 Required Action M.2 Page4

2.2.3 Other Variations ATTACHMENT 1 Description and Assessment 2.2.3.1 Clinton, Dresden, LaSalle, and Quad Cities Additional Variations EGC is proposing the following additional variations from the TS changes described in TSTF-582. The variations are described in Table 2. These variations do not affect the applicability of TSTF-582 to the proposed license amendments.

Table 2. TSTF-582 BWR4 and BWRG Other Variations TSTF-582 (BWR4)

Dresden Quad Cities Comments SR 3.3.5.2.3 No equivalent SR No equivalent SR No changes made TS 3.6.1.3 Condition G No equivalent No equivalent No changes made condition condition TS 3.6.1.3 Condition H No equivalent No equivalent No changes made condition condition TSTF-582 (BWR6)

Clinton LaSalle Comments TS 3.3.5.2 Conditions D No equivalent No equivalent No changes made and E Condition E Conditions D and E SR 3.3.5.2.3 No equivalent SR No equivalent SR No changes made SR 3.5.2.7 No equivalent SR N/A No changes made 2.2.3.2 Clinton Specific Variation EGC is proposing the following variations from the TS changes described in TSTF-582 for Clinton Power Station. EGC is proposing to delete TS 3.3.6.1 Required Actions M.3.1, M.3.2, M.3.3, and M.3.4. These are not included in TSTF-582. With the TSTF-582 deletion of TS 3.3.6.1 M.2 for Clinton (J.2 in TSTF-582), TS 3.3.6. 1 Required Actions M.3.1, M.3.2, M.3.3, and M.3.4 are no longer applicable. These Clinton specific actions are no longer applicable after adoption of TSTF-542 (Reference 5, 6, and 7). Required Actions M.3.1, M.3.2, M.3.3, and M.3.4 should be deleted with the deletion of TS 3.3.6.1 M.2. This plant specific variation does not impact the applicability of TSTF-582 to the Clinton TS.

Page 5

ATTACHMENT 1 Description and Assessment

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination Analysis Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC), requests adoption of TSTF 582, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) Enhancements." The Technical Specifications (TS) related to RPV WIC are revised to incorporate operating experience and to correct errors and omissions that were incorporated into the plant TS when adopting TSTF-542, Revision 2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control." TSTF-582 includes the following changes to the TS:

1. The Drain Time definition is revised to move the examples of common mode failure mechanisms to the Bases and seismic events are no longer considered a common mode failure mechanism.
2. The Drain Time definition exception from considering the Drain Time for penetration flow paths isolated with manual or automatic valves that are "locked, sealed, or otherwise secured" is revised to apply the exception for manual or automatic valves that are "closed and administratively controlled."
3. The TS are revised to permit placing an inoperable isolation channel in trip as an alternative to declaring the associated penetration flow path incapable of automatic isolation.
4. A Surveillance Requirement (SR) that requires operating the required Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) injection/spray subsystem for at least 10 minutes through the recirculation line, is modified to permit crediting normal operation of the system to satisfy the SR and to permit operation through the test return line.
5. Dresden, Unit 2 and 3 share secondary containment structures between units. LaSalle, Unit 1 and 2 share secondary containment structures between units. Quad Cities, Unit 1 and 2 share secondary containment structures between units. The TS Actions are revised to recognize that an operable secondary containment and operable secondary containment isolation valves satisfy the Required Actions.
6. The Clinton, Dresden, LaSalle, and Quad Cities designs contain additional isolation instrumentation functions based on low RPV water level that could be credited when calculating Drain Time. Those functions are added to the required functions in TS 3.3.5.2.
7. TS 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown," SR 3.8.2.1, is revised to not require SRs that test the ability of the automatic diesel generator to start in Modes 4 and 5. Automatic ECCS Page 6

ATTACHMENT 1 Description and Assessment initiation in Modes 4 and 5 was eliminated in TSTF-542. This was an oversight in TSTF-542.

8. TS 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation," Required Action J.2 (J.2 for LaSalle and M.2 for Clinton) is deleted. This action is no longer applicable after adoption of TSTF-542. This was an accidental omission in TSTF-542. This change is made for clarity and has no effect on the application of the TS.
9. The Applicability of TS 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)," is revised to delete the phrase, "When associated instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.6.1, 'Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation'." This makes TS 3.6.1.3 only applicable Modes 1, 2, and 3. Following adoption of TSTF-542, no functions in LCO 3.3.6.1 are applicable outside of Modes 1, 2, or 3. The Actions and SRs are revised to reflect this change. These changes are made for clarity and have no effect on the application of the TS.
10. The TS are revised to use wording and to define acronyms in a manner consistent with the remainder of the TS. These changes are made for consistency and have no effect on the application of the TS.

EGC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment(s) by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

1.

Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed change incorporates operating experience and corrects errors and omissions that were incorporated into the plant TS when adopting TSTF-542, Revision 2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control." Draining of RPV water inventory in Mode 4 (i.e., cold shutdown) and Mode 5 (i.e., refueling) is not an accident previously evaluated and, therefore, revising the existing TS controls to prevent or mitigate such an event has no effect on any accident previously evaluated. RPV water inventory control in Mode 4 or Mode 5 is not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated. The existing and revised TS controls are not mitigating actions assumed in any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Page 7

ATTACHMENT 1 Description and Assessment

2.

Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed change incorporates operating experience and corrects errors and omissions that were incorporated into the plant TS when adopting TSTF-542, Revision 2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control." The event of concern under the current requirements and the proposed change is an unexpected draining event. The TS have contained requirements related to an unexpected draining event during shutdown for over 40 years and this event does not appear as an analyzed event in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for any plant or in the NRC's Standard Review Plan (NUREG- 0800). Therefore, an unexpected draining event is not a new or different kind of accident not considered in the design and licensing bases that would have been considered a design basis accident in the UFSAR had it been previously identified.

None of the equipment affected by the proposed change has a design function described in the UFSAR to mitigate an unexpected draining event in Modes 4 or 5, although the equipment may be used for that purpose. Therefore, the proposed amendment will not change the design function of the affected equipment. The proposed change will affect the operation of certain equipment, such as the manual initiation function and related instrumentation to permit initiation of the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem, and the control of valves credited for preventing a draining event. However, these changes provide adequate protection to prevent or mitigate an unexpected draining event and do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident due to credible new failure mechanisms, malfunctions, or accident initiators not considered in the design and licensing bases.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3.

Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No The proposed change incorporates operating experience and corrects errors and omissions that were incorporated into the plant TS when adopting TSTF-542, Revision 2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control." The safety basis for the RPV WIC requirements is to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3. The proposed change does not affect any specific values that define a safety margin as established in the licensing basis. The proposed change does not affect a design basis or safety limit, or any controlling value for a parameter established in the UFSAR or the license.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Page 8

ATTACHMENT 1 Description and Assessment Based on the above, EGC concludes that the proposed change presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

3.2 Conclusions In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The proposed change would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed change does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed change meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed change.

5.0 REFERENCES

1. Letter from the Technical Specifications Task Force to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Transmittal of TSTF-582, Revision 0, RPV WIC Enhancements,"' dated August28, 2019
2. Letter from Victor G. Cusumano (U.S. NRC) to Technical Specifications Task Force, "Final Safety Evaluation of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-582, Revision 0,

'RPV WIC Enhancements' Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (EPID L-2019-PMP-0199)," dated August 13, 2020

3. Letter from Victor G. Cusumano (U.S. NRC) to Technical Specifications Task Force, "Model Safety Evaluation of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-582, Revision 0,

'RPV WIC Enhancements' and TSTF-583-T, Revision 0, 'TSTF-582 Diesel Generator Variation,' Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process," dated October 9, 2020

4. NUREG-1433, Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric BWR/4 Plants, Volume 1, Revision 4, dated April 2012 Page 9

ATTACHMENT 1 Description and Assessment

5. NUREG-1434, Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric BWR/6 Plants, Volume 1, Revision 4, dated April 2012
6. Letter from Alexander R. Klein (U.S. NRC) to Technical Specifications Task Force, "Final Safety Evaluation of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-542, Revision 2, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control," dated December 20, 2016
7. Letter from P. Simpson (EGC) to U.S. NRC, "Application to Revise Technical Specifications Following Adoption of TSTF-542, 'Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control,"' dated June 18, 2019 Page 10

ATTACHMENT 2 Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications Pages 2.1 Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES 1.0-3 1.0-4 3.3-43a 3.3-43b 3.3-43c 3.3-43d 3.3-44 3.3-51 3.3-52 3.3-78 3.8-19

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)

DOSE EQUIVALENT I - 131 DRAIN TIME CLINTON The COLR is the unit specific document that provides cycle specific parameter limits for the current reload cycle.

These cycle specific limits shall be determined for each re l oad cycle in accordance with Specification 5. 6. 5.

Plant operation within these limits is addressed in individual Specifications.

DOSE EQUIVALENT I - 131 shall be that concentration of I - 131 (microcuries/gram) that alone would produce the same inhalation CEDE dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I - 131, I - 132,

I - 133, I - 134, and I - 135 actually present.

The inhalation CEDE dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table 2.1 of Federal Guidance Report 11, "Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion," ORNL,

1989.

The DRAIN TIME is the time it would take for the water inventory in and above the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to drain to the top of the active fuel (TAF) seated in the RPV assuming :

a.

The water inventory above the TAF is divided by the limiting drain rate;

b.

The limiting drain rate is the larger of the drain rate through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e g I

8ei8mic e uent,.l.B-8-& M normal po 1 1er, Bingle R-Yma-n error ), for all (continued) 1.0- 3 Amendment No. ~

Definitions DRAIN TIME (continued)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS ) RESPONSE TIME CLINTON Definitions

1. 1 closed and administratively controlled penetrati on flow paths below the TAF except 1.

Penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system, or isolated by manual or automatic va l ves that are l ocked, sea l ed,

G-t-otheri1ise secured in the closed position, b l ank flanges, or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths ;

2.

Penetration flow paths capable of being isolated by va l ves that will c l ose automatical l y without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water l evel isolation instrumentati on ; or 3.

Penetration flow paths with iso l ation devices that can be closed prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF by a dedicated operator trained in the task,

who is in continuous communication with t h e control room, is stationed at the controls, and is capab l e of closing the penetration flow path i solation devices without offs i te power.

c.

The penetration f l ow paths required to be evaluated per paragraph b ) are assumed to open instantaneously and are not subsequently isolated, and no water is assumed to be subsequently added to the RPV water inventory ;

d.

No addit i onal draining events occur ; and e.

Realistic cross - sectional areas and drain rates are used.

A bounding DRAIN TIME may be used in l ieu of a ca l culated va l ue.

The ECCS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time i nterval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ECCS initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until t he ECCS equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i. e., the valves travel to t heir required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.).

Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, where applicable.

The response time may be measured by means of any seri es of sequential,

over l app i ng, or total steps so t hat the entire response time is measured.

(continued )

1.0- 4 Amendment No. ~

3. 3 INSTRUMENTATION RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentati on 3. 3. 5. 2 3. 3. 5. 2 Reactor Pressure Vesse l (RPV ) Water I nventory Control I nstrumentation LCO 3. 3. 5. 2 The RPV Water I nventory Control instrumentation for each Function in Table 3. 3. 5. 2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABIL I TY :

According to Tab l e 3. 3. 5. 2-1.

ACTIONS


NOTE-------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is al l owed for each channel.

CONDITION A...-

Gf+/-l..g..:r. ~

QAClAA9la iA9j;;>Q:f ClQl9 One or more channels inoperable.

AA :r g qyi:rg g b¥-

ggqyi:rgg Ai;;ti9A

.a.A4 :rgfg:r9AQ9G.i-1:+

~JJ521 G-... AA :rgqyi:rgd b¥-

ggqyi:rgd A i;;ti9A A..-+/-

.a.fi4 :f9f9:f9AQ9g.i-1:+

~JJ521 CLINTON REQUIRED ACTION

~

.t.f+/-. C9A9iti9A

fQfQ:fQAQQg.i-1:+

~

J J 5 2 f.G-:r-

-t-M QAilAAQl Initiate action to place channel in trip.

Decl a r e associated penet r ation flow path (s ) incapable of automat i c isolation.

Initiate action to calcul ate DRAIN TIME.

3. 3-43a COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immedi ately Immediately (continued )

Amendment No. J.;b.

ACTIONS (conti nued )

CONDITION

~

Ag. +/-:H'J:Hi+/-:@Q b¥ P-.-1.

g@qni+/-:E!Q AGtigi:i A-...l.

~

+/-:E!fE!+/-:E!!=!GE!Q.i.f+

~

~

~

~ 2 l QR D--.- E-.-

Ag. :i;sqtii+/-:eci b¥ E-.-J,.

geq ti i:i;eg AGt i gi:i A-...l.

~

i;efe:i;ei:iGeQ.i.f+

~

~

~

~ 2 l R.- geqni:i;sg AGt i gi:i ~ R.-J,.

ei:;;:;;gGieit@g Cgmpletigi:i Hme-G-f-Cgi:ig i tigi:i c,.Q., G-+/-- E AG-t-me-t-.-

CLINTON RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentati on f

3. 3. 5. 2 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLET I ON TIME bl@G l ;;p:@ ~

"'.l'atE!m

.;i,. ~

ii:igp@ i::: eildl@

~

-the- ~

pYmp

.;i,. ~

aHGtiQl=l.t..g. -the-

ypp
i;9
;;:;;,:i,gi:i ~

gs:;;tg i:::e Gfiirni:iel.t..g.

-64 ~

GJi!Egll £l1E :;;tatti:;;

blsGlei i:::s a:;;:;;gGieiteg Immegiatsl:i' ECC£. ii:i:j E!Gtigi:i,l :;;p:i;ei J'

yld.s
i,
;;tem ii:igpe:i;aldle 3. 3-43b Amendment No. ~

These SRs apply to each Function in RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentati on 3. 3. 5. 2 SURVE I LLANCE REQUIREMENTS


--NOTE-------------- -------------------- ---

Re-f.e.+/--.t-G-Tabl e 3. 3. 5. 2 - 1.t-G-de t e rmi1:rn ~

.£.Re. ~

.f.G+/-:. ~

EGG.£. F1m.::tig1=1.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3. 3. 5. 2.l Perform CHANNEL CHECK.

SR 3. 3. 5. 2. 2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCT I ONAL TEST.

