ML20236A241
| ML20236A241 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 02/17/1989 |
| From: | Lorion J CENTER FOR NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITY, LORION, J. |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| CON-#189-8227 89-584-01-LA, 89-584-1-LA, OLA-4, NUDOCS 8903170001 | |
| Download: ML20236A241 (22) | |
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BEFORE THE UNITED STATES U [c
' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 79 . FEB 21 P6 :19 In the Matter of- ) . Docket Nos. 50-25Q7pLA... , , .
. )' 50-251.gp h ,f,a n*
. Florida Power & Light Company ) rr'"
) ASLBP No. 89-584-01.LA Turkey Point, Units-3 & 4 ) (Pressure / Temperature:
)- Amendments) .
PETITIONERS' AMENDED REQUEST FOR HEARING AND PETITION FOR LEAVE'TO INTERVENE I. INTRODUCTION On October 19, 1988, a notice was published in the Federal Register announcing the proposed. issuance of amendments to the Technical Specifications for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. 53 Eed. Reg. 40988. The proposed amendments.would modify the-pressure / temperature units for the reactor coolant system and the pressurizer for each unit.
On November 17, 1988, the Center for Nuclear Responsibility,
'Inc. (" Center") and Joette Lorion, collectively referred to herein as " Petitioners," filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") a Request for Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene (" Petition") concerning Florida Power & Light's
("FPL") amendment request.
On January 10', 1989, the NRC Staff issued Amendment Nos. 134 and 128 to the operating licenses for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 respectively, revising the pressure / temperature ("P/T") limits for the Turkey Point units along with their Safety Evaluation and Final Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration.
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. Shortly thereafter, on January 19, 1989, the Atomic Safety and Licensing-Board (" Board") issued an order directing Petitioners to serve their contention (s) on or before February 13, 1989.
Petitioners then requested and were granted an extension of time to' file and serve their contentions until February 17, 1989.
II. BACKGROUND There is a high, increasing likelihood that someday.soon, during a seemingly minor malfunction at any of a dozen or more nuclear power plants around the United States, the steel vessel that houses the radioactive core is going to crack like a piece ot glass. The result will be a core meltdown, the most serious kind of nuclear accident.
"The Risk of a Meltdown," New York Times (March 29, 1982),
attached The Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 pressure vessel welds are among the most embrittled in the entire United States. For that reason, these reactor vessels are more susceptible to rupturing from thermal shock when the plant is starting up, cooling down, or during accident conditions. A rupture of the reactor pressure vessel could result in the melting of the reactor core and release of the radioactive material therein. Emergency core cooling systems in the present generation of r.eactors are not designed to prevent core melting stemming from breaks in the vessel itself. According to NUREG/CR2239, a full scale accident at Turkey Point could kill and injure hundreds of thousands of
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s people in the Miami area and could cause 43 billion dollars in i.
l property damage.
The pressure / temperature limits currently being revised for Turkey Point-Units 3 and 4 are'among the most limiting condi-tions of operation for any nuclear plant because they define the (
permissible operating envelope during reactor heatup, cooldown, criticality, and testing, and are designed to ensure safe operation of the reactor pressure vessel, a critical piece of safety equipment. These limits are required to be based on the most limiting nil-ductility reference temperature (RTNDT) for the respective reactor units. Since the RTNDT, when based on tests of reactor surveillance weld samples for the respective units, is an accurate assessment of radiation embrittlement damage to the vessel welds, it is necessary to accurately and conservatively account for the effects of irradiation and other reactors on RTNDT in order to set conservative pressure /
temperature limits and to protect the public from a pressurized thermal shock accident and subsequent meltdown of the reactor core. It is for the above reasons and for those reasons stated in the contentions that follow that Petitioners are requesting-a hearing on these very important pressure / temperature amendments.
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III. AMENDED PETITION AND CONTENTIONS Petitioners, the Center for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc.
and Joette Lorion, request a hearing and leave to intervene in the above license amendment proceedings.
