ML20214U406

Proposed Tech Specs,Redefining Core Alteration to Exclude Normal Movement of Source Range Monitors,Intermediate Range Monitors,Lprms,Traversing in-core Probes or Special Movable Detectors

ML20214U406
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	06/03/1987
From:	SYSTEM ENERGY RESOURCES, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20214U390	List: AECM-87-0111, Application for Amend to License NPF-29,redefining Core Alteration to Exclude Normal Movement of Source & Intermediate Range Monitors,Lprms,Traversing in-core Probes & Special Movable Detectors.Fee Paid ML20214U406
References
TAC-65511, NUDOCS 8706110175
Download: ML20214U406 (10)

Text

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DEFINITIONS NormI meuama o F rk< sM1e, .TRMs, LP)ep s,

1. 8" ####' M '#* " '# "

• f ##" ' ' *l** J CORE ALTERATION f cat s M.rs pIrTo ""N.* J 1.7 CORE ALTERATION shall be the addition, removal, relocation or movement of fuel, sources, incore instruments or reactivity controls within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. -

Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of the movement of a component to a safe conservative position. '

CRITICAL POWER RATIO i

1.8 The CRITICAL POWER RATIO (CPR) shall be the ratio of that power in the  !

cssembly which is calculated by application of the XN-3 correlation to cause

some point in the assembly to experience boiling transition, divided by the ,

cctual assembly operating power. i l 00SE EQUIVALENT I-131 1.9 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131, microcuries per gram, which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present.

The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, " Calculation of Distance Factors for. Power.

cnd Test Rea.ctor Sites.". 1 DRYWELL INTEGRITY

.. i 1.10 DRYWELL INTEGRITY shall exist when:

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a. All drywell penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE drywell automatic isolation system, or ,

2. ' Closed by at least one manual valve, b1'ind flange, or deactivated automatic valve secured in its closed position, except as provided in Table 3.6.4-1 of Specification 3.6.4.

b. The drywell equipment hatch is closed and sealed.

c. The drywell airlock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.2.3. .

d. The drywell leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.2.2.

, e. 'The suppression pool is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.3.1.

f. The sealing mechanism associated with each drywell penetration; e.g. , welds, bellows or 0-rings, is OPERABLE.

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 1-2 Amendment No. l 8706110175 870603 PDR ADOCK 05000416 PDR

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' 1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be equal to or greater than: .

a. 0.38% delta k/k with the highest worth rod analytically detemined, or

b. 0.28% delta k/k with the highest worth rod determined by test.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.

. 4 ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less thah specified:

a. In' OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2, reestablish the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or be in 'at least HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 or 4, immediately verify all i,nsertable control rods to be inserted and suspend all activities that could -

- reduce the SHUTDOWN MARGIN. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4, establish SECONDARY-CONTAINMENT. INTEGRITY within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

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c. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS I and other activities that could reduce the SHUTDOWN MARGIN and insert all insertable control rods within I hour. Establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, j SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be equ41 to or greater than

[

I specified at any time during the fuel cycle:

l l a. By measurement, prior to or during the first startup after each l

refueling.

1 I b. By seasurement, within 500 MWD /T prior to the core average exposure at which the pred.icted SHUTDOWN MARGIN, including uncertainties and calculation biases, is equal to the specified limit.

f c. Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after detection of a withdrawn control rod that is

' immovable, as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interfer-I ence, or is untrippable, except'that the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod.

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I REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPE 8tATION (Continued)

ACTION: (Continued)

b. With a " slow" control rod (s) not satisfying ACTION a.1, above:

1. Declare the " slow" control rod (s) inoperable, and

2. Perform the Surveillance Requirements of Specification 4.1.3.2.c at least once per 60 days when operation is continued with three or more " slow" control rods declared inoperable. '

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

c. With the maximum scram insertion time of one or more control rods exceeding the maximum scram insertion time limits of Specification 3.1.3.2 as deter-mined by Specification 4.1.3.2.c, operation may continue provided that:

, 1. " Slow" control rods, i.e. , those which exceed the limits of Specifica-tion 3.1.3.2, do not make up more than 20% of the 10% sample of control rods tested.

) 2. Each of these " slow" control rods satisfies the limits of ACTION a.1.

