ML20244E235
| ML20244E235 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/27/1986 |
| From: | Lainas G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Adensam E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20238A944 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-87-438 NUDOCS 8609030104 | |
| Download: ML20244E235 (44) | |
Text
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DOCK'ET.NO. 50-410 DISTRIBUTION DOCKET FILE MEMORANDUM FOR: Elinor Adensam, Director PSB R/F BWR Project Directorate No. 3 F. Witt Division of BWR Licensing - J. Kudrick D. Vassallo FROM: Gus C. Lainas, Assistant Director G. Lainas Division of BWR Licensing
SUBJECT:
NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION The Plant Systems Branch has reviewed the applicable sections of the applicant's submittal,-dated August 6, 1986, regarding additional Techr.ical Specification changes. We'have completed our review for all the requested changes except one. The MSIV related change has required significant amounts' of added information which we.have recently received. This issue should be C resolved prior to exceeding 5% power since the MSIV's have been leak tested but, by a test method which has not been approved by the staff. The fact that tests have been performed provided reasonable assurance that some degree of leak tightness has been demonstrated, even if further testing becomes necessary.
For the remaining changes, we find them acceptable with minor modifications (the marked up pages are enclosed). Additionally, changes related to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J,. required a supporting SER which is also enclosed. Our SALP for this effort is attached.
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY D. VASSALLO FOR Gus C. Lainas Assistant Director Division of BWR Licensing p
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosures:
R. W. Houston "
-T. Speis D. Crutchfield.
E. Rossi C. Schulten M. Haughey
Contact:
F. Witt (X29440) fcJ.M -17 ~ W S/ s 5520 Document Nare: 9 MILE POINT TECH. SPEC. ,
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Subject:
Justification for Technica.1 Specification Charge to Main Steam Isolation Valve Leak Rate i
The current Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Technical Specification Table 3.6.1.2-1 allows six standard cubic foot per hour (scfh) of leak rate per Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV). This leak rate is based on potential bypass i l
analytical limit of 6 scfh of leakage through the valve under !
Loss-of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA) condition. To ensure that the MSIV leak rate !
is within the Technical Specification limit, the MSIY ball valve is leak ;
tested through a test connection such that the volume between the valve's two '
seats is pressurized to test condition. The flow resistance under this test condition (two seats in parallei) is less than the flow resistance that would be encountered under the LOCA condition (two seats in series). Thus, the leak rate when testing the valves between the seats could exceed 6 scfh but still satisfy the LOCA potential bypass analytical limit for leakage through the j valve. Calculations show that a leak rate under field test condition of 14.86 '
scfh (valve seats in parallel) is equivalent to the LOCA bypass analytical limit of 6 scfh with the valve seats in series. Niagara Kohawk, therefore, requests changes to the Technical Specification allowable leakage rate for the MSlYs to reflect the actual test configuration. The requested change to the ,
Technical Specification Table 3.6.1.2-1 is attached.
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Subject:
Justification for change to Technical Specification Bases 3/4.6.3,
, " Primary Containment Isolation Valves" The requested change is enclosed. This change will Clarify the relationship between isolatten system instrumentation response time and isolation valve closing time.
CHANGE REQUESTED FOR CLARIFICATION l C5 1)W 1/2//ft
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Subject:
Justification for changes to Technical Specification Tables
- 3. 3. 7.10-1 and 4. 3. 7.10-1 in the area of radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation l
The current Technical Specification Section 3.3.7.10 requires the Liquid Radweste Monitor to be OPERABLE at all times, whether radwaste discharge is !
occurring or not. System design provides three valves to prevent inadvertent discharge. These velves must be specifically lined up in the course of making a discharge. Inherent in this design is the isolation of the small section of discharge line f rom and to which the Liquid Radwaste monitor's sample pump takes supply and return. When in continuous use, the sample pump produces more heat than can be dissipated in the small volume of water contained in this section of pipe. Therefore, it is requested to revise Technical Specification Tables 3. 3. 7.10-1 a nd 4. 3.7.10-1 to provide:
- 1. The Liquid Waste Monitor must be OPERABLE at all times during discharge of liquid waste.
- 2. The CHANNEL CHECK and SOURCE CHECK are to be performed P (prior to discharge).