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l- 1. The Center for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. and Joette Lorion request that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission grant them a hearing and allow them to intervene in the above-captioned license amendment proceeding concerning the Turkey Point nuclear power plants as allowed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Rules of Practice.
- 2. The Center for Nuclear Responsibility is a corporation i with its principal place of business in Miami, Florida. The Center is an environmental organization.
- 3. Many of the Center's members live, work, vacation in, and otherwise use and enjoy a geographic area within the immediate vicinity of the Turkey Point nuclear power plants and would suffer consequences if a serious nuclear accident occurred at these facilities.
Thus, the Center and its members are significantly and adversely affected by the final agency action proposed in the October 19, 1988 Federal Register Notice. The Center is an appropriate party to represent the interest of persons similarly situated whose interests might otherwise go unrepresented. Some members of the Center who may be affected are:
Joette Lorion, 7269 S.W. 54 Avenue, Miami, FL 33143 Dr. Steven Meyerson, 12660 S.W. 97 Place, Miami, FL 33176 Brenda Meyerson, 12660 S.W. 97 Place, Miami, FL 33176
- 4. Joette Lorion is an individual who lives, works, and owns property real and personal in and about the city of South Miami, Florida, approximately 15 miles from the Turkey Point plants, and otherwise uses and enjoys a geographic area within the immediate vicinity of those plants. Her interest, and that' of her family, could also be significantly and adversely affected if a serious nuclear accident occurred at the Turkey Point nuclear reactors. As Director of the Center, she is an appropriate party to represent the interests of others similarly situated whose interests might otherwise go unrepresented.
15 . The Commission's issuance of the proposed license amendments in the manner sought by the Licensee, Florida Power
& Light Company, operation of the Turkey Point nuclear power plant Units 3 and 4 would:
(a) involve a significant increase in the probability and consequences of a serious nuclear accident; i
(b) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; (c) involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
- 6. If permitted to intervene, the petitioners would address the following contentions: '
CONTENTION 1: That the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff's Final Determination of No Significant Hazards Considera-tion issued on January 10, 1989 in support of license amendment nos. 134 and 128 issued to allow FPL to revise the pressure /
temperature limits for Turkey Point nuclear units 3 and 4 respectively, is based on incomplete, faulty and i non-conservative data, is in error, and should be reviewed by this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in order to protect the
'public health and safety from a loss of pressure vessel integrity and subsequent meltdown.
BASES-FOR COhrENTION 1: The issue for consideration in-revising new pressure / temperature limits for the Turkey Point reactors is whether the new limits could cause the loss of reactor pressure vessel. integrity, which could in turn cause the most feared reactor accident--a meltdown. The NRC Staff in reviewing the amendment request and making their Final Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration has erred because they have based their analysis on substantial uncertainties, incomplete data, and non-conservative assumptions in the prediction of adjusted reference temperature nil-ductility-transfer (RTNDT) for the reactor units.
Petitioners contend that the NRC could not make a valid determination of a no significant hazard consideration because (a) the NRC Staff has allowed FPL to use Unit 3' test
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surveillance data to set the pressure / temperature limits for the more severely embrittled Unit 4 reactor unit; (b) the NRC Staff has allowed FPL to use a lower percentage of copper than is identified in the historical documents for both Units 3 and 4 to predict the RTNDT for those respective units and to revise the pressure / temperature limits. Petitioners contend that because the NRC Staff permitted FPL to use Unit 3 reactor test surveillance capsule data to predict the RTNDT and pressure / temperature limits for Unit 4 rather than the plant-specific data, and because the Staff permitted FPL to predict the RTNDT and pressure limits based on a
non-conservative estimate of copper content in the welds, the Staff was unable to accurately determine whether or not:the issuance of license amendment nos. 134 and 128 was and is a significant hazards consideration. Thus, this Board must review the Staff's decision in order to protect the public health and safety from the consequences of a loss of pressure vessel integrity and suosequent meltdown that could result from the Staff's error.
