ML20211D932

Rebuttal Testimony of Cl Hulin Re Intervenor 850801 Allegations of Harassment & Intimidation of QC Inspectors. Certificate of Svc Encl.Related Correspondence

ML20211D932
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	10/16/1986
From:	Hulin C COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
References
CON-#486-1159 OL, NUDOCS 8610220307
Download: ML20211D932 (43)

Text

) MEi ATED CORRESPONDENCE

[< COL KE llt UNITED STATES OF AMERICA USNPC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOA % ET 20 Pl2:37 0FFICE. 06 : ' r ". i A H V In the Matter Of: ) 00CnETtHU A M FVICf.

) BRANCH COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY )

) Docket Nos. 50-456 (Braidwood Station, Units 1 ) 50-457 and 2) )

BRAIDWOOD HEARINGS REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF CHARLES L. HULIN 8610220307 861016 PDR ADOCK 0500 T -

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6-10/16/86 BRAIDWOOD HEARINGS REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF CHARLES L. HULIN Q.1 Would you state your name and address please.

A.1 My name is Charles Lee Hulin. My address is 603 East Daniel Street, Champaign, Illinois, 61820.

Q.2 What do you do for a living?

A.2 I am a professor of psychology in Liberal Arts and Sciences and in the Aviation Institute at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. My speciality within the general field of psychology is Industrial / Organizational Psychology.

Q.3 Would you briefly describe what industrial / organizational psychology is?

A.3 - Industrial / organizational psychology is a specialty within the general field of psychology that is concerned with the behavior of individuals in organizations. This is generally taken to mean that we study the behavior of what would be regarded as normal human adults in business and related organizations. The overall field of I/O i

psychology, as it is generally called, is concerned with i

everything from organizational theory to individual differences--differences among individuals that influence their attitudes and behaviors at work. There are many subspecialties within I/O psychology. My subspecialties are applied measurement (measurement of differences among

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s-Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin. Page 2 individuals), motivation (the process by which individuals are motivated to perform an act and those characteristics or events that lead individuals to behave in certain ways), job attitudes (the process by which individuals acquire positive and negative attitudes towards their work and how these attitudes become translated into behaviors), and individual differences (those characteristics that differentiate among individuals and have relevance for their behavior in organizations).

Q.4 Please describe you educational and professional background.

A.4 I was graduated from Northwestern University in 1958 with a BA degree in psychology. 'I received my MA degree in 1960 from the New York St. ate School of ~ Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell and my PhD in Psychology with a minor in mathematical statistics in January, 1963, also from Cornell University. From 1962 through the end of the 1985-86 school year, with the exception of sabbatical leaves at Berkeley in~ 1968 and at the University of Washington at Seattle in 1975, I have been on the staff of the Psychology Department and the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I am currently a professor of

s-Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 3 psychology at the University of Illinois in Liberal Arts and Sciences and in the Aviation Institute's Aviation Research Laboratory.I was a member of the Center for Advanced Study at the University of Illinois in 1976.

. For seven years, from 1975 to 1982, I was the Associate Editor of the Journal of Applied Psychology. Before that I was a masthead editor for that journal for about two years. I am currently a masthead editor of Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes.

The remainder of my professional and scientific accomplishments are listed in my vita, a copy of which I have attached as Exhibit 1 to this document.

Q.5 What issues have you been asked to analyze in connection with the Braidwood licensing proceeding?

A.5 I have been asked to examine documents, testimony, interview inspectors and supervisors, and comment on whether the harassment and intimidation of quality control inspectors, as alleged in the intervenor's contention of August 1, 1985, may have adversely affected the quality of work of the quality control inspectors at Braidwood.

Q.6 Could you tell us what in your background or experience qualifies you to do the type of analysis called for in this case?

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 4 Nearly all' of my professional career has been spent A.6 studying environmental, organizational, and individual 4

characteristics that influence the behaviors of individuals at work in complex organizations. Much of my

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'research has involved population of blue-collar workers.

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4 Among these studies have been analyses of the motivations

, and attitudes of individuals who work in the temporary work industry, antecedents of turnover in a variety of

populati~ons of workers; analyses of motivations of employees of printing companies, the Illinois National Guard, employees (and residents) of a company town in' northwestern British Columbia; cross-cultural studies of

. work attitudes; and I am currently writing two chapters

- for the Handbook of Industrial and Organizational i

Psychology: 2nd Edition, one on the antecedents of i

commitment and withdrawal among workers. An important aspect of these studies is their diversity.

Also, whenever possible, I learn as much as I can 4

firsthand about the populations I study. When I studied i

the temporary work industry, I " shaped-up" at the local Manpower office and was sent out three days to work as a blue-collar worker unloading moving trucks and working as a day laborer. When I have worked as a consultant in a

different industries, I have tried to spend one or.more f

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 5 days on the shop floor learning about the jobs. I spent two. days underground in a coal mine in southern Illinois observing the work of a crew at the coal face and talking to them as much as I could.

I have worked as a laborer on construction jobs, driven a liquid propane truck, worked on an assembly line in Michigan in the' automobile industry, and a's a laboratory technician for a chemical company.