CLINTON 3. 3-43c FREQUENCY I n accordance wi th t he Surveil l ance Frequency Control Program In accordance with the Surveil l ance Frequency Control Program Amendment No. ~

FUNCTION.-

Jog11 Press" re Cggl:;rnt IHj e stiGH n (bPCI)

oHGl 1.g" Pres:;;nPe Cgre

£pny (1-PC:a')

a'nldsystem:;;

a-.-

!< e a st gr u gggg l Prge2rnrg 1,gp (IHjestiGH Permi:;;:;;i" e)

G-.-

bPC:a' PYmp bliscAargg Flgu 1,gp (llyp:o gg)

G..-

bPCI Pnmp.A Pigsfis.rge ¥12'7 bbl'! (ll yp* gg)

~ bPCI !l aH9 bPCI C

a'uldi;;yi;;temg a-.-

l<eastr;ir " egggl Pr988 " Hl J,gp (IHjestiGH Pgr:miggiug )

G-.-

1-PCI Pnmp !l

OH9 1-PCI Pnmp C Pisslnrge Fl2F -

b2F (llypass)

RPV Water Inventory Contro l Instrumentat i on 3. 3. 5. 2 Table 3. 3. 5. 2-1 (page 1 of 2)

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation APPLICABLE CQNPITIQ11£ MODES OR REQUIRED l<li!:Fl!:l<l!:llC!W OTHER CHANNELS ERGM SPECIFIED PER l<l!:Ql!Il<l!:P

£l!J<l11!:IbbMJCI!:

ALLOWABLE CONDITIONS FUNCTION

.ACTIQ~J A 1 l<l!:Q(!IJ<l!:Ml!:~JT:a' VALUE

.gg 2 1 f; Hi4 p:;;ig

.gg 2 2

.gg 2 1

72Q gpm

.gg 2 2

.gg d d 2 1

9QQ gpm

.gg d d 2 2

.gg d d 2 1 f; 494 p:;;ig

.gg d d 2 2

.gg

d 2 1
9QQ gpm

.gg d d 2 2 (continued)

+ei+

Ass2si3tgg PitJ:1 3H !!:CC£ snldsystgm r:gqnir:gg tg }dg QPl!:l<A!lbl!: ldy bCQ d 3 2,

" l'P" \\l'J3tgr IHHQHtGP/

Cgi:i.trg l CLINTON 3. 3-43d Amendment No. ~

FUNCTION Migl:! Press11re Cgre

£pr3y (MPC£)

£yste111 FCIC £tgrage TaAk be" @l b9'!

~ MPC£ Pn111p bl i sr;;l:iarge Pre a a" re Migl:!

(llypns )

G-.-

MPC£ £yste111 Fl9H F3te -

b91' (llypns )

RHR System Isolation a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low, Level 3 Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low Low, Level 2 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentati on 3. 3. 5. 2 Table 3. 3. 5. 2 - 1 (page 2 of 2)

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS 4 <b1, a*

(<> )

~

(<> )

REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION 2 in one trip system 2 in one trip system CQNblITIQN£ Fli:Fli:Rli'.NCIW

-FRGM Fli:QTJIF!i:bl JlCTIQN Jl 1

£TlF" li:IbPNC!i:

Fli:QTJIF!i:Nli:NT£

.£R

-a-]~]"""-'~2>-.-+/--

1

.£R

-a-]~]"""-'~2~

2

.£R

~:;~:;_...,.'"'"""2~1

.£R

] -.--a

]-.-d~2,.....-.=-

2 2 1 2 1 2 1 ALLOWABLE VALUE

~ ?QQ gpm

". 8.3 inches
". - 48. 1 inches

+a+

" ssssi3te9 11itl=l aA Rccg s11ssyste111 ret=J:11ireol ts loe QP!i:F " llbli: loy bCQ :; 3 2,

" FP" Water IA"eAte;sy C9Atrgl "

Wl=leA MPcg is QP!i:F " llbli: fgr G9111pliaAGe 11itl=l bCQ :; 3 2,

" FP" Water IA" eAtsry C9Atrsl, " aA9 aligAeol ts tl=le FCIC stsrage taAk 'll=lile taAk *1ater level is Ast 11itl=liA tl=le limits gf

£F ] a 2 ]

When automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path(s) is credited in calculating DRAIN TI ME.

CLINTON 3.3-44 Amendment No. ~

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3. 3. 6. 1 ACTIONS (continued)

J.

K.

L.

M.

CONDITION As required by Required Action F. l and referenced in Table 3. 3. 6. 1-1.

As required by Required Action F. l and referenced in Table 3. 3. 6.1 - 1.

OR Required Act i on and associated Completion Time of Condition I or J not met.

As required by Required Action F. l and referenced in Table 3. 3. 6. 1-1.

As required by Required Action F. l and referenced in Table 3. 3. 6. 1-1.

CLINTON J. l K. l AND K. 2 L. l OR L. 2 M. l REQUIRED ACTION Isolate the affected penetration flow path (s).

Be in MODE 3.

Be in MODE 4.

Declare associated standby liquid control subsystem inoperable.

Isolate the Reactor Water Cleanup System.

Initiate action to restore channel to OPERABLE status.

IHitiate aGtiGH.t4 isGlate ~

1;:es i cilnl

~

1;:e1+18a l ~

£l::wtciGHH CGGliHg

£ystem snGtiGH ~

~

re21GtGr "essel 3.3-51 COMPLETION TIME 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 12 hours 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> 1 hour 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Immediately Immeciiately (continued)

Amendment No. ~

Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation 3. 3. 6. 1 ACTIONS M.

N.

CONDITION (Continued)

As required by Required Action F. l and referenced in Table 3. 3. 6. 1 - 1.

CLINTON REQUIRED ACTION Initiatg aQtign.t4 rgstgrg SQQgndary Qgnt;;iinmgnt.t4 QPJi:'.RAJ3I.E: steitns Initiatg aQtign.t4 r gstgrg ' standay ga.& trgatmgnt ~

s 11agyst:gm.t4 QPE:RAJ3I.E:

status Initiatg aQtign.t4 rgstgrg isglatign Qapaaility.i.A ~

r9b{ 11 irgd SQQgnd;;iry Qgntainmgnt 6-00 s g Qgndary Qgntainmgnt aypass p g n g tratign

~

pa-th A-G-t-is g lat 9 d M.--J-. NQ TE:

N. 1 OR N. 2 E+l-t-Pf aH-G ~

-i-&

pgrmissiblg.um:ie-r-administratiug Qm:1trgl Initiatg aQtign.t4

-G-1-G-&e- '

OOG-r-.i.A -t-fi.e-

.uppe-r. Qgntainmgnt pgrsgnngl d-i+/-- ~

Isolate the affected penetration flow path (s).

Suspend movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment.

3.3-52 COMPLETION TIME Immgdiatg ly Immediately Immediately Amendment No. ---2-1-e.

3. 3 I NSTRUMENTATION 3. 3. 8. 1 Loss of Power (LOP ) Instrumentation LOP Instrumentati on 3. 3. 8. 1 LCO 3. 3. 8. 1 The LOP i nstrumentation for each Function in Tab l e 3. 3. 8. 1-1 shal l be OPERABLE.

APPLICABIL I TY :

MODES 1, 2, and 3, ~

Wfi.e-A.:l;.l:i.e aeeocia.te d di e s e l ge n e ra.tor ~

.i.& r e qtJ.ire d.t.G b.e-OP:E;g7\\fl1.8 b:f I.W ~ g

~

.'.!.AG £onrce s - £J:rntdoun "

ACTIONS


NOTE-------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is al l owed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more channels A. 1 Place channel in trip.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable.

AND A. 2


NOTE----------

On l y applicable for Funct i ons 1. c, 1. d,

1. e, 2. c, 2. d, and 2. e Restore channel to OPERABLE statu s.

7 days B.

Required Act i on and B. l Declare associated DG Immediately associated Completion inoperable.

Ti me not met.

CLINTON 3.3-78 Amendment No. ~

AC Sources ~ S hu tdown 3. 8. 2 SURVE I LLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SR 3. 8. 2. l


NOTE--------------------

The fol l owing SRs are not required to be.Jt:!

per f ormed :

SR 3.8. 1.3, SR 3. 8. 1.9 through

$R ~ g l ll, $R J g l u through SR 3. 8. 1. 16, 6-AG $R J g l a.

lowing SRs The fol are app

~

~

AC sources required to be OPERABLE~

licable for

£.R.g. ~ £pg,-;ifi£atioi:i J g l, gxggpt

$R ~ g l g, $R J g l 16, $R J g l 17 '

$R ~ g l lg, 6-AG $R J g l 6Q a-re appli.-;afile SR 3.8.1.1 SR 3.8.1.6 SR 3.8.1.2 SR 3.8.1.9 SR 3.8.1.3 SR 3.8.1.10 SR 3.8.1.4 SR 3.8.1.14 SR 3.8.1.5 SR 3.8.1.16 CLINTON 3. 8-19 FREQUENCY

~

, SR 3.8.1.10, SR 3.8.1.14, and

--0 I n accordance with appl i cable SRs Amendment No. ~

ATTACHMENT 2 Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications Pages 2.2 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES 1.1-4 3.3.5.2-1 3.3.5.2-2 3.3.5.2-3 3.3.8.1-1 3.6.1.3-5 3.8.2-3

Definitions

1. 1 1.1 Definitions (continued)

DRAIN TIME closed and administratively controlled Dresden 2 and 3 The DRAIN TIME is the time it would take for the water inventory in and above the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to drain to the top of the active fuel (TAF) seated in the RPV assuming:

a.

The water inventory above the TAF is divided by the limiting drain rate;

b.

The limiting drain rate is the larger of the drain rate through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e. §., seismic eveAt,

l oss of Aorrna l po*.1er, siA§le hbtrnaA error),

for all penetration flow paths below the TAF except:

Penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system, or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are l ocke9, sea l e9, or other* *i se seCb1re8 in the closed position, blank flanges, or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration fl ow paths;

2.

Penetration flow paths capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation; or

3.

Penetration flow paths with isolation devices that can be closed prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF by a dedicated operator trained in the task, who is in continuous communication with the control room, is stationed at the controls, and is capable of closing the penetration flow path isolation device without offsite power.

(continued) 1.1-4 Amendment No. 266/259

3.3 I NSTRUMENTATION RPV Water Inventory Contro l Instrumentation 3.3. 5. 2 3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vesse l (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.2 The RPV Water Inventory Contro l instrumentation for each Funct i on in Table 3.3.5.2-1 sha l l be OP ERABLE.

AP PLI CAB ILITY:

According to Tab l e 3.3.5.2-1.

ACTIONS

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -NOTE- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

A.On in ope Separate Cond i tion entry is al lowed for each channe l.

CON DIT ION REQU I RED AC TI ON COM PLETI ON TI ME A.-

GAe OF Arn Fe GAflAAe~ s A--.+/--

E:A teF tl:le 6oA9itioA I11m1e9i ete~ J' iAOFJeFaB~e Fef:eFeAGe9 i A

+a t:i~e J

. J

. a

. ~ 1 f:OF A.1 I tRe GAaAAe~

\\¥

.g.._

As Fe~tJiFe9 BJ'

.g....,..+

Initiate act i on to Immediately

\\

Re~tJi Fe9 AGtiOA A. 1 place channe l in a Ag Fef:eFeAGe9 i A trip.

+at:i ~e J

. J

. a

. ~ 1.

OR IA.2.1 I it e or more channels

~

Dec l are associated Immediately rable.

penetration fl ow path(s) incapable of automatic iso l ation.

A~

B.2. 2 Initiate action to Immediately ca l cu l ate DRAIN TIM E.

6. As Fe~tJi Fe9 gJ1 b----.----+/--

i:n aGe GAaAAe~ i A tFiFJ.

1 AOLiF Re~tJiFe9 AGtioA A. 1 fJA9 Fef:eFeAGe9 i A

+at:i~e J.J. a. 2 1.

(cont i nued)

Dresden 2 and 3 3.3.5. 2-1 Amendment No. 2§g/2§1

RPV Water Inventory Contro l Instrumentation 3.3. 5. 2 ACTIONS COND IT ION REQUIRED ACTION COMP LETI ON TI ME Q. As FeEjtii reEI B:J'

.IJ-.--+/-.

Restere GRannel te 24 R8blFS ReEjti ire El AGtien A. 1 OPrnAgLE stattis.

a nEI ref:erenGeEI in

+:a8le

~

. ~

. 9

. 2 1.

E. ReEjti ire El AGtien a nEI

-h IJeGlare asseGiateEI l ei,1

+/-mmeEli atel:J' asseGiateEI 6emf)letien flFesstire E66£

+:ime ef: 6enElitien 6 8F i naeGti en,LSfJFa:J' Q net met.

SblBS:J'Stem inef)eFa8le.

SURV EILLANCE REQUIR EMENTS

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NOTE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

~These SRs apply to each Function in I

Ref:er te Tab l e 3.3.5.2-1 te Eletermine 11RiGR £Rs af)fllY f:er eaGR E66£

~tinGtien SURVEI LLANC E SR 3.3.5. 2.1 Perform CHANNE L CHECK.

SR 3.3.5.2.2 Perform CHANNE L FUNCTI ONAL TEST.

Dresden 2 and 3 3.3.5. 2-2 FREQUENCY In accordance with the Survei l lance Frequency Contro l Program In accordance wi t h the Survei l lance Frequency Contro l Program Amendment No. 268/261

FUNCTION

~ ReaGter Steam Geme Press~re be11 (Permissi,,e)

B-.

Gere S~ray P61m~

G i s>:~arge

  • l e" be11 rn) ~a66 l be11 Prsss *1rs Geel a Rt IRjeGtieR (bPG I ) Systsm

~

~

~

4-.

~ ReaGter Steam Geme Prsss~re be11 (Psrmissi,,e)

{)...

be1 I Press 11re Geel a Rt IRjeGtieR P11m~

GiSGRarge *1 e1 I be11 rny~ass)

Shutdown Cooling System (SOC) Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation
a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low RPV Water Inventory Contro l Instrumentation

3. 3. 5. 2 Table 3. 3. 5. 2-1 (Page 1 of lJ RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS 4-,----4

~

( {} )

~

( {} )

REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION

~

~

1 1m~ (al

~

lee~ ( 3) per trip system per trip system bGNl:llTIGMS R>*rnrnGrn

~

R>Q" IRrn SllR" U bb ' MG>

' bTIG~I 0. 1 R>Ql lIR>MDIH

~ L~

. 9

. 2

. 2

~ :i. :i. 8. 2. 2

~ ;J.:J.9.2.2

~ ;i. ;i. 9. 2. 2

~ ;i. ;i. 9. 2. i

~ ;i. ;i. 9. 2. 2

~ ;i. ;i. 9. 2. 1

~ ;i. ;i. 9. 2. 2 ALLOWABLE VALUE

,,; ;J41.7 ~sig

,,; ;J41.7 ~sig llG? g~m

~ 2. 65 inches

~ 2. 65 inches 0 sseGiate9 " itR aR.:u:s s~9system re~~ireEJ te 9e GP>R ' H> 9y u:G :l. 9. 2, " RP " 'later IR"eRtery (;eRtrel."