CONTENTION 2: That the revised temperature / pressure limits that have been set for Turkey Point Unit 4 are non-conservative and will cause that reactor unit to exceed the requirements of General Design Criterion 31 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, which requires that the reactor coolant pressure boundary be designed with a sufficient margin to ensure that, when stressed under operating, maintenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions, (1) the boundary behaves in a non-brittle menner and (2) the probability of a rapidly propagating fracture is minimized.
Petitioners contend that the new pressure / temperature limits could cause the reactor vessel to exceed these requirements because the Licensee has based its calculation of the predicted RTNDT for Unit 4 partly on surveillance capsule V test results from Turkey Point Unit 3 rather than predicting the RTNDT for Unit 4 based on Unit 4 capsule V surveillance capsule data--a practice which is not scientific, not valid, and could cause the Unit 4 reactor to behave in a brittle manner which would make the chances of a pressure vessel
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-failure and resultant meltdown more likely. Petitioners contend that predictions of RTNDT and pressure / temperature limits derived from the shift in nil-ductility transfer should be based only on plant-specific Unit 4 data, especially in light of the fact that the only tests ever performed on Unit 4 weld specimens demonstrated that the weld material in the Unit 4 vessel was 30% more brittle than that of Unit 3. Because Unit 4's weld material is more embrittled, Petitioners contend that the FPL Integrated Surveillance program does not meet the Requirements of 10 CFR Appendix G Parts V.A and V.B. and 10 CFR Appendix H, including Appendix H Parts IIC and IIIB. Finally, Petitioners contend that the surveillance capsule V for Unit 4 should be tested to establish the new pressure / temperature limits and should the testing indicate that the RTNDT for Unit 4 has passed the 300-degree Farenheit screening criterion set by the NRC, Unit 4 should be shut down until it is demonstrated that the Unit 4 reactor pressure vessel can maintain its integrity beyond this limit.
BASES FOR CONTENTION 2: RTNDT is an important aspect of revising pressure / temperature limits. It is widely acknowledged that the RTNDT should be based on plant-specific data. Accor-ding to the Southwest Research Institute in their report on the Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, dated May 1979, the data obtained from the V capsules, which were to be removed from both units after 7 EFPY operation, was to provide the information necessary to revise the heat-up and cooldown limitations for operation beyond 10 l - _ ------- _ ---_---_---_ -_ _ _ _ _ _
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capsule V test data from the less severely affected reactor
[ Unit 3 for predicting the RTNDT and revising the heat-up and-L cooldown limits. Additionally, Dr.! George Sih, Director of Fracture Mechanics at Leheigh University, stated in a letter to Martin Hodder, the Center's attorney in a previous lawsuit, the following about the practice of using Unit 3 data to predict the rate of embrittlement for Unit 4:
The rate at which the beltline weld material deteriorates and/or embrittles depends on the n.ombined effects of irradiation and pressurized thermal shock. It is plant-specific in the sense that the influence differs inherently from one unit to another. In other words, the metallurgical properties alone cannot determine the damage. behavior of the welds. the loading history plays a major role. Unless the rates of irradiation, fluctuations in thermal gradients and time variation in pressure are exactly the same for both Units No. 3 and No. 4,.one is not justified to assume that data collected in Unit No. 3 could be applied to predict the behavior of Unit No. 4. Hence, conclusions drawn on RTNDT for Unit No. 4 based on the data of Unit No. 3 cannot be considered valid.