When I was in graduate school my chairman insisted that everybody who worked with her must have as much firsthand knowledge as possible about the people we studied before we began our formal research. This meant that we had to spend a great deal of time talking with these workers (not just interviewing them) in one-on-one situations to learn about their beliefs,. perceptions and attitudes quite divorced from our formal studies.

I think this is important because during this process I have been exposed to workers and working conditions that have ranged from white-collar sales personnel to 1

construction workers and miners. There is not much that will surprise or shock me anymore about a site or a shop floor or any work situation one might reasonably expect to encounter in the United States.

Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 6 Q.7- Wh'at research methods do you normally use in your research?

A.7 My research methods are tailored to fit the hypotheses I am testing or the consulting job being done. I generally favor field studies over laboratory experiments for the kinds of research I do, although I have done.both. I try to use multiple research. methods in my studies because each of these research methods, if used individually is going to.be flawed. By using different methods with

! different kinds of. independent flaws, we can usually be pretty sure that our results are not due to metho'd bias that. influences results based on only one source of data or method of generating data. Whenever possible, I combine interview,-questionnaires, analyses of behavioral trace measures, examination of production records, analyses of absenteeism or quit rates, and, where possible, experimental procedures. In short, I use all sources of data that will give us a handle on the likely i causes of the behaviors of the workers and that are relevant to the questions we are asking and on which reliance can be placed. We must recognize that all methods of obtaining data about the behavior of 4

individuals are biased and flawed to one degree or another. However, if all of these flawed methods, with i

their different and independent sources of bias, give us i

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin- Page 7 the same conclusions or support the same general set of findings,- then confidence in the strength and validity of the findings is increased. Any finding that is supported by only one source of data is suspect.until it receives independent verification.

Q.8 Would you describe the basic theoretical orientation you normally use to analyze the antecedents of the behaviors

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of the workers you have studied. What factors influence worker' bahaviors in the workplace--in their work organizations?

A.8 I think it is fruitful to view workers' behaviors in work organizations as a series of behavioral choices. They choose from a very large number of possibilities to maximize their subjective expected utility. Utility is a technical term that can be used here as equivalent to anticipated total (overall) satisfaction they expect to experience as a result of a series of acts or the

outcomes from a single act. The approach is called General Expectancy Theory or Subjective Expected Utility Theory.

No general theory in this area is without flaws nor can any general' theoretical model account adequately for all of the varieties of behavior we encounter in organizations. This general approach, if augmented by propositions from other areas such as work values or individual differences, seems 'to be the soundest

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 8 theoretical explanation of the behavior of individuals at work in organizations currently available.

In the current. applications of this theory to organizational behavior, workers are assumed to know what contingencies or relationships (technically, conditional probabilities) exist between their acts (or behaviors) and the products of their acts. They also know the  !

l: relationship between these products and the evaluations they receive. They know the contingencies there are between the evaluations they receive and their personal outcomes. This complete set of contingencies tells them what rewards or punishments they can expect to receive as a result of their acts or behaviors. Contingencies may i be thought of, without oversimplifying too much, as a series of beliefs that relate behaviors to products, relate products to evaluations, and relate evaluations to organizational outcomes.

Individuals are assumed-to act as if they were aware of what products they could expect as a result 6f commitments of different levels of time and effort, what kinds of evaluations they might expect from their supervisors and co-workers as a result of these products, and what outcomes they might expect to receive as a 4

Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 9 result of the different evaluations. Workers' personal outcomes directly. determine their utilities or satisfactions.

Q.9 How do. workers learn about these contingencies or relationships that link their behaviors to their outcome?

A.9 They learn about these contingencies by 1) firsthand experience, 2) observing others in the situations, 3) being told what the contingencies are, and 4) comparing

, their present work situation to other situations they have seen in the past.

Q.10 Could you expand on what specifically you mean by an organizational contingency? Are they established by the organization or are they more subjective in nature?

A.10 Contingencies are both the subjectively perceived and objective connections between actions (what to do) and what we produce, between our products and the evaluations others have of us and between these evaluations and what organizational outcomes we personally receive. These connections are stochastic or probabilistic rather than functional relations. That is, they only describe probabilities of things happening, not completely defined and known hard connections.

An analysis of the relevant contingencies that influence the bahaviors of individuals becomes complicated very rapidly. Any action we. undertake

Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin .Page 10 generally has a number of products associated with it.

Each of these products can lead to a different evaluation. To further complicate things, any given product is likely to be evaluated by several different people in the organization--subordinates, co-workers, supervisors--and by individuals not even connected with the organization--our families, regulatory commissions, members of the legal profession. The extent to which an individual's behavior is influenced by the evaluations of different people is largely a matter of the power the different evaluators have to translate their' evaluations into' outcomes that the individual values or wants to avoid.

Q.ll Is there any research that would support the' theory that individuals in organizations learn about and respond to these contingencies.

A.ll Yes. Our assumptions about how individuals in organizations learn about these contingencies seem reasonable because when we ask individuals to describe the contingencies that link behavior to evaluations and outcomes in their organizations, they can do it.

