ML20210U613
| ML20210U613 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1984 |
| From: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Bishop T, Lear G, Parr O NRC, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210U520 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-197 NUDOCS 8610100122 | |
| Download: ML20210U613 (16) | |
Text
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~~g UNITED STATES
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j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5
- p WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555
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MAY 17 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas W. Bishop, Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects George E. Lear, Chief, Structural Geotechnical Engineering Branch, DE Olan D. Parr, Chief, Auxiliary Systems Branch, DSI Robert J. Bosnak, Chief, Mechanical Engineering Branch, DE Vincent S. Noonan, Equipment Qualification Branch, DE FROM:
G. Knighton, Chief, Licensing Branch No. 3, DL
SUBJECT:
DIABLO CANYON SSER ON IDVP Attached is a Draft Safety Evaluation prepared by H. Schierling (PM) on IDVP Open Items (01) and Follow-up Items (FI) that required some action in accordance with SSER 20 on the sub.iect. The list of items with branch responsibility is attached.
It is our understanding that no further action by PGAE or the staff is required While further effort is ongoing regarding piping and on any of the items.
supports as related to 0118, the scope of that ongoing effort is much larger and the results will be in a separate report. Regarding OI 29, the IDVD related effort appears to be complete; however, it should be noted that this matter also is a license condition per Amendment 9 of April 18, 1984 in accordance with the Commission Order CLI 84-5 and the decision ALAB 763.
The draft should be reviewed promptly and any comments be provided directly to H. Schierling by Wednesday May 23, 1984.
ieorge
- Knighton, ef Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing
Attachment:
As stated 8610100122 860930 PDR FOIA HOLMES86-197 PDR
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9 List of SSER 20 IDVP Items 01 2
' 20 Hertz Cutoff Frequency for Containment Annulus Structure (MEB)
OI 11 Roof Truss Modeling of Turbine Building (SGEB)
OI 18 Additional Large Bore Piping Analyses (MEB)
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OI 20 Equipment Qualification (MEB)
OI 25 Intake Structure Lateral Forces (SGEB)
OI 29 Jet Impigement Loads Inside Containment (MEB)
OI 30 Rupture.RestraintsInsideandOutsideContainment(MEB)
FI 1 AFWS Runout. Control System Test (ASB)
FI 5 Oualification Analysis for Motor bapacitor (E0B/ASB)
FI 9 Modifications to AFWS (ASB)
FI 11 Modifications and Documentation from Pressure / Temperature Reanalyses (ASB/EQB)
FI 12 Confirmation of Environmental Oualification Documentation (E08)
FI 14 Moderate Energy Line Break Environmental Qualification of Cables (EQB)
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Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Staff Evaluation for Ooen Items and Followue Items J
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Open Item 2: 20 Hertz Cutoff Frecuency The staff stated in SSER 18 that the use of the 20 Hertz cutoff frequency for the generation of floor response spectra should be verified and/or justified.
In SSER 20 the. staff requested an additional analysis for a piping system in the high' amplif.1 cation region of the annulus structure since the spectra for these locations show acceleration peaks in the 20 to 33 Hertz region. The-licensee provided an outline for the analysis which the staff reviewed and found acceptable. By letter of March 16, 1984 the licensee provided a report entitled " Effects of Horizontal Flexibility of the Annulus Structure'on the Seismic Qualification of Attached piping and Supports." The staff has reviewed this report and determined that the full design margins are assured for loadings associated with the Hosgri event.
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DIABLO CANYON CCMMISSION PAPER
Ocen Item 11: Turbine Buildino Roof Truss Modeling In SSER 18 the staff raised a concern regarding the modeling of the turbine building roof trusses. As stated in SSER 20 the staff had essentially com-pleted its review but had required PG&E to document its efforts. By letter of February 10, 1984, PG&E provided a study documenting the validity of using generalized uniaxial members to obtain individual truss member responses for the turbine building roof. The staff has reviewed this information and finds it acceptable. Therefore, this open item is resolved.
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Ocen Item 18: Additional Pioind Analyses The staff s'tated in SSER 18 that calculations for selected piping systems pre-viously analyzed and reported in ITR-12 and ITR-17 should be repeated with revised support configurations and current loadings to verify that piping and supports satisfy the applicable design. criteria. As stated in SSER 20, the IDVP conducted an additional,' independent reevaluation of two piping systems selected by the staff. Th'e staff concluded at that time that this open item was resolved with respect to icw power operation (Mode 2) only and final resolution was required prior to full power. operation (Mode 1).
Ey letter of February 3,193a PG&E' provided th'e results.of the confirmatory piping analysis of two piping systems selected by the staff (Analysis E-102 anc 3-111), as presented in a report by R. L. Cloud and Associates (RLCA),
" Stress Analysis of Two Piping System and Supports, Diablo Canyon Nuclear power plant, Unit 1, Revis' ion 0."