When automatic i solation of the associated penet ration flow path(sJ is credited in calculat i ng DRAIN TIME.

Dresden 2 and 3 3.3. 5. 2-3 Amendment No. 256 / 249

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 LCO 3.3.8.1 The LOP instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.8.1 -1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

ACTIONS MODES 1, 2, and 3, ~

'1Jf1 e A Hie assoc i ate El Eli es el

§ e A et at o I" i s I" e q 1:.d I" e El to 13 e OPERABLE B)' LCO 3.8. 2, " AC Sotll"ces SFiutElo'vJA."

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -NOTE- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Separate Condition entry is all owed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more channels A.1 Place channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable.

trip.

B.

Required Action and B.1 Declare associated Immediately associated Completion diesel generator (DG)

Time not met.

inoperable.

Dresden 2 and 3 3.3.8.1-1 Amendment No. 185/180

ACTIONS CON DIT ION

c.

(cont inued)

C. 2 D.

MS IV lea kage ra t e D. 1 not wit hin l imit.

E.

Requ i red Acti on and E. 1 assoc i ated Comp l et i on Ti me of Cond iti on A, AND B' C, or D not met..:i-A-MQg~ +/-' 2 ' 8F d.

E. 2 Dresden 2 and 3 REQUIR ED ACTIO N

- -- - - - - -NOTES- - - - - - - -

1.

I so l ation devices in hi gh rad i ation areas may be veri f ied by use of admi ni strative means.

2.

I so l ation devices t hat a re a l ocked, sea l ed, or otherwise secured may be verified by use of admi nistrative means.

Ver i fy the affected penetrat i on fl ow path is i so l ated.

Restore leakage ra t e to wit hin l i mit.

Be i n MOD E 3.

Be i n MODE 4.

PC I Vs 3. 6.1. 3 COM PLETI ON TI ME Once per 31 days 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 12 hours 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> 3. 6.1.3-5 Amendment No. 256 / 249

ACTIONS CONDITION B.

One required DG inoperable.

B.1 B.2 B.3 REQUIRED ACTION Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

Suspend movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment.

Initiate action to restore required DG to OPERABLE status.

AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 COMPLETION TIME Immediatel y Immediatel y Immediately SR 3.8.1.3, SR 3.8.1.10, SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.15, and SR 3.8.1.17.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.2.1

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -NOTE- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The following SRs are applicable for The followi g SRs are not required to performed: r~~r.--...+-.--T.---2M+--'7-.e-.--:r--.--:+/-:-1::1----t-tt-H::H:ttl-ft

~R 2. g. 1. 12, ane

~R 2. g. 1. 14 thro~gh

~R 2. g. i. rn.

i------+ ~

AC sources required to be OPERABLE

~Rs of ~pecification 2. g. 1, except

~R 2. g. 1. 9,

~R 2. g. 1. 12,

~R 2. g. 1. 19,

~R 2. g. 1. 20, ane

~R 2. g. 1. 21 are applica8 l e.

SR 3.8.1.1 SR 3.8.1.2 SR 3.8.1.3 SR 3.8.1.4 SR 3.8.1.5 SR 3.8.1.6 SR 3.8.1.10 SR 3.8.1.11 SR 3.8.1.15 SR 3.8.1.17 FREQUENCY In accordance with applicable SRs Dresden 2 and 3 3.8.2-3 Amendment No. 26g/26 1

-+

t

ATTACHMENT 2 Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications Pages 2.3 LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES 1.1-4 3.3.5.2-1 3.3.5.2-2 3.3.5.2-3 3.3.5.2-4 3.3.6.1-4 3.3.8.1-1 3.5.1-1 3.5.1-2 3.5.2-2 3.5.2-3 3.5.2-5 3.8.2-4

1.1 Definitions DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 (continued)

DRAIN TIME closed and administratively controlled LaSalle 1 and 2 Definitions

1. 1 30, Supplement to Part 1, pages 192-212, Table titled, "Committed Dose Equivalent in Target Organs or Tissues per Intake of Unit Activity."

The DRAIN TIME is the time it would take for the water inventory in and above the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to drain to the top of the active fuel (TAF) seated in the RPV assuming:

a.

The water inventory above the TAF is divided by the l imiting drain rate;

b.

The limi ting drain rate is the larger of the drain rate through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the dra i n rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failu re (e. g., seismic event, loss of normal

~0 1.1er

, single

~u1man error), for all penet rat ion flow paths below the TAF except:

1.

Penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system, or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are l ocked, sea l ed, or 0H1ernise seCblred in the closed position, blank flanges, or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths;

2.

Penetration flow paths capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation; or (continued) 1.1-4 Amendment No. 242/228

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation -+-

3. 3. 5. 2 3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.2 The RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

ACTIONS According to Table 3.3.5.2-1.

A.1 Initiate action to place channel in trip.

OR

- - - - - - - NOTE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Separate Condition entry is a lowed for each channel.

CONDITION

-A-o-0Ae or more cAaAAels iAoperable.

A. One or more

-channels

-r+----i IV inoperable.

As reEJt:li reEl by ReEjuireEl ActioA A.1 aAEl refereAceEl iA Taele 3.3. 5. 2 1.

REQUIRED ACTION EAter tAe CoAElitioA referCAced i A Taele 3.3. 5. 2 1 for tAe cAaAAel.

Declare associated penetration flow path(s) incapable of automatic isolation.

( ~A N~ Initiate action to IQ-/,. r calculate IA.2.2:t---.~ B-: Calculate DRAIN TIME.

C. As reEJui red by ReEjui r eEl ActioA A. 1 aAEl refereAceEl iA Table 3.3.S. 2 1.

Place cAaAAel iA trip.

COMPLETION TIME I

Imme Eli a tel :Y

\\!Immediately I

'+'

Immediately Immediately 1 ROUP (continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 3.3.5.2-1 Amendment No. 230/216

RPV Water In ventory Control In strumentation ~

3.3.5.2 ACTION S (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTIO N COMPLETION TIME B.,ais FeEf td Fee B:Y B-:-+

Res=!:sFe eFiaAAel =!:s 24 AS~FS ReEf~i Fee,o,e=t:i SA A. 1 OPERABLE s=!:a=!:~s a A El Fefe FeAeeEl i A

=Fasl e 3. 3. 5. 2 1.

E.

ReEJ~i Fee P.c=!:i SA a AS f-:-1.

Beel a Fe asssci a=!:ee Ifflffleei a=!:el y asssei a=!:ee EGGS i Aj ee=!:i SA 1ls13 Fa:y Gsfflp le=!: i SA =Fiffle sf s~ssys=!:effl iAspeFasle.

GsAElHi SA G SF B AS=!:

m-e+-:-

These SRs apply to each Function in SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NOTE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

RefeF =!:s Table 3.3.5.2-1 =!:s Ele=!:eFffliAe WAiCA SRs apply fsF eacFI EGGS F~Ac=!:isA SURVEI LLANC E SR 3.3.5.2. 1 Perform CHANN EL CHECK.

SR 3.3.5.2.2 Perform CHANNE L FUNCTIONAL TEST.

LaSal l e 1 and 2 3.3.5.2-2 FREQUENCY In accordance wi th the Survei 11 ance Frequency Control Program In accordance with the Surveil l ance Frequency Control Program Amendment No. 230/216

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation +-

3. 3. 5. 2 Table 3.3.5. 2-1 (page 1 of 2)

+

RPV Water Inve ntory Control Instrume ntatio n

==

FUNCTION h

Le.. PFessriFe Gee l aAt IAjeetieA A (LPG!)

aA8 Le.. PFessriFe GeFe S19Fa)

( LPGSJ Sri13s; stems

..r.-

ReaeteF Steam Beme PFessriFe Le..

(!Ajeeti BA PeFmissi oe)

APP LI CABLE MOD ES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CO NDIT IONS LPGS Prim19

~

Bi sei'1aF§Je Fle.. Le.. (B;13ass)

LPGI Prim13 A

~

Bi sei'1aF§Je Fl s.. Ls.. (B) 13a ss l 4-:-

LPGS aA8 LPGI,',

~

lAjeetieA LiAe PFessriFe Ls..

(lAjeetieA PeFmissioe)

~ LPGI B aA8 LPGI G Sri8s) stems

..r.-

ReaeteF Steam Bsme PFessriFe Ls..

(lAjeetieA PeFmissi.el LPG! Prim13 B aA8 LPGI Prim13 G Bisei'1aF§Je Fle.. Le.. (B)13ass)

LPG! B aA8 LPG! G lAjeetisA LiAe PFessriFe Le..

(lAjeetieA PeFmissi.el REQU IR ED CHANNE LS PER FUNCTION

~

~..+

~

~..+

~

~..+

G8Pl8 IT I8N S REFERDIGEB

-F-R8!4 RE81:1 I RE8 AGTI8PI A. l Sl:IRVEI LLMIGE RE81:1 I REMUITS AL LOWABLE VALUE

.£tf 3. 3. 5. 2. 2 ~

~

.£tf 3. 3. 5. 2. 2 ~

§I'm a AS

< 1835 §J l3m

.£tf 3. 3. 5. 2. 2

~

§Jl3m a AS

< 2111 §I'm

.£tf 3. 3. 5. 2. 2 ~~

.£tf 3. 3. 5. 2. 2

~

~

.£tf 3. 3. 5. 2. 2

~

§Jl3m aAS

< 2111 §I'm

.£tf 3. 3. 5. 2. 2

~

~

(contin ued)

+a-+ Asseeiates.. itR aA EGGS sril3s;stem FeEfriiFe8 te 13e 8PERABLE 13; LG8 3. 5. 2, " RPV ',/ateF !AoeAtef)

GeAtFel. "

LaSal l e 1 and 2 3. 3.5.2-3 Amendmen t No. 230/216

[]

FUNCTION :-

Iii §A PFesstJFe Cs Fe S13Fa)

( llPCSl S)steFA 13-7 ll PGS PtlFA/3 Bi seAaF§e PFeSStJFe Iii §A rnnass) llPCS S) steFA Fl e" Rate Le.. (8)13ass)

~

4-:-

RHR Shutdown Cooli ng System Isolation a. Reactor Vessel Water Leve l -Low, Level 3

~,,.,. Reoctoc Wotec Cleooop (RWCUJ System Isolation a. Reactor Vessel Water Leve l - Low Low, Level 2 RPV Water In ventory Control In strumentation ~

3.3.5.2 Table 3.3.5.2-1 (page 2 of 2)

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS

( !> )

~

( !> )

REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION 2 in one trip system 2 in one trip system co~rn IT ID~Js REFERDJCEB

-F-OOM REGl:IIREB ACTION A. 1 Sl:IRVEI LLMICE RE81:1IREMEMTS

~ 3. 3. 5. 2. 2

~ 3. 3. 5. 2. 2

~ 3. 3. 5. 2. 1

~ 3. 3. 5. 2. 2

~ 3. 3. 5. 2. 2 ALLOWAB LE VALUE

> 113. 2 13si§

~~

-a-A4 219~ §/3FA

11. 0 inches
- 58. 0 inches

+a-+

AssseiateEI.. itfl aA EGGS StlBS)SteFA FetjtJiFeE1 ts 13e OPE 11ABLE B) LCO 3. 5. 2, " IWV '.later lAoeAtSF)

CsAtFe l."

~)

When automatic isolation of the associated penetration f l ow path(s) i s credited in calculatin g DRAIN TIME.

LaSal le 1 and 2 3.3.5.2-4 Amendmen t No. 230 / 216

ACT IONS CON DIT ION J.

As requ i red by Re qui red Act i on C.l and referenced i n Ta bl e 3.3.6.1-1.

SURVEI LLANCE REQU I RE ME NTS J.l Primary Containment Isol ation In strumentation 3. 3.6.1 REQUIRED ACT ION Init i ate action to restore cha nne l to OP ERAB LE st at us.

IAit i ate aetieA ts i se l ate Hie Resi E1 1:1a l li e at Remeva l (R llR ) Sl91:1 tE1e.. A Cee li A§ (S BC) S)ste m.

COMPL ET IO N TI ME Immed i at ely IF!HtteEl i a te l )

- - - - --- -- - -- --- -- -- - -- - -- -- - - -- -- -- - -- - -- -- - NOT ES -- -- -- - --- -- - -- --- -- -- - -- - -- --- -- --- --- - - -

1.

Refer to Tab l e 3.3.6.1-1 to determi ne whi ch SRs ap pl y for eac h Primary Contai nme nt Isolat i on Function.

2.

Whe n a chan nel is pl aced in an i noperable sta t us so l ely for pe rfor mance of requi red Survei l lances, entry into assoc i ated Conditi ons and Requi re d Acti ons may be de l ayed f or up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> provi ded t he assoc i at ed Funct i on mainta i ns isolation capa bi l i ty.

SURVEI LLANCE SR 3.3.6.1. 1 Perform CHANNEL CHE CK.

SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUN CTIONAL TEST.

LaSalle 1 and 2 3. 3.6.1-4 FR EQ UEN CY In accorda nce wit h t he Sur veil l ance Frequency Co ntrol Program In accordance wit h the Survei l lance Freque ncy Con t ro l Program (cont i nued)

Amendment No. 200/ 187

+

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.8.1 The LOP instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.8.1 -1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

ACTIONS MODES 1,

'1Jf1eA Hie OP CRABLE 2, and 3..., ~

associatee eiese l §eAerator (DC) is re~uiree to be by LCO 3.8. 2, "AG Sources Sl'l uteo*,m."

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -NOTE- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Separate Condition entry is all owed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more channels A.1 Place channe l in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable.

trip.

B.

Required Action and B.1 Declare associated DG Immediately associated Completion inoperable.

Time not met.

LaSalle 1 and 2 3.3.8.1-1 Amendment No. H 7/133

ECCS-Operating

3. 5. 1 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS CECCS), REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL CRPV)

WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING CRCIC)

SYSTEM 3.5.1 ECCS-Operating LCO 3.5.1 Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of six safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3, except ADS valves are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure ~ 150 psig.

ACTIONS High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NOTE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to H-P-G-&.

CONDITION A.

One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.

LaSalle 1 and 2 A. 1 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Restore low pressure 7 days ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

(continued) 3.5.1-1 Amendment No. 230/ 216

ACTIONS CONDITION B.

lligfi PresstH' e Core S~ray (HPCS+ System inoperable.

B.1 B.2 C.

Two low pressure ECCS C.1 injection/spray subsystems inoperable.

D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met.

D.1 E.

One required ADS valve E.1 inoperable.

F.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition E not met.

LaSalle 1 and 2 F.1 REQUIRED ACTION ECCS-Operating

3. 5. 1 COMPLETION TIME Verify by Immediately administrative means RCIC System is OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE.

