ML20247L502

Fowards Comments on Proposed Rule Entitled, Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel in NRC-Approved Storage Casks at Civilian Nuclear Power Reactor Sites. Summary of Comments Listed

ML20247L502
Person / Time
Issue date:	04/08/1988
From:	Burnett R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:	Morris B NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES)
Shared Package
ML20245D207	List: ML20245D205 ML20245D472 ML20245D561 ML20245D566 ML20245D977 ML20245E125 ML20245E904 ML20247K937 ML20247L030 ML20247L067 ML20247L214 ML20247L223 ML20247L235 ML20247L283 ML20247L319 ML20247L363 ML20247L441 ML20247L464 ML20247L482 ML20247L502 ML20247L540 ML20247L553 ML20247L585 ML20247L615 ML20247L703 ML20247L716 ML20247L762 ML20247L768 ML20247L784 ML20247L795 ML20247L820
References
FRN-54FR19379, RULE-PR-170, RULE-PR-50, RULE-PR-72 AC76-1-13, NUDOCS 8906020187
Download: ML20247L502 (11)

Text

_

. s. . ~ Jter n q u

, ./ 'e UNITED STATES #-

[' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AC% -/ pt

• : E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

....+ $ 99 ,

MEMORANDUM FOR: Bill H. Morris, Director Division of Regulatory Applications, RES *

,FROM: Robert F. Burnett, Director Division of Safeguards and. Transportation, NMSS

SUBJECT:

PROPOSED RULE " STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL IN NRC APPROVED STORAGE CASKS AT CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR SITES" In response to your memorandum of March 1, we have reviewed the subject pro-posed rule. In accordance with prior coordination with W. Pearson of your staff, we are" furnishing in the enclosure suggested discussion and proposed rule modifications to address the safeguards aspects of the rulemaking.

In the enclosure, item 1 is the safeguards discussion for the statement of con-siderations. Although the RES draft calls for it to be inserted in the

" Proposed Rule" section, we believe it should be placed at the end of the

" Discussion" section.

Item 2 directs the reader to appropriate material control and accounting (MC&A) requirements in Part 74, where all MC&A requirements are being consolidated.

Item 3 is suggested wording to exempt a dry cask storage licensee from inappro-priate requirements of Part 73.

l. Items 4 and 5 set forth proposed Part 73 physical protection requirements for l independent storage of spent fuel at reactor sites.

l Item 6 contains the proposed MC&A requirements for insertion in Part 74.

1 Item 7 lists the safeguards cost impacts for use in the regulatory analysis.

We are coordinating the proposed modifications with the NRR staff.

pt4ob F. B ett, Dire or v Di ion o afeguards and Transportation, NMSS I

Enclosure:

As stated cc: J. G. Partlow, NRR 8906020187 890526 Y') l PDR PR PDR _

50 54FR19379 7_

L _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

, . v . ,

L l

l SGTR COPMENTS ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR PART-72 AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO OTHER PARTS

1. We.suggest that the following material be a continuation of your pre-sent." Discussion" section in the statement of considerations. Basically the material provides the rational for why the safeguards component of dry

, storage.can'be regulated through a general license approach.

Irradiated fuel removed from light water reactors contains low enriched uranium, fission products, plutonium, and other transuranic. Owing to the .special nuclear material in spent fuel, safeguards for an independent spent fuel storage. installation must protect against theft and radiologi-  ;

cal sabotage,.and must provide for material accountability.

The theft issue arises principally from the plutonium component of the spent fuel. Plutonium, when separated from other substances, can be used in the. construction of a nuclear explosive device and therefore must be provided with a high level of physical protection. However, the plutonium contained in spent nuclear fuel. is not readily separable from the highly radioactive fission products and transuranic and for that M son is not considered a' highly attractive material for theft. Moreover, the massive construction of casks and fixed dry vaults significantly complicates theft scenarios. For these reasons no specific safeguards measures to protect against theft are proposed other than maintaining accounting records and conducting periodic inventories of the special nuclear material contained in the spent fuel.

Safeguards measures to protect against sabotage should be consistent with the probability and consequences of radiological sabotage. The term

" radiological sabotage" is defined in 10 CFR Part 73 and means any deli-berate act directed against a plant or transport in which an activity l licensed pursuant to NRC regulations is conducted, or against a component of such a plant or transport which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

In assessing the probability and consequences of radiological sabotage, the NRC considers: (1) the threat to storage facilities; (2) the response of typical storage casks or vaults and their contained spent fuel to postu-lated acts of radiological sabotage; and (3) the public health consequences of acts of radiological sabotage.

i l

i

\

1

m -

The NRC has carried out studies to develop information about possible ad-

,versary. groups which might pose a threat to licensed nuclear facilities.-

The itudies:are entitled Generic Adversary Characteristics Sumary Report

.(NUREG-0459) and Potential Threat To Licensed Nuclear Activities From Insiders (NUREG-0703). Actions against facilities were found to be limit-ed to a number of low consequence activities and-harassments such'as hoax.

bomb threats, vandalism, radiopharmaceutical thef ts, and fireanns discharges.

