ML20210U540
| ML20210U540 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/1984 |
| From: | Strumwasser M CALIFORNIA, STATE OF |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210U520 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-197 NUDOCS 8610100069 | |
| Download: ML20210U540 (25) | |
Text
., ;- g.
e.
s' TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J.
STRUMWASSER, SPECIAL COUNSEL.TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES January 24, 1984 Mr. Chaionan and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the committee's continued interest in the licensing process at Diablo Canyon and for the invitation to participate in today's hearings.
Less than eleven months ago, I sat here as Attorney General John Van de Kamp described to this committee the concerns of the State of California that led Governor George Deukmejian to undertake representation of the state's interests in the Diablo Canyon licensing proceedings.
The Attorney General has asked me to report to you the past eleven months' developments.
First, let me assure the committee that the considerations that led Governor Deukmejian to enter the case remain unchanged.
The Governor continues to look forward to the day when Diablo Canyon is in operation, serving as a valuable energy resource for the people of California.
However, the Governor remains committed to the pursuit of full assurance that
[
Diablo Canyon has been designed and constructed properly, that the safety requirements of Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have been met, and that Pacific Gas and Electric Company has discharged the obligations it assumed when it t
received authorization to construct the facility.
fy01$g9860930 HOLM+S86-197 PDR f
...:J....___.-....w_..~~
'g s
The past year has seen progress toward these objectives, and we continue to expect that the remaining safety issues will be satisfactorily resolved.
However, the past year has also shown that the requisite assurance of safety has not yet been 4
achieved.
Let me relate some of the encouraging developments of i'
the past year.
i We have generally been favorably impressed by the work of the Independent Design Verification Program.
Although we have specific disagreements with the IDVP, we think that, in general, its engineers have conducted themselves in a competent, j
professional manner, and that we can have a high degree of confidence in the design of the specific systems reviewed by the IDVP.
j The past year has demonstrated the soundness of PG&E's 4
I decision to retain the Bechtel Power Corporation to help complete 1
i the project.
The Bechtel personnel have definitely strengthened the project organization and improved overall performance, fl Last March Attorney General Van de Kamp shared with you our general impression that the technical issues were narrowing among the parties.
That impression has since been confirmed.
'l Particularly in the area of seismic qualification of the I^
structural design, there are a small number of relatively minor issues that separate the parties, which could readily be resolved by new analyses we have called for.
In the area of non-seismic
'l design, a less thorough review has been performed, but those i
2.
-,..;_...:c. _......
.....;_n.,_.~..__,,..,.,,..
I areas that have been verified by the IDVP have now, in our view, been demonstrated to be qualified.
There have also been favorable developments in the performance of the regulatory system itself.
In particular, we have been encouraged by the caution exhibited by the commission in the relicensing process.
During this committee's last hearings on Diablo Canyon, a number of witnesses expressed concern that the commission's approval of the concept of three-step licensing amounted to a commitment to a rapid i,
relicensing and hasty approval of commercial operation.
Since then, we think the commissioners have exhibited appropriate prudence and concern for the unresolved safety issues and have shown their willingness to let the pace of licensing be set by i
the rate at which the safety issues can be satisfactorily 4
resolved.
t We are also pleased to report that, in our view, the past year has-demonstrated that the commission and the parties before it can, as we had expected, conduct the needed hearings l
I expeditiously and avoid unnecessary delay in adjudication.
From April 21, 1983, when the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board agreed to reopen the hearing on design quality assurance, to January 4,1984, we were able to carry out a vigorous discovery program, to conduct a four-week hearing into the adequacy of i
j Diablo Canyon's design and the program to verify that design, and to complete extensive briefing of the issues.
During that same time, we held an abbreviated hearing on construction quality i
3.
l
.,_....-.-.......-.------..3
--..y.....
assurance.
The commitment made to the parties and related to this committee by the Attorney General last March, that we would work with the parties to expedite the proceedings and avoid unnecessary litigation of undisputed matters, has, we feel, been fulfilled.
We believe the commission, its appeal board, and the parties have succeeded in holding meaningful hearings while avoiding unnecessary delay.
Despite these favorable developments, we cannot yet say that the safety of Diablo Canyon has been demonstrated.
DESIGN VERIFICATION The Independent Design Verification Program has substantially reduced the uncertainties surrounding the quality of the design.
Unfortunately, in some cases the uncertainty has been reduced by the certain demonstration that the design was, indeed, plagued with errors.
However, many of those errors have been identified and corrected, and it is now reasonably clear what is required for resolution of the remaining concerns.
PG&E has undertaken a broad review of the seismic design of the structures at Diablo Canyon, with the IDVP reviewing the PG&E work on a sample basis.
It is now clear that the initial seismic design of the facility was seriously deficient.
Much of this deficiency has been remedied 'by reanalysis.
In other cases, PG&E has chosen to work around the deficiencies, in effect demonstrating that no matter how pocr a portion of the analysis was, the errors cannot make any difference in the safety of the 4.
~
^
des ig n,
We anticipate that still other problems can be solved by some further reanalysis.
2 The non-seismic design was verified by the IDVP on only a senple basis, with the IDVP thoroughly examining three systems 1/
and, in response to errors found in those three systems, certain i
j aspects of all other systems in Unit 1.
What analyses have been done appear to have been carried out in an able manner.
We retain, however, reservations about the efforts of PG&E and the IDVP to draw conclusions about the unsampled portions of the plant on the basis of the samples drawn.
The commission expressly approved the use of sampling in the verification of Diablo Canyon's design.
The commission and its staff clearly required of the IDVP that it give due consideration to the use of statistical sampling techniques and l.
avail itself of the services of a competent statistician.
The IDVP committed itself to doing so.
Nevertheless, the IDVP, which had no such statistician on its staff, never in fact retained such an expert.
Instead, it drew samples based on what it called
" engineering judgment," without any regard for the possibility that its sampling might be statistically invalid.
We both produced testimony at the recently concluded design quality l
1.
The three systems were the 4,160-volt electrical system, the auxilliary feedwater system, and the control room ventilation and pressurization system.
PG&E sought at the hearing to characterize the sample as "three of the ten" systems comprising the Unit 1 non-seismic design work, but it became clear that characterization was improper.
The sample could more easily be characterized as three out of twenty-two.
5.
.__....___._____._._._._...i..__.. '
- - - ~ - -
assurance hearings that the sanpling was invalid and that no conclusions could properly be drawn about the unsanpled portions of the plant from the sampled werk.
a Perhaps even more troubling than the methodological flaw in the IDVP's work is the way in which the IDVP dealt with its I
commitment.
Acknowledging that it had made a commitment to obtain competent statistical expertise, the IDVP deemed itself relieved of that obligation by subsequent developments that somehow rendered statistical expertise unnecessary.
Its program manager has acknowledged he never advised the NRC that the IDVP deemed itself relieved of that obligation, nor was approval sought or obtained for its failure to discharge the obligation.
And, indeed, the program manager for the staff testified that he thought the obligation was still operative and had been discharged -- by the hiring by PG&E of a statistician whom the IDVP disclaimed as its expert.2/
It is, of course, most troubling to hear that the staff had not noticed the IDVP's failure to meet one of its obligations.
One fact to emerge from the design verification hearings is the virtual certainty that there remain in the design at 2.
It should be clear that the IDVP could not discharge its obligations by permitting PG&E to retain an expert and do the work for it.
The expert, PG&E witnesses testified, was retained for litigation purposes connected with the hearing, and not as a part of the IDVP program.
PG&E's direct relationship with the
'i statistician and the absence of any of the independence and controls required by the commission of IDVP contractors would have rendered his use by the IDVP a violation of both the
,i commission's order and the assurances given Congress about the independence of that program.
6.
- m e * + = =, - ewe t em.wm
--e m e,.see
-* m emw. m
-,.4 4
.ee as ww eg e,.
. en
..,y.e.g.,
-w.
....e-mm--
+w- - -
ue ei--,
.--wy
-.v--,---
- + - - - - - - -
--m
-w 7
g.....,_,..,
4 Diablo Canyon undetected errors that cause the design to fail to meet licensing criteria and regulatory requirements.
This was acknowledged by witnesses for the applicant, the IDVP, and the NRC Staff.
We have identified the steps necessary to achieve regulatory compliance and urged the appeal board to order those measures.
Another important fact to emerge from the design hearings is that PG&E continues to have difficulties reconciling its constructed plant to the design drawings and analyses continues to be a problem.
Some of the discrepancies can be attributed to slowness by PG&E in the reconciliation process, sometimes taking years to obtain engineering approval for field design changes.
Other cases are more difficult to explain, suggesting a pattern of deficient configuration control practices.
We have urged the appeal board to require a systematic, thorough verification of as-built conditions and design documentation.
CONSTRUCTION QUALITY ASSURANCE Mr. Chairman, in our view the issue of construction i
quality assurance is the most serious unresolved issue at Diablo j
Canyon.
Last April we urged the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board to reopen the record on quality assurance -- without l
distinguishing between design and construction.
While it was l
l true that the original errors that had led to suspension of the low-power license for Unit 1 were design errors, it was also true 7.
i
. _ _. _.. _.. =,. _
y._. _.
that those errors had escaped detection by a single, integrated quality assurance program, headed by a single quality assurance manager, implementing the single set of licensing commitments that pertain to quality assurance.
We felt then, and continue to feel today, that those facts, together with the known design i
errors, precluded the high degree of confidence one would want to have in the overall quality assurance program and the quality of work it was intended to assure -- including the quality of construction.
We pointed out to the board the commission's past findings, expressed in opinions and in testimony before Congress, that the key to quality assurance failures in the nuclear industry has been the absence of an adequate management l
commitment to quality assurance.
