ML20196A140

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Proposed Tech Specs Adding 3.10.9, Control Rod Pattern - Cycle 8, to Support Startup from Outage Planned for Early Dec 1998
ML20196A140
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 11/20/1998
From:
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20196A127 List:
References
NUDOCS 9811270066
Download: ML20196A140 (6)


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Enclosure 3 L

Proposed Technical Specifications l

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9811270066 981120 PDR ADOCK 05000458 P PDR;,

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3.10 Control Rod Pattern - Cycle 8 3.10.9 Control Rod Pattern LCO 3.10.9 During fuel cycle 8 the requirements of LCO 3.1.6. " Control Rod Pattern." may be suspended and control rods bypassed in the Rod Action Control System as allowed by SR 3.3.2.1.9.

Control rods shall comply with the requirements of the banked position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) with the exception of fully inserted control rods 44-29, 44-25, 48-29. !

12 29 and 08-29.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2 with THERMAL POWER < 20% RTP.

I ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more control rods A.1 -------NOTE---------

not in compliance with the Affected control rods may be LCO. bypassed in RACS in accordance with SR 3.3.2.1.9 for insertion only.

1 Suspend withdrawal of control rods. Immediately E

A.2 Place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. I hour l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

.SR 3.10.9.1 Verify all control rods with the exception of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> inserted control rods 44-29, 48-29. 44-25. 12-29 and 08-29 comply with BPWS.

Enclosure 4 Proposed Technical Specification BASES i

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B 3.10 Special Operations B 3.10.9 Control Rod Pattern - Cycle 8 BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to permit operation while in MODES 1 and 2 (but less than or equal to 20% reactor thermal power), by imposing certain administrative controls. Control rod patterns during startup conditions are controlled by the operator and the rod pattern controller (RPC)

(LC0 3.3.2.1 " Control Rod Block Instrumentation"), such that only the specified control rod sequences and relative positions required by LC0 3.1.6.

" Control Rod Pattern." are allowed over the operating range from all control rods inserted to the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RPC. The sequences effectively limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase that could occur during a control rod drop accident (CRDA). This Special Operations LCO provides the necessary exceptions to the requirements of LC0 3.1.6 and provides additional administrative controls to allow the deviations in such tests from the prescribed sequences in LC0 3.1.6.

APPLICABLE The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating SAFETY ANALYSES the CRDA are summarized in References 1 and 2. CRDA analyses assume the reactor operator follows prescribed withdrawal sequences. These sequences define the potential initial conditions for the CRDA analyses. The RPC provides backup to operator control of the withdrawal sequences to ensure that the initial conditions of the CRDA analyses are not violated. For special sequences, the initial control rod patterns assumed in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2 may not be preserved. Therefore, special CRDA analyses are required to demonstrate that these special sequences will not result in unacceptable consequences, should a CRDA occur during the testing. These analyses, performed in accordance with an NRC approved methodology. are dependent on the specific sequences.

As described in LC0 3.0.7. compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional. and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply.

Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

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l LCO Compliance with the prescribed control rod sequences minimizes the potential l consequences of a CRDA by limiting the initial conditions to those consistent l .

with the BPWS with the exception of inserted control rods 44-29, 44-25. 48-29.

i 12-29 and 08-29. No other control rods are to be bypassed. This LCO applies l to OPERABLE and inoperable control rods.

l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 and 2, when THERMAL POWER is s 20% RTP. the CRDA is a Design Basis Accident (DBA) and, therefore, compliance with the assumptions of the safety analysis is required. When THERMAL POWER is > 20% RTP. there is no credible control rod configuration that results in a control rod worth that could exceed the 280 cal /gm fuel damage limit during a CRDA (Ref. 1). In MODES 3.

4 and 5. since the reactor is shut down and only a single control rod can be withdrawn from a core cell containing fuel assemblies, adequate SDM ensures that the consequences of a CRDA are acceptable, since the reactor will remain subcritical with a single control rod withdrawn.

ACTION A_.1 If one or more control rods are out of sequence, the control rod pattern significantly deviates from the prescribed sequence. Control rod withdrawal should be suspended immediately to prevent the potential for further deviation from the prescribed sequence. Control rod insertion to correct control rods withdrawn beyond their allowed position is allowed since, in general, insertion of control rods has less impact on control rod worth than withdrawals have. Required Action B.1 is modified by a Note that allows the

, affected control rods to be bypassed in PACS in accordance with SR 3.3.2.1.9 l to allow insertion only.

1 With one or more control rods not in compliance with the Control Rod Pattern.

the reactor mode switch must be placed in the shutdown position within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

With the reactor mode switch in shutdown, the reactor is shut down, and therefore does not meet the applicability requirements of this LCO. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is reasonable to allow insertion of control rods to restore compliance, and is appropriate relative to the low probability of a CRDA occurring with the control rods out of sequence.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.10.9.1 REQUIREMENTS The control rod pattern is verified to be in compliance with the BPWS. with the exception of inserted control rods 44-29. 44-25. 48-29. 12-29 and 08-29.

at a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency, ensuring the assumptions of the CRDA analyses are met.

l The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency of this Surveillance was developed considering that the primary check of the control rod pattern compliance with the BPWS is performed by the RPC (LCO 3.3.2.1). The RPC provides control rod blocks to enforce the required control rod sequence and is required to be OPERABLE when operating at 4

s 20% RTP.

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REFERENCES:

1.- 1.NEDE-24011-P-A. "GE Standard Application for Reactor Fuel. GESTAR II" (latest approved

, revision).

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2. USAR. Section 15.4.9.

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3. NUREG-0979. "NRC Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Final Design Approval of the GESSAR 11 BWR/6 Nuclear Island Design. Docket No. 50-447." Section 4.2.1.3.2. April 1983.
4. NUREG-0800. " Standard Review Plan." Section 15.4.9. " Radiological Consequences of Control Rod Drop Accident (BWR)." Revision 2. July 1981.

5.10 CFR 100.11. " Determination of Exclusion Area. Low

6. Population Zone, and Population Center Distance."
7. NED0-21778-A. " Transient Pressure Rises Affected Fracture Toughness Requirements for Boiling  !

. Water Reactors." December 1978. l

8. ASME. Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
9. NE00 21231. " Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence." January 1977.
10. General Electric Letter LC-262-98-177 dated November 10. 1998 l

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