Restore HPCS System to OPERABLE status.

14 days Restore one low 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

Be in MODE 3.

Restore required ADS valve to OPERABLE status.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 14 days 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (continued) 3.5.1-2 Amendment No. 196/183

RPV Water Inventory Control.+----

3. 5. 2 ACTIONS (continued)

I


.-----------.---------~

CONDITION C.

DRAIN TIME < 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> and

~ 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

LaSalle 1 and 2 C.1 C.2 C.3 REQUIRED ACTION Verify secondary containment boundary is capable of being established in less than the DRAIN TIME.

COMPLETION TIME 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Verify each secondary 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> containment penetration flow path is capable of being isolated in less than the DRAIN TIME.

/

-i(SGT)I Verify one sta y

4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> gas treatment subsystem is capable of being placed in operation in less than the DRAIN TIME.

(continued) 3.5.2-2 Amendment No. 230/ 216

ACTION S (continued)

COND ITION D.

DRAIN TIME < 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

D.1 AND D.2 AND D. 3 RPV Water In ventory Control..+--

3.5.2 REQUIRED AC TION COMP LETION TIME

- -- - - - -NOTE- - - - - - - -

Required ECCS injection/spray subsystem or additional method of water injection sh a 11 be capable of operating without off site electrical power.

Initiate action to Immediately establish an additional method of water inj ect i on wit h water sources capab l e of maintaining RPV water l eve l > TAF for

'.'. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

Initi ate action to Immediately establish secondary conta inment boundary.

Initiate action to Immediately isolate each

}-----____

secondary containment penetration flow path

!automatically or LaSal le 1 and 2 r---__, or verify it can be I

~ manually isolated D.4 from the control room.

Initi ate a~

verify one staA~~Y

§as treatmCAt subsystem is capable of being placed in operat i on.

Immediately (cont in ued) 3.5.2 -3 Amendment No. 230/216

NOTES

1. Operation may be through the test return line.
2. Credit may be taken for normal system RPV Water In ventory Control operation to satisfy this SR.

3.5.2 SURV EILLANC E 0EQUIREMENTS (cont inued)

SURVE ILLANC E FREQUEN CY

-&ff 3. 5. 2. 5

'"ITC

~

-I---

p~ 8t PeEjtd PeEI t8 ee lflet f e P S:'J'Stelfl

~'eAt f 1 8111' i:iaHis ei:ieAeEI l::!ASeP aEllfli Ai s=l:Pa=t i 'i'e eeA=l:Pe i.

\\I e Pi f:,', feP He PeEj l::! i PeEI EGGS

+/-A aeeePdaAee i Aj ee=t i 8A1'SFJPa:'7' Sl::!B5:'7'5 t elfl, eae A lfla A l::!a 1,

11~i t A H e

+-

i:ie 11~e P ei:iePa=te EI, a AEI a l::!te lfla=tie 1~a 1 1~e i A He Sl::!P~' ei 11 aAee f 1 8~1 13aH, Hat i 5 Aet iee l<eEI, sea i eEI, 8P

~PeEfl::!eAE :'7' eHe P~vi se seel::!PeEI i A 13es i tieA, i 5 i A He Ge At Pei PPe§Palfl eeP Peet i:iesitieA.

~

SR 3.5.2. Operate the required ECCS i njection/spray In accordance

~

subsys tem through the reci rcul ati on lin e for with the

~ 10 minutes.

Survei 11 ance Frequ ency Control Program t SR 3. 5.2. Verify each valve credited for automatically In accordance

~

isolating a penetration fl ow path actuates with the to the isolation position on an actual or Survei 11 ance simulated i so l at i on signal.

Frequ ency Control Program SR 3.5.2..g

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -NOTE- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

~

Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.

Verify the required ECCS injection/spray In accordance subsystem can be manually operated.

with the Survei 11 ance Frequency Control Program LaSal le 1 and 2 3.5.2 -5 Amendment No. 230/2 16

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 COMPLETION TIME D.

Required offsite circuit or DG of LCO Item d. inoperable.

D.1 Declare associated Immediately standby gas treatment subsystem, control room area filtration subsystem, and control room area ventilation air conditioning subsystem inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.2.1 The following SRs are applicable for SURVEILLANCE

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -NOTE-&- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

+.:-

The following SRs are not required to be performed:

SR 3.8.1.3, SR 3.8.1.9 tAFS~§A SR 3.8. 1. 11, SR 3.8. 1. 13 tAFS~§A SR 3.8.1.16, SR 3.8. 1. 18, UftE!.

SR 3.8. 1. 19.

~ SR 3.8. 1. 12 aA8 SR 3. 8. 1. 19 are As t Fe ~~i Fe G te Be ffiet.

f.&r AC sources required to be OPERABLE, SRs ef S13ee if ieatieA 3.8. l, eJ(eqit SR 3.8. 1. 8, SR 3.8. 1. 17, aA8 SR 3.8. 1. 20,

a Fe a1313l i casl e.

SR 3.8.1.1 SR 3.8.1.2 SR 3.8.1.3 SR 3.8.1.4 SR 3.8.1.5 SR 3.8.1.6 SR 3.8.1.9 SR 3.8.1.10 SR 3.8.1.14 SR 3.8.1.16 FREQUENCY

, SR 3.8.1.10, SR 3.8.1.14, and In accordance with applicable SRs LaSalle 1 and 2 3.8.2-4 Amendment No. 230 / 216

ATTACHMENT 2 Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications Pages 2.4 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES 1.1-4 3.3.5.2-1 3.3.5.2-2 3.3.5.2-3 3.3.8.1-1 3.5.2-2 3.5.2-4 3.5.2-5 3.5.2-6 3.6.1.3-1 3.6.1.3-4 3.8.2-5

Definitions

1. 1 1.1 Definitions (continued)

DRAIN TIME The DRAIN TIME is the time it would take for the water inventory in and above the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to drain to the top of the active fuel (TAF) seated in the RPV assuming:

a.

The water inventory above the TAF is divided by the limiting drain rate;

b.

The limiting drain rate i s the larger of the drain rate through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e. g., seismic eveRt,

l oss of Rormeil poi,ier, siRgle hblmeiR error),

for all penetration flow paths below the TAF except:

closed and administratively controlled

1.

Penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system, or i so lated by manual or automat ic va l ves that are Quad Cities 1 and 2 l ockeEi, seei l eEi, or otheni'i se secblreEi in the closed position, blank flanges, or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths;

2.

Penetration flow paths capable of being isolated by valves that wi ll close automatically with out offsite power prior to the RPV water le vel being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water leve l isolation instrumentation; or

3.

Penetration flow paths with isolation devices that can be closed prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF by a dedicated operator trained in the task, who is in continuous commun ication with the control room, i s stat ioned at the controls, and is capable of closing the penetration flow path i solat ion device without offsite power.

(continued)

1. 1-4 Amendment No. 279/274

3. 3 I NSTRUMENTATI ON RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3. 5.2 3. 3. 5.2 Reactor Pressure Vesse l (RPV) Water Inventory Contro l Instrumentat i on LCO 3.3.5.2 The RPV Water Inventory Contro l instrumentat i on for each Funct i on in Table 3.3.5.2 -1 shal l be OPERAB LE.

AP PLI CAB ILITY:

According to Tab l e 3.3.5.2-1.

ACTIONS

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -NOTE- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Separate Cond i tion entry is al lowed for each channel.

A.1 Initiate action to place channel in trip CON DIT ION OR COMP LETI ON TI ME

/Jr..

0Ae 8P lfl8Pe cl9aAAel s A-:-

EA:f:et"

=E 19 e CeAE1it:ieA IlfllfleE1i at: el y i Ae13 n a 131 e.

PefereAceE1 i A Tas le 3. 3. 5. 2 1 fep rllmmediately I A. One or more He el9aAAel.

r channels inoperable.

.J JV

'4 B-:-

As PeEjui PeE1 B:Y

£-:-+

Dec l are assoc i ated Immediate l y ReEjui PeE1,01c=EieA A. 1 IA~.11 penetration fl ow a As Pe:fePeAces i A path(s) incapable of Ta sle 3.3. 5. 2 1.

automatic isolation.

c ~

f Initiate action to calculate IA.2.2 H ~ -B-ti-Cal cul a=Ee DRA IN TI ME.

Immed i ate l y

c. As PeEjUi PCS B)'

-:-+

Place CAaAAel i A fPij3.

1 A8UP ReEjUiPeS Ac=EieA A. 1 a A E1 PefePeAeeE1 i A

i:a 81 e 3.3. 5. 2 1.

D. As PeEjUi PeE1 B)'

~ Resf:epe el9aAAel f; 0 2q A8UPS ReEjuiPe8 Act:ieA A. 1 OPERABLE st:a t:us.

a AE1 PefePeAeeE1 i A Tasle 3.3. 5. 2 1.

(continued) I Quad Ci t i es 1 and 2 3.3.5.2-1 Amendment No. 273/268

ACTIONS COND IT ION RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3. 5.2 REQUI RED ACTION COM PLETI ON TIM E

- J E. ReEjtl i FEEi Aet i sA a A El f-:4.

Deel a Fe assseiateEI l S\\i' l A'IA'leEl i a tel y assseiateEI GSA'if3 l et i SA f3FESSl:lFe EGGS

/

f i ffie Sf GsAElitisA G SF i Ajeeti SA11s13 Fa:,*

D A St ffiet.

StlBS:)'Steffi i As13eFa l=Jl e.

rJThese SRs apply to each Function in I SURV EILLANC E REQ UIREMENTS

-)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NOTE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

~ ef:eF ts Tab l e 3.3.5.2-1 ts EleteFA'liAe ld ~i e~ SRs a1313 ly f:sF eae~ EGGS FtlAetisA.

SURV EILLANC E FREQU ENCY I

SR 3.3.5. 2. 1 Perform CHANNE L CHECK.

In accordance with the Surve i 11 ance Frequency

-)

Control Program..

SR 3.3.5.2. 2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

In accordance with the Survei 11 ance Frequency Control Program Quad Ci t i es 1 and 2 3.3.5.2-2 Amendment No. 273/268

FUNCTION h

Ge Fe S13Fa; S; stelll tt7 Reaete1-Stealll Bellle P1 esst:H'e Le (Pe:lllissi.el tr.

GeFe S13Fa)

P~lllf3 Bi SEAaF§e Fl e Ls (8)13assl b

Le.. P1 ess~1 e Geel a19t IAjeetieA (LPG!) S;stelll

~

tt7 ReaeteF Stealll Bellle PFess~Fe Le..

(PeFl!lissi el tr.

Le Press~Fe GeelaAt IAjeeti SA P~lllf3 Bi SEAaF§e Fl e Le (B;13assl RHR Shutdown Cooling System (SOC) Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low 4..,.

Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCUJ System Isolation

a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 Table 3. 3.5. 2-1 (Page 1 of 1)

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQU IRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION

+--!7tt le e13 (al per trip system per trip system G8~18 I TI 8N S REFERUIGEB fiWM RE88IRE9 S8R"EI LL ' NGE AGT I 8N P. l RE88IREMENTS 5-lt

3. 3. 5. 2. 2 5-lt
3. 3. 5. 2. 2 5-lt
3. 3. 5. 2. 2 5-lt
3. 3. 5. 2. 2 5-lt
3. 3. 5. 2. 1 5-lt
3. 3. 5. 2. 2 5-lt
3. 3. 5. 2. l 5-lt
3. 3. 5. 2. 2 ALLOWABLE VALUE

~ 3.8 inches

~ 3.8 inches

' sseeiateEI itA aA EGGS s~BS)Stelll Fe~~i FEEi te se 8PER ' BLE B) LG8 3. 5. 2, " RP" llateF IA eAtSF) GeAtFel. " i calculating DRAIN TIME.

When automatic isolation of the associated penet ration flow path(s) is credited in Quad Cities 1 and 2 3.3.5.2-3 Amendment No. 273/ 268

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 LCO 3.3.8.1 The LOP instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.8.1 -1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

ACTIONS MODES 1, 2, and 3, WAeA tAe associated diesel geAerator is reqHired to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8. 2, " AC SoHrces SAHtdmm."

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NOTE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Separate Condition entry is all owed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more channels A.1 Place channel in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable.

trip.

B.

Required Action and B.1 Declare associated Immediately associated Completion diesel generator (DG)

Time not met.

inoperable.

Quad Cities 1 and 2 3.3.8.1-1 Amendment No. 199/195

ACTIONS CONDITION C.

DRAIN TIME < 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> and

~ 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

Quad Cities 1 and 2 C.1 C.2 C.3 RPV Water Inventory Control ~

3.5.2 REQUIRED ACTION Verify secondary containment boundary is capable of being established in less than the DRAIN TIME.

COMPLETION TIME 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Verify each secondary 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> containment penetration flow path is capable of being isolated in less than the DRAIN TIME.

~(SGT) I Verify one sta /

4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> gas treatment subsystem is capable of being placed in operation in less than the DRAIN TIME.

(continued) 3.5.2-2 Amendment No. 273 / 268

ACTIONS CONDITION D.

(continued)

D.3 RPV Water Inventory Control t 3.5.2 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Immediately Initiate action to isolate each secondary containment penetration flow path or verify it can be

!automatically or f-------~-' manually isolated D.4 E.

Required Action and E.l associated Completion Time of Condition C or D not met.

DRAIN TIME < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE from the control room.

Initiate action to Immediately verify one st aA~~ Y ga s treatmeAt

~.L."::..---r1:SGT I subsystem is capable of being placed in operation.

Initiate action to Immediately restore DRAIN TIME to

~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.1 Verify DRAIN TIME~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

In accordance with the Quad Cities 1 and 2 3.5.2-4 Survei 11 ance Frequency Control Program (continued)

Amendment No. 273/ 268

RPV Water Inventory Control +-

3. 5. 2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.5.2.2 SR 3.5.2.3 -R 3

. 5

. 2

~

SURVEILLANCE Verify, for the required ECCS injection/

spray subsystem, the:

a.
b.

Suppression pool water level is

~ 8.5 ft; or Contaminated condensate storage tank(s) water volume is~ 140,000 available gallons.

Verify, for the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem, locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

Net l"etji:1i l"e E1 te se FAet fel" sys t eFA 'o'eAt fl 8'oJ

~a t ~ s e ~ e A e E1

~ A E1 el" aE1FAi Ai stPat i ve ceAtl"e l.