In addition, Dr. Sih analyzed the only test results ever performed on the weld metal of Turkey Point Unit.4, and, in a chart attached to the letter, demonstrated that according to FPL's own test data Unit 4 has already passed the 300-degree NRC screening criterion. '(See attached.) Thus, it is both non-conservative and unsafe to use Unit 3 data to predict pressure / temperature limits that will govern the operation of the more severely embrittled reactor 4 vessel.
g CONTENTION 3: That the revised pressure / temperature limits that have been set for Units 3 and 4 are non-conservative and.
will not meet the requirements of General Design Criterion 31 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 which requires that the reactor coolant pressure boundary be designed with sufficient margin to ensure that, when stressed under. operating,' maintenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions,.(1)'the boundary
- behaves in a~non-brittle manner and (2) the probability of a rapidly propagating fracture is minimized. Petitioners contend that the sufficient safety margin required by GDC 31 does not exist because the P/T limits for Units 3 and 4 were not based on the most limiting value of RTNDT as required by 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix G and H, for reactor vessel welds because the percentage of copper that was used in the RTNDT calculation is non-conservative in that it is lower than the percentage of copper that was used in previous surveillance test reports and lower than the percentage of copper quoted in many of the earlier FPL documents. Petitioners contend that the use of this non-conservative estimate of copper content means that the adjusted RTNDT is unrealistically low and that the current revised P/T limits are not restrictive enough to ensure that an adequate margin of safety against brittle fracture of the reactor vessel exists. This increases the possibility that the reactor vesses for Unit 4 will behave in a brittle manner resulting in a fracture of the vessel and subsequent meltdown of the reactor core.
Petitioners further contend that if a more conservative and-accurate estimate of copper content was used to calculate the RTNDT, the P/T limits would be more restrictive and that in fact, there is a possibility that it could be discovered that the NRC screening criterion of 300-degree Farenheit has been reached and the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 would have to be shut down because they do not meet the fracture toughness requiremerr of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix G.
BASES FOR COhrzNTION 3: According to the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) Review of Pressurized Thermal Shock. NUREG CR Zall, conservative estimates of embrittlement of the welds-should be made by assuming the worst possible weld chemistry and maximum credible nickel and copper content for a reactor unit. In their prediction of RTNDT, FPL assumed a copper content of .26, while many of the earlier documents on Turkey Point assumed a copper content of .30 or above. According to the PNL report, a lowering of the copper content by a few hundredths of a percent of copper can lower the RTNDT by 10-15 degrees. Thus, because FPL has used a non-conservative copper content in calculating the adjusted RTNDT for the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, it follows that the revised P/T limits which use this non-conservative RTNDT as a basis are also non-conservative and increase the possibility that when stressed these pressure vessels will behave in a brittle manner, resulting in a fracture of the vessel and subsequent meltdown of the core. This is especially disturbing in light of recent information that demonstrates that the Charpy Notch capsule V weld metal
specimens'which were removed from Unit 311ndicate'that the measured.Charpy upper-shelf energy _for the limiting beltline weld material already does not meet-the fracture. toughness requirements of 10 CFR Appendix G Section V.C.
IV.- CONCLUSION For all the above stated reasons and because a rupture of the reactor vessel at Turkey Point would result in a core melt
. accident that could kill and injure hundreds of thousands of-people in the Miami area, Petitioners ask that their Petition
< for Leave to Intervene be granted so that the issues raised concerning the revision of the Pressure / Temperature limits can be reviewed by an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in a formal hearing process so that the public health and safety can be-protected.
Respectfully submitted _
J o
- b ci w J0ETTE LORION Director, Center for Nuclear Responsibility 7210 Red Road, #217 Miami, Florida 33143 (305) (661-2165 DATED: February 17, 1989 l
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, DOCKETED UNITED STATES OF' AMERICA USNRC
-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 39 FB3 21 P6:20 In the Matter o ) (U C E " ~ 4, .
( ) v0CKEim . , jg :
FLORIDA POWER F LIGHT CO. )
Docket Nos. 50-250 OLA."- "
y 50-251 OLA Turkey Point Plant )
Units 3 and 4 (Pressure / Temperature Amendments)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of Petitioners' " Amended Petition for Leave to Intervene and Request for Hearing" have been served on the following parties by deposit in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid on the date shown below:
Dr. Paul Cotter John T. Butler Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Steel, Hector & Davis U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4000 SE Financial Center.