Further, these contingencies can be used to describe i

differences between organizations in what is often called organizational culture or organizational climate. The important point, however, is that these descriptions of

Braidwood Hearings

-Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 11 contingencies differ across organizations and even across departments within organizations in predictable and theoretically meaningful ways. Perceived contingencies within organizations and within departments in organizations show expected patterns in terms of the agreement levels among individuals. That is, individuals within one organization have less variance in their descriptions of organizational contingencies than do individuals from different organizations; individuals within departments show less variance than do individuals from different departments. These two conditions are important and show that the organizational employees are learning similar contingencies within organizations and there is more within agreement within units where there should be agreement about what the organizational contingencies are and less agreement where there should be less agreement.- There are also mean differences between organizations in terms of these.descrir of organizational contingencies. Organizations involved in dangerous work or with dangerous working conditions and where there are constant safety campaigns and sanctions for unsafe behaviors will-have employees who report relatively strong contingencies between unsafe behaviors and (negative) outcomes. Individuals from service

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organizations not involving dangerous work or working conditions will be less likely to report contingencies

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between unsafe behaviors and outcomes. Members of production and R&D or legal departments will report different contingencies between conservative or risky / innovative behaviors and evaluations even within the same organization.

Q.12 Are there other factors that influence workers' behaviors.

A.12 These contingencies are powerful in shaping the behaviors

, of individuals in organizations--or anywhere else for that matter. However, just as workers are influenced by 4

their immediate organizational environmente and perceptions of contingencies, they are also influenced by the values and interests they bring with them, by work values they have acquired during the course of their lives, by societal norms and standards, and by all of the accumulated learning that has gone in their lifetime.

Most studies of any set of theoretical propositions control or randomize the effects of variables that are extraneous to the theory. This has been the case with this particular theory also. Thus, from studies done on the theoretical propositions relevant to this theory, we know about how variables of this theory influence behaviors but we may not know how these theoretical s

Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 13 variables interact with other variables extraneous to the theory, such as norms and values, to influence behaviors jointly. Values and norms are important, however, because they often regulate the limits of the influence of the immediate organizational environments and perceptions of organizational contingencies. In other words, individuals in organizations behave with respect to what they find in the organizational environment and what they bring with them to the organization. As organizational theorists, however, we sometimes get carried away with the influence of organizational va-iables and forget about these other limiting factors in the form of individual differences in work values and societal norms on employees' behaviors.

Q.13 What determines which, from among the many products and the many evaluations, are the ones that influence our behaviors?

A.13 To simplify it a great deal, it comes down to who do we i

perceive as having a right to evaluate what we do and who has the power to translate their evaluations of our behaviors and products into positive and negative outcomes? The two questions are quite independent. For instance, our families' evaluations of us influence what we do even though these evaluations may not carry any weight of official or even unofficial sanctions.

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 14 Co-workers' evaluations are'important to the extent that we value their friendship and value memberships in informal work groups. Supervisors' evaluations may be important because of their power to have their evaluations translated into organizational rewards or punishments--although rewards seem to do a much better job than punishments in.the long run.

Q.14 What happens when different individuals who may evaluate our products are in conflict with each other? That is, what if one person evaluates an act or a product positively while another evaluates it negatively?

A.14 It would depend on the perceived legitimacy of the two f

evaluators, their relative power, and the extent to which their evaluations were in conflict with our own values and beliefs about what is right (in some abstract sense). The theory is-mute with respect to which course of action people will take when external pressures brought on us by some supervisor or evaluator are in conflict with our personal values. It is very difficult, how'ever, to get people to violate their own norms and standards in significant ways in work situations because of pressures from supervisors. In the laboratory, where the experimenter has control over all sources of information, it is a different story but in organizations where we are familiar with the rules and the general

Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 15 norms, we are unlikely to violate strongly hel'd beliefs or values.about what is right or what should be done.

Q.15 What determines,if a supervisor who may evaluate our work has power so that their evaluations of what we do influence what we will do in.the future?

A.15 'Does he have power, granted to him by managers in the organization, to administer punishments for behaviors he does not evaluate positively and does he have the power to cause rewards to be given to us that are based on his positive evaluations of our behaviors? There may be other elements of this reward power but these would seem to be the main ingredients.

Q.16 How do individuals in organizations come to know who has the power to translate their contingencies into outcomes that influence the utilities or satisfactions of the workers? That is, how do they learn who has power to translate their evaluations into rewards and punishments?

A.16 Mainly through experience in the organization. We should expect that every organizational manager will have a slightly different set of expectations for the behavior of their employees. Workers are able to learn if the managers can translate these expectancies into official or even unofficial contingencies that say to a worker "If you want to get this, then you should do that." If a manager can translate their contingencies into i

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 16 organizational outcomes, then the. managers' evaluations should influence behaviors.

Q.17 What have you done to allow you to make a determination whether the alleged intimidation and harassment or undue production pressure claimed to exist by the intervenors in fact influenced the quality of the work of the Comstock quality control inspectors?

A.17 I have read the following materials:

a) the internal, Comstock memos written about the incident involving Richard Saklak and Richard Snyder-that occurred in late March, 1985, b) the internal, Comstock memos relating to the discharge of Worley Puckett and the transfer of John Seeders, c) the prefiled' testimony of Richard Arvey and David.

