ML20247H896

Proposed Tech Specs Clarifying Requirement to Test Thermal Overload Protection & Bypass Devices Normally in Force During Plant Operation & Bypassed Under Accident Conditions

ML20247H896
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	05/25/1989
From:	TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20247H894	List: ML20247H888 ML20247H896
References
NUDOCS 8905310361
Download: ML20247H896 (10)

Text

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS e

'R37 MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION I

j.lMITING CONDITIDN FOR OPERATION 3.8.3.2 The thermal overload protection devices, integral with the motor starter, of each valve listed in Table 3.8-2 shall be OPERABLE. R37 1

APPLICABILITY: Whenever the motor operated valve is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

With one or more of the thermal overload protection devices inoperable, declare j the affected valve (s) inoperable and apply the ACTION Statement to the affected valve (s). lR37 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i 4.8.3.2 The above required thermal overload protection devices shall be demonstrated OPEkABLE:

a. At least once per.18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRA-TION of a representative sample of at least 25% of all thermal overload devices which are not bypassed, such that each non-bypassed ,

device is celibrated at least once per 6 years.

I I

h . A k leas + cnce per 18 muHhs, by the performa nce d o CH ANNE L. F'ONC.TIONAL. TEST ef +he, by pars circui*y for 4ho se thermal avenla2d de vices which ct re. normally in force op erakton an d by pa ssed un der during lp lo a cC. ci c n +

n+

condi+ ions .

8905320361 890525 "7 PDR ADOCK 05000327'

. P PNV SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 8-17 R84 Amendment No. 77/ PO August 16, 1988

TABLE 3.8-2 (Continued)

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION Valve No. Function I 1-FCV-1-15 Stm Supply to Aux FWP turbine R65 1-FCV-1-16 Stm Supply to Aux FWP turoine 1-FCV-1-17 Stm Supply to Aux FWP turbine 1-FCV-1-18 Stm Supply to Aux FWP turbine 1-FCV-1-51 1-FCV-62-138 TDAFW Pump Trip and Thrcttle Valve Safe Shutoown Redundancy (CVCS) y[Sj((] jj lR84 1-FCV-63-1 ECCS Operation 1-FCV-63-3 ff Pump Mini-flow 1-FCV-63-4 SI Pump Mini-flow 1-FCV-63-5 ECCS Flow Path 1-FCV-63-6 ECCS Operation 1-FCV-63-7 ECCS Operation 1-FCV-63-8 ECCS Flow Path 1-FCV-63-11 ECCS Flow Path 1-FCV-63-22 ECCS Flow Path 1-FCV-63-47 Train Isolation 1-FCV-63-48 Train Isolation 1-FCV-63-72 ECCS Flow Path from Cont. Sump 1-FCV-63-73 ECCS Flow Path from Cont. Sump 1-FCV-63-93 ECCS Cooldown Flow Path 1-FCV-63-94 ECCS Cooldown Flow Path R65 1-FCV-63-152 ECCS Recirc 1-FCV-63-153 ECCS Recirc 1-FCV-63-156 ECCS Flow Path j 1-FCV-63-157 ECCS Flow Path 1-FCV-63-172 ECCS Flow Path 1-FCV-63-175 SI Pump Mini-flow '

1-FCV-67-123 CSS Ht Ex Supply 1-FCV-67-124 CSS Ht Ex Discharge 1-FCV-67-125 CSS Ht Ex Supply 1-FCV-67-126 CSS ht Ex Discharge 1-FCV-67-146 CCW Ht Ex Throttling 0-FCV-67-205* lurb Bldg Hdr Isolation 0-FCV-67-208* Turb Bldg Hdr Isolation 1-FCV-68-332 Pressurizer PORV Block Valve 1-FCV-68-333 Pressurizer PORV Block Valve R84 0-FCV-70-1* SFPCS Hx Throttle 0-FCV-70-11* SFPCS Hx Throttle 1-FCV-70-153 RHR Ux Outlet Isolation 1-FCV-70-156 RHR Hx Outlet Isolation 0-FCV-70-193* SFPCS Hdr Isolation 0-FCV-70-194* SFPCS Hdr isclation 0-FCV-70-197* SFPCS Hdr Isolation 0-FCV-70-198* SFPCS Hdr Isolation 0-FCV-70-206* CDW: Isolation R65

• Common for Units 1 and 2 i

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 8-18 Amendment No. $7//(V 80 R84 August 16, 1988 1

TABLE 3.8-2 (Continued)

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTI

-}'alve No- Function F ro- W- C 1-FCV-70-2074 COWE Throttle i 4>0-FCV-70-208*

1-FCV-72-20 CDWE Isolation Cont. Spray Pump Suction

]

1-FCV-72-21 Cont. Spray Pump Suction l 1-FCV-72-22 i Cont. Spray Pump Suction i i 1-FCV-72-23 Cont. Spray Pump Suction 1-FCV-72-40 RHR Cont. Spray Isol.