Tha requested changes to Technical Specification Tables 3. 3.7.10-1 and 4.3.7.10-1 are enclosed. These changes also affect the final Safety Analysis Report and the Safety Evaluation Report. Changes to the appropriate pages of these reports are also enclosed.
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i RRL DMFT INSTRUMENTATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION RA010 ACTIVE L10U10 EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION l
l LIMITING CONDIT]dNS FOR OPERATION !'
3.3.7.10 The radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channels ,
shown in Table 3.3.7.10-1 shall be OPERABLE with their Alare/ Trip setpoints set to ensure that the limits of Specification 3.11.1.1 are not exceeded. The Alarm / Trip Setpoints of these channels shall be determined and adjusted in accordance with the methodol'gy and parameters in the OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM).
APPLICABILITY- " ' ' ' ' - - - [ MMN ACTION:
- a. With a radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channel A13rm/ Trip Setpoint less conservative than required by the above specifi-cation, immediately suspend the release of radioactive liquid effluents monitored by the affected channel, or declare the channel inoperable, er change the setpoint so it is acceptably conservative.
- b. With the number of channels OPERABLE less than the Minimum Channels OPER-ABLE requirement, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3.7.10-1. Restore the instruments to OPERABLE status within 30 days and, if unsuccessful, explain in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report why the inoperability was not corrected in a timely manner.
- c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable. f SURVEILLANCE RE001REMENTS 1
4.3.7.10 Each radioactive liquid ef fluent monitoring instrumentation channel ]
shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, SOURCE ~
CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCT10NAL TEST at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.7.10-1.
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HINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 3-9B M 25 E 1
RM DMFT TABLE 3.3.7.10-1 RAD 10 ACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTAL 10N
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MINIMUM CHANNELS INSTRUMENT OPERABLE ACT]DN
- 1. Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm i and Automatic Termination of Release Liquid Radweste Effluent Line 1 '28
- 2. Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm But Not Providing Automatic Termination of Release
- a. Service Water Effluent Line A I 130
- b. Service Water Effluent Line B 1 130 130 *
- c. Cooling Tower Blowdown Line 1 A
- 3. Flow Rate Measurement Devices
- a. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line 1 131
- b. Service Water Effluent Line A 1 131
- c. Service Water Effluent Line B 1 131
- d. Cooling Tower Blowdown Line 1 131
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- 4. Tank Leve; Indicating Devices' 1 132
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- Tanks included in this specification are those outdoor tanks that are not surrounded by liners, dikes, or walls capable of holding the tank contents and ~ l do not have tank overflows and surrounding area drains connected to the liquid radwaste treatment system, such as temporary tanks.
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Subject:
Justification for change to Technical Definition 1.38' Secondar#
Containment Integrity" The requested change is enclosed. The change reflects the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 design. This change is made in order to make Definition 1.38 consistent with 4.6.5.1.b.2 on page 3/4 6-37.
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DEF INITIONS REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 1.35 (Continued) until deenergization of the scram pilot valve solenoids, The response time may be sneasured by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total sters so that the entire response time is ineasured.
REPORTABLE EVENT 1.36 A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in 10 CFR 50.73.
ROD DEN 51TY 1.37 R0D DEN 51TY shall be the number of control rod notches inserted as a fraction of the total ny uer of control rod notches. All rods fully inserted is equivalent to 100% ROD DENSITY.
SECONDARY CONT AINMENT INTEGRITY 1.3E SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist whan:
- a. All reactor building and auxiliary bay penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
- 1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE reactor building autoaatic isolation system, or
- 2. Closed by at least one manual valve, blind flange, or reactivated aute-matic damper secured in its closed position, except as provided in Table 3.6.5.2-1 of Specification 3.6.5.2.
t; . All auxiliary bay hatches are closed and sealed.
- c. The standby gas treatment system is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.5.3. .
- d. At least one doo in each access *,o the reactor building and auxiliary bays is closede .A y 4 d p.
- e. The sealing mechanism associated with each reactor building and auxiliary bay penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or 0-rings) is OPERAELE.
- f. The pressure within the reactor building and auxiliary bays is less than or equal to the value required by Specification 4.6.5.1.a.
