ML20244E344

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Forwards Input to Sser Section 9.5.1.4,updating NRC Concerns in Sser 5 Re Potential Fire Hazards of HVAC Charcoal Filter Units.Revised Page 11-1,responding to Licensee Comments on Sser 5,also Encl
ML20244E344
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook, 05000000
Issue date: 10/02/1986
From: Milhoan J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Nerses V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20235T530 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-87-51 NUDOCS 8610100174
Download: ML20244E344 (5)
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OCT 2 1986 Docket Nos: 50-443/444 MEMORANDUM FOR: Victor Nerses, Senior Project Manager PWR Project Directorate No. 5 1 Division of PWR Licensing - A FROM: James L. Milhoan, Chief Plant Systems Branch Division of PWR Licensing . A l

SUBJECT:

INPUT FOR SUPPLEMENT TO THE SAFETY i EVALUATION REPORT SEABROOK STATION,  !

UNITS I AND 2

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Applicant: Public Service Company of New Hampshire i

Plant Name: Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2 1 Docket Nos.: 50-443/444 Licensing Stage: OL ,

Responsible Directorate: PWR PD #5 l Project Manager: V. Nerses l PSB Reviewers: S. West, A. Singh, and J. Hayes j Review Status: Awaiting Information Enclosed is the Plant Systems Branch (PSB) input for Section 9.5.1.4 of the Seabrook Station, Units I and 2 Supplement to the Safety Evaluation Report ,

(SSER). It updates the staff's concern in SSER 5 regarding the potential l fire hazards associated with the station's HVAC charcoal filter units. The l staff met with the applicant on this issue and by letter dated September 17, l 1986, the applicant comitted to submit the results of its HVAC charcoal filter fire hazards analysis for staff review by October 10, 1986, and to have the HVAC charcoal filter unit fire detection systems, and any other modifications that stem from the fire hazards analysis, complete and operable prior to exceed.

ing 5 % power.

In addition, the applicant provided coments on SSER 5. PSB has reviewed these coments and has revised page 11-1 (attached) to respond to these comments. '

The SALP provided with the SSER 5 input is still applicable.

James L. Milhoan, Chief l Plant Systems Branch Division of PWR Licensing . A ,

Enclosures:

As Stated DISTRIBUTION Docket Fil J. Shapaker cc: T. Novak PSB Subject File J. Milhoan V. Noonan PSB Reading File J. Calvo J. Hayes .. N L. Hulman A. Singh W. Minners S. West 1

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Contact:

A. Singh, x27462

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SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION )

DIVISION OF PWR LICENSING - A, PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCH l SEABROOK STATION, UNITS 1 & 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-443 and 50-444 9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.5 Other Auxiliary Systems 9.5.1 Fire Protection 9.5.1.4 General Plant Guidelines 1

Ventilation During the course of discussions with the applicant (Public Service Company of flew Hampshire, et al) concerning their charcoal filter adsorber temperature

~ analysis (addressed in Supplement 5 to the Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2 Safety Evaluation Report), the staff learned that the applicant had not considered the potential fire hazards associated with HVAC charcoal filter units or detemined the consequences of a charcoal filter unit fire on safe shutdown capabilities, in accordance with Section II.B of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 and Section A.2 of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1.

The staff met with the applicant on September 4,1986 to discuss this issue, and by letter dated September 8,1986, (V. 5. Noonan to R. J. Harrison) transmitted its position to the applicant. During the September 4, 1986 meeting the appli-cant agreed to revise their fire hazards analysis with regard to the charcoal filters, outlined their proposed analysis methodology, and stated that improved fire detection capabilities would be installed in the subject filter units. By letter dated September 17, 1986, the applicant committed to meet the agreements reached with the staff during the September 4,1986 meeting.

l The applicant plans to develop individual charcoal fire models for charcoal filters EAH-F-9, 69; FAH-F-41, 74; CAH F-8; PAH-F-16; and CAP-F-40. The models will consider ignition of a specific area of a charcoal cell and the effect on adjacent cells. Propagation of the fire and heat transfer will be evaluated to I

detennine the effect of the burning charcoal on structures and equipment required for safe shutdown. Burning effects will be evaluated under both forced draft .

and natural circulation conditions.

In the Septcaber 17,19P6 letter, the applicant' committed to provide for staff review, by October 10,1986,(1) the charcoal filter fire analysis, (2) pen and ink markups of thtreports entitled " Fire Protection Program and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A" and " Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R)," and (3) a schedule of any plant modifications needed to support the analysis. In addition, the applicant stated that the afore-mentioned detection system and any other plant modifications will be operational prior to exceeding five percent power. The applicant also committed to formally update both the " Fire Protection Program and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A" and " Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R)" rcports in November 1986.