The list of-actions is continually updated in a report entitled Safeguards Sumary Event List (NUREG-0525). None'of the actions has affected spent fuel containment and none-has caused any radiological health hazard. i In addition, the NRC staff regularly consults with law enforcement agen-cies and intelligence gathering agencies to obtain their views concerning the possible existence of adversary groups interested in radiological sabotage of commercial nuclear facilities. None of the information the staff has collected to date confirms the presence of an identifiable domes-tic threat to dry storage facilities or to other components of nuclear 1

facilities.

Despite the. absence of an identified domestic threat the NRC has consider '

~

ed it prudent to study the resistance of loaded storage casks to~ a range of sabotage scenarios.' The study report is classified. However, an overview of the study and the conclusions are provided in the paragraphs below.

Being highly radioactive, spent fuel requires heavy shielding.for safe-s torage. Typical movable storage casks are of metal or concrete, weigh 100 tons, and have wall thickness from 10 to 16 inches of metal or 30

. inches of concrete. Storage might also be in fixed, above-ground vaults of steel and concrete of dimensions comparable to or greater than those of movable casks. In either case the structural materials and dimensions enable the casks and vaults to withstand attack by small arms fire, pyro-technics ~, mechanical aids, high velocity objects, and most forms of explo-

.sives without release of spent fuel, i

The consequences to the public health offsite would stem almost exclusive-ly from that fraction of the release that is composed of respirable parti-cles, meaning those having a diameter of 4 microns or less. In the NRC i

study an experiment was carried out to evaluate the effects of a very severe, perfectly executed explosive sabotage scenario against a simulated 2

- . . . . . . . . - . . - . _ . . _ . _ . _ . - _ - ~_.-______ -_.-._ __._._.- __- - _ _ _ -

. m ,

~

e storage cask containing'unirradiated fuel assemblies. The amount of fuel disrupted was measured. The fraction of disrupted material of respirable 4

dimensions _(0.005%)had-beenestablishedinapreviousexperiment.-From thir information an estimate of. the airborne, respirable release was made

'and dose as a function of range and other variables was calculated. In a

-typical situation, for an individual at the boundary of the reactor site (taken as 100 meters from.the location of the release) and in the center

!- '.of.the airborne ~ plume. the whole-body dose was. calculated-to be 1 rem and D

the 50-year dose _to the lung (the most sensitive organ) was calculated to

.be 2 rem. Doses higher or lower can be. obtained-depending on the vari-

' ables used in the calculation. Variables include the meterological. con-ditions, the age and burnup of~ fuel..the heat-induced buoyancy of_the air-borne release, the range to the affected individual,'and the explosive scenario assumed.

Although the experiment and calculations carried out lead to a conclusion of. low public health consequences, there are limitations that must be ,

taken into account. -In particular, consequence modeling assumptions more '

severe than those used.in'the foregoing. calculation are possible if uncon-strained sabotage' resources or protracted loss of control of the storage.

site are allowed. For that reason protection requirements are proposed to providefor(1) early detection of malevolent moves against 'a ~ storage site, and (2)' a.means to quickly summon response resources to assure against protracted loss of control of a site. i l

The proposed requirements comprise a subset of the overall protection .

requirements currently in force at every operating nuclear power reactor.

Inasmuch as the security force at each reactor is thoroughly familiar with requirements similar to those proposed and has years of experience in carrying them out, the NRC. concludes that the requirements can be success-fully imposed through a general license for storage of spent fuel in NRC approved casks without the need for advance NRC review and approval of a physical security plan or other site-specific document before the reactor licensee implements the requirements.

Material control and accounting (MC&A) requirements are designed to pro-tect against the undetected loss of the special nuclear material in spe't n fuel by maintaining vigilance over the material, tracking its movement and location, monitoring its inventory status, maintaining records' of all transactions and movements, and issuing reports of its status at the time of physical inventory. Requirements for MC&A similar to those proposed herein have been applied to power reactors, to spent fuel storage at inde-pendent spent fuel storage installations, and to operations at certain other classes of fuel cycle facilities without requiring the licensee to submit a plan to document how compliance will be achieved. In these situa-tions the requirements have been found to be sufficient. For these reasons, it is concluded that the MC&A requirements for the dry fuel storage at power reactors can be handled under a general license.