, SHUTDOWN MARGIN 1.39 SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be the amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would t'e subtritical assuming all control rods are fully in-serted except for the single control rod of highest reactivity worth which is NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 1-7 AIN 2 5 BB6
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July 3, IBM (f.MTEL 0770)
Ms. Eliner G. Adensam, Dire:::r BWR Project Directorate N:- 3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-ission 7920 Nor#olb Avenue Wasnin; ton. DC 20555
Dear Ps,
Adensam:
Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Docket No. 50 410 Niagara Mohawt requests changes to Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Technical Specifications in the area of Fire Protection Program.
In response to our discussion with Mr. C. Shulten and Mr. D. Kubicki on June 3,1986, the proposed cnanges to the Technical Specifications, as well as justification for these changes are attached.
Very truly yours, C. V. Mangan Senior Vice President
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l In the Matte
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Niagara Mena... Po.er Corporation ) Docket No. 50 410 (Nine Nile Point Unit 2) )
AFFIDAVIT C. V. Mancan , being duly sworn, states that he is Senior Vice President of Niagara Monawk Power Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said Corporation to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission tne documents attached hereto; and that all- such documents are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.
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~6 Subscrlhed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Ne=
YorA arid County of O/lMddh , this d day of Adu , 1986.
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01frtin Notary Public in and for 6/tMdtiac County, New York u
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';NE M;LE PO15!. U:;II 2 EE:T;O' .?
~,1,2(c) T:RE SUPPFISSION '.iATER SYSTEM E X : c ! '7, l'
At 'eas: en:e per * '{
diesel tc an .c r.enths, during shutdown, by subjecting the inspe ction in accordance with piocedures prepartd in con]'snet aen tth its manuf acturer's recommendations f or the class of serv;ct.
PEOPOSED At least once per 18 mont hs, by subjecting t he diesel . . . . . . . . '
DISCUSSION Based en industry operstd c, swerience, occur during an outage when cc ruv ettis.n activity atfires are more likely to Therefore, the Itbasis for limit.ng ..ets w.ivity during shutdown the site is elevated.
is undesirable.
is diesel engine driven fire pump dur:our intention to w ; available for service the
.g the outage, if possible. Any necessary during, scheduled maintenance work would be performed either prior te, specified. er af ter the outage in accordance with the surveillance interval will be Dar:ng
=aintained. th:s period of maintenance, the provisions of Section 3.7.7.1 for service to supply UnitTwo 1601 back-up fire puttps could be readily available underground distribution system between the two uni'ts.2, if required. by cross connecting - !
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NINE MILE POINT. L* NIT 2 SECTICS 4.7.).'(b) HALON SY5 EM3 I
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EF.IETING At least once per 6 months be verifying halon s: stage : n,. we;;r: an:
pressure.
PROPOSED At least 6hce per 6 months by verifying Halen storage tant weigh: rr level and pressure.
DISCL'5510N Section 3.7.7.4(LCO) provides the option of using level to determine the current capacity of the storage tenks. In addition. Bases Section 3/4.7.7 identifies that level measurements are made by either a "L liste; or TM approved method. The change identified above would be consistent with these ref erences and enable the surveillance to be performed without physically disconnecting the storage tank f rom the discharge :anif old. !r satisf y an NRC concern. a footnote vill be added vnere ever ref erence it i nade to level measurement for this system which will read as f ollows:
" Level determination f or the purpose of ver.if ying Malon System operability shall conf orm to NRC accepted UL on FM test procecures j ai, d /c ' '>ipment." 5 !
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' FIRE SUPPRESSION SYS'iEMS FIRE SUPPRt!5 ION WATER SYSTEN SURVEILLANCE REQUIRD'ERTS 4.7.7.1.1 (Continued)
- c. At least once per 6 months by performance of a systes flush,
- d. At least once per 12 months by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
- e. At least once per 18 months by performing a system functional test which includea simulated automatic actuation.of the systen throughout its operating sequence, and:
- 1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct , position,
- 2. Verifying that each fire suppression pump develops at least 2500 gps at a not discharge head of 113 psig,
- 3. Cycling each valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation through at least one complete cycle of full travel, and
- 4. Verifying that each fire suppression pump starts and maintains the fire suppression water systes pressure of 125 psig or more,
- f. At least 'once per 3 years by perfoming a flow tast of the system in accorcance with Chapter 6, Section 15, of the Fire Protection Handbook.
15th Edition, published try the National Firs Protection Association.