VeP ify, fe l" t~ e l"e ~~i l"e E1 EGGS iAj ec tieA /s ~ P a y s ~s sys t e fFI e a c ~

FF1a A ~al

~e 'oJCI" e~el"ate E1 aAE1 a~teFAat i c 'wa l ve iA Hie fl 8\\1' ~atA

, tAat is Aet l ecke E1, sea l eE1, el" et~el"wise sec~PeE1 i A ~ esitieA

, is iA t~e cel"l"ect

~ esitieA FREQUENCY In accordance with the Survei 11 ance Frequency Control Program In accordance

'I' with the Survei 11 ance Frequency Control Program

+

IA accePE1aA ce

  • ,;i tA Hi e S~l"vei ll aAce Fl"e~~eAcy GeAtl"e l Pl"e§l"aFA (continued)

Quad Cities 1 and 2 3.5.2-5 Amendment No. 273/ 268

ISR 3.5.2.4 I

-&R-

3. 5. 2.5 NOTES
1. Operation may be through the test return line.
2. Credit may be taken for normal system I

operation to satisfy this SR.

REQU I/REI I

SURVEI LLANCE

'Y Operate the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem t A P S~§A tA e Pec iP c ~latieA liA e for ~ 10 minutes.

r In ventory Control -r 3.5. 2 FREQUENCY In accordance with the Survei 11 ance Frequency

~-

Control Program SR 3.5.2.~----------------------+-------

ISR 3.5.2.6 I

-&R-

3. 5. 2.6 Verify each valve credited for In accordance
3. 5. 2. 7 automatically isolating a penetration flow with the path actuates to the isolation position on Surveil lan ce an actual or simulated isolation signa l.

Frequency

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -NOTE- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.

Verify the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually operated.

Control Program In accordance with the Survei 11 ance Frequency Control Program

==========================================================+-'

Quad Cities 1 and 2 3.5.2-6 Amendment No. 273/ 268

3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves CPCIVs)

PC I Vs 3.6.1.3 LCO 3.6.1.3 Each PCIV, except reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers, shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3, W~eR associate~ iRstr~meRtatioR is re~~ire~ to ~e OPERAgLE f)er LCD 2. 2. 8. 1, "Primary CoRtaiRmeRt IsolatioR I RstrnmeRtati OR."

ACTIONS

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NOTES - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1.

Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2.

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3.

Enter appl icable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by PCIVs.

4.

Enter appl icable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," when PCIV leakage results in exceeding overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.

CONDITION A.


NOTE--------

A.1 Only appl icable to penetration flow paths with two or more PC I Vs.

One or more penetration flow paths with one PCI V inoperabl e for reasons other than Condition D.

AND Quad Cities 1 and 2 REQUIRED ACTION Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.

COMPLETION TIME 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> except for main steam l in e 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for main steam line (continued) 3.6.1.3-1 Amendment No. 199/195

ACTI ONS CON DIT ION

c.

(con t inued)

C. 2 D.

MS IV leakage rate D. 1 not with i n li mit.

E.

Required Action and E. 1 associated Comp l et ion Time of Cond iti on A, AND B' C, or D not met-+A-MQQi; +/-, 2, er 3.

E.2 Quad Ci t i es 1 and 2 REQU IRED AC TI ON

- - - - - - - - NOT ES- - - - - - - -

1.

I so l at i on dev i ces in high rad i ation areas may be verif i ed by use of adm i ni st rat i ve means.

2.

I so l at i on devices that are locked, sea l ed, or oth erwi se secured may be verified by use of administrat i ve mea ns.

Verify th e affec t ed penetra t ion fl ow path i s i solated.

Restore leakage ra t e to withi n l i mit.

Be in MODE 3.

Be i n MOD E 4.

PC I Vs 3. 6. 1.3 COM PLETI ON TI ME Once per 31 days 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 12 hours 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> 3. 6.1.3-4 Amendment No. 273/ 268

SR 3.8.1.3, SR 3.8.1.10, SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.15, and SR 3.8.1.17.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.2.1 AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 FREQUENCY The following SRs are applicable for


~

f.ef'- AC sources required to be OPERABLE t-J:T.e.

SRs ef SfJcci fi ca ti eA 3. 8. 1, CJ\\CCfJt In accordance with applicable t

SR 3.8. 1. 9, SR 3.8. 1. 13, SR 3.8. 1. 19,

SR 3.8. 1. 20, aA8 SR 3.8. 1. 21, ape SRs

-t-afJfJl i casl e.

SR 3.8.1.1 SR 3.8.1.2 SR 3.8.1.3 SR 3.8.1.4 SR 3.8.1.5 Quad Cities 1 and 2 SR 3.8.1.6 SR 3.8.1.10 SR 3.8.1.11 SR 3.8.1.15 SR 3.8.1.17 3.8.2-5 Amendment No. 273/268

ATTACHMENT 3 Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications Bases Pages (Information Only) 3.1 Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES PAGES B 3.3-122a B 3.3-122b B 3.3-122c B 3.3-122d B 3.3-122e B 3.3-122f B 3.3-122g B 3.3-122h B 3.3-122i B 3.3-122j B 3.3-168 B 3.3-169 B 3.3-225 B 3.3-228 B 3.3-229 B 3.5-17 B 3.5-18 B 3.5-19 B 3.5-22 B 3.5-23 B 3.5-24 B 3.8-35 B 3.8-36 B 3.8-39

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3. 3. 5. 2 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3. 5. 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND CLINTON The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced, which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation.

Safety Limit 2. 1. l. 3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of t he active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures.

Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50. 36 to include limiting safety system settings (LSSS) for variables that have significant safety functions.

LSSS are defined by the regulation as "Where a LSSS is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded."

The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variabl e at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that a SL is not exceeded.

Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures that the SL is not exceeded.

However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protection channels must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the sett ing at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.

The actual settings for the automatic isolation channels are the same as those established for the same functions in MODES 1, 2, and 3 in +/-rG.Q.

J
J 5 1,

"I!:merr;;rerH:;y GG..re. C.:wliHr;;T

£ystem (I!:CC£ )

I HstnameHtatiGH 1 "

G-.:i:: LCO 3. 3. 6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation instrumentation. "

With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses.

RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2. 1. 1. 3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur.

Under the definition of DRAIN TIME, some penetration flow paths may be excluded from the DRAIN TIME calculation if they will be isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation.

(continued)

B 3.3-122a Revi sion No. ~

BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO,

and APPLICAB I LI TY considered considered CLINTON RPV Water Inventory Control I nstrumentat i on B 3. 3. 5. 2 The purpose of the RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation i s to suppor t the requirements of LCO 3. 5. 2,

" RPV Water Inventory Control, " and the definition of DRAI N TIME.

There are functions that ~

r e qt1ire 9.f.G-T m:urnal iHitiatioH G--T-operatioH G..t:.t.f+e EGG.£. iHj e.::tioH/e:pray gyJdgye:ts m r s qt1ire 9.t4 ~ OP.KRAJ;JJ;.,l!;'. b:f J..G.Q. ~

.a.HQ ~

fnH>::tioHe ~

support automatic isol ation of Residua l Heat Removal subsys t em and React or Water Cleanup system penetration flow path (s ) on low RPV water level.

-+/-Re-RW Wa-t-9-r-IHue Htory CoHtrol IHe:trt11+1e HtatioH eYJd)dOrte:

ops ratioH G..t: J,.o.w. pre e:e:yrg ~

~

(J;.,PC£ ), J,.o.w. prs e:e:t1re

.::oolaHt iHj e.::tioH (J;.,PCI ),.a.HQ ~

pre e:e:t1re ~

~

(FIPC£ )

~

gqnip1+19Ht iH uolugg.w.i.tf+/- ~

G..t: ~

gygtgmg.;i,..g.

ggggrilds9.i.H-.t.f+e ~

.f.G-T J..G.Q.

~ 5 ~

With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventor y cont rol is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safet y Limit 2. 1. l. 3 and the fuel c l adding barri er to prevent t he release of radioactive material shoul d a draining event occur.

A double - e nded gui l lotine break of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS ) is not in MODES 4 and 5 due t o the rn reduced RCS pressure, reduced p ipin stresses, and ducti l e piping systems. I nstead, an event is poe:tt1late 9 i n which a siHgle operator ~

G--T-initiating event a l lows draining of the RPV water inventory through a singl e penetration flow path with the highest f l ow rate, or the s um of the drain rates through mu l tiple penetration f l ow paths suscept ible to a common mode fa i lure (e g, seismic e " eHt, +/-G-&& G..t: Horma l pm 1er, siHgle R-Yrn error ). It is assumed, based on engineering judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manua l ly initi ated to maintain adequate reactor vessel water l evel.

As discuss e d in Re f e rences 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, ope rating experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant to public health and safety. Therefore, RPV Water Inventory Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50. 36 (c ) (2 ) (ii ).

Permissive and interlock setpoints are general l y considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy.

The specific App l icable Safety Ana l yses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

(continued)

B 3.3-122b Revi s i on No. ~

0 t-<

H z f-3 0 z to w

w I

f-'

N N

0

'.:JJ

(]) <

1-'-

CJJ 1-'-o CJ z

0 l

(lJ >' (/) >'

to CJZ::i:>ro

0. >' rr:I 'U

(/)

~

t-<t:rlt-<

t:rl 0 >' t-< f-3 H CJ) 0

'U (/) >--< 0 CJ'Ut:rl rt t-< (/)

to f-J-H

~

t-<

CJ 0

t:rl c >' t-<

(]) to 0 Q. H 0

~ t-< ~

H f-3 HHiHHi H1!1' It u~

1 ~1 f ' !P' UI it~nr H r

,. -1 f

~. ~.

t I

~ -

~ n

'.:JJ

'U <

8 (lJ rt

(])

Ci H

CJ <

(])

f J f t

~. i 1 ~

t J f f t'

  • I

~

  • 1* u f I

~~ l t r f. ~

  • i ~.

ti d r H

~If r~ t r t

~

rd~f rlf ~ J !lh r

  • f ;~;~f ll Ut tHh!t~ f ~

~

CJ rt 0

Ci CJ (fJ

~ i [t~I pi lHfi ~ If r~ iJ~f ~

~ l[ f ~J [f :l ~1*

It

{

t~

~ Ji P r t t ru id l i i ~ r t;f h f

~~

t

BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO,

and APPLICAB I LI TY (continued)

CLINTON RPV Water Inventory Contro l I nstrumentat i on

,f--

B 3. 3. 5. 2

~

~

Discharge HG-W = bGW Allo11able Ealtws a-re-R-i-gl+/-

e nough -t-o-e nsure -t-Ba-t- -t-Be-p-ump -t-1--Gw -ra-t-B -i-& sufficie nt.t-o-prote ct -t-Be-p-ump-,- ye-t, G-W e nough -t-o-e nsure -t-Ba-t- -t-Be-closure G-.t: -t-Be-minim um -t-1--Gw ~

-i-& in it i at e g -t-o-

.a,.1.J,..o.w..f.u.l..l. -t-1--Gw

.i.n.-t-o- -t-Be- ~

~

channel G-.t:.t.J:+/-. ~

Discharge ~

= bGW Fnnction -i-&

regnireGl -t-o-oo OPE1UB1E.if+ ll4GDE.£. 4.a-00 ~ ~

-t-Be-associateGI

~

G-r ~

p-ump -i-& reguired -t-o-oo OPEP:AB1E b-y l,CQ. ~

.t-o-e nsure -t-Be- -p-uHlp8-a--r-e-capable G-.t: inj e cting.i.n.-t-o- -t-Be-P: e actor Pre ssure Ee ss e l wH-e-H-manually initiate g

.J-,...a....,..

P:eactor ~

Isolation Cooling (P:CIC) £torage ~

~

= bGW bGW -l-e-v-e.if+ -t-Be-RC-+/--C £torage +e-nk indicate s -t-Be-una'railability G-.t: e.++ ag e quate supply G-.t: make up ~

.f.r.Gfl'I

~

normal source Mormally -t-Be-sldction " al" e s b e tueen

~

~

-t-Be-RC-+/--C £ torage +e-nk a--r-e- ~

~

~

.f.G-r ~

injection ~

w.t.a.k.@.n,.f.r.Gfl'I.t.J:+/-. RC-+/--C £torage ~

Flo1 '9er,.i.ct.t.AA ~

~

.if+ ~

RC-+/--C £torage +e-nk ~

~

a-pre s e lecte d l e u e l,.f-i-r-8-t- -t-Be-suppre ssion pG-G suction ¥a-l-¥e-automatically ope ns, ~

-t-Be-n -t-Be-RC-+/--C £torage

~

sldction ¥a-l-¥e-automatically clos e s

-'+/--R--i-.s-e nsure s -t-Ba-t-e.++ ag e guate supply 4.f: make up ~

-i-& a" ailabl e -t-o- -t-Be- ~

p.ldHlp-.-

M pre " e nt losing suction -t-o- -t-Be-p-ump-,- -t-Be-suction

" al" es ~

interlockeg ~ -t-Ba-t-.t.AA gnppression pG-G suction

~

ffi.U-.£.t. ~ ~

before.t.AA RC-+/--C £torage +e-nk snction

~

automatically clo8 e 8 RC-+/--C £torage -'+/-'-a+l-k hB¥e-l- = bGW eignal8 a--r-B initi a ted -f-r-Gm. -t-wB

-l-e-v-e tranBmitter8

~

~

-i-& arranged.,s.u.G-fi,.t.f+.a.t. either tranem.itter.a.AA a88ociated ~

.c-a-n ~

-t-Be-8uppre88ion pG-G 8Uction ~

-t-o- ~

.a.00 -t-Be-RC-+/--C £torage -'+/-'-a+l-k 8uction

~

-t-o-cloee

-'+/-'-AA RC-+/--C £torage +e-nk be-¥e-+/--

=

bGW Function 7\\llo' rabl e.\\la-1-uB

-i-& B-i-g-A enough -t-o-ensure adeguate p-ump suction fIB.a-G wB-i-1-e wa-te-r -i-& be-i-ng -t-a-keH-.f.r.Gfl'I -t-Be-RC-+/--C £tor age -'+/-'-aFl-k-,...