Based on the review of the information in the report the staff concludes
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While'this resolves the specific issue stated in SSER 18 and subsequently addressed in SSER 19 and SSER 20, additional concerns regarding piping and piping supports were raised in various allegations as addressed in SSER 21 and SSER 22. The staff initiated a special review and evaluation effort for this matter which resulted in requirements for additional evaluations by pG&E and which were established as license conditions in the NRR Crder Modifying License of April 18, 1984 These license concitions must be met prior to full power.
pG&E provided an initial response to those conditions in a submittal of Acril 27, 1984.
The staff and pG&E are pursuing resolution of the concerns through frequent meetings, submittals, and audits at the PG&E offices. The result of this broad effort will be reported in a separate SER supplement.
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Ocen Item 20: Eouiement Qualification The staff stated in SSER 18 it should be verified that all equipment listed in the Diablo Canyon Project Final Report is seismically qualified. SSER 20 stated that PG&E will inform the staff upon completion of the qualification of Class I mechanical equipment for current nozzle loads and response spectra and that this issue must be resolved prior to Mode 2.
In a letter of February 15, 1984 PG&E advised the staff of the completion of this effort.
Equipment qualification has been documented in the PG&E files.
Some modifications to mechanical equipment supports and foundations were made as a result of this effort. The staff finds this acceptable and considers this item resolved.
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Ooen Item 25:
Intake Structure Lateral Forces The staff stated in SSER 18 that the total lateral forces, the total resistance to sliding, and the factor of safety against sliding of the intake structure should be fully evaluated. The IOVP presented the results in,ITR-68, "Verifi-cation of HLA Soils Work," Revision 0 and Revision 1.
As stated in SSER 20 the staff requested, as a result of its review of ITR 68 Revision 1 and as a result of its audit in October 1983, that R. L. Cloud Associates (RLCA) provide certain confirmatory information regarding ITR-68.
By letter dated December 29, 1983 RLCA provided the requested information to the staff. Based on its review the staff concludes that the information is satisfactory and this open item is resolved.
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Ooen Item 29: Jet Imoincement Leads on Piping Inside Containment The staff stated in SSER 18 that the review of jet impingement effects had as yet not been completed and that consideration of jet impingement loads in the design and qualification of al'1 safety-related piping and equipment should be clearly demonstrated. SSER 20 stated that PG&E and Westinghouse were conduct-ing an evaluation of jet impingement loads on piping and supports, mechanical and electr.ical equipment and conduits.
PG&E submitted a report on this effort by letter of February 6,1984.
In addition, the Atomic Safety and Licenisng Appeal Board in its decision of March 23.1984 (ALAE-763) requested PG&E to perform a jet inpingement evaluation for those lines inside containment that were not includeo within the scope of the pressure / temperature criteria.
PG&E applied the e-iteria for the iden 1-fication of the lines for analysis,
'.c provided its response to this recuirement in a letter of April 9,1984. The staff has reviewed this information and con-cludes 05/'.7/54 6
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Open Item 30:
Ruoture Restraints The staff stated in SSER 18 that it should be clearly indicated that rupture restraints inside and outside containment have been properly designed and installed. As a result of an audit in October 1983, the staff had raised a concern regarding the acceptance criteria for compression members of the frame-type rupture restraints which contain ' crushable bumpers. At a meeting on December 6, 1983'PG&E provided extensive supplementary information which demon-strated that the criteria used by the licensee conform to accepted industry practices for the design of rupture restraints.
In a letter of January 20, 1984 PG&E clearly identified this information in a report by K. P. Buchert, titled " Review of Criteria Usec to Verify.the Beams /Colums Used on the Inside arc'O.tside Containment Pipe Wnip Restraints en the Diaolo Project." The staff has reviewec tnis report and concludes that the information is applicable and acceptable for the Diablo Canyon Plant. On this basis th'is item is resolved.
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Follow-Vo Item 1: AFWS Runout Control System Test As stated in SSER 18, PG&E, as a result of an IDVP analysis of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS) runout control system, changed the low pump discharge pressure setpoints and committed to perform a test of 'the runout control system to confirm dynamic stability and component. operability. As stated in SSER 20 this test would be performed at hot standby conditions (Mode 3).
PG&E described the prope' sed test in. a letter of December 6, 1983,. The NRC Region V staff noted during an audit that the proposed test would not confirm the dynamic stability of the AFWS during runout conditions. The licensee stated that Start-Up Test 37.12, Addendum 3 will confirm ooerability and stability of the AFUS level control valve actuators,and will demonstrate that tne system will maintain steam generator water level.