4.7.7.1.2 The diesel driven fire suppression pump shall be d4eonstrated OPERABLE: .
- a. At least once per 31 days by:
- 1. Verifying the fuel day tank contains at least 150 gaitons of fuel.
- 2. Starting the diesel driven pump free eseient conditions and operating for greater than or equal to 30 minutes on recirculation flow.
- b. At least once per $2 days by verifying that a sample of diesel fuel free the fuel starege tank, obtained in accordance with ASTWD4057-81, l 1s within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM 0975-81 l
when checked for viscosity, water, and sediment.
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At least once per 18 month;[h :; kr _9hy subjecting the diesel l
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to an inspection in accordance wtth proceduN prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for tk. class of service. .
NINE MILE POIKT - UNIT 2 3/4 7-25 APR 04 5
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FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS MALON SYSTO'.S LIMITING f0NDITIONS FOR OPERATION --
3.7.7.4 The following Halon systems shall be OPERABLE with the storage tanks having at least 95% of full charge weight or level"and 9G% of full cnarge 'h pressure: i ZONE W BUILDING / ELEVATION 353 SG Control /288' 6" 354 SG Control /288' 6" 362 SG Control /288' 6" 357 XG Control /288' 6" 358 XG Control /288' 6' 374 SG Control /306' 0" 375 SG Control /306' 0" 381 SG Control /306' 0" 376 XG Control /306' 0
APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment protected by the Halon systems is required to be OF N LE.
ACTION:
- a. With one or more of the above required Halon systems inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for those areas in which redundant systems or components could be damaged; for other areas, establish an hourly fire watch patrol.
- b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable. .,
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.7.4 Each of the above mquired Halon systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve-manual, power-operated, or automatic in the flow path is in its correct position.
- b. At least once per 6 months by verifying Halon storage tank weight en*=
M or luel" and f rusurt.
- /gsul cleftroninathn f fht furfest of Stnhiy $d/cn JfN 0NW'HY Mati con {em to NRC dut,Did UL or FM ded procciutt s a"O'
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Subject:
Change to Technical Specification Definition 1.42, " Source Check" The requested Change and justification for the change were Submitted to you in a letter dated July 24, 1986. That letter is enclosed for your infonnation.
CHAEE REQUESTED FOR CERTIFICATION f.N i,r e d .,
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DEFINITIONS SHUTDOb'N MARGIN 1.39 (Continued) assumed to be fully withdrawn and the reactor is in the' shutdown condition, cold (i.e., 6B'F), and xenon free.
SITE BOUNDARY i, 1.40 The SITE BOUNDARY shall be that line around the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station beyond which the land is not owned, leased, or.otherwise controlled by the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation or the New York State Power Authority.
50 LID 1FICAT10N 1.41 SOLIDIFICATION shall be the conversion of wet wastes into a form that j rneets shipping and burial ground requirements. 1 I
J SOURCE CHECK 1.42 A SOURCE CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel response-tt-m i f, e l o m end/cr tri; f.,xti;n; :. O..r. 1 f.il.r; trips when the channel sensor is exposed to a source of increased, activity. s 4.04 L~1. L,,N L.w' STAGGERED TEST BASIS ' A %E 1.43 A STAGGERED TEST BASIS shall consist of:
L.e uy
- a. A test schedule for n systems, subsystems, trains, or other designated components obtained by dividing the specified test interval into n equal subintervals.
- b. The testing of one system, subsystem, train, or other designated component at the beginning of each subinterval.
THERMAL POWER -
1,44 THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.
TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 1.45 The TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME consists of two time intervals:
a, Time from initial movement of the main turbine stop valve or control valve until 80% of turbine bypass capacity is established, and
, b. the time from initial movement of the sain turbine stop valve or control f valve until initial movement of the turbine bypass valve.
- Either response time may be measured by any series of sequential, overlap- '
ping, or total steps, so that both entire response time components are measured.
l NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 1-8 j 1
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Subject:
Justification for changes to Technical Specification Table 3.6.3-1, .
" Primary Containment Isolation Valves" 1
I The requested changes are enclosed. The changes are consistent to our letter dated July 3,1986 which requested three relief valves to be tested under reverse flow condition and 13 relief valves.to be exempt from Type C testing. ,
l Our letter dated July 3,1986 is also. enclosed for your_ infomat ion.