The hundreds of design errors detected in the last two years appear to demonstrate the absence i
i of an adequate management commitment at PG&E to quality assurance in the design process.
PG&E's witnesses testified before the appeal board that the management commitment to quality assurance was identical for both design and construction quality assurance.
This suggests that the necessary managerial commitment to quality assurance was missing for both the design and construction of Diablo Canyon.
The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board declined to draw that inference, instead reopening the record only on design 8.
. _.., f.._.n ;_;,-..., f._._ f
=
quality assurance / and requiring our motion to be refiled on the 3
question of construction quality assurance.
During the first six months of 1983 we began to receive reports of serious construction problems at the site.
Subsequent testimony showed that beginning around December 1982 PG&E and its principal construction contractor, the H. P.
Foley Company, were preparing up for a massive construction effort, which came to be called the " Big Push."
By the time we refiled our motion to reopen on construction quality assurance, Foley's Quality Assurance Manager at Diablo Canyon had been discharged and had reported to us and to the NRC allegations of improper practices at the plant.
We brought those of the allegations then available to us to the attention of the appeal board in our motion to I
reopen.
PG&E and the staff filed written responses, disputing the significance of the allegations.
The board acknowledged that the conflicting evidence raised "a number of unanswered questions" about the quality of construction.
Rather than ordering the record reopened, however, as we believe NRC precedent requires, the appeal board convened a
" mini-hearing" in July in an attempt to resolve the conflicting l
evidence.
This procedure prevented us from conducting any i
discovery and developing a complete picture for the board.
At i
G 3.
To their credit, both PG&E and the NRC staff abandoned their opposition to reopening on design quality assurance, l
stipulating to the reopening of the record on that issue.
In its i
unpublished April 21, 1983, order reopening the design quality assurance record, the appeal board expressed its concurrence that the facts merited such reopening.
l 9.
_ i 12.,.
~
~
~
the hearing, the applicant put forward witnesses who testified about the quality assurance program, seeking to controvert the direct evidence and inferences of quality assurance inadequacies in the construction process.
The board then weighed these claims against whatever evidence we were able to produce without the t
benefit of discovery.
The board proceeded to find that we had failed to demonstrate what it considered to be a sufficient degree of breakdown in the quality assurance program to warrant reopening.
We have urged the commission to review this decision on the ground that the appeal board fundamentally erred in the L
standard and procedures it used to review the motion to reopen.
The problem with the board's ruling was amply demonstrated by events that followed the July hearing.
At the July hearing PG&E witnesses had sought to limit the implications of alleged quality assurance breaches by the H.
P. Foley Company by pointing to the superior performance of the other major construction contractor at Diablo Canyon, Pullman Power Products.
A September 9 filing by the Joint Intervenors revealed the existence of a 1977 independent audit of Pullman showing that it failed to meet all but one of the commission's eighteen l
l l
quality assurance criteria and revealing the falsifiertion of records, absence of any corrective action system, inadequate direction to workers, failure to require the contractor to comply with the regulations, and numerous examples of construction errors.
Neither the NRC Staff nor the other parties knew of the i
10.
l
. ~..
i existence of the audit, which was conducted at the very time of the 1977 hearings before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board on_the PG&E quality assurance program.
PG&E neither disclosed the audit in 1977 nor proffered it at the July 1983 hearing before the appeal board.
Discovery would have revealed the i
Pullman audit -- and whatever similar evidence remains today undisclosed.
Notwithstanding the limitations of the hearing, the board heard evidence of serious problems in the current round of construction at Diablo Canyon.
The discharged Foley Quality Assurance Manager testified to violations of quality assurance requirements and to harassment, intimidation, and excessive production pressure.
Foley was unable to get enough qualified quality assurance inspectors to keep up with the enormous work force -- substantially larger than had been employed originally to construct the facility.
The result was the hiring of unqualified inspectors, sometimes with false certifications, inspectors working up to 60 or 70 hours8.101852e-4 days <br />0.0194 hours <br />1.157407e-4 weeks <br />2.6635e-5 months <br /> per week, and numerous errors in the course of construction.
The appeal board did not find the evidence presented adequate to justify reopening the record.
Missing from the appeal board's treatment of the evidence of quality assurance deficiencies is any objective standard for how bad things have to get before the record should be reopened.
The board simply stated that the evidence "must establish.
that there has been a breakdown of the quality 11.
l l
e y,
,, -,q-nnm s.
a--
n-,-p-,y-+
-g_-
_---.m,-,,
m
--mn-
- -, -,,- - -----.--,-gw,,
~
^
assurance program sufficient to raise legitimate doubt as to the plant's capability of be'ing operated safely."
The opinion did not give the parties be$ ore the NRC guidance as to what constitutes a " sufficient" showing.
It also does not tell a Congress concerned about the NRC's handling of such matters how the Atomic Energy Act is being administered.
A review of NRC inspection reports over the past thirteen years shows that many of the deficiencies in the quality assurance process, and many of the construction errors, were not unique to the " Big Push" of 1983.
Prior Big Pushes, corresponding to the original construction and to the implementation of Hosgri modifications, were marked by similar problems.
We have pointed 1
out to the commission that neither the staff nor the appeal board t
has dealt with the evidence indicating that, contrary to the NRC quality assurance regulations, PG&E continues to lack a proper j
action program to ensure errors do not recur.
i One useful product of the July proceedings on l
construction quality assurance was the information that PG&E never, in fact, committed itself to comply with the NRC's quality assurance regulations in the construction of Unit 1 of Diablo Canyon.A/
Instead, PG&E only committed itself to meet the regulations "as. practicable."
The justification for this limitation was that the quality assurance regulations were 4.
Although the testimony at the July hearing was addressed solely to construction, the licensing commitments cited by the applicant's quality assurance manager applied without distinction to design and construction.
12.
--w
>s
..e-.
.ee e om.e-o.g..,-.e.e.,
adopted and made effective in mid-1970, after much design and some construction work had already been completed.
- However, PG&E's former quality assurance manager acknowledged that some unknown amount of design and construction work that followed adoption of the quality assurance regulations failed to comply with them.
The finding that PG&E neither made nor met a commitment l
to full compliance with the quality assurance regulations, in and of itself, contradicts the NRC's 1981 licensing board decision and requires reopening of the record.
The inference from known design deficiencies to suspicions about the quality of construction led the regional staff of the NRC to recommend expansion of the IDVP to review the adequacy of a sample of the construction.
Rather than sampling from the work of each of the twelve contractors who constructed Unit 1, the IDVP selected three contractors for review.
It found i
numerous discrepancies between design documents and actual 4
a construction.
However, it pronounced the deviations not to be safety-significant, concluded the work of those three contractors was satisfactory, and extrapolated to the unsampled nine 1
i contractors, approving their work without examination.
- Indeed, i
l at the July hearing the IDVP was prepared to offer testimony on i
l the quality of Unit 2, despite the fact that it did not examine any part of Unit 2.
Once a construction worker deviates from the plans, l
whether that deviation violates licensing criteria or creates a 13.
._....._,._.__,,,_,7
-,m,
,._.._,,,9,
= - - - ---
sv 4-
-, -,,.,y
,. l.
1.._..__..._...Z..~..
.9 safety hazard is a mere fortuity.
The worker is likely not even to have known that his or her work deviates from design i
documents,'otherwise he or she likely would not have varied from them.
Even were the worker to be aware of the deviation, there is no way he or she can foresee how the configuration being l
installed might be analyzed by the complex mathematical models and computer programs used to qualify the design.
For this reason, we have emphasized to the commission that the mimber of deviations from design documents is more significant than opinions about the safety consequences of the deviations as long as the commission continues to rely on sample observations.
The appeal board failed' to address this point' in denying the motion
{
to reopen on construction quality assurance, an omission we hope the commission will redress.
I repeat that none of these deficiencies should ultimately prove fatal to the power plant.
What is required is a thorough, systematic, independent assessment of the quality of construction, sufficient to achieve the same confidence in the construction one would have had the quality assurance program met legal requirements.
We continue to believe that this level of i
confidence can be achieved relatively quickly.
The sooner this task is undertaken, the sooner public confidence can be restored l
and safety assured.
REGULATORY PRACTICES As it has over the years, Diablo Canyon continues to i
teach us important lessons about the regulation of nuclear power 1
i l
14.
- n :
= =.
= - --
~
..... ~~::.~ ~
in the United States.
While we continue to be impressed by the technical competence of the NRC personnel, we do find some of its practicos to be troublesome.
I would like to discuss a few of those concerns briefly, while emphasizing our appreciation for the efforts of the NRC and its staff to enforce the Atomic Energy Act in a fair and responsible manner.
Adherence to Regulations.
The Atomic Energy Act is unambiguous in requiring that applicants for an NRC license demonstrate that they have complied with the commission's regulations.
We are sorry that we cannot report consistent adherence to this requirement by the staff and the appeal board assigned to Diablo Canyon.
In 1970 the commission adopted Appendix B to part 50 of its regulations, containing the eighteen criteria for the assurance of quality -in safety-related structures, systems, and components.
In the face of uncontradicted evidence that PG&E failed, for many years after i
1970, to meet those regulations in the construction of Diablo Canyon, the appeal board, at the urging of the staff, has said that full compliance is not necessary as long as it appears that the resulting construction product does not contain errors having safety significance.
There is no legal basis for excusing failures to comply with the commission's regulations.
We have asked the full commission to correct this error.
4 1
Adherence to Licensing Criteria.
Just as the Atomic Energy Act requires compliance with commission regulations, both l
15.
l l
i
_m
~
the statute and regulations make the meeting'of licensing criteria a requirement for issuance of a license.
The inconsistent treatment of this requirement by the NRC staff has been a source of concern to us.
When the Independent Design Verification Program was established, its objectives were clears to determine whether or not the design met the licensing criteria.