Washington, D.C. 20$55 Miami, Florida 33131 Glenn O. Bright Steven P. Frantz Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Newman & Holtzinger P.C.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1615 L. Street NW Washington, D.C. 20555 Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20036 Jerry Harbour Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Office of Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Janice Moore Office of General Counsel k E" Joette Lorion U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Director, Center for Washington, D.C. 20555 Nuclear Responsibility 7210 Red Road #217 Miami, Florida 33143 Dated: February 17, 1989 (305) 661-2165
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LEHIGH UNIVERSITY: i Institute of Fracture and Solid Mechanics : . .
'i Packard Lab. Bids. #19 BETHLEHEM. PENNSYLVANIA 19015 g
. Telex No. Lehigh Univ. UD 73o.6701086 . ,
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October 10, 1985 f.
1 Attorney Martin H.:Hodder ..
t 1131 N.E. 86th Street Miami, Florida. 33138 RE: Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Unit No. 4: Reactor Vessel Embrittlement and Surveillance Program
Dear Attorney Hodder:
In response to your letter dated August 29,1985 and the above referenced subject matter, I have read the package of documents on the RPV. embrittlement prograc at Turkey Point Unit No. 4. A number of supporting arguments with ref-erence to the calculation of ARTg are questionable, if not invalid from the scientific view point. In what follows, the SWRI report and the FPL letter shall be referred to as [1]* and [2]**, respectively., - -
(1) SWRI Prediction [1]
-Based on the RPV material surveillance methodology, SWRI [1] estimated the shift in RT NDT for Turkey Point Unit No. 4. The results pertaining to wall location 1/4T based on the data of Capsule T in terms of EFPY are sumarized graphically on the sheet attached to this letter. The shift in RTNDT is found to.be a: proximately 324*F at 8 EFPY. This is beyond the NRC screening value of 300*F.
E. B. Norris, " Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program for Turkey Point Unit No. 4: Analysis of Capsule T", Southwest Research Institute Technical Re-port No. 02-4221, June 1976. .
Letter, Uhrig FPL, to Eienhut, "Re: Turkey Point Unit 4, Docket Nos. 50-251, PTS to Reactor Pressure Vessels", January 21,1982.
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(2) FPL Response [2]
With reference to the material in Docket No. 50-251 on PTS of RPV as stated in [2], a lower ARTNDT value of 211*F was objained for Uni! No. 4. This result, however, was obtained by application of the surveillance data taken from Turkey Point Unit No. 3. The justification was that the metallurgical propert.ies 1-of the beltline welds of the Turkey Points Units No. 3 and No. 4 are the same and that data on Unit No. 4 are not sufficient.
A
! (3) Comments .
I The rate at which the beltline weld material deteriorates and/or em-brittles depends on the combined effects of irradiation and pressurized thermal shock. It is plant-specific in the sense that the influence differs inherently from one unit to another. In other words, the metallurgical properties alone cannot determine the damage behavior of the welds. The Lomfing hi4 tory plays a major role. Unless the rates of irradiation, fluctuations in thermal gradients and time variation in pressure are exactly the same for both Units No. 3 and No. 4, one is not justified to assume that data collected in Unit No. 3 could be applied to predict the behavior of Unit No. 4. Hence, conclusions drawn on NDT for Unit No. 4 based on the data of Unit No. 3 cannot be considered valid.
ART I will not delve into the other details concerning the actual calculation of ARTNDT as they are beyond the scope of our innediate concern.
Very sincerely yours,
/ f j N' f,.7 George C. '5fh Professor of Mechanics GCS:bd Enclosure 1
4 Data Reprdduced from Table on Page 3 at Wall Location 1/4T, Report by.E. B. Norris, " Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program for Turkey Point Unit No. 4: Analysis of Capsule T",
Southwest Research Institute Technical Report No. 02-4221, -
June 1976. .