1-FCV-72-41 RHR Cont. Spray Isol.

1-FCV-74-1 1 1-FCV-74-2 Open for Normal Plant Cooldown '

1-FCV-74-3 Open for Normal Plant Cooldown ECCS Operation '

1-FCV-74-21 ECCS Operation 1 1-FCV-74-33 ECCS Operation 1-FCV-74-35 ECCS Operation i

R65 i i f

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'SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 8-19 Amendment No. /J'4'/gy1 f0 R84 August 16, 1988

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I ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION g; l

g 41 TING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 348.3.2 The thermal overload protection devices, integral with the motor

R._

starter, of each valve listed in Table 3.8-2 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever the motor operated valve is required to be OPERABLE.

s ACTION:

With one or more of the thermal overload protection devices inoperable, declare the affected valve (s) inoperable and apply the ACTION Statement to the affected R25 valve (s).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.3.2 The above required thermal overload protection devices shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL ,

CALIBRATION of a representative sample of at least 25% of all thermal overload devices which are not bypassed, such that each non-bypassed device is calibrated at least once per 6 years.

R2!

b. A + leas 4 on ce per 18 rnon4hs, by the per formance of a C H A N N E L. F uNCT~l ON A L TEST ~ of the hypos.S circuHry for 4hase therrna } overload dences wh%

normal 13n f'orce dcr ct rc. i plan + o p e r Q. b m and bypa ssed under a ca clen + condi1'icns.

AmendmentNo./f/71 R71 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 8-18 2 August 16, 1988

.* l

. 1 TABLE 3.8-2 (Continued)

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION I

Valve No. Function '

2-FCV-1-15 .Stm Supply to Aux FWP turbine R53 2-FCV-1-16 Stm Supply to Aux FWP turbine 2-FCV-1-17 Stm Supply to Aux FWP turbine i 2-FCV-1-18 j Stm Supply to Aux FWP turbine '

2-FCV-1-51 l R71 2-FCV-62-138 TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve (p]7lj cj[fm) j Safe Shutdown Redundancy (CVCS) 2-FCV-63-1 ECCS Operation 2-FCV-63-3 SI Pump Mini-flow 2-FCV-63-4 SI Pump Mini-flow ,

2-FCV-63-5 ECCS Flow Path 2-FCV-63-6 ECCS Operation 2-FCV-63-7 EJCS Operation 2-FCV-63-8 ECCS Flow Path 2-FCV-63-11 ECCS Flow Path 2-FCV-63-22 ECCS Flow Path 2-FCV-63-47 Train Isolation -

2-FCV-63-48 Train Isolation l 2-FCV-63-72 ECCS Flow Path from Cont. Sump 2-FCV-63-73 ECCS Flow Path from Cont. Sump R53 2-FCV-63-93 ECCS Cooldown Flow Path 2-FCV-63-94 ECCS Cooldown Flow Path 2-FCV-63-152 ECCS Recirc 2-FCV-63-153 ECCS Recirc 2-FCV-63-156 ECCS Flow Path 2-FCV-63-157 ECCS Flow Path 2-FCV-63-172 ECCS Flow Path 2-FCV-63-175 SI Pump Mini-flow 2-FCV-67-123 CSS Ht Ex Supply 2-FCV-67-124 CSS Ht Ex Discharge 2-FCV-67-125 CSS Ht Ex Supply 2-FCV-67-126 ' CSS Ht Ex Discharge 2-FCV-67-146 CCW Ht Ex Throttling 0-FCV-67-205* Turb Bldg Hdr Isolation 0-FCV-67-208* Turb Bldg Hdr Isolation 2-FCV-68-332 Pressurizer PORV Block Valve 2-FCV-68-333 Pressurizer PORV Block Valve 0-FCV-70-1* R71 SFPCS Hx Throttle 0-FCV-70-11* SFPCS Hx Throttle 2-FCV-70-153 RHR Hx Outlet Isolation 2-FCV-70-155 RHR Hx Outlet Isolation 0-FCV-70-193* SFPCS Hdr Isolation 0-FCV-70-194* SFPCS Hdr Isolation 0-FCV-70-197* SFPCS Hdr Isolation 0-FCV-70-198* SFPCS Hdr Isolation 0-FCV-70-206* R53 (FCV.70-2079 s/