~

channel8 G-.t: -t-Be-RG+/-G £torage -'+/-'-a+l-k hB¥e-l- = bGW Function a--r-B ~

requireGI -t-o- ~ OPEP:l\\BlE wH-e-H-JWG£. -i-& required -t-o- ~

0.PEP:l\\BlE -t-o-fulfill ffie requirementB 4.f: l,CO ~ 3 2, ~

-i-&

aligne g -t-o- -t-Be-RC-+/--C £torage ~

~

-t-Be-RC-+/--C £torage +e-nk wa-te-r -l-e-v-e -i-& f+O.t. Hithin -t-Be-limit8 G-.t:.£R

~ 3 2

~

(continued )

B 3.3-122d Revi s i on No. ~

BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO,

RPV Water Inventory Control I nstrumentat i on B 3. 3. 5. 2

~

.J-.-.G-..-

.fW.C£- ~

Diacharge l?re aatire

  1. .i-gR-(Bypaaa ) a-00

.fW.C£- £ygtem HB-W Ra--t-e = -hGW (Bypagg )

and APPLICAB I LI TY ~

miI:1imt1m.f..l.g..w. i1:rntrt1m.e Hta &re-prg" ige g w prgte ct.t.AA (continued)

.fW.C£-

p.blmp.f.r.GHl g" e rhe atiHg :wfi.ef+.t.AA p.blmp -i-& ope ratiHg a.H-G CLINTON

.t.AA agggciate g iHj e ctioH ~

-i-& ~

~

~

~

mi H im 1 'm.f..l.g..w. ~

~

-i-& opeHe g ~

J,..Q.w.f..l.g..w. a.H-G ~

p.blmp gigch:uge pre gg11re ~

ae i::ia e g, a.H-G.t.AA ~

-i-&

atitomatically cloaed ~

-t-00.f..l.g..w. -r-a-ffi -i-& adeqtiate w prgte ct.t.AA p.blmp G-r- -t-R-e-diacharge pre aatire -i-& J,..Q.w (iHdicatiHg.t.AA.fW.C£- p.blmp -i-& ~

gpe ratiHg )

GHe-

.f..l.g..w. traHam.itte r -i-& ~

w ge t e ct.t.AA ~

£ygtem' g

.f..l.g..w..r.a.t.-.-

~

~

-i-& ;;i rraHge g ~

.t.J:J..e.t..t.AA traHam.itter catia e a.t.AA miHim11m ~

~

.t.Q. ~

prguiggg.t.AA.fW.CS p.blmp diacharge preaatire, ae Haed fl-¥ aHgtJ:J.er traHamitte r, -i-&

~

e Hgtigh (iHdicatiHg.t.AA p.blmp -i-& ope ratiHg )

~

~

W-i-+/- ~

.t.AA miHimtim.f..l.g..w. ~

GR-Ge-.t.AA cloatire ae tpgiHt

-i-& e 2c ce e ge g

~

~

W-i-+/-.a-1-&G ~

~

.fW.C£- pbl-Hlp gigchaP3e pre aatire ge cre aaiHg ~

-t-R-e-ge tpoiHt )

~

~

£ygte m. HB-W ~

= -hGW a.H-G ~

~

Diach;;irge l?regg11re = #.i-gR-Allgo;;il?le ~

-i-& ~

eHongh w eHanre

.t.J:J..e.t. pbl-Hlp.f..l.g..w. -r-a-t.e -i-& atifficie Ht w prote ct -t-f+/-e. pt!-ffip-,- -'fe-l-J,..Q.w e ngtigh w e natire.t.J:J..e.t..t.AA cloaure G-f.t.AA m.inimum.f..l.g..w.

~

-i-& iHitiate d w e-l-1-Gw -f.bl-l.f..l.g..w. -i-H-t-9.t.AA GG-re-.--

~

~

~

Diacharge l?re ggnre

  1. .i-gR-Zl ll011ct1?le ~

-i-&

.g.g.t. ~

9H0 11gh w 9Ha ti rg.t.J:J..e.t..t.AA ~

W-i-+/- ~

w ~

~

.t.fi..e. ~

-i-& ~

ope r;;itiHg GHe-channel G-f e-aBB-Functign -i-& required.t.G-Be-OJ?EgABLE wf+/-BB-

.fW.CS -i-& r e qtiire d w Be-OJ?Eg?l £JLE fl-¥ bGG ~

-i-n ~

4-

.a-00.a.,..

(continued)

B 3.3-122e Revi s i on No. ~

BASES RPV Water Inventory Control I nstrumentat i on B 3. 3. 5. 2 APPLICABLE RHR System Iso l ation SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO,

4--.-e- -

Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low. Level 3 and APPLICAB I LI TY (continued)

The definition of DRAIN TI ME allows crediting t he closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being automatically isolated by RPV water l evel isol ation instrumentation prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low, Level 3 Function is onl y required to be OPERABLE when automat ic isolation of the associated RHR penetration f l ow path is credited in cal culating DRAIN TIME.

CLINTON Reactor Vessel Water Leve l -

Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from four level transmitters (two per trip system) that sense the d i fference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference l eg ) and the pressure due to the actua l water level (variable leg ) in the vessel.

While four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Leve l -

Low, Level 3 Function are available, only two channels (al l in the same trip system) are required to be OPERABLE.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low, Leve l 3 Al l owable Value (LCO 3. 3. 1. 1 ),

since the capabi l ity to cool the fue l may be threatened.

(continued)

B 3.3-122f Revi s i on No

. ~

BASES RPV Water Inventory Control I nstrumentation B 3. 3. 5. 2 APPLICABLE Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System I solation SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO,

~

- Reactor Vessel Water level -

Low Low, Level 2 and APPLICAB I LI TY (continued)

The definition of DRAIN TI ME allows crediting t he closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being automatically isolated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation prior to the RPV water level be i ng equal t o the TAF.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with RWCU System isolation may be credited for automatic isolation of penetration f l ow paths associated with the RWCU System.

ACT I ONS CLINTON Reactor Vessel Water Leve l -

Low Low, Leve l 2 i s initiated from two channels per trip system that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg ) and the pressure due to the actua l water level (variable l eg ) in the vessel.

While four channels (t wo channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low, Level 2 Function are avai l able, onl y two channels (al l in the same trip system) are required to be OPERABLE.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low Low, Leve l 2 Allowab l e Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low Low, Level 2 Al lowab l e Va l ue (LCO 3. 3. 5. 1 ), since the capabil i ty to cool the fue l may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low Low, Leve l 2 Function is onl y required t o be OPERABLE when automatic i solat ion of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calcul ating DRAIN TIME.

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels.

Section 1. 3, Completion Times, speci fies t hat once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions,

s ubsystems, compone nts, or variables e xpre sse d i n the Condition discovered to be inoperabl e or not wi thin limits will not result i n separate entry into the Condi tion.

Section 1. 3 also specifies that Requ i red Actions cont inue to apply for each additional failure, with Completi on Times based on initial entry into the Condi tion.

However, t he Required Actions for inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condi tion entry for each inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channel.

(continued)

B 3.3-122g Revi s i on No. ~

BASES ACTIONS (continued)

IA.1. A.2.1. and A.2.2 A.2.1 CLINTON RPV Water Inventory Control I nstrumentation B 3. 3. 5. 2 P:si;;p;iirs 8 AstiGH A-.-l-8irs -;=;tg ~

.i.fi.t.G..:tJ:+e. apprgpriats CeH8itieH r s f s r s H-;;e g ffi ~

~

~ 5 2 - 1

~

appli-;;abls Cm:i.8iti91:1 r e f e r e H-;;0 8 ffi.:tJ:+e. ~

.i.& FttH-;=;tiGH 8epe H8 e Ht

~

~

~,;J:ieiHHQl.i..e. 8ieQ9" HQ8 iHGp@reiblg, CGH8itiGH A.i.&

eHts:rng.f.G+.t.J:i.a.t; QA&lJ'.l.J'.l.91 ~

i;n*gu iggg.f.G+ tr;;i!'.l.gfgr w.t.00 apprgpriate £ttbseqtt@Ht CGHditiGH

~~

" 2 1, """ ~

RHR System Iso l ation, Reactor Vesse l Water Leve l -

Low Leve l 3, and Reactor Water Cleanup System, Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low Low, Level 2 functions are applicable when automat ic isolati on of the associated penetrati on f~

low path is credited in calcu lating Drain Time.

If t he A.1 instrumentation i s inoperable, Requi red Action ~ irects immediate action to place t he channe l in trip.

With the inoperable c hannel in the t ripped condition, t he remaining channel will iso l ate the penetration f l ow path on low water If both channels are inoperable and p l aced in tr i p,

flow path wi ll be isolated.

Al ternat ive l y,

1--~'-"+J..U..J;;,f;i"°"-_....(;..i;.-..c;~~..,.........,o--,E'e-6f'\\:H:-lE'e-~ t he associated pen et ration.-----.

f l ow path (s )

be i mmediat ely declared incapable of IA.2.2 I a u tomat ic isolat i on.

Re quired Action ~

directs initiat ing action to ca l culate DRAIN TIME.

The calcul ation cannot credit automatic isolation of the affected

-+-

penetration flow path (s ).

t" bG-W-reagtgr " 98891 pr988ttrs 8igHal8 a..r.e- ~

.a...s-psrmi88ius8

.f.G+.:tfi.e. +/-G.w pr988t1T9 EG.C.£. iHj98ti9H/8pray 8t1B8]'8t9m H\\3.Httal ir:iitiatiGH fttH-;=;tiGH8 U

.t.f:i...i.& psrmi8eiue.i.& iHGperabls,

maJ'.l.ttal iJ'.l.itiatiGJ'.l. &f. m

.i.& prgfl.ibiteg Tl:lergfgrg,.:tJ:+e.

pe rmi88i" O Hltl--&t be-pla-;;gd ffi.:tJ:+e. -t-r-i-p QGHditiGH Pitl:iiH 00-tl-T-r W-i-t-R-.:tJ:+e. permi88i" e ffi.:tJ:+e. -t-r-i-p ggr:iditign, manttal iHitia tiGH may-be-perfgrmed

-P-r-i-G-r-

-t-G-plaGiHg.:tJ:+e.

permi88iue ffi.:tJ:+e. tripped 89HditiGH 1

.:tJ:+e. epsratgr G-a-R.t.a.k-e maHttal 8GHtrgl &f..:tJ:+e. ~

~

.:tJ:+e. iHj98ti9H ~

-t-G-iHj98t

~

.i.fi.t.G..:tJ:+e. R-.J2-',l..,...

~

Cgmple tiGH.T.Htte-G-f. ~

.i.& iHts H8 e 8 -t-G-.a-1--1-G.w.:tJ:+e.

gperatgr ~

-t-G-O" alttate.a.fi..lf 8i8QG" ere8 iHGperabilitie8 ~

-t-G- ~

.:tJ:+e.

-;=; J:i a H He l ffi.t.r.i.p...-

(continued )

B 3.3-122h Revi s i on No. ~

BASES ACTIONS (continued)

CLINTON RPV Water Inventory Control I nstrumentation

.+---

B 3. 3. 5. 2 gequired Actiona -Id-.--+/- aH-G ~

~

intended w enaure Wa-t-appropriate actiona a.re- ~

.i.f. multiple, inoperal2le cH.annela PitH.in -t.H-e-

&aHte-Function reault.i..n.a.J,..g..g..g. G-f-a tt tom at i c 8 u c ti on.,g.w..ap ~

-t.H-e- ~

8'/ 8 t em.f.r-OHl -t.H-e-RG.J.G ator;;igg.t.a.+/-+k w

.t.J+g anpprgggion ~

~

~

gygtgm ~

oo GleclareGl iAopenele uiUi.iA.1. 00.u+/- G+ -t.H-e- ~

p.ump attction ~

oo aligned w -t-00 attppreaaion -pGG-1-., aince,.i.f.

aligned, -t.H-e-function -i-.s-already performed

-'+/-'-Re-.1. OOtJ.r. CompletioA Um -i-.s-acceptal2le 12ecatt8e.i..:t; minimizeg -t.H-e-

.r.i..g..J.;, G-f- ~

~

nee9e9 Pitfiout.a..i:+ a9eqttate

~

aonrcg w.fi.i.l.g. allouiAg.t.i.m ~

r@atoratioA G+

iligAmeAt G-f- ~

p.ump attctioA w -t.H-e-attppreaaioA ~

U

.a..i:+ ~

G+ ~

Qigcf:i.arge ~

= W.w. 12ypa88 function G-.r.

~

£ygtem Qigcf:i.arge Preaaure = filgl+/- G+ ~

~

=

W.w.

12 yp a 8 8 f n Act i o A -i-.s-i Ao pg r a 12 lg, -t-00.r.- -i-.s-.a.;r.i..a.k -t-fi.a-t- ~

a88ociate9 ~

p.ump ~

o" QrHeat ~

.:t.AA p.ump -i-.s-operating aH-G -t.H-e-aaaociated injection.v-a-l¥e- -i-.s-fi.G.-t- -f-tt-l-1-y-Gpe-fi.--

-+/--H-tJi...i-& condition, -t.H-e-operator -Ga-H- -t-a-k-e manttal control G-f- -t.H-e-p.ump aH-G -t.H-e-injection.v-a-l¥e-w enattre -t.H-e-p.ump ~

fi.G.-t-o" erH.eat

~

.:f-4 OOtJ.r. Compl@tion ~

.w..a.a. cfioggn w ~

.t.i.m ~

-t-00 op>Hator w e " alnate aH-G repair.a.f+¥ 9iaCO" >He9 inoperal2ilitiea p-r-i-o-r w declaring -t.H-e-affected 8t1BByBtem inoperable.

-'+/-'-Re-Completion Um+/--& appropriate g-i-¥BB- -t.H-e-ability w manually &t-a-r-t- -t.H-e- ~

pttmp..s- -a-00 GpB-R -t.H-e-inj ection ualueg.a.& neceBBary w enBure -t.H-e-affer;:;ted p.uHlf' OOe..s-fi.G.-t-ouer!::i.eat W-i-t-R -t.H-e-geqttired Ar;:;tion a-BG aBBOGiated Completion Um G-f-ConditionB G, If., G+ E fi.G.-t-me-t,- -t.H-e-aBBOGiated ~

injer;:;tion/Bpray BttbByBtem ma.:r be inGapable G-f-performing -t.H-e-intended fttnGtion, a-BG ~

be der;:;lared inoperable immediately (continued )

B 3.3-122i Revi sion No. ~

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CLINTON RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3. 3. 5. 2 The following SRs apply to As ~

.H+ -t-00 beginning &t: -t-00 $R.&-r -t-00 SR-&.f.G-+/-' each RPV Water Inventory Control instrument Function -a£-B ~

in -t-fi.B SR-& column &t: Table 3. 3. 5.2 - 1.

SR 3.3.5.2.l Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred.

A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels.

It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value.

Signific ant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious.

A CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected outright channel failure is limited; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertaint ies,

including indication and readability.

If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

(continued)

B 3.3-122j Revision No. ~

BASES ACTIONS (continued)

CLINTON Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation B 3. 3. 6. 1 K.1 and K. 2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip, or any Required Action of Condition I or J is not met and the associated Completion Time has expired, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply.

This is done by placing the p l ant in at l east MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach t he required plant conditions from full power conditions in an order l y manner and without challenging plant systems.

L. 1 and L. 2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status wi t hin the allowed Completion Time, the associated SLC subsystem(s) is declared inoperable or the RWCU System is isolated.

Since this Function is required to ensure that t he SLC System performs its intended function, sufficient remedial measures are provided by declaring the associated SLC subsystem inoperable or isolating the RWCU System.

The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for personnel to isolate the RWCU System.

RWCU isolation is achieved by closing 1G33F001 or 1G33F004, which are the containment isolation valves associated with this isolation function.

