ML20212N354

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 119 to License DPR-50

ML20212N354
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	08/14/1986
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20212N346	List: ML20212N345 ML20212N354
References
NUDOCS 8608280194
Download: ML20212N354 (3)

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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.11o TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-50 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT N0. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-289 INTRODUCTION A number of events have occurred at operating Pressurized Water Reac+.or (PWR) facilities where decay heat removal capability has been seriously degraded due to inadequate administrative controls during shutdown modes of operation. One of these events, described in IE Information Notice 80-20 dated May 8, 1980, occurred at the Davis-Besse Station, Unit No. 1, on April 19, 1980.

In IE Bulletin 80-22 issued May 9, 1980, licensees were requested to imediately implement administrative controls which would ensure that proper means are available to provide redundant methods of decay heat removal. While the function of the bulletin was to effect immediate action with regard to this problem, the NRC considered it necessary that an amendment be made to each PWR license to provide for permanent long-term assurance that redundancy in decay heat removal capability will be maintained. By generic letter dated June 11, 1980, all PWR licensees were requested to propose Technical Specification (TS) changes that provide for redundancy in decay heat removal capability in all modes of operation.

NRC model TSs were provided as guidance.

GPU Nuclear Corporation (the licensee) responded.to the NRC generic letter by letters dated January 26, 1982, and October 10, 1984, in which the generic issue was discussed but no actual changes to the TSs were requested.

By letter dated March 8,1985, as supplemented by letter dated May 14, 1985, GPU Nuclear Corporation applied for TS changes designed to assure redundant decay heat removal capability for all modes of reactor operation for TMI-1.

In an April 24, 1986 letter, the licensee provided additional information concerning the amendment request.

DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION The proposed TSs provide for redundant means of decay heat removal in all modes of operatioa except during refueling when a large mass of water is above the core. These redundant means are outlined as follows:

Power Operation and Hot Standby (reactor critical)

These modes for TMI-1 are comparable to Standard Technical Specification (STS)

Modes 1 and 2, Power Operation and Startup.

For TM1-1, both reactor coolant (RC) 8608280194 860814 PDR ADOCK 05000289 P

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. loops with one reactor coolant pump (RCP) in each loop must be in operation when the reactor is critical. With less than four RCPs in operation, the TSs require a reduction in power.

Hot Shutdown (reactor sub-critical)

This mode for TM1-1 (RC temperature above 525 F) is comparable to STS Mode 3 Hot Standby (RC temperature above 305'F).

For TMI-1 in Hot Shutdown, both RC loops are required to be operable. The STS requirements for Mode 4, Hot Shutdown (RC temperature below 305 F) are essentially covered by the proposed TMI-1 TSs that require two decay heat removal means to be available with one loop in operation when the RC temperature is below 250 F, i.e., either two decay heat removal loops, two RC loops, or one of each.

The proposed TSs would allow the plant to operate in the equivalent of STS Mode 3 with one RCP operating and STS Mode 4 with no RCP operating. By letter dated January 9,1986, the NRC staff requested the licensee to verify that operation in such modes will be bounded by the conditions in the TMI-1 FSAR analysis of accidents.

By letter dated April 24, 1986, the licensee provided information by which they concluded that the proposed amendment would allow operation in a manner bounded by their FSAR analysis. This letter provided confirmatory information to the NRC staff but did not change the application for amendment as it existed in their May 14, 1985 submittal. This letter provides sufficient justification for the staff to conclude that the proposed TS changes place additional rertrictions on the licensee by designating systems which must be operational when RC temperature is between 200 F and 250 F.

Furthermore, the proposed TS changes do not allow TMI-1 to operate in any condition less restrictive than current TSs and cre therefore acceptable.

Cold Shutdown and Refueling with the Water Level Above the Core Less Than 23 Feet Two decay heat removal loops are required to be operable with at least one loop in operation.

Refueling with the Water Level Above the Core Greater Than 23 Feet At least one decay heat removal loop is required to be in operation. The other loop need not be operable. Under such conditions, the mass of water above the core provides adequate heat removal capability and therefore a redundant method is not necessary.

In addition to the above requirements for operability, the proposed TS revisions specify surveillance intervals for heat removal systems that are consistent with the STSs. The revised TSs provide an improvement over the existing ones since redundant decay heat removal will now be provided when 1

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. the plant is in the equivalent of STS Modes 3, 4 and 5.

Duringrefbelingwith a large mass of water above the core, only a single heat removal path is required. The surveillance requirements that would identify any inoperable equipment or degraded performance ~ are performed daily. The NRC staff, therefore, concludes that the proposed TSs meet the intent of the STSs with respect to redundant means of decay removal capability and are acceptable.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.

We have determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissinn's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: August 14, 1986 Principal Contributors:

G. Schwenk, J. Thoma s...

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