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As justification for not having an operable fire detection system for the HVAC charcoal filter units by the time of licensing, the applicant proposes-to establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the charcoal filter units, as an interim compensatory measure, until the detection system is operable. The fire watches will be established in accordance with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Speci-fications (NUREG 0452) for an inoperable detection system. This is, therefore, an acceptable compensatory measure.

In addition to the standard fire protection license condition, the staff will add the following license condition in the body of the Seabrook Station operating license: The applicant shall sulmit the results of its WAC charedal filter fire hazards analysis for staff review by October 10, 1986, shall have the HVAC charcoal filter unit fire detection systems and any other modifications dictated by the fire hazards analysis complete and operable prior to exceeding 5 percent of rated

~3-power, and shall update the reports entitled " Fire Protection Program and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A" and " Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability (10 CFR 50, Appendix R) by November 30, 1986".

In Supplement 5 to the Seabrook SER, Section 9.5.1.4 states that the deviation request made by the applicant in a March 18, 1986 letter on the utilization of low-flow air bleed systems for ESF and non-ESF charcoal adsorbers, would require additional justification. This issue was considered an open item until such information was provided.

The current design of the ESF charcoal adsorbers includes low-flow air bleed system. Therefore, this design is appropriate far operation of the reactor.

For non-ESF charcoal adsorber units, the low-flow air bleed system would not be necessary for the removal of decay heat caused by the collection of radioactive iodine and its decay products since these systems are not utilized to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, this item is considered closed.

9.5.1.8 Summary of Approved Deviations from Staff Fire Protection Guidelines All approved deviations from staff fire protection guidelines are identified in SSER 5.

9.5.1.9 Conclusions '

On the basis of its review, the staff concludes that, with the exception of the protection of the charcoal filter units, the applicant's fire protection program for Seabrook Station, with approved deviations, meets the staff fire protection guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and satisfies GDC 3.

The staff will condition the operating license to require that the applicant implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program for the life of thd plant, submit the fire hazards analysis for the HVAC charcoal filter units and implement any plant modifications dictated by the analysis prior to exceeding 5 percent of rated power, and update the appropriate reports identified in Section 9.5.1.4 of this Supplement by November 30, 1986.

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11 RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 11.3 Gaseous Waste Management System l Seabrook has a unique waste gas processing system, which utilizes charcoal delay beds to decontaminate waste gases. This permits recycling of the hydrogen cover gas and minimizes releases. This system could present an unusually high poten-tial for hydrogen deflagration in the cubicles housing the waste gas system be-cause the gas in the system is almost pure hydrogen.

The applicant contends that the consequences of such a deflagration would be relatively minor because (1) the resulting increase in radioactivity release would be inconsequential even when compared to the criteria of Appendix I, and (2) there are no safety systems in the vicinity to be affected. Furthermore, the applicant has minimized the likelihood of a deflagration by (1) installing hydrogen detectors in each cubicle, (2) providing continuous ventilation of all cubicles, and (3) having an automatic purge system to rapidly reduce the hydrogen concentration (if needed) in the cubicle containing the surge tank.

The staff has reviewed the provisions for control of explosive gas mixtures in the cubicles. On the basis of the above considerations and the assurance of availability of equipment provided by the TOCMi:al Spec:fication, the staff concludes that these ' provisions are acceptable.

11.4 Solid Waste Manacement Systems V" 11.4.1 System Description The solid waste processing system (SWPS) is designed to process two general types of solid wastes: wet solid wastes and dry solid wastes. Wet solid i wastes consist mainly of spent filter cartridges, demineralized resins, filt:m l ciud;;;;, chemical drain solutions, and evaporator bottoms, which contain radio- '

active materials removed from liquid streams during processing. Dry solid wastes consist mainly of ventilation air filtering media (high efficiency l particulate air, charcoal), contaminated clothing, paper, rags, laboratory glassware, and tools.

The applicant indicated that the various wet and dry solid radioactive waste produced will be processed either by a single permanerttly installed solid waste management system utilizing asphalt or by using the services of a mobile solid-

! ification contractor using cement. The permanently installed system 1:111 not be completed by the Unit 1 fuel load date; therefore, contracted mobile solidi-fication services will be used.

Spent filter cartridges will be encapsulated and solidified using either an asphalt binder or cement in 55 gal -drums. The radioactive wastes in the form i of slurry will be pumped either to the permanently installed asphalt evaporator /

extruder or to the alternate solidification. station. GTpent-demitteMizer resin vill be proce5;;d by velvme redtteticr and 50lidificatig;2-Solidified wastes will be deposited into either 53 gal drums or. 85-f t3 containers. )

Seabrook SSER 5 11-1 ,

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