M. l r M-.-2-,- M J 1, M J 2, M J J, a-AG~

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flow path should be isolated (i. e., closing either 1El2-F008 or 1El2 - F009).

However, if the shutdown cooling function is needed to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow the penetration flow path to remain uniso l ated provided action is immediately initiated t o restore the channel to OPERABLE status G-F w firouide ffie.a+l ~

Gontrol G-f. flOtential radioaGtiue releases.

~

inGhades enstuin~ seGondary Gontainment.i...s-Ol?Kl~~Al3I.:e;:: ;.a.t. e-a-&t-G-H-e-

£ t::rn sH> y Ga-& Tr e a tm en t +£.G.T+. s yg s y s t em.i...s- 0 pg g 71 13 I.E ;

.a.AG seGoAGla:ry GoAtaii:imeflt isolatioi:i Gafla9ility (i e,.a.t. e-a-&t-G-H-e-isolation ¥a-l¥e-a-AG assoGiated inst:rt1mentation -a--:r-e OJ?Eg7\\J3I,E G-F ~

aGGeflta9le 21slmii:iist:r21tiu e GoAt:rols w 21ssn:re isol21tioi:i Gafla9ility ).i-1:+ ~

seGoAGla:ry Goi:it21ii:imei:it a-AG seGondary Gontainmeflt 9yflass fJenetration ~

~

~

isolated tJ+a.t..i...s-asst1med.t.G.9e isolated.t.G miti~ate (continued )

B 3. 3-168 Revi sion No. +/--G.=4

BASES ACTIONS the channel is restored to OPERABLE status.

CLINTON Pri mary Contai nment and Drywe l l Iso l ation I nstrumentat i on B 3. 3. 6. 1 M. l, M-.--6, M J 1, M J 2, M J J,.a-AG M-.--J-.-4 (conti nued )

radioactiuity r e l e a£ e £ Tu-i ~

Pe-pe rforme d aS-a+/-+

admiI:1i2trati" e cJ::J.e ck, b¥ e xaminiI:1g ~

~ ~

information, w de t e rmiA e.i..f. ~

compone nt£.a.r.e.g.y..j; Q..f ge p rice ~

mainte nance ~ ~

r e a£On£

.J.t..;i,..a. fl4t.

ngcggg:;iry w pgrform.t.J::J..- £HP'9ill:;incgg nggdgd w dgmon2tr:;itg

.t.00 0PE1U'1H1.ITY Q..f.t.00 Gompon0i:i.tg

.r..f.,.. J::J.o\\'G" Gr, d-Wf r e quire d Gompoi:i.e i:i.t.;i,..a. iAope rabl e, -tRe-A -i-t-m-&t-Pe-r e 2tore d w

QpEg 71 ~.bE 2tatu£

.I-fl-.t.fl..i-& Ga-&e-r ~

£uP'e illance £ ~

Aee4 w Pe-pe rforme d w r e 2tore ~

Gompone nt w QPEg 11 ~1.E gtatug Ii:i. additioi:i.,.a..t. J,..e..a.,s..t. ' ~

.i.f+ ~

~

Goi:i.taii:i.me nt p e raoi:i.ne l.a.i+/-. ~

m-&t-Pe-Gloa e d

~

c l oa e d

.a.i+/-. ~

Q.Q..g.r. Gomplgtgg.t.J::J..- boHi:i.dary ~

coi:i.trol Q..f potGi:i.ti:;il radioaGti" G rglg:;iggg W.i.tJl..t.00 appropri:;itg admii:i.iatrati" e Gontrol£ J::\\oPe " er, -tR-e Gloa e d Q.Q..g.r. &a-1:+ ~

ope ne d inte rmitte ntly ~

~

.a-AG ~

Tu-i allouance.;i,..a.

acG eptable 4u-e-w ~

Aee4 ~

Gontainment aGCe ££.a-AG 4u-e-w

~

~

progre ££ioi:i. Q..f e ue nt£ ~

~

r e ault ~

.a.

r e aGtor " e ££ e l draii:i.douA e" e i:i.t g e actor " e ££ e l draindoPn e" e nt£ ~

fl4t. Pe-expe Gte d w r e n;i l t.i.f+ ~

imme diate rglg:;igg G-f appr9Giablg fi££ion prodnGt£ w

.t.J::J..- Goi:i.t:;iinmgi:i.t

itmoapJ
:J.grg Act i ons must continue unti l;f\\.a..l.l. rgq11irgmgi:i.t£ Q..f

.tR--i Condition.a.r.e £ati2fie d I

N. l, N. 2. 1, and N. 2. 2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Comp letion Time, the associated penetration flow path (s ) shoul d be isol ated (Required Action N. l ).

I solating the affected penetration flow path (s ) accompl ishes the safety function of the inoperable instrumentation.

Alternately, the p l ant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply.

If applicable,

movement of recent l y irradiated fuel assemblies (i. e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core wi t hin t he previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ) must be i mmediate l y suspended.

Suspension of these activit i es shal l not preclude completi on of movement of a component to a safe condition.

(continued)

B 3. 3-1 69 Revi s i on No. G.=2-

BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES,

LCO, and APPLICABILITY CLINTON LOP Instrumentation B 3. 3. 8. 1 l. a, l. b, 2. a, 2.b.

4.1 6 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage) (continued)

The Division 3 4. 16 kV Emergency Bus Loss of Voltage Function 120 - volt Basis trip setpoint is

~ 67 volts and

~ 78 volts.

Six channels of 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage) Function per associated emergency bus for Divisions 1 and 2 and four channels for Division 3 are only required to be OPERABLE when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the DG function.

(Six channels input to each of the Division 1 and Division 2 DGs and four channels input to the Division 3 DG.

Each of the six channels for Division 1 and six channels for Division 2 is an inverse time delay relay.

Each of these time delays are considered to be separate channels.

For Divi sion 3, the Loss of Voltage Function logic inputs to a single time delay relay.

Thus,

only one time de l ay channel is associated with Division 3. )

Refer to LCO 3. 8. 1, "AC Sources-Operating, " ~

J.GG J g

~

.!.!.AG £9H:rggg £l:J.Ht.bl9HA 1 " for Applicability Bases for the DGs.

l. c, l. d, l. e, 2.c, 2. d, 2. e.

4. 16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage )

A reduced voltage condition on a 4.16 kV emergency bus indicates that while offsite power may not be completely lost to the respective emergency bus, power may be insuffic ient for starting large motors without risking damage to the motors that could disab l e the ECCS function.

Therefore, power supply to the bus is transferred from offsite power to onsite DG power when the voltage on the bus drops below the Degraded Voltage Function Allowable Values (degraded voltage with a time delay ).

This ensures that adequate power will be available to the required equipment.

The Bus Unde rvoltage Al l owable Value s are low e nough to prevent inadvertent power supply transfer, but high enough to ensure that sufficient power is available to the required equipment.

As stated above, the purpose of this instrumentation i s to ensure that sufficient power will be available to support the ECCS function during a LOCA.

During a LOCA, the ECCS and other safety systems will be initiated at the start of the event.

This l arge loading of the safety buses results in a voltage transient of (continued )

B 3. 3-225 Revision No. 4=J.

BASES ACTIONS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CLINTON B.1 LOP Instrumentati on B 3. 3. 8. 1 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time is not met, the associated Function may not be capabl e of performing the intended function.

Therefore, the associated DG (s ) are declared inoperable immediately.

This requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3. 8. l ~

l.CO] S l, which provide appropriate actions for the inoperabl e DG (s ).

As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each LOP Instrumentation Function are l ocated in the SRs column of Table 3. 3. 8.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, ent ry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> provided the associated Function maintains DG initiation capability.

Upon completi on of the Surveillance,

or expiration of the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the app l icabl e Condition entered and Required Actions taken.

SR 3. 3. 8. 1. 1 This SR has been deleted.

SR 3. 3. 8. 1. 2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. For series Functions, i. e., for the degraded voltage relays in series with their associat ed delay timers, a separate CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is not required for each Function, provided each Function is tested.

A successfu l test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a singl e contact of the relay.

Th is c l arifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCT I ONAL TEST of a relay.

This is acceptable because al l of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Surveillance Frequency is control l ed under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(continued)

B 3. 3-228 Revi sion No. -+/-4=6

BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

REFERENCES CLINTON SR

3. 3. 8. 1. 3 LOP Instrumentati on B 3. 3. 8. 1 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor.

This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3. 3. 8. 1. 4 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a specific channel.

The system functional testing performed in LCO 3. 8.1 e+l-4 J,,G.Q ~

overlaps this Surveil l ance to provide compl ete testing of the assumed safety functions.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

1.

USAR, Section 8. 3. 1.1. 2.

2.

USAR, Section 5. 2. 2.

3.

USAR, Section 6. 3. 3.

4.

USAR, Chapter 15.

5.

I P Calculati on 19-AN-1 9.

B 3. 3-229 Revi sion No. -+/-4=6

RPV Water Inventory Contro l B 3. 5. 2 B 3. 5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS ), REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV )

WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC )

SYS TEM B 3. 5. 2 RPV Water I nventory Control BASES BACKGROUND APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The RPV con tains penetrations be l ow t h e top o f the active fuel (TAF ) t hat have the potential to drain the react or coo l ant inventory to be l ow the TAF.

If the water leve l should drop be l ow the TAF, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced, wh ich could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and c l ad perforation.

Safety Limit 2. 1. l. 3 requires the RPV water l evel to be above the top of t he active irradiated f uel at all times to prevent such elevat ed cladding temperatures.

With t h e unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory contro l is not required to mitigate any events or accidents eva l uated in the safety analyses.

RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2. 1. 1. 3 and the fuel c l adding barrier to prevent the re l ease of radioactive material to the environment should an unexpected draining event occur.

!considered I D gg n b l e ended qui:l,lotine break of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS ) is no~ p98ttt l atgg in MODES 4 and 5 due t o the reduced RCS pressure, reduced piping stresses, and ducti l e

....-~~~~~~~~-

piping systems.

Instead, an event is considered in which an event that creates singlg gpgratgr m G-r-in i tiating event a l lows draining of a drain path through multiple vessel penetrations located below top of active fuel, such as or LCO CLINTON the RPV water inventory through a singl e penetration flow path with the highest f l ow rate, or the sum of the drain rates throu h mu l ti le enetration f l ow a h suscept ible a common mode fa i lure

(~

sgismi8 gugnt, loss of normal power, single human error ).

It is assumed, based on engin ring judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5, on e l ow pre ssu e ECCS injection/spray subsyste m can maintain adequa e reactor vessel water level.

to As discussed in References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, operating experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant to public health and safety.

Therefore, RPV Water Inventory Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50. 36 (c ) (2 ) (ii ).

The RPV water l eve l must be controlled in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure that if an unexpected draining event should occur,

the reactor coolant water level rema i ns above the top of t he active irradiated f uel as required by Safety Limit 2. 1. 1. 3.

The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO ) requires t he DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF to be ~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

A DRAIN TIME of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> is considered reasonable to (con tinued )

B 3. 5-17 Revis i on No. ~

BASES LCO (continued}

RPV Water Inventory Contro l B 3. 5. 2 identify and initiate action to mitigate unexpected draining of reactor coo l ant.

An event that cou l d cause l oss of RPV water inventory and result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> does not represent a significant chal l enge to Safety Limi t 2. 1. 1. 3 and can be

.--~~~~~~ managed as part of normal plant operation.

from the control room aligned and OPERABILITY of the ECCS injection/spray subsystem includes any necessary valves, instrumentation, or controls needed to manually align and start the subsystem from the control room.

CLINTON One ECCS injection/spray subsystem is equire OPERABLE and capabl e of being manually started to provide defense - in - depth should an unexpected draining event occur.

n ECCS injection/spray subsystem is defined as either one of the three Low Pressure Coo l ant Injection (LPCI }

subsystems, one Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS } System, or one High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS } System.

The LPCI s ubsys t em and the LPCS Sys t em cons i st of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV ).

The HPCS System cons i sts of one motor dr i ven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression poo l or RC I C storage tank to the RPV.

Management o f gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem OPERABI LITY.

The LCO is modif i ed by a Note t hat al l ows a LPCI subsystem to be inoperabl e during a l ignment and operation for decay heat removal with reactor steam dome pressure less than t he residual heat removal cut - i n permissive pressure.

Th is is necessary since the RHR system is requ ired to operate in the shutdown coo l ing mode to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor, and manual realignment from the shutdown cooling mode to t he LPC I mode cou l d r esul t i n pump cavitation and voiding in the suction piping, resulting in the potential to damage the RHR system, inc l uding wat er hammer.

One LPC I s ubsystem is a l lowed to be considered inoperable for this temporar y period, because in s h ut down cooling mode it i s fu l fil l i ng a decay heat remova l capaci t y f unction.

At these low pressures and decay heat levels, a reduced compl e ment of ECCS s ubsystems should provide the required core cooling, thereb y a l lowi ng operation of RHR shutdown coo l ing when necessary.

Becau se of the restrictions on DRAIN TI ME, sufficient time wil l be available fo l lowi ng an unexpected dra i ning event to manua l ly align and operate t he re quired LPCI subsystem to maintain RPV wat er inventory prior t o the RPV water l eve l reach ing the TAF.

(continued}

B 3. 5-18 Revis i on No. ~

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY RPV Water Inventory Control B 3. 5. 2 "Instrumentation,"

RPV water inventory control is quired in MODES 4 and 5.

Requirements on water inventory ntro l in other MODES are "ECCS, RPV Water r-~c f'7;o~n~t~a~i=.;n:;-e~d~;;i.;;n-;--;L;C;..0

....s;__~

i

>...n Section 3. 3, Inetr1,1mgntat.ign, and other LCOs in ::>ection._).,,, EC.CS.,.- ~

.a.n.Q ~

~

I nugntgry Inventory Control, Cgntrgl RPV water inventory control is required to protect and RCIC System."

Safety Limit 2. 1. 1. 3 which is applicab l e whenever irradiated fuel is in t h e reactor vessel.

ACTIONS CLINTON A. 1 and B. 1 If the required ECCS injecti on/spray subsystem i s inoperable, it must be res t ored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

In this Condition, t he LCO controls on DRAIN TI ME minimize the possibility that an unexpected dra i ning event could necessitate the use of the ECCS injection/spray subsystem, however the defense - in-depth provided by the ECCS injection/spray subsystem is lost.

The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time for restoring the requ i red ECCS i njection/spray subsys t em to OPERABLE status is based on engineering judgment that considers the LCO controls on DRAIN TIME and the low probabil i ty of a an unexpected draining event that would result in a l oss of RPV water i nventory.

If the inoperable ECCS injection/spray subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, action must be initiated immedi ately to establish a method of water i njection capab le of operating without offsite electrical power.