In furtherance of that requirement, the IDVP established a taxonomy for the classification of errors, with the most severe errors, class A errors, being defined as those which cause licensing criteria to be violated.
In the course of its verification activities, the IDVP uncovered a substantial number of such violations in the samples it took, requiring each error discovered to be corrected.
By this past fall, when the hearings on design quality assurance were convened, it was clear that the IDVP's objective
-- to ensure that licensing criteria had been met -- had not been satisfied.
Witnesses from both PG&E and the IDVP testified that it is virtually certain there remain undetected class A errors in both the seismic and non-seismic design of both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
In defense of its recommendation that the verification process cease, the IDVP opined that, while there remain errors causing the licensing criteria to be violated, it was sure that those errors do not pose a safety hazard.
Yet witnesses associated with both the Governor and the IDVP testified that an assessment of safety significance of violating licensing criteria could not be made without a detailed study of the consequences of the j
j 16.
i
=
J. ~..
^
design deviations.
The IDVP acknowledged that it had performed no such study and, in fact, had no opinion about the safety significance of the errors it had detected.
While the IDVP had i
no opinion as to the safety significance of the errors it actually had uncovered, it offered an opinion about the safety significance of undetected errors, the nature of which could not even be described.
Plainly, any talk about the safety significance of deviations from licensing criteria in a business as serious as the regulation of a nuclear power plant must be founded on careful studies and analyses of the specific deviations from licensing criteria and an explicit assessment of each of their possible consequences.
The licensing criteria themselves contain the commission's determination of what is required in order to assure public health and safety.
At a minimum, deviation from those criteria cut into the margin of safety of i
i the power plant.
As the program manager for the IDVP himself i
i testified, talk about the safety significance of errors is l
i l
j fundamentally unhealthy because it encourages a disrespect for the importance of meeting licensing criteria.
It is clear that the verification program uncovered more design errors producing a larger number of deviations from licensing criteria than had been expected.
A review of the j
documents that chartered the IDVP and guided its work gives the impression that the use of safety significance was adopted after the program was designed and was turned to when it became clear 17.
.. ~
_,..,,,--.y y-.-,_
--m,,
y
.-,-,._,.,---__.,,,,,_m.,-
.%--es
))^
~
that the initial objective, verification of compliance with the licensing criteria, was impossible, given the point at which the IDVP chose to terminate verification.
The commission and the IDVP were correct in their initial objectives for the program, and we are urging them now to settle for nothing less than I
j fulfillment of these objectives.
The position of the staff on compliance with licensing criteria was disquieting.
In prepared testimony in the design quality assurance hearings, the staff acknowledged that the objective of the verification program was to establish "whether or not the previously approved licensing criteria had been met."
In light of the testimony of PG&E and the IDVP about the certainty that this objective had not been fulfilled, the staff opined that the regulations do not require compliance with all licensing criteria but merely with " fundamental licensing criteria" and prohibit only "significant deviations" from those criteria, two terms that do not appear in the regulations.
Instead, the staff testified that an applicant is entit'ad to a license so long as none of the deviations from the approved licensing criteria do not create a significant safety hazard.
i Staff reliance on safety significance was especially i
troublesome because of the staff's assessment of the known errors.
The staff testified at t!ie design quality assurance hearings that none of the known design errors constituted a safety-significant error -- not the reversed blueprint, not the incorrect i
calculation of masses in the annulus, not even all of the errors collectively.
18.
- r:;r-- -..
1 _
r r--
- -- n-n.w
- = ~ - - ~ ~ -
l. a..
~
We continue to maintain before the commission that the proper objective for relicensing is the demonstration that the
. verification. program has achieved the same level of license compliance as a legally sufficient quality assurance program.
The Evolving Technology of Verification.
Besides Diablo Canyon, there are a number of verification programs at various nuclear power plants attempting to remedy discovered deficiencies in past quality assurance practices.
Diablo Canyon has demonstrated that the standards for such verification need to be clarified.
The first matter to be settled is, of course, the' objectives of verification.
The retreat from license compliance to absence of safety-significance deviations from the license was in part the product of claims that errors causing deviations from licensing criteria are inevitable, even in plants that have fully functioning quality assurance programs.
If that is in fact true, it does not support the conclusion that violations of licensing criteria are unimportant unless they appear to be safety-significant.
The problem confronting the verification programs is that there is no known standard for the number of errors to be expected at a plant conforming to NRC quality assurance i
requirements.
We do not dispute the propriety of substituting an after-the-fact verification for a timely quality assurance program.
But if the standard for verification is to be something other than full compliance with licensing criteria, the burden i
19.
l l
-..--,,.---.-,--n.
.~'
} ;_._..
_,. ],,, _ f
.l properly falls on the applicant and, ultimately, the commission to demonstrate that any lesser standard conforms to the performance of a lawful quality assurance program.
In the absence of any evidence of how many errors can be expected from a design produced under a functioning quality assurance program, we have proposed two alternative standards for a verification program:
either demonstrating that the design --
or some specified portion of it -- was error-free, or subjecting the design to the same level of scrutiny it would have been subjected to under a proper quality assurance program.
Demonstration of freedom from errors could be either by a 100 percent review of the design or by a statistically valid sample that supported the claim that the probability of remaining errors i
causing violations of licensing criteria was negligible.
This raises another recurring issue in verification programs:
when and how properly to draw inferences from sample observations.
Despite the commission's directions in Diablo Canyon to give due consideration to statistical methods in l
l drawing samples, both the staff and the IDVP have been content to base verification efforts on samples drawn in a non-random fashion.
While such sampling has value for certain perposes --
l most notably when one is seeking to identify errors quickly and i
has reason to believe one knows where they are most likely to be
-- such sampling does not permit extrapolation of the findings of the sample to the unsampled portions of the plant.
i The sampling practices of the IDVP are simply an l
20.
l
..+ ~.
^
~
outgrowth of the historic " spot check" of ten used by inspectors.
Whate,ver the merits of such a sampling approach under other 1
circumstances, this approach has no applicability to the verification of a nuclear power plant like Diablo Canyon, where the quality assurance program has been demonstrated to be so deficient that, as the appeal board has ruled, the program cannot be the basis of confidence that any portion of the design meets licensing criteria.
With the recurring need for verification of different aspects of various plants, we hope the commission will take the earliest opportunity to make it clear that it will require scientific rigor in such verification programs, including rigor in the selection of samples.
l In some respects, the'very nature of the verification problem makes it very difficult to pay proper attention to the methodological details.
The NRC, inevitably and understandably, functions best when confronted with safety question concerning an identifiable piece of hardware.
It does not do nearly as well when assessing the possibility that there are undetected errors of unknown nature in unspecified equipment.
Because the verification problem is inherently so intangible, there is a persistent temptation to look at a few places and, if no errors are found, to pronounce the verification completed and the power plant ready for operation.
This feeling is compounded by the i
fact that every dollar spent in verification is easily measurable as a dollar of expense, while the verification that dollar 4
6 21.
-~
~~
^~
purchases makes a contribution to safety tha't is difficult to measure.
It is, of course, a complete answer to such observations to point out that the consequences of an error (n a plant like Diablo Canyon can have truly astronomical tangible and intangible costs, and that the most serious accidents experienced at American nuclear plants have been the product of relatively minor errors that were difficult to detect and assess.
NRC Investigations.
The most recent round of allegations and concerns regarding Diablo Canyon -- numbering over 100 by the staff's count -- once again raise questions about-the efficacy of the staff's enforcement and investigation program.
We are particularly sensitive to these concerns because we have ourselves been the recipients of a number of anonymous allegations.E/
Frequently people bringing their concerns to us have expressed a reluctance to take their claims to the NRC, doubting either that their anonymity will be preserved or that the allegations will be effectively investigated.
I want to emphasize that we have seen no evidence that the NRC is unwilling or incapable of protecting the anonymity of informants, and we do l
not doubt the sincerity of the staff in its efforts to l
investigate safety allegations.
In particular, we have been i
5.
Because the Attorney General represents a pa*rty to the licensing proceeding, we consider it inapropriate for us to pursue contacts made by employees of PG&E and its contractors, since the rules governing the conduct of attorneys in litigation preclude contact with the employees of an opposing party without l
notice to counsel for that party.
We do encourage informants to take their concerns to the commission, and we have on occasion referred matters to other law enforcement agencies.
I i
l t
22.
l
.i 1
E~~ ~ '
'" 7 E 7,. __ __ _ ~ "'-~~' T E Z _T i~ Z.'J' Z 1"._ i.
i
~
impressed by the coordinated, systematic program the staff has recently implemented to evaluate the allegations and concerns.
In dealing with these allegations, we look to the staff to provide a thorough evaluation of them.
In particular, we hope i
the staff will:
'i (1)
Separate the issues of regulatory compliance from i
safety significance.
Historic practice has been for the i
staff first to determine whether a claim is factually accurate and then to assess its significance to safety.
Supplement 21 to the Safety Evaluation Report appears not to draw this distinction clearly.
(2)
Give attention to both. prospective and historic implications of quality assurance deficiencies.
Where a past practice has been deficient, it should be corrected.
But it is also essential that any past defects in the design or construction product caused by the quality assurance inadequacy be corrected.
(3)
FNaluate both the specific finding and the pattern of similar findings.
When a number of alleged deficiencies have been confirmed, even if each deficiency itself does not amount to a safety hazard, the whole may well amount to more than the sum of its parts.
In particular, if a pattern of deviations from proper procedures has been demonstrated, that i
pattern is itself a finding requiring an independent assessment.
i' I
23.
l j
y_.__._...