McKirnan, experts for the intervenors, d) the deposition of David McKirnan, e) the report (82-03) detailing earlier investigations into supposed harassment, f) the NRC memos of March 29, 1985 and of April 5, 1985, g) 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B and 10 C.F.R. part 50.7, h) the opening statement of Mr. Guild, attorney for the intervenors, i) the testimony of Martin Frankel, George Marcus, Irving DeWald, Robert Seltmann, and James Gieseker.

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Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 17

'I have also examined in detail both the BCAP reinspection data and the PTL overinspection data as well as the results of statistical analyses of those data carried out by Martin Frankel. These BCAP reinspection data and the PTL overinspection data were examined particularly with regard to the data reflecting the qualify of work of the QC inspectors before and after July 1, 1982, the date Richard Saklak was hired, before and after August 1, 1983, i

the date Irving DeWald was hired, and before and after April 1, 1985, the date Richard Saklak was fired (the BCAP data ended for work done as of June 30, 1984).

These dates were chosen to test hypotheses, using the best available behavioral trace measures, that were relevant to the intervenors' contentien.

If, as alleged by the intervenors, these individuals were part of a pervasive climate at Braidwood that strassed quantity of work over quality of work by the QC inspectors, then we should see differences in the quality of the work of the QC inspectors coinciding with those dates. In other words, if we accept the contention of the intervenors at face value, we should see the effects of.the hiring and discharge of l

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 18 these instruments of the pervasive influence. These effects should coincide roughly with the dates of their hiring and termination.

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In' addition, I spent two days at the Braidwood construction site talking with the quality control s

j manager, the- quality . assurance manager, the assistant quality control manager, and three~of the quality

- control inspectors who are working there now and who were working on the job when Saklak was quality I

3 control supervisor. I spent time with these three i quality cont'rol inspectors observing.their work on the job'and learning about their jobs. While doing this, I also tniked with production employees and

! their immediate supervisors.

T Q.18 Have you reached an opinion concerning whether the alleged harassment, intimidation, and applications ~of

" undue" production pressure by Comstock management affected the quality of its quality control inspectors' work?

A.18 Yes. Before I elaborate on this answer, I want to stress that there is no single piece, or even set, of data that is definitive in this matter. This is consistent with

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nearly all scientific research on the behavior of individuals in organizations. The conclusion that is more likely true is the conclusion that is supported by all of the different, independent pieces of evidence. Any

i Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 19 one piece of data or evidence is likely to be flawed.

Any conclusion.that is supported by only one piece of data or evidence is suspect. If all of these independent pieces of evidence point to the same conclusion, then it is overwhelmingly likely that the conclusion is correct even though no one piece of evidence is crucial or definitive.

On the basis of the multiple pieces of evidences that I have reviewed, it seems highly.unlikely that the alleged harassment and intimidation and undue pressure by Comstock management adversely affected the quality of the work of the quality control inspectors.

Q.19 What is the. basis for your opinion?

A.19 This is going to be a very long answer so I will provide an outline of it first and then go back and take up the points one by one and elaborate on them. The bases for my overall opinion can be divided into three major components and several sub-parts. I do not list these in order of importance because I think that all of the parts of the data support the same general conclusions; to separate one factor or another for i special consideration would not be consistent with the preponderance of the evidence and the consistent

conclusion the data suggest.

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 20 A. Organizational, interpersonal, and psychological factors.

1. The degree of harassment and intimidation l by Saklak of the'QC inspectors.

2. The safeguards built into the system by the NRC and by the Quality First Program at Braidwood.

3. The nature of the work of the QC inspectors, the relative subjective / objective standards they use, the training they receive, and the general quality climate at the site.

4. The lack-of hard and fast production standards for QC inspectors.

5. -The lack of organizational power possessed by Saklak.

6. The conclusions indicated by application of a general theory of organizational behavior to understand the behavior of the QC inspectors.

B. The impact of values and norms of society and the inspectors on their on the job behaviors.

C. The overinspection and reinspection' data generated by BCAP and PTL that reflects on the quality of work of the QC inspectors.

I shall discuss these factors and sub-factors one at a time.

Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 21 A. Organization, interpersonal , and psychological factors.

1. The degree of harassment and intimidation

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by Saklak of the QC inspectors.

This must be judged within the framework of a factor that is difficult to quantify or express precisely. This is related to the expected role behaviors of supervisors and inspectors (or production employees) at any construc-tion site or production plant. Basically, supervisors are expected to' exert some pressure on employees to keep i

busy, to be productive; employees are expected to offer certain amounts of resistance to these pressures.

Behaviors that fall within these role expectations are 4

generally regarded as part of the background noise of a 4

production or construction site; they would be more ncticeable if they were absent than if they occur.

People really only attend a very few of the nearly infinite number of stimuli that impinge upon them. They r,espond to even fewer. Those stimuli that are important for biological' survival, that are unusual, that are especially salient, that rise about the background noise I

level, and that are life threatening are attended and responded to. Most others are not. In this context,

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 22 out-of-role-behaviors by the supervisor are much more likely to be attended to than expected role behaviors.

