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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES i
F. F.
MAUTZ
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e Fr. F. F, Maittz is the Chief Civil Eagineer for P. G.. sad E.- 'He has t
rseponsibility for the.atructural design of the Bodega atomic plant.
Mr. Mautz has been an engineer with P. O. ' arrt E tc.r 28 years,' ever since his Braduation
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.1 with honors as a civil en,gineer from ths,Usiversity of Californin' at Berkeley.
,t in 1936. Since 1946 his respencibilities in the Conrpany have included all phases of P. G. and E. 's thermal power plant design program, sud certain civil 1
structural design responsibilities for hydroelectric pro,jects.' At an early I.
date, Mr. Hautz secuned s, prominent role in the Company's nucleer studies and j
prgeets, incluiling since 1957 studies 'aue. design ef the Bodega atomic plant.
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' T E L f: PHONE aU 14211
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.i REMARKS BY F. F. MAU1'Z.
y Our purpose in going to Alaska was to observe directly the extent of damn 6e to structures caused by the Alaskan earthquake and to determine, to the extent possible, the reason for damage or lack of damage to structures the,re,
. We were particularly interested in finding the relationship, if any, between the damage done by the Alaskan earthquake and our plans for the Bodega i
Bay nuclear plant. Our pre 14=4aa7 information about the Alaskan earthquake -
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had indicated that the damage in Alaska was 2argely due to unstable soil con-ditions, such as do not exist at our Lodega site. But, in the interest of ' com-k pleteness, and in order to learn all that might possibly bear upon our stulies
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of the safety of the Bodega Head reactor site, we wished to make a first hand i
i inspection of the damage in Alaska.
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We found essentially that the damage in the Alaskan quake was due to I
a combination of two factors: (1) poor foundation conditions, and (2) failure T
to follov known atructural design and construction standards for earthquake
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areas.
j Major damage to structures, and usually the more spectacular type of i
damage, was due primarily to soils failures -- that is, massive. slumping and sliding of the ground made possible by the presence of a bluff. This ground
.i was of a type that would be expected to act in such a manner during heavy-
'l earthquake shocks. Such type of ground, as I have indicated, is not found at the Bodega reactor site.
Of particular interest was the manner in which important major struc-tures designed to resist earthquakes, such as power generating stations in the (more)
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TELEPHONE SU 14211 REMARKS BY DR. GEORGE W. HOUSNER PJ conclusions from our inspection trip to Alaska may be sumatarized -
as follows:
1.
The intensity. of ground shaking in Anchorage 'in the frequencies
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pertinent to the design of nuclear power plants was not at all severe, as.
j evidenced by the fact that very few one story buildings were damaged and only a very small fraction of un-reinforced masonry chimneys were toppled by the (j
- shock.
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I saw no evidence of significant damage to any buildinga designed U
and constructed in accordance with approved practice. On the contrary, even some relatively poorly designed and relatively weak buildings survived with only moderate dems6e.'
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Most of the serious damage to ' buildings vcs the result of large f
1 landslides in areas adjacent to bluffs. The landslides were the consequence of i
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I failure of a thick layer of clay which is very soft and slippery when saturated.
News reports dramatized those buildings which were damaged by landslides.
These reports have distorted the over-all picture of the earthquake effect. I estimate that at least 80% of the buildings in Anchorage survived undamaged h.
Although there were few structures founded on rock in the region severely shaken by earthquake, those that were apparently came through vithout trouble.