_j o
9 CONCLUSION Diablo Canyon is in some ways symbolic of the difficult decisions presented by the regulation of nuclear power and, in a broader sense, by the challenge of providing safe, economical energy to the nation.
l It would be easy to look back on the troubled history of Diablo Canyon, to declare the power plant a hopeless, irredeemable i
mess that should never be permitted to operate, and to walk away from the plant in disregard of the cost of such a decision and the lost benefits Diablo Canyon offers.
Likewise, it would be easy to declare the substantial, costly efforts to correct past errors sufficiently close to adequate, to dismiss nagging doubts about practices at the plant as ephemeral, hyper-technical objections, and to rely on the redundancy of safety systems to protect us from the consequences of any remaining errors.
Each of these courses is being urged in good faith by well-intentioned, sincere people.
But those responsible for the consequences of regulatory decisions do not enjoy the luxury of such simple, unambiguous views.
It is undeniable that there have been serious a
deficiencies in the design and construction of Diablo Canyon.
It l
is just as true that these deficiencies and their consequences i !
can be remedied, albeit at a cost.
We continue to look to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure that all measures will be taken that are necessary to restore public confidence in Diablo Canyon and to bring the plant into compliance with the law.
We 24.
4 9
continue to be optimistic that Diablo Canyon will, iri the near futur4, be producing power safely for the people of California.
9 i
9 D
+
1 1
4 6
0 0
1
?
I I
9 I
l s
l 25.
i e
I
.... -......... ~. _.. -...... ~ -. - -. _
..z..
/
- ,cs tituq'o,;
y UNITED STATES 1
E NUCLEAR HEGULATORY COMMISSION T
- h b
g li.
'- l WASHINGTON, D. C 20555
/
Docket Nos.:
50-275 JAN 2 7 ggy and 50-323 i
MEMORANDUM FOR: George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing FROM:
Hans Schierling, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
MEETING WITH PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DATE & TIME:
January 31, 1984, 2PM LOCATION:
PG&E Offices Room 1760 77 Beale Street San Francisco, CA PURPOSE:
Discuss with PG&E preliminary results of NRC staff review and evaluation of small bore piping analyses.*
PARTICIPANTS:
NRC Staff Licensee / Applicant Staff D. G. Eisenhut G. Maneatis J. Martin H. Friend et al.
J. Knight T. Bishop H. Schierling et al.
(l
%j.)vns Lc (
Hans Schierling, Pro)ect Manager Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing
Contact:
NRC:
H. Schierling 301-492-7100 PG&E:
J. Hoch 415-768-0881 l
cc: See next p'ge a
2 W*
- NOTE: THIS MEETING WILL BE TRANSCRIBE 0.
t 1
, ~.
(f l
1
&R t [ PG fiE.
ASJ4mwr 2.
QLk
%u M
RN SPo T.Salap 3
N. {cNIs.cle%}
- 1. EurgG gc
- b. Etuuk J tt %% u T%
%zc ferms
- Cup, R EE2LER NRCf6Ml~
Lynn K. Pria mHB rech A.so bNk b l#
L
% &b Joen c. //oenet -dD e
Unack YAS
%AGAlAs b%'! - W-P/?C=iE Mb.h.Ac JfJclo1A i
CR 4L.ec b~g %k3 h p kgu c s. iws+en i
aQ4jz
[.L.CLeOD d d. ScItuy(W
}) esse,n l
(L q AxL..sm l~ d.
C R k^/ t-S cbm/ W1-L
/
.1 V, & cea l
l f4 M
?.G. Anww.-
was a: ws,c a Ah.4/4e 6 k4 h m,
a,n esL L-f-M6ll601G% %
pttuYFALuty nc:,
i==.c.,
Ia M Mc 8lCH9D h.
L o c. Z 6 m..),._14a>6m DAV'D 3ok a 5kY i
9.d.'39c)a&.
D B. 9 A n ni(
K/#44~
d.k6
.w-4
e e
9 s%oa cc o,a a
- scearra 4
py' m
isy,.-
y%
t ps. 6 " ed
~%9+5$n..I c.
v.,c c, e 4
/
x max.
n s.
- n. e. s,a, >
m,m
,x,
=
- w.,
,,I )s,
- 4,
/p y (,
x=.
6, f
Q;W6 D
grsk p-s v
c e
os v4 W> q } l
s
. 2 M,4E -2..s.
+t a.-e....~>>,...
_, _ m.
.o aa3...
=
l l
~
AAAmm43
SUMMARY
OF ISSUES
~
I.
N0t! TECHNICAL ISSUES
- 1. Altered Current Documentation.(55, 87, 79).
2.DestroyedDocumentation(87).
~
- 3. Inadequate Training and Indoctrination of Personnel (82, 79).
- 4. Defective Document Control System (79, 55).
~ 5. Individual Fired for Ubistle Blowing (81).
- 6. Small Bore Piping Verification Program (NRC Staff)
S g
m.. een B
II. TECHNICAL ISSUES 1.
Improper Code Break Design (88, 55, 86).
2.
Different Penetration Stiffnesses in Static and Dynamic Analysis (79, 55).
3.
Modeling of Rigid Support Gaps in Small. Bore Piping Thermal Stress Analysis (79, 55).
4.
Different Stiffness for the Same Rigid Supports in Static and Dynamic Piping Analysis (55, 88).
5.
Calculational Errors and Modeling Deficiencies in Support Design Packages (NRC Staff).
6.
Placement of New Restraints Adjacent to Old Restraints to Qualify the Old Restraints (88).
7.
Snubbers Located Adjacent to Rigid Restraints, Inoperative During Dynamic Loading (79).
8.
Inproper Resolution of Pipe Interface (89).
9.
Calculation of Maximum Support Load Carrying Capacity (79, 88).
b 1
- 10. Assumption of Joint Release for Rigid Connection (88).
- 11. U-Bolt Allowables Used by the DCP are Incorrect. U-Bol t Interaction Equation Unconservative (85).
- 12. Unbraced Angle-Section Steel Members Exceed AISC Stress Allowables (95).
- 13. Drain Li,ne Support Bracket Bolted to the Floor With Onlf
~
One Bolt (78).
- 14. Calculation of Fundamental Frequency (NRC Staff).
~
O t
(
1 r
- - - -.. +., -
-s,,_,
am---,
.--.--a
-e-
.?23h.';
i
.v.c
.. MF/.
5'....
l-I i
i
@. w& : __-'
- i. e. i
.c e
,s e
Op; 1 c-
.i i.
.: \\
~.%Y. ::_=.
^
.~ w.,
ci....
n
>..,~.,p.
.% d...
4 ei._.
- t. ?, s.,,;p c t' 3..
a.
g, i
z'
..,3
.. : G i z.
j
.w :
e l.
h.
-I O, I <.
S,,. ! ;
b,
,, :,_=.
.J:: r n ;:
'g; 4.:
i
.3 '
N e
ts q :.
~,,i_
2 e I w,-
j:t i._
c 2 1, 2:-
r i
w s-,<
=: -
'.2 's n'J i c2 '
i w14 Z
=
.y o o,-
m,.
c M.
-- e,.C 1
-i-O_
r,O-O F-
- d---
to e:
e.
- x -.-
i.
i i
1c__-
1 a
t g
c g
43J O
t9' tO l
1 (f)
M l
@I co-c
-ec-el
__i gm co co t
nN s
s s
s y
Af)
O s9 r-(f) sn t/i o
A-
_l e. c i
i i
.i en tG M
N
<jh A
A mi f
vi l
H I
i i:
4
- ~ C i.., (? $ q l
ll D:
D;!
i l~.-
l l
i A
O g,c, g,q l
jj c, tQ.,
rh% pg e5G 4 93 l l:.1 gmse:r r.c l
s;f.
6:
e, e si F.c'
! n ; u < ;.:. 5
, sl y:a.
g l i i
l s.).i i i s.
I
- i
.:: i
'Im%
(w!.:.
.w: - e-e l
-y
- ttl
.,ir i g.4 g
- 24. i. -
- -. e. c. g
.l sy; 6.:
,.. le.wgc. es
.-Ng lc4N:
i a::.N, s, n 4:-
1 m,..
l l
J._.!
. '. =.
O !U) l
- l. 1E
. i..! !.'
ILd I' i_ni
<tr_. ! l. : $,3; 3
W I.l 1
l L.-
1'
.~
- A Di. CO.
1 -- (0 l.4
.:2.A h.
, O c: ;wi -
r_r. %..
L.,: c5 2- -
<- L' !.,.
.w..c:
-,r cs
-si l
yc::
s..m.
.. ~ c.,; *c p.
% f,i-i l
-'::- Fr C_'<l $'" t # /:,
l c-8 I I
u
<:} :
t.
~.
_l. *, i l X<'.i i l.
. ::J '.:
i e l'O:
- n'
<:5lEc! ear e!c-l e
~f
'M :
i i
.,2 lm.i -
y e pq
,2 -
v.
i i,,.
i,.
i.
i.i v.
se u I 2
a t
I
_ l I....
2 e pr, ;r e
c.:
<G s :.
w,.:
i
.c
[
(D's]IFl ;ij i
l i
e jm9,
+
l i
GU v.: :: &l \\ ' N u
l
'> i Sl N
,5:
- :< t" i
c.__.u: w; i
uj 3N9 I ol l
N d
cl c4
!.0.., W!
Pi [ 9 cg,! ol; y vi a
+. i.n:
- e
.j c.
t_,
cc. @ nm$.c; N: e'
+1 6:
eJ cd
- c.. q:1
- 3 ca c-
~J yl. m n,
r I e.i@:z.
,_n il t.,
en-ci i
.. c-i J,.
cs ;.
i ez oJi
.:>, ca' c_
i m
c-cm er e-.<
c w.c,
co ca c4 9
c.
of 8 8. c=v]le.z:
. L,.J l.
o,
. c:.i a
c l
.N.