The language used by Saklak in his behavior toward his subordinates falls withir. this area of expected role behaviors. It was rough.and profane and was occasionally out of line with the language used by many other super-visors at any construction site. An example, identified by the intervenors as being extreme was the "if beating were legal" statement. .One can still question if this statement was likely to have much lasting effect on the working behavior of quality control inspectors. It was above the noise level and was ncticed but beyond that, it may not have elicited much of a response. Without the other events going on at the site, the inspectors may not have brought Saklak's behavior to the notice of the NRC inspectors. I would certainly not advocate such language in' general by supervisors. It i s not clear, however, that his language would directly influence the work behavior of the QC inspectors.

The statements of Saklak to Snyder can be considered extreme. We can all agree he should not have made them and this is not the type of behavior we want in a supervisor at a construction site. We can still search in vain for any theoretical reason to expect an influence l

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 23 on the behavior of the inspectors,-absent a demonstration or an expectancy of a substantial amount of organiza-tional power'on the part of Saklak, or any empirical evidence that such influence occurred. His language, when viewed within the framework of expected-role behaviors, would be noticed by most quality control inspectors at a construction site but expecting it to cause any consistent responses, to have any long term effects on the work behavior of adult, QC inspectors is not consistent with what we know about experienced workers.

Words are strange symbols. I have worked with support groups at the Prairie Center for Substance Abuse and at LW's Place, a private, not for profit substance a b u s e c'*[n t e r . I once had one of the people I was working with ask me if I wanted him "...to hurt him (an administrator.whose behavior I was complaining about) a little." I have no doubt that the administrator was in more danger from being " hurt a little" by this person than Snyder ever was from Saklak.

2. Safeguards built into the system by the NRC and the Quality First Program at Braidwood.

The safeguards built into the system permitting access of-the quality control inspectors (as well as the production employees) to the NRC and Quality First >

Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 24 Program, the posted phone numbers for calling and reporting incidents that~might affect construction quality adversely, the knowledge of the production employees.that their work was to be inspected, the knowledge of the quality control inspectors that their work was to be overinspected or reinspected on a random or quasi-random basis, the professionalism of the employees and the general awareness of the inherent dangers of poor quality work in nuclear power stations all come.together to generate a work climate in which the safety of the resulting structure seems uppermost in the minds of most of the employees. [There was even a belief

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expressed several times while I was at the site that if a certain percentage of the welds or terminal a QC inspector approved were rejected on overinspection, then 100% of his work would be reinspected instead the 10% or 35% (both figures were mentioned) of the inspections that were normally reinspected.)

In addition, we must remember that the QC inspectors observed on at least one dramatic occasion that the safeguards worked. Once Saklak " threatened" Snyder, he was summarily dismissed. Whatever the cause of the dismissal alleged by the intervenors, the QC inspectors observed an immediate response by Comstock, Edison, and

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Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 25

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the NRC after the incident. This would seem likely to convince them the system of safeguards worked.

3. The nature of the work of the QC inspectors.

The nature of the inspectors work is such that there are few shortcuts that can be taken. There are relatively few purely subjective-judgments that must be made in the course of their work. The inspectors further know that a certain percentage of their work is going to be overinspected by PTL, NRC and/or the various Quality-

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Assurance departments. They also have to sign the inspection reports, which should increase their feelings of responsibility. If their work was largely subjective, they could easily respond to any perceived pressures by doing sloppy work and later argue that it was a judgment call and that the PTL or other inspectors were using much too stringent standards.

Thus, the Braidwood QC inspectors knew they could not execute sloppy work because, except>for a few of the weld attributes, the criteria for accepting or rejecting an installation are objective and can be applied consis-tently by independent inspectors. Few of them want to have their work considered unacceptable. They know it may be reinspected (at least part of it) and eventually sloppy work will be detected. This in itself, loss of

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 26 respect from one's co-workers, could be considered a negative outcome they would not want to incur.

4. Lack of hard and fast production standards for QC inspectors.

Hand-in-hand with the general belief that quality was.

important was the perception that there were no hard and fast production standards they had to meet to keep 1

supervisors off their backs. I asked every inspector, production worker, and supervisor I talked to about this

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and was told'by every one they they knew there was some pressure for them to complete inspections because i

j production would be delayed if they did not complete the inspections in a timely fashion. None, however, expressed concern about excessive pressure and all confirmed that the production standards that did exist were flexible and informal.

That pay was not tied to production but rather was tied for a time to the number of areas in which an inspector was qualified also speaks to the official organizational contingencies between inspector qualifications and pay along with no organizational 4

contingencies between sheer production and pay. This does not imply there were no standards for performance

! among the inspectors. It was clearly understood that you 1

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 27 can.be disciplined for sleeping on the job, for regularly performing so few inspections per day that you are basically not putting forth any effort, or for excessive absenteeism. The important points are that there were safeguards built into the system-to catch unsafe.

performance and there were no organizational contingencies that would encourage production at the expense of quality.