5 There was nothing anomalous about this earthquake. The ground-notions were consistent with our expectations of what such an earthquake should 4
produce. Judging from the damage observed at Anchorage and that reported at Cordova, Seward and Whittier, a structure designed according to the criteria v
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T ELE PHON E SU t.4 211 j
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES' DR. GEORGE W. HOUSNER f
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Dr. George W. Housner is a Professor of Applied Mechanics and Civil i
Engineering at California Institute of Technology. His special field is earth-1 quake engineering, and he is an international authority in this field. Among j
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Dr. Housner's professional associations are: President of the Earthquake j
I Engineering Research Institute; Director of the International Association of
.j Earthquake Engineering; and a Director of the International Institute of h
Seismology and Earthquake Engineering. As a consultant his experiences in-I clude assigunents for the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Aeronautics l
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and Space Administration, and'the California Water Plan. He has. consulted on the seismic design of practically every r.uclear reactor proposed for location
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in seismic areas, such as the five built or proposed in California and others in Nevada, New York, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Japan.
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area, withstood the earthquake and subsequent shocks. These structures gave a I
good account of themselves. For example, none of the power plants in the, earth-quake area was forced out of operation during the earthquake because of mechani-cal, electrical or structural failure.
Our observations indicated that in every case where structures of any
.j type were built on good foundations, particularly on rock, they suffered little or no damage, while those erected on unconsolidated materials or poor foundations suffered the greatest amount of damaEe.
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Where the likelihood of earthquake forces was taken into account by the.
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application of known principles in design and in selection of foundation condi-tions, as we are doing at Bodega, structures withstood the earthquake and the resulting after-shocks without ceasing to perform their primary function and with safety to persons in and about them.
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being used for the Bodega Bay plant would have survived without any' damage and I
with relatively lov stresses. In fact, the structure being designed for the t
j Bodega Bay plant would withstand earthquake forces approximately five times I
those developad at Anchorage.
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There was nothing about the Alaskan earthquake that would indicate i
a necessity for reconsidering the earthquake design criteria for the Bodega Bay.
plant.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
.DR. HUGO BENIOFF
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Dr. Hugo Benioff is Professor of Seismology at the California Inst 1tute
~of Technology. (Seismology is the scientific study of. earthquakes.)' He is an j
international' authority on the mechanisms of earthquakes and on seismic instru--
l ments. He has been ' associated with the' Seismological Laboratory of-the -
California Institute of Technology for O years. He has ' contributed chapters '
in scientific treatises and articles for the Encyclopedia Britannica on the r
subject of earthquakes.
Dr. Bentoff is also the author of numerous scientific-papers on this subject. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences as
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voll as a number of geological, seismological, geophysical and astronomical societies, and has served as a consultant for the U..S. State Department' and I
l the U. S. Air Force as well as acting as chairman of the Consulting Board for' l
Earthquake Analysis for the State of California's Department of Water c
Resources.
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l REMARKS BY DR. HUGO BENIOFF Our trip to Alaska has reaffirmed much that we already know about earthquakes. Nothing shown by the Alaskan earthquake would indicate that the i
Bodega Head site is not safe. In my opinion the Bodega Head site is an excel-(
1 lent location for a nuclear reactor from the point of view of earthquake hazards.
The reasons very briefly are these. Bodega Head provides granitic rock into which the reactor can be buried. Although the site is situated near the San Andreas fault, this is not cause for alarm. Indeed, locations near active faults often provide better foundations for structures from the standpoint of 7
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earthquake hazards, than do locations farther away. It is important for the public to realize that proximity to a fault is not the most important factor I
in determining the safety of a site from earthquake hazards.
j I should like to speak somewhat reassuringly to the public about the San Andreas fault. This fault, which is a major and well-defined geologic
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feature of California, is an old geologic structure, having existed for some E
60 to *f0 million years. The entire fault structure extends over 1000 miles and varies in vidth from about 400 to 2000 yards. In the Bodega area the 1906 break was 13 miles east of the plant site. The possibility of the San Andreas fault shifting its course and rupturing elsewhere, such as through the Bodega Head reactor site,'is so remote that for all practical purposes it may be dis-regarded.
I do not believe an earthquake on the San Anireas fault could be very much greater than the 1906 earthquake. Yet, the Bodega reactor structure, I am informed, vill be designed to vithstand an earthquake forc.e even twice that of the 1906 shock.