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Biography of Dr. George C. M. Sih -
Professor of Mechanics and Director of the Institute of Fracture and Solid Mechanics Dr. Sih is currently Professor of Mechanics and .['irector of the Institute of Fracture and Solid Mechanics at Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
He also holds qe appointment of Adjunct Professor at The Hahnemann Medical Col-lege and Hospit)1 of Philadelphia since 1972. He received his B.S. at the Unf-versity of Portland, Oregon,1953; his M.S. 'at New York University,1957; and Ph.D. at Lehigh University,1960; all of these degrees in Mechanical Engineering. l Dr. Sih has engaged in research in the interaction of mechanical defonnation and heat flow (1960) supported by the Koppers Foundation, in Fracture Mechanics (1960 and 1961) for the Boeing Company Transport Division and (1962 to 1965) for f
j the National Science Foundation, and as a member of the Technical Staff Bell Telephone Laboratory (Summer 1961). He has been engaged as Principal Investigator in more than fifty projects at Lehigh University sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, Naval Research Laboratory, the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-tration, the Air Force, the Anny, etc., all of which are concerned with opti-mizing the use of high performance material with design, e discipline that has been frequently referred to as " Fracture Mechanics". Mt4ch of his work has been l concerned with estimating the remaining life of material and structural components damaged by yielding and/or fracture. He specializes in developing computer soft- 1 ware for predicting the mechanical behavior of structures and the stability of I objects moving through fluid media. His more recent activities are concerned
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l j with the influence of moisture and temperature in composite materials, laser glazing techniques and non-destructive testing methods involving high-voltage 1
electrophotography. ,),
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- From 1953 to 1957.. Dr. Sih was employed by Radio ' Corporation of America as
. .a project and research engineer. He worked on! the research and development of input and output devices for the first generation "Bizmark" computer system.
Among the significant patents he obtained were:
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'1. Adjustable optical system for line printing.
- 2. Automatic magnetic disc printing device for the Xerox process.
In 1957 an 1958, Dr. Sih returned to the academic life and served at the i
1 City College of New York as Lecturer in Mechanical Engineering. He came to Lehigh University in 1958 as Instructor in Engineering Mechanics and was appointed ;
Assistant Professor'after completion of his doctorate. From 1965 to 1966, Dr.. Sih '
held the ' position of Visiting Professor in Aeronautics at the California Institute of Technology and participated in an Air Force research project on the dynamics of a
crack propagation and size effects in the fracture of plates.
l Dr. Sih assumed in 1970 the duties of Regional Editor, International Journal- !
of Fracture Mechanics, and the responsibilities of soliciting and reviewing papers in the field of Fracture Mechanics. From 1971 to 1975, he served as an Associate Editor of the ASME Journal of Applied Mechanics. He is also on the Editorial Ad-visory Board of the Journal of Engineering Fracture Mechanics. He is also Editor- i i
in-Chief of an International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Fracture Mechanics.
Dr. Sih is a Fellow of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and Honorary j Fellow of the International Congress of Fracture. He is also a founding member of the International Cooperative Fracture Institute, an organization established to promote the interchange of ideas and infonnation among active researchers in '
l fracture mechanics.
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Dr.;Sih is also a member of the fu11owing societies:
- 1. Society of Sigma ,Xi .
- 2. ASTM Comittee E-24 on Fracture Testing of Materials 3.- International Society of Engineering Science 4.! American Society of Civil Engineering .