- i. Subsequent discussion with Mr. J. Kudrick and Ms. M. Haughey..of your staff, resolved their review concerns.
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\" " '/ SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
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( RELATED TO APPENDIX J TO 10 CFR 50 TESTING l
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,NINE MILE _ POINT UNIT 2 DOCKET N0. 50-410 INTRODUCTION By letter dated July 3,1986, the applicant withdrew a request for exemption from Section III C of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 for 16 relief valves. The exemption request was to eliminate the need to locally leak rate test these l valves per the requirements identified under the type C test program. The withdrawal was based on several factors. Three of the valves were determined to be capable of reverse flow testing. As a result, these valves will be type C air tested in accordance with Appendix J. The remaining 13 valves will have their discharge lines modified, prior to fuel load, so that they do not represent a containment atmospheric leak path. Specifically, the vacuum breakers will be seal welded closed. This modification eliminates the pathway l to the containment atmosphere since the discharge pipes end within the suppression pool and below the minimum post-Loca drawdown water level.
EVALUATION The staff has reviewed the requested exemption withdrawal for 16 relief valves from Section III C of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50. The applicant has reevaluated l
the potential of reverse testing. The results have enabled him to include that for three valves, the reverse test is as conservative as a forward test.
Therefore, these three valve will be tested in the reverse direction, which is in compliance with the requirements of Appendix J.
The remaining 13 valves with their associated ' piping will be modified, prior to fuel load, to eliminate them as potential containment atmosphere leak pathways. This will be accomplished by seal welding closed the discharge line vacuum breakers. The weld will be continuous and leak checked to assure a leak tight barrier. In addition, discussions with the applicant have indicated the elimination of the vacuum breaker function will not cause steam condensation loads to exceed design. After these modifications have been made, the 13 relief valve can be assumed to qualify for hydrostatic rather than pneumatic testing. As a result, Appendix J requirements are not applicable.
Therefore, an exemption from the Type C testing requirements is not required.
CONCLUSION The staff concurs with the approach taken by the applicant to withdraw the exemption request for 16 relief valves.. For three valves, the reverse .
directicn tests puts these valves in complete compliance with Appendix J j requirements. Therefore :; exemption is needed. For the remaining 13 relief valves, the comitted to < modifications would make Appendix J requirements inapplicable. Therefore, the exemption request is not necess6ry.
FINAL DRAFT l he
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l HNAL DRAFT TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued) .
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES l
TABLE NOTATION
" Isolates on injection signal, not primary containment is'olation signal.
(a) See Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-4, for valve groups operated by isolation signal (s).
(b) Deleted.
(c) These valves are the RHR heat exchangers vent lines isolation valves. The vent line connects to the RHR safety relief valves (SRVs) Discharge Header ;
before it penetrates the primary containment. The position indicators for these valves are provided in the Control, Room for remote manual isolation. i (d) Type C leakage tests not required.
(e) The associated instrument lines shall not be isolated during Type A test- '
ing. Type C testing is not required. These valves shall be tested in ,
accordance with Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.4. !
(f) These valves are check valves, located on the vacuum breaker lines for RHR SRVs discharge headers. The SRV discharge header terminates under pool water and therefore has no containment isolation valves other than those on lines feeding into it.
(g) 25LS"MOV5A and B are globe stop check valves. These valves close upon reverse flow. The motor operator is provided to remote manually close.the valve from the control room.
(h) These valves are testable check valves. They close upon reverse flow.
The air operator on each valve ic provided only for periodic testing of the valve. These valves can only be tested against a zero d/p.
(i) Valves are. maintained closed and the lines are capped. Valves are Type C tested.
(j) Not primary containment penetration isolation valves. These valves close on an isolation signal to provide integrity of "A" and "B" LPCI loops.
(k) Valves close on a SCRAM signal; not pa"rt of primary containment isolation system but are included here for Type C testing per Specification 3.6.1.2. i These valves are not required to be OPERABLE per this specification but are required to be OPERABLE per Specification 3.1.3.1.
(1) Not subject to Type A or Type C leak test because of constant monitoring under constant-1800 psig pressure and the possible detrimental effects of shutdown.
(m) Not subject to Type C test per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. A hydrostatic test ;
- is performed in accordance with Specification 4.6.1.2.d.3.
(n) These valves are Type C tested in the reverse direction.
NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 6-34 JUN 2 5 gg
l
- \
> SALP INPUT FROM THE PLANT SYSTEM BRANCH FOR NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES A. Licensing Activities
- 1. Management Involvement in Assuring Quality During the review process the licensee's activities exhibited little evidence of prior planning.
Rating: 3
- 2. Approach to Resolution of Technical Issues from a Safety Standpoint.
During the review some issues were not resolved in a timely manner Rating: 3
- 3. Responsive to NRC Initiatives Rating: N/A
- 4. Staffing (including Mananement)
Rating: N/A
- 5. Reporting and Analysis of Reportable Events.
Rating: N/A C. Training and Qualification Effectiveness.
Rating: N/A
- 7. Overall rating for Licensing Activity Functical Area:
Rating: 3 .
I
4fg 5 /////E~ MILE POINT - UNIT 1
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.f 5, INTRODUCTION
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w II. BALL ANO SEAT REPAIRS The balls were r emoved from.all eight valves and shipped to the ;
manufacturer for evaluation and repair. The tungsten carbide l
coating was then removed ~and the underlying Haynes overlay repaired as required in acordance with code rules. Ball s/n 16 and 2 did not need repair to the overlay and were recoated at the Union Carbide f acility, restoring them to the original specified condition.
Ball s/n 8 & 2 had the Haynes overlay repaired by welding and Doll s/n C, wwsw olov tevvoLed at the Union Carbide facility.
3 & 7 would have required extensive repair and it was considered more .e s p a d.i a n+ to r1onerf acnre ret 1acemen& %0 t s ci \ 416ny enn Fng spare castings. (s/n 5, 11, 14 & 15) The replacement and recoated balls were re-installed in the MSIV's as follows:
Replacements
~
i Valve 6D 73 7C ?D Ball s/n 15 11 14 5 l Recoated l
Valve 6A 6B 6C 7A .
Ball s/n 16 8 12 2 Fe2.M-??- 4 3 g
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T All the seats were removed from the MS!V's and returned to si'hI'I manufacturer for repair. Scratches on the seats w e' r.e removed by machining. Where possible t .i e seats were restored to the as specified condition, this involved weld repairs to some seats.
Seats which required extensive repair were scrapped and replacement seats manufactured.
Upon re-assembly of the MSIV's the springs in the spring packs were re-configured such that the seats were eccentrically leaded on the ball. This re-configuration is shown in Figure 4-8 of the Final 52.55(e) Report dated 10/21/86.
Thrust washers of a bronze material were f abricated and installed during re-assembly of the valves. The thrust washer aids in the centering of the ball within the valve during installation. Our experience indicates that the ball does not rest on the washer subsequent to installation.
The spool bore packing originally specifie? is no longer available.
Replacement packing (Chesterten 10000) was specified by the valve manuf acturer snd was installed in MSIV's 6A, 6B, 60 and 70. Sucsequent supplies of this packing were undersized. The packing manufacturer was not able to provide consistent lots of packing. An alternate packing (Lattytex 117) was specified by the valve vendor and this was inscalled in MS!V's ?A, ?B, 70 and 6D.
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, g12. ACTUATOR MODIr1 CAT 10N .
' Tg The MSIV actuator was modified to ensure positive, iepeatable %
fast closures commensurate with the 3 to 5 second time constraint.
The modified actuator is shown in Tigure 4-1 of the Final MSIV Acutator Report. The rnechanical' istching mechanism which includes trip solenoids, pivot plate, and blocking lever pivot assembly, was removed. Added to the actuator was a jockey pump and an accumulator which are used to maintain hydraulic pressure in the cylinder. The jockey pump has a capacity of .48 gpm and will maintain the system pressure between 1100 and 1300 psig. The accumulator is a steel cylinder and a piston with a nitrogen precharge of 825 psig. This pressure has been adjusted for ambient temperature conditions inside 'the geliminary] containment and steam tunnel.
A flow control valve is utilized between the accumulator and hydraulic j header to permit accumulator recharging h slow controlled.
flow release inte the system. This flow into the system does not compromise the fast closure of the MSIV. A check valve has i been insta'. led on the discharge of the jockey pump.
The' r e vised design cf the actuator requires that the Target Rock i
^
solenoid valves be continuously energized in the closed position.