2. In 572.51, a new paragraph (e) is added to read as follows:

672.51 Material balance, inventory, and records requirements for stored materials.

1 3 i 1

4 a

(e) In lieu of following the requirements of paragraphs (a) through (d) of tEs section, a licensee who holds a general license under 10 CFR 72 (b)(2) or who is applying for a specific license under other sections of Part 72 to store spent. fuel at an independent spent fuel storage installa-tion within the exclusion area (as defined in Part 100) of a nuclear power reactor shall follow the material control and accounting requirements in section 74.61 of 10 CFR Part 74 for special nuclear material in spent fuel stored in NRC approved dry storage modules.

3. In 073.6 add a new paragraph such as that set forth below which will ex-empt a general licensee from inappropriate sections of Part 73. Also, 973.6 should be revised to assign a letter reference (ie., (a),(b)...(z))

to each paragraph. The new paragraph would read:

A licensee is exempt from the requirements of $573.20, 73.25, 73.26, i 73.27,73.37,73.40,73.45,73.46,73.50(a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(g),and(h),

73.55, 73.60, 73.67, 73.70, 73.72, 73.73 and 73.74 for spent fuel subject to 973.53.

4. Add a new 573.53 as follows:

973.53 Requirements for physical protection of spent fuel in independent NRC-approved storage structures at licensed nuclear power reac-tor sites.

Alicenseewhoholdsagenerallicenseunder10CFR72.6(b)(2) or who is applying for a specific license under other sections j of Part 72 to store spent fuel at an independent spent fuel l storage installation within the exclusion area (as defined in Part 100) of a nuclear power reactor shall establish and maintain a physical protection system that will minimize the possibilities  ;

for radiological sabotage of the fuel. The protection system '

shall provide for a security organization, physical barriers, access controls, communication capabilities, testing and main-  ;

l tenance, and response and escort capabilities as follows:

(a) Physical security organization.

(1) A security organization, which may be the security organization that serves the collocated reactor, shall be established to protect spent. fuel in the installa-tion against radiological sabotage.

(2) If the security organization that serves the collocated reactor is used, the organization shall be staffed to simultaneously carry out the requirements of this sec-tion 73.53 and those of paragraph 73.55(h)(3).

4 i

(3): At least one supervisor of_the security organization shall be 'at the ~ reactor or ~within the- reactor exclusion area at all times.  ;

(4).. Written security procedures which document the structure of-E the security organization and which detail the duties of, individuals responsible for security shall be established, maintained, and followed.

(5); An individual acting'as member of the security organiza-tion shall have been trained, equipped, and qualified to

. perform each assigned security duty in accordance with Appendix B, General: Criteria for Security Personnel," of this-Part. Upon the request of an authorized.representa-tive of the Connission the' licensee shall demonstrate the ability of the physical security personnel to carry out their: assigned duties and responsibilities. Each member.

of the security organization shall .requalify in accordance with Appendix B of this Part at'least every 12 months. The requalification shall be documented.

(6) Each guard and armed response person shall qualify and requal-ify annually for night firing in accordance with the criteria

.of Appendix G of this'Part, using all' assigned weapons. The licensee or the licensee's agent shall. document the results:

of weapons qualifications and requalification for night firing.

The licensee shall retain the documentation of each qualifica-tion and requalification as a record for three years after. each' qualification and requalification.

(b) Physical barrier.

(1) Casks or other structures containing spent. fuel shall be located within a protected area such that access to casks requires passage through at least one physical barrier.

(2) At'several randomly selected times each day, security per-sonnel shall check the perimeter of the protected area for unauthorized persons, vehicles, and activities.

(3) An isolation zone shall be maintained along both the inner  ;

and outer perimeter of the protected area.

1 (4) No protected area or isolation zone shall be used as a '

parking area.

(5) Isolation zones shall be illuminated to a level sufficient for checking as required by paragraph (b)(2) of this section,  ;

but not less than 0.2 foot candles.

5

,f-

' .'(c)'? Access requirements.'

(1); All points of. personnel and vehicle access inte. a protected .

'areaLused for' storage of spent-fuel in casks or-other structures.shall be controlled. Personnel-and vehicles shall.be. identified and authorization.to enter shall be-ver.ified at.the control points prior to' entry.-

.(2) All packages being delivered into the ' protected area shall-be; checked for proper. identification'and authorization.

(3) i A picture badge. identification system shall be used for all individuals who'are authorized access to_the protected area without escort.

(4) Access.to the protected area shall be limited to individ-uals who~ require such access.to perform their duties. .