- 5. American Society of Mechanical Engineering ~~
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- 6. International Society for the Interaction of Mechanics and Mathematics
'I Dr. Sih is tie Editor of three book series. Seven volumes on the Mechanics of Fracture series have been or are about to be published:
Volume I - Methods of Analysis and Solutions to Crack Problems,1973 Volume II - Three-Dimensional Crack Problems,1974 Volume III , Plates and Shells with Cracks, 1975 Volume IV - Elastodynamic Crack' Problems,1976 Volume V - Stress Analysis of Notch Problems,1976, Volume VI - Cracks in Composite Materials, 1980 Volume VII - Experimental Evaluation of Stress Concentration and Intensity Factors, 1980 The two other series are Fatigue and Fracture:
Volume I - Fatigue and Fracture, S. Kocanda,1978 Volume II - Fracture Micromechanics of Polymer Materials, V. S. Kukshenko and V. P. Tamuzh,1980 and Engineering Application of Fracture Mechanics: $
Volume I - Fracture Mechanics Methodology: Evaluation of Structural Compo-nents Integrity, edited by G. C. Sih and L. Faria
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Volume II - Mixed Mode Crack Extension by E. E. Gdoutos Volume III . Fracture Mechanics of Concrete: Material Characterization and Testing, edited by A. Carpinteri abd A. Ingraffea Volume IV - Fracture Mechanics of, Concrete: Numerical Analysis and l Structural Appl,I ation by G. C. Sih and A. DiTommaso Volume V - Bonded Repair of Aircraft Structure by A. A. Baker and R. Jones Volume VI - Crack Growth and Material Damage in Concrete: Limit Load and Brittle Fracture by A. Carpinteri l
Dr. Sih has also served as principal organizer and editor of proceedings of several conferences: ,
'" 1. International Conference on " Dynamic Crack Propagation", (1972), Lehigh 1
University o
- 2. International Conference on " Prospects of Fracture Mechanics", (1974),
I The Netherlands
- 3. Conference on " Linear Fracture Mechanics"., (1975), Lehigh University
, ]
- 4. International Conference on " Fracture Mechanics and Technology", (1976), I
. Hong Kong 1
- 5. 14th Annual Meeting of the Society of Engineering Science, (1977), Le- j j high University 3
- 6. First USA-USSR Symposium on " Fracture of Composite Materials". (1978),
USSR
- 7. International Conference on " Fracture Mechanics in Engineering Applica-
, tions", (1979), India i
- 8. International Conference on " Analytical and Experimental Fracture Me-
' chanics",(1980), Italy
- 9. International Conference on " Defects and Fracture", (1980), Poland l
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73, :
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- 10. . International: Conference on "M'i xed Mode. Crack Propagation",'(1980),
lT Greece -
- 11. International Conference on_ " Absorbed. Energy and/or Specific. Strain En-
.. ergy Density Criterion",'(1980). Hungary p
'12. International Conference on'"pefects. Fracture and Fatigue", (1982),
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p Canada- .
- 13. International Conference on " Fracture Mechanics Technology. Applied to
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- Mater'ial Evaluation and Structure Design". '(1982), Australia l
-14. International Conference on " Application of Fracture. Mechanics.to Ma-terialsandStructures".(1983), Germany Dr. Sih has approximately two hundred publications principally in the area !
of solid and fracture mechanics. He has authored and co-authored a total of three- ;
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. books. <
- 1. Handbook of Stress Intensity Factors,1973
- 2. Three Dimensional Crack Problems (with M. K. Kassir),1974 1
- 3. Cracks in Coraposite Materials (with E. P. Chen),1980 I Dr. Sih received the 1975 Achievement' Award from the Chinese Institute of Engineers in the United States and the 1984 Achievement Award from the Chinese i Engineers and Scientists Association of Southern California for his accomplishments in research and teaching in fracture and solid mechanics.
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-Dr. Sih has also been active in serving as members of national comittees. 1 Among them are the National Materials Advisory Board concerning with the Dynamic- )
1 Response of Materiels Subjected to High Strain Rate loading; Ship Materials Fab-rication and Inspection; and other comittees concerning Nuclear Reactor Compo-nents.
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m_
- nsed le the reactor vessels, and with each day of opermom, neutron radia.
2 tlan is maldag the metal more brittle. ..,,..==
- and more prone to crack in case of
- sudden temperature change under
,. priemure.
-g --.=
~ ~.= =_
a
-One ===daenerer of nuclear reac. [y Ik 8 ist
.ters bas. reported to the Nuclear Ragu. .
-latory a==i==ian that in three m . - -
five mero years, the vessels la some
- plants will be too br* tle to operate worker dropped a small light bulb into not mangla vital to the safe operatien
.mfrysBut this estimate is wtahful an lastruneet panel, caustag an elec. af a plans ended up canetag sortens
- stenkang, based on unroelistic as.