Si c.
-i r
c a~
.Q
- c..
n
- k.'.k. U-' l0b.:_- r";:-~
, m: :...*.
.--.l:
t,,::.
- r;r
- u.,.p.-
.== lll
.:i',;4;.::.-l a
di
. t.,.
.w a ;.1
~
-- 'Uj.lf ce
- 71 g'
- l
<~i c-l es 7.-
c:,.'
A sp 0)
.I c>o'
'::q-r-
4 d
g!
g c-c--
i N
Cl
'-j
,d. :q:
c'.J c'
.O r,:2 L e
e:
--S2, l v.: !<
- I ::-
,::::. l W
Mi Tl wv l
w.-
.n.w.
e.
w
.3 g.,..
/s (f)x
-lo Q
x
- <s
__a w
z e
_O_
$s
@Q.
m
'9'9
.$ o e
g
'm e
e g
- 01 a2
@s e
m
+
m m
m 9
a 9
e o
e
'e p
s i
e S Ea i
b
$ o-D i
s S s?
t 6
? 9 9 9
'J
< g
(
m q
w
- 4. 4 s
e A
N m
m m
a o
3
.g x
O 4
-6 4
$ !d5 Ed,dd dj$,hi$ 2[ ?IM UN$i g
d g c m o o
a s o
.g#
1 o_
< a.3 c e m e
- z 3 h,. w
,;3 m
, b o '
y o_ z kgs R o m
tn e t d N i
D C
4 6Q &mi s jQ9Qh I i N P @
Q w
3,
=3 i
e d
Q_ z o
- l 2
J 2
2 2
o m
_i m
BE,jW 3 N 3 y s E,b h h s,a m E
n sni t;..
W <w.x3Ma y%. >
c 3
r.-
1-- 4.e.sW
- g.o m 6
s 9 2 i
- c,. a o f-vn M i
m c.< w st o. c o-p q 4
4 2 e EN Q
O eos 4 T W s y g,? Ma ed-d Hi sr 2p. Fs t
.m.:
ot 4
co i
9 r-.gg.q v N
y g
c-
- y. p a
n d'W a
_j
~
i
-<. se 2
u,,S <_,
m 2 G~
Q f,a
\\
Z a a C
U lE y
g~ c
.c e e
s.
.:. om o
o e c g
c z 5
.3 m
a e
r-c as c.
~
m, o.
o c. cn r
r-v e _e. a.
to m.
ss.
t,n tn w
a e e
.3 e
v a
i e
e r-c c
e c <iz e
a o
u a
w w
s w
y 3
o o
e,,
e w =l qa s
s= w, a
a a
a Uf N u[
U-( [
g
-l g
O O
s gr wi c_
w cc tn a
r_
ce c-o
__; a e
w 2
g.gg 3 w
a e-e-
e e
e c
8 ee
.,e n s e a.
e e c
e e
a a
e c
e-O 3z e
- c..
e c.
e-d e
i
- c. -
- e. '
e.
e_
e.
e.
e.
cl e.. f T_ T_.'5_ T 7
T
'I.
T.
T_.< L T_i T_
T_ T_ v._, v_ T
~~-
-~
SEO W-U: REV $
k a w i-_ M.,-
1 P
b
~
/' L3=3s.h 5 i
9.0 5.t.87s_.
\\
8-
/
I I4.+'
'N I t,i 3
g
.y g
c.
i
.s?i '
!)p,o
.i.
s
~
Ga a
~-
i
'k V %
s' frc tou A-2 it i
23 \\
.a
~i,,-;s
.T, c
.r-ww FOR lh.,yr.e n.-g-re_
.w w ONLY 1
- g..,
N.f
-t
's JI V
.I I
n s
s V
I)CTAIL. 1 l
~
pr
..j, '
x.,
+
tahb
,I O,s' N
a e % 1] )
is.
l V.c y
Ni 4
g i.\\
l8. s
-/
23.1375 *_
l l
2 7. *? 75*
35.?)7f'
!:. !st f *
- 'er ; -" Y 3C.??so"
+(
~
vo. o -
y I
7LAN '/IEW q
f t: rou CC x
- K TMt$
.3*H C TCH RCil[C. S d$ Zut!. T CA.;bl 7t O M
((R.
84 A s.x b o w d on
- s..Si. f } k 2 2.-83 2 -~~ m) m. v.
m.,
.y
8 MP.Cf? r". _$
\\ p' %
d' C
W T m~ Q. /- -.
~
2.f" T
e
=
Ya l*,"
4375 1
. zan -
- s..
t
.m I
l.375"
\\[
_As r
s
%,3 1
T 4
- l. g-' 'f4 Jc7Ast' l V
r.
TYF. FoK o f f05'T E a t
.4..
,a s-v FOR INFORMATEN T
ONLY s
- s. t.
9
-f.
t-7 I
I
- s l
l I
s.
I M
t o
LS i
L c-
.e f cerian 8-8
/!0C ' rars Secres Rcn.ccrs As B un.r mk b..* s* C CWA)
- Al
% a r ric s.
~~=
.:.i: s.- :... i :.. c.<..s +
.~
./wy
{
l I
i I
l
it,.;
n 1z, m.r
,9 l_.
i SHEET 60
.s/TE ENGINEERING' SMALL BORE PIPE SUPPURT CALCULATION LOG UNIT i
' HANGER CALC. STATUS P RE PA R E R CHECKER APPROVAL
/"dd/TCALC.
//d.
R'EV N O.
IlEV. PREllu FINAL Sy@
- DATE,
. DATE DATE REMARKS i
t-A. 6 //05 G 6 c 747ck l
MF-9B(e k f1(20-%
I f/Q3
'~ $ /4 -83
, 7-lb-83
~
- 61. 'Silotk'HE 7 D1.Sthb/QUE i
MP.99/1 3
21 % -297 Y
// F3
// - 7, E 3
//-/O-3 I MP-936 im-isz
~~
$G-33 6
[
' ~I TNgt,5
'A.-It -8'S
~ #~ b-D 4
it-4 j
W.C4.lADA LtlPE F4 BRAHMOWV__
Mp-990 3 169 G-74-sa
'G 'Z4-83
& @43 i
H. Sir 16d R.. EAm eu -
Y MP,99l 2163-37 e - %ea 8- @ &*.
k'Nd i
O.ON57hisco
/C. RRatnslb Mf-902 W
l03 -80 2 -lG9 to - q. gp to 89
(
MP 993 1-13T
~
i A. Mt>sf G. R. sn AM f#-994 Y
2-104 S
//- 0 9-P.3
//-0 9-f 3
- ~/M3 1
h
- n. 0. StyrE l.
- 11. CHOSE MP-996 (I
'2-1G6 1
/
//-2-fj 1o 27-%3 lo- :22-f 3
- d. Lim
<0. Del 416N6c0 i
i i
bf-99(s 0
42-3
- 9. 2-as.
9-9. ss.
00'N 1
L4P-997 2tSI-3d 4
+1-61 i
/
H. SIN (fl 14N alm MP-999 2 8 a :5 B-s-r3 s 89-5:3 m
MP-999 216 9-13
~
fjP-Itoo 1109-It i
131' t!(2L LIG9 71 c
j if-l101 7169-29 1
i t
- p' 9
-(
t'b y,,o
=ae..
- e. :s c.r..A L W ~D
, 15 c.,10
$tl5 u
x y6; c,4
,. O C'"
'b _Q
<C ft
/ f,
- 12. - S~ U
- A A
_3 1
w z
e
_O__
d h
h h h h
h k h
$ h o
f S Es 3
a 3
R h
?
@ b A
m 2 h
6 E'
D
<c e e
A N
6 to m
to N
(b 4 4-a; o A
4 4
6 v
s g
e 5
w e.'
y 3
3 I-- c-m S
t x
.s 3
4 E W s
k m 9a e
p C
$ m <
i
.I
.?,
k, pJ.<a m M ( i? R d 5 a!
- w-t3 m.
g q _s_g,t
}t c
-p- 'o m
p.c o
gg m
a c
ym k Dz,EIN YUd
.c a c
e' t y,g u
e c
y n
h q
e i m
i pM5 M C-E d D, g
@%U f e?U N IE:
't 5
('d e M% %
% 4 5 y%
f phi ud 4j l %.
y s
cL 2:
5 J
Q. $<9 IN 9 $n) i$ $d 5 '}
I EE ?
3 s
k.$N @.
g tn w
s.
t 0h JyF ca g jc q s.'. ;iu m4 s
s
.i;o{
. gR uJ <,<s y %g mQ, Sy5
)
T T
s
<s'u
= $.L ei n zn' s ;
L
?.
2-ms k.
O,2 CW z 's. 8 m
s a.i n., = a' g
- M.
1 m l
U x x co
~.
s a
2s. c i n-m-IM w
1 e>w w
~
.N, s
a s
I 1
._i r=
m '. 9~,
=
D L4J c"w f,
y l
Cf) U~$
E z 0 05 l
E -d!d N
's N
'N 'N 'N N-N N \\ N N N N
N \\ 'NI 2 9s J G 4 O
61 C
CO N o O
- o
.C O
k' r
t a m c
o e
e 3
m e
m e
c-a, e- -:
e ss
,n m
T o
5 w
w
- d w
e 2 0 s
8 i
i i
e i
e m
Q,,
4
<Z b-o r--
of
-Q.
0 i
i
.s e-
,s o
e B
g m
uJ I v
e 2
e e
e e
o e
e g
fe g
in 4 g
Uj u>
n n..
b _"a w o
s O
a u
s
~
~
O' u
in 3
r-
' c-1 o
N wi ' c-1 in e-r-
co e-N l*$ @
to tO
- s S
T T
t" 3:
C-'
C~
0-G C~
C' C'
- t-if,,
-C v
-C' l
2
,O' C'
C C
C C
C C'
C~
g b
L
(
{
d d
N d
b l
$l 2_. 1 1
'T, 1 1 v( y( T ; k' 1 E.
