ML20245D844

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Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Definition of Primary Containment Integrity - Fuel Handling to Allow Increased Flexibility During Performance of 10CFR50,App J,Type C Leak Rate Testing
ML20245D844
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 09/28/1988
From:
GULF STATES UTILITIES CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20245D839 List:
References
NUDOCS 8810070237
Download: ML20245D844 (7)
v • d • e


Text

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4 DEFINITIONS PRESSURE B0UNDARY LEAKAGE 1.30 PRESSURE B0UNDARY LEAKAGE shall be leakage through a non-isolable fault in a reactor coolant system component body, pipe wall or vessel wall.

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY - FUEL HANDLING 1.31 PRIMARY CONTAIMENT INTEGRITY - FUEL HANDLING shall exist when;

a. All containment penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by at least one manual valve, blind flange, e hetivated automatic valve secured in its closed position.

caiste i

b. All containment hatches are closed.
c. Each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.4.

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY - OPERATING 1.32 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY - OPERATING shall exist when:

a. All containment penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
1. Capable of being closed by an OPERA 8LE containment automatic isolation system, or
2. Closed by at least one manual valve, blind flange, or deacti-wated automatic valve secured in its closed position, except as provided in Specification 3.6.4.
b. All containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed.
c. Each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.4.
d. The containment leakage rates are within the ifmits of Specification 3.6.1.3.
e. The suppression pool is in compliance with the requirements of Speci-fication 3.6.3.1.

! f. The sealing mechanism associated with each primary containment penetra-tion; e.g. , welds, bellows or 0-rings, is OPERABLE.

PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP) 1.33 The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM shall contain the current formula, sampling, analyses, tests, and determinations to be made to n.sure that the processing anC packaging of solid radioactive wastes based on demonstrated processing of actual or simulgted wet solid wastes will be accomplished in such a way as to assure. compliance with 10 CFR Part 20,10 CFR Part 61,10 CFR Part 71 and RIVER' BEND - UNIT l' 1-6 8

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l ' INSERT" for page 1-6 Up to twenty vent and drain line pathways may be opened under administrative control for the purposes of surveillance testing provided the total calculated flow rate through the open vent and drain lIne pathways is less than or equal

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to 70.2

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY - FUEL NANDLING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY - FUEL HANDLING shall be saintained.

APPLICABILITY: Operational Condition *f ACTION:

Without PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY - FUEL HANDLING, suspend handling of irradiated fuel in the primary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a- potential for draining the reactor vessel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j 4.6.1.2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY - FUEL HANITLING shall be demonstrated:

a. Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to entering and at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> during Operational Condition" by verifying that all primary con-tainment penetrations required to be closed during accident condi-t'automatic ions arevalves closed by hatches, secured valves, @ blind flanges, or deactiva in position. ]
b. By verifying each containment air lock is.in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.4.

f**0ptotwentyventanddrainlinepathwaysmaybeopenedunder administrative control for the purposes of surveillance testing provided the total calculated f low rate through the open vent and ,

drain line pathways is less than or equal to 70.2 cfm.

Nhen handling irradiated fuel in the primary containment and during CORE' ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

  1. See Special Test Exception 3.10.1.

RIVER BEND - UNIT 1~ 3/4 6-2

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REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME ,

l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.4 Thereactorshallbesubcriticalforatleast24hoursh l APPLICA8ILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITMN 5, during movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure Vdssel.

ACTION:

With the reactor suberitical for less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.4 The reactor shall be determined to have been suberitical for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verification, prior to movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor j pressure vessel, of the date and time of suberiticality.

' The reactor shall be subtritical for et least 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> prior to opening vent and drain line pathways under the provisions of Specification 3.6.1.2.

RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 9-6 i

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e e Revised Technical Specification Beses i

A 3.4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES -

_3 /4. 6.1 CONTADJMENT 3/4.6.1.Lb55.d.bPRIMARY wm CONTAINMENT y _

INTEGRITYkPkTIN(()

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PRIMARY CONTAIV'iENT INTEGRITYhPERATIhGbed"Nkb'IDnsures that the release of radioactive materials from the prTsarp containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will lirit the site boundarf radiation doses to within the limits f in r39 art 100 during accident conditions.

  • lNSERT 3/ . 1.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE Thilimitations on primary containment leakage rates ensure that the total primary containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the accident analyses at the peak accident pressure of 7.6 psig, Pa. As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage rat,e is further limited to less than or equal to 0.75 La, during performance of the periodic tests, to account for possible degradation of the primary containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

Operating experience with tM nain steam line isolation valves has irdi-cated that degradation has' occami Ally occurred in the leak tightness of the valves; therefore, the special L.quirement for testing thest valves.

Tha surveillance testing for measuring leakd2e rates is consistent with the regtcirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50.

3/4.6.1.4 PRIMARY CONTAINFl INT AIR 8.0CKS The limitations on closure and leak rate for the primary containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY-OPERATING and t.he primary containment leakage rate given in Soecifica-tions 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.3. The specification makes allowances for the fact that there may be long periods of time when the air locks will be in a closed and secured position durirg reactor operation. Only one closed door in each air lock is required to maintain the integrity of the primary containment.

1 RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-1

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"IN3ERT" for page 83/4 6-1 3/4.6.1.2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY - FUEL HANDLING f

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT IKi:GRITY - FUEL HANDLING ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment atmosphere will be restricted I to those leakage pathways and associated leak rates assumed in the accident I analysis. This restriction will limit the site boundary radiation doses to less than 25% of the 10CFR100 limits during a postulated fuel handling accident within the primary containment.

The footnote allows the opening of vent and drain line pathways for the purposes of performing leak rate surveillance testing. Offsite doses as a result of a postulated fuel handling accident inside primary containment were calculated f based upon the flow rate which would be produced through twenty open 3/4 inch vent and drain line pathways with a 0.357 inch water gauge differential pressure

) between the containment and auxiliary buildings. This would result in a total r calculated flow rate out of these open vent and drain lines of 70.a cubic feet per minute. Accordingly, this footnote allows the opening of up to twenty vent

) and draitt line pathways for the purposes of performing leak rate surveillance f testing provided the total calculated flow rate, considering the specific I containment and auxiliary building differential pressure, does not exceed 70.2 cubic feet per minute as used in the above analyses.

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