- trical short circuit.The shott wreakad problems. . p :
-=rmptions about plant operators' ac. havoc on the plant's control systems The Nuclear Regulatory Coaunis.
.tions and accident sequences. Some - a variety of instrmaants that run slan is charged with ensuring that an.
plants are alrundy too dangerous to , crucial pumps and valves - and the clear plants are operated "witti ads. -
1pperate without correcdve measures. result was that too much water v es quate penracelan" of the public health
. .The er=n ntaten could do a great pomped through the reactor, cht!!ing and safety. But bureaucratic Spes.
Meal to prevent such an accident, and it suddenly. It is very doubtful that dragstag and pr=amupattre wie pub.
strech out the lives of many of these some af the older plans operating- Dc retations and financial problems af
- . brittle vossais if 11 ordered the type of today would be able to withstand the the industry are contributing to a
" corrective steps alrundy taken a7 same shock. Fortunately, Jeancha shortsighted view - that *=ehaient leone Enropean reactors. But the Sece had been in operatica less than Iroblems can watt or do not suist.
mm= immon. regulatmg an industry :wo years; had it been in operation for Some -brs of the staff acknowl.
,that has serious Maanrem' and techni. 10. Its pressure vessel most ilkaly edge the safety problems === aria'ad -
! cal pro 64 ems, instead of taking initia. would have ruptured. -
with control systems, tna the aguacy
+ ttves tands to sweep dif5 cult '=ehaie=1 . The kinds of courol systems that has yet to d=aand from utilities oper.
-problems under the rug reacting to went haywire at Rancho Sace are very ating nuclear.pgwer plants the teclud.
cr.ses only after thry occur. !!katy to fait at cructal times in other cal data en contml systems necessary
, .The rnmnpanion must realize that nuclear. power plants. When a pape to assess the systems' safety
-this crhus is upon us. A temperature bursts, or a seal fails, er a valve inDy.
. change severe enough to crack a brtt. sticks, a'aama'te control and safety It may be that we need unclear
. ,tle reactor vessel alrundy has oc. systams aknost instantly take actice powerio =nenemin eur standard af1tv.
, curred la California, but not at one of to ===panna'a but they do not always tag. But there is a vast differsom be.
the older, more vulnerable plants. The take the rigts actim. tween havtag to aczmpt =amaredng
==nmartsal nuclear todustry's ad. Centrol are not reviewed and making it acceptable. We saa ,
intrabis safety record - no deaths by the Regulatory Commis. make nuclearpower mee==-ha-caused by radiation - still is imact, s6ca. They are not immune to fire or The Nuclear Regulatory Coaunis.
~
but this cannot last much longer, be - power inihne; they often have no ska chairman. Nunaso P=tindina, has cause the reactor vessels and other backups, so are prone to simple fall. apr*= of cleas.ing up our =netaar am.
- critical compnaants are aging, ure. They are not even earthquake. As a private cidaan. I hope that we do
- For many years. It has been known proof. so, h=*aa+a with viritmace at the
- fhat vessels are h~=wa- brittle. 1be N.R.C. staff has taken the pass. N.R.C. One more accleant the sine af What makes the problem urgent is tion that if a plant gets into trouble to. Three M1.te Island's, and the public's
.that the metal is agmg more rap 6dly causeof-4. malfunctions, r==Mir= almost certainly will fare.
than arpae' art and the circumstances it has safety systeens to take care of close the nuclear optson. .
est would cause such an accident now any problems. But this la not so, as unesa morelikaty, ovuus of the last few years show. At Domstrios L. maadahaa is a reacter Ranchs Seco, at Three Mile tat net, sofery mit aser t ws A the Naaclear
' r.esneses.
At er *macha Caut..Seco pts.nt, amar to Marc.h 1575 Sec.
a and at other plama, control systems RagudasoryCommisstori.