CDWE Isolation 2-FCV-71-2074 CDWE Throttle I

• Common for Units 1 and 2 August 16, 1988 l SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 8-19 Amendment No. 25//lQ 7I R71 l

Corrected: 11/27/87

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ENCLOSURE 2 l' PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 1

DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SQN-TS-89-04)

DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR CLARIFICATION OF TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR THERMAL OVERLOAD AND BYPASS DEVICES AND IDENTIFICATION )

0F COMMON VALVES IN TABLE 3.8-2 N

,- ENCLOSURE 2 Description of Change Tennessee Valley Authority proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) units 1 and 2 technical specifications to revise Section 4.3.3.2 and Table 3.3-2 to include a surveillance requirement for the turbine-driven auxiliary feeuwater pump trip and throttle valves. The overload devices for these valves are normally in force during plant operation and bypassed under ccident conditions. The proposed change also identifies valves 1-FCV-70-207 and 2-FCV-10-207 in Table 3.8-2 as common to both units.

These valves are shown on Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 9.2.1-1.

Reason for Change Ihe SQN turbine-driven auxiliary f eedwater pump trip and throttle valves (valves 1-FCV-1-51 and 2-FCV-1-51) have thermal overload devices that are normally in force during planc operation and bypassed under accident conditions. Problem reporting document SQQ 880057P was initiated to document the need for testing the bypass circuitry of these valves. As permitted by Regulatory Guide 1.106, " Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor-Operated Valves," TVA proposes to ensure these motor-cperated valves will perform their function by conducting a channel functienal test of the bypass circuitry at least once every 13 months.

The condensate demineralized vaste evaporator throttle valves (1-FCV-70-207 and 2-FCV-70-207) are common valves to both units. The proposed change will provide administrative consistency by identifying them as such.

Justification for Change The performance of a channel functional test of the bypass circuitry at least once every 18 months will minimize the possibility of a malfunction that will prevent these two motor-operated valves from performing their intended safety functions. This test of the bypass circuitry is TVA's preferred method of verifying thermal overload operability. The bypass circuitry conforms to the appropriate sections of Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers Standard 279-1971, " Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." The performance of the bypass circuitry test conforms to the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.106 and to the standard Westinghouse Electric Corporation TSs for thermal overload devices normally in force during plant operation and bypassed under accident conditions. Additionally, this test is simpler to perform than setpoint calibration since it requires no thermal overicad removal.

The identification of the condensate demineralized waste evaporator throttle valves (1-FCV-70-207 and 2-FCV-70-207) as common valves to both units is an administrative change only. These valves are in unitized lines that flow into a connon supply line to the waste gas evaporator

building. This common supply line is isolated by the condensate demineralized waste evaporator isolation valve (0-FVC-70-208) when the water level in component cooling water surge tank A or B is low. Both throttle valves also close when either surge tank is low; therefore, both valves are common to both units. This change is being submitted to provide consistency.

. Environmental Impact Evaluation ~ '

The proposed change request does not involve an unreviewed environmental question because operation of SQN units 1 and 2 in accordance with this change would not:

1. Result in a significant increase in any adverse environmental impact previously evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) as modified by the staff's testimony to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, supplements to the FES, Environmental Impact Appraisals, or in any decisions of the Atomic Safety Licensing Board.

2. Result in a.significant change in effluents or power levels.

3. Result in matters not previously reviewed in the licensing basis for SQN that may have a significant environmental impact.

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ENCLOSURE 3 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SQN-TS-89-04)

DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS t

i

i ENCLOSURE 3 Significant Hazards Evaluation TVA has evaluated the proposed TS change and has determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration based on criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Operation of SQN in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed change to perform a channel functional test of the bypass circuitry has no effect on currently analyzed accidents; the current analysis is based on single-failure criteria and will be unchanged. The proposed change to identify the condensate demineralized waste evaporator throttle valves as common valves to both units is an administrative change and has no effect on hardware. It therefore does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident.

(2) Create the possibility cf a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed. The channel functional test of the bypass circuitry is an appropriate surveillance recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.106. The identification of the condensate demineralized waste evaporator throttle valves as common valves to both units is an administrative change and has no effect on hardware. It therefore does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The appropriate testiag of the bypass circuitry at least once every 18 months acts to confirm the performance of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump trip and throttle valves as required; it should act to increase the margin of safety. The identificatica of the condensate demineralized waste evaporator throttle valves as common valves to both units is an administrative change and has no effect on hardware. It therefore does not significantly reduce the margin of safety.

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