The transfer of John Seeders from tool inspections to a clerical job in engineering and the termination of Worley Puckett,that are alleged by the intervenors to be a part of this overall, pervasive stress on production at the expense of quality can be interpreted in two ways. A worst case scenario is provided in the opening statement of Mr. Guild. A different and very plausible account ma'y be obtained from a reading of the internal memos and testimony regarding these actions. This second inter-pretation would suggest that John Seeders was at best a marginal employee in the tool inspection area. He did-not issue ICRs o. .'CRs whenever a tool was found to be out of tolerances. Thus, work may have been done with defective tools and not redone as required. In spite of repeated directives to produce a report detailing the existence of such' work and how it had been corrected,

Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page'28 Seeders did not produce the report. Worley Puckett was hired to be the first Comstock site level III weld inspector. This position was created in response to previously identified concerns with Comstock's welding

. program. Puckett was hired to conduct an overall' review of the program, including welding procedures, weldcr qualification procedures and records and weld materials i control. The Level III position required familiarity with and ability to interpret the pertinent codes, specifications, and procedures. Puckett's abilities in this regard were apparently marginal since his only recommended solutions to problems he identified were to stop work. Other experienced weld engineers determined, with Puckett's apparent concurrence, that the most significant.stop work recommendation was inappropriate and unnecessary, but he persisted'in an even more sweeping recommendation that all work be stopped, again based on misinterpretations of the applicable codes. I

should add that I have no independent expertise in those 4 ' codes, but am relying on the testimony of witnesses sponsored by CECO and the NRC for this assessment of Puckett's capabilities. Moreover, Puckett was repeatedly unable to pass his level III field tests that would qualify him to be a level III inspector, a degree of

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C Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 29 qualification required for his job. Neither the termination of P'uckett nor the transfer'of Seeders can be unambiguously attributed to the alleged pervasive pressure for quantity of production over quality.

Just as important as what,the objective record seems to indicate is what the other employees at the Braidwood site interpreted the cause of the transfer and the termination to be. It is again not clear that the QC inspectors would interpret these actions as'part of the pervasive influence for quantity over quality. Testimony seems to suggest that in Seeders' case, he was regarded as being responsible for the tool inspection records being in a mess and as deserving of a transfer if not termination. In Puckett's case, while many of the inspectors regarded him as knowledgeable, one character-ized him as a " talker" rather than a " doer" and all regarded his replacement, Tony Simile, as a highly competent individual who had improved the Comstock welding program. Similarl? although many inspectors characterized Puckett's tet.aination as having taken place because "he made too many waves", his subsequent success-ful resort to Department of Labor nrocedures was known to other QC inspectors. Those inspectors described Puckett's settlement of the Department of Labor proceeding as

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j winning against Comstock management. Thus, there should 2

be a perception that the safeguard system worked.

5. Lack of organizational power by Saklak.

Interviews with the quality control manager, i assistant. manager, and quality assurance manager indicated that Saklak had very little real organizational power to translate his verbal threats, if we can indeed call them threats, i'nto any real outcomes. He did not decide on pay raises. He could not_ unilaterally assign I

sutpensions. He could only recommend vacation time;

, these all had to be decided by the' quality control manager. It is also apparent that suspensions were not used as a weapon to beat greater quantity of production out of the inspectors. These statements of organiza-tional procedures were repeated by the inspectors that I talked with and are reflected in the deposition testimony. They seem to know who has power end who does 1

not. Note that these impressions gained from two days of interviews are completely consistent with the reports of

19 inspectors summarized in 82-03. Neither source of 4 data alone is convincing. Both of them together, being

- obtained for different purposes by different individuals at different times, suggest the validity of the non-harassment conclusion.

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 31

6. Conclusions suggested by applications of a general theory of organizational behavior.

Applications of a Generalized Expectancy or a Subjective Expected Utility theory to the behavior of the inspectors at Braidwood supports the lack of effects of Saklak's behavior on the quality of the inspectors' work because his evaluation of their work products had few, if any, impacts on their organizational outcomes. There were essentially no organizational contingencies between production (quantity) and organizational outcomes.

Further, there were no generally perceived contingencies between sheer volume of inspections and organizational outcomes. There were some contingencies between sleeping on the job and negative outcomes just as there were some levels of performance that were so far below standards that they would cause questions to be asked and actions to be taken. Performance standards, however, in any organization, no matter how sensitive the work is, are a reasonable expectation. They are necessary. Industries that expose thousands of individuals everyday to life threatening dangers, such as the air transportation industry, must have some production standards or they would not be in business. As long as the organizational emphasis is on safety and quality and not on production

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 32

per se, the priority among.the work standards is reasonable.

Once again, the informal picture of the~ perceived contingencies ~that existed at Braidwood for the QC

' inspectors is. borne out by an inspection of the record of terminations for cause at Braidwood by the Comstock l management. Individuals were disciplined for excessive i absenteeism, for sleeping on the job, and in one case for performance so far below the norms established by the 4

other inspectors as to be out of line in any i

organization. There is no evidence that the objective organizational contingencies were between quantity of inspections and organizational outcomes. All of these l factors together suggest that the QC inspectors would correctly perceive the on the job behaviors that produced

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4 organizational outcomes did not include sheer volume of inspections carried out.