Since tight shut off and fast repeatable valve opening is essential, a new disc o-ring and graphite impregnated teflon backup ring were installed in the SOV's. To insure tight sealing in the hydraulic cylinder, enhanced piston lip seals were installed. Other new features of the cylinder include a mechanical adjustable stop on the low pressure side of the cylinder to assure the ball is j
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in the 100 % full open position. An orifice was inserted 'in' ,
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high pressure inlet / outlet line to the cyl'mder to maintain fast MA 9
closi,ng time between 3 to 5 seconds. Additionally, 'twg pressure )
switches were added to start and stop the jockey pump at the low and high pressure system setpoints.
The actuation logie for the revised MSIV actuator was changed to reflect the new mode of operation. The major changes involved:
- 2. Addition of hydraulic pressure control to the new jockey pump.
- 3. Addition of back-up pressure contrcl to the main pump in the event of pressure switch of jockey pump fai;ure.
- 4. Suitable alarms nonitoring low hyd raulic pressure ,and excessive pockey pump cycling.
5 Addition of RPS test menitoring circuit to detect failure of the test reset circuit.
- 6. Addition of dual power sources f or all hydraulic solenoids.
- 7. Addition of a UPS source of pcwer to the test solenoid.
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- 8. Revision to the surveillance test reset circuitry to y
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improve operator interaction. s j
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All the above changes were implemented te enhance MSIV availability without affecting the valve's. ability to perform its safety related function of closing upoh receipt of an emergency trip signal. l IV. TYPE "C" LEAKAGE TEST RESULTS All eight MSIV's have been successfully Type "C" tested as described in Appendix 9.3 cf the Final MSIV Leakage Report. The le*k, a age
- s, test results are as follows:
Valve 6A 6B 6C 60 Final Leakage Rate 2.93 1.65 1.22 4.697 s
valve 7A 7B 7C 7C Final Leakage Rate 5.997 5.63 5,524 1.22 i-The test method used was between the seats which has proven to Q:
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bG conservative by t9 sting both seat i por 4ther than
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V. ACTUATOR TEST RESULTS A test actuator located at the. manufacturer's facility was utilized to verify acceptable operability of the final " hydraulic latch"
. actuator design. This same actuator had previously undergone seismic / dynamic qualification shake table testing at Wyle Labs.
Operability testing of this test
, actuato(fl1Eed)with the modified hydraulic system began on August 29, 1986, with over 70 actuator trip tests per f ormed since then. On September 23, 1986, the solenoid operated valves on the test actuator were equipped with the final EP rubber o-ring / graphite filled teflon (TFE) backing ring combination, and twelve actuator trips were performed. Each of the twelve trip tests using this combination of Sov ring material verified that the actuator closes within the required 3 to 5 seconds every~
time; there were no unsuccessful trips. The latest trip test was successf elly per f ormed on December 4, 1986 after the actuator
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had been held in the open position by the hydraulic system for l e period of thirty-eight days.
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DCO.8396 10:51 NMPC 9 MILE Fo!NT C2 LYCoMING NY P.09 TABLE 1
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SUMMARY
OF RESULTS FOR ACTUATOR TESTING USING FINAL SOV DISO SEAL a.,
Test Results _ (Seconds)
Actuator Time at SOV Trip Stroke Total Date Pressure Time Time Time Remarks 9/23/86 <30 min. 0.4 3.2 3.6 No Spring Spacer 9/24/86 15 brs. c .~ 4 3.2 3.6 No Spring Spacer 9/24/B6 <30 min. 0.5 3 .~ 3 3. 8- So Spring Spacer 9/29/96 <30 min. 0.4 3.1 3.5 No Spring Spacer 9/30/86 16 hrs. 0.4 3.2 3.6 No Spring Space:
10/8/86 3 days- 0.3 3.2 3.5 Nc Spring Spacer 1 l
10/10/86 15 nrs. e.5 3.2 3.7 No Spring Spacer 10/10/86 <30 min. 0.4 3.3 3.7 No Spring Spacer 19/15/86 5 days 0.3 3.3 3.6 No Spring Spacer 10/27/86 12 days c.4 3.3 3.7 No Spring Spseer
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10/27/86 6.5 hrs. 0.2 3.1 3.3 Spring Spacer Installed
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DCC.03 'E6 16:CE NMPC 9 MILE POINT C2 LYCoMING NY P.03 INSERT .