(5) When unoccupied, the protected area.shall be locked and

_ . protected by a volumetric' intrusion-alarm system. The system shall be segmented so that gates are served separately from

i. :other barrier segments. While a gate is open only the alarm segment serving.that gate shall be deactivated and all'other alarm segments shall remain activated.

(6) Individuals not employed by the licensee (1) shall'be es :

corted by a watchman, or other individual designated by-the-licensee,whileintheprotected-areaand(ii)'shall be. badged'to indicate that an escort is required..

(7) No vehicles used primarily for the conveyance of individu-als shall be permitted within the protected area except under emergency conditions.

(8) All keys, locks, combinations, and related access' control devices used to control access to the protected area must be controlled to redur.e the probability of compromise.

All'such keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices must be changed or rotated at least every 12 months. Whenever there is evidence or suspicion that h any key, lock, combination, or related access control device may have been compromised, it must be changed or rotated. The licensee shall issue keys, locks, combina-tions,:and other access control devices to the protected area only to persons granted unescorted access to the storage _ facility. Whenever an individual's unescorted l; access is revoked due to his or her lack of trustworthy-(

ness, reliability, or inadequate work performance, keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices to which that person had access must be changed or rotated.

6  !

I

/ i

(- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

f L (d) Detection aids, t

(1) Thealarmsrequiredbyparagraph(c)(5)ofthis'sectionsh'all. U terminate in the central _and secondary alarm stations that serve the collocated reactor.

.(2)_ All' alarm devices including' transmission lines to annucia-

' tors shall be tamper indicating and self-checking e.g., an automatic indication is provided when failure'of the alarm system or a component occurs, or when the system is on stand-by power. The annunciation of an alarm at the alarm stations shall indicate the location (barrier segment) served by the alarm.

(e)' Communication ' requirements.

Each member of the security organiz'ation carrying out the pro-visions of this section shall be capable of maintaining contin-uous communication with an individual in the central. alarm station that serves the collocated reactor, who shall be capable of call-ing for assistance from other guards.and watchmen and from local law enforcement authorities.

(f) Testing and maintenance.

Intrusion alarms, communications equipment, physical barriers, and other security-related devices or equipment utilized pur-suant to this section shall be tested and maintained in accor-dancewithparagraphs73.50(g)(1),(2)and(3).

(g) Response requirement.

(1) The licensee shall have a safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats and radiological sabotage related to the spent fuel which is subject to the provisions of this section. The plan shall be in accordance with the criteria in Appendix C of this Part, " Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans."

(2) Upon detection of abnormal presence or activity of persons or vehicles within an isolation zone or protected area of a storage installation or upon evidence or indication of intrusion into the protected area the licensee security organization shall:

i) Determine whether or not a threat exists, ii) Assess the extent of the threat, if any, and iii) Take immediate concurrent measures to respond to the threat by:

(A) Requiring responding guards to interpose themselves between the protected area and any. adversary attempt-ing entry for the purpose of radiological sabotage and,

'l 7

i

f f.m (B) Informing local. law-enforcement agencies of the threat and. requesting assistance.

~

-(3) The licensee.shall instruct every guard to prevent or-im-pede' attempted acts of radiological sabotage by using force sufficient to counter-the, force directed at him'1ncluding deadly force when the guard has a reasonable belief-it'is

, necessary in'self-defense orLin the defense of others.-

c (h) Spent fuel movements..

e

,J 'A guard or watchman shall escort _

-during movement.between the cated collo.each' reactorcask containing and the storage spent fuel installation.

5. - In Part 73, add a new Appendix.G as follows:- [Seeseparatepage]

6. In Part 74, a new section 74.61 is added to read as follows:

674.61 Spent reactor fuel storage -in dry storage modules.

~

(a)' Scope. This section contains.the material control and accounting.

requirements for the special nuclear material.in spent reactor fuel as long as the material remains in an NRC-approved, tamper-safe dry storage module.

.(b)_ General recordkeepinc . Each licensee shall keep records showing the

= receipt, inventory (inclucing location), disposal, acquisition, storage, and transfer of the special-nuclear material content of all spent fuel.

The records must include as a minimum the name of shipper of the material to the facility, the quantity of special nuclear material per item, item identification, seal number (if applicable), and location. Except as re-

' quired in paragraph (c) of this section, these records must be retained for as-long as-the material is possessed and for a period of five years after the material is disposed of or transferred off site.