5.
T__, ~2.,, X X.,;
t.'.
t l
t-TABLE Sl4ALL BORE SUPPORT CALC PACKAGES (asofDecember8,1983)
NO.
CALC.
SUPPORT COMMENT l
1 : MP 072 1 2171-16 Design Deficiency, QA Deficiency lMP345
- 2182-74,
OK 2
1 3 ' MP 357 2182-91 OK 4, MP 951
- 100-111 Deficiency (Review Not Complete).
j 6
5 [f1P955~
l 99-201 Calc. Deficiency. QA Deficiency.
I I
6 14P 983 99-11 Design Deficiency.
7 lMP988 100-132 Modeling Deficiency.
Calc. Errors.
l QA Deficiency.
8
- ItP 397 H21-226 OK l
9 MP 465 i 002-170 QA Deficiency.
1D ! f4P 942 99-20 Calc. Deficiency. Calc. Error, i
i i
i 11lNP1621 2156-200 Calc. Error. Design Deficiency.
12lNP1691 97-90 QA Deficiency.
l i
- .M:cM.:q.4F.*:.W ?6....'iG%W-Gs'
.. L ~.. T.'.t..! G..'.M r, - ~ --~.-
.. ' - E:
'\\
~ /';
5 \\ /\\ /6 *\\ / \\ / \\ / \\/'< /\\ / \\, t /\\ /\\ / \\ / \\ <". / \\ / ' / \\ [' ' \\ '\\ /\\
~~~$,$ :/%lQ G' A,/\\ lV?? !\\ h./. A., f./
5EO5~##'W %/ '
./.
- 1...
. ~. -.
1-
- 7j,.
07 S # _
/ ' /. / ' /\\.\\/\\/'
/' /'
SH-
-. ~..- 7:
'./ \\'/: \\./\\ /* /\\ / \\./\\ /.
/ \\ / \\ / \\ / \\.'/ \\ /\\ ' ' \\ /. \\ / \\s--L, s. / /._. /..
- . / s
- /.\\s'/_\\../ bi \\../.-\\ / \\ / \\
s s
I_N] \\ /:\\,/. !/_.=.../__\\./_.\\._/\\/ \\. / \\/ \\-4\\ /\\ A__.N /\\/_\\,/_\\ / \\ / \\. /\\,._ %_N A./
1/_\\_,/ \\ / \\f.ia /._\\_,/\\/ \\ / \\ /V. N/ \\ / \\ / \\
/ \\ / \\/ \\ / \\/ UT_ \\
a
../\\e.ib:\\9\\ /\\/\\/\\/\\/\\/\\/\\/\\ \\/\\/\\/\\'/\\/\\/\\.- \\ /\\ /\\ / s./
\\
/\\/\\ /\\/\\ /\\. ' \\,
l
/ \\ /\\/ \\ /\\/_'e,. s\\ / \\ e\\/\\/ \\/w '. _ /\\_\\/\\/\\
_ /\\/\\/\\/\\/\\,. /
O s_./._4./_s _/s._/ ar/ \\ / \\ / \\ / \\ / \\ / \\ / \\:/ \\
g/ \\_. M,_ _\\__r'_Js :.
\\ /\\/\\ /\\./_\\./ \\/\\
e
-_._ / -'/ \\ '\\ /n i./ '__.
/.__ /
(. / s./w/r /R._\\ /./\\ / \\ /\\ / k' \\,/\\_ /. _\\ \\
i
/ / /\\/s / \\..e \\. / './i.
r 1/\\ 4\\n \\!pf \\i/ \\./\\/ \\ /. / i / \\ /'
\\/ /\\/\\ /,\\-h.s / /./
/\\/
o..-
'k
'.'" e 6 /
N/\\/N
/\\/\\/ ?/'3f. / / (,QE\\ f fi/\\
. /i
{\\ /.E8 /.>q' M. m.
-__\\. / \\ / \\ / \\ / i /A
\\ / \\ /,.. 'a t ~,./_N / '
'N, ~
i
/ \\././ \\ / \\ \\
.N.. T.._.\\ /\\/\\,/\\/if s NE
. /
i/_:\\ /.C.y/9/9/\\ /\\ /\\ / \\/Y \\
so...
=
/\\ 'N /\\./i
..../ \\ / yN / \\ / \\ /Q. \\'.'s&n y.w.
/_\\_./__ / \\
n.
\\
N /./
./..
- x.. x
' \\!
.P i, f
.g..,
\\ \\ \\
/ /\\/ ',\\
\\hi.2.3.sp s /\\ /\\ /5/\\...
R
./\\/\\/_\\
\\/.!
V/ /\\/ \\/\\/W.\\/ / /\\/
\\
/ /\\/
g/_ /\\ / \\/_ /\\/ \\./ \\'/ \\ /\\ i \\ '... /=./ 95 O'\\/_\\/.\\/\\/\\/ __._../_.. el i.s /_.\\/\\ /\\ /\\./\\/\\ \\ #. ~g\\ \\ \\ /
\\ /\\ /._\\ /\\/_\\. 4..
y 4
m
.N
\\/\\/\\/
g'~ * ' \\/ \\'/ \\ / \\./\\ /\\
/'. /;
d
!/\\/\\/\\/\\/\\/\\,N \\/M A \\/\\/\\/\\. \\e @'.\\ /\\ /\\ / \\.'\\ / \\/i /'
/
./ / 's /\\ /\\./ \\:/ \\/\\/\\/ \\ \\/
\\,
1 ix/\\/\\/\\/\\/\\/\\ \\
\\* /.,A,.. \\
N / /_ \\.'
r\\ b s
. ir l'..
,\\ '.
l\\. i / \\ os / \\/ \\ / s/ \\/ \\
.i
- s. \\.-
s.
n Ic. /..
/._.s/.
\\-- \\ / \\ / s i \\,. / >** /.i a.
7 is
/\\
/ Q "e./Q' \\ / /\\ /\\ /\\ /. \\
\\/\\ \\ /\\ s. '..'_\\
\\ / \\ / \\ /_.\\../\\ /
\\
. \\ ' 7*
/,
s l/\\/\\/\\/\\/\\/
\\ \\ /SN \\/
\\/\\/ /\\/\\/\\/\\/\\ \\/\\ N/\\/i/\\
' \\i
\\W9 \\/' '/ \\ / \\ /X / \\./ \\/ \\./_\\. _\\/ \\/\\ /\\ \\ / h./..
/i G'.
\\./ \\../ \\e/ \\ / \\/ \\ /
.\\
\\/
/
s a / -
s f\\
s is
,\\
i/ \\,\\f rg,.. i e/.'
e
/\\
.\\/ s. - =./_.
fgs,f
./ s f
fi f s /\\ /\\ e
\\ b>
/s e
s
\\/
si \\
\\/-
..e..s. /..g s./_. / s/
s.
/
/..
i s/g
.\\/ \\f sf j
e.
es e s / \\ /._ e
/
s/ s /
fg <
fs es s../s g
fs f
/ s s
s
\\
.. g._
_i...~
- i. \\ f \\.f \\
\\
-g./\\ /\\/\\ /\\ /\\r
\\ /\\/\\./ N T '\\ f
- l I
!/\\ /\\/\\/\\ /\\'/\\r\\/
/
DJ,. \\ / \\/ /\\/\\/ Y\\/.
/\\/\\/\\' /\\/\\
\\,
L,, '
N / \\(/ \\./ M
/\\fi
\\d lE..Jg'\\n
/ / \\ \\ /\\ /.\\./\\./_\\.
a.
y
..'- _\\.,'N
\\_ \\ h./1 /\\ \\ /\\f\\/../g..f_ /. \\w/__..
/
/
\\
.._. \\. / \\ \\ / \\./ \\/._\\/.._\\
--./..l.
M.
\\ \\ / $ /\\ / \\f_._' './ \\,/. \\/.._.s.e_.\\../ _ /._\\.._\\. / _.. / \\
s
/ \\ / \\/\\ /\\/\\ / \\ /\\/ \\/
\\'/ \\ /\\ <
'\\/\\/
y' \\/\\/\\/\\/ \\/\\ \\
' \\l
'\\/ \\ / \\./ \\/\\,/ \\ / \\
\\.. _\\ /._\\. / \\ /. / \\.
/ \\ /\\, / '\\. /. /\\/\\/\\/\\/\\ '.,.
. /.
" E.
x.
L.
1 i',V
.,/\\,/-
/ \\,
\\ j \\, /, J./x.
./
./ \\ /../ ~
\\,
- i \\../ r ;.,f.
u s,.
s
-f \\
/..e-\\/\\/../\\/.
g/1. /', N. -
er
./\\/s 4
s
_\\./
.s s
\\,T /./\\ /\\ /\\ / / \\ / \\,7. \\...,'\\ /s _..
O,,.
g
[
...g..s.p_/ \\. / \\ / '\\_ \\g,
3
/
\\
n/ \\
i~
v
/
N,
. / s./ s. -
~
/4 o
s
..g
- /
\\,\\ ' \\/ \\ / \\. / \\ / \\ \\/\\/\\/\\ /\\ /' /\\ /\\ '\\. / \\ / \\ / \\
/ h._' \\ /_ / \\ \\ / s i 2/\\.
/
- /. [N./ \\.(/ \\./_'
\\t \\..G./ \\./\\ /\\_/..\\ /\\ [N./\\ / \\.. ' '.
." /\\/ -@/ ~ / \\P
'3.
o
\\ d p
\\
<\\
. E /._ e
- s.,. \\ / > /_.l.