By letter of Maren 19, 1984 PG&E informed the staff that this test has been successfully completec and confirms that the contrel system exhibits stable operation. The staff concludes that the successful completion of the test resolves this item.
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-i Follow-Vo Item 5: Motor Cacacitor Qualification Analysis J]
In SSER 18 'the staff stated that PG&E will conduct an analysis to determine
- j the qualified life of the motor capacitor of the motor-operated auxiliary feed-water valves for steam generator level control. As stated in SER 20, PG&E sub-e sequently provided documentation regarding the qualified life of the capacitor.
The staff reviewed the information and found it acceptable with respect to low-
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power operation. The staff also stated'in SSER 20 that the final resolution is required prior to full power operation.
PG&E, by letters of January 20 and January 30, 1984, provided additional infor-mation on tne environmental qualification of the motor capacitor in the electro-nycraulic (EH) actuator of'the motor-operated auxiliary feedwater valves for steam generator level control. The staff reviewed this information, newever was not able to conclude that this equipment had been satisfactorily demon-strated to be environmentally qualified for the postulated high energy line break environment.
PG&E, by letter of February 15, 1984 provided additional information, including a reference to SSER 9 (June 13, 1980), page 7-1, stating that the auxilary feedwater level control valves are not required to be quali-fied for the severe environment.
This information is contained in Amendment 69 (September 1978) to the FSAR, Notes to Table 3.11-1A.
The staff reviewed the information and concludes that no more than two EH valve actuators would be affected by any single high energy line break environment. Therefore, a con-current single active failure will not prevent the delivery of sufficient auxiliary feedwater by the turbine-driven AFW pump or the affected motor-criven pumps to at least two intact steam generators, and thus a safe shutdown can be achieved.
In addition, by letter of March 23, 1984 PG&E confirmed that failure of the valve actuators will not affect other safety-related systems and will not mislead the plant operators into taking appropriate action. The staff has reviewed the above information ano concludes that the EH valve actuators need not be qualified to the high energy line break environment. Thus, the original staff evaluation on the subject, as contained in SSER 9, remains acceptable anc tnis issue is consicered resolved.
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Follow-UP Item 9: Modifications to AFWS As stated in SSER 18, the staff will confirm that any modification required in safety-related systems to satisfy pressure / temperature rating and power-operated ~
valve operability under proper differential pressure conditions are implemented.
As stated in SSER 20 modifications to the AFWS resulting from the revised pres-sure and temperature ratings'had been completed, except for the AFWS pump turbine overspeed setpoint change. This change was to be conducted during hot shutdown (Modek)whensteamisavailablefromreactorcoolantpumpheat., The Region V staff audited documentation for selected modifications that had been completed. The licensee informed the staff by letter of March 19, 1984 that the overspeed trip setooint of the AFWS pump turbine was cc pleted during Mode d.
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The staff concludes that -his action reso1ves this item.
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f Follow-Up Item 11: Pressure /Temeerature Reanalysis Modifications and Documentat' ion
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As stated in SSER 18, as result of the PG&E pressure'/ temperature reanalyses for environments were required. The staff required, as stated in SSER 20, that the modifications be completed prior to criticality (Mode 2).
In a letter.of 4
December 6,1983 PG&E identified the specific modifications required and in its P
letter of February 15, 1984 the licens'ee stated that all modifications had been completed. The staff considers.this item resolved.
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Follow-Up Item 12: Confirmatory of Environmental hualification Documentation In SSER 18 to staff stated that it will evaluate the results of the PG&E anal-ysis with respect to assuring environmental qualification of equipment. As stated in SSER 20, the staff conducted an audit of the PG&E qualification files in late 1983. The staff determined that the equipment is qualified for the
. reanalyzed environments. However, specific documentation was not available in the files.
This aspect was discussed in further detail in a letter dated Janua ry 31, 1984 from T. Bishop, NRC Regicn V, to J. Schuyler, PG&E. PG&E responced in a letter of March 1, 1984 and stated that the files have now been updated.
'A PGLE interoffice memorandum was issued which recuires that these rec:rds be treated as cuality recorcs. The staff concluces that these actions rescive this ite-k 05/17c'9-12 OIAELOCANYOkCCMMISSICNPA?E;
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Follow-Vo Item 14: Environmental Qualification of cables and Wires As stated in SSER 18, the IOVP revie,w of high energy pipe cracks indicated that certain cables and wires, other than those previously identified as environ-mentally qua'lified for use in the AFWS, were utilized and were subject to severe environments due to high temperature jet impingement. The staff audited the 4
documentation for certain wires and cables and the results were documented in SSER 20. The licensee provided additiona'l information by letters of December
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12 and 21, 1983. ' Based on the audit and on the review of the acditional infor-mation the staff finds the information acceptable and concludes that this item is resolved.
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