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B. The impact of the values and norms of society and the workers on their on the job behaviors.

The factor of the general performance of normal human l

adults is relevant. Adults have learned the values and norms of our society and of the industry for which they l

work over a long period of time. These are general principles that serve to guide oitr behaviors in many

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 33 different arenas. It takes a significant force applied over a long period of time to alte'r the general trend of these behaviors, although random factors from day to day may cause a substantial amount of random variation around the general trend line. Organizational contingencies that consistently rewarded certain types of behavior applied for a significant period of time would be such a force. It would be unusual if the behavior of one supervisor or even a manager were to alter significantly the behaviors of a large group of individuals over a significant period of time, particularly if these interpersonal factors were not accompanied by other organizational events, such as changes in objective con *,ingencies between behaviors and outcomes.

These general work values that the inspectors might be expected to bring with them could be described as middle class work values: You are what you do. To do nothing is to be nothing. To do poor work is to be a poor person. Work in America has been described as the test bed in which a person obtains their identity. It takes significant and long term applications of contingencies that are counter to our work values to change them significantly.

r Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 34 This conclusion of very limited effect of Saklak on

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the behavior of the QC inspectors is also consistent with the general findings that the influence of leaders, although very popular in the media and non-scientific literature, is hard to document empirically with any consistency. By this I mean that in laboratory settings where.we have a great deal of control over many variables that influence behavior of individuals, we can rather easily demonstrate that leaders with certain characteris-

. tics influence ~the behavior of their followers in systematic ways. It is much more difficult to demonstrate that leaders' characteristics in real organizations have the same systematic and significant effects on the overall level of, say, the production of workers.

C. The data on the overinspection'and reinspection programs.

These data will be broken into two distinct sets for purposes of discussing the results. However, both data sets were treated similarly for the purposes of analyses and hypothesis testing. For the purposes of this analysis, I essentially accepted the intervenors' contention at face value and used this characterization of the Comstock operation at Braidwood to generate f

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 35.

hypotheses about the expected effects of such an atmosphere on the behavior of the QC inspectors and the timing of anticipated changes in their work behaviors as a' result of changes in the makeup of the managerial staff of Comstock.

That is, if one accepts the contention of the intervenors as providing a theory of Comstock as an organization and a place to work, then we can formulate hypotheses about behavior, based on this theory of the organization. These hypotheses can be tested using the available data generated by the BCAP reinspection program and'the PTL overinspection program. This is identical to what is done in normal scientific studies of organiza-tions regardless of the sources of the hypotheses.

All statistical analyses were carried out by Dr. Martin Frankel. The general hypotheses were generated by the intervenors' theory of the organization.

The work quality records of the quality control inspectors as a group were analyzed to detect differences in their work quality or breaks in the overall trends that are linked to the arrival of Saklak, the arrival of

DeWald or the later departure of Saklak. Other events

that might influence quality of work were also used to j

j generate specific hypotheses about the work behaviors of I

r Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L.-Hulin Page 36 the QC inspectors. No evidence was found that would support the hypothesized effects on these work behaviors.

The reinspection data generated by the BCAP program e was available for work completed through the second quarter of 1984. This reinspection data was examined in two ways. A measure of agreement between the QC inspectors and the BCAP inspectors was used to evaluate

'the QC inspector's overall performance. A second measure focusing specifically on weld inspections was also derived. Both of these measures were examined to determine if there were any differences in the agreement rates before and after July 1982, the arrival date of Saklak as QC supervisor and before and after August 1983, the arrival date of DeWald as QC manager. There were no

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significant differences in the agreement rates before and after any of these two dates.

These essentially constant rates of agreement indicate very clearly that neither DeWald nor Saklak had the effects on the behaviors of the QC inspectors that have been hypothesized by the intervenors " pervasive influence" argument.

The PTL overinspection data exist from July 1982 to the present. These data show a very slight linear trend over time in the agreement rates between the Comstock QC

l Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 37 inspectors and the PTL inspectors. This linear trend accounts for a very small amount of the variance in the overall performance / agreements of the inspectors. It can be attributed to any of a number of causes.

However, whatever the cause of the trend, it is important to note that there are no discontinuities in.

the trend line at a third important date, April 1985, the-date Saklak was terminated. The linear trends in the data for the 19 months before Saklak was terminated and the 15 months after his termination were .119 vs. .120 with R squared of .020 and .018. These dates demonstrate another trend with no discontinuities. Again, whatever the reasons for overall trend, Saklak had no observable effects on the trends in quality of the QC' inspectors' work. If Saklak had the effect hypothesized by the intervenors, we would expect this effect to up in behavioral trace measures reflective their performance.

Q.20 How can'you account for the visit of the 24 QC inspectors to the NRC office except as it was caused by Saklak's intimidation and harassment?