..N../ s../ \\,i. \\\\._\\. __\\./_'
,'\\.. /._.1/..'../._.\\. /._\\_\\_\\..._\\. '..' /.\\
/
/
/ s. /\\j
\\ j.,
/\\_./..,n N. \\.
g
.. / \\ f \\..c
.y s
f.
s/s g sf j
. /. \\..J N../ '.s./.\\../. \\, N. \\ / N f \\ / \\.
/ [
x. \\ /_\\ /. 4-.-.
.\\ m $s(:.n. \\./_\\./ \\,
0
..j ' :\\; \\
N.? \\/
\\,/..../ \\
~ /.. < \\b.'
/'
sj. \\ w...
i
.~
\\/
'.f./.../ '
.....k...
/
k.... /..
' \\.
./'
\\
\\
. /.
c
\\
..._.i._..
.s.
a./
5.6 s.
'\\/'
Q P
'\\/-
'\\/ /
<\\/'
's '\\/.
4
/\\
/\\
.../_ \\.......... _/ \\
h
/\\.x
/\\.
s
~
j
/
.\\
/'.'.,
\\
/
i
/
,./_'...
g
.s.....
d s,
,,w.
Y.......
\\, \\. ' \\ /,'\\ / \\ / / ' / \\ / \\ / \\ / / ' / \\ / \\./.{..s. /...../ \\..;.\\
/"
G.2
- Eg1, f4 e ~I
- =
. A.^
.f orb,am m m m Or.=
fw r -.- -
/q q e
- ~
s c7
'. O*
/\\
/\\
/\\
/
./
........:/...
....... \\\\.~ :;/\\/\\/
\\
/
- /\\
l
.'.0 4....
D,.. /g. &'p. g(l.l,. ~o f2 U7
...i..
J
,..p ;
s.
./ **, / '
g,
/\\ / \\. / \\, t
/ \\., ' '
, /. /... '. r
-M....b' i
f g f
,. / '.
.... - \\
s a
.e
..4-
..s./
. e....
\\ -
~ '#M,O \\M,;....
... %... d T.,/ \\., ' \\ ' i f
// ' - /-
y s\\
.. \\.../..
\\ /\\ / \\ /", / \\ / *
... '. L.
.f s
/\\ /\\
/ \\, / \\ g / i /
/\\/\\ /\\ /\\ /\\ /\\ /~
/
\\.
..\\. \\
/ './4.. c / \\/ \\ / \\
\\/ \\
\\ (\\ / 5 / _ /. \\.
/
\\
J
/
\\./.,.., \\.../... '.\\'./ \\. /. \\ /. \\. / \\,
. /...i
- =
e
- /_5./ 9.x.. h
.f
.x \\..../\\/\\/\\/S
\\/ \\./ \\. /...\\.. /\\ / \\ /v'.
..,/ \\.../ \\
/.. \\..!
/ /.
/\\/ /\\/ J \\/\\/\\
.M.,... a..m '.\\ / \\ / \\ /.
..r
./ \\ \\, \\. ~/ \\ / \\ / \\
\\/ / \\.
\\
/
/\\
/
w-.\\./
/\\ \\/\\/\\/
/..\\./>
s.
- .... /\\ /y
/\\ /y/\\/\\/\\ /\\
a
/\\
.,,f\\/
/\\g
/\\ /\\ /\\j
/g /\\
. < 3 _+.-..
3. N.
./' gy N./ \\/ \\ / \\./ \\ / \\ / \\ * /1. / \\.6. c -.\\.t.
%/.
/
\\../
si f
,\\
/n.
e.
- i. O
+
s
-s.
- u. o.
-.s.
s- -.g s
s
\\*
si
.y
...,.gg
_.e
.. j g
f
' 's
.~ g
.m
...r
'...! ~\\...
?\\ /\\ [\\ /'
.'g
../'./
/.
- 'g f*)
- /\\ /\\
.s,/ \\
.- '. \\ ri
/
m.s..f.
6
~,
..r..
i/\\ //s// \\./ \\ /
- i,
/s
/\\./ \\
i\\
- /\\
t f
1 s /
/
- j e
s.
s.*
/
rg
\\/
g si
\\.
? \\/
Y
/s s
./ s.
../ \\ r i. /\\s,/ *\\ i/ \\.,/ \\. / /
e.
c g
.4._
~ -.
a
.g
. \\ f._3 T
~
r\\ /\\ fs
(..'.,......g.
e s/ si \\/*\\.e g/ \\./ \\ /
/\\
...s..
f.
g s
( - -
it i._../ \\..
f.
ji
>g j
.s.
.\\ /. /.'
g
.s._..
.. i s. /.
..C.....
/
g,-
\\-
\\/ \\
w
-g
. \\.q
.\\
.f.
r.
/s-
., o
(,%
..~
.f
- s. :
/ /
.4.
..s
_.. /J
...4
,,s s
.~ -
... :. i.
e i
o y-
=
/'.
........e
...s..
\\d
...\\-
s.
s i..
.,., s,.
s G*LG m
9 r
e H
r
.a
)
r..
.. r% ~
t p.
.t..
n 00
. ~
[
- i
\\, e (t
s.
/..
..41.' \\. *.-./'
- [\\ /
S.
... '...[ \\,.
... /.. \\
.. [...
\\../.
s
,/.
s
\\
s c
\\i
,Q
....;m.....
h.,....
..M.....*.
. ~..
/
=
./
/
is
. ~...
...u.
....e..
b
.4
... ~
m...
~
.............7...
\\ +
\\..
- s. !
[,s I,
\\.
. t,
........t~..
-...,p *g
......../',*
/\\* #
. \\,
t.
.g
./
....n.
... ~....,.*
4
. /
.% -o__
........./......
r.
- f.
A e
.y f.
b.
t
.,/
.. +..
/
3_.. _..._
. _ y.. -
+
I
.N
- j. --.-
.q 2-
.. 4.. e
..4......................
i
=
\\
........ =
g......
/s 1A.. i o
Os/.-\\- /.:.g./
.[
,p L
i
~
/,e\\i 4
l x
76 4
./ ;\\;
z..
./'
.Q
\\ / '.
K,l \\
r 1
i
\\ "O,.y-yi L..!$./ '.. '. / '
. / '-
\\;
'\\;.?'
/\\/~'?
k [.
' / \\/ sl.. ' '.
.,,s
".,/'./
/\\/.
ss
' \\,'\\ /\\ / \\ / \\/ \\ / [
\\ / 's / ' / \\i \\/
'i
\\
. / x, s., / N/ vl
< s./ru / \\ / si\\ /,\\/ \\ <
9/ \\/ \\/ \\/./ \\/),,
./.
t i
s.
,_ ' \\.
./.'\\../s 'N'\\/\\t/XN/\\
,/\\/\\/\\/ /\\/\\'\\.
/t/
/
' \\..
/; / s. /\\/N/
\\ / \\ / s / \\X NA) / \\ /\\ / / \\./. / * /
< \\ /. /_s 3
. / / '. / \\'/ -A.\\ / \\ /\\/ \\ / \\ \\ / \\/ \\ / \\/.9 \\/ \\ / \\ eT/ \\/,i+. / 'A / A 7\\ /.
.i
'\\fg/*. /\\ /\\.\\./e.' \\./ g/ \\/ \\/. '\\/ \\ / \\ /,\\-fM \\/ \\ /' /.W.\\'/ \\/ \\/ \\ / \\./%/MR/ \\/
t
\\
/ \\./ \\ / \\/ \\/ \\ / \\ / \\M,/ / _g/ \\ /V-e,\\ iA/ \\/X/ \\'/Q. / \\ / \\ '\\/
. /\\ /\\.'\\/\\/\\/\\/\\/\\/\\ /\\/\\/\\/n/en \\ %.%/ \\?(/\\/T/\\ /\\/'i./
\\< \\
'N /\\ /\\/\\/\\/.\\/\\/\\/\\/\\ /\\/\\/\\/\\/\\.f@/T/\\ /\\/\\/W \\ /\\/\\/.s '\\
.,~ \\ /-\\ / \\/\\/ \\/ \\/ \\/\\/\\/ \\/ \\/\\/ \\/\\/ \\/\\/h./ \\/\\/)(/\\@ / :/\\/ \\
\\ x,
' N / \\ / N/ \\ '\\/ \\/ \\/ \\/ \\/ X/;s./,h.i\\/.M/ \\/ \\ / \\rA/ \\M'i/\\/ \\ /sc. / \\/. / ' /
\\ ' ',/\\ /g\\/\\ / \\ / QQ,.$' /dfg7 \\/ \\/ \\/ \\'/\\/[./\\.f%,'iN / \\ / \\ / '
~~
.. w..... i s..i...,g, j g.i s.,/ N... i,...,..,, i s..s,p i r..i,.i s..i, i s.,,, i,
. i.
i
- " m'
/\\/\\. s /.'-/ O
/ \\ \\/ \\ ' i / Vf < \\ g, / s./ \\, s /17 '. / \\. *.
m f
.\\ C
.g 1f
+
<s i*
s
=
q
.,. se
,5
/i.
f./ s
\\..
p.. s e
s s
/
s
- s
.,g,
- /
l'
,l\\
/, '
/./
m. ' i., ~ \\,
,'.\\.---
./
/
p
.N / i N /y..
.- t.'
.,.e., _ i.' _. l (g
- N.!y
.g. -
i gh
- 7 a, '.'/ e @m
=. -.
s
.7
. \\./
t
',s cg
._l;
.,.l s
1
.~.
.y l
.i -
._r- :v:.
. ~. -
+\\
.B,
..__.. \\ *._/....**._._....._..