NEED PkE-OP TEST RESULTS .
f VI. MSIV TESTING BETWEEN PRE OPERATIONAL ANO 100 HOUR WARANTEE RUN At various test conditions all MSIV's will be tested to verify
- fast stroking closure and 60 close and open inservice test. Details of the various tests at different test conditions and power levels are summarized in the table below.
MSIV TESTING BETWEEN PREOP AND 100 HOUR WARANTEE RUN TEST CONDITION TEST PARAMETER .
(Fw L ct osvAN TC - Heat Up 1, Fast strok=A sennae +ofnall MSIV's. 47",4- 7/*fE )
.+ r tesreb i%a nd t imi n e a n a.s.
- 2. Inservice test: 6C close and open.
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TC - 3 1. At 50 % power fast strokeAtiming of all MS1V*s. W # 7'""h o u :: 1~u ...u m s :.;u r. = v.-
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.w . r mate POINT cz tyemr W W
,c . , 1. rast stroxo the cos...- --
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. a t JHf % power . (Scun .rm.r//4// fp3 /fy "
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Tc . 6 1. rest stroke (tuice.) the fas$est MSIV at Y t power. (.Ccw sms(bbily iHbyh
- 2. Run full isolation by injecting MS:V
, closure initiation signal and verify that upon receipt of the signal all 8 MSIV's fast closed.
VII. PROT _OTYPE TESTING SCHEDULE 1
I VIII. BALL S/N 4 DAMAGE AND RELATED ACTION .
i one of the recente? hs11 e (a/n 4) was instalind in valve 6D and l Type "C" tested. The test failed and subsequently the ball was remove 3: his ' time minor scoring was noted on the tungsten carbide coating. The apparent cause of the scoring was minor seat to ball misalignment during installation. The misal'ignment is believed f
to have boon caused by a combination peeking tha+ was dimenninnally at the minimum allowable h coupled with spool seat and spool bore dimensions that were also on the non conservative limits l l
of dimensions. The combination of these items allowed the spool 5
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9 sont to misolign during installation causing local,1y high otrosses e on the ball coating which lead to the scoring.
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The scored areas did not penetrate through the tungsten carbide coating and were removed by lapping. This ball was then re-installed in' valve 7B and tested. A .new valve bonnet was used concurrently in this installation. . An interference between the ball riem and new bonnet caused the ball t' h ansi h during its open/close cycle. The result was coating damage due to improper ball movement during cycling.
In order to further assure that leak rate test results are a direct indication of ball and seat conditions, a remote video inspecticn of all balls has been performed. The results have been video taped for record purposes. In no case was. damage (as on s/n 4) ,
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observed. l 0
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DEC 04 *E6 11214 NMFC UNIT 2 RAD WASTE \-
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INTERNAL CO9 DESPONDENCE
,o.m mm u.ci on M Y NIAGARA l
FROM RUMOHAWK J. T. Conway O DISTRICT Nile Point Unit 2y ,
TO R. B.' Abbott DATE October IC, 1980 FILE CODE NMP- 192 98
$UBJECT MSIV TESTING DURINC POWER ASCENSIch Testing of thd Main Steam Isolation Valves during Power Ascension is accomplished in asccordance with startup test 25 which is described in TSAR Tables 14. 2-22 7 and 228.
detailed aumnary of the testing performed at each test A more condition or pleeasu la provided belou with approximate time
- intervals from the start of fuel loading based on the 250 day Power Ascension schedule logic.
Heatup.
- All valves are individually tested (fast closure)
- t at rated temperature and pressure 55 days into the test program.
s TC-3, All valves are individually tested (fast closure) at 50% pouer 150 days into the program.
TC-5, The fastest valve is tested (fast closure) at 70% power 180 daya into the program.
TC-6 The fastest valve is tested (fast closure) at 80% power 105 days into thti program.
1 All valves are tested (full isolation + scran) at 95% power 220 days into the program.
In summary all the valves will enperience fast closures a ~
minimuc of three (3) times and the fastest valve vill experience five (5).
an additional two (2) closures for a total of These are the minimum requirements as described in the FSAR.
It may be desirable to demonstrate individual closure at the maximum postulated power level for scram avcidance; however, this ;is not required. This does not include.psrtial closure l testing (RPS or Inservice Testing).
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