ML20247H888

Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79, Consisting of Tech Spec Change 89-04,clarifying Requirement to Test Thermal Overload Protection & Bypass Devices, Normally Enforce,But Bypassed Under Accident Conditions

ML20247H888
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	05/25/1989
From:	Michael Ray TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML20247H894	List: ML20247H888 ML20247H896
References
NUDOCS 8905310360
Download: ML20247H888 (9)

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TENNESSFE. VALLEY AUTHORITY r

CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 SN 1578 Lookout Place MAY 251989 10 CFR 50.90

'TVA-SQN-TS-89-04 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,

ATTN: Document Control Desk Hashington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328 i

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE 89-04 In accordance with.10 CFR 50.90, we are enclosing a requested amendment to licenses DPR-77 and DPR-79 to change the TSs of SQN units 1 and 2. The proposed' change clarifles the requirement to test thermal overload protection

'and bypass devices that are normally in force during plant operation and bypassed under accident conditions. Additionally, the change identifies valves 1-FCV-70-207 and 2-FCV-70-207 in Table 3.8-2 as common to both units.

The proposed TS change is identified in Enclosure 1. .The justification for the proposed TS change is provided in Enclosure 2. A proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92 is provided in Enclosure 3.

Please dir'ect questions concerning this issue to K. S. Whitaker at (615) 843-7748.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

\' ho M.J. Ray, Hanker, Licensing Project Management p

l Sworn t9_3pd subscr ed before me this d a e day of O M h 1989 Notary Public i b My Commission Expires h h O Enclosures i I

cc: See page 2 i 7

@NkOM P

An Equal Opportunity Employer

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f . U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 25 W cc.(Enclosures):

Ms. S. C. Black, Assistant Director for. Projects TVA Projects Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Assistant Director' for Inspection Programs TVA Projects Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II .

101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. Michael H. Mobley, Director (w/o enclosetes)

Division of Radiological Health T.E.R.R.A. Building 150 9th Avenue, N Nashville, Tennessee 37203 Sequoyah Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 American' Nuclear Insurers Attention: Librarian The Exchange, Suite 245 270 Farmington Avenue Farmington, Connecticut ~06032 i

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. 4 ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. S0-327 AND 50-328 ,

(TVA-SQN-TS-89-04)

LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES Unit 1 3/4 8-17, 18, 19 Unit 2 3/4 8-18, 19 l

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r ENCLOSURE 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SQN-TS-89-04)

DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR CLARIFICATION OF TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR THERMAL OVERLOAD AND BYPASS DEVICES At'D IDENTIFICATION t' COMMON VALVES IN TABLE 3.8-2 f

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,- ENCLOSURE 2 Description of Change Tennessee Valley Authority proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) units 1 and 2 technical specification.s to revise Section 4.8.3.2 and Table 3.8-2 to include a su a illance requirement for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump trip and throttle valves. The overload devices for these valves are normally in force during plant operation and bypassed under accident conditions. The proposed change also identifies valves 1,-FCV-70-207 and 2-FCV-70-207 in Table 3.8-2 as ccmmca to both units.

These valves are shown on Final Safety Analysis Report figure 9.2.1-1.

Reason for Change The SQN turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump trip and throttle valves (valves 1-FCV-1-51 and 2-FCV-1-51) have thermal overload devices that are normally in force during plant operation and bypassed under accident conditions. Problem reporting document SQQ 880057P was initiated to document the need for testing the bypass circuitry of these valves. As permitted by Regulatory Guide 1.106, " Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor-Operated Valves," TVA proposes to ensure these motor-operated valves will perform their. function by conducting a channel functional test of the bypass ' circuitry at least once every 18 months.

The condensate demineralized waste evaporator throttle valves (1-FCV-70-207 and 2-FCV-70-207) art common valves to both units. The proposed change will provide administrative consistency by identifying them as such.

Justification for Change The performance of a channel functional test of the bypass circuitry at least once every 18 months will minimize the possibility of a malfunction that will prevent these two motor-operated valves from performing their intended safety functions. This test of the bypass circuitry is TVA's preferred niethod of verifying thermal overload operability. The bypass circuitry cor. forms to the appropriate sections of Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers Standard 279-1971, " Criteria for Frotection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." The performance of the bypass circuitry test conforms to the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.106 and to the standard Westinghouse Electric Corporation TSs for thermal overload devices normally in force during plant operatiol and bypassed unde accident conditions. Additionally, this test is simpler to perform than setpoint calibration since it requires no thermal overload removal.

The identification of the coridensate demineralized waste evaporator throttle valves (1-FCV-70-207 and 2-FCV-70-207) as common valves to both units it an administrative change only. These valves are in unitized lines that flow into a common supply line to the waste gas evaporator

building. Thir common supply line is isolated by the condensate demineralized laste evaporator isslation valve (0-FVC-70-208) when the water level ir component cooling water surge tank A or B is low. Both throttle valves also close when either surge tank is low; therefore, both valves are coaman to both units. This change is being submitted to provide consistency.

Environmental Impact Evhluation The proposed change request does not involve an unreviewed environmental question because operation of SQN units 1 and 2 in accordance with this change would not:

1. Result in a significant increase in any adverse environmental impact previously evaluated in the Final Environmental Stat . it (FES) as 1 modified by the staff's testimony to the Atomic.Safet) and Licensing l Board, supplements to the FES, Environmental Impact Appraisals, or in -

any decisions of the Atomic Safety Licensing Board.

2. Result in a significant change in effluents or power levels.

3. Result in matters not previously reviewed in the licensing basis for SQN that may have a significant environmental impact.

ENCLOSURE 3 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET N05. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SQN-TS-89-04)

' DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS .

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, ENCLOSURE 3 Significant Hazards Evaluation TVA has evaluated the proposed TS change and has determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration based on criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Operation of SQN in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed change to perform a channel functional test of the bypass circuitry has no effect on currently analyzed accidents; the current analysis is based on single-failure criteria and will be unchanged. The proposed change to identify the condensate demineralized waste evaporator throttle valves as common valves to both units is an administrative change and has no effect on hardware. It therefore does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident.

1 (2) Create the possibi'lity of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed. The channel functional test of the bypass circuitry is an appropriate surveillance recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.106. The identification of the condensate demineralized waste evaporator throttle valves as common valves to both units is an administrative change and has no effect on hardware. It therefore does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The appropriate testing of the bypass circuitry at least once every 18 months acts to confirm the performance of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump trip and throttle valves as required; it should act to increase the margin of safety. The identification of the condensate demineralized waste evaporator throttle valves as common valves to both units is an administrative change and has no effect on hardware. It therefore does not significantly reduce the margin of safety.

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ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SQN-TS-89-04)

LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES Unit 1 3/4 8-17, 18, 19 Unit 2 3/4 8-18, 19 I

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