(c).Physicalinventory.-.Eachlicenseeshallconductaphysicalinventory j of the spent fuel.in storage at intervals not to exceed 12 months unless otherwise directed by the Commission. The licensee shall retain a copy of the inventories and the results of the inventory record for three years.

i

-(d) Procedures. Each licensee shall establish, maintain,.and follow '

. written material control and accounting procedures that are sufficient to enable the. licensee to account for the material. The licensee shall re-tain a copy of-the material control and accounting procedures while they are current and for three years after being superseded.

(e).Duplicationofrecords. Pecords of material possessed must be kept  !

'in duplicate. The duplicate set of records must be kept at a location separate and sufficiently remote from the original records that a single ,

event would not destroy both sets of records. Records of spent fuel '

transferred out of a facility must be preserved for a period of five years after the date of transfer from the facility.

8 1

(f) Material status reports. Each licensee shall comply with the appli-cable requirements in 974.13 or 675.35.

(g) ~Euclear material transfer reports. Each licensee shall comply with the applicable requirements in 974.15 or 675.34 with the exception that the independent measurements in paragraph 74.15(b) or paragraph 75.34(a) are not required.

7. The following cost estimates are _for your use in Section 4.2.3 of the regulatory analysis where cost impacts on industry are set forth.

COST TO INDUSTRY OF SAFEGUARDS MEASURES l-Security Organization No New Costs Physical Barriers $5/ foot x 850 feet = $4250 Illumination 8 poles x $1100/ pole = $8800 l Access Controls No New Cost  !

Detection Aids $3200/ system x 6 systems = $19,200 Communications No New Cost Testing & Maintenance $1,300 Annually i Response Capability No New Cost Material Control & Accountability No New Cost i

1 l

9

dd j n en t o du r g d p aod - o Ngle na ut l

a o

e ~w a

e orn l d

1 l

a vdnsg ni tp rp oe ps de en r d edure nee d ul eoe

p n ul dk a n n

_ e3u- u Werfk os noin dre a n e3k e sai s

e l cg l - ggg r n l n1t - l e aio h edid o n eI wfft s ttel e cis r cil e 1

1 od id d ften 1 snspnssfn e freo wl aea ueu uduonr: a d t anr oene r:

GDNisded A

L thlkl re arh6h r

t rt rir ruadg otnn l a t e eo sn55 kp E

d.t nwnw t t ofo p ond h -

/

g/g aeaW2rrei R s gi gi p

/ d2pnn t - - nn I t a oa i ggii e.

I

- C - - i i tnt oetct w n ndl I dtdt aia l ra s iine T nrnr o nei n t ddae l

ba c aaaa 1

5 0 Nhetttt e r

ssss t pt e rf t o t

r a

r a- -

2 r

a-r n nt n a a ask t t u o

P Uc 3 6 S S t

S t

Tt s s55 l l

A X a I -

X 1 t

XX1 R 32/. /. o E /. /. c e sc n T cc e s I ee ss s

5 X X X XX XX i

1 1 1 11 11 t R 5 4 C G G 592 / /. /. /. /. /. /. /. hg N N ///

ss s s c c e es c

e cc cc i I

dd d d

r s s ee ee ss ss l

N I M rr r yl G O R I

T 2 0 5 5 0500 a I I 236 1 3 4 1 5555 d X TF g t n

I A i D r C T u N I H g

d d

- E F G .

u ss ss t P I I l gggg n e

P L N 0 s aa aa L 3 k k mm mm L m A A A T c v u c d e

E T dddd A

T p

i i U R O rr rr u T 8 B l O O q Q O / iO 00 f i

T SSSS T e F S D r = - - - - = nd M N 66 6 2 1 3 3

3 9 2222 0 ol U 0 0 4 i u t o M l i

f a

I l u

N m)

_ I M E C

N ss s s

s s

s ss ss i .

s t e dd d d d d d dd dd h A yyy y y y y yy yy g T i r S 377 5 7 5 5 n I 5555 D 1 1 2 2222 f a ol e

s U

E G 123 4 1 2 3 1234 .

A t T h s

- S g e

- ,g i c n i t e a d l

T 7 ,

y E 7 7 2

- 2 l G 2 - n i R - - 8 B 8 o t A

T e g

~

d n i o

- - - - - - ei et ot et ot eiot b f

- tdto tdto tdto o i n o i n o in o GN Sotf sotf sotf t e I Co n2 co co s T d eg d eg n2 deg n2 i

- {

s Q t n- t n- s t n- s g t I ai de ai de ai de n i L l tsel l tsel l tsel .

i s uhned uh ned uhned r mgocn ngocn ngocn i f iiixa iiixa iiixa SLtec Sltec Sl tec f o l

l A U

_ N N

_ U U E N G G L E

O D T F

- P N O I T

- A A H R O E H S N W

,' l'