B
.i /, q,
=,
.p g
_.b:
I s
/\\3'd g n -d w B3' i
C/.4.. -.- e
@ '[4jr a
.pg.g-f ws wy.;7 a.e n-:
1 9y I
I ~ W /V'O M.@ I'@ '2 :C "TEii!O
.SH H 071
- z. 5 l-co l cr: p '
t l
/
.. t ~20 : : l.2 7 7 : t- ?-: : -;,
i
l
/
[yl9 7 d SMALL 00. 3 r,/.'.'/ti'G l 5 ((E!: Si; f
"swlm 2.[ 24les i
/.A.-
k h03 l'
1.
41
- )
g SI
/
~!
i so
/,Ap
?n' /sk f
/
2~,-
s! %
g h.
4 e
r, -
is l,
IS Ne.
f IT I
(%
s
.h
<0
~
/
.% g SOV E~R.C \\/ EW
.UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED i
~
- g q q 8jq'
} {,] J{2{. f {i."
CLASS I. UNIT / _ AREA SI!
-=r m s. w.= m-:uua.-i:.
7,x=dmwAc==::=t.*-e.ntw ELEV IC'M
' !M# ! DWG. No.H ~ II PEV NO. d DESI N MM.icsW,.'enW-tay t11.
I ggo,M:)Ld DATE I~
~'l
.': >W SHT C: 1
- aw? s =. n y,
' e.
p.
7 h: ":.v&)
- ss*#. I
.=...,.P6.*.9 t*
.g.
. tg..Y
,,.....es.=..-..
g
,/.. \\ '.- /.
\\
.\\. / '. r/.
..*,41@
.fr/;. 78 isn
- '..,. -, j \\ p, \\./. ;.
5 r
.. sh. osx.....e
.._.4
\\. <._.\\ / 5
........ /...
6 pe,:#.
.._.._... 4f,
p,3, m
l.
/ \\ /.:.'/ q. O~ \\../...
- y.
.y
.ys C':.:-
/
1.
. g...n
~
- /\\/' a. Q..*
Ks.x.
1.9
%8 V.
~ i \\.j '. :
i\\ /*
._y.
m s
j'..
_ i. /. f. \\ g,..,/,././ ' L W / s '
$,.a.
\\.._\\..
' ' ~, -
.. g.,.f.i........ g-Q(y
<\\/
N
~
...!s
... c.. try,,
o v.. O
.gg
,s
- y..-
r="____..
- f......._
c'.. 2-
..\\j
. g%,,1 e
s
..r..........
Q_.
.. s
.r.
s s
\\/.
/,\\
\\.
@.w-
\\ / \\ / \\ / \\ T.,e.,..: :.:.'..
...../. i. 8:....' e.. { \\ ~
.'.s.......
/
/ g t
9
\\/.
si
?./ \\ /
+
V. ~,,-
l/\\r./\\ /\\/\\/'/ ' / \\ / \\ r..
/
/
e
/.7.d./ _.* C i.,.._t.. / \\.,._.... /. s. / \\ / \\./. \\./, N / \\ /
s /.
l.' '
,...,._. ? g-i / \\ / \\ / \\ /._.\\. < \\...
,g, G
i/ \\/ i f \\ f,*- \\ / \\ / \\ / '
T,.
i.
../i c;\\.a/ \\
\\./N./,N. / [.x./ \\ / \\ / \\ / \\f w./ '.\\. / \\,.
s h / \\../...\\./ \\ / \\ / \\ /.\\.../ \\.,
. \\. /\\. / '.
.\\. /.._'\\_
. /,\\ / \\ /\\ \\ / \\ /\\ /3/...\\...]*. /. \\.. /..\\$ /;
"y 6
.(G.
j,7 ',
i/ '../\\/\\/\\/\\/\\/\\[
- i. \\/' j.<
j/\\/\\/N.j/\\/\\/\\7\\/
'\\, g 4
"" / g /
'7
's
/s p
.l
/, f. g :./\\ fg t
4
/g // s.
,A s
., ;.),... ti. p}....
'._ e
./
s !
....A
-.-. 4't
. / \\ /,'... / *. / \\,
g t
s D,\\,
~$
/ \\. [
- g"
/
..f. p..,
.,..a
'\\;. j%
. j\\. ;
g,,.
yy
- r
,1 g
- r ;
j 1
,....... ~
\\
/
-.s.-
._i t4. a/,...
.%... 9C t
/..
- m.,,.u i s1..% g}..
\\; \\r/gs/\\ /\\. i,"
t7
' /.
/\\ '-
g
- /g /\\
\\ r\\ /
C /s o x </ \\
s sz
.r s;
r.
w
.e-
. '. r / s s.
.j r,, 'a, sn
/.
t r. i r is is
.....i.+.,
....!i \\. < \\\\,t r
.4
.........e.
/
\\ /
- s. / r:
\\>
? '. i. - c
.. +.
s
.a
.......s....
o
.. p,, g;....>
.y.
r!...,,,,,.,.A. j,.
9...
y
- 4 a'
s.
- '., g 4 l\\/\\
.,, \\ /,. l.
r r c\\.
i f
/% / \\,. es d.
9.4
/ $.
i s
'.._.. f.a
.,j
..~
.'. w.....
eR ft o..' &,.
g.. 0.
.h g g g=
c e
. /s
,/g/.
e.
.,,/gs/
%.,7 m < %
\\
t"
]
\\-
, {/
@,6,
. /.m
...g.
.b E
.g
.7g g ;
s
...,.k t
u.
.j. -.-
a' ts..
.k..
!f.
O.
f
& E 0
ar,..
.. 9..
3 a, (.3(
sh g,
.D"* '.
j
.%='
.,'.....C"
~*
....... b
-c
- - - ~ _ -
f__...
p p.
we i
3 Cn A
,../..
d g..L....
.L........
\\.
..,ef')'
1.,y
.f......
...g....
.. ~...
-e
...1, sO U.-
C/
e 4
S e
h
.4 e
=
Q
.'s..4 e's..
r,.)
2
~
ge.
,7 A
_._ A rs *
- 3 p Qy,,,,
% s h, j _,
9... l.. Nd.
+
'?
e..
... A S,
y
. i.
//...w
.. - ~
s
,l
- .'.A
/_..& _.'
E f.
=a 2.
s S
Q
^
~
.. s g,
p y Q
.m
.\\
\\...e. *.
9.,
..v.
g t
....-..f S.\\
?
crm s*f' W~4 e
t.c y g;.,_,,
c
. y s,
- - = =
SH U
o~ _jl Q
?
y g
.._n_
.d...e> ; c.,, s,.... g. }....s. s.h,.w..~. _ -.'......
9 7'..
LL%
% ',i?.6flG~
. 9,
~
e I.
%. 4,., m.
n.
4
~.r-^
... Q.
@,e _-
s..
- Y N-
.~
.1 g. _....
.. + m.t:m +.,4ea 4ilsw xn.w:..
y._...v.-i n.,.' - n.. :..._, ;..
- ;- -@.W.'d V. t '. =.' '
d9 *;'..;e O.'.i.;..;d.?,ii.%,l5.??..,.f.,&...z 'i..
/.,. q.. r --. w rc...-- ;r rg.-........
, _ t
%.m,._,
- i -
.. g..
,.o
. _, A.LL. t.l'.1, L U...
m.
..,.... _. _. _.... _- %.ar 1 c. st m.,y a.,
..... a c.u._.. _s,
. - (a -
........s.
. e.*
A_
{T
.n..
.r SB a..CATE$1/1Ig3..
.4._ d, 4~.sQ.I g..JP*.%..::..l0 :
\\
..v t
.....w...'.#..'6.-..
..s,...._
..u
.....v
.w...
... H..,...... e,,.,.e.
o
{
8,.
'u1 Q.
.v ggo o;, m pg, q~y,,
.q.._.
gy
/
.oy _q s
f -. _..
Q j
+s Ic t
Il
. I.
.......... 'O
}...
is y-
~
3....
'3,
,,e 3
,a p.c,h _. W '...
_._%u.
t.
jtlllg.s J
/;",T
,,' % g t
,,1
......!./,,d'"(**fj'.s. n ',
g.ns.
k
,y 5* * ;
j s
~
.,t.
Y C
. if
( I,,, '.,.,. gs M.~ Ns.
p
..t i
.-_. Vv. - (. _ _. '..y g.
. Q.
f
. i o
_ p:-
l J
. r.c
,q g.
- g..... 9..
. ~.1
. - Q__ - ---
y
.... n..'N.Nk, __
3 I 'Ns..'N i
s i
1 m._ '%s N..
., # li (. __
ey.
. f._
- .g.. w..... g l.
jI.
It, x!.,
- 'l.
ID 71
,l/.,.
g
, /,
. ;.L el it
,.1
,v
+..
....3
(..
S.g t%
m.
g.._
-ll. Cl
._)
.A, i s#
... ---g
/
v t l' j
Q..
l l
l
%u1 g
s 1
p'.
\\
r^
E5 - Q Q
.\\.
....._. 27s _ f.,,., iQJp, _
..C
.., g_....
/v:._
, s_>.'
p-~
/
j/
. _ _...... a
-,...........g..,
L.
g '
t
\\
L_
~. -.
%>.r'---.
gg/pgh.rw.-
,., t g-g,j-fjy 3
UNLESS OTHERWISE S?ECIFIED j
- g. g,., o e
_L'. 3...._._, __....
UNU 1 4
n
..~-..n..v....m l
C,.
m /z
- " DW3_. N
- .
F E '.' ?. :
_ DESIGN e.w.t r.tv4 *.f.=== &'-Cm.
- ELEY I
.U.%. '.'
e.:..v: n.r:..*. m a.a: m n.'.
j......
,, _.,,. c.: -
~
e-
......... ?
_ _._. _ - _ - - _ - -