3. The eight adjacent control rods surrounding each " slow" control rod are:

a) Demonstrated-through measurement within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to satisfy the maximum' scram insertion time limits of-Specification 3.1.3.2, and b) OPERABLE.

r .

j 4. The total number of " slow" control rods, as determined by Specifica-tion 4.1.3.2.c, when added to the sum of ACTION a.3, as determined by Specification 4.1.3.2.a and b, does not exceed 7.

l Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

d. The provii s ons of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.2 The maximum insertion time of the control rods shall be demonstrated through measurement with reactor coolant pressure greater than or equal to 950 psig and, during single control rod scram time tests, the control rod

=

drive pumps isolated from the accumulators:

P a. For all ' control rods prior to THERMAL POWER exceeding 40% of RATED ... -

i- THERMAL POWER following CORE ALTERATIONS

• or after a reactor shutdown 1 that is greater than 120 days, s b. For specifically affected individual control rods ** following maintenance i

on or modification to the control rod or control rod drive system which

j. could affect the scram insertion time of those specific control rods, and

c. For at least 10% of the control rods, on a rotating basis, at least 4 once per 120 days of POWER OPERATION, i " Except :cr en e' So", IP", c- rpei! e edM etectem e normal control l rod movement.

j. **The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into

OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 provided this surveillance is completed prior to entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1.

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 1-7 AmMe.# No.

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INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3.1-1 (Continued)

. REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

, ACTION

• ACTION 1 -

Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 2 -

Verify all insertable control rods to be inserted in the core and lock the reactor mode switch in the SHUTDOWN position within one hour.

ACTION 3 -

Suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS", and insert all insertable control rods within one hour.

. ACTION 4 -

Be in at least STARTUP within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. --

ACTION 5 -

Be in STARTUP with the main steam line isolation ~ valves closed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 6 -

Initiate a reduction in THERMAL POWER within 15 minutes and reduce turbine first stage pressure to less than the automatic bypass setpoint within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

ACTION 7 -

Verify all insertable control rods to be inserted within one hot- ..

ACTION 8 -

Lock the reactor mode switch in the SHUTDOWN position within one hour.

ACTION 9 -

Suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATION 5*, and insert all insertable control rods and lock the reactor mode

switch in the SHUTDOWN position within one hour.

C J tlSo fosfA.wb "E ::;; :: :-* c' _ I"", 5"" : : ::f:? r: :$': dete:t :, 0 . rep acement of LPRM strings i..id;d SRM instrumentation is OPERABLE per Specification 3.9.2.

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e GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-4 MahmT Alo.

REFUELING OPERATIONS l

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION ,

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1 I

3.9.2 At least 2 source range monitor * (SRM) channels shall be OPERABLE and inserted to the normal operating level with: ,

a. . Continuous visual indication in the control room,

b. One of the required SRM detectors located in the quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed and the other required SRM detector located in an adjacent quadrant, and

c. Unless adequate shutdown margin has been demonstrated, the shorting links shall be removed from the RPS ci the time any control rod is withdrawn.pcuitry prior to and during APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5.

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ACTION:

With the regi:irements of the above specification Jnosatisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS and insert all insertable

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l control rods.

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.2 Each of the above required SRM channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. At least once per 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />s:

1. Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK,

2. Verifying the detectors are inserted to the normal operating level, and

3. During CORE ALTERATIONS, verifying that the detector of an OPERABLE SRM channel is located in the core quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed and another is located in an adjacent quadrant.

A The use of special movable detectors during CORE ALTERATIONS in place of the normal SRM nuclear detectors is permissible as long as these special detectors are connected to the normal SRM circuits.

!b:ptmovementOfIP",SP"orcpeci:1mer:b!cdetecterc.

1. Not required for control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 and 3.9.10.2.

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 9-3 , pj

REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.5 Direct communication shall be maintained between the control room and refueling platform personnel.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5, during CORE ALTERATIONS.*

ACTION:

When direct communication between the control room and refueling platform personnel cannot be maintained, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.*

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIE:.~-MENTS 4.9.5 Direct communication between the control room and refueling platform personnel shall be demonstrated within one hour prior to the start of and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during CORE ALTERATIONS.*

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j "Except movement of incere 4 9:trument: tier 2nd control rods with their normal drive system. '

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GRANO GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 9-7 Am b4# N#*

A. SUBJECT

1. NLS-87/06 Change Srubber Additional Test Criteria from 10% to 5%

2. Affected Technical Specifications:

a. Plant Systems, Snubbers, 4.7.4.e.1) - page 3/4 7-11.

b. Bases for Snubbers, 3/4.7.4 - page B 3/4 7-3 B. DISCUSSION

1. The additional snubber sample size after a test failure is proposed to be changed from 10% to 5% for sample plan 1 of Surveillance Requirement 4.7.4.e and in Bases 3/4.7.4.

C. JUSTIFICATION

1. Surveillance Requirement 4.7.4.e specifies three . functional test plans for snubbers. The first plan is proposed to be changed by this submittal. This present test plan requires that at least 10%

of the total of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested either-in-place or in a bench test during the first refueling outage and at least once per 18 months thereafter during shutdown. For each snubber of a type that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.7.4.f, an additional 10% of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or until all snubbers of that type have been functionally tested. The additional 10% test size is proposed to be reduced to 5%.