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Some observers have suggested that during a major movement of the Sar, Andreas fault the reactor structure might be damaged by possible associated movement along a small auxiliary fracture that traverses the bedrockin-the reactor site. This fraci,ure, however, has not moved significantly during the'
.past 40,000 years. During that time there have been perhaps 200 to 400 move-i ments along the San Andreas fault of the general magnitude of. the San Francisco J
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earthquake. This is strong ev1dence that the stresses which gave rise to this fracture dissipated long ago and that no further movement along it is to be ex-j
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1 pected. The reactor structure, however, vill be designed to accommodate aux 11-iary fracturing should it occur.
j I have treated the subject of the Bodega site at some length to make clear that any concern on the part of the public that the Alaskan-earthquake-shows the Bodega Head site to be unsafe is wholly unfounded.- The Alaskan earth-quake merely reaffirmed knowledge we already had concerning the mechanisms by I
which earthquakes cause damage. It is our understanding of these mechanisms, g
and particularly our understanding of the San Andreas fault system, that permits Ij us to state confidently that the Bodega site is safe for a properly designed plant.
Indeed, from the standpoint of earthquake hazards, I repeat that the Bodega Head site is an excellent location for a nuclear reactor. It would be unfortunate if public misunderstanding about the nature of earthquake' movements were to lead to the impression that the site is uncafe.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES j
1 E. C. MARIJAVE' 1
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f Mr. E. C. Mar 11 ave is an engineering. geologist.. Frost 1939 to 1956 he I
was Chief Engineering Geologist and was in charge of all geologic work for the l
I' California Department of Water Resourecs. In that work one of his. primary re-sponsibilities was to determine the safety of sites for dams,. tunnels, canals and power plants from the point of view of safety from earthquake hazards. The 1
I foundation conditions for most of the major dans proposed or constructed in California during this period were required to be approved by Mr. Mar 11 ave.
Since 1956 Mr. Mar 11 ave has been engaged in private consulting work. Among L
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his many professional associations, he has been honored by election to fellow-1 l
ship in the Geological Society of America and by election as counsellor to the l
Engineering Geology Division of that Society. He has also'been appointed as I
l that Division's liaison representative to the Hydraulic Division of the American F
Society of Civil Engineers..He is presently retained for special consulting i
work by the California Department of Water Resources, the Delaware River Basin r
Ccamission, the City of Los Angeles and other California municipalities, as well as by a number of private organizations, such as P. G. and E., and by engineering firms, several of which have engaged him on assignments in foreign i.
countries.
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REMARKS BY MR. MARLIAVE In view of what has already been said by the other participants on l
the Alaskan trip, I can be very brief.
I The recent Alaskan earthquake again confirms certain facts previously i
known. One of the most important items in resisting earthquake damage is a good foundation. This is far more important than distance from an epicenter or the surface break of a fault.
In the Anchorage area 70 miles vest of the epicenter a soft slippery clay underlying much of the residential section slid otxt from bluffs and se-verely damaged many homes and buildings. In Valdez,120 miles east of Anchorage, I
j and 40 miles east of the epicenter,' the saturated soft glacial material under-l lying the town and dock area slumped and slid out into the harbor, destroying the dock and severely cracking ground in the town.
In contrast, the City of Cordova, 75 miles southeast of the epicenter, which <3 founded on rock that is severely. jointed, fractured and faulted, was I
u b M ed.
Even dishes and tall lamps on shelves did.not fall. No damage to buildings old or new was observed or reported.
t This and other shocks such as the 1906 shock near San Francisco
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clearly demonstrate the importance of a firm foundation.
I It is fallacious to suggest that damage that occurred at Anchorage and Valdez could occur on Bodega Head. Those foundation materials are markedly different and it would be more appropriate to compare foundation rock at Bode 6a Head with the rock at Cordova, where no damage occurred.
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