A.20 There are a very large number of factors simultaneously influencing the behaviors of workers at a construction site or in any complex organization. Of these factors, it is very likely that only a few were

A Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 38 instrumental in precipitating the visit to the NRC office. Among the candidates for important precipitating events or factors would be: a) the unionization drive, campaign, certification election, and the resulting lack of effects the union election had on the workplace; b) Saklak was a profane and aggressive supervisor and probably not well-liked by the QC inspectors; c) some inspectors may have seen the visit as an opportunity to harass Saklak; d) the inspectors may have had a complaint about Saklak but not a grievance in any contractual or legal sense of the term; e) social pressure and social conformity, such as demonstrated in the Asch and Sheriff Effects in social psychology may have translated the complaints of one or two or three inspectors into a visit by 24 of them even though not all of the 24 would have the same complaint--or even any complaint; f) some combination of one or more of the above. With all of the events and factors going on simultaneously at Braidwood, it would be on very questionable scientific basis for us to attribute the visit of the 24 QC inspectors to any one or even two or three factors. Many were likely happening. Singling out Saklak as the cause is simply not warranted on the basis of evidence.

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f Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles'L. Hulin Page 39 Q.21 Don't all of these other factors that you have suggested may have caused the QC-inspectors to go to the NRC, and all of the apparent unhappiness of the QC inspectors over the pay system, also raise questions about the quality of the inspections of the QC inspectors?

A.21 No. The relationship between job satisfaction and morale has been studied for approximately 50 years by I/O psychologists and researchers in related fields. The overwhelming conclusion that we must reach on the basis of these many studies done in many different indust 41es and organizations is that there is no relationship between job satisfaction and productivity--quantity or quality. Nor is there any theoretical reason to expect such a relationship. Workers who are very dissatisfied on a job may be expected to engage in behaviors that they perceive as leading to a more satisfying job. They may be absent if they can do more pleasurable things while absent and not lose'their job. They may be more likely to quit if they think they can find a better job. They may do other things to increase their job rewards. But the empirical data from more than 50 years of studies is convincing that they do not reduce .their job performance.

Q.22 Are there additional data you would like to see, such as more thorough reinspections or overinspections, before you would feel confident in your conclusions?

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Braidwood Hearings Rebuttal Testimony of Charles L. Hulin Page 40 A.22 No scientist is ever willing to conclude that he or she has enough data to be completely satisfied. However, we also recognize that the' probability of an hypothesis being true is often so large that the likelihood of a sufficient amount of contrary data being found is essentially zero. All of the data reviewed in this case seem to-suggest that the alleged harassment and intimidation ha'd no significant effect on the work of the quality control' inspectors. None of the data support the opposite conclusion. At this point it seems that the

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null hypothesis of no effects should be accepted, even with all of the inherent difficulties of accepting any null hypothesis, and we should regard the incident as an incident and not a cause for concern about the safety of the Braidwood Units.

Q.23 Does this conclude your testimony?

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A.23 Yes.

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,s-6 vEr ATFD CORRESPONDENCE . ~

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Ui4RC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 16 0CT 20 R2:37 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD OFFit! 0F to An-00CKlie G A H F vH.L In the Matter Of: ) ORANC"

)

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY )

) Docket Nos. 50-456 (Braidwood Station, Units 1 ) 50-457 and 2) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Rebecca J. Lauer, one'of the attorneys for Commonwealth Edison Company, certify that copies of the attached BRAIDWOOD HEARINGS REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF CHARLES L. HULIN have been served in the above-captioned matter on those persons listed in the attached Service List by United States mail, postage prepaid, this 16th day of October, 1986.

W 4'- 44 Rebecca J( Lauer ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE Three First National Plaza Suite 5200 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 558-7500 DATED: October 16, 1986

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f -s 4

SERVICE LIST Herbert Grossman, Esq. Mr. William L. Clements Chairman Chief, Docketing and Services Administrative Law Judge United States Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Licensing Commission Board Office of the Secretary United States Nuclear Regulatory Washington, DC 20555 Commission Washington, DC 20555 Ms. Bridget Little Rorem 117 North Linden Street Dr. Richard F. Cole P.O. Box 208 Administrative Law Judge Essex, IL 60935 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board United States Nuclear Regulatory Robert Guild Commission Douglass W. Cassel, Jr.

Washington, DC 20555 Timothy W. Wright, III BPI 109 North Dearborn Street Dr. A. Dixon Callihan Suite 1300 Administrative Law Judge Chicago, IL 60602

-102 Oak Lane Oak Ridge, TN 37830 Charles Jones, Director Illinois Emergency Services Stuart Treby, Esq. and Disaster Agency Elaine I. Chan, Esq. 110 East Adams Office of the Executive Legal Springfield, IL 62705 Director United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission William Little, Director Washington, DC 20555 Braidwood Project Region III United States Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Licensing Commission Board Panel 799 Roosevelt Road United States Nuclear Regulatory Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 Commission Washington, DC 20555 Janice A. Stevens (For Addressee Only)

Atomic Safety and Licensing United States Nuclear Regulatory Appeal Board Panel Commission United States Nuclear Regulatory 7920 Norfolk Avenue Commission Phillips Building Washington, DC 20555 Bethesda, MD 20014 George L. Edgar, Esq.

Thomas A. Schmutz, Esq.

Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.

1615 "L" Street, N.W.

Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20036

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