The method of water injection includes the necessary ins t r umentation and control s, water sources, and pumps and va l ves needed to add water to the RPV or refueling cavi ty should an unexpected draining event occur.

The method of water injection may be manually operated and may consist of one or more systems or s ubsys t ems, and must be able to access water inventory capabl e of maintaining the RPV water level above the TAF for

~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

If recircu l ation of injected water would occur,

i t may be credited in determining the necessary water volume.

(continued)

B 3. 5-19 Revis i on No. ~

BASES ACTIONS Required Actions D.2, D.3, and D.4 are considered to be met when secondary containment, secondary containment penetrations, and the Standby Gas Treatment System are OPERABLE in accordance with LCO 3.6.4.1, LCO 3.6.4.2, and LCO 3.6.4.3.

CLINTON RPV Water Inventory Control B 3. 5. 2 0. 1, 0. 2, 0. 3, and 0. 4 (continued) operated and may consist of one or more additional method of water injection must be able to access water inventory capable of being injected to maintain the RPV water level above the TAF for ~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

The additional method of water injection and the ECCS injection/spray subsystem may share all or part of the same water sources.

If recirculation of injected water would occur, it may be credited in determining the required water volume.

Should a draining event lower the reactor coolant level to below the TAF, there is potential for damage to the reactor fuel cladding and release of radioactive material.

Additional actions are taken to ensure that radi oactive material will be contained, diluted, and processed prior to being released to the environment.

The secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products can be contained, diluted, and processed prior to release to the environment.

Required Action D. 2 requires that actions be immediately initiated to establish the secondary containment boundary.

With t he secondary containment boundary established, one SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment with respect to the environment.

The secondary containment penetratio automatically Or secondary containment boundary.

Req requires that actions be immediately i nitiated to verify that each secondary containment pen ation flow path is isolated or to verify that it can be manually isolated from the control room.

Examples of manual isolation from the control room coul d include the use of manual isolation pushbuttons, control switches, or placing a sufficient number of radiation monitor channels in trip.

A secondary containment penetration flow path can be considered isolated when one barrier in the flow path is in place.

Examples of suitable barriers include, but are not limited to, a closed secondary containment isolation damper (SCIO), a closed manual valve, a blind flange, or another sealing device that sufficiently seals the penetration flow path.

The primary containment upper personnel airlock and other primary containment penetrations that bypass secondary containment are considered part of the secondary containment boundary ;

therefore, they must be considered when completing this action.

One SGT subsystem is capable of maintaining the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filter gaseous releases.

Required Action 0. 4 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify that at least one SGT subsystem is capable of being placed in operation.

The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

(continued )

B 3. 5-22 Revision No. G-=6

BASES ACTIONS (continued}

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS closed and administratively controlled CLINTON E. 1 RPV Wate r Inventory Control B 3. 5. 2 If the Required Actions and associated Completion times of Conditions C or D are not met or if the DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, actions must be initiated immediately to restore the DRAIN TIME to 2 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

In this condi t ion,

there may be insufficient time to respond to an unexpected draining event to prevent the RPV water inventory from reaching the TAF.

Note that Required Actions D. 1, D. 2, D.3,

and D.4 are also applicable when DRAIN TIME is less t han 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

SR

3. 5.2. 1 This Surveillance verifies that the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF is 2 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

The period of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> is considered reasonable to identify and initiate act ion to mitigate draining of reactor coolant.

Loss of RPV water inventory that would result in the RPV wat er level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2. 1. 1. 3 and can be managed as part of normal plant operation.

The definition of DRAIN TIME states that realistic cross -

sectional areas and drain rates are used in the calculation.

A realistic drain rate may be determined using a single,

s t ep-wise, or integrated calculation considering the changing RPV water level during a draining event.

For a Control Rod RPV penetration flow path with the Control Rod Drive Mechanism removed and not replaced with a blan k flange, the realistic cross - sectional area is based on the control rod blade seated in the control rod guide tube.

If the control rod blade will be raised from the penetration to adjust or verify seating of the blade, the exposed cross -

sectional area of the RPV penetration flow path is used.

The definition of DRAIN TIME excludes from the calculation those penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system, or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are lggJrnd, sealed, e.+/-:- gtJ::ierFise semued -i+l-.tfi.e Gl esed i;w sit i eH,

blank flanges, or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths.

A blank flange or other bolted device must be connected with a sufficient number of bolts to prevent draining -i+l-.tfi.e ~

~ e.++

OperatiHg E-a-&i-& Earthg+iake.

Normal or expected leakage from closed systems or past isolation devices is permitted.

Determination that a system is intact and closed or isolated must consider the status of branch lines.a.HG eHgeiHg p-l.a.H.t.

maiHteH3.H8 e.a.HG t es tiHg a Gtiuities.

The Residual Heat Removal (RHR} Shutdown Cooling Syst em is only considered an intact closed system when misalignment (continued}

B 3. 5-23 Revi sion No. ~

BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.5. 2. 1 (continued)

RPV Water Inventory Control B 3. 5. 2 issues (Reference 6) have been precluded by functional valve interl ocks or by isola

~

~-~

temporary alterations in The exclusion of penetration fl w ~

from the j.......J::ie.t..e..r:ri:LJ....I:i..a.!~*~9 n of DRAIN TIME consider the pgtgntial support of maintenance effects m

.Q+/- initiating ~

.Q.f:l.

....--.!::::::==========~ -i-t.em.& guppgrting mainte n:rnce a.00 t e gting (rigging,

If reasonable controls are scaffolding, temporary shielding, p i ping plugs, gnubbe r implemented to prevent r

u failu re G-f. such.i-t.em&

,___ ___________ ____, ~

r e ettlt

~

a draining event from a closed temporary alterations from causing the effect of the temporary alterations on DRAIN TIME need not be considered.

Reasonable controls include, but are not limited to controls consistent with the guidance in NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision4, N UMARC 91-06, "Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management," or commitments to NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants."

CLINTON system or between the RPV and the isolation device,

pgngtratign.f..l.g.w p.a..t.A ~

f:l..9.t. w gxcl 1 g;lgg ~

~

~

calc11latign.

Surveillance Requirement 3. 0. 1 requires SRs to be m between performances.

Therefore, any changes in pl conditions that would change the DRAIN TIME require new DRAIN TIME be determined.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3. 5. 2. 2 and SR 3. 5. 2. 3 The minimum water level of 12 ft 8 inches required or the suppression pool is periodically verified to ensure that the suppression pool will provide adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) for the ECCS pump, recirculation volume, and vortex prevention.

With the suppression pool water level less than the required limit, the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable unless it is aligned to an OPERABLE RCIC storage tank.

With regard to suppression pool water level values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indicat i on instrumentation, t he specified limit is not considered to be a nominal value with respect to instrument uncertainties.

This requires additional margin to be added to the limit to compensate for instrument uncertainties, for implementation in the associated plant procedures (Ref. 2).

When the suppression pool level is < 12 f t 8 inches, the HPCS System is considered OPERABLE only if it can take suction from the RCIC storage tank and the RCIC storage tank (continued)

B 3. 5-24 Revi sion No. ~

BASES LCO (continued)

AC Sources -

Shutdown B 3. 8. 2 the ability to manually start a e l ectrical power s upport, assuming a loss of the o fsite circuit.

Simi l arly, when the high pressure core s ray (HPCS ) is required to be OPERABLE, a separate offs ' te circuit to the Di vision 3 Class lE onsite electri c l power distribution subsystem, or an OPERABLE Division 3 G, ensure an addi t i ona l sour ce o f powe r f o r the HPCS.

Toget e r,

OPERABI LITY of the required offsite c i rcuit (s ) an DG (s )

ll.5e::..!n.!s~u~res:.:::Su---:;:)'il" 9 Aatt:r 9 the availability o f s ufficient AC sources to operate the p l ant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of pos t ulated events during shutdown (e. g., fue l handling accidents ).

CLINTON The qualified offsite circui t (s ) must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and vo l tage whi l e connect ed to their respective ESF bus (es ), and accepting required loads during an accident.

Qualifi ed offsite circuits are t hose that are described in the USAR and are part of t he licens i ng basis for the plant.

The offsite circuit consists of incoming breaker and disconnect to the respective reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) or emergency reserve auxiliary t r ans f o r mer (ERAT ), and the respect i ve c ircui t path including feeder breakers t o all 4. 16 kV ESF buses required by LCO 3. 8. 10.

I n addition, an onsite, permanent l y instal led static VAR compensator (SVC ) is availab l e for connect ion to the offsite c i rcuits to s upport required vol t age for t he ESF busses.

Connecti on of the SVC to the offsite circuit i s via circuit breakers to t he secondary side of the RAT and/or ERAT.

Connect ion and operation of the SVC (s ) is dictated by the existing need for voltage support of t he offsite electrical power source (s ) based on prevailing grid conditions.

Thus,

OPERABILITY of the offsite electrical power source (s ) is norma l ly supported by, but i s not necessari l y dependent on,

connection and operation of the SVC (s ).

The resu l tant i mpact on OPERABI LI TY of t he offs i te e l ectrical sour ce (s )

from disconnecting the SVC (s ) from the offsite circuit (s )

can be determined by analysis based on u se of an established model of the o f fsite transmi ssion network and existing grid conditions, including available generating sources, which can be updated on a dai l y or more frequen t bas i s.

The mode l provides the capability to predict or determine what the onsite voltages would be at the RAT and/or ERAT (while connected to the offsite electrical sources ) under maximum postu l ated load conditions.

(continued )

B 3. 8-35 Revi sion No. ~

BASES LCO (continued)

APPLICABILITY CLI NTON AC Sources~Shutdown B 3. 8. 2 being manually started The required DG must be capable of etartiHg, accelerating to rated speed and vo l tage, and connecti ng to its respective ESF bus ~ 9ete,-;ti9H Q..f. ~

tiA90P'91Lige, and accepting required loads.

~

2:Qr;;_{PQAQQ ffit.1-8-t-b. :;i,-;,-;gmpl igl:J.gg Hitl:l.i H

-+/-- 2:8Q9Hda EaGR-JdG ffit.1-8-t-a-l-8-G-be-,-;apablg Q..f. a,-;,-;eptiHg r eqtiire9 ~

u i tl:l.i A -t-RB-aggi;ime9 l oa9 i Hg 2eqtieA>Je iHtOP'ale, 6-A-d ffit.1-8-t- >J9AtiAtie -t-9 gperate tl-H-t-i-l-gff2ite pG-We-r-

~

~ regtgre9 -t-9 -t-RB- ~

bi;ises

~

,-;apabi l itieg.a-r reqi;iire9 -t-9 ~ m.t..f..r.m.eo " ariety Q..f. iAitial Q9A9iti9Ae ~

.a-g.+.

JdG.H:+ ataA9by.w-i-t-l:+/-.t.J:+/-. @AgiAQ ~

6-A-d JdG.H:+ ataH9by

.w-i-t4+.t-l:J..@ @HgiHe a..t; eimbi@Ht Q9A9iti9Aa Additi9Aal JdG

,-;apabilitieg ffit.1-8-t-

&!- dem9Aatrated -t-9 H\\B-t-reqti i red

£tiP'eillaA>Jeg, e--.-g-.-,,-;apability Q..f. -t-RB-JdG -t-9 re" ert -t-9 staAdby 2tati;ig ~

-e>H ECC£- 2igAal wh-i-1-e-gperatiAg.H:+ paral lel

.t-e-s-t. ~

Prgpgr geqneA>JiHg Q..f. l9a9a 1 iA>Jln9iAg trippiAg Q..f.

AQAOaaeHtieil lgagg,

.i..e..eo reqi;iire9 ftiA>Jti9A ~

JdG Qpgg llJH I. ITY I t is acceptabl e for divis i ons to be cross t i ed during shutdown conditions, permitting a s i ngl e offsite power circuit to supply all required AC e l ectrical power distribution subsystems.

No fast transfer capabi l ity is required for off site circuits to be considered OPERABLE for this LCO.

As described in Applicable Safety Analyses, in the event of an accident during shutdown, the TS are designed to maintain the p l ant in a condition s uch that, e¥ef+ :w-i-t-A, ~ siAgle faili;ire, the p l ant will not be in immediate difficulty.

The AC sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies i n the primary or secondary containment provide assurance that :

a.

Systems that provide core cooling are ava i lable ;

b.

Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are availab l e ;

(continued )

B 3. 8-36 Revi sion No. G-=6

BASES ACTIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.1.7, SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.12, SR 3.8.1.13, SR 3.8.1.15, SR 3.8.1.18, and SR 3.8.1.19 are not required to be met because DG start and load within a specified time and response on an offsite power or ECCS initiation signal is not required.

lwhich precludes REFERENCES CLINTON C. 1 (continued )

AC Sources ~ Shutdown B 3. 8. 2 additional required AC source is inoperable, and power is s t ill supplied to HPCS, 72 hou rs is a l lowed to restore the additional required AC source to OPERABLE.

This is reasonabl e cons i deri ng HPCS will still pe r fo r m i ts funct i on,

absent an additional singl e failure.

SR 3. 8. 2. 1 SR 3. 8. 2. 1 requires the SRs from LCO 3. 8. 1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in o t her tha~MODES 1, 2, and 3.

SR 3. 8.1. 8 is not requ ired to be met sin e only one offsite circuit is required to be OPERABLE.

In MODES 4 and 5 ECCS injection/spray subsystems are manually controlled in accordance with LCO 3. 5. 2,

"Reactor Pressure Vesse l (RPV) Water I nventory Control."

No ECCS initiation signals are credited for initiation of these subsystems.

Adequate time is availab l e to manually start and load DGs from the Main Control Room in support of RPV inventory control, if required.

Therefore, SR 3. 8. 1. 12 and SR 3. 8. 1. 19, which verify the DG ' s capability to start automatically on actual or simulated ECCS initi ation signal s, are not required to be met i n MODES 4 and 5.

SR 3. 8. 1. 17 is not required to be met because the required OPERABLE DG (s ) is not required to undergo periods of being synchronized to the offsite circuit.

SR 3. 8. 1.20 is excepted because starting i ndependence is not required with the DG (s ) that is not required to be OPERABLE.

Refer to the corresponding Bases for LCO 3. 8. 1 for a discussion of each

<;: P' This SR is modified by a Note~~~

reasgn ~

.t.fte. ~

~

.t.G preclYde requiring the OPERABLE DG (s ) from being paral l eled with the offsite power network or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs, and preclude de - energizing a required 4.1 6 kV ESF bus or disconnecting a requ ired offsite circuit during performance of SRs.

With l imited AC sources available, a single event could compromise both the required circuit and the DG.

I t is the intent that these SRs must sti l l be capable of being met, but actua l performance is not required for any DG or offsite circuit.

None.

B 3. 8-39 Revi sion No. ~