2. It is SERI's belief that the 10% criteria for additional testing was chosen without a suitable snubber failure data base. The proposed change to 5% for additional testing was developed by the ASME OM-4 working group which determined that 50% of the initial sample size of 10% needs to be tested for each failed snubber. The NRC has found the ASME position acceptable as justification for granting this proposed technical specification change at other BWR plants.

3. Functional testing of hydraulic snubbers at Grand Gulf was performed during the first refueling outage using sample plan 1 of Surveillance Requirement 4.7.4.e. Eight hydraulic snubbers from a population of 76 were tested with no functional test failures.

D. SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The initial sample size of 10% has not been reduced. Reducing the additional sample size to 5% after a snubber test failure has been determined to be adequate by the ASME OM-4 group to determine if additional snubber problems exist.

J16ATTC87052801 - 1

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed. The present 10% additional test criteria was apparently determined in the absence.of a suitable snubber failure data base. The proposed change reflects the use of additional data and plant experience from the ASME OM-4 group. Thus, the probability of detecting additional snubber failures using a sample size of 50% of the initial . sample size of 10% was determined by that group to be adequate for safe plant operation.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The present 10% additional test criteria was apparently not based on a suitable snubber failure data base; therefore, the change to 5% based on the ASME OM-4 work does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

J16ATTC87C52801 - 2

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PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. Functional Tests During the first refueling shutdown and at least once per 18 months thereafter during shutdown, a representative sample of snubbers shall be tested using one of the following sample plans for each type of snubber. The sample plan shall be selected prior to the test period and cannot be changed during the test period. The NRC Regional Administrator shall be notified in writing of the sample plan selected prior to the test period or the sample plan used in the prior test period shall be implemented:

1) At least 10% of the total of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested either in place or in a bench test. For each snubber of a type that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.7.4.f, an additional Q%

of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested until no 5 more failures are found or until all snubbers of that type have been functionally tested; or e

' 2) A representative sample of each type of snubber shall be func-tionally tested in acccedance with Figure 4.7.4-1. "C" is the total number of snubbers of a type found not meeting the accept-ance requirements of Specification 4.7.4.f. The cumulative number of snubbers of a type tested is denoted by "N". At the end of each day's testing, the new values of "N" and "C" (previous day's total plus current day's_{Dcrements) shall be plotted on Figure 4.7.4-1. If at any time the point plotted falls in the " Reject" region all snubbers of that type shall be functionally tested.

If at any time the point plotted falls in the " Accept" region, testing of snubbers of that type may be terminated. When the point plotted lies in the " Continue Testing" region, additional snubbers of that type shall be tested until the point falls in the " Accept" region or the " Reject" region, or all the snubbers of that type have been tested; or

3) An initial representative sample of 55 snubbers shall be func-tionally tested. For each snubber type which does not meet the functional te.it Fcceptance criteria, another sample of at least one-half the size of the initial sample shall be tested until the total number tested is equal to the initial sample size multi-plied by the factor,1 + C/2, where "C" is the number of snubbers found which do not meet the functional test acceptance criteria.

The results from this sample plan shall be plotted using on " Accept" line which follows the equation N = 55(1 + C/2). Each snubber point should be plotted as soon as the snubber is tested. If the point plotted falls on or below the " Accept" line, testing of that type of snubber may be terminated. If the point plotted falls above the " Accept" line, testing must continue until the point falls in the " Accept" region or all the snubbers of that type have been tested.

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 7-11 AmeMm7- No.

e.

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.4 SNUBBERS (Continued)

The acceptance criteria are to be used in the visual inspection to determine OPERABILITY of the snubbers. For example, if a fluid port of a hydraulic snubber is found to be uncovered,'the snubber shall be declared inoperable and shall not be determined OPERABLE via functional testing.

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability one of three functional testing methods is used with the stated acceptance criteria:

1. Functionally test 10% of a type of snubber with an additional y tested for each functional testing failure, or 5

2. Functionally test a sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using Figure 4.7.4-1, or

3. Functionally test a representative sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using the stated equation.

Figure 4.7.4-1 was developed using "Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Plan" described in " Quality Control and Industrial Statistics" by Acheson J. Duncan.

Permanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for individual snubbers may be granted by the Commission if a justifiable basis for exemption is presented and, if applicable, snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify the snubbers for the applicable design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date. Snubbers so exempted shall be listed in the list of individual snubbers indicating the extent of the exemptions.

The service life of a snubber is established via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and asso-ciated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubber, seal replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc.). The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life.

3/4.7.5 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION The limitation on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium. This limitation will ensure that leakage from byproduct, source, and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values.

Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with surveillance requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group. Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not. Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism, i.e., sealed sources within radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices, are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.

GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 8 3/4 